Race fluidity and Electoral Outcomes in Brazilian Municipal Elections

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Abstract

When determining the causes of racial differences in a setting with ambiguous racial classification, it is unclear whether differences arise from identity *signaling* or *perception*. We argue that municipal elections in Brazil are appropriate to disentangle the two, as candidates self-report their identity (*signaling*), and then voters make their decision based on how they feel about candidates, potentially taking their race into account (*perception*). In this paper, we exploit the fact that, between 2016 and 2020, more than a quarter of candidates in Brazilian municipal elections changed their declared race, to observe the effects of race fluidity on electoral outcomes. We find that, despite the existence of substantial racial differences in the votes received by candidates and a high degree of switching of one's reported race, there is no link between candidates changing their declared race and electoral outcomes, indicating that race perception is more important than signaling in this context. This contrasts sharply with previous results from the labor market which reveal strong gains from switching one's declared race. This result has potential implications for affirmative action policies in a context where identity is ambiguous.

Keywords: Race fluidity, Elections, Brazil

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1 Introduction

Race is often thought as being an immutable characteristic of individuals. This, in part, reflects the origins of the literature on discrimination in the United States, where racial identity was thought of as a fixed trait, with individuals considered as Black using the "one-drop" rule, i.e. if one or more of their ancestors was Black.

However, some evidence has emerged to show that identity, and race in particular, can be fluid. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) famously stated that "choice of identity may be the most important economic decision people make". To cite a few examples, Dahis et al. (2019) found that as much as 1.4% of all Black men in the U.S. were classified as White between 1880 and 1940; Cassan (2015) found that a large fraction of the population manipulated their caste identity following a policy change in India; Antman and Duncan (2015) found that after removing affirmative action policies, multiracial individuals are 30 percent less likely to identify as the minority race in their multiracial background; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2013) found that introducing a quota for Black students in the University of Brasilia raised the percentage of students identifying as Black. One region where racial fluidity has been particularly investigated is Latin America, with a long historical tradition of inter-racial marriages and classification changes (Telles, 2002; De Micheli, 2021).

Whether race is a fixed characteristic or a more fluid variable that individuals can influence or control, the fact remains that sharp racial discrepancies exist across a broad variety of domains. To cite just a few examples, racial minorities are often less represented in legislatures,[1] have been found to have lower wages (Wright, 1978; McNabb and Psacharopoulos, 1981), to have lower access to education (Bleemer, 2022) and to be disproportionately affected by several diseases such as breast cancer (Yedjou et al., 2019) or COVID-19 (Khanijahani et al., 2021). The question therefore is: if it is (at least partly) possible to influence other people's perception of one's own racial identity, and if there

[1]Only 3 U.S. senators were African American in 2020, less than 10% of MPs in the UK were from minority ethnic members, Janusz (2018) found a strong correlation between race and electoral outcomes

are large potential gains to identifying as the majority group, why do we not observe more people change their identity to the majority group?

One potential explanation for why substantial group differences persist, in a context of potential fluid identities, is that it is not how race is *signalled* which matters, but how it is *perceived*. In other words, it may be difficult to "pass" as the majority group. For instance, Telles (2014a) find that in a number of Latin American contexts, socioeconomic status is not strongly correlated with individuals' racial self-identification, but very correlated with how their race, and in particular their skin color, are perceived by others.

It is difficult, however, to investigate the differential effects of perceived identity vs intended identity signaling because in existing data, it is often unclear who classifies the race of the individual. For instance, Cornwell et al. (2017) found that in the Brazilian labor market, a race change to White was associated with a substantial wage increase, and a substantial wage decrease was observed for workers whose race changed to Non-White. However, it is unclear in the labor market if the race change is a result of workers being able to manipulate their identity, or employers having a different perception of the identity of workers.

In this paper, we investigate the effects of race changes in the context of Brazilian politics, which is particularly prone to race changes (Janusz, 2021). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to look at the effects of changes in candidate social identity switching (and switching racial identification in particular) on electoral outcomes. In particular, we investigate the effects of race changes during the municipal elections of 2016 and 2020. In our sample, more than a quarter (27%) of candidates changed their declared race between the two elections. We argue that the number of candidates changing race is unlikely to stem from measurement error, as other observables, such as gender, age or education have much lower levels of changes between the elections.

The setting of Brazilian municipal elections is particularly relevant for studying the question of identity signaling vs perceived for several reasons. First, we can observe the universe of all candidates in Brazil. Previous work, such as Cornwell et al. (2017), could

only investigate the consequences of race-switching on a limited data set. In the case of elections in Brazil, all candidates are mandated to fill a registration form, on which, in particular, their race is reported. Second, as previously mentioned, we observe a very large sample of race-switchers, giving us statistical power. Third, and most importantly, it is clear in this setting that the race variable we observe is a measure of racial identification, not perception of the race of the candidate, as it is candidates who fill the forms, not voters. Finally, all the candidate information is made publicly available prior to the elections, so if the declared race of candidates matters, voters could easily access the information.

Our results are twofold. First, we find that substantial racial differences exist in votes received by candidates, even after controlling for observables. We find that candidates declared as White earn approximately 1pp vote shares, which is very substantial in a context where the average candidate earns approximately 2% of the votes. This result is in line with previous findings from the literature (Janusz, 2021).

Second, we find that race switching is not associated with electoral outcomes. In particular, we do not find that switching from Non-White to White is associated with a significant increase in votes. This stands in contrast to the positive effects of race switching to White in the labor market found by Cornwell et al. (2017) for wages. We also do not find that there is a negative effect on votes of switching from White to Non-White. Importantly, the effects are not driven by our categorization, as the results are robust to several changes in the classifications or which races are considered.

The consequences of race changes are therefore very different between the labor market (Cornwell et al., 2017) and elections. This result sheds light on the potential mechanisms through which race affects decisions. In particular, it appears that in the election context, how candidates are perceived matters more than race a candidate signals.

The results have potential consequences for public policy in the context of affirmative action. Indeed, if voters do not care about the reported race of political candidates, there could be an incentive for candidates to switch race, without reflecting their true identity, if there are incentives to do so. In particular, in Brazil, affirmative action policies exist in

education and in public jobs.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The data is described in Section 2. Our empirical strategy is presented in Section 3, and the results in Section 4. Last, in Section 5 we discuss our findings and conclude.

2 Data

For this paper, we use data from Brazilian municipal elections for 2016 and 2020.

2.1 Election system

Municipal elections occur every four years in Brazil. In these elections, voters chose Mayors, Vice-Mayors and City councillors. The elections occur in November of the election year. In 2016, the election took place on October 2nd. In 2020, it took place on November 15th.

For Mayors, the election system differs depending on city size. If the city has fewer than 200,000 eligible voters, a first-past-the-post system is used: the candidate with the most votes wins. If the city has more than 200,000 voters, a two-round system is used: if no candidate wins more than 50% of the vote in the first round, then the top candidates move to a second round.

For City Councils, the system is one of proportional representation by open list: voters may vote for individuals within a party list, which rearranges the order of names on the party's list. The seats are allocated by a proportional rule by the number of votes received by the lists.

2.2 Candidate information

Parties and coalitions need to register information about candidates (*Requerimento de Registro de Candidatura*) at the latest 30 days prior to the election to the central election

authority (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*, TSE). This registry includes birth date, gender, education level, contact information and, importantly for the purposes of this paper, their declared race. Candidates also provide their unique national identification number, which enables us to track candidates across elections.

The information is made public on the website *Divulgaçaõ de Candidaturas e Contas Eleitorais*. The information on the website is first made available about 1,5 months before the election date, and is regularly updated with information about candidates as they are being transmitted to the TSE. For the 2016 election, the first publication was made on August 23rd. For the 2020 election, the first publication was on September 26th.

2.3 Coding of the variables of interest

We use data from the 2016 and 2020 municipal elections. Approximately 500,000 candidates run in each election, with approximately 150,000 running in both elections.

Outcomes The main outcome of interest is the percentage of votes a candidate earns, called *percent 16* and *percent 20*. The number of coalitions being very high in Brazilian elections (Aguilar et al., 2015), the average vote share for candidates is low, with a median vo of about 1.4%. We also use dummy variables for whether the candidate won the election (*won 16* and *won 20*).

Race and race history The main research question of this paper is to investigate the link between changes in declared race and electoral outcomes. In both 2016 and 2020, candidates had to declare their race when filing their applications.[2] For our analysis, we mainly focus on three racial categories: White (*branco*), Mixed (*pardo*) and Black (*preto*). The other groups (Asians - *amarelo* - and Indigenous - *Indigena*) together represent less than 1% of the sample of any election (see Table 3).

[2] In 2020, candidates had the option not to answer the race question. Approximately 1% of the candidates did so.

Following Telles (2014b), in our primary analysis, we pool the Black and Brown categories into a *Non-White* category. We therefore use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate declares herself as White, and 0 if she declares as Non-white (Brown or Black). We therefore four dummy variables to define candidates' race history: 00 (Non-White in 2016, Non-White in 2020), 01 (Non-white, White), 10 (White, Non-White) and 11 (White, White). In Appendix we also investigate the effects of race change pooling the White and Brown categories into a *Non-Brown* category, and in Appendix C, we also investigate the effects of any race change.

Controls In all specifications, we control for age, gender, education level, city size (the number of eligible voters in the municipality), nationality, incumbency and state fixed effects.

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.

3 Empirical Strategy

The main research question of this paper is to investigate the link between declared race and electoral outcomes. To answer this question, we estimate the premia in vote percentages for the different race histories. To be specific, we estimate the following equations, where $vote_y$ corresponds to the percentage of all votes in the election in which the candidate is running in year y, w_{ij} are dummy variables for whether the declared race history of the candidate is ij (see Section 2 for the definition of race histories), and X are the set of controls (age, level of education, gender, the number of eligible voters in the city, incumbency, nationality and state fixed effects). State-fixed effects are included.

$$vote_{2016} = \alpha_{11}w_{11} + \alpha_{10}w_{10} + \alpha_{01}w_{01} + \alpha' X + state + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

$$vote_{2020} = \beta_{11}w_{11} + \beta_{10}w_{10} + \beta_{01}w_{01} + \beta' X + state + \nu \quad (2)$$

Table 1: Descriptive characteristics of candidates, Brazilian municipal elections

			Race history			
	All candidates	Ran twice	11	10	01	00
Race History						
11	NA	40.04%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	NA	10.29%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
01	NA	8.56%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
00	NA	38.87%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Declared race is White						
2016	51.75%	51.30%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
2020	48.72%	49.64%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
Male						
2016	68.20%	77.85%	76.56%	78.47%	78.13%	78.95%
2020	66.08%	77.82%	76.54%	78.44%	78.13%	78.90%
Age						
2016	44.92	45.09	46.14	44.60	45.31	44.12
2020	45.73	49.09	50.16	48.59	49.30	48.12
Educational level						
2016	5.55	5.62	5.84	5.54	5.54	5.43
2020	5.72	5.74	5.96	5.65	5.65	5.56
Incumbent						
2016	10.13%	17.82%	19.24%	18.29%	17.94%	16.23%
2020	4.42%	14.40%	16.05%	14.42%	14.04%	12.74%
Number of observations						
2016	448 800	149 948	60 042	15 433	12 830	58 288
2020	510 457	149 948	60 042	15 433	12 830	58 288

Note: Race history is composed of two dummy variables. The first is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate declared their race as White (*branco*) in 2016, and 0 if the candidate declared their race as Mixed (*pardo*) or Black (*preto*). The second dummy is the same for 2020.

As presented in Equations 1 and 2, α_{ij} and β_{ij} represent the vote premium associated with race history ij relative to the reference group - Non-White/Non-White - in the 2016 and 2020 elections, respectively. A positive α_{ij} or β_{ij} indicates that, on average, candidates with race histories ij have a higher vote percentage than candidates with a race history 00 (Non-White/Non-White), in the respective election.

After measuring the premia for every race history in each election, we investigate whether a change in self-declared race (Non-White to White or White to Non-White) is associated with a change in votes for candidates running in both elections. We do this by testing whether the premium in vote share for a given race history changes over time, by estimating the following equation.

$$difference = \gamma_{11}w_{11} + \gamma_{10}w_{10} + \gamma_{01}w_{01} + \gamma' X + state + \mu \tag{3}$$

In equation 3, a positive γ means that the premium for the race history has increased between the two elections. In particular, if the coefficient γ_{10} is negative, it means that there is a negative association between changing a candidate's race to Non-White and votes (as was found for wages in Cornwell et al. (2017)).

4 Results

4.1 Race gap in elections

As previously found in the literature (Janusz, 2018), we find that candidates who declare themselves as White have a substantially higher vote share, on average, than Non-White candidates (Table 2). On average, White candidates have about 1pp more votes, which is very large, considering that the average vote share in Brazilian municipal elections is approximately 2%. The result holds for both elections, and is even stronger among candidates who ran in both elections (Columns 2 and 4).

Table 2: Cross-sectional race gap in votes

	Election 2016		Election 2020	
	All candidates	Ran twice	All candidates	Ran twice
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White 2016	0.952***	1.522***		
	(0.023)	(0.048)		
White 2020			0.871***	1.472***
			(0.021)	(0.052)
Observations	445,374	148,765	500,783	147,342
R^2	0.075	0.059	0.061	0.060
Mean vote percentage	2.241	3.513	1.983	3.604

*Note:*The dependent variable is the percentage of votes in municipal elections. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the vote percentage in 2016, in columns 3 and 4, the vote percentage for 2020. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include age, level of education, gender, the number of eligible voters, incumbency, nationality and state-fixed effects.

Furthermore, we see that there is a strong premium for all race histories, relative to Non-White/Non-White, in both elections (Table 5, Columns 1 and 2). We also see that in both elections, the premium for the race history White/White is larger than for the race histories White/Non-White and Non-White/White. These results are very similar to patterns found in the link between race and wages in the labor market, where Cornwell et al. (2017) found that candidates who do not have the race history Non-White/Non-White have between 1.5 and 7% higher wages than Non-White/Non-White workers.

4.2 Race-switching in Brazilian municipal elections

Candidates' declared race is very fluid in Brazil. Between municipal elections in 2016 and 2020, we observe that approximately 27% of all candidates running in both elections declared a different race in 2020 from their declared race in 2016 (Table 3). This figure is in line with previous findings (Janusz (2021) found 25% of candidates changed their declared race between 2014 and 2016).

Table 3: Declared race in Brazilian municipal elections

	Race in 2020						
	White *Branco*	Mixed *Pardo*	Black *Preto*	Asian *Amarelo*	Indigenous *Indígena*	Not declared	N
Race in 2016							
White	78.68%	19.22%	1.00%	0.28%	0.03%	0.79%	76 316
Mixed	20.67%	68.56%	8.84%	0.32%	0.18%	1.44%	59 548
Black	4.05%	31.48%	63.07%	0.07%	0.12%	1.21%	12 904
Asian	36.86%	44.20%	2.79%	14.24%	0.15%	1.76%	681
Indigenous	3.21%	28.06%	4.61%	0.00%	63.13%	1.00%	499
N	73 139	59 996	14 208	512	462	1 631	149 948

Importantly, the data indicates that the change in declared race is unlikely to stem from measurement error. In Table 4, we display changes in observables for candidates. Less than one percent of candidates declared a different nationality or gender between the two elections. Only two percent of candidates did not declare the exact same birth date (most of the observed errors were typos, such as "10" becoming "01") or birth state. The characteristic on which we observe the most variation is education, where approximately 10% declared a lower education level,[3] but even this figure is significantly smaller than the share of candidates who changed their declared race.

Table 4: Changes in observables between the 2016 and 2020 municipal elections

Variable	**Mean**	**(Std. Dev.)**	**N**
Different gender	0.001	0.034	149 948
Different nationality	0.007	0.082	149 948
Different birth date	0.022	0.145	149 944
Different birth state	0.026	0.160	149 944
Lower education level	0.109	0.311	149 948
Different race	**0.270**	0.444	149 948

[3]We did not take into account candidates declaring a higher education level, because it is unclear whether this would be classified as declaration error or simply an indication that candidates did increase their education level.

Moreover, there seems to be a limited selection into race switching on observables. First, the differences in observables is not large for any observable (Table A.1). Second, little correlations exist between race histories and observables (Table A.2).

4.3 Race-switching and electoral outcomes

In Column 3 of Table 5 are presented the results from the estimation of Equation 3. Coefficients correspond to the variation of the vote premium for each race history, between the elections of 2016 and 2020. We see that the coefficient for White/White is significantly positive, meaning that relative to 2016 and relative to Non-White/Non-White candidates, the electoral advantage of candidates who reported their race as White increased between the two elections.

However, we do not find a significant reduction in the vote premium for candidates with a race history White/Non-White, nor do we see an increase in the vote premium for candidates with a race history Non-White/White. This indicates that the fact of switching race to or from White does not have an effect *per se* on electoral outcomes. This result is in contradiction to CRS, who found in the labor market that there is a strong positive link between switching to White and wages, and a similar negative link from switching to Non-White.

A number of robustness checks confirm the fact that race switching has no effect on electoral outcomes. First, we find that pooling the White and Brown categories into a *Non-Black* category does not change the results: the premium for candidates with the race history Non-Black/Non-Black increases between the two elections, and there is no link between race switching to or from the Black category and electoral outcomes (Table B.1). Second, we find that switching race from and to any racial category is not associated with votes (Table C.1). Third, we do not find significant heterogeneity of the effects of race switching, when splitting the sample based on gender, age, the share of white candidates or incumbency (Table D.1).

Table 5: Link between race history and votes

	Vote percent 2016 (1)	Vote percent 2020 (2)	Difference (3)
11: White/White	1.941***	2.033***	0.133***
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.032)
10: White/Non-white	0.784***	0.801***	0.039
	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.043)
01: Non-white/White	0.509***	0.525***	0.028
	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.047)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	149,945	149,947	149,945
R^2	0.061	0.062	0.011
Variable mean	3.513	3.604	0.091

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in the 2016 municipal election. In column 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in the 2020 municipal election. In column 3, the dependent variable is the difference between the two percentages of votes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include age, level of education, gender, the number of eligible voters, incumbency, nationality and state-fixed effects.

5 Conclusion

Distinguishing whether racial differences in economic or political outcomes are primarily driven by race *perception* or race *signaling* is difficult because it is not always clear who makes the decision of defining race. In the context of Brazilian elections, it is relatively clear that politicians *signal* their race, and the voters (do not) react to this information.

We find that, while there exist substantial racial differences in votes received by candidates, race changes are not associated with any effect on votes. This result would therefore say that racial differences do not come primarily from how race is signaled by politicians, but from how race is perceived by citizens.

We see three potential avenues for future work on the topic. First, while the information about identity is made publicly available prior to the election, it is unclear whether voters actually receive the information. The lack of effect of race changes could there-

fore be a consequence of voters not being aware that candidates might have changed their race. Second, future work should focus on understanding, from a voters' perspective, whether they value (positively or negatively) candidates changing their identity (Carlson and Dolan, 1985). Lastly, if there is no electoral consequences of racial change, it is likely that the candidates are not strategically changing their declared race for electoral purposes. Future work should focus on understanding the reasons behind politicians' changes in identity.

This paper has policy implications, in particular with respect to affirmative action. If voters do not really care about the declared race of candidates, then there would not be strong incentives for candidates to report truthfully their identity. In the case of an affirmative action policy which aim would be to increase representation of marginalized groups, the results from the paper could indicate that candidates could benefit from the ambiguity and pass as minorities, even though they are not.

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Appendices

A Race histories and observables

Table A.1: Characteristics of race switchers vs non-switchers

	Switched race			
	No		Yes	
	(1)		(2)	
Age	49.23	(10.39)	48.71	(10.19)
Education	5.80	(1.79)	5.60	(1.77)
Gender: Male	0.777	(0.416)	0.782	(0.413)
Incumbent	0.147	(0.354)	0.135	(0.342)
Voters	103,373	(495,888)	98,240	(434,934)
N	109,417		40,531	

Note: Observable characteristics of candidates in Brazilian municipal elections. A candidate is considered a race switcher if her declared race in 2020 is different from that of 2016.

Table A.2: Race histories explained

	11: Always White (1)	10: From White (2)	01: To White (3)
Gender 2016	−0.053	−0.037	−0.155
	(0.099)	(0.131)	(0.141)
Gender 2020	−0.002	0.048	0.158
	(0.099)	(0.130)	(0.140)
Age 2016	0.007**	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age 2020	0.005	−0.005	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Incumbent 2016	0.043***	0.029**	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Incumbent 2020	0.119***	−0.003	−0.015
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Brazilian 2016	0.084	0.030	−0.074
	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Brazilian 2020	0.077	−0.072	−0.018
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.068)
City size 2016	−0.000	0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
City size 2020	0.000	−0.00000	−0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education = 3	0.218***	−0.068**	−0.064**
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Education = 4	0.284***	−0.045	−0.053
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Education = 5	0.234***	−0.087**	−0.022
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Education = 6	0.307***	−0.058*	−0.055*
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Education = 7	0.519***	−0.150***	−0.114***
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Education = 8	0.648***	−0.148***	−0.124***
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Constant	−1.103***	−1.066***	−1.303***
	(0.080)	(0.106)	(0.109)
Observations	149,944	149,944	149,944
Pseudo-R^2	0.020	0.001	0.001

Note: The dependent variables are race histories. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

B Race switching pooling White and Brown categories

Table B.1: Link between race history and votes combining White and Brown categories into a Non-Black category

	Vote percent 2016 (1)	Vote percent 2020 (2)	Difference (3)
00: Non-Black/Non-Black	1.659***	1.703***	0.114**
	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.055)
10: Black/Non-Black	0.070	0.108	0.040
	(0.148)	(0.162)	(0.087)
01: Non-Black / Black	0.081	0.084	0.054
	(0.138)	(0.150)	(0.081)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	149,945	149,947	149,945
R^2	0.057	0.058	0.011
Variable mean	3.513	3.604	0.091

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in the 2016 municipal election. In column 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in the 2020 municipal election. In column 3, the dependent variable is the difference between the two percentages of votes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include age, level of education, gender, the number of eligible voters, incumbency, nationality and state-fixed effects.

C Any Race switch

Table C.1: Link between race history and votes for any race switch

	Vote percent 2016 (1)	Vote percent 2020 (2)	Difference (3)
White/White	2.493***	2.587***	0.178***
	(0.098)	(0.107)	(0.058)
Mixed/Mixed	0.866***	0.873***	0.064
	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.059)
Other/Other	1.095***	0.553	−0.445*
	(0.403)	(0.438)	(0.237)
Any switch	0.926***	0.942***	0.071
	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.058)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	149,945	149,947	149,945
R^2	0.061	0.062	0.011
Variable mean	3.513	3.604	0.091

Note: In column 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in the 2016 municipal election. In column 2, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in the 2020 municipal election. In column 3, the dependent variable is the difference between the two percentages of votes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include age, level of education, gender, the number of eligible voters, incumbency, nationality and state-fixed effects. The reference group is candidates with a race history Black/Black.

D Alternative samples

Table D.1: Reduced-form relationship between race history and vote share: Alternative samples

	Baseline	Only men	Only women	Age $\geq$ median	Age $\leq$ median	Share white $\geq$ median	Share white $\leq$ median	Incumbents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
11: White/White	0.133***	0.179***	−0.011	−0.031	0.293***	0.145***	0.079*	0.100***
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.033)
10: White/Non-white	0.039	0.064	−0.038	−0.037	0.104*	0.053	0.027	0.015
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.045)
01: Non-white/White	0.028	0.032	0.026	−0.00003	0.035	−0.086	0.088*	0.046
	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.052)	(0.048)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	149,945	116,732	33,213	74,979	74,977	75,316	75,156	123,231
R^2	0.011	0.012	0.007	0.004	0.012	0.013	0.009	0.009

Note: For all columns, the dependent variable is the difference between the vote percentages in the 2020 and 2016 municipal election. The columns differ in the sample used. In column 1, the complete pool of candidates is used. Only men are included in column 2, only women in column 3. Only candidates above (resp. below) the median age – approximately 45 years old – are included in column 4 (resp. 5). Only candidates in cities with a high (resp. low) share of white candidates are included in column 6 (resp. 7). Only candidates who were incumbents in 2016 were included in column 8. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include age, level of education, gender, the number of eligible voters, incumbency, nationality and state fixed effects.