Sentiment in Online Car Auctions

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► E-commerce: Ebay, Amazon, Facebook Marketplace, and others

- Data accessibility
- ► How does the online nature of the market affect how it operates?
- ► Adverse selection

- ► Lewis (2011) "Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors"
 - "Institutional features" photos, text, etc. allows sellers to reveal private information
 - Adverse selection effects disappear

- ► Comments, product reviews are also similar institutional features
 - Sentiment

Sentiment in economics:

- ► Angelitos and La'O (2013)
- ▶ Baker and Wurgler (2007)
- ► Yen et al. (2021) and Xu and Hsu (2022)

In this paper...

- ► Auction rather than asset market
- ► Sentiments are expressed directly on the marketplace
- ► Sentiments are accessible to all agents of the market

Question: Does sentiment in the context of an auction affect its final price?

Data

► carsandbids.com

- ► Online car auction website
- English auctions
- ► Model years 1980 and up
- ► Over 10,000 cars sold

Figure 1: carsandbids.com homepage.

cars & bids

Auctions Sell a Car

What's Cars & Bids?

Q Search for cars (ex. BMW, Audi, Ford)

Sian Up

Auctions

Body Style Y Transmission >

Ending soon Newly listed No reserve Lowest mileage Closest to me



2015 Mercedes-Benz F63 S AMG Wagon

577-hp Twin-Turbo V8, AWD, Diamond White Metallic, Mostly Unmodified West Bloomfield MI 48323



1994 Ford Bronco XLT 4x4 NO RESERVE 5.8-Liter V8 Power, 4WD.

Tobago Green Clearcoat, Some Modifications Yorba Linda, CA 92886



2022 Chevrolet Camaro ZL1 Coupe

650-hp Supercharged V8, Magnetic Ride Control, Shadow Grav Metallic



Cars & Bids is the best marketplace for modern enthusiast cars.

More about us



2013 Jeep Wrangler Unlimited Sahara 4v4

6-Speed Manual, V6 Power, 4WD, Some Modifications Stratford CT 06614



2005 Mini Cooper S

NO RESERVE 6-Speed Manual, Chili Red. Extensive Performance Modifications Herriman IIT 84096



2013 Lexus LX 570

~47,800 Miles, 4WD, 1 Owner, Highly Equipped, Florida-Owned Orlando, FL 32809

New Listings



2017 BMW Alpina B7

Twin-Turbo V8 Power, AWD, Highly Optioned, Unmodified Massaging front seats

- . Bowers & Wilkins sound system
- Night vision La Jolla, CA 92037

Figure 2: Basic vehicle information.

cars & bids

Auctions Sell a Car

What's Cars & Rids?

Q Search for cars (ex. BMW, Audi, Ford)

Sian Up



Place Bid

Ending March 22nd at 1:30 PM EDT

Make	Mercedes-Benz	Engine	5.5L Turbocharged V8
Model	E63 AMG ☆	Drivetrain	4WD/AWD
Mileage	84,300	Transmission	Automatic (7-Speed)
VIN	WDDHH7GB1FB119478	Body Style	Wagon
Title Status	Clean (MI)	Exterior Color	Diamond White Metallic
Location	West Bloomfield, MI 48323	Interior Color	Black
Seller	avfolk Contact	Seller Type	Private Party



Doug's Take

We love the Mercedes-Benz E63 AMG Wagon on Cars & Bids - it boasts a powerful V8 engine, it touts a luxurious interior, and it's an amazing combination of performance and practicality. This 577-horsepower, \$212generation E63 AMG Wagon is finished in gorgeous Diamond White Metallic, and it boasts the AMG Exterior Carbon Fiber Package, dynamic LED headlights, a Harman/Kardon sound system, and lots of driver assist features. Plus, this E63 hasn't been significantly modified - and it comes with a clean, accident-free Carfax report, for added peace of mind.

Ending soon



1994 Ford Bronco XLT 4x4 NO RESERVE 5.8-Liter V8 Power,


4WD. Tobago Green Clearcoat. Some Modifications Yorha Linda CA 92886



2022 Chevrolet Camaro ZL1 Coupe

650-hp Supercharged V8. Magnetic Ride Control, Shadow Gray Metallic Irvine, CA 92612

Figure 3: Comments & Bids section.



Data

- ► Total data scraped:
 - ▶ 8,405 auctions
 - Reduced to 6,942 after removing make-models with few observations
 - ► Auctions ending April 26, 2021 to January 6, 2023

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Price	30,815.89	30,121.88	2,950	405,911	6,942
Sentiment score	0.62	0.11	0	1	6,942
Number bids	28.32	13.50	1	139	6,942
Number bidders	12.41	4.57	1	33	6,942
Number comments	41.29	26.25	1	381	6,942
Mileage	76,421.89	56,092.31	5	336,400	6,942
Number highlights	5.21	0.86	3	8	6,942
Number equipment	11.96	4.21	1	35	6,942
Number modifications	5.77	8.62	0	118	6,942
Number known flaws	6.45	3.84	0	28	6,942
Number service history	3.68	3.65	0	40	6,942
Number other items	4.23	2.18	0	24	6,942
Number owner history	1.00	0.07	0	1	6,942
Number videos	2.92	2.13	0	22	6,942
Number views	10,590.55	5,792.04	2,912	96,557	6,942
Number photos	117.98	47.86	37	443	6,942

Methodology: Overview

- 1. Define and create a sentiment score for each auction
- Define a linear model to explain price as a function of the other variables
 - ► Regress ln(Price) on ln(Sentiment score), other covariates, and controls

$$\ln y_t = \beta \times \ln(\text{Sentiment Score}_t) + \lambda x_t + \alpha \gamma_t + \varepsilon_t$$

Methodology: Sentiment Analyzer

- ► Optimally:
 - ▶ Random subset of comments would be used to create training dataset
 - Sentiment analyzer would be trained using this dataset
 - ► Benefit: best performance
 - ▶ Downside: long process, time and resource constraints
- ► Alternative:
 - ► Use preexisting, "off-the-shelf" sentiment analysis model
 - "Twitter-roBERTa"
 - ► Trained on 124M tweets from January 2018 to December 2021

Methodology: Sentiment Score

► Mean:

$$sentimentscore_n = \frac{\sum\limits_{i} sentimentscore_{n,i}}{I_n}$$

Where

- \triangleright sentimentscore_n is the overall sentiment score for an auction n
- ightharpoonup sentiment score for a message i in an auction n
- ightharpoonup I is the total number of messages in an auction n
- ▶ All sentiment scores min-max scaled to [0, 1]

Methodology: Regression Analysis

$$\ln y_t = \beta \times \ln(\text{Sentiment Score}_t) + \lambda x_t + \alpha \gamma_t + \varepsilon_t$$

Where

- \triangleright y_t is the price or ending bid of an auction t
- \triangleright Sentiment score is the sentiment score of auction t
- \triangleright x_t is a vector of other covariates (next slide)
- $ightharpoonup \gamma_t$ is a vector of control variables which contains the year as well as dummy variables for the make, model, and color of vehicle in order to control for the intrinsic value of the vehicle of auction t
- $ightharpoonup arepsilon_t$ represents the idiosyncratic preferences of the highest bidder of an auction t which may affect their bid

Table 2: Variables in vector *x*

Variables	Type	Description	
Number bids	discrete	Number of bids of the auction.	
Number bidders	discrete	Number of bidders in the auction.	
Number comments	discrete	Number of comments in the "Comments & Bids" section.	
Mileage	continuous	Milage of vehicle on auction.	
Private seller	binary	1 if seller of vehicle is a private seller, i.e. not a dealership. 0 otherwise.	
Number highlights	discrete	Number of highlights listed.	
Number equipment	discrete	Number of equipment listed.	
Number modifications	discrete	Number of modifications listed.	
Number known flaws	discrete	Number of known flaws listed.	
Number service history	discrete	Number of service history listed.	
Number other items	discrete	Number of other items listed.	
Number owner history	discrete	Number of owner history listed.	
Number videos	discrete	Number of videos on auction page.	
Title status	binary	1 if vehicle has a clean title. 0 otherwise.	
Number views	discrete	Number of times auction was viewed.	
Number photos	discrete	Number of photos of vehicle.	

Methodology: Specification

$$\ln y_t = \beta \times \ln(\text{Sentiment Score}_t) + \lambda x_t + \alpha \gamma_t + \varepsilon_t$$
 (1) versus

$$y_t = \beta \times (\text{Sentiment Score}_t) + \lambda x_t + \alpha \gamma_t + \varepsilon_t$$
 (2)

- ▶ (2) presumes that covariates have a dollar effect on price
 - ▶ Does not change depending on the price of vehicle

however...

- ► A dollar effect is higher for a lower priced vehicle than higher priced vehicle
- ► Intuitively, this should not necessarily be the case
- (1) with log allows for *percentage* effect on price per 1% change in β

Results

Table 3: OLS Estimation Results

		Milage	-0.000***
	(1)		(0.000)
	ln(Price)		
In(Sentiment score)	0.199***	Number modifications	0.004***
	(0.019)		(0.001)
Reserve	0.170***	Number known flaws	-0.026***
	(0.010)		(0.001)
Number bids	0.007***	Number views	0.000***
	(0.000)		(0.000)
Number bidders	-0.013***	Number photos	0.000***
	(0.001)	_	(0.000)
		R-squared	0.874
Number comments	0.000	Observations	6941
	(0.000)	Robust standard errors in par	rentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Results

- ▶ R-squared: 87% of variation in ln(price) explained by model
 - ▶ Remaining unexplained 13% variation due to idiosyncratic tastes of winning bidder
- ➤ Sentiment score: 1% increase in sentiment score causes 0.199% increase in price
- ▶ Number of bids and bidders: interpretable as bids per bidder
- ► Reserve: higher price for an auction with reserve. Why?

Results: Sentiment Score

- ► Average vehicle price = \$31,000
- ➤ Suppose we have one such vehicle with sentiment score of 0.5. All else constant, the increase in price due to an increase of sentiment score from 0.5 to 1, i.e. a 100% increase is given by:

$$(2^{\beta} - 1) \times 100 = (2^{0.199} - 1) \times 100 = 14.8\%.$$

Remember:

$$\ln y = \beta \times \ln(\text{Sentiment score}) + \lambda x + \alpha \gamma$$

Suppose we increase Sentiment score by 100%, then

Sentiment score, $= 2 \times \text{Sentiment score}$.

Then

$$\ln(y_{new}) = \beta \ln(\text{2Sentiment score}) + \lambda x + \alpha \gamma$$

$$= \beta \ln(\text{Sentiment score}) + \lambda x + \alpha \gamma + \beta \ln(2)$$

$$= \ln(y) + \beta \ln(2)$$

$$\ln(y_{new}) - \ln(y) = \beta \ln(2)$$

$$e^{\ln(y_{new}) - \ln(y)} = e^{\beta \ln(2)}$$

$$\frac{y_{new}}{y} = 2^{\beta}$$

$$100 \times \left(\frac{y_{new} - y}{y}\right) = (2^{\beta} - 1) \times 100$$

Results: Robustness and Sparsity

Potential problem: Loss of estimator efficiency due to high dimensionality

Table 4: Variables in vector γ

Variables	Type	Description
Make-model	nominal	Unique make and model of vehicle (encoded as 264 dummy variables).
Year	discrete	Model year of vehicle.
Interior color	nominal	Interior color of vehicle (encoded as 13 dummy variables).
Exterior color	nominal	Exterior color of vehicle (encoded as 13 dummy variables).

291 control variables, 309 total covariates against \sim 7,000 observations

Robustness and Sparsity: Solution(s)

- Use domain knowledge
 - Relies on accuracy and correctness of researcher
- ► Use lasso-inferential regression method
 - robustly selects controls, uses the data to decide
- 1. Double-selection Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014)
- 2. Partialling-out Belloni et al. (2012)
- 3. Cross-fit partialling-out Chernozhukov et al. (2018)
- All 3 methods will estimate β and λ but will use lassos to select a subset of γ . α is not estimated.

$$\ln y_t = \beta \times \ln(\text{Sentiment score}_t) + \lambda x_t + \alpha \gamma_t + \varepsilon_t$$

Table 5: Lasso Linear Estimation Results: ln(Price)

Tuote 5. Eusso Emedi Estimation results. In(Trice)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Double-Selection	Partialing-Out	Cross-Fit Partialing-Out	
In(Sentiment score)	0.161***	0.137***	0.127***	
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	
Reserve	0.250***	0.275***	0.288***	
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	
Number bids	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Number bidders	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.014***	
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Number comments	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Milage	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	
-	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Number modifications	0.003***	0.002***	0.003***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Number known flaws	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.033***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	

Table 6: Lasso Linear Estimation Results: Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Double-Selection	Partialing-Out	Cross-Fit Partialing-Out
Number views	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Number photos	0.000***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	6941	6941	6941
Number potential controls	289	289	289
Number controls selected	162	162	171

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Conclusion

- ▶ What does sentiment score represent?
 - ► Implications for causality
- ▶ Does positive sentiment cause people to bid more?
 - corr(Sentiment score, Number bids) = -0.084
 - corr(Sentiment score, Number bidders) = -0.080
- ► Can we explain sentiment score?
 - ► R-squared = 0.14

Conclusion: Sentiment vs Useful Information

There is both irrational emotional information, i.e. sentiment, and also useful private information expressed in the comments. c.f.

There are pictures of the car literally underneath a lift so it seems like a very small effort to put the car on the lift to get undercarriage pictures. It is unfathomable to me the seller isn't willing to put in that small of an effort. If the undercarriage is as clean as they claim it is a difference of easily multiple 10's of thousands of dollars would be had.

Combine that with the caginess answering questions and erroneously listing it as a V-Spec originally and this deal smells real bad.

Conclusion: Sentiment vs Useful Information

...versus...

Just checked out your instagram. Great Collection you got going on!

and

Makes sense, Thanks for the response brother!

Conclusion: Extensions

- ► Sentiment analyzer unable to differentiate between pure sentiment and useful information
- ► How could one do so?
 - Aspect based sentiment analyzer for this corpus
 - ► Topic model to categorize comments

Thank You!

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