

# Intro to DER

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# DER vs DG

- ▶  $DG = \text{Distributed Generation}$
- ▶  $DER = DG + \text{Storage}$

May seem like semantics but small storage grew in potential since 2005

# What is in DER

- ▶ Definitions vary but Small ( $< 49\text{MW}$ ) generation seems to count with  $< 1\text{MW}$  most common.
  - ▶ Plenty of renewable
  - ▶ Small turbine
  - ▶ Backup generators
  - ▶ Battery banks.
- ▶ Combined Heat and Power
  - ▶ Steam Generation
  - ▶ Chill Water
  - ▶ District Energy

# Why Would I (Private) Build It?

- ▶ Power Quality
  - ▶ Equipment is sensitive to voltage drops or spikes
  - ▶ Equipment is sensitive to frequency variation.
  - ▶ Wave shape and harmonics
  - ▶ High reactive power needs (Often avoids utility charge.)
- ▶ Reliability (Often combined with quality)
  - ▶ High cost of interrupted power, e.g., hospital
  - ▶ Two common measures
    - ▶ System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), average total time without power over a year.
    - ▶ Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), average time without given your power is out.
    - ▶ Many more relating to frequency and cost of lost service.
  - ▶ You could have lower rates if you have an interruptible tariff.

# Why Would I (Private) Build It? (Cont)

- ▶ Peak reduction
  - ▶ If you have demand (kW) charges, your maximum use.
  - ▶ If you have a coincident peak (kW) charge, you use at system peak.
- ▶ Cogeneration Opportunity
  - ▶ Already need Steam or Chill water
  - ▶ Electricity generation is a bonus
- ▶ Reduction in volumetric (kWh) charges
  - ▶ Net metering just a bit to shave off the high block charges
  - ▶ Peak Pricing Tariff
  - ▶ Real-time Prices.
  - ▶ Nice subsidy.
  - ▶ Actually, social cost, cheaper.
- ▶ The utility side is significantly more complicated.

# Why The Controvoursy

- ▶ Limited markets for local reactive power.
- ▶ Limited markets for local reliability.

# Three simple ways of thinking about costs

- ▶ The Make vs Buy trade-off (TC).
- ▶ The Minimum Efficient Scale (AC), i.e., volume such that AC is at a minimum.
- ▶ Investment Delay, a time value of money concept.

With all cost estimates the key conceptual problem is to only look at incremental costs.

- ▶ It is often unclear what those incremental costs are relative to.
- ▶ Cost does depend on your point of view.

# Example Make vs Buy

- ▶ Assume cost functions of  $C = F + \alpha q$  form.
  - ▶ Fixed cost
  - ▶ Constant average variable cost
- ▶ Make vs Buy: Given known  $q$ , Choose the least cost technology



# Example MES

- ▶ Several definitions of MES
  - ▶ Quantity such that  $MC = AC$ .
  - ▶ Quantity such that AC decreases very little as quantity increases.

# Example Investment Delay

- ▶ Pushing costs into the future can be valuable.
- ▶ Value of delay increases as interest rates increase.
- ▶ Exponential discounting  $P = \frac{F}{(1+i)^N}$ .
- ▶ Example: Maintenance expenditures of \$100 a year forever.  
What is the value of skipping a year?

- ▶  $PW(Maintenance) = \frac{100}{i}$  At  $i = 10\%$  this is 1000.
- ▶ Delay for 1 year is  $\frac{100}{1+i}$ . This is 909.09.
- ▶ The difference is the savings.

# Report Example




Figure 1:

# How Did We Get to the Current G-T-D Arrangement (MES Argument)

- ▶ Both large scale and small scale originally existed.
- ▶ Large scale developed
  - ▶ Lower AC
  - ▶ Higher MES
  - ▶ Speed of change up till 60s made this the dominant form.
- ▶ Small scale continued to develop
  - ▶ Right sized scale and MES
  - ▶ Decreasing AC
  - ▶ 1978 Qualifying Facilities Era was when they could sell power under some conditions.

# Private Choice of Technology (Make vs Buy Argument)

- ▶ Have access to utility power and DG.
- ▶ Several States of Opportunity Costs
  - ▶ If you have no special needs and need to pay full cost of fuel.
  - ▶ If you have 'Free' access to fuel, e.g., wood chips, AC of DG is lower.
  - ▶ If power quality or interruption is not what is desired, AC of utility power is higher.
  - ▶ If you face a Peak, Time of Use or Demand Charge.
  - ▶ More complicated diagrams can be made but this works.

# Utility Point of View

Please note that lots of power quality issues need to be solved on the D side, with capacitors and transformers. Power quality may actually get worse with new equipment and DG.

- ▶ Utility: Supply customer needs with T+G or with DG.  
Trade-offs between the two in an isoquant/isocost sense.
- ▶ Customer: Decide to take utility solution or provide with private DG. (Make vs Buy).

## Odd Diagrams and Points in the Report

Fig 3-4




Figure 2:



# What is Wrong?

- ▶ Need two diagrams, one for constrained DG and one for wholesale electricity market
- ▶ Confuses Reduced usage is Value to Participants with utility cost reductions and reduction in DWL.

## Fig 3-7

- ▶ Gives perfect competition result for a competitive public utility.
- ▶ Somehow, it can be rate of return regulated.
- ▶ Analysis should be that of a price ceiling with a reduction in demand and a reduction in the ceiling.

# What is going on NOW

By NOW I mean in the last month/week. Comments are rough because it is all very new.

- ▶ Proposed rule for virtual power plants, though not by that name, as well as new definitions so DER can participate at the wholesale level. (Nov 17, 2016)
  - ▶ <https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2016/111716/E-1.pdf>
  - ▶ CAISO has had them for a few years <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Non-GeneratorResourceRegulationEnergyManagementImplementation.pdf>
- ▶ New York is on the topic too. (Oct 27th, 2016)  
<http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={59B620E6-87C4-4C80-8BEC-E15BB6E0545E}>

# The FERC NOPR is *very* political

- ▶ Appears timed to be in place before the FERC board turnover in January.
- ▶ There is a procedure for rule making that involves months of notice and hearings.
- ▶ Undoing requires doing this again.

# The FERC Proposal

- ▶ Elimination of Barriers to Electric Storage Resource Participation in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets.
- ▶ Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator in the Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

# The Barriers

Please note that many market definitions vary by ISO/RTO. FERC gives directions.

- ▶ Rules are set up to accommodate existing technology:
  - ▶ How long they can provide service
  - ▶ How they provide service
  - ▶ Often restricted to regulation service
- ▶ Examples
  - ▶ ISO-NE requires registered Generator Assets to participate in all wholesale markets
  - ▶ Common vision of storage is pumped storage with under an hour use.
- ▶ Some RTO/ISOs are better
  - ▶ PJM Energy Storage Resource Model
  - ▶ CAISO Energy Storage Resource model
- ▶ But all are found wanting by their *own* assessment.

# Connection to Demand Response

Demand response is typically:

- ▶ Things done on the consumer side of the meter
- ▶ Remote turn of of equipment
- ▶ Agreements to turn off with notice
- ▶ Getting paid for not consuming electricity

The reason is that demand response is considered a residual definition, if not generation then demand response.

# Virtual Power Plants, aka, Aggregators

- ▶ Typically there is a minimum size to participate in the wholesale markets. Minimum size is defined by the unit.
- ▶ Aggregation allows you to combine many small units and operate them as one large unit.
- ▶ Common practice
  - ▶ Banks are savings aggregator
  - ▶ Corporations are investment aggregators to accommodate small investments.



# The FERC Proposal

- ▶ Electric storage resources must be eligible to provide all capacity, energy and ancillary services that they are technically capable of providing in the organized wholesale electric markets;
- ▶ The bidding parameters incorporated in the participation model must reflect and account for the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources;
- ▶ Electric storage resources can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing price as both a wholesale seller and a wholesale buyer consistent with existing rules that govern when a resource can set the wholesale price;
- ▶ The minimum size requirement for electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets must not exceed 100 kW; and
- ▶ The sale of energy from the organized wholesale electric markets to an electric storage resource that the resource then resells back to those markets must be at the wholesale LMP.

# Commentary Bidding Parameters

- ▶ Not just about storage. This is aiming for technology neutrality.
- ▶ Bidding parameters could include things like state of charge
  - ▶ Like CAISO and NYISO.
  - ▶ MISO is more detailed requiring hourly max levels, storage rates,etc.
- ▶ Proposal is: “RTOs/ISOs establish state of charge, upper charge limit, lower charge limit, maximum energy charge rate, and maximum energy discharge rate”

## Commentary (Con't)

- ▶ Balance between the additional costs and complexity to the ISO/RTOs and the benefits of technological development
  - ▶ Makes it harder to manage the grid.
    - ▶ NG that has connection to pipeline and backup diesel is easier to optimize than battery with limited storage.
    - ▶ It literally increases the mathematical difficulty and will require new models. Basically, convert to pumped storage model.
  - ▶ May produce “Gresham’s law” power with increased market monitoring costs.
  - ▶ New technology does not get developed unless there is a way for it to make money.
- ▶ Spinning Reserves requires spinning, but batteries don’t spin.

# Commentary, Buyer and Seller

- ▶ Some existing limitations
  - ▶ MISO in real-time market but as demand response
  - ▶ NYISO as negative prices on generation side with other restrictions.
- ▶ This is a proposal to submit bids as both a buyer and a seller in the same period.
  - ▶ Makes sense since this is a special feature of storage but;
  - ▶ ENRON did some manipulation of congestion pricing with this. They did it through wheeling but there may be a dynamic analog.

## Commentary on size

- ▶ Smaller than *most* ISO/RTO, CAISO is low with 10kW
- ▶ 100kW puts high-end Teslas on the list.
- ▶ 100kWh Powerpack, at \$145K, with \$52K inverter buys in.
- ▶ Most DER is under this but with the aggregation rules, may not be an issue.

# No Arbitrage Rule or is it?

- ▶ Avoids people buying at wholesale and then net metering.
  - ▶ I bet there is a way around this!
  - ▶ But they used the distribution network to get the power.
- ▶ Need new rules for a firewall between the retail and wholesale markets.
  - ▶ Can I buy wholesale ( $G+T$ ) to avoid retail ( $G+T+D$ )?

This will be where the next round of trouble will be. How will the load serving entity, i.e., the utility survive?

# Aggregation, Virtual Power Plants

- ▶ Idea
  - ▶ Get a bunch of small DER together.
  - ▶ Contract to control market interactions subject to limitations.
  - ▶ Pay them for their power/storage
  - ▶ Take a slice.
- ▶ CAISO idea as far as I can tell but others have done it.
  - ▶ Was usually just demand response, i.e., getting paid for not using power.
  - ▶ NYISO puts limitations on the size of the individual units, less than 10kW.
- ▶ Would allow more behind the meter storage, think PV to participate, but currently many limitations on them injecting power.

## Why this is really interesting.

- ▶ LMP don't often provide the right incentives for new generation.
  - ▶ Prices are high now but
  - ▶ Once you enter, prices would be low.
- ▶ This allow you to build a power plant for an area a bit at a time.
- ▶ May offset some smart grid costs, the generator pays rather than the Load Serving Entity.
- ▶ Connects with making the nodes as broad as possible to increase competition.