

DISS. ETH NO. ....

**MOBILIZING MEMORIES:  
THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF WARTIME  
VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS**

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*Generales*

*traidores:*

*mirad mi casa muerta,*

*mirad España rota:*

*pero de cada casa muerta sale metal ardiendo  
en vez de flores,*

*pero de cada hueco de España*

*sale España,*

*pero de cada niño muerto sale un fusil con ojos,*

*pero de cada crimen nacen balas*

*que os hallarán un día el sitio*

*del corazón.*

— Pablo Neruda, *España en el corazón*, 1937.

*¿Te preguntas, viajero, por qué hemos muerto jóvenes,  
y por qué hemos matado tan estúpidamente?*

*Nuestros padres mintieron: eso es todo.*

— Jon Juaristi, *Suma de varia intención*, 1987.



## **Abstract**

This dissertation examines the long-term consequences of wartime violence against civilians on political preferences. Previous research suggests that violence either produces a counter-mobilization against the perpetrator or demobilizes the targeted population. However, it is unclear under which conditions each of these two effects prevails. In this dissertation I bridge these two arguments and argue that the social context surrounding the victims determines the consequences of violence. In particular, the effect of violence depends on the ideological context, defined as the presence of ideologically-aligned social networks at the local level.

The first empirical part tests this argument in the case of Spain, building a novel dataset using archival data, historical secondary sources, and already existing datasets. I analyze the effect of Francoist violence against civilians during the civil war on electoral support for the Left after democracy was restored four decades later. I show that wartime victimization is linked to an increase in leftist vote share, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine, left-leaning political networks were active after the conflict. In areas where these networks were not present, violence did not have any meaningful consequences.

The second empirical part tests the theoretical argument in a very different case, Guatemala. I again build a local-level dataset using several data sources and analyze the effects of state-led violence against civilians during the civil war on post-war voting patterns, particularly for the leftist party linked to the former rebels that fought against the right-wing government. I find that state-led violence increases electoral support for the former rebels in those municipalities which had been exposed to leftist political mobilization before the war. In municipalities without such exposure, state-led violence against civilians does not have any significant effect.

These analyses offer robust evidence supporting the theoretical argument from two very different contexts, which nonetheless constitute single cases. The third part adopts a broader perspective and tests the external validity of the argument, focusing on a global sample of ethnic groups and analyzing the impact of ethnically based violence against civilians. On the one hand, I find that previous theories on the consequences of violence are not able to explain the effect of violence on conflict recurrence. On the other hand, using survey data from several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, I show that my argument might be a good explanation for the consequences of violence on political attitudes.



## Zusammenfassung

Diese Dissertation untersucht die langfristigen Auswirkungen von Kriegsgewalt gegen ZivilistInnen auf deren politischen Präferenzen. Existierende Studien legen nahe, dass Gewalt entweder eine Gegenmobilisierung gegen den Täter oder die Täterin erzeugt oder die betroffene Bevölkerung demobilisiert. Es ist jedoch unklar, unter welchen Bedingungen welcher dieser beiden Effekte vorherrscht. In dieser Dissertation gehe ich über diesen Dualismus hinaus und argumentiere, dass der soziale Kontext, in dem die Opfer leben, die Folgen von Gewalt bestimmt. Insbesondere hängt die Wirkung von Gewalt vom ideologischen Kontext ab, der als das Vorhandensein von ideologisch ausgerichteten sozialen Netzwerken auf lokaler Ebene definiert ist.

Der erste empirische Teil testet dieses Argument im Fall Spaniens. Dabei erhebe ich einen neuartigen Datensatz, der sich auf Archivdaten, historische Sekundärquellen und bereits vorhandene Datenquellen stützt. Ich analysiere die Auswirkungen der Gewalt unter Franco gegen ZivilistInnen während des Bürgerkriegs auf die Wahlunterstützung für die Linke nach der Wiederherstellung der Demokratie vier Jahrzehnte später. Ich zeige, dass das Leiden unter dieser Gewalt mit einem Anstieg des Stimmenanteils für die Linken verbunden ist, aber hauptsächlich in den Gemeinden, in denen nach dem Konflikt im Verborgenen aktive, linksgerichtete politische Netzwerke existierten. In Gebieten, in denen diese Netzwerke nicht präsent waren, hatte die Gewalt keine sinnvollen Konsequenzen.

Der zweite empirische Teil testet die theoretische Argumentation in einem ganz anderen Fall, nämlich in Guatemala. Ich baue erneut einen Datensatz auf lokaler Ebene auf, wobei ich mehrere Datenquellen nutze, und analysiere die Auswirkungen staatlich geführter Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung während des Bürgerkriegs auf die Wahlmuster nach dem Krieg, insbesondere für die linke Partei, die mit der ehemaligen Rebellengruppe verbunden ist, die gegen die rechte Regierung kämpften. Ich stelle fest, dass die staatlich geführte Gewalt die Wahlunterstützung für die ehemaligen Aufständischen in den Gemeinden erhöht, die vor dem Krieg der linken politischen Mobilisierung unterworfen waren. In Gemeinden ohne eine solche Exposition hat die staatlich geführte Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung keine signifikanten Auswirkungen.

Diese Analysen bieten aus zwei sehr unterschiedlichen Kontexten, die dennoch Einzelfälle darstellen, stichhaltige Belege für die theoretische Argumentation. Der dritte Teil nimmt eine breitere Perspektive ein und testet die externe Validität des

Arguments, indem er sich auf eine globale Stichprobe von ethnischen Gruppen konzentriert und die Auswirkungen ethnisch begründeter Gewalt gegen ZivilistInnen analysiert. Einerseits stelle ich fest, dass frühere Theorien über die Folgen von Gewalt nicht in der Lage sind, den Effekt von Gewalt auf die Rückkehr zu Konflikt zu erklären. Andererseits zeige ich anhand von Umfragedaten aus mehreren Ländern in Subsahara-Afrika, dass mein Argument eine gute Erklärung für die Folgen von Gewalt auf politische Einstellungen darstellt.

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**Part I**

**Introduction and Theory**



# 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 The puzzle

In the mining valleys of central Asturias, in the north of Spain, the end of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the establishment of General Franco's regime did not bring full peace to the region. Until the late 1940s, guerrilla fighters remained hidden in the near mountains, and periodically attacked the authorities. These anti-regime fighters tapped into local social support, which was partly a consequence of the Francoist repression experienced in the aftermath of the war and the harsh economic conditions of the postwar period. Just a few years later, from the mid 1950s on, the clandestine labor movement would emerge in these same mining and industrial towns, where memories of the civil war played an important role in the mobilization of the next generation. Despite the paralyzing effect of repression, both past and present, strong social networks helped to create collective memories and perpetuate the labor culture that had been so harshly repressed during the civil war. The story of these valleys seems to be defined by a polarizing cycle of repression and mobilization against the state. It might not seem surprising that, still to this day, this area is a stronghold of communist and socialist ideology.

These valleys, however, were not the norm in Spain. In many other parts of the country, networks of opposition to the Francoist regime were much weaker, or did not exist at all. In those places, violent repression during the civil war and its aftermath had been much more successful in rooting out pockets of leftist support and demobilizing the entire population. Memories of victimization became a social taboo and people would quickly brush over the reasons why a relative had been killed during the war, even in private family conversations. In this context, there was no leftist mobilization based on wartime memories. The fierce repression that had taken place a few years before did not lead to a mass rejection of the Francoist regime, nor did it leave any meaningful legacy in the form of a change in political preferences.

Why do we observe so different scenarios, in cases with a previous history of victimization where both perpetrator and political fault lines are the same? This question is the main focus of this dissertation. In other words, I explore the consequences of wartime violence against civilians for political preferences and try to

account for those cases in which these effects seem not to follow our expectations. My goal is to understand the conditions that explain why civilian victimization produces a particular effect in some cases, but not in others.

A long-held view suggests that violence produces a counter-reaction by those who suffer it, an argument that has been applied in conflict research to explain the consequences of violence against civilians. In particular, previous works suggest that civilian victimization brings about a backfiring effect, in other words, a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity as a result of victimization (Balcells, 2012; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017). However, this argument does not account well for those cases where violence does not seem to have the expected effect but instead demobilizes the population or even increases support for the perpetrator. A few other works support an opposite view, namely, a demobilization argument that suggests that violence against civilians is successful in quashing dissent and demobilizing the targeted population (Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Lyall, 2009; Padró i Miquel & Yared, 2012; Zhukov, 2015; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016). But again, this argument cannot be applied to those cases where we do observe cycles of repression and radicalization. Indeed, none of these arguments provides evidence on the way this process takes place and the reasons why it should be present in some cases but not in others.

Rather than pitting these two arguments against each other, the question is how to bridge them in order to explain the divergent effects that we often see in conflict contexts. In other words, what are the conditions under which violence leaves a backfiring effect or demobilizes the population? All previous works suffer from one limitation. Namely, they assume that violence has a homogenous effect on political attitudes and behavior. In most cases, they just compare those individuals who suffered violence with those who did not, without probing into the potential variation within exposed individuals or communities. In other words, previous research assumes an average individual effect which is aggregated up to the level of observation used, such as local communities. Differences in the effect of violence, if acknowledged, are usually attributed to the characteristics of the violence itself. Using this framework, it is difficult to understand why victimization has a different impact across countries or areas within the same conflict, and it makes impossible to interpret null or mixed findings and to generalize beyond specific contexts.

This dissertation aims to overcome these limitations and answer the question on the divergent effects of violence. Following the example from Spain above, I suggest that the explanation for such differences lies in the social context surrounding the victims. In other words, it is the local social context and, in particular,

the existence of a facilitating ideological context—which I define as the presence of ideologically-aligned social networks at the local level—what determines whether violence produces a backfiring or a demobilization effect. Moreover, I argue that the process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences or behavior is not a direct one, but rather consists of several steps: the framing of violent events, the creation and maintenance of collective memories, and the translation of these memories into political behavior through mobilization. Each of these steps is not restricted to the individual level. Rather, they take place at a higher level of analysis, such as local communities, which explains the importance that the local ideological context has on the whole process. I thus develop a contextual theory of the consequences of violence.

This is the main contribution of this dissertation. By dissecting the process that leads from violent events to a particular outcome and pointing to the social dynamics present in this process, I introduce a new theoretical framework that bridges previous arguments on the consequences of violence. Moreover, I develop an argument that looks at the community level in order to get a comprehensive picture of how wartime events give birth to collective memories which in turn are translated into specific political behavior. With this new approach, it is easier to make sense of mixed findings or to derive theoretical expectations for specific cases.

Improving our understanding of the consequences of wartime violence has a crucial importance beyond its scholarly relevance. Dealing with the scars of a conflict is not only a humanitarian or economic problem. There are important security risks involved, both local and global. For example, the US-led invasion of Iraq and its questionable treatment of local civilians, along with the violence perpetrated against them during the war, is often believed to have contributed to the rise of extremist organizations within the Sunni community. This idea, supported by former US military advisers (Dearden, 2016), suggests that violence against civilians carried out by the US army—such as the 2003 shooting of civilian protesters in the future ISIS stronghold of Fallujah (Fisher, 2003)—or the Shia-dominated government helped fueling radical Sunni nationalism and feelings of revenge. It should be no surprise that ISIS, an organization that catered to these demands, would later grow fueled by local Sunni support. Moreover, the outbreak of new conflicts is explained by endogenous dynamics as well, and the consequences of violence against civilians are likely to be a major factor in this explanation. The fact that the evolution of conflict trends worldwide seems to be linked to a few conflict-ridden regions (Dupuy & Rustad, 2018) supports the idea that we need to pay closer attention to this problem.

Without a proper understanding of the legacies of wartime violence, it is impossible to predict patterns of radicalization after a civil war, let alone to design programs that promote reconciliation and avoid the relapse of another war. The contextual theory of the effects of violence I develop in this dissertation is precisely aimed at improving our understanding of these processes and the way we tackle them. For instance, the findings of this dissertation suggest that perhaps the way to avoid radicalization dynamics, such as the rise of ISIS in post-occupation Iraq, is to work at the level of communities and to monitor locally influential voices that could be steering sympathies towards one side or another. Going beyond the individual and focusing on the social context not only gives us new insights on conflict dynamics, but also new tools to improve policy-making.

## 1.2 The argument

In this dissertation, I develop a contextual theory on the long-term consequences of wartime violence against civilians for political preferences. In previous research, the process leading from a violent event to a change in political preferences or behavior is assumed to take place at the level of individuals. Thus, if different effects of violence are observed, these are usually attributed to differences in the type of violence. This is the basis for those arguments that predict either a backfiring effect of violence, by which victimization brings about counter-mobilization against the perpetrator (Balcells, 2012; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017), or a demobilization effect, making the victimized population retreat from politics (Lyall, 2009; Zhukov, 2015; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016). Here, I attempt to bridge the gap between these two arguments, and answer the question of why we see divergent effects of violence. To do so, I put the social environment front and center, and explore the sociopolitical conditions under which violence has a long-lasting impact on political preferences.

In particular, I develop the concept of ideological context. By this, I mean the existence of local social networks linked to a particular political identity, defined vis-a-vis the political divisions that delineated the conflict. These identities, presumably, motivated the violence, or at least were used to make sense of the wartime events after they took place. The social networks that form the ideological context can be formal political parties or organizations, but also social networks ingrained in everyday life, such as neighbor associations or labor groups. These networks have a crucial impact on each of the steps of the process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences or behavior, and they explain why violence can have a backfiring effect.

I argue that the process that explains a change in political preferences as a result from violent events follows several steps. Namely, the process involves framing and interpreting these events, a collective discussion and creation of collective memories, and mobilizing upon these memories to translate them into political behavior. Individuals who have been exposed to victimization do not go through all these steps in isolation, but do so as part of a social context. In particular, it is the ideological context found at local communities what determines whether violence changes political preferences and the direction of this change.

First, violent events need to be depicted within a certain frame, so individuals are able to develop a political interpretation of them. Experiencing violence does not mean that exposed individuals will form an objective opinion about the event (Basta, 2018). This political interpretation constitutes the first step in any process that brings about a change in preferences as a result of victimization. The ideological context greatly influences this process. The views that different civilians have about the same wartime events can be starkly different (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016), and this variation might be the product of political factors (Silverman, 2019). Thus, the local ideological context surrounding an individual has a crucial influence on this framing process, and determines the political meaning that individuals give to these events, particularly taking into account that civilians who have been exposed to violence cope with trauma collectively (Lyons et al., 1998).

Second, the creation of collective memories is a form of political socialization, in which individual interpretations of violent events are collectively discussed and remembered, in a process I call here ‘collective remembrance’. A collective memory of the violence is thus created and becomes part of a group identity. The ideological context again has a crucial impact on collective remembrance, as these networks provide a social space in which memories are discussed, private experiences are politicized, and the events of the war are collectively remembered. Indeed, previous research has found that the persistence of political attitudes and preferences has a lot to do with being around those who share a similar ideology (Wittenberg, 2006; Tavits, 2013).

Finally, even if collective memories exist and they are part of the group identity, they do not necessarily have a direct translation into political behavior, such as electoral support, as there are many other issues that can drive political behavior. Thus, the last step in the process from violent events to their observable outcome involves political mobilization, which again is highly dependent on the local social environment. In particular, the existence of ideologically-aligned networks plays a fundamental role in the mobilization of the population upon these memories,

which translates into specific political behavior such as voting for certain political parties.

All in all, I argue that the existence of a facilitating ideological context ensures that this whole process takes place as expected for the backfiring effect to occur, given that in those cases individuals have access to the necessary political tools to understand, interpret and discuss violent events, and are exposed to a form political mobilization that translates collective memories into specific political behavior. When this ideological context does not exist, or when it is mostly linked to the perpetrator's political identity, violence does not have any backfiring effect, but rather demobilizes the population or it even increases support for the perpetrator.

### 1.3 Empirical approach

I test the validity of this argument using three main pieces of evidence: two local-level analyses of Spain and Guatemala and a global analysis of the consequences of violence against ethnic groups. The empirical implications of the theory are directly tested using detailed data from Spain and Guatemala. I build municipality-level datasets and show that the consequences of wartime violence against civilians are dependent on the local ideological context, which is operationalized using different strategies for each case, detailed below. In both cases, and more extensively in the case of Spain, I also include qualitative evidence supporting the quantitative analyses.

These two cases show that the theoretical argument is able to explain the consequences of violence in two distinct contexts, where the antecedents and dynamics of the conflict, the type of violence employed against civilians during the war, and the postwar trajectory are remarkably different between these two countries. Yet, a question about the external validity of the results still remains open.

To account for this limitation, the last empirical chapter focuses on a global sample of ethnic groups and analyzes the impact of ethnically based violence against civilians on patterns of conflict recurrence, complementing these analyses with survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa. Although I am not able to offer a direct test of the theory, given that comparable data on local ideological contexts is not available, I show that the previous, unconditional theories on the consequences of violence are not able to explain the results. Moreover, the empirical evidence from the survey analyses points out that the contextual argument can help explaining the results, opening the door to further research and data collection efforts.

Overall, this dissertation offers comprehensive empirical evidence supporting the theoretical argument. The analyses of Spain and Guatemala constitute a de-

tailed quantitative approach to show that the contextual argument improves our understanding of the consequences of violence in these two cases. The datasets cover many local political phenomena across several decades, and the level of detail of the data together with qualitative information helps to improve the validity of the results. Finally, the empirical chapter on the consequences of ethnic violence across a global sample has the double goal of improving the external validity of the previous analyses and suggesting potential avenues for future research on the topic. I detail each of the empirical sections below.

### 1.3.1 Spain

The Spanish Civil War took place between July 1936 and April 1939, and was fought mainly along the left-right cleavage, pitting the nationalist rebels commanded by General Francisco Franco against the Republican forces, formed by army officers who remained loyal to the Republic as well as left-wing militias. During the conflict, violence against civilians was extensively used, in an attempt to wipe out potential enemies within the controlled territories and gain allegiance of the civilian population through coercive means. Although both sides resorted to violence against civilians, the right-wing rebels did so with the explicit goal of dismantling the Republican regime and controlling the population, and were responsible for more than two thirds of the total estimated 150,000 civilian deaths.

After winning the war in 1939, General Franco continued with the task he had already started in the conquered territories since 1936, setting up a reactionary regime and repressing any residual opposition that still existed within the country. He remained in power for almost four decades. During this time, leftist groups and individuals were harshly repressed, and it was only after the mid-1950s when the underground opposition began to organize and grow in size. After Franco died in 1975, the most progressive sector within the regime put the country on track towards democracy. Socialist and communist parties were legalized and the first multi-party democratic elections were celebrated in 1977.

In the empirical analyses, I test whether being exposed to civilian victimization by Francoist forces during the war produced a long-term increase in leftist political preferences, measured as electoral support for leftist parties in all elections that took place after 1977. The availability of local-level data in Spain allows me to build a detailed dataset that spans through several decades and covers more than 2,000 municipalities across 13 provinces. The dataset, which relies on archival sources, secondary historical research, and other existing datasets, includes information on many political phenomena throughout the whole period.

My argument states that the effect of Francoist violence should be conditional on the existence of a facilitating ideological context at the local level. I operationalize this context using a yet-unexploited dataset on judicial sentences to measure the presence of underground, leftist networks in each municipality during the Francoist dictatorship. Supporting the contextual theory on the consequences of violence, the results show that wartime victimization perpetrated by Francoist forces during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share after democracy was restored four decades later, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine, left-leaning political networks were active after the conflict. Further analyses show that wartime violence is not related to postwar clandestine activity or leftist vote increase, and rule out that this is just a story about organizational persistence. In addition, secondary historical sources offer qualitative evidence on the demobilization efforts of the Francoist regime and the way local networks helped in the processes of framing and collective remembrance of wartime events, which explains the long-term legacies of victimization.

### 1.3.2 Guatemala

The Guatemalan Civil War took place between 1960 and 1996, even though during the first two decades the conflict remained at a very low intensity. During the 1970s, the rebel groups reorganized and moved to the Northwest, hoping that the rough terrain—rainforest and mountain ranges—and the long-standing inequality suffered by the Maya, which constituted the majority of the population in that area, would help them to grow in size and to step up their fight against the state. During this time, the guerrillas established a first contact with local communities and gained some popular support, in many cases with the help of Catholic priests and peasant activists. It was after the late 1970s when violence escalated and the country experienced the most intense phase of the war. The military government decided to carry out the infamous counterinsurgency campaign that involved large-scale violence against civilians who were suspected of supporting the guerrillas. Most of the estimated 200,000 deaths during the Guatemalan Civil War took place during the early 1980s, under the military governments of Lucas García and Ríos Montt. Ríos Montt went even further and set up a forced recruitment system, where villagers were required to participate in civil defense patrols against the guerrillas and their informants.

After violence decreased in intensity in the late 1980s, the conflict reached an impasse, as the government was incapable of eliminating a by then weakened insurgency. As more moderate governments, mostly ruled by civilians, came to

power during the 1990s, the peace negotiations accelerated and a final peace accord was signed in December 1996. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the umbrella organization consisting of the four main rebel groups, became a legal political party and first participated in national elections in 1999. The winner of those elections was the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), a right-wing political party founded by Ríos Montt ten years before, that employed a similar discourse to the one that had been put forward by the military government during the most violent years of the war.

In the chapter dedicated to Guatemala, I look at the consequences of the brutal campaign of civilian victimization during the early 1980s for local-level political preferences in the postwar period. In particular, I analyze patterns of electoral support for the FRG and the URNG, and check whether the effect of violence varies depending on the local ideological context found in each municipality. To do so, I build a dataset that covers all municipalities in the country and includes variables on multiple political phenomena from the 1960s to 2015. Contrary to Spain, I argue that in Guatemala the determinants of the local ideological context are found in the prewar period. In particular, this ideological context developed in those areas that had been exposed to leftist political mobilization carried out before the war by Catholic priests and the peasant movement.

As in the case of Spain, my argument states that state violence should only backfire in the form of increased support for the rebels (URNG) in those areas where there was the ideological context needed to build collective memories of the violence and capitalize on them to mobilize a political response against the perpetrator. In areas without that favorable ideological context, violence should demobilize the population or even increase support for the FRG, the political party linked to one of the perpetrators.

The empirical analyses support the theoretical argument. Proxying prewar exposure to political mobilization using road infrastructure, particularly distance to the Pan-American Highway and the local share of paved roads, I show that in more accessible municipalities—those that presumably were more exposed to political mobilization prior to the victimization campaign of the early 1980s—state violence is linked to an increase in electoral support for the URNG and a decrease in support for the FRG. On the contrary, in isolated places with worse road infrastructures, state violence did not have any meaningful effect on postwar voting patterns. While I offer evidence on the relationship between road accessibility and prewar political mobilization using qualitative historical sources, further quantitative analyses show that violence patterns during the civil war are not correlated with either distance to the Pan-American Highway or the local share of paved roads.

These complementary analyses help to improve the validity of the two proxies employed.

Complementing the evidence from Spain, the case of Guatemala constitutes a context in which prewar mobilization was limited, violence followed much more indiscriminate patterns of targeting, and a democratic regime was restored right after the war ended. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that the theoretical argument applies in two very different contexts of war legacies.

### 1.3.3 Beyond single cases

The previous two empirical chapters test the argument using very detailed data at the local level in two separate case studies, putting the emphasis on the internal validity of the findings. The stark differences between the Guatemalan and Spanish contexts guard against thinking that these are very case-specific patterns. Yet, in this last chapter I attempt to assess the implications of the theory on a global sample and at a much higher level of analysis.

In particular, I focus on the consequences of state violence against ethnic groups and how this affects postwar patterns of ethnic mobilization. In the first part of the analyses, I analyze the effect of wartime violence against ethnic groups on the likelihood of conflict recurrence, using a global sample of ethnic groups since 1989. The second part of the analyses relies on survey data to assess the individual-level impact of victimization on several political attitudes. In addition, I test whether the effect of violence is conditional on individuals' political activity and interest. These two variables are treated as an approximation to the influence of social relationships in the effect of violence.

In this chapter, I am not able to perform a direct test of the theoretical argument. The reason is that data on the ideological context across several countries, or at least a valid approximation, is not available. And although collecting it could be possible, it would not only entail a good case knowledge, but a great deal of effort in tracking and coding information on organizational and social activities at the local level across a high number of national contexts, which would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. My empirical strategy is thus slightly different. By relying on the two pieces of empirical evidence discussed above, I try to show that the backfiring and demobilization arguments are not able to explain global patterns of conflict recurrence, and to offer some hints on the direction of future research.

The results support my expectations. State-led collective targeting of ethnic groups does not have any effect on conflict recurrence nor does it clearly increase or decrease the effect of other conflict triggers, namely, ethno-political exclusion.

The survey analyses show that being exposed to civilian victimization because of own's ethnic identity has a positive effect on ethnic self-identification and ethnic grievances, but I find no evidence for an effect of violence on the likelihood that individuals support the use of violent means in politics. Moreover, the positive effects of victimization on ethnic self-identification and grievances are higher for individuals who report being politically active and interested in politics. This finding speaks to the idea that violence probably has effects conditional on the social activities of individuals, even though the two mediating variables employed do not offer any information on the ideological characteristics of the social context.

## 1.4 Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I review previous research on the consequences of civil wars and point to the limitations of previous research. In response to these gaps, I develop my theoretical argument on the long-term effect of violence on political preferences in chapter 3. Here I update the previous framework used to understand the consequences of violence, and develop my argument focusing on the role of the local ideological context in mediating the effect of violence.

The second part of the dissertation presents the empirical evidence that tests the theoretical argument. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the Spanish case. The first one develops the historical background of Spain, derives the theoretical expectations, and shows qualitative evidence from archival and secondary sources. The second one turns to the quantitative analyses, explaining the data and methods used and showing the main results. Chapter 6 shows the evidence from Guatemala. I first summarize the historical background, and then turn to both the qualitative and quantitative evidence. Chapter 7 presents and discusses the analyses that explore the effects of wartime collective targeting on postwar ethnic mobilization across a much larger sample. Lastly, chapter 8 concludes. I provide an overview of the argument and the empirical findings, point to its limitations and the open question that motivate future research, and discuss its policy implications.



## 2

### The legacies of conflict

The study of the consequences of civil wars, and civil war violence in particular, is a relatively new topic in political science. With a few exceptions, previous research has mostly focused on the causes and dynamics of conflicts, rather than on its effects. Although the impact of civil wars on economic or other non-political outcomes has garnered some attention, the social and political legacies of civil conflicts has only started to be systematically studied during the last few years. Ten years ago, in a general review of the literature on civil wars, [Blattman & Miguel \(2010, 42\)](#) stated that “the social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts.” The quest for exogenous factors explaining the onset of internal wars, which dominated conflict research during the 1990s and early 2000s, is part of the reason why this question was sidelined from the research agenda.

During the last few years, however, this approach has changed. Endogenous factors are now considered a crucial component of any explanation of civil war onset. Moreover, civil wars are also acknowledged to leave long-lasting legacies on domestic politics, strongly determining the trajectory of conflict-ridden countries and the likelihood of future conflicts. The consequences of civil wars and political violence have thus emerged as an important question in political research, and the number of articles and books on this topic is rapidly growing.

Despite all the advances that have been made during the last decade, the literature on the sociopolitical consequences of violence still suffers from a few notable limitations. In particular, I argue that we still have a fairly simplistic view on the impact of civil war violence on civilian political preferences, which constitutes a crucial issue to understand how conflicts affect the future development of post-conflict societies, including the risk of renewed war.

Our current knowledge on the consequences of civil war violence is summarized in two arguments, which I label as the ‘backfiring’ and ‘demobilization’ arguments. While the former argues that violence should produce a counter-reaction in the form of a rejection of the perpetrator’s political identity or ideology as a result of victimization, the latter suggest that violence induces fear among the targeted population and demobilizes it. However, these two arguments, which I collectively refer to as unconditional theories on the consequences of violence, assume that vi-

olence has a homogenous effect on the exposed population and do not account for other factors that might influence the way this effect plays out. This gap stops us from fully understanding the divergent effects of violence within the same conflict, making the interpretation of mixed findings more difficult and hindering our capacity to deal with postwar societies. This dissertation is an attempt to bridge these two arguments and overcome this limitation.

This chapter reviews previous research on the consequences of civil wars and political violence, ranging from the early works on the macro-level consequences of conflicts to the latest works on the long-term consequences of violence against civilians. I follow a chronological view, and offer a comprehensive tour through the literature I build upon, so it is easier to understand where our knowledge currently stands and the limitations that motivate this dissertation.

## 2.1 Early research on the consequences of conflict

The consequences of violence, or at least the endogenous origins of civil wars, were blatantly ignored in conflict research during the 1990s and early 2000s. The post-1989 international order brought about changes in the way internal conflicts were explained. In particular, it led to a search for exogenous factors that shifted the probability of an insurgency taking place in a country. The end of the great ideological clashes and changes in warfare type—partly brought about by the end of the Cold War ([Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010](#))—nurtured the ‘New Barbarism’ paradigm ([Richards, 1996](#)). This perspective argued that the new wars were pure banditry committed by apolitical rebels that capitalized on the weaknesses of many new states ([Kaplan, 1994](#)). When identity or ideology, whose origins are often found in the previous trajectory of the country, were brought up to explain conflicts, they were integrated into tautological arguments that highlighted the role of ‘ancient hatreds’ ([Kaplan, 1993](#)) and the inevitable radicalizing effect of previous conflicts ([Kaufmann, 1996](#)). Later, materialistic explanations rejected this view and spearheaded the emerging body of research on civil wars that was to follow. However, contrary to a focus on internal dynamics, these new explanations would not include the effects of previous conflicts and violence.

These works tried to capture quantitatively the economic conditions that favor insurgencies ([Collier & Hoeffer, 2004](#); [Fearon & Laitin, 2003](#)), laying the groundwork for future cross-national research on civil wars. Thus, partly because of this development, conflict research during those years suffered from a ‘cause bias,’ looking mostly at those factors that can be measured quantitatively and seem to

be exogenous to the sociopolitical trajectory of each country, such as terrain, natural resources, or economic endowments.<sup>1</sup>

Yet, past conflicts have been recurrently found to be a major determinant of current conflicts, suggesting that endogenous dynamics should be in every complete explanation of political violence. This idea was highlighted early on, upon the well-established finding that countries that experience internal armed conflict once are much more likely to experience it again (Collier et al., 2003; Collier, Hoeffer & Söderbom, 2008; Walter, 2004, 2011). More recent works explore this trend in a much more extended historical way. Fearon & Laitin (2014) link conflict in the colonial period to current forms of political violence, whereas Besley & Reynal-Querol (2014) argue that patterns of conflict between 1400 and 1700 explain current war incidence. Most research on conflict recurrence is limited to country-level explanations, and some of the arguments proposed do not account for the impact of conflict dynamics on future conflict onset. Some authors explain the problem of repeated war arguing that conflicts exacerbate the factors that caused the war in the first place, either materialistic (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffer, 2004) or identity-based (Rothchild & Groth, 1995; Kaufmann, 1996). In contrast, others acknowledge that the fate of these countries is not pre-defined before the war is fought. Among these, some authors investigate whether wars ending with military victory or those being terminated by a negotiated settlement have different rates of recurrence, without finding empirical consensus (Licklider, 1995; Pearson et al., 2006; Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; Toft, 2010).

Thus, even though they attempt to understand the effect of previous conflicts, all these works suffer from overaggregation and an excessive focus on national elites. Since the historical link between past and current conflicts seems to be linked to sociological factors, such as some type of ‘conflict capital’ (Fearon & Laitin, 2014) or an increase in ethnic identification (Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2014), this limitation of the literature on recurrence is particularly worrying. Without knowing what happens on the ground, and how this influences the sociopolitical dynamics of a country, any explanation of the legacies of violence will remain, at best, incomplete. Wood (2008) and Blattman & Miguel (2010) highlighted this gap years ago, but it was only recently when research on this topic really took off.

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<sup>1</sup>Some notable exceptions are e.g. Goodwin (2001), Petersen (2002), or Wood (2003); who all attempt to explain insurgencies and revolutions as the product of non-material conditions, such as grievances or emotions over a situation of political exclusion or unfairness.

## 2.2 Focusing on micro-level dynamics

A breakthrough in the study of conflict dynamics, at least for the study of the sociopolitical consequences of violence, took place when a new interest in the micro-dynamics emerged (e.g. [Kalyvas, 2008b](#), for an early overview). This change involved moving the focus from larger-level dynamics of conflict, usually analyzed on a global scale, to studying the micro-level variation we find within a single conflict. Although this strand of the literature is mainly concerned with the determinants of such violence, it has improved our understanding about how violence plays out on the ground and the different processes that it prompts at the local level. We now know much more about the determinants of violence against civilians during civil wars ([Kalyvas, 2006](#); [Balcells, 2010b, 2017](#)), dynamics of wartime civilian displacement ([Steele, 2011, 2017](#); [Balcells & Steele, 2016](#)), the organizational origins of armed groups ([Weinstein, 2006](#); [Staniland, 2014](#)), or patterns of insurgent mobilization ([Goodwin, 2001](#); [Wood, 2003](#); [Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007](#)), just to name a few topics.

This burgeoning literature enjoys a relatively high degree of internal validity and has greatly improved our understanding of the inner workings of civil wars. These findings are a major foundation for the study of the consequences of civil war violence, particularly when looking at micro- or meso-level units of analysis. In fact, one of the observations that has emerged from the micro-dynamics research agenda is that wartime behavior is much more endogenous than previously thought. In stark contrast with primordialist explanations of violent behavior (e.g. [Kaufmann, 1996](#)), [Kalyvas \(2006\)](#) argues that civil war violence is mainly determined by local and personal disputes. Civilians, rather than following what their political identity would ‘recommend,’ adapt their behavior to the context in which they find themselves. Alternative accounts suggest that political factors play a crucial role in determining internal wartime dynamics ([Balcells, 2017](#); [Steele, 2017](#)). In any case, and more importantly for this dissertation, this view acknowledges that the legacies of a civil war depend on the internal variation of violence—including non-fatal forms of violence—and do not simply follow predetermined identities. For instance, when looking at ethnic identities and the impact of civil wars on them, current research understands that this effect can vary depending on the specific development of the conflict, particularly taking into account the intra-conflict variation in violence intensity and the fact that ethno-national identities do not necessarily predetermine wartime behavior ([Kalyvas, 2008a](#); [Lyall, 2010](#)).

All these works constituted an important stepping stone for the development of a research agenda on the consequences of wartime civilian victimization, and

their findings still underpin many of the theoretical foundations of the study of the legacies of violence. In particular, there are two related bodies of research that are worth mentioning: the literature on counterinsurgency and the body of research that focuses on the social processes that take place as a result of war violence, affecting local structures and institutions.

First, the counterinsurgency literature pioneered the work on the consequences of violence against civilians. In his pioneering work on the dynamics of violence during a civil war, [Kalyvas \(2006\)](#) argued that state violence was counterproductive, as it might produce a backfiring effect boosting support for the insurgents. [Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas \(2011\)](#) find support for this view using data from the Vietnam War. Similarly, [Condra & Shapiro \(2012\)](#) find that collateral damage within a counterinsurgency campaign can increase support for the insurgents in areas where they already enjoyed support.

The literature on terrorism had already pointed out that aggressive responses to terrorism could backfire. In particular, theoretical works suggest that counterinsurgency efforts by state—i.e. the use of violence against terrorists—may generate grievances and increase recruitment into insurgent groups ([Rosendorff & Sandler, 2004](#)), which also applies to other countermeasures taken by governments that include economic sanctions ([Siqueira & Sandler, 2006](#)). Empirical works come to a similar conclusion, and support the view that violent counterinsurgency is not necessarily successful, as it might increase public support for terrorists ([Kaplan et al., 2005](#); [Kydd & Walter, 2006](#)).

The opposite argument has also found support in the literature. [Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson \(2007\)](#) argue that state counterterrorist activities do not always raise support for the insurgents, and [Padró i Miquel & Yared \(2012\)](#) develop a theoretical model to argue that violent counterinsurgent measures can indeed reduce support for the terrorists through its fear-inducing effect among the population. Empirically, [Lyall \(2009\)](#) has shown that the use of state indiscriminate violence in Chechnya actually reduced insurgent attacks. [Johnston & Sarbahi \(2016\)](#) finds similar effects for the effects of US drone attacks in Pakistan. Related to these works, and speaking to the role of fear in curbing support for the insurgents through state violence, [Schubiger \(2013\)](#) finds that wartime indiscriminate violence actually reduced insurgent collective action in Peru. Mobilizing against the insurgents functions as a strategy to signal support for a state that is perceived as much stronger and capable of violent coercion.

Second, a more recent body of research has explored the way civil wars affect local social structures and institutions ([Wood, 2008](#)). Most of these works focus at the local level and often show that civil wars have a long-term effect on local com-

munities. [Daly \(2012\)](#) shows how communities that suffered conflict in the past are more likely to be current hotspots of insurgent activity. [Osorio, Schubiger & Weintraub \(2016\)](#) show that this is not limited to insurgent violence. In Mexico, current forms of self-defense mobilization against criminal violence can also be traced back to historical popular rebellions. In a similar vein, [Bateson \(2013\)](#) explains how self-defense militias set up during the Guatemalan civil war are still active as vigilante organizations, shaping the way local communities cope with the recent rise in criminal activity. Thus, it is clear now that violence can also have a crucial impact on local forms of socialization.

In brief, the literature on the micro-dynamics of conflicts inaugurated a new research agenda that focused on the internal workings of civil wars, including wartime violence against civilians. These new works not only significantly increased our knowledge of how civil wars play out on the ground, but also paved the way for a thorough investigation on the consequences of violence and the impact of civil wars on the civilian population. They constitute the direct precedent for the study of the long-term effects of wartime violence. Indeed, the two arguments on the effect of wartime violence on political preferences that I review in the next section were already present in this literature.

### 2.3 The long-term consequences of violence

In the micro-dynamics literature reviewed above, those studies that explore the consequences of violence against civilians usually do so focusing on short-term effects, mostly in terms of military effectiveness during the same ongoing conflict. However, these effects do not necessarily correspond to long-term consequences, nor does rebel activity match the political attitudes and behavior of civilians.

During the last few years, an emerging research agenda has indeed turned its attention to this puzzle, mostly focusing on whether the exposure to violence changes individuals' social and political attitudes. The main finding is that violence increases pro-social behavior towards members of the same social group, which often translates into increased capacity for collective action ([Bellows & Miguel, 2009](#); [Blattman, 2009](#); [Voors et al., 2012](#); [Gilligan, Pasquale & Samii, 2014](#); [González & Miguel, 2015](#); [Bauer et al., 2016](#)). Related to this, similar studies have found, also at the individual level, that exposure to violence is related to less potential for ethnic reconciliation ([Bakke, O'Loughlin & Ward, 2009](#); [Beber, Roessler & Scacco, 2014](#)) or a decrease in political trust ([De Juan & Pierskalla, 2016](#); [Grosjean, 2014](#)).

All these studies focus on outcomes such as pro-social behavior or political trust which, in general, lack any information on the ideological or identity-based content

of any effect of violence. This dissertation, however, studies the effect of violence on political preferences. In other words, the question is whether civilian victimization has any effect on the preferences of the exposed population vis-a-vis the political divisions or ideologies that defined the conflict. Following this, two possibilities exists, which correspond to the two existing arguments that focus on this question. On the one hand, violence could have a backfiring effect, in other words, victimization could bring about a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity, boosting support for its opponents. On the other hand, civilian victimization could demobilize the targeted population or even increase support for the perpetrator because of fear and acceptance.

These arguments, which I refer to as unconditional theories on the consequences of violence, share a similar view on the effect of violence. Namely, they assume that wartime violence against civilians has a direct, homogenous effect among the population. Even if the outcome is measured or theorized at the level of communities or larger units of analysis, they assume an average individual effect, unconditional on other factors. This is their main limitation, and the one upon which I build my theoretical argument in chapter 3. I review each of these two arguments below, before turning to their limitations and the gaps that motivate this dissertation.

### 2.3.1 Backfiring argument

According to the backfiring argument, violence against civilians during a civil war should bring about a long-term rejection of the perpetrator's political identity among the exposed population. On one of the first works that explored this issue, [Balcells \(2012\)](#) argues that rejection is the more likely outcome of victimization, compared to other consequences such as acceptance of the perpetrator's identity or demobilization. She also states that "rejection may also involve hostile feelings, attitudes, and behaviors toward social or ethnic groups associated with the perpetrator(s)" ([Balcells, 2012](#), 315). Using survey data from Spain, she finds empirical evidence supporting the backfiring argument, both for those who personally suffered victimization during the civil war in Spain and those who have victimization experiences within their own families.

Along the same lines, [Lupu & Peisakhin \(2017\)](#) argue that previous victimization will also lead to a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity. Like [Balcells \(2012\)](#), they also talk about family socialization as one of the channels that explains how traumatic experiences of wartime violence have long-term conse-

quences across several generations. They test these expectations using survey data from Ukraine, and find empirical evidence for the backfiring argument.

According to this view, then, the use of civilian victimization generates an emotional response among those who are close witnesses of the violence in the form of moral outrage, sadness, or discontent. These emotions, which are already present in previous literature (Goodwin, 2001; Wood, 2003; Bar-Tal, 2013), generate long-term memories that find a political translation in the rejection of the political identity or ideology linked to the perpetrator. These attitudes are transmitted across time through processes related to family socialization.

Although these two works focus on individuals, another set of works have explored these same effects at the level of communities, with a similar theoretical discussion on the mechanisms. [Balcells \(2010a\)](#) analyzes the effects of civilian victimization across municipalities in Spain, looking at the difference in violence between leftist and rightist forces during the civil war and its effect in voting patterns in Catalonian municipalities. However, she does not find conclusive results. [Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov \(2017\)](#) explore the effect of Stalin's forced deportations in Ukraine in the 1940s, and show that exposed communities are less likely to vote for pro-Russian parties many decades later. They argue that this effect is due to a community-level process where memories of the violence become part of collective memories and thus bring about a collective rejection of the perpetrator. Similarly, [Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini \(2017\)](#) explore the effects of the violent Nazi occupation of Italy during World War II and its effect on voting patterns between the 1940s and 1980s, finding that Nazi violence increased electoral support for communist parties. Focusing on Guatemala, and using a research design close to the one used in chapter 6 of this dissertation, [Vogt & Sáenz de Tejada \(2019\)](#) find that municipalities where state violence was more intense during the early 1980s show higher levels of electoral support for leftist parties in the postwar period.<sup>2</sup>

In brief, the backfiring argument suggests that violence against civilians produces a set of emotional reactions that translate into a long-term rejection of the perpetrator, an effect that can be transmitted across generations or even resonate within local or ethno-national communities. Memories of the violence, which can be created and told within the family or local communities, are thus a key aspect for understanding the persistence of these attitudes.

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<sup>2</sup>In the introduction to chapter 6, I explain the differences between this study and my own.

### 2.3.2 Demobilization argument

Even though the backfiring argument enjoys more empirical support in the literature, other authors suggest that violence might have the opposite effect. Studying the effect of Russian indiscriminate violence on insurgent violence during the war in Chechnya, [Lyall \(2009\)](#) argues that violence could indeed decrease insurgent activity. He explains that this effect could be due to two different mechanisms. First, state-led indiscriminate violence makes insurgent activities much more difficult by eroding their logistical capacity, because of the effects of violence on organizations or networks of support. And second, local civilians could blame the insurgents for the violence, particularly in those cases where insurgents are not able to offer effective protection to the targeted population. This shift in preferences would force the insurgent to reduce their fighting efforts, given the lack of popular support. Indeed, these mechanisms has been tested empirically. Using data from Ukraine, [Pechenkina, Bausch & Skinner \(2019\)](#) study the attribution of blame to state indiscriminate violence and find that individuals not personally exposed to violence usually blame the government for the violence.

In line with the mechanism focusing on the logistical impact of violence, [Johnston & Sarbahi \(2016\)](#) find that US drone attacks as part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Pakistan actually reduced insurgent activity. Although they do not rule out the possibility that US attacks produced a popular backlash against the insurgents, they assume that the effect is due to the disruption of militant operations by the rebels and the death of rebel leaders as a result of the attacks.

Besides this last mechanism, others have acknowledged that state violence can have a crucial impact on the exposed population by inducing fear of further reprisals. Contrary to the backfiring argument discussed above, this emotional reaction would reduce support for the insurgents and thus bring about a lower likelihood of further insurgent collective action. Focusing on Zimbabwe, [Young \(2019, 140\)](#) argues that “fear makes citizens more pessimistic in their perceptions of the risk of repression and the likelihood that other opposition supporters will mobilize alongside them, and less accepting of risk.” Relatedly, [Zhukov \(2015\)](#) studies dynamics of resettlement during civil wars and finds that this strategy is successful in reducing support for the rebels, by increasing territorial control by the state. Moreover, he also finds evidence supporting an effective counterinsurgent effect of indiscriminate violence. According to his theoretical model, this type of violence against civilians should take place when “both sides depend on popular support ... and where the opponent enjoys a coercive advantage” ([Zhukov, 2015, 1176](#)).

These works suggest an opposite account to the backfiring argument, where violence against civilians is conceived as a successful method to control dissent and secure popular support, even if this is due to fear. Either because violence disrupts militant activities or because it makes the population fearful of future reprisals, civilian victimization should bring about the demobilization of the targeted population—or even acceptance of the perpetrator’s political identity.

In the next section I outline the limitations of the previous literature and of these two arguments in particular, and lay out the way in which I contribute to filling these gaps.

## 2.4 Limitations and contribution

In this review of the literature, I have shown how research on the consequences of civil wars and civil war violence has evolved during the last two decades. After a period when only the macro-level consequences of conflict received any attention, a new interest in the micro-dynamics of civil wars spurred a new research agenda on the legacies of civil war violence, looking at the problem in a much more detailed way. The field has thus evolved considerably during the last decade. I have also discussed the two main arguments currently existing to explain the consequences of wartime violence against civilians on political preferences, namely, the backfiring and demobilization arguments. Current research, however, suffers from a few limitations that still motivate further research.

First and foremost, previous research has treated the process that leads from violent events to a change in preferences—or any other outcome—in a much too simplistic way. In other words, the ‘black box’ that explains this effect has not been opened, and the theoretical discussion on this assumes that violence has a direct impact on civilians, without acknowledging that this process entails many different steps that could work independently of each other.

Second, and partly as a consequence of the first limitation, previous research has not accounted for any conditional factors that might mediate the relationship between violence and its outcome. This means that little theoretical attention has been paid to the way this process takes place, and under which conditions, as most works just compare those individuals who suffered violence with those who did not, without accounting for the potential variation within exposed individuals or communities. When different effects have been considered, they have been attributed to different types of violence or to variation in its intensity. For instance, Finkel (2015, 340) studies the consequences of violence for subsequent mobilization, and argues that a “legacy of repression is the acquisition of the resister toolkit

by segments of repressed populations, who then capitalize on these skills during subsequent repression episodes," but only when violence is selective. Indiscriminate violence, where targeting is not based on political activities but on collective identities, is much less likely to have these consequences. Similarly, the difference between short-term and long-term effects is mostly treated as an empirical problem, instead of discussing how the process leading from violence to an outcome changes over time.

Third, all previous works assume that civilians interpret violence in an objective way, and do not pay attention at how this interpretation might vary across contexts. As [Basta \(2018, 1244\)](#) says, "scholars usually take the meaning of events for granted, examining their causal efficacy without accounting for the processes of political contestation through which this meaning is created." Without a proper understanding of the subjective interpretation of wartime events, it is impossible to understand their political legacies. An important consequence of this limitation is that the sociopolitical context in which this interpretation takes place has also been sidelined from previous research, which almost assumes that individuals experience violence in isolation and that their personal view of the events does not depend on their social environment.

All these limitations are related to each other, and partly stem from the first gap highlighted above. In other words, by assuming a direct effect of violence on political preferences or attitudes, previous research has ignored how this process might vary across different contexts and the role of the social environment in mediating the process leading from violent events to a change in political preferences.

This dissertation addresses these limitations. First, I analytically dissect the process leading from violence to a change in preferences, and spell out each of the steps that take place in between. Second, I acknowledge that this process might be mediated by other conditioning factors, which explains why similar violent events could have different consequences depending on the specific context. And third, I bring in the social context as an important factor in explaining this relationship, accounting for the way it defines the interpretation of wartime events and its translation into political preferences.

Addressing the limitations of these unconditional theories, in the next chapter I develop a contextual theory on the consequences of wartime violence on political preferences. To do so, I present and update the existing theoretical framework and discuss how the social environment influences the process leading from violence to a change in preferences.



# 3

## Theoretical Framework

The previous chapter reviewed the existing literature on the consequences of violence against civilians, particularly the two arguments on the effect of victimization. While the backfiring argument predicts a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity as a result of victimization (Balcells, 2012; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017), some other works suggest that violence demobilizes the targeted population (Lyall, 2009; Zhukov, 2015; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016). However, all previous works assume that violence has a homogenous effect on political attitudes and behavior and, in most cases, just compare those individuals who suffered violence with those who did not, without probing into the potential variation within exposed individuals or communities. Addressing this gap could explain why exposure to victimization has a different impact across countries or areas within the same conflict, helping to interpret null or mixed findings and to generalize beyond specific contexts. This dissertation tries to overcome this limitation, updating the theoretical framework and analyzing each of the steps in the process that leads from violence to its outcome. Its main contribution is to introduce the social context as the factor that crucially determines the political consequences of wartime victimization.

In particular, I argue that the ideological context, or the existence of ideologically-aligned social networks at the local level, determines whether violence has a backfiring or a demobilization effect. The process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences or behavior consists of several steps, and it is the existence of a facilitating ideological context at the local level what allows the whole process to take place: the framing of violent events, the creation and maintenance of collective memories, and the translation of these memories into political behavior through mobilization.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I discuss the main concepts of the theoretical argument and its scope conditions, specifying what I mean by wartime civilian victimization, exposure to violence, and the different effects that violence can have. The second section revisits the theoretical framework present in previous research and updates it, exploring each of the steps in the process from violence to its outcome and introducing the concept of ideological context. The third section wraps up the previous discussion and develops the argu-

ment, discussing the role of the ideological context in each of the three mechanisms proposed. The last section concludes with a brief summary.

### 3.1 Building blocks

#### 3.1.1 Wartime civilian victimization

Violence against civilians is a common phenomenon during civil wars. By civilian victimization or violence against civilians, I refer to intentional acts of physical violence against unarmed civilians perpetrated by an armed group—including state authorities. Civilians are all those individuals who are not formally part of an armed group, regardless of whether they support them or are former members. Thus, I distinguish this from other types of violence that also take place during civil wars, such as combats between armed groups or collateral damage, including the indirect effects of fighting on the overall population.

Although the study of violence against civilians was sidelined for many decades within conflict research, where civilian victimization was treated as a by-product of war, a new consensus has emerged. This type of violence is now considered as “instrumental and coordinated by powerful actors seeking to achieve tangible political or military objectives” (Valentino, 2014, 91). This point of view could be seen as irrelevant in a dissertation focusing on its consequences, given that it could be argued that the cause of violence does not matter as its effect will be the same regardless of the process or motivations it stems from. Yet, the instrumental and political nature of victimization is an important aspect, for both its definition and for understanding why and how it produces a political reaction.

As in previous works on wartime civilian victimization, I focus on intentional, lethal acts of violence against civilians, thus distinguishing it from other forms of violence that do not result in death, such as torture, or from other forms of lethal violent events, such as battle violence between combatants or collateral violence (see Balcells, 2017, 20).<sup>1</sup> The crucial constrain here is thus the target of violence, which here refers to civilians who are targeted usually because of an alleged connection with the enemy, and is less dependent on other conceptual aspects of political violence, such as the repertoire, the technique, or the frequency (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017). Moreover, although most of the empirical analyses focus

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<sup>1</sup>Moreover, although this is not a crucial aspect in the theoretical argument, the theory developed here and particularly the empirical analyses on Spain and Guatemala focus on ‘direct’ violence against civilians (Balcells, 2017, 21).

on the consequences of state violence,<sup>2</sup> the argument is in principle applicable to violence committed by any party, as long as it is connected to a political identity.

The key aspect is that those who commit violence are linked to a political ideology or identity, or consist of a political organization themselves. Most of the violence considered here was committed face-to-face by individuals, often linked to the armed forces. However, is the reaction by those civilians exposed to victimization to the ‘political label’ violent actors represent what this dissertation focuses on, rather than the reaction to those individuals in particular who committed violence. For example, in the case of Spain, violence against civilians was in many cases committed by local affiliates to the nascent Franco regime, and usually both victim and perpetrator were already acquaintances before the war. Thus, rather than explaining the reaction of, say, the family of the victim towards the person who committed violence, I focus on the reaction to the political identity that the perpetrator represented and that motivated the violent event. This is why it is important to keep in mind the intentional or strategic component of violence.

When it comes to targeting patterns, the theory is not limited to either indiscriminate or selective violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Valentino, 2014). Pure indiscriminate violence would be problematic for the theory, given that it would mean that individuals were randomly killed without any attention to political or group identities. However, this form of violence is not common, and what it is usually understood as indiscriminate violence is not entirely indiscriminate, but rather follows patterns of collective targeting where violence is aimed at specific groups but is individually indiscriminate within these groups (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017). Although collateral violence is left out of the argument given its non-intentional nature, whether the perpetrator engages in selective or more indiscriminate forms of targeting is not as important for the theory, particularly since a political interpretation is usually built *ex post* following macro-level political divisions. The existence of identity groups, such as ideological cleavages or ethnicities, is more important, as I discuss below in the scope conditions. Even in a situation of completely indiscriminate violence, the perpetrator would have a specific political identity, and reactions to violence would develop with regards to that identity.

The definition of civil war violence has also been the object of extensive debate (see Kalyvas, 2006), as the distinction between violence as an event within the context of a civil war and the civil war itself is not as clear as it seems. Moreover, the specific characteristics of political violence also suffer from conceptual inaccura-

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<sup>2</sup>In the case of Spain, Franco’s forces were technically the rebels during the civil war, even though in practice they functioned like a state in the territories they controlled and went on to become the official state authorities after 1939.

cies ([Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017](#)). Particularly in the past, works on violence also included other forms of domination that were not objectively violent, such as structural or symbolic violence ([Galtung, 1969](#); [Bourdieu, 1977](#)). The view that this dissertation follows, at least when operationalizing violent events, follows the more restrictive definition and focuses on the actual occurrence of violent events. As [Nordstrom & Martin \(1992, 8\)](#) recognize,

“There is a tendency in the social science to study violence when it is manifested, even while recognizing that its genesis lies in structural violence. In other words, the view supported is that violence ceases when violent actions stop.”

Yet, the extensive definition is relevant to this theoretical framework because I study the reaction to victimization, and it would be unrealistic to assume that civilians only react to violent events that resulted in death. The expectation of violence, torture or non-lethal attacks, and even economic discrimination all accompany lethal violence in most conflicts and naturally contribute to the change in political preferences that violence brings about. However, partly because lethal violence is the most extreme form of violence and partly because of empirical constraints, I focus on lethal forms of violence against civilians, assuming that they are the tip of an iceberg that includes other forms of structural or symbolic violence, which also affect preferences.

### 3.1.2 Exposure to victimization and unit of analysis

What it means to experience victimization, given that it results in the death of the victim? The answer to this question is deeply related to the empirical design developed to answer the question of the consequences of violence. In any case, my definition of exposure to violence refers to those around the victim who witness the violent event because of personal and spatial proximity. This could mean that an individual exposed to violence is the neighbor of the victim, a bystander who witnessed the killing, a relative, or someone related to the victim by some kind of social or political bond: a friend, a member of the same ethnic group, or someone who shared the political ideology of the victim.

Much of the processes that are discussed here and that relate to the initial emotional response to a killing could take place across many levels, and ultimately the definition of exposure is linked to the level of observation chosen. I detail below how violence could have different effects that take place at different levels of analyses, both spatial and temporal, but given that much of the theoretical argument

and the empirical evidence is discussed at the local level, I restrict my definition of exposure to those who were spatially close to the killings.

Using this spatial definition, one could argue that there exists a sort of decay function where the effects of violence decrease as distance to the event increases. And within this framework, the argument could suffer from inconsistencies, as defining the strength of the bond between the victim and those exposed to the victim overlooks many channels in which this does not follow a function of distance. The next-door neighbor could be oblivious to the death of someone while a relative who lives in the other part of the country will be much more affected. Similarly, within the same local community, the impact of having a family member directly dragged out of the house and summarily executed is clearly not the same as hearing that an acquaintance was killed during the previous night. For the sake of simplicity, however, I assume that exposure means being spatially close to the killings, in other words, exposure to events that took place in the same spatial unit. Everyday interactions and the close networks that exist within a local community ensure that these events should be felt as closer, both in terms of indignation and fear.

It could be argued that communication technologies and mass media amplify violent events that occur beyond the local community. If a massacre takes place in the other part of the country, as long as it is reported in the media, its magnitude and the potential political, personal, or ethnonational links that exists between the victims and the spectators could amplify feelings of indignation or even fear. However, I still restrict my definition of exposure to the local level. Two reasons justify this. First, the theoretical argument is built at the local level. Although the framework could be expanded to larger levels of analysis, most of the mechanisms I discuss and the influence of the ideological context on the effect of violence take place at the level of local communities, mainly through processes that involve everyday interactions and face-to-face contact. It thus makes sense to keep the definition of exposure consistent with this idea. Although it is natural to assume some spill-over effects, given the density of everyday contacts among those who live in the same municipality, I expect, on average, that the effect of victimization is stronger among neighbors than across individuals living in different places.

And second, on a more practical note, the empirical analyses of Spain and Guatemala are carried out at the local level, and the particular context in which they took place maximizes the validity of the exposure assumption. Both these conflicts happened decades ago, when communication technologies had not yet evolved and where the highest density on interpersonal relationships was probably found at the local level. In current conflicts, however, this assumption might have

to be relaxed. Although the theoretical argument developed here can be scaled up to larger levels of analyses, the definition of exposure should be revisited for those cases.<sup>3</sup> As I discuss in the conclusion, this is a limitation that could motivate further research on the topic.

### 3.1.3 Effects of violence

The term ‘effect of violence’ is more complex than it seems at first. Many different types of effects or phenomena are hidden beneath that term. At the very least, there are conceptual differences between effects of violence that take place at different levels of spatial aggregation or at different points in time. In this section I discuss these concepts. The goal is to add conceptual clarity for a better understanding of the next sections.

#### *Different levels of aggregation*

Regardless of the level of observation chosen, violence can have many different effects whose generating process takes place at the level of individuals, local units of population (e.g. municipalities), or larger groups where everyday contact does not take place.

The first set of effects concerns those that take place at the level of individuals. These are what previous research on the consequences of violence highlights the most. For instance, violence has an impact on individual-level emotions, such as fear (Young, 2019), or it can cause psychological trauma on those individuals who have experienced it (Goldbaum et al., 2003; Ullman et al., 2007). Violence can also affect sociopolitical outcomes, such as trust (Grosjean, 2014; De Juan & Pierskalla, 2016), or cooperative behavior (see Bauer et al., 2016). These effects are usually thought of as the consequence of individual reactions to violence, brought about by a process that takes place at the level of individuals. Following this, these effects would be the basis for the observed effect of violence, even if it is measured at levels of analysis different than the individual.

Even though individual-level effects are the starting point for any theory on the consequences of violence, they are not the only ones. They usually constitute the first reaction to violence, and they should be the more predominant effects right

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<sup>3</sup>The last empirical chapter tries to offer evidence on a much larger sample, focusing on ethnic groups, even though this unit of analyses is different than the municipality. In this case, I assume that exposure takes place within individuals who share an ethnonational identity, even though this entails spatial proximity in many cases. In any case, as I explain in chapter 7, a direct test of the theory at the level of ethnic groups across many countries is not possible at the moment due to data availability reasons. Rather, what I do in that chapter is to test the competing theory, i.e. the one that speaks of an unconditional effect of victimization on political preferences.

after the violence, as victimization spurs an emotional and rational reaction among individuals. However, the social context can have an impact on these individual effects. That is, processes such as psychological stress or fear are influenced by the social environment in which individuals live, even if the mechanisms are mainly bounded to the individual level (e.g. [Dorff, 2017](#)).

A second type of effects of violence takes place at the local level, in other words, within social networks that experience face-to-face interaction. Previous research has already mentioned how civil war violence affects social networks. [Wood \(2008\)](#) has reviewed the social consequences of civil wars and how that affects social structures, norms and practices. In particular, several processes take place at the local level during a civil war, that either are the result of violence or influence its effects. For instance, the militarization of local life and the mobilization of local civilians often “have the joint effect of polarizing local identities” ([Wood, 2008, 547](#)) which, together with the militarization of local government, should greatly influence the way civilians perceive violent events in their communities and respond to them.

In addition, social networks are also transformed as a consequence of victimization. Violence destroys networks formerly in place, through the repression of individuals who are deemed supporters of the opposition ([Balcells, 2017](#)), but it also gives birth to new ones, through mobilizational processes ([Pearce, 2015](#)) or the creation of new social structures to cope with violence (e.g. [Schubiger, 2013; Jentzsch, 2014; Arjona, 2015](#)).

All these changes have a crucial impact in everyday social interactions and transform the way people cope with violence, and thus these changes have a deep impact on the individual effects of violence discussed above. As in the case of social movements, where participation in new organizations creates new ties and leads to the creation of new collective identities ([Gould, 1995](#)), the reconfiguration of local-level networks as a result of violence and mobilization also impacts the long-term effect of victimization. Discussions over what happened during the war or the networks of support on which victims rely will not be the same after a civil war.

Lastly, violence also has macro-level effects, namely, those that take place at the level of ethnic groups or entire countries. In other words, at the level of social groups where face-to-face interaction does not usually happen. Indeed, classic theories of group dynamics suggest that civil wars polarize social groups, cement political identities, and favor the radical leaders that rally on those issues ([Simmel, 1955; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Bowles, 2008](#)).

These effects are not necessarily an aggregation of individual-level or even local-level effects. Although some authors argue that ethnic violence hardens eth-

nic identities across every level through a fear-based mechanism (Kaufmann, 1996), more recent research has found different results that suggests that this effect does not necessarily take place at the level of individuals. Focusing on the consequences of wartime violence on ethnic prejudices in Croatia, Massey, Hodson & Sekulić (2003, 71) find that “war experiences influence ethnic nationalist sentiments less strongly than religiosity, education and professional status.” Strabac & Ringdal (2008) show similar results that contradict the ethnic hatred thesis. Even more interestingly, they find results that are coherent with the idea that these patterns are not the product of individual exposure to violence, but rather, that they have to do with dynamics that take place at a higher level of analysis:

“It is interesting that the regional effects of war are stronger than individual ones. ... individuals living in municipalities that were heavily affected by the war are expected to score 7 points higher on prejudice, after controlling for relevant individual and regional characteristics” (Strabac & Ringdal, 2008, 789).

Beyond the effect of victimization on individuals and local social networks, victimization also brings about processes that take place at the level of entire national communities. Changes in political communication, public discussions of the violence by mass media, and hardened political identities are potential mechanisms that explain these effects, taking place beyond the lower levels of analysis previously discussed.

Overall, effects across all these three levels interact with each other and produce the outcome, namely, the legacies of violence. The observed consequences of violence, regardless of the level of analysis, will be the product of the interaction of different types of effect. Particularly for this dissertation, where the process that leads from violence to its outcome is analytically dissected, it is important to keep in mind these distinctions when developing the argument on the consequences of violence.

#### *Different effects in time*

In addition to different types of spatial levels, the effects of violence can also be different across a temporal scale. In particular, the effects in the immediate aftermath of violence can be different from the ones that play out in the long-term.

Past research on the repression-dissent nexus has already pointed to this difference, arguing that although state repression reduces dissent in the short-term, it shows a positive effect in the long-term (Rasler, 1996). Finkel (2015) has shown that

the capacity of anti-Nazi Jewish resistance groups during World War II was linked by exposure to prewar repression, which in some cases leads the victimized groups to develop the skills to mount a resistance against future attacks. Similar patterns could be found regarding the effects of wartime violence against civilians. In a first moment, experiencing violence could produce fear, withdrawal, or other psychological mechanisms. These first reactions can be transformed into more political outcomes as time passes and those who have been exposed to violence discuss and reflect upon it. Indeed, this is one of the mechanisms discussed in the next section.

Moreover, beyond the psychological effects of violence and how they change over time, the way a civil war plays out at the local level can also have different effects across time. Territorial control could produce a short-term shift in political preferences that also influences how people react to violence, mainly motivated by fear of further reprisals ([Kalyvas, 2006](#)). However, this does not necessarily mean long-term demobilization or attachments. In Angola, [Pearce \(2015, 131\)](#) shows how civilians could remain neutral, by belonging to a “category of people who were not political actors but rather subject to whichever political movement was in control of the place where they were.” For at least some of the population then this change is probably a ‘mock’ attitude, and private opinions can be kept, at least while the conflict lasts. Following the opposite point of view, [Kalyvas \(2006\)](#) argues that these changes could indeed produce long-term attachments, as in the following example of the Spanish Civil War:

“Once the local Republican leaders were decimated in the first days of the war, all the young men, irrespective of their family’s prewar political affiliation, were drafted into the Nationalist army, fought against the Republic, and ‘became’ Nationalist. This endogenous preference shift was reflected in subsequent patterns of religious practice, where observance serves as a proxy for support for the Nationalist cause ... Initially the result of repression and fear, this shift eventually produced new, real, and enduring identities” ([Kalyvas, 2006, 130](#)).

The important aspect here is that the short-term and long-term effects of victimization do not necessarily match each other. And what it is probably more relevant for this dissertation, in the long-term, the social environment surrounding those who have been exposed to victimization might have a bigger impact than in the short-term. While, initially, emotional and psychological reactions to violence probably predominate, a long-term change in attitudes and preferences should be more dependent on the social structure of local communities, the way people discuss with each other about the violence or the inputs they receive from local elites.

I discuss this aspect below. Thus, as I try to do in the argument developed in this chapter, it is important to take into account the whole extended period after the violent events and the different mechanisms that could play out across time.

### 3.1.4 Scope conditions

This chapter discusses the social conditions of the effect of wartime civilian victimization on long-term political preferences. The aim is to develop a theory that explains why and when wartime violence against civilians leaves legacies in the form of a change in political preferences among those who have been exposed to such violence. The argument developed in the last section of this chapter can in principle be applied to any context of wartime violence against civilians. The key aspect is the existence of a facilitating ideological context, in the form of politically-aligned social networks at the local level, that allows for the whole process lined out below to take place.

In line with this, one assumption is made in the theoretical argument about the existence of identity groups. Given that we are talking about the ideological context, there needs to be some kind of political division defining identities and groups in the civil war, such as left-right ideology or ethnonationalism, which at least operates at the macro level. In practice, this assumption is not very problematic as virtually all wars are defined by some kind of political division, or else they are created in the course of the conflict. Yet, in the hypothetical case that a civil war was fought along non-political divisions and neither were they created *ex post*, the argument would have a hard time explaining the political consequences of violence.

Finally, I focus on the effects of wartime violence. Yet, the general insight on how the social context matters for the explanation of the legacies of violence and many of the mechanisms discussed are also valid in cases where civilian victimization takes place outside of a conflict, such as the repression of peaceful protests or even crime victimization. With certain caveats, the importance of the local social context in the creation of collective memories of the violence, the maintenance and politicization of private experiences, and the process of mobilization should take place in any context regardless of whether it is a civil war or not.

In this section, I have laid out the conceptual blocks of this theoretical argument. I have discussed what I mean by wartime civilian victimization, what it means to be exposed to such violence, and what different effects of violence we can think of. All these points are important as they set the foundations over which the argument is built. Thus, for instance, the different mechanisms through which the social context

influences the effect of victimization only make sense when we keep in mind that violence brings about different processes in the short-term and the long-term, or at the level of individuals or local communities. In the next section, I revisit previous arguments on the consequences of violence and update them, introducing a key factor: the influence of the local ideological context in the process by which violence leaves lasting effects on different outcomes, in this case, political preferences.

### 3.2 Explaining the legacies of violence

What are the consequences of wartime violence against civilians in terms of political preferences? In chapter 2 I reviewed the two main arguments that attempt to answer this question. The backfiring argument suggests that violence produces counter-mobilization, in other words, it decreases support for the perpetrator or its political identity and spurs support for its political opponent, which is usually explained by the emotional reaction to violence in the form of anger, outrage, or resentment (Balcells, 2012; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017). The demobilization argument holds the opposite view. Violence demobilizes the targeted population, as fear to further reprisals cancels out any other emotional reaction. Even if public support for the perpetrator does not increase, the victimized population retreats from politics and the perpetrator is thus successful in quashing the opposition (Lyall, 2009; Zhukov, 2015; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016).

Even though these two arguments provide two different expectations on the outcome of violence, they both share the same theoretical framework, which I show in figure 3.1. The main question is about the effect of wartime violence against civilians ( $V$ ) on some particular outcome that is measured in the postwar period ( $O$ ), such as political preferences or behavior. The key feature of these arguments is that the effect of  $V$  on  $O$  is assumed to be direct and unconditional. As I said above, most previous works assume that violence has a homogenous effect on political preferences and, in most cases, just compare those individuals who suffered violence with those who did not. The process leading from a violent event to a change in political preferences or behavior is assumed to take place at the level of individuals, and thus, if different effects of violence are observed, these are usually attributed to different types of violence or, if anything, to differences in the exposed population.

Beyond wartime violence and the outcome it produces, previous works also acknowledge that prewar conditions have an effect on both patterns of wartime violence and the outcome itself. However, this factor is treated as a confounder,




Figure 3.1: Previous theoretical framework

and the arrow that goes from V to O is not affected by it. Thus, violence could be conceived as the product of endogenous dynamics related to territorial control and personal hostilities (Kalyvas, 2006), or be determined by prewar political identities (Balcells, 2017) and even ancient hatreds (Kaufmann, 1996). In any case, the effect of violence is treated as a direct, unconditional one, which contributes in hardening and intensifying the divisions that motivated the violence or the ones that were created during the conflict. All this gives us a theoretical framework in which the consequences of violence are almost pre-determined during the civil war, and depend more on the generating process of civil war violence than on the process that leads from violent effects to a change in preferences.

The limitation of this approach is that it does not acknowledge that the process that leads from a violent event to a change in preferences, the arrow from V to O in figure 3.1, is neither direct nor unconditional. Rather than being a simple process that takes place at the level of individuals, the individual reaction to victimization in terms of political preferences or behavior is the product of a process with several steps, where the social environment plays a very important role. This theoretical framework needs to be developed to account for these conditional effects. In particular, I argue that the process from a violent event to a change in political preferences entails framing and interpreting these events, a collective discussion and creation of collective memories, and mobilizing upon these memories to translate them into political behavior. Individuals who have been exposed to victimization do not go through all these process in isolation, but do so within a social context. Borrowing the term from the literature on political behavior (Sprague, 1981; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Huckfeldt, Plutzer & Sprague, 1993; Burbank, 1997), I refer to this as the contextual argument, which I develop in the next section. Rather than supporting either the backfiring or the demobilization argument, I attempt to bridge the gap between them and acknowledge that identical instances of violence can have different outcomes depending on the context in which this process takes place.

### 3.2.1 Towards a contextual theory

The effect of violence on long-term political preferences and behavior is not an automatic response. Rather, it is the product of a process consisting of several steps. Figure 3.2 shows this process graphically.




Figure 3.2: Mechanisms

Three different steps mediate the relationship between violence and a change in political preferences or behavior. First, events and their interpretation, particularly their political interpretation, are not the same. Events need to be framed for individuals to understand how and why they happened, which political divisions explain their occurrence and how they match the political identities of victim, perpetrator, and those who have witnessed the violence. The result is an individual interpretation of an event. Along these lines, [Basta \(2018\)](#) distinguishes between occurrences and events, where the former are “all instances of political action” and events are the political interpretation of these events. Furthermore, he states that “without a broadly shared understanding among the relevant constituents that a particular occurrence constitutes a significant departure from the status quo, such an occurrence does not become an event” ([Basta, 2018, 1246](#)).

Second, the creation of collective memories is a form of political socialization, in which individual interpretations of violent events are collectively discussed and remembered, in a process I call here ‘collective remembrance’. A standardized, collective memory of the violence is thus created and becomes part of a group identity. As [Lindgren \(2005, 156\)](#) says, “it is above all when memories of violence are narrated in public that people together start to ‘remake the world’ and re-arrange social categories into evil and good.”

And finally, collective memories do not necessarily have a direct translation into political behavior. For them to be translated into specific preferences or behavior, such as voting to a particular political party, mobilization needs to take place. Even if victimization is part of the collective identity and individuals have developed

identities and social relationships where victimization is a defining feature, there are many other issues that can drive political behavior. These collective memories will only have an observable effect when they are used to justify certain political behavior.

All these steps do not take place at the level of individuals, but within a social context. The main insight of my argument is thus that the social context plays a crucial role in determining the effects of violence. In particular, I argue that the ideological context in which this process takes place determines whether violence produces a backfiring or a demobilization effect. Contrary to the previous arguments reviewed above, a contextual theory of the consequences of violence explains the direction of the effect by the differences in this ideological context.

By ideological context, I mean the existence of local social networks linked to a particular political identity that drive the processes of framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization in a particular direction. This political identity is defined vis-a-vis the political divisions that delineated the conflict and which, presumably, motivated the violence, or at least were used to make sense of wartime events. The social networks I talk about can be formal political parties or organizations, but also social networks embedded in everyday life, such as neighbor associations or labor groups. This is why local-level variation is crucial to understand the effects of violence. The existence of these networks means that individuals have access to certain political tools to understand, interpret and discuss the violence. A large enough number of community members linked to a certain ideology will ensure that individuals have access to political information and are able to get together to discuss personal experiences of the violence, developing some kind of ‘ideological capital’ that enables the whole process to take place. This is true particularly for the case of a backfiring effect, where the opposition to the perpetrator needs to frame the violent events, create collective memories and mobilize a behavioral response. The absence of a facilitating ideological context—or an ideological context mostly linked to the perpetrator’s identity—will stop the whole process from victimization to the behavioral outcome from taking place.

Ideology has already been acknowledged in the literature as an important factor determining conflict dynamics (e.g. [Sanín & Wood, 2014](#); [Balcells & Kalyvas, 2015](#); [Costalli & Ruggeri, 2015, 2017](#)) and, particularly, its role in channeling emotions. [Nussio \(2017, 928\)](#) argues that “ideology as a specific kind of collective frame can act as the connecting piece that channels meandering emotions into a given direction and prescribes a corresponding behavioral response.” Moreover, [Schubiger & Zelina \(2017, 950\)](#) acknowledge that “ideology, as a set of values, norms, and beliefs that connects individuals to a movement or organization as a whole, is not

only important as an explanatory variable or strategic tool, but may also mediate and moderate many relationships we care about in the study of political violence.” My argument states that the presence of a facilitating ideological context at the local level will be a key factor determining the process that leads from violence to its outcome and thus the effect it has on any change in political preferences.

Following this, the effect of violence on the outcome will not be a direct, unconditional one, as pictured in the framework discussed above. Here, this effect depends on the ideological context present in each local community, which explains why violence has a particular effect. This updated theoretical framework I propose, shown in figure 3.3, includes thus this moderating variable in the relationship between V and O. In turn, the ideological context is also affected by both wartime violence and the prewar context. This last issue is discussed in the next section, although it constitutes more of an empirical problem than a theoretical inconsistency.




Figure 3.3: Updated theoretical framework

The inclusion of the ideological context as a moderating variable in the relationship between violence and its outcome is the main theoretical innovation of this dissertation, which develops a contextual theory of the legacies of victimization and highlights the importance of the social context. Two theoretical aspects found in the literature are worth discussing, as they justify this new approach.

First, the individual reaction to victimization is dependent on the social environment surrounding the victim, an observation that has been pointed out by previous research. This means that, even without considering local-level effects, the way individuals who have been exposed to violence react, in terms of both psychological symptoms and sociopolitical reactions, is heavily dependent on where they live, with whom they interact, and the social networks of support they enjoy. Thus, two victims of the same violent event could have two completely different reactions depending on whether they have an extensive network of support or not, or whether they live in an environment where violence is frowned upon or not. Again, this observation goes against the assumption in many previous studies on the legacies of political violence pointed out in the previous chapter, namely, that there

exists a homogenous effect of victimization and that its variation depends more on the characteristics of the violence itself than on those of the victims.

Second, leaving victimization and individual reactions aside, the social context has long been regarded in social and political science as an important factor in determining political preferences. Beyond individual characteristics, those of the people surrounding an individual will shape the way she thinks about a particular topic or the way she changes that perception. The argument on the social conditions of the long-term effect on victimization, developed in the last section of this chapter, draws heavily on this insight.

Here I discuss these two points, before turning to the last section of this chapter, where I develop the theoretical argument going back to the three mechanisms laid out above and discussing the importance of the local ideological context for each of them.

#### *Contextual reactions to victimization*

The individual reaction to victimization varies depending on the social context that surrounds the victim. As with any other shock, individuals cope with the trauma of violent experiences collectively (Lyons et al., 1998). This means that any social or political reaction to violence, far from being an individual-only process, has to be understood in the context of the social environment that surrounds those who have been exposed to violence.

There are two reasons why this aspect is very important to understand the political reactions to violence. First, experiencing or witnessing violence is a traumatic experience. Assuming that every individual has by its own means the tools to overcome it is not very realistic. Rather than increased social embeddedness or political participation, the default reactions will probably be withdrawal, fear, or trauma. Thus, considering the impact of the social context is crucial to understand how a victim develops a relatively positive social and political reaction. Previous research on the consequences of crime or violent trauma suggests this is the case.

In a recent study on the consequences of crime victimization in Mexico, Dorff (2017) focuses on the increase in individual political participation as a result of victimization, and shows that the density of kinship networks influences the increase in political actions caused by exposure to crime:

“when victims communicate often with their families, they engage in a process of sharing their experience of victimization and are more likely to turn their experience into action. By processing with their loved ones about the traumatic event, individuals feel supported and motivated to

participate in their community and to be a part of changing their environment, instead of remaining a victim of it" (Dorff, 2017, 561).

Thus, rather than assuming an almost automatic effect of victimization on increased political participation, victims' reaction seems to be highly dependent on their social context and thus in the way they socially discuss the events and develop a reaction to them. This idea resonates with previous research from psychology showing that social networks of support help an individual overcome traumatic experiences (Walsh, 2003, 2007), and that PTSD symptoms on victims of trauma likely depend on the social reactions from those surrounding the victim (Brewin, Andrews & Valentine, 2000; Ullman et al., 2007), including those who have suffered war-related trauma (Johnson & Thompson, 2008). Moreover, psychological research also shows that, among individuals who live in high-crime neighborhoods, the density of interpersonal connection helps diffusing the effect of crime on fear and mistrust (Ross & Jang, 2000).

Second, when it comes to more political outcomes, as the one considered in this dissertation, the impact of the social environment should be even more important. An increase in political participation or, even more crucially, a shift in political preferences towards certain ideologies or political parties is the product of a much more complex interpretation of the events. This process invariably takes place in the social space, among relatives, friends, or neighbors, who discuss the violence and develop a social agreement on what it means, who was responsible for it and its consequences for the future. Explaining the sociocognitive mechanisms that explain the influence of past ethnic conflict on current war, Rydgren (2007) explains that ethnically homogenous friendship networks explain the radicalization of ethnic prejudices in the Balkans:

"People are involved in social-reality testing when they validate knowledge and beliefs, in particular beliefs that lack objective referents, or that have objective referents of which people are unaware (...), by comparing them to the beliefs held by significant others. The more their beliefs harmonize with those of significant others, the more valid or appropriate they are judged to be" (Rydgren, 2007, 235–236).

In summary, the effect of victimization on individuals is the product of a process highly dependent on the social context. This is true for even such isolated consequences as the psychological reaction to violence, but it is even more relevant when focusing on its consequences for political preferences and behavior.

*Contextual factors and political preferences*

Beyond the importance of the social context in shaping the individual reaction to victimization, another crucial aspect of this theoretical framework is the way the social environment shapes the formation and change of political preferences. Even though this process is relevant in every political context and not unique to wartime or postwar situations, previous research in political science has made clear that the political preferences and attitudes of an individual are shaped by those who surround her and the everyday environment in which she lives. Thus, when it comes to think about how events of such importance as wartime violence change political preferences, it is important to note that this change does not take place in isolation.

Political preferences are not the outcome of a process that takes place exclusively at the individual level. Rather, the preferences of those around an individual greatly determine the way someone thinks about a certain topic or updates her preferences. Indeed, whether having a certain preference is more or less important than being around those that have the same preference has been long discussed within the social sciences, as in the case of the impact of Catholic attitudes vis-a-vis Catholic social networks on individual behavior (Durkheim, 1897). Contextual theories of politics are a modern version of this debate, where political behavior is explained not—or rather, not exclusively—by individual characteristics but by the characteristics of the social environment. There is a strong interrelation between one's political characteristics and those of the surrounding social networks, and the social interactions that stem from this situation ultimately define political preferences (e.g. Sprague, 1981; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Huckfeldt, Plutzer & Sprague, 1993).

Everyday social interactions are a key factor determining someone's political preferences, because the political context in which an individual lives is a constant influence on them. Beyond the formation of life-long preferences on 'constant' issues or general ideologies, this point of view is also valid to the relationship between political events and preferences. In the long term, these contextual factors might be even more important to understand how certain events, civil war violence in this case, impact political preferences. Informal groups and interpersonal discussion greatly shape the way people frame political events (Walsh, 2004), and thus how they come to interpret them and compare against their own previously held beliefs. Rather than a one-way process, the social structure should also determine the interpretation of certain frames. For instance, previous research on evaluations of governments' economic policy suggests that partisanship crucially determines

how citizens see economic facts (e.g. [Evans & Pickup, 2010](#); [Tilley & Hobolt, 2011](#); [Achen & Bartels, 2016](#)), and these processes of affective polarization are not exclusive to political affiliations but also play an important role across opinion groups, as in the case of Brexit in the UK ([Hobolt, Leeper & Tilley, 2018](#)).

The contextual approach to understand political preferences and the interpretation of political events is a key aspect in the argument developed in the next section. Following research on public opinion and preferences formation, the influence of social networks and political identities on the way wartime violent events impact preferences needs to be taken into account.

These two insights from previous research on the psychology of trauma and the formation and change of political preferences again underscore the need of a contextual theory of the legacies of violence. Previous works rely on a theoretical framework that ignores the social environment and conceive the process that transforms violent events into a change in political preferences as a direct, unconditional one. I argue that this process is more complex than previously thought, as individuals cannot be treated as isolated spectators of violence. The local social environment plays a crucial role in it and determines the direction of the effect of violence. In particular, it is the ideological context, or the presence of local social networks linked to a particular political identity, what explains the way this process plays out. The next section develops this argument discussing the effect of the ideological context in each of the mechanisms shown above in figure 3.2.

### 3.3 The role of the local ideological context

I argue that the effect of violence on political preferences is dependent on the local ideological context, which I defined above as the existence of politically-aligned social networks at the local level, which allow for the whole process to take place and determine the direction of the effect. This concept allows me to bridge previous arguments on the consequences of violence which suggest that violence has either a backfiring or a demobilization effect. Although most previous works support the backfiring argument, particularly in terms of political preferences, the evidence for this effect is still limited and it is unclear how it varies or why it would be present in some areas or cases but not in others. My argument states that the effect of violence does not take place directly, nor are exposed individuals isolated spectators to violence who create an individual response to it. It is the local ideological context what determines the direction of this effect.

In this section I discuss how this ideological context affects each of the three steps on the process that leads from violent events to a change in preferences, laid

out in figure 3.2. First, ideologically-aligned local networks contribute to the framing of violent events, helping individuals to make sense of the violence and the political nature of victimization. Second, the ideological context has a crucial impact on collective remembrance, as these networks provide a social space in which memories are discussed, private experiences are politicized, and the events of the war are collectively remembered. And finally, the existence of ideologically-aligned networks plays a fundamental role in the mobilization of the population upon these memories, which translates into specific political behavior such as voting.

Three assumptions need to be discussed. First, my argument is in principle agnostic to the prewar conditions under which wartime violence emerges, in other words, the determinants of civil war violence. My focus is on the consequences of the violence itself, which in principle is independent of whether patterns of violence were the product of, for instance, prewar identities (Balcells, 2017) or non-political antipathies (Kalyvas, 2006). It is true, however, that the ideological context is dependent on these prewar conditions, as well as on patterns of wartime violence. Figure 3.3, which summarizes the theoretical framework I propose, shows two dashed lines indicating an effect of the prewar context and wartime violence on the postwar ideological context. Although empirically these are factors to be accounted for, theoretically they are not as problematic. The ideological context after the war can, and usually does, stem from prewar conditions, as at least some networks aligned with a particular ideology are likely to remain in place after the war, and so do the structural conditions that produce them. Similarly, the civil war also affects the ideological context, as violence is likely to follow political divisions. In any case, my discussion revolves around the local context that is in place after the civil war, and its endogenous origins are more of an empirical problem than a theoretical one.

Second, I talk about the long-term effect of violence on political preferences. The definition of long-term in the literature is always relative, and examples from conflict research use this concept to refer to time periods that range from a few years (e.g. Costalli & Ruggeri, 2018) to several centuries (e.g. Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2014). I do not provide a specific temporal definition of long-term, although the empirical chapters analyze data that span across a few decades. When I talk about the long-term effect of violence, I refer to the whole process outlined above (see figure 3.2) and the time it takes for this process to take place.

Finally, I develop an argument focusing on local communities as the unit of analysis. I do so because it is mainly at this level where the mechanisms and the impact of the ideological context take place. In my argument, the three steps of framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization work through everyday inter-

action and close social networks. However, this does not mean that the argument could not be scaled up to talk about aggregated effects at larger levels of analysis, such as ethnic groups or entire countries. Similarly, measurement does not necessarily have to follow this level of analysis. Individual-level data, provided that data on the ideological context in which each individual lives is available, could also be used to test the argument. Actually, the fact that I focus at the local level does not mean that I rule out any variation within local communities. As I discuss in the conclusion, this is one of the questions this dissertation leaves open for further research.<sup>4</sup>

In the following, I discuss the impact of the ideological context in each of the three mechanisms I outlined above. Again, by ideological context, I mean the existence of ideologically-aligned social networks at the local level, where alignment is understood relative to the main war cleavages and, in particular, the perpetrator's political identity.

### 3.3.1 Framing

The first step in the process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences entails the interpretation it is made about such event. Experiencing violence does not mean that exposed individuals will form an objective opinion about the event. Rather, this interpretation is dependent on the way wartime events were framed. My argument states that the local ideological context surrounding an individual has a crucial influence on this framing process, and determines the political meaning given to these events.

Past research shows the importance of the social environment in this framing process, even during wartime or immediately after it. For instance, [Shesterinina \(2016\)](#) shows how, during the first moments of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993, information about war-related threats spread in Abkhazia through local community leaders, and was “reinforced and acted on within the quotidian networks of relatives and friends” ([Shesterinina, 2016](#), 411). In the context of the Sri Lankan civil war, [Mohan \(2014\)](#) tells the story of a group of Tamil civilians who, in the middle of the last government offensive of 2008-2009, were seeking refuge from air shelling in a bunker, and illustrates the way they coped with this situation:

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<sup>4</sup>For instance, even if wartime violence produces a backfiring effect against the perpetrator, that does not necessarily mean that all local population shifts in the same direction, as those ideologically closer to the perpetrator could experience an ‘entrenchment’ effect and support even more the perpetrator, increasing local polarization. My own ongoing work explores precisely this question in the case of Spain.

"They spent a few hours reminiscing about other battles, as the people of Vanni tended to do, especially when they were waiting out storms such as this. ... These were the common threads that bound the Tamil community: the close shaves, the what-ifs, the recasting of dumb luck as courage, pain as experience, loses as tests of character. ... As the battles continued, people needed to tell and retell these stories, gather mental energy for more strife, track back reflexive decisions that had saved or killed someone, and glean strategy from them" ([Mohan, 2014](#), 66-67).

The networks that form the local ideological context thus frame wartime events and provide a political account of victimization, helping to form collective memories. As said in the previous section, coping with violence is a collective experience ([Lyons et al., 1998](#)). Social-psychological research suggests that self-perceived victimhood is usually a collective phenomenon in which social identities play a crucial role defining wartime memories ([Bar-Tal, 1997, 2007](#)). These memories are likely to vary across and even within localities, and do not always correspond to an objective portrait of the conflict. In Guatemala, villagers in some municipalities cared more about which of their neighbors was responsible for the denunciation that led to their relatives' deaths than whether it was actually carried out by the guerrilla or the army ([Burrell, 2013](#)). Thus, local networks carry out an important mobilization task by providing a collective story of victimization and pointing out to those who were responsible for the violence.

As time passes, this contextual influence becomes more important. Reviewing the literature on the effect of wartime experiences in the Balkans, [Glaurdić & Vuković \(2016, 137\)](#) acknowledge that "survey research ... has suggested that while individual experiences of war violence carry little predictive power in explaining one's future nationalism or ethnic prejudice, contextual experiences of violence can help explain the development of these sentiments" (see also [Dyrstad, 2012](#)). [Huddy et al. \(2002\)](#) find results coherent with these contextual effects in the context of the perceived risk of terrorist threats. Using data from Pakistan, [Fair et al. \(2018\)](#) find that psychological perceptions of violence, rather than exposure to violence itself, influence support for militant groups.

This interpretation is heavily dependent on the political identities of the victims and perpetrators, and it is very likely that social divisions within local communities create radically different views on actual events. Some researchers have found that civilians sometimes hold completely different views of wartime events. They attribute this to a "Fog of War" effect of wartime confusion, where there are completely different accounts among civilians who just witnessed the same events

(Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016). However, others acknowledge that this variation depends heavily on the identity of the perpetrator and civilians' political beliefs, where "civilians' factual beliefs is not simply the result of cognitive confusion and wartime ambiguity, but the product of systematic motivational factors in conflict settings" (Silverman, 2019, 1464).

Political elites know this, and the perpetrator, particularly if it is in a position of power, will try to coopt the local population and establish an interpretation of events that goes to its own interest. Daly (2019, 749) argues that "the security gains attributed to the stronger belligerent offsets the belligerent's use of atrocities, allowing it largely to evade culpability for violence." Relatedly, Matanock & García-Sánchez (2018) find evidence for a preference falsification mechanism when civilians are asked about the state counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia. If the local ideological context is linked to the opposition to the perpetrator, it acts as a counterweight to these cooptation efforts.

Furthermore, in the context of a civil war, the social structures that emerge in the aftermath of a conflict will play a role in this process, as authorities will seek to gain cooperation from local sectors to establish political power and cement their own story of the conflict. Even in the absence of prior political attachments, conflict dynamics bring about a mechanism of local alignment that also affects these interpretations. As Kalyvas (2006, 386) argues, "once a war has ended, the master narrative of the conflict provides a handy way ex post factor to simplify, streamline, and ultimately erase the war's complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities." Taking into account that cooperation with repressive authorities is a common phenomenon across any type of political regime, and that this type of cooperation may even take place in the absence of direct incentives (Bergemann, 2017), it becomes clear that witnessing a violent event does not mean that local civilians will have an uncontested view over what happened.

Thus, in many conflict contexts, civilians are not fully aware of wartime events, and attitudes towards the perpetrator are not what should be expected. In Argentina, where the government was successful in covering up the harsh repression that took place between 1976 and 1982, "it was only after the 1982 defeat ... that the public learned of the extent and brutality of the political persecution during the dictatorship" (Robben, 1995, 82). The cooptation of local elites is also important to understand these divergent opinions about factual events, particularly since they are usually embedded within the community. In Mozambique, talking about the *majubas*, or local enforcers of Renamo, Finnegan (1992, 67) noted that "former captives [of Renamo] spoke about the *majubas* with amazing mildness. They often pointed out that the *majubas* had little choice; they were just ordinary peasants

themselves, compelled to do the dirty work of the *matsangas* [Renamo fighters] to survive. Of course, when they talked about *majubas*, they were often talking about members of their own families.” In Papua, Indonesia, [Wilson & Akhtar \(2019, 720\)](#) find that “repression has not led to a coordinated, mass-level uprising because it has been accompanied by the increased co-optation of many local leaders.”

My argument states that the existence of local networks that work as a counter-weight to the perpetrator’s political identity is key to frame violent events, enabling civilians to have an interpretation of these that acts as a first step to any change in preferences in the direction of a backfiring effect. This is clear in cases where the perpetrator is in power after the civil war, as in the two cases that this dissertation analyzes, Spain and Guatemala. However, competing stories and framing processes take place everywhere, and the importance of ideologically-aligned local networks will be key to witness a violence-induced change in preferences in a particular direction.

### 3.3.2 Collective remembrance

Local, ideologically-aligned social networks also contribute to foster the remembering of events, creating spaces for like-minded individuals to discuss and get immersed in a process of political socialization. The public component of this process is key to understand the long-term creation of collective memories. This would not happen without the existence of a facilitating ideological context, as individuals of a certain ideology (e.g. contrary to the perpetrator) would not have the opportunity to get together and share and discuss their own interpretations of wartime events.

This mechanism draws heavily on the previous discussion on framing, as frames are learnt socially in everyday discussions ([Gamson, 1992; Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Walsh, 2004](#)). Moreover, frames need to be recovered over and over again in order to create a durable output in terms of political preferences. Discussing the psychological mechanisms behind the framing effect, [Chong & Druckman \(2007\)](#) highlight the importance of retrieval and how, in this case, constant exposure to political discussion drives this process:

“In order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration … needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use. … In addition to being available, the consideration must be accessible, meaning its activation potential must exceed a certain threshold so that the consideration is retrieved from long-term memory. One way in which accessibility increases is through regular or recent exposure to a communication frame emphasizing the consideration” ([Chong & Druckman, 2007, 110](#)).

By engaging in constant interaction with those who share political experiences and identities, individuals develop a common understanding of past experiences of victimization and come to understand them in the language of political cleavages. Along these lines, [Wittenberg \(2006, 51\)](#) explains that the persistence of rightist ideology during the communist period in Hungary was due to local church institutions, noting that “being nominally Roman Catholic (or Calvinist) mattered less for the transmission of rightist attachments than being around other Catholics (or Calvinists) in a church community.” In the context of Eastern European new democracies, [Tavits \(2013\)](#) argues the existence of local party branches motivates interaction between party members and supporters, increasing electoral support. Moreover, case evidence from previous research points to the importance of the social context in explaining the persistence of attitudes in the long term. For instance, [Voigtländer & Voth \(2012, 1341\)](#) find that anti-Semitic attitudes persisted in Germany over many centuries, but mainly in small towns with tight networks and low mobility, where collective rituals such as “symbolic practices and festivals may have helped perpetuate hostile beliefs.” In repressive contexts, being in constant contact with other like-minded individuals might also reduce the fear induced by repression, which according to previous studies on its relationship with dissent, seems to play an important role particularly through “pessimism about the likelihood that other opposition supporters will also engage in dissent” ([Young, 2019, 140](#)).

Being among people with a shared ideology also reinforces the identity component which, at least in places that have been exposed to violence, should also include a strong component related to past victimization. As discussed above, violence creates new social structures and collective identities are reinforced within these new structures. The same applies to cases where violence targets previously existing identities, such as ideological or ethnic groups. In any case, the experience of victimization should play a major role in the collective identity. As [Gould \(1995, 18\)](#) says, “critical events can set the stage for mobilization not because they create collective identities where none existed before but because they rearrange the priority ranking of social identifications that already matter to people in varying degrees.” This argument resonates with an agency-focused view on class formation, as formulated by [Thompson \(1963\)](#). Here, the formation of class consciousness stems also not from the economic position but from the social relations that are forged because of this economic structure, together with individuals’ “inherited culture and expectations.”

Thus, the existence of a facilitating ideological context, or a critical mass of individuals with a shared ideology, which could partly be the product of violence it-

self, helps maintaining collective memories and political identities over time. This should cancel out the cooptation strategies carried out by elites linked to the perpetrator or the decay in the importance of wartime memories that takes place over time. Without this form of political support, the existence of cross-cutting pressures should produce at least some kind of disengagement from politics, making the memories of wartime events less salient in defining preferences and demobilization more likely to take place. Studying the effect of conflict on ethnonational identities in Catalonia and how it affects groups with such pressures, [Hierro & Gallego \(2018, 1332\)](#) show that “disengagement from politics is a common reaction to conflict among this cross-pressured group.” [Mutz \(2002\)](#) shows that individuals who have ideologically cross-cutting networks are less likely to participate in politics and suggests two mechanisms to explain this findings: “attitudinal ambivalence that cross-cutting exposure is likely to engender” and social accountability, in other words, the social pressures imposed by this type of networks, which makes political action to be perceived as more costly or risky ([Mutz, 2002, 840](#)).

All in all, the existence of a facilitating ideological context, in the form of networks of like-minded individuals, contributes in keeping collective memories alive, cancelling off cross-cutting pressures, and maintaining the salience of the conflict experience. Identities and political affinities that are linked to past victimization get thus reinforced and continue to be a defining factor of political preferences.

### 3.3.3 Mobilization

A final mechanism in the process that is often overlooked is the translation of collective memories into political behavior. Many issues different from victimization can drive political behavior, such as voting to particular political parties, even if victimization is part of the collective identity.

Ultimately, it is the existence of ideologically-aligned social networks that makes people more likely to act based on wartime memories than on other social or economic issues. As with any other form of mobilization, this is far from being an individual-based process. Previous research again suggests that mobilization is necessary for memories of victimization to be translated into specific forms of political behavior. In Greece, [Fouka & Voth \(2016, 4–5\)](#) link massacres by Nazi forces during the Second World War with boycotts to German car sales during the 2010–14 Euro crisis, and find that the effect is bigger in “areas with a history of political radicalization in the past ... [and] in areas with numerous Facebook groups dedicated to boycotting German products.”

Although perhaps less relevant than the two mechanisms previously discussed, the existence of a facilitating ideological context in the local community makes it more likely that memories and preferences translate into specific forms of political behavior. This observation is valid for both voting patterns and more extreme forms of political mobilization, such as recruitment into violent groups. Indeed, [Molina \(2014\)](#) argues that memories of Francoist victimization in the Basque Country, which certainly motivated recruitment into and support for the terrorist group ETA, were a product more of the mobilization work done by local networks than of actual experiences of victimization.

### 3.4 Summary

This chapter has introduced the theoretical framework of this dissertation. Previous research on the consequences of violence relies on a direct, unconditional model of the effect of violence on political preferences or behavior which rules out any mediating factor. I have updated it, arguing that the process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences consists of several steps and that the local ideological context plays a crucial role in the way this process plays out. In particular, the ideological context, or the presence of ideologically-aligned social networks at the local level, plays a fundamental role in at least three aspects. First, it determines the framing of wartime events, helping local individuals to develop a political interpretation of what happened during the civil war. Second, the existence of these ideologically-aligned networks provides a space where like-minded individuals can discuss politics and make private experiences public, helping to create collective memories and to maintain them over time. And third, the existence of this type of networks contributes in the translation of collective memories and preferences into actual political behavior, mobilizing the local population upon the experience of victimization.

The next chapters test this argument empirically, relying on two detailed analyses of Spain and Guatemala. Moreover, the last empirical chapter looks at a much larger sample to find if the results are coherent with the theory or, rather, offer evidence to the competing argument that speaks of an unconditional effect of violence.



**Part II**  
**Empirical evidence**



# 4

## Spain I

### Background, argument and qualitative evidence

In the first part of this dissertation, I reviewed previous literature on the consequences of violence against civilians, discussed its limitations and discussed the gap that justifies this dissertation. In chapter 3, I developed the theoretical framework that offers a new argument on how wartime civilian victimization leaves a long-term effect on political preferences. I turn now to the empirical evidence, focusing first on the case of Spain.

The Spanish Civil War is by now a classic episode in the recent European history and has long attracted a considerable attention from writers, artists, historians, and academics. The war started on July 18, 1936 and ended on April, 1, 1939, and it was preceded by one of the most politically intense periods in the contemporary history of Spain. During those three years, the conflict pitted the right-wing nationalist rebels commanded by General Francisco Franco against the Republican forces, formed by army officers who remained loyal to the Republic as well as left-wing militias. Franco's victory in the civil war meant the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Spain that would last almost 40 years, until democracy was finally restored after the death of Franco in 1975.

Beyond romantic tales of popular revolution and the struggle of ideas that have inspired many writers ([Hobsbawm, 2007](#)), the Spanish Civil War is also a case of academic interest, particularly when it comes to violence against civilians (see [Balcells, 2017](#)). Victimization was commonly used during the conflict and targeting strongly followed political identities, in an attempt to wipe out potential enemies within the controlled territories. Although both sides resorted to violence against civilians, the right-wing rebels did so with the explicit goal of dismantling the Republican regime and controlling the population. More than 150,000 people died as a result of rearguard one-sided violence during and immediately after the war. The rebels were responsible for two thirds of these deaths. The extent of this repression and its legacies have played an important role in Spanish politics, which continues to this day. In late 2019, the exhumation of Franco's remains from a public shrine, the *Valle de los Caídos* (Valley of the Fallen), became a topic of major importance ([Taladrid, 2019](#)) and probably played a significant role in November 2019

elections. Understanding how wartime victimization affected political preferences in the long term is thus a compelling question and speaks both to current research on the legacies of violence as well as modern Spanish politics.

Building on the theoretical argument developed in the chapter 3, I argue that Francoist victimization only had a backfiring effect—i.e. increased leftist electoral support—in those communities where political networks of opposition had been active during the dictatorship, helping to provide individuals with a political interpretation of wartime victimization, creating collective memories based upon it, and offering a social context in which it was possible to discuss and share wartime experiences, thus mobilizing electoral support for leftist parties in the long run.

In this chapter, I focus on qualitative evidence. I first give an overview of the Spanish Civil War and the recent history of Spain. Then, I present my argument on the specific determinants of the long-term effect of violence in Spain, building upon the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3, and define my hypotheses. The final section draws on the extensive historiography on the Spanish conflict and the dictatorship to offer qualitative evidence for the argument. The last section concludes. All the quantitative evidence is presented and discussed in chapter 5.

## 4.1 Historical background

Spain hosts 46.7 million inhabitants ([UN, 2019](#)) across a large and geographically diverse territory. Socially, the country is not homogenous either. Besides Spanish, several languages are spoken, and three of them are co-official in their respective regions: Galician, in Galicia; Basque, in the Basque Country and northern Navarre; and Catalan in Catalonia.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in these three regions there are national identities and, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country, nationalism has strongly defined the political development of these regions and spurred independence movements in both cases. Figure 4.1 displays a map of Spain showing its first-level administrative regions.<sup>2</sup>

The recent political historically has been volatile. The proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931 was the beginning of a period of social and political reform that constitutes the direct antecedent to the Spanish Civil War. After the conflict, Franco set up a long-lasting dictatorship that would only give way to a democracy after his death in 1975. In this section I briefly review the civil war, including

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<sup>1</sup>In addition, Occitan (*Aranés*) is official in a small area in Catalonia, and both Astur-Leonese and Aragonese have special recognition in their regions.

<sup>2</sup>Spain has 17 autonomous communities (*comunidades autónomas*), which are divided in 50 provinces, plus the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The following maps in this and next chapters show the division in provinces or municipalities.



Figure 4.1: Administrative Map of Spain

Source: CIA (2019).

patterns of civilian victimization, and both Franco's regime and the transition to democracy. This is the historical background for the two chapters dedicated to Spain.

#### 4.1.1 The Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War started in July 1936, and it was preceded by one of the most politically intense periods in the contemporary history of Spain.<sup>3</sup> The conflict was mainly fought along the left-right cleavage, between the nationalist rebels commanded by General Francisco Franco, and the Republican forces, formed by army officers who remained loyal to the Republic as well as left-wing militias. Social and

<sup>3</sup>For detailed information about the conflict see the works this section draws on, e.g., Thomas (1977); Preston (2007); Casanova (2010); Payne (2012).

political struggles along this division were already very present in the previous years.

The Second Republic, which lasted between 1931 and 1936, brought profound social, economic, and political changes that reshaped the country and set in motion a process of polarization between the progressive and conservative political sectors. Broad liberal reforms approved by the left in the first two years of the Republic were responded by a reorganization of the Right. The class struggle intensified, anticipating the civil war. The best example of this was the general strike of October 1934, which escalated to a full-blown revolution in the mining region of Asturias, and was violently repressed by the army, commanded by General Francisco Franco.

In early 1936, when general elections took place, the political climate in Spain was extremely charged. The elections gained “a kind of plebiscitary status, either in support of the insurrection and an all-left Republic that excluded the center and right, or in favor of the right and some kind of transformed rightist regime” ([Payne, 2012](#), 29). The *Frente Popular* coalition, which included all major leftist parties, won and displaced the previous conservative government. But just a few months later, in July 18, a group of army officers rose against the government. The partial failure of the coup fractured the Armed Forces and divided the country in two sides, marking the beginning of the civil war. Figure 4.2 shows the situation just a couple weeks after the coup, which basically mirrors those places where the coup was successful.

The first few weeks of the conflict witnessed a quick mobilization of both sides, who urged to organize and gain territory. During the ‘hot’ summer of 1936, the rebels conquered the South-West and the western half of Asturias, joining the rebel cities of Toledo and Seville in the South and Oviedo in the North with the rest of the rebel territory. The Republican government kept most of the East coast, and the northern strip of coast between the heavily industrial and left-lining regions of Central Asturias and the Basque Country.

The territorial divisions established during the summer of 1936 would remain stable during the first half of the conflict. Indeed, the Spanish Civil War is a classic case of conventional civil war in which both sides fought along relatively fixed frontlines, using classic armies and warfare techniques. In 1937 the rebels obtained a decisive victory in the Northern Front, winning the ‘War in the North’ campaign when they first occupied Bilbao in June, then Santander in September, and finally Asturias in October.

The battle of the Ebro river, the longest and bloodiest one of the civil war, took place during 1938. The rebels won this battle in November, and shortly after this victory, Barcelona fell to the nationalist side in January 1939. In late March, Franco’s



Figure 4.2: Patterns of territorial control in July 1936

army occupied Madrid and captured all the rest of the territory, announcing the end of the war on April 1, 1939.

#### *Patterns of civilian victimization*

The Spanish Civil War witnessed extensive victimization of the civilian population, in an attempt to wipe out potential enemies within the controlled territories. Following current research, more than 150,000 people died as a result of rearguard one-sided violence, of which around 100,000 took place in the territory controlled by the military rebels (Casanova, 2010, 181).

Both sides resorted to violence against civilians, but the rebels did so with the explicit goal of dismantling the Republican regime and controlling the population. When urged by foreign diplomats to bring the war to a quick end, Francisco Franco affirmed that he was “not interested in territory but in inhabitants,” and expressed worry about ending the war too soon, before he had “the certainty of being able to found a regime” (cited in Anderson, 2016, 10). Similarly, General Emilio Mola, one of the early leaders of the uprising until his death in a plane crash in 1937, declared shortly after the July 1936 coup that “the military victory is nothing more than a

phase, a stage... then comes the reconstruction of Spain and the punishment of the miserable, the evil, and the murderers" (quoted in [Reig Tapia, 1990](#), 58–59).

The pattern of victimization by the rebel forces started right after the coup. Following a selective way of targeting, the main victims were the active or potential members of the opposition, who could complicate the founding of a new regime. As [Casanova \(2010, 181–182\)](#) says,

“the repression dealt out by the military rebels was of a selective nature from the outset. The first to fall were the political authorities, distinguished republicans and political and trade union leaders. ... They were killed not to serve as a lesson to their followers, as is sometimes said, but to overthrow the model of society and system of freedoms that they defended.”

Violence in the Republican side was similar, although of a much less institutionalized nature. In both sides, non-rational, non-planned, or more intimate reasons played a role in shaping violence, as when people denounced neighbors based on previous family quarrels. However, the main factor explaining the violence were political identities and the profound social divisions created by these ([Balcells, 2010b, 2017](#)).

Victimization took place in several shapes. There was indirect violence in the form of bombardments, mainly by the Rebel forces against Republican areas. And there was direct violence, in which local militias would track down local opposition, using previous political affiliations or membership in trade unions (in the nationalist side) or religious organizations (in the Republican side). A common form of violent repression were the *paseos* (strolls), when the local militia would go to the victim's home, take him or her for a walk, and kill the victim extrajudicially. And finally, a relevant part of the victimization, which took place mainly after the war, were the summary executions sentenced by war trials (*Consejos de Guerra*) against people who had form part of the Republican side during the conflict, or were just suspected of having done so.

The focus of this dissertation is on the direct repression carried out, at least partially, by local actors. Differently from indirect violence such as air shelling, I focus here on we are interested in the local repression of local opposition, of which direct, ‘illegal’ repression is the best mirror. Given the number of victims and its international nature, violence against civilians in Spain would qualify as an episode of “mass killing”, following [Valentino’s \(2004\)](#) definition.

#### 4.1.2 The Franco dictatorship

The rebel's victory in the civil war meant the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Spain that would last almost 40 years. Franco continued with the task he had already started in the conquered territories since 1936, setting up a fully conservative regime and repressing any residual opposition that still existed within the country (Julia, 1999; González Duro, 2003; Núñez Díaz-Balart, 2004; Maestre et al., 2004).

##### *Winners and losers during the postwar*

The first few years of the postwar period were especially harsh. The new authorities prosecuted hundreds of thousands of people who had participated in the civil war against Franco's forces—and those who would be denounced later on, executing many of them. García Piñeiro (2001, 104) tells how, in postwar Spain, "leftist people did not ignore that they were always suspects, not only of political crimes, but of any other offense that had been committed." This form of repression and social pressure would continue for many years, even after spending some time in jail. Bernal (1993, 153) gives a clear account of the intensity of repression, including its non-violent forms, during the postwar years:

"For those who survived the conditions of the jails and concentration camps, going back to their hometowns meant facing a form of repression that was even worse: the lack of jobs, the hunger, the humiliations, the cruel treatments of the priests, nuns and local fascists ..., which alone explains how in many cases it would break down the resilience capacity and that, as it often happened, necessity made [the losers] show docility with the executioners."

This dire situation meant that in many cases the only resistance found in local communities took place in the form of petty economic crimes, which were the only solution to overcome a situation of extreme scarcity: "the quality of life of the lower classes during the postwar became so pauperized that these classes broke the legality and made use of robbery as an strategy of subsistence" (Rodríguez Barreira, 2008, 222).

It is thus not a surprise the large amount of people who fled outside the country, or within it. The *huidos* (fugitives) were Republican combatants who fled to the mountains, mainly in Andalucía, Asturias, Galicia, and León. Just in Asturias, between 10 000 and 15 000 people fled after the fall of the region, although most of them died, were captured, or surrendered in the following months (García Piñeiro,

2015). These men and women ran away looking for mere survival, but after some time those who remained in hiding organized and set up a resistance movement against the newly found regime, particularly in mountainous regions of Galicia, Asturias, the Pyrenees, and the southern ridges (Romero Navas, 2004; Serrano, 2001; Redondo Abal, 2006; García Piñeiro, 2015). These guerrilla fighters, also known as *maquis*, later reunited with some of those who had fought in the French resistance and mounted the most serious threat the Francoist regime faced during the 1940s. The guerrilla movement lasted until the early 1950s, when repression and the absence of external support made the insurgency impossible.

The situation in the 1940s was thus an extension of the violence and prosecution that had taken place during the civil war, and the only viable resistance was that of the guerrilla groups, which never reached a critical point. As Nicolás Marín & Alted Vigil (1999, 31) say, “the internal resistance in the first years of the postwar was thus very limited, given that the absence of liberties and the constant persecution did not allow for anything but a few isolated actions, even those that required more coordination: the violence actions.”

#### *Emergence and evolution of organized anti-Francoism*

In the mid-1950s, internal dissent to the regime stepped up again, initially led by the student movement in Madrid and, later, by the northern miners. The 1956 strikes in the university marked the beginning of the opposition movement within the younger generations, and would continue to grow until the end of the dictatorship. In the 1960s, the students’ movement would manage to mobilize a much larger share of the students, in contrast to the few activists linked to underground organizations that had taken part in the contentious activities the 1950s (Hernández Sandoica, Ruiz Carnicer & Baldó Lacomba, 2007).

The labor movement was the other focus of opposition activities against the regime. A starting point was 1962, when massive strikes took place in the Asturian mines and would later extend to other parts of the country. This also marked the beginning of a constant activity against the Francoist authorities, where clandestine organizations started to grow and became increasingly more organized (García Piñeiro, 2001; Señaldá, 2014; Vega, 2014). Labor conflicts also spurred other forms of dissent, as Nicolás Marín & Alted Vigil (1999, 65) tells:

“Community associations boosted the labor struggle when the conflict had broken out in companies located in their neighborhoods, promoting the organization of neighbors’ and workers’ assemblies, the economic

solidarity through resistance funds and relief to those who had been laid off."

In terms of political organizations, the communists, and particularly the *Partido Comunista de España* (Spanish Communist Party, PCE) managed to become the most important organization during the dictatorship. Although anarchist organizations had enjoyed wide support during the Second Republic and the civil war, they could not adapt to the postwar repression because they were ill-equipped to deal with a situation of clandestinity. The PCE, traditionally organized in small cells of a few militants, managed to survive in this context and later capitalize most of the anti-Francoist sentiment. Writing on the context of Almeria, ([Rodríguez Barreira, 2008](#)) gives an account of this:

"Underlying the antifascist discourse there were many different social classes ... and different political sensibilities. All of them were aligned in their experience of repression and, as they declared, 'the family necessities and disgraces.' The PCE know how to monopolize this discourse and became the reference point of the opposition to Francoism."

After the mid-1950s, Spain witnessed profound social transformations and intense economic development, which partly explain the renewed internal opposition. But the regime did not stand still. After the 1962 strikes gave rise again to a new period of contentious activity, Francoist authorities set up in 1963 the *Tribunal de Orden Público*, a special court that prosecuted political offenses against the State or the values it represented ([Del Aguila, 2001](#)). This court would be active until 1977, when it was abolished in the context of the democratic transition, after processing more than 30 000 cases in its roughly 15 years of existence.

#### 4.1.3 Transition to democracy

In November 1975 General Francisco Franco died. Amidst strong social pressures, the most progressive sector within the regime put the country on track towards democracy. Socialist and communist parties were legalized and the first multi-party democratic elections were celebrated in 1977, more than 40 years after the outbreak of the civil war.

Electoral politics after 1977 played out along the same divisions that had defined politics during the Second Republic (1931–1936) and, although some of the prewar political organizations no longer existed, political cleavages remained unchanged from the prewar period ([Maravall, 1982](#)).

Memories of the civil war still continue to play a very important role in contemporary Spanish politics (Richards, 2013; Aguilar & Payne, 2016). Although the ‘forgetting the past’ was a key aspect of the transition to democracy, primarily because many of the civil war actors on the Francoist side were still alive and active in politics, this amnesia (Aguilar, 2002; Aguilar & Payne, 2016) has been far from uncontested. The socialist government of Zapatero (2004–2011) passed in 2007 the *Ley de la Memoria Histórica* (Law of Historical Memory), which recognized the victims of the civil war and dictatorship on both sides. Among other things, this new law involved the identification and, in certain cases, exhumation of mass graves where the victims of Francoist violence were buried (Ferrández, 2014), along with the removal of public monuments and street names to those who had committed human rights violations during the civil war. The recent exhumation of Franco’s remains is still a consequence of these developments.

## 4.2 Revisiting the theory

In this section I discuss the determinants that explain the long-term effect of Francoist violence on political preferences in Spain, building upon chapter 3, and derive the corresponding hypotheses. I do not expand the argument and rather summarize its implications for the case of Spain, given that the theoretical framework was already developed above and that the last section in this chapter provides qualitative evidence from historical research on Spain.

In chapter 3, I argued that the effects of violence—whether it backfires in the form of a counter-mobilization or it demobilizes the population—depend on the local ideological context. In particular, when considering the backfiring argument, only when there is a facilitating ideological context do the creation of collective memories of the violence and its translation into political preferences take place. Without such a context, the three mechanisms discussed in the previous chapter—framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization—do not take place as expected.

In the case of Spain, I argue that this facilitating ideological context was present in those areas where, after the civil war, there were local networks linked to the underground left-wing opposition to the dictatorship. These networks played a crucial role in building, maintaining and mobilizing upon the memories of the civil war violence. The active role of the Francoist regime in establishing a reinterpretation of the civil war, together with a fierce repressive policy, meant that in areas without the presence of this networks, Francoist violence did not have any backfiring effect on political preferences. Rather, violence demobilized the population. The presence of isolated networks of opposition to the regime functioned as a coun-

terweight to the forgetting policy of the dictatorship, sustained by the sponsoring of an official memory over the conflict and violent repressive methods.<sup>4</sup>

The existence of these networks played a fundamental role in at least three aspects. First, they helped to frame wartime events and provide a political account of victimization, helping to form collective memories and overcome the problems in the subjective interpretation of violent events that is common in conflict contexts (e.g. [Shesterinina, 2016](#)). Thus, at the same time that the Francoist regime and social pressures contributed to transform personal memories of the violence into private, depolitized issues, a local ‘critical mass’ of left-wing individuals helped to maintain the stories of the ‘losers’ and their political meaning. This idea is coherent with some of the works reviewed in the theory chapter, which affirm that civilians cope with the war trauma collectively ([Bar-Tal, 1997, 2007](#); [Lyons et al., 1998](#)).

Second, the existence of left-wing networks provided a social space in which it was possible for leftist individuals to discuss politics. This is especially relevant in the case of Spain, where a repressive dictatorship and a firmly established atmosphere of fear meant that discussing politics was a risky and much feared activity for leftist individuals. In contrast to this, the official story, that of the ‘winner side,’ could be freely told and discussed. This again resonates with those studies that find that the persistence of ideologies is directly linked to the existence of ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can discuss freely and thus build a political community ([Wittenberg, 2006](#)).

And finally, even if the losers’ memories of the civil war were kept alive, a few mobilized leftist individuals or networks could transform these memories into actual political behavior which, in Spain, meant voting for leftist political parties after 1977.

Building upon this argument, the main hypotheses for the Spain chapters are defined as follows.

H4.1 In municipalities where there was underground leftist activity after the civil war, wartime Francoist violence increased leftist electoral support in the long-term.

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<sup>4</sup> Theoretically, these networks could also be the product of civil war violence, which would particularly complicate the empirical analyses in the following chapter. However, in Spain, the location of dissent during the late dictatorship was independent enough from wartime dynamics, which ensures enough variation to test the argument. I provide further evidence in the next section of this chapter as well as in the next chapter, where I test this claim quantitatively as part of the alternative explanations.

H4.2 In municipalities where there was no underground leftist activity after the civil war, wartime Francoist violence did not have any long-term effect on electoral preferences.

The argument above supposes that the combination of wartime Francoist violence and active political networks during the dictatorship produced an increase in leftist political preferences, which translated into electoral support for all leftist parties. However, there are two additional implications that can be discussed. First, as discussed above in the historical background, most of the clandestine opposition activity during the dictatorship was linked to the communist party PCE. Thus, given the importance of these underground networks in explaining the long-term effect of wartime violence, the question is whether there was some kind of organizational loyalty once democracy settled in. In other words, did underground organizations and networks, which were linked in its majority to the PCE, mobilize support for all leftist parties or for the PCE in particular?

Second, the left-right divide is not the only cleavage in Spain. In regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia, there is a second cleavage which divides between those who support non-Spanish nationalism and those who do not. Although this cleavage did not clearly map onto wartime divisions—some right-wing Basque or Catalan nationalists even supported the nationalist rebellion, Franco supported an extreme form of Spanish nationalism during the dictatorship, which antagonized non-Spanish nationalists. It is not clear to what extent non-Spanish nationalism is related to the civil war or, rather, to Franco's nation-building policies during the dictatorship. Some authors say that the stories of the civil war were reinterpreted so they could offer a justification for peripheral nationalism, particularly in the Basque Country ([Molina, 2014](#)). In any case, the question is whether the increase in leftist political preferences also translated into an increase of non-Spanish nationalist vote. This change could also take place as a result of a general rejection of the Spanish nationalism that Franco had supported—which the new rightist parties after 1977 somewhat inherited—or directly because of civil war violence. Following these two additional questions, two further hypotheses are defined.

H4.3 The long-term effect of wartime Francoist violence, conditional on postwar underground leftist activity, was linked to an increase of PCE vote.

H4.4 The long-term effect of wartime Francoist violence, conditional on postwar underground leftist activity, was linked to an increase of non-Spanish nationalist vote.

The next section in this chapter discusses the qualitative evidence for this argument found in secondary historical research, while in chapter 5 I offer quantitative evidence from an original dataset covering more than 2,000 municipalities in Spain.

### 4.3 Qualitative evidence from secondary sources

In this section, I offer qualitative evidence for the argument presented above, found in previous historical research on Spain. Rather than showing support for the implications listed in the main hypotheses—especially H4.1 and H4.2, I try to discuss the evidence for the proposed mechanism. In particular, I discuss two aspects that are key to make the argument plausible. First, I show how wartime violence could have a demobilization effect in the absence of a facilitating ideological context. In particular, I discuss the successful efforts of the Franco regime in repressing personal memories and extending a climate of apathy and depolitization among the population. Second, I discuss the role of underground activities in developing the necessary ideological context for the backfiring effect to take place. In other words, I show how underground leftist networks made possible the framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization processes.

#### 4.3.1 Depolitization and the repression of memories

After Franco won the civil war and established the regime, the new authorities engaged in a thorough campaign of depolitization, eradicating any possibility of organized opposition. They did so by repressing any effort to organize dissent or to mobilize the population by denouncing Francoist violence. In particular, there were two main related mechanisms used to defeat any internal opposition ([Palo-mares, 2004](#)). First, the role of fear in imposing a generalized silence and the ‘forgetting’ policy that was designed to erase any memories of what had happened before, during, and immediately after the civil war, particularly when it came to violence against civilian. And second, the introduction of an ‘official memory’ of recent events, which reinterpreted the Second Republic as a period of chaos and instability and the military rebellion of 1936 as a crusade to reestablish order.

Mass fear, the pervasive state of mind that reigned among the population during the conflict, did not stop after the most violent phase ended. Since the very beginning, “the central thesis of the Francoist State in terms of social control was that such control could only be possible, ultimately, *manu militari*” ([Aróstegui, 1990](#), 242). Thus, once violent repression decreased in intensity, the fear of further reprisals still defined strongly the way civilians behaved in public and, even, in private. Indeed, this was part of the initial plan of the rebellion, where violence

had a double goal: to eliminate the leftist leaders and deter any opposition from the rest of the population ([Barruso Barés, 2007](#)). Fear thus replaced an active mobilization strategy by the new authorities, contrary to what happened in other fascist states in Europe. Actually, [Reig Cruañes \(2007, 88\)](#) states that this lack of active mobilization could have been more successful because of the “extreme politisation of the period prior to the war and the fear of a repetition of its consequences.”

Plenty of historical research discusses the role of fear in depolitizing the population, particularly during the first decade after the conflict. [Sevillano \(1999, 155\)](#) shows how Franco’s regime managed to control internal dissent through the use of traditional methods of social control and the threat of repression, which made people retreat from public life, afraid to “give certain opinions that did not have enough public and official support.”

An insurmountable fear of reprisals defined how civilians behave, particularly those on the side of the ‘losers.’ These dynamics were due to the culture of denunciation that the regime had fostered since the start of the conflict. The new authorities welcomed the civilians under their control to collaborate with them in the “prosecution, repression, punishment and extermination of all those who were considered to be ‘asocial’ elements, antipatriotic, traitors or leftists in general” ([Cobo Romero & Ortega López, 2005, 121](#)). Moreover, “the experience of war provided the dictatorship an extensive base of men, the former combatants, who in some way or another could be used for its own interests” in exchange for the possibility of enjoying a position of relative power over those who had fought in the opposite side ([Alcalde, 2013, 128](#)).

The testimony of Vicente Gutiérrez Solís, a communist militant from Asturias, gives an account of how it was to live as someone with a leftist background in a small town during the postwar period:

“There was so much horror there, that you could not live in the villages. People, even though they had everything there, went down to the cities and paid a rent because the constant pressure to people living in the villages was unbearable” ([Señaldá, 2014, 132](#)).

This atmosphere led to widespread demobilization. The Spanish public sphere was not polarized in the sense of split in half between those who had won and those who had lost. A small minority of those linked to the army or the political wing of the Francoist state had a very active role, but among the vast majority of the people, silence was prevalent ([Gracia & Ruiz Carnicer, 2004, 44](#)). This situation also extended to the way the conflict was remembered.

"Convinced Republicans who would have insisted that the violence had been instrumental in crushing lower-class demands for reform were repressively silenced. For many of the uncommitted it made sense to explain violent conflict as the result of private vendetta or quarrels which could be seen plausibly in personal terms" ([Richards, 2013](#), 98).

The Francoist regime managed to destroy all independent social spaces where the opposition to the dictatorship could be discussed. As [Rodríguez Barreira \(2008, 29\)](#) says, "the real success of Francoism was that Spaniards locked themselves in the domestic sphere, thus becoming alienated from any responsibility on the collective sphere."

Beyond the immediate consequences of fear during the postwar period and dictatorship, its effects would last for a very long time. The story of a young French student who, in 2003, went to a Valencian little town—from where her family originally hails—to gather interview material for a thesis reflects well these long-lasting consequences.

"One morning she goes to the home of an old, 87 years old. ... They are about to start talking when the old man tells her to wait, to not start yet. He gets up, goes to the front door and closes it. He comes back to the chair. Fear, he says to the women. Still the fear" ([Cervera, 2004](#), 155).

In addition to the use of fear to impose a generalized silence over the events of the recent past, Francoist authorities also set up a propaganda machinery to establish an official account of the conflict and the violence it ensued. The Second Republic was portrayed as a period of chaos and political instability, and therefore the 'excesses' of this period of political freedom were seen as the culprit of the civil war. The July 1936 rebellion had been an attempt to bring back the order, and although wartime violence in the Republican area was extensively reported as an example of the chaos of leftist politics, Francoist violence was quickly brushed over.

At the local level, this official narrative was reinforced by silencing the victims of repression who could have an alternative account and, through the use of local media, pointing out to concrete examples that supported the state narrative of the conflict [Gutiérrez Lázaro \(2007, 345\)](#). Events were thus reinterpreted, and the activities of leftist organizations or the progressive policies of the Second Republic were erased from the collective memory. An account from Cantabria shows how the propaganda machine of the new Francoist authorities played out in the whole country:

"The past was rebuilt and reinterpreted, and the authorities made up events for which, because of being distant in time or the chaos during which they supposedly took place, no one could show any proof to shed light on what actually happened. And all this strategy was carried out with the purpose of sowing doubt and destroying any memories that the Cantabrian society could have about the trade union activities carried out by the *Federación Obrera Montañesa* throughout the region" ([Gutiérrez Lázaro, 2007](#), 344).

In addition, public monuments and symbols were erected to honor those who fought on the victors' side, emphasizing thus the account told by public institutions and media. In contrast, the 'losers' did not have any opportunity to create any collective remembrance to the victims, and as mentioned above, any private memory became a social taboo and was not discussed in public ([Álvarez, 2007](#)). Indeed, this situation lasted to the last years of the Francoist state and even steered the transition to democracy ([Aguilar, 2002](#); [Aguilar & Payne, 2016](#)).

These two factors, the resort to fear and repression to set up a spiral of silence and the institutionalization of an official account of the past, contributed to the general state of depolitization that reigned among the Spanish population during the Franco regime. [Reig Cruañes \(2007\)](#) summarizes the effect of the Francoist state during the postwar on the political preferences of the population:

"The ideological neutralization and the sporadic use of mobilization combined with repression and a pervasive misery, which forces people to focus on pure survival, produce the expected result of depolitization and the formation of a mentality of self-exclusion from public affairs" ([Reig Cruañes, 2007](#), 93).

#### 4.3.2 The role of political networks

My expectations for Spain are that the presence of anti-regime networks would help politicize these memories and mobilize civilians within the local community. The existence of the ideological context defined by the presence of anti-regime networks would be crucial in this process. These networks mainly contributed to the framing and collective remembrance steps, according to the framework developed in chapter 3, either because they started the public conversation or because they provided a social context in which enough left-leaning people could discuss personal experiences. For example, [Richards \(2016, 188\)](#) tells how an émigré from

southern Spain, the son of an executed leftist mayor, compared the politicized context in Barcelona with his native village, where people “had a very superficial attitude to politics,” including in the way they interpreted the conflict. It is this same mechanism what justifies the focus at the local level, where “the primary centers of democratic socialization are found,” ([Cabana, 2013](#), 93) and where we find the variation in the effect of wartime violence.

Again, historical research highlights how in certain areas of Spain the silence was slowly broken and stories of the ‘losers’ of the war were recovered and became collective memories. [Domínguez, Somoza & Fernández \(2010\)](#) state that, over time, wartime stories began to be discussed within certain groups or communities, building a collective discourse of the war. Following the concepts of the theory, this amounts to the political interpretation of wartime events and, especially, to its collective remembrance.

A good example of how these anti-Francoist networks could work in a politicized area is Asturias, where industrial workers and their families lived within dense networks of neighbor groups, labor unions and leftist cultural associations. Although wartime victimization had been very intense in these areas, leftist codes of behavior remained active and enforced, and years later, ‘any form of collaboration with the dictatorship, even if they did not involve harm to anyone, meant losing the respect of colleagues and neighbors’ ([Vega, 2014](#), 230). In this context, many young socialists and communists discovered and were inspired by the political activism of their parents. Memories of the civil war could only be activated because there was a climate of left-leaning political activism, where experiences of prewar or wartime militancy were something to be proud of, rather than a personal secret that could mean social rejection.

A potential concern with this story is that anti-Francoist activities in the last decades of the dictatorship could be directly related to leftist activities during the civil war, and thus related to wartime victimization patterns. In other words, pockets of leftist support at the end of the Franco regime could be just a continuity of the same ideological distribution during and before the war, and both victimization and clandestine activities during Francoism were just an outcome of those patterns. Yet, even if some continuity surely existed, the role of the organized opposition to Franco was key to revive leftist sentiments and activities, and amplify them through different social sectors. The personal story of Anita Sirgo, an important communist activist from Asturias, gives an example of these interrelations. She was born in 1930 to a miners’ family who later suffered harsh repression during and after the civil war. Her mother was imprisoned during five years and both her father and uncle became part of the guerrilla resistance after the fall of Asturias

and were later summarily killed by the authorities. Sirgo declares that after her uncle was killed, she “lost all contact with the guerrilla” ([Señaldá, 2014](#), 105). Years later, she would marry a miner of the same region, and when social opposition intensified in the late 1950s, she would become highly involved in the mining conflicts and join a group of other communist women whose husbands were either involved in the strikes or already imprisoned because of them to support the miners’ struggle and mobilize local support for them. Although these women had a clear personal link to these struggles and some of them, like Sirgo, had a personal history of leftist activism and repression, they likely played a key role in deepening local anti-Franco sentiments and mobilizing support among the community:

“We decided that we had to do something more, and the group of women from the PCE went to small local businesses to ask for food—it was Christmas—to send to the political prisoners in Burgos, Carabanchel, Segovia... We have to be careful because there was a lot of secret police and they would detain you. We did not check whether these businesses were leftist or rightists, we went to all of them. (...) The truth is there was a formidable response, there was no one who said no to us” ([Señaldá, 2014](#), 107).

They would later contact with women from other clandestine leftist organizations to organize secret meetings at the home of a local sympathetic priest to discuss further actions. This testimony gives an account of how opposition activities during the dictatorship interacted with a personal past of victimization, and how the combination of these two aspects helped mobilize local communities. Without the emergence of organized opposition activities, personal memories could have stayed dormant and leftist sentiments would be more easily repressed because of the active attempts of Francoist authorities to demobilize the population. Surely, without active conflicts—with a different origin from wartime violence dynamics—flaring up in these regions, the few convinced activists like Sirgo would not speak out and try to mobilize local communities.

Obviously, at the personal level, that continuity existed. But that is precisely where the role of the clandestine organizations is found, in the sense that an older generation helped socialize younger people into leftist ideas during a first period, before these recently mobilized activists helped propagate these attitudes, as shown above. Labor and student movements were probably the early focus of these activities in most places. Indeed, most of the students who became involved in opposition activities during their university years would continue with

these activities after they finished their studies, which “doubles the importance of these generational evolution in the struggle against the dictatorship, giving consistency to a combative attitude that increasingly expanded to more social sectors” ([Hernández Sandoica, Ruiz Carnicer & Baldó Lacomba, 2007](#), 154). With regards to the workplace, an Asturian miner who started working at 16 shows how this political socialization took place:

“I started working as a colliers’ helper with admirable people who had been through a lot in life. The great majority were much older than us, they were former political prisoners of the civil war and were people with principles that are hardly found today. They had high ethical standards and a very important labor movement culture. (...) By interacting with them I matured and started to share their concerns. I developed a rebellious attitude against the injustices that were taking place” ([Señaldá, 2014](#), 183).

[Nicolás Marín & Alted Vigil \(1999](#), 135) also tell the story of anti-Francoist activist who, in his youth, started working in the workshop of a former victim of repression, which also function as a center of dissemination of propaganda against the regime. Thus, these collective experiences are key to understand the new political consciousness developed during Francoism ([Bayona Fernández, 2007](#); [Domènech, 2010](#)).

Even though the initial dissent took off mainly in urban areas, it also propagated to many rural areas, where political possibilities opened up, following the earliest examples of organized dissent ([Bernal, 1993](#), 157). Thus, similar processes can be found in very different contexts beyond the university and the industrial and mining areas. In the agrarian areas of Lugo, in Galicia, [Cabana \(2013](#), 100) talks of a “feedback process between the rural population and the trade union leaders” in order to turn land grievances into visible protests against the authorities. The role of the opposition organizations was key to turn social resentment into organized dissent. Interestingly, in the first trade union elections to choose the local representatives to the local agrarian council, these former clandestine organizations had better results where local residents had been members of these organizations and, presumably, had played a role in convincing the local population.

Regarding the role of political parties and organizations, I already mentioned in the historical background that the PCE had a prominent role in the opposition movement. And even though during the second half of the dictatorship the leadership of the PCE supported a position closer to the official ‘forgetting policy’ in

order to allow for a national reconciliation, this was not the case among its cadres, who kept the memories of the conflict and the role in it of the Francoist forces very much alive.

“One thing was the public discourse of the Spanish communism and another the longings of the militants ... which hailed from their own biographical or elective trajectory. They had also been republicans, they were born in families that had been republican, they had witnessed the defeat, ... or, more simply, they had opted for the militancy in a political party that was the direct heir of the defense of the Republic during the civil war and of the fight against the rebels, which was the same struggle that was being waged at the moment against the Francoist regime. It was thus difficult that the discourse of the National Reconciliation was built, beyond the silences, in a reinterpretation of the necessity and legitimacy of the [Francoist] actions in the war” ([Domènech, 2010](#), 119).

Moreover, there was also political activity beyond proper political parties, and politically interested people found ways to circumvent the restrictions of association imposed by the regime:

“Given that freedom to assemble was restricted mainly to Catholic organizations, the need to obtain official permission for gatherings of 20 or more people (even if it was for a family event) led to the use of alternative channels for the discussion of political issues. These channels included private gatherings, publications (newspapers and magazines), study groups or clubs (which were normally formed around a publication), trading or commercial societies, and cultural associations. The arrival of the 1964 Law of Associations did not change this pattern. The new Law was still restrictive and cramped the freedom of Spanish citizens. For those who did not want to form proper political parties and therefore be recognized as part of the democratic opposition, the practice of meeting through alternative channels to discuss politics continued after 1964” ([Palomares, 2007](#), 122).

All in all, in areas where there was this facilitating ideological context, civilians got together to discuss political issues, and the three steps of framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization could take place. This process led to the creation and development of leftist sympathies, something that was unheard of in other places. Indeed, the situation in areas without the presence of these leftist networks

was starkly different. As an opposite account, Cazorla-Sánchez (2009) writes about other regions in Spain where there was not a critical mass of leftist survivors—in other words, where there the ideological context was the opposite. He describes how in certain regions former Republican families preferred not to talk about what happened during the war, and the victims of wartime repression ‘even thought that Franco was a good man who knew nothing of the crimes, injustices, and miseries committed against people like themselves’ (Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009, 3). Thus, in conservative areas without left-leaning networks of support, wartime memories contrary to the Francoist regime were deeply repressed by the social environment:

“For example, the agrarian region of Santander had a reputation for being conservative and staunchly Catholic. Here, as in the rest of Spain, defeated republicans living under Franco could expect official prosecution and social rejection for having fought on the wrong side in the war, even from their own families. (...) Even in the early 1990s, when democracy was on a safe footing, they preferred not to talk too much” (Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009, 32–33).

The role of leftist networks and the existence of a ‘critical mass’ of fellow left-wing individuals at the local level meant that the memories of the war were kept alive and translated into increased leftist support. The Francoist state developed a thorough campaign of demobilization through the use of fear of reprisals and a reinterpretation of the past. These two factors together meant that, in the absence of a facilitating ideological context, memories of the civil war did not lead to a rejection of the perpetrator’s political identity. Instead, in these areas, violence demobilized the population. Reig Cruañes (2007) encapsulates well the effects of such a strategy over time, even for someone who had personally suffered reprisals:

“Even though the biographical memories that form the collective memory differ sensibly ... Francoist political socialization and propaganda are unique and the effect of such overwhelming influence contributed to homogenize the resulting stories. ... If only because the memories of the war and the harsh postwar period awake a marked conservatism and promoted inaction” (Reig Cruañes, 2007, 220).

Thus, historiography on the Spanish case shows evidence supporting my theoretical expectations, namely, that the presence of a facilitating ideological context at the local level was key for individuals to develop a rejection of Francoist ideology as a result of being exposed to victimization.

#### 4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the Spanish case, developed theoretical expectations based on the argument discussed in chapter 3, and shown that historical research on Spain offers some supporting evidence of the argument. In particular, I argue that wartime Francoist violence only had a backfiring effect in those areas where there was a facilitating ideological context, which in the case of Spain was related to the presence of clandestine leftist networks. Reviewing historical research, I have shown that the Francoist regime made a conscious effort to demobilize the civilian population and erase the memories of the civil war, which was the effect of violence in those areas without such ideological context. Moreover, I also discuss the role that these networks played in keeping memories of war alive and mobilizing leftist support among the population.

The next chapter tests the argument quantitatively. I build an original dataset covering more than 2,000 municipalities across Spain and show that Francoist violence during the civil war had a positive effect on leftist vote increase after 1977 mainly in those municipalities where there was underground leftist activity during the dictatorship.

# 5

## Spain II

### Quantitative analyses

In the previous chapter, I presented the Spanish case, introducing the historical background and the argument explaining the long-term consequences of Francoist violence for political preferences in Spain. I also discussed the qualitative evidence found in Spanish historiography that offer support for the argument. Here I turn to the quantitative evidence.

I create a novel dataset covering 2,100 municipalities in 13 provinces of Spain. The dataset, which relies on archival sources, secondary historical research, and other existing datasets, spans through several decades and includes information on many political phenomena at the local level. In particular, I analyze the long-term effect of Francoist violence against civilians during and immediately after the Spanish Civil War, and test whether this effect varies depending on the existence of leftist, underground networks during the dictatorship. The results are coherent with the argument. Using a difference-in-differences setup, I find that wartime victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share four decades later, but only or mainly in those municipalities where the clandestine opposition was active during the dictatorship. Moreover, I try to rule out that either wartime violence is causing both postwar clandestine activity and leftist vote increase or that it is just a story about organizational persistence.

Moreover, I test two additional set of hypotheses, regarding the organizational loyalty of the change in political preferences, analyzing vote for the *Partido Comunista de España* (Spanish Communist Party, PCE), which led the underground opposition to the Francoist regime, and the potential effect of Francoist violence on cross-cutting cleavages, particularly non-Spanish nationalism, analyzing its effect on electoral support for Basque nationalist parties. The results suggest that Francoist violence increased leftist preferences in a generic way, as neither the PCE monopolized the increasing in leftist vote nor there was an increase in Basque nationalism.

The case of Spain shows that, in a context of clear territorial control and selective violence against civilians following political identities (Balcells, 2010b, 2017), the backfiring effect of victimization was not homogenous, but conditional on the

work done by political networks and organizations in turning wartime events into collective memories and thus, influencing political behavior in the long run.

In this chapter, I first give an overview of the data and methods used to test the argument. I then to the main analyzes focusing on the long-term effects of violence on leftist vote, before analyzing its effect on PCE vote and non-Spanish nationalism in the Basque Country. The last section concludes.

## 5.1 Data and methods

The data used in this chapter is the product of merging together several datasets from different sources, which include historical archives, secondary historiography, and replication data from previous research. The result is an original dataset that covers both regions and phenomena that had not been previously analyzed in prior quantitative research.

The data covers 2,100 municipalities—around a fourth of all municipalities in Spain—across thirteen provinces: Lugo (Galicia), Asturias, the three Basque provinces (Biscay, Gipuzkoa, and Alava), the three provinces in Aragon (Huesca, Zaragoza, and Teruel) the four provinces in Catalonia (Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, and Barcelona), and Albacete (Castilla-La Mancha). These provinces were the only ones for which I could gather all the necessary datasets with a minimum quality, particularly for wartime violence against civilians and prewar electoral results.<sup>1</sup> Figure 5.1 shows the geographical coverage of the data. In section A.3 in the Appendix I compare municipalities included in the sample with those that were not, using two datasets that are available for all of them: census data and electoral results after 1977. I show that there are no relevant differences between these two groups.

The municipalities in the sample show wide variation within Spain, in terms of socioeconomic contexts and wartime experiences. Some of these provinces were conquered by the Francoist rebels during the first few days of the war and, as in the case of Galicia and Western Asturias, the civil war effectively ended in those regions during the first weeks without significant battles. Victimization in these areas was mainly limited to suspected leftist supports who were targeted in the effort of Francoist authorities to ‘clean up’ their rearguards. Some other provinces were the scenario of military campaigns throughout the war, and hosted some of the most stable battlefronts of the war. This is the case of central Asturias and Bizkaia, where

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<sup>1</sup>There are violence-related datasets for other regions, such as Andalucía, but they were produced by requesting data on victims from relatives or friends, so they are not comprehensive. Moreover, other provinces, such as Badajoz or Navarra, have quality data on violence but data on prewar elections could not be gathered on time, even though they might be available in regional archives.



Figure 5.1: Municipalities and provinces included in the sample

the War in the North was fought until late 1937, and Aragon, where a frontline split the region in half from north to south until 1938. Finally, other regions included in the sample remained under Republican control until the last few months of the war, as it is the case with Catalonia and Albacete. In these provinces, in addition to rearguard violence against suspected leftists after the Nationalists conquered these territories, the period of Republican control also involved victimization of rightist sectors or individuals who were suspected of collaborating with the rebellion.

In terms of socioeconomic backgrounds both before and after the civil war, the sample also covers a wide array of variation. Lugo, western Asturias, Albacete or some parts of Aragon were deeply agrarian regions before the war, and experienced a loss of population during the economic boom of the 1960s due to rural-urban migration. Central Asturias, the Basque Country, and Catalonia were industrial centers already before the war, and during the Francoist regime they continued to develop economically and were net recipients of internal migration. Relatedly, the political context also varies largely across these regions. Agrarian provinces like Lugo were more supportive of right-wing parties before the war, and they continue to be conservative strongholds to this day. In the contrary, left-wing parties enjoyed wide support in industrial centers like Asturias and Catalonia, although there are also differences in this regard: while Asturias or the Basque Country have

traditionally supported Socialism, Catalonia, as much of the northeastern coast, were prewar strongholds of anarchist organizations and trade unions.

Partly due to the socioeconomic transformation during the 1950s and 1960s, many municipalities experienced territorial changes during the period of analysis. Some towns merge to form new, bigger units. Others were absorbed by larger municipalities, while some others emerged as they segregated from bigger communities. In every case, the strategy to deal with these changes was to reduce the list to a ‘minimum denomination’ of municipalities, so as to ensure data compatibility across all periods. For instance, if two municipalities merged in 1950 to form a new one, the merge is used across all periods, between 1930 and 2019. Similarly, if a segregation took place in 1950 and a new municipality formed as a result, it will be ignored and still considered part of the bigger one. All data sources across different periods have been standardized following this strategy.<sup>2</sup> Section A.1 in the Appendix explains in more details this strategy and the tools developed to deal with this problem.

In the following I provide details about the data sources used for each of the main variables.

### 5.1.1 Wartime victimization

Data on civilian victimization comes from difference sources depending on the province. Data for Galicia comes from the research project *Nomes e voces* (Names and voices) (Fernández et al., 2018) based at the University of Santiago de Compostela, while data for Asturias comes from a similar project based at the University of Oviedo, directed by Carmen García et al. (2011) (see also Caunedo, Díaz & Alonso, 2007). Data for Albacete from the research project *Represión de guerra y postguerra en Castilla-La Mancha* (Wartime and post-war repression in Castilla-La Mancha), developed at the University of Castilla-La Mancha by Ortiz Heras (2015). Data for Catalonia and Aragon comes from the replication data from Balcells (2010b), who obtained the data from secondary historical sources (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 1989; Solé i Sabaté, 2000; Casanova et al., 2001). Finally, the data for the Basque Country comes from the list compiled by the Basque Government including all those who disappeared or were killed during the civil war (Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2018). Using these datasets, I calculated the number of people killed by Francoist forces in each municipality, following the place of residence of the victim. I restrict the list to those killed in irregular killings or executions, excluding those

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<sup>2</sup> The actual number of municipalities in the 2011 census in the included provinces is 2,162. In 1930, there were 2,517.

who died in combat. All these databases have a high degree of internal validity, and some were created from pairing death records in the local civil registries with historical documents and testimonies, and thus constitute a comprehensive data source of victims and their personal stories during the civil war and its aftermath.<sup>3</sup>

The main independent variable is a binary indicator of civilian victimization by Francoist forces—including the army, police forces, or local militias linked to the rebels—between the beginning of the civil war in 1936 until 1942, when most of the violence had already ended and which often marks the end of wartime repression, or at least of its most violent period (see e.g. [Payne, 2012](#), 109-110). I use a binary measure of killings mainly to avoid inconsistencies between different regions, where the data sources are different, and because there is less reliability in terms of the actual number of people killed. Moreover, given that repression not only included violent killings but also other forms of non-fatal or non-violent repression ([Bernal, 1993](#); [García Piñeiro, 2001](#); [Rodríguez Barreira, 2008](#); [Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009](#)), using a binary indicator can work as a proxy for those municipalities that suffered to some extent reprisals from the Francoist government. In any case, I also run a version of the models with a continuous measure of violence, namely, the logged number of killings by 1000 habitants. Figure 5.2 shows the geographical variation of this variable in its continuous version.

Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of violence over time in those provinces for which I have data at the level of individual killings. As said above, most of the violence took place before 1942, including in those provinces that had been conquered at the very end of the war (e.g. Albacete) and thus only suffered repression from 1939 on.

Moreover, the temporal nature of the killings testifies to the strategy of Francoist forces, which involved an extensive campaign of victimization after each territorial gain in order to get rid of potential leftist supporters. In Galicia, where the rebellion was successful in July 1936, violence spiked in the summer of 1936, and most of it had already ended by early 1938. The case of Asturias is very illustrative, as the first killings in 1936 and 1937 correspond to its western part (with fewer population than the center and eastern areas), conquered around September 1936, while the peak of violence during 1938 and 1939 show the victimization campaign carried out after Franco established control over the whole region in October 1937. A similar

<sup>3</sup>The Basque data is a preliminary list part of an ongoing project that fulfills these same quality standards, so the list could be subject to changes once the project is finished. Although these changes are likely to be minimal, at least at the aggregation levels used here, I show in the appendix (section A.7.2) that the results do not change when excluding the three Basque provinces.




Figure 5.2: Wartime victimization by Francoist forces (1936-1942)




Figure 5.3: Wartime victimization by Francoist authorities over time

pattern is found in the Basque Country, where Gipuzkoa fell to the rebels in 1936 but Bizkaia hosted the eastern front of the War of the North until September 1937.

### 5.1.2 Postwar underground activity by the opposition

The argument states that violence will only leave long-term legacies if there are active political networks that play a role in keeping those memories alive and capitalizing on them for mobilization. To measure the presence of networks or organizations, I rely on the archives of the *Tribunal de Orden Público* (Public Order Court, TOP), a special court similar to the German People's Court that prosecuted political offenses against the State or the values it represented from 1963 to 1977. The sentences of this court, compiled by [Del Aguila \(2001\)](#) from the national archives and not yet used in quantitative social science, are thus a measure of opposition activity during the last period of the dictatorship.<sup>4</sup>

In particular, I code a binary indicator of underground activity that measures whether there were offenses classified as 'illegal association' or 'illegal propaganda' in a given municipality or in any of its neighbors within 10km. As part of the robustness tests, I include in the appendix (section A.7.3) analyses using a similar version of this variable but changing the distance to 5km or 20km, or only marking those municipalities that had underground activity themselves. There are two main reasons for including this buffer area. First, it is natural to assume spill-overs of organizational activity, in the sense that political actors sentenced by the TOP would have engaged in activities beyond their municipality of residence. And second, by extending the indicator to neighboring municipalities as well, I attempt to capture latent political networks and not only political activity, trying to mitigate the bias against those networks that did not engage in more visible activities. Figure 5.4 shows which municipalities had underground activity as processed by the TOP, and their neighbors following the 10km distance rule.

This dataset does not offer a perfect measurement of the existence of actors and networks as discussed in the theory, and it is probably biased towards those actors that engage in more visible activities, ignoring the everyday support that victims could have had in 'ideologically friendly' environments. However, it is a good indicator of the existence of anti-regime networks during the Francoist dictatorship, and it covers the years when political dissent took off in Spain and the organized opposition to the dictatorship, particularly in the form of the working-class movement and student organizations, expanded from the few places where it managed to survive during the early dictatorship to a much larger territory within the country ([Maravall, 1978](#)).

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<sup>4</sup>I thank Juan José del Águila for sharing this dataset with me.




Figure 5.4: Underground anti-Francoist activity (TOP) between 1963–1977

### 5.1.3 Electoral support

Data from the February 1936 elections comes from different sources depending on the province. Election results in the province of Lugo (Galicia) were obtained from the *Boletín Oficial de la Provincia* (Official Provincial Gazette), available at the provincial archives in Lugo. Data for Asturias was retrieved from the Electoral Atlas of Asturias, compiled and published by SADEI (1996). Similarly, data for Albacete comes from Requena Gallego (1982), who compiled the data from the Official Provincial Gazette of Albacete. For the Basque Country, electoral results have already been collected from the Official Gazettes of each province by the Basque Government, and are published online (Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2016). For Aragon, the data comes from the replication data from Balcells (2010b), who obtained the data from Germán Zubero (1982). For Catalonia, the data comes from the Electoral Atlas compiled by Vilanova (1986). In all cases, I code the share of that the leftist coalition *Frente Popular* (Popular Front, FP) got in each municipality. In Catalonia, the equivalent to FP was the *Front d'Esquerres* (Front of the Left). Figure 5.5 shows the geographical variation of the prewar leftist support variable.

Data on electoral results between 1977 and 2019 are published online by the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior, 2013). To measure left-




Figure 5.5: Leftist support in 1936

ist vote, I coded the share of votes in each municipality for all the leftist parties, including both the major, country-wide parties such as *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) or *Partido Comunista de España* (Spanish Communist Party, PCE), as well as the leftist nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, such as *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (Basque Left, EE), *Herri Batasuna* (Popular Unity, HB), or *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia, ERC). I detail in the appendix (section A.4) which parties were coded as leftist in each election.

Figure 5.6 shows the geographical variation of leftist vote in the first democratic elections in 1977, while figure 5.7 shows the absolute change in leftist vote respective to 1936 in each municipality in the sample, differentiating between municipalities that suffered Francoist violence against civilians during the civil war and those that did not. As it can be observed, although all municipalities follow some national patterns (such as the increase in leftist vote in 2004 and 2008 elections), there is a great deal of variation to explain within each group. The fact that there are no stark differences between municipalities with and without previous exposure to victimization speaks to the puzzle of this dissertation, namely, that the effect of violence on political preferences is not homogenous but depends on third factors.




Figure 5.6: Leftist support in 1977

#### 5.1.4 Other variables

I also include a number of additional variables to control for both the determinants of civilian victimization and the evolution of leftist vote between the civil war and the post-1977 democratic period.

First, I get data on local population from all the censuses between 1930 and 2001, published by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (National Statistical Institute, INE) ([INE, 2018](#)). In the analysis, I include the logged population in 1970 and the change in population between 1940 and 1970, to control for economic changes and rural-urban migration patterns.

Second, I include a dummy variable indicating the presence of local affiliates to the two major labor unions before the war. First, data for the anarchist *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (National Confederation of Labor, CNT) comes from the list compiled by [Cucó-Giner \(1970\)](#) and [Calero \(2009\)](#), who track affiliations in 1931 and 1936, respectively. The dummy variable indicates whether there was any local chapter in either 1931 or 1936. Data for the socialist *Unión General de Trabajadores* (Workers' General Union, UGT) comes from the 1931 electoral census made by UGT itself, which lists all the local chapters and was published as an appendix to the monthly bulletin of November 1931 ([UGT, 1931](#)).




Figure 5.7: Change in leftist vote in every municipality relative to 1936

Third, I include the standard deviation of elevation within each municipality, calculated using GIS tools from a digital elevation model (DEM), the Terrain Tiles available at Amazon Web Services ([Mapzen, 2018](#)). This variable proxies rugged terrain and inaccessibility, which influences both patterns of victimization and sociopolitical dynamics that could affect postwar trajectories.

Finally, following [Balcells \(2010b, 2017\)](#), I also calculate a measure of electoral competition in 1936 between the left and the right, to account for the determinants of victimization during the civil war, using the same sources described above. I also include a variable indicating the leftist vote in 1936, to control for different baselines.

### 5.1.5 Models

I estimate difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of wartime victimization on leftist vote between 1936 and all the fourteen elections that took place between 1977 and April 2019. I first estimate a base model that only indicates the effect of

Francoist victimization on the increase of leftist support relative to 1936. To test the main argument, I include an interaction with the network variable in all subsequent models and show how the effect of victimization varies depending on the presence of these networks.

A first concern with these analyses is that the binary nature of the victimization variable could hide important variation explaining why certain municipalities, which suffered harsher violence, show a bigger increase in leftist vote. Therefore, I also run the same model using the log number of killings per 1,000 inhabitants. Second, rural-urban migration, which was an important phenomenon after the 1950s, could mean that people more likely to vote for the Left moved to cities, such as the emerging left-leaning working class. Moreover, economic repression, that took place particularly during the first years of the Francoist regime, meant that the losers of the civil war were more likely to experience economic hardship (Bernal, 1993; García Piñeiro, 2001; Rodríguez Barreira, 2008; Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009). If these cities experienced more victimization during the civil war because of strategic reasons, results could be confounded. Thus, I also run a model excluding all municipalities that had 10,000 inhabitants or more in 1970 (around 7% of the total).

Every model includes province-level fixed effects, accounting for possible inconsistencies across different regional datasets. In addition, I include a series of robustness tests in the Appendix. In particular, in section A.7.1 shows that the results do not change significantly when controlling for spatial dependency, using a spatial lag of violence that controls for the existence of victimization in contiguous municipalities, and neighboring municipalities within 5km and 10km. Section A.7.3 shows that results do not change when using different specifications of the underground activity variable, and section A.7.2 shows the excluding the three Basque provinces does not alter the results either.<sup>5</sup>

### 5.1.6 Endogeneity and alternative explanations

Here I try to show that there are strong reasons to think that wartime victimization caused a long-term increase in leftist vote, and that this effect is stronger in those areas where underground opposition organizations were active during the late dictatorship. However, this research design still leaves room for an obvious concern for endogeneity. In particular, two other potential explanations for the results arise.

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<sup>5</sup> A further concern with the DiD design is the parallel trends assumption. Unfortunately, an empirical test is not possible given that electoral data before 1936 is not available, but there are no strong reasons to think this assumption would be violated, particularly given the amount of time between 1936 and the first post-Franco elections.

First, when interacting wartime victimization with postwar underground activity to predict long-term leftist support, the analyses could just be capturing the effect of victimization on postwar underground activity. To account for this, I show that underground activity does not correlate with victimization patterns during the civil war.

Second, organizational persistence is another explanation for the results. In other words, areas of leftist support before the war could have been more likely to experience Francoist victimization, develop networks of opposition during the dictatorship, and support leftist parties after 1977. Obviously, organizational persistence existed to some degree, as Francoist repression was not able to wipe out leftist support completely and some areas remained leftist strongholds during the whole period. However, if this pattern is strong enough it could confound the results and invalidate my argument. My claim is that the presence of political networks during the late dictatorship was in part a consequence of the socioeconomic dynamics of the 1950s and 1960s, and that there is enough variation with respect to patterns of prewar leftist support to provide evidence for the main argument. To test this assumption, I run a model substituting postwar clandestine activity for the presence of trade unions before the war, to rule out the possibility that the existence of prewar organizations is determining subsequent dynamics.

The key question in this article is about the conditions under which violence had long-term effects on electoral behavior and the role of underground networks in that process. This is an intrinsically endogenous process and, theoretically, both victimization and the existence of networks could take place in the same municipalities. However, without enough spatial variation, an empirical test of the argument would be very difficult. Ideally, the mechanism could be tested by linking the mobilization activities of these networks and over-time variation in both the way civilians remembered wartime violence and their political preferences. Unfortunately, such analyses would require data that is not currently available. By showing that there is enough variation and ruling out alternative explanations, I attempt to provide evidence in support of the argument that the effect of violence was mediated by the existence of political actors and networks.

### 5.1.7 Additional analyses

In this section, besides the main analyses on the effect of Francoist violence on leftist vote, I also test two secondary implications of the theoretical argument: the extent of organizational loyalty and the effect of violence in areas where cross-cutting cleavages define political preferences. Although these two analyses are not crucial

for the main argument, they help us to dig deeper into the theoretical argument and learn more about how the long-term effect of violence plays out.

First, I run the same main analyses but substituting the vote for all leftist parties after 1977 for the vote for the PCE or the coalitions it was part of. Given that the PCE was the main organization present in the underground opposition activities against the regime (e.g. [Nicolás Marín & Alted Vigil, 1999](#); [Rodríguez Barreira, 2008](#); [Vega, 2014](#)), the question here is whether the PCE was the main recipient of the backfiring effect of violence or, rather, this effect meant a general increase of leftist preferences.

Second, a related question is whether the effect of Francoist violence also applies to cross-cutting cleavages in regions where there is also a political division between Spanish and non-Spanish nationalisms, as in Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia. This question is particularly relevant since Franco suppressed any form of peripheral nationalism, sponsoring a strong Spanish identity, forbidding the use of other languages and banning non-Spanish nationalist political organizations. I explain further details and present the results of these complementary analyses below, in sections [5.3](#) and [5.4](#).

## 5.2 Wartime violence and leftist vote

### 5.2.1 Main Results

Figure [5.8](#) presents the results from the DiD models on the increase of leftist vote respective to the 1936 elections.<sup>6</sup> The first model (1) gives a simple DiD estimate of wartime rightist victimization on the subsequent increase in leftist vote without any interaction. The coefficients correspond to the interaction between wartime violence and each election, and indicate the increase in leftist vote for each election, relative to the 1936 share, that is due to wartime Francoist violence against civilians. The effect of victimization is positive and significant during the first half of the democratic period, peaking around the mid-1980s and decreasing thereafter. In the appendix, I show that these results hold when comparing a model with only pre-violence variables estimated on the full sample and on two matched datasets, using nearest neighbor and coarsened exact matching (see section [A.5](#)).

Turning now to hypotheses [H4.1](#) and [H4.2](#), the second model (2) includes an interaction of the victimization variable with the existence of political networks during the late dictatorship. In this case, we are interested in the three-way interaction between wartime violence, the existence of networks, and each election dummy,

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<sup>6</sup>Throughout this chapter I summarize the results graphically (see [Gelman, Pasarica & Dodhia, 2002](#); [Kastellec & Leoni, 2007](#)) and include the full tables of the DiD models in section [A.6](#) in the appendix.




Figure 5.8: Effect of wartime victimization on leftist vote conditional on the presence of political networks

Coefficient plot for four difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

which correspond to the increase in leftist electoral support as a result of violence in municipalities where there were underground leftist networks. The coefficients of the interaction between violence and the election dummies, in turn, indicate the effect of violence in municipalities without network presence.

The results support my theoretical argument and the expectations for the Spanish case. In particular, the effect of victimization on leftist vote increase is close to zero and not significant in those cases without political networks, but it is positive and significant when these networks are present. For a better interpretation of the results, figure 5.9 shows the DiD estimates, or the victimization-related increase in leftist vote share for each election respective to 1936, in municipalities with and without presence of underground political networks during the late Francoism. The DiD estimates thus show the additional, victimization-related increase in leftist vote share between 1936 and each modern election accounting for the general trend between those years. The graph shows how in those municipalities where there were political networks, victimization has a positive and significant effect, particularly during the mid-1980s through the early 2000s. Victimization does not seem to have a relevant effect in those municipalities without networks. Again, the temporal dynamics are coherent with the idea that once the democratic regime settles in, the relevance of underground networks active during the dictatorships decreases.




Figure 5.9: DiD estimates of wartime victimization on leftist vote depending on the presence of political networks

DiD estimates show the effect of wartime violence against civilians on the increase of leftist vote in each election relative to prewar (1936) elections.

A first concern with this analysis is that the binary nature of the victimization variable is hiding important variation that explains why certain municipalities, which suffered harsher violence, would later show a bigger increase in leftist vote. The third model (3) in figure 5.8 shows the results of a model using a continuous measure of Francoist victimization, the log number of killings per 1,000 inhabitants. The results mirror those in the main model.

Considering that the Francoist dictatorship lasted for four decades, and that Spain underwent a significant social and economic transformation during those years, another possibility is that the results might be driven by these transformations. In particular, rural-urban migration, which was an important phenomenon after the 1950s, could mean that people more likely to vote for the left moved to cities, such as the emerging left-leaning working class. Moreover, economic repression, that took place particularly during the first years of the Francoist regime, meant that the losers of the civil war were more likely to experience economic hardship, particularly in small towns. If these cities experienced more victimization during the civil war because of strategic reasons, results could be confounded. Even though the main model controls for population change between 1940 and 1970, the last model (4) in figure 5.8 estimates the main model in a sample excluding all municipalities that had 10,000 inhabitants or more in 1970 (around 7% of the total). The results, again, do not show any significant difference with those in the main model, suggesting that the effect is also found on small towns that, if anything, suffered a loss of population during these years.

In addition to these analyses, I include in the appendix further different specifications to test the robustness of the results (section A.7). In particular, I show that the results hold when including spatial lags for controlling for potential spill-over effects, when excluding the three Basque provinces from the sample or when using different specifications of the network variable. Moreover, I show that the results do not change when taking into account wartime leftist victimization, in those provinces where this data is available.

In brief, the results thus suggest that wartime victimization produced an increase in leftist sympathies, particularly in those places where anti-regime networks had been active during the dictatorship, and presumably helped to develop collective memories and mobilize support based on them. Once Spain transitioned to democracy, these sympathies translated into votes for leftist parties. The analyses show that the effect of wartime victimization is no longer statistically significant after 2004, which in principle is coherent with the argument. Once democracy settled in, leftist parties became more institutionalized, new generations that had not known Franco's regime reached voting age, and other issues different from

wartime memories gained in importance, which should explain why the local effect of violence became less relevant.

### 5.2.2 Alternative explanations

#### *Networks as a consequence of victimization*

An alternative explanation to the results presented above is that both leftist vote increase and the presence of clandestine political activity during Francoism are the consequence of wartime victimization. Although delving into the specific causes of anti-regime network presence is outside the scope of this dissertation, for the empirical results to be valid the presence of networks at the local level should be independent enough from wartime dynamics explaining victimization. To test this, I regress the presence of networks on wartime victimization and leftist vote in 1936, including a set of control variables similar to the ones included in the main analyses. Table 5.1 shows the results using different specifications, including or not the interaction between victimization and leftist support in 1936 and with and without province fixed effects.

In every model, wartime victimization does not show any relationship with the presence of political networks during the Francoist regime, and only in the model without province FE and without interaction does it have a barely significant effect, only at the 90%. In all other specifications, particularly when including province FE, the effect strongly decreases and stops being significant.

The absence of a clear link suggests that postwar political activity against the regime was the consequence of a different process, possibly related more to the social and economic dynamics of those years than to the legacies of the civil war. The positive and significant coefficient of population change between 1940 and 1960 points to one possible determinant, namely, economic and population growth, which is not related to wartime dynamics of victimization and was already controlled for in the main analyses.

#### *Persistence of prewar organizations*

Another alternative explanation is organizational persistence, in other words, that in those municipalities where the labor movement was present before the civil war leftist organizations might have survived the conflict and influenced the emergence of an anti-regime movement after the war.

This explanation is not at odds with the theory. If political organizations are resilient enough to survive violent repression during a civil war, they might be the

Table 5.1: Wartime victimization and postwar clandestine leftist activity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-9.845*** (0.849)	-12.266*** (1.254)	-9.939*** (0.908)	-12.343*** (1.295)
Francoist victimization	0.534+ (0.280)	0.099 (0.311)	0.638 (0.446)	0.192 (0.494)
Leftist support 1936	0.114 (0.617)	0.947 (0.879)	0.372 (1.050)	1.155 (1.217)
Victimization × Left 1936			-0.318 (1.056)	-0.271 (1.107)
Population change 1940-60	1.723*** (0.267)	0.670* (0.321)	1.720*** (0.267)	0.668* (0.321)
Log. Population 1960	1.064*** (0.114)	1.434*** (0.166)	1.067*** (0.114)	1.435*** (0.166)
Prewar unions	0.838*** (0.238)	0.433 (0.293)	0.839*** (0.238)	0.436 (0.293)
Elec. competition 1936	-2.242*** (0.502)	-0.413 (0.625)	-2.249*** (0.502)	-0.423 (0.625)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
Province FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,047	2,047	2,047	2,047
Log Likelihood	-353.782	-294.419	-353.737	-294.389
Akaike Inf. Crit.	723.564	628.838	725.474	630.779

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

ones that carry out the mobilization against the perpetrator in the postwar period. Some degree of persistence surely existed, but again, this empirical design requires enough spatial variation. To tease this out, I test here whether the increase in leftist vote is related to the presence of trade unions before the war. I run a version of the main models (figure 5.8), but interacting wartime victimization with the presence of prewar trade unions. Figure 5.10 shows the results, while figure 5.11 shows the DiD estimates of the main model (1).

In this case, both the results of the three models and the DiD estimates show that the effect of victimization in the presence of trade unions before the war are not statistically significant in any of the different specifications and, in some cases, they even have a negative impact. Again, this suggests that the location of dissent during the late dictatorship is at least partly exogenous with respect to patterns of leftist organizational activity during or before the civil war.




Figure 5.10: Effect of wartime victimization on leftist vote conditional on the presence of trade unions before the war

Coefficient plot for four difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.




Figure 5.11: DiD estimates of wartime victimization on leftist vote depending on the presence of trade unions before the war

DiD estimates show the effect of wartime violence against civilians on the increase of leftist vote in each election relative to prewar (1936) elections.

### 5.3 Organizational loyalty (PCE vote)

In this section I probe whether there was a pattern of organizational loyalty in the increase in leftist vote as a result of Francoist victimization, as stated in hypothesis H4.3. In other words, given that most clandestine activity during Francoism was linked to communist groups and to PCE in particular, did violence increase affinities for the PCE or for leftist ideologies in general? Here I explain briefly the empirical strategy to answer to this question and present the results.

#### 5.3.1 Empirical strategy

The empirical strategy essentially mirrors to one used in the main analyses. The only difference is that instead of using the share to all leftist political parties as the leftist vote after 1977, here I only include the vote for PCE and the subsequent coalitions it was a part of. In particular, between 1977 and 1982, the PCE run to the elections as a standalone party, while between 1986 and 2015 it became part of the *Izquierda Unida* (IU, United Left) coalition. In 2016 and 2019 its electoral support was coded following the results of the Podemos coalition, of which IU formed part. The value of leftist electoral support in 1936 is the same as in the main analyses.


The main problem with this strategy is that leftist vote in 1936, the share of FP in particular, does not fully correspond with the vote for PCE. Even though it does not correspond with general leftist vote after 1977 either, the high levels of electoral

continuity in Spain and the fact that 1936 elections clearly differentiated between the leftist and rightist blocks makes this parallelism much more convincing. However, it might not be the case for the PCE which, although it was part of the FP coalition in 1936, the electoral power of the communists before the civil war was fairly limited. It was only during the war and the dictatorship when they emerged as the main organization within the left, after the anarchists essentially disappeared during the postwar period and the socialists did not manage to establish local bases of support within the country—even though their power would increase during the latest years of the regime and particularly during the democratic period. Yet, given that there is no way to disaggregated the results of the 1936 elections by different parties, I continue with this strategy despite these limitations.

### 5.3.2 Main Results

Figure 5.12 shows the results of the four models using PCE vote as the outcome, replicating the main models in figure 5.8. Interestingly, the coefficients in the first model (1), which does not include the interaction with the network variable, suggest that Francoist violence has had a negative effect on PCE vote throughout the democratic period. Once the interaction with underground networks is included, however, this result becomes slightly more uncertain, although it remains to be negative in most cases, far from supporting hypothesis H4.3. Only in 2016 and 2019, when the PCE was part of a much larger position with the newly founded far-left party Podemos, does victimization show a positive effect on electoral support. The DiD estimates showing in figure 5.13 support these points, although in this case the negative effect of violence is even more clearly visible. Moreover, the results using either a continuous measure of Francoist violence or limiting the sample to towns below 10,000 inhabitants show the same patterns.

These are interesting results. The fact that violence seems to have a negative effect on PCE/IU vote throughout the democratic period does not support the organizational loyalty idea and instead suggests that Francoist violence increased the sympathies for more mainstream leftist political parties, such as PSOE. Moreover, the positive effect in 2016 and 2019 in the vote for Podemos, particularly when the overall effect for leftist parties found in the previous section was not positive, suggests that the change in preferences as a result of Francoist violence points to an increase in general leftist preferences. Thus, after 2015, when a potentially viable party to the left of PSOE emerged (PCE or IU never reached beyond 10% of the votes), municipalities that had suffered Francoist violence and hosted underground activity during the dictatorship seemed to have switched to Podemos. In



**Figure 5.12: Effect of wartime victimization on PCE vote conditional on the presence of political networks**

Coefficient plot for four difference-in-difference models on PCE vote respective to 1936 elections (FP share). Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.




Figure 5.13: DiD estimates of wartime victimization on PCE vote depending on the presence of political networks

DiD estimates show the effect of wartime violence against civilians on the increase of PCE vote in each election relative to FP share in prewar (1936) elections.

other words, the PSOE, which was the only viable leftist party until the emergence of Podemos in 2015, did not enjoy of organizational loyalty during the last two elections either.

#### 5.4 Cross-cutting cleavages (Basque nationalism)

Even though Spain has several ethnonational identities and the nationalist cleavage also played a relevant role in domestic politics before the war—and continues to do so today, the Spanish Civil War was fought mainly along the left-right divide. However, Franco supported a staunch opposition against any form of national identity different from the Spanish one, and during the dictatorship, the use of languages different from Spanish was prohibited in institutions and their everyday used was frowned upon, in addition to banning all parties that supported peripheral nationalism, including those on the right. Indeed, in some cases the civil war, and by extension the Francoist regime, was reinterpreted as a conflict between the Spanish and the rest of the nationalist minorities (see [Molina, 2014](#)), despite the fact that rightist, non-Spanish nationalist groups had, at the very least, an ambiguous relationship with Francoism. Therefore, a relevant question is whether Francoist victimization had any effect on nationalist vote in regions where there is another national identity, such as Galicia, Basque Country, and Catalonia. In the previous chapter I stated this expectation as hypothesis [H4.4](#).

In this case, I focus on the Basque Country, where the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV), run for the 1936 elections as an independent party without forming part of either the rightists and leftist front. The PNV, a Christian-democratic party, is the traditional Basque nationalist party, founded in 1895 by Sabino Arana, the father of modern Basque nationalism. Thus, in the Basque Country, it is possible to get a measure of nationalist vote before the war, unlike in Catalonia, where ERC and other Catalan nationalist, leftist parties run within the leftist block (*Front d'Esquerres*) and *Lliga Catalana* (Catalan League, LC) and other rightist parties formed the *Front Català d'Ordre* (Catalan Front of Order, FCO), the Catalan version of the rightist coalition.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the relative exceptionality of the Basque country, where underground activity registered in the TOC archives was much higher due to the existence of a terrorist group (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, ETA) and where a separatist form of nationalism was fairly strong ever since the beginning of Francoism makes these analyses even more relevant.

#### 5.4.1 Empirical strategy

Again, the empirical strategy developed here follows the one used in the main analyses. I substitute the outcome variable (leftist vote) for Basque nationalist vote, taking the PNV share as the reference point and including all Basque nationalist parties after 1977. Table A.3 in section A.4 of the appendix lists the parties coded as Basque nationalist in each election between 1977 and 2019. I include both the center-right PNV and the parties in the so-called *ezker abertzalea* (Basque for 'patriotic left'), such as EH Bildu, HB, or EA.

A limitation of this strategy is that the nationalist left, which mainly rose in importance during the Francoist dictatorship, might not be comparable to the PNV, which although has also supported a strong form of Basque nationalism, has always been much more conservative regarding economic and social issues. However, it is not possible to get data on electoral support for Basque, leftist parties before the war. The only existing party in the 1930s, *Eusko Abertzale Ekintza* (Basque Nationalist Action, EAE) run for the 1936 elections within the FP coalition. To account for this potential problem, I replicate these analyses in the appendix (section A.8) including only PNV vote after 1977. The results do not change much and support the main points discussed here.

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<sup>7</sup>It could be argued that LC, the dominant Catalanist party until ERC become the hegemonic force after 1931, did not support the same form of nationalism as in the case of ERC or other nationalist parties in the left. In any case, the existence of coalitions makes it impossible to know the specific electoral support for nationalist parties in 1936 elections in Catalonia.


### 5.4.2 Main results

Figure 5.14 shows the results of the four models using Basque nationalist vote as the outcome, again replicating the main models in figure 5.8. Figure 5.13 shows the DiD estimates of the second model (2) for a better interpretation of the results. The coefficients in the first model (1), which does not include the interaction with the network variable, show a negative effect of Francoist victimization on Basque nationalist vote, which goes in line with the findings on the PCE analyses. When the interaction with underground networks is included the effect remains negative but uncertainty increases substantially, and the coefficient stops being statistically significant. Figure 5.13 shows the DiD estimates of the second model (2) for a better interpretation of the results. Interestingly, the negative effect is only significant in those municipalities that had leftist underground activity during the dictatorship. In any case, no evidence in favor of hypothesis H4.4 was found. Results using either a continuous measure of Francoist violence or limiting the sample to towns below 10,000 inhabitants show the same patterns.

Coherent with the findings from the analyses on PCE vote, the results suggest that the combination of Francoist victimization and underground opposition activity during the dictatorship increased the sympathies for a leftist ideology, which seems to have translated into a general vote for leftist parties. Together, the results on PCE and Basque nationalist vote point to the idea that this is a story about leftist preferences, and neither organizational loyalty nor a transfer to other cross-cutting cleavages seems to explain the patterns found.

## 5.5 Conclusion

In chapter 4 I introduced the Spanish case and the theoretical argument suggesting that the long-term backfiring effect of Francoist violence only played out in those areas where there were active opposition groups during the dictatorships. Moreover, I presented qualitative evidence from secondary historical sources supporting this argument. In this chapter, using extensive local-level data from Spain, I showed that the empirical analyses also support the argument. Rightist violence against civilians during the Spanish Civil War increased long-term support for leftist parties, but mainly in those municipalities where political networks were active after the war. The results are thus consistent with the idea that the long-term legacies of political violence for political preferences are not homogeneous across different areas, but rather depend on the existence of a facilitating ideological context. Moreover, the additional analyses on communist (PCE) and Basque nationalist



**Figure 5.14: Effect of wartime victimization on Basque nationalist vote conditional on the presence of political networks**

Coefficient plot for four difference-in-difference models on Basque nationalist vote respective to 1936 elections (PNV share). Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.




Figure 5.15: DiD estimates of wartime victimization on Basque nationalist vote depending on the presence of political networks

DiD estimates show the effect of wartime violence against civilians on the increase of Basque nationalist vote in each election relative to PNV share in prewar (1936) elections.

vote point out that the effect of Francoist victimization increased leftist sympathies in general, which translated into increased electoral support for leftist parties in general and were independent of patterns of loyalty with specific organizations or of cross-cutting cleavages.

Previous studies have identified the long-term effect of victimization on political preferences, but they have failed to provide evidence on the way this process takes place and the reasons why it should be present in some cases but not in others. Although this article uses empirical data from a single conflict, its findings clearly point to the need to understand the social context in which this long-term effect plays out, and the actors involved in the process. In the next chapter, I focus on Guatemala to show that the same argument on the long-term consequences of wartime victimization is also valid in a context that is radically different from Spain.

# 6

## Guatemala

The Guatemalan civil war (1960–1996) is an infamous example of the use of violence against civilians as part of a counterinsurgency campaign by the state. And as usually happens in countries where these strategies have been used, the social and political consequences of state killings go well beyond the military development of the war, and still reverberate in modern Guatemalan politics.

In this chapter, I analyze the effects of the brutal campaign of civilian victimization that took place in the early 1980s on local-level political preferences in the postwar period. In particular, I analyze voting patterns to both *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG), the party that emerged from the former rebel group, and *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco* (Guatemalan Republican Front, FRG), the party founded by General Ríos Montt, the President of Guatemala during the early 1980s and one of the main responsible persons of the ‘scorched earth’ campaign.

Following the theory, I argue that in the case of Guatemala it was exposure to leftist political mobilization in the prewar period what determined the local ideological context present in each municipality after the war. Thus, I probe whether the effect of violence varies depending on the level of prewar exposure to political mobilization of each municipality. I expect that those communities with more such exposure had, in the aftermath of violence, the tools needed to build collective memories of the violence and capitalize on them to mobilize a political response against the perpetrator. In municipalities without this exposure, however, I expect that violence did not have such effects and even had the opposite effects. In fact, in addition to the violence, the Guatemalan state engaged in a broad ideological campaign in order to win the battle on hearts and minds, by trying to make local communities believe that the conflict was the guerrillas’ fault and that they army was the one who ultimately pacified the countryside and maintained security.

The empirical analyses support these expectations, proxying prewar exposure to political mobilization using road infrastructure, particularly distance to the Pan-American Highway and the local share of paved roads. In more accessible municipalities, and thus those that presumably were more exposed to political mobilization prior to the victimization campaign of the early 1980s, state violence is linked to an increase in electoral support for the URNG and a decrease in support

for the FRG. On the contrary, in isolated places with worse road infrastructures, state violence did not have any meaningful effect in postwar voting patterns. Finally, in response to a potential concern of selection bias, further analyses show that violence patterns during the civil war are not correlated to either distance to the Pan-American Highway or the local share of paved roads, which improves the face validity of these two variables as proxies for prewar exposure to political mobilization.

Complementing the evidence from Spain, the case of Guatemala constitutes a context in which prewar mobilization was limited, violence followed much more indiscriminate patterns of targeting, and democratic elections took place right after the war ended. In this case, the results highlight the importance of prewar factors and how the local context at the outset of the war strongly defined the effects violence would have in each municipality. In terms of the theoretical framework, the case of Guatemala shows again the importance of the local ideological context and, in particular, how it is determined by prewar dynamics, as illustrated in figure 3.3 in chapter 3.

Finally, a note on previous research. Analyzing the long-term electoral effects of state violence in Guatemala, [Vogt & Sáenz de Tejada \(2019\)](#) develop the closest analysis to the one done in this chapter. Similar to the theory developed here, they argue that “collective memories of state violence contribute to the formation of pro-insurgent collective identities,” increasing long-term support for the rebels. This effect, they say, should depend on the “victims’ embeddedness in their communities,” ([Vogt & Sáenz de Tejada, 2019](#), 3) and conclude that state violence will have a particularly strong long-term electoral effect in municipalities with a higher share of indigenous population. They find that municipalities where state violence was more intense during the early 1980s show higher levels of electoral support for leftist parties in the postwar period, and the persistence of this support across the postwar period is higher in those municipalities with a higher share of indigenous population. The main difference in their empirical analyses is that they do not weight the number of events or victims by the population in each municipality. In any case, however, regardless of how robust is the evidence of an increase in leftist vote as a result of state violence, linking the share of indigenous population to community cohesion is relatively problematic, particularly when some authors report fierce local conflicts and an increase of distrust in indigenous municipalities as a consequence of the counter-insurgency campaign (e.g. [Burrell, 2013](#)). Two further reasons suggest caution when interpreting the results regarding the persistence of leftist electoral support. First, state violence was more heavily concentrated in municipalities with a large share of indigenous population. And second, the fact that

in both 2011 and 2015 elections the URNG run in a coalition with Winaq, an explicitly Indigenous party, might explain part of this persistence in indigenous areas. In any case, [Vogt & Sáenz de Tejada's \(2019\)](#) findings are coherent with the argument advanced in this chapter.

Moreover, given that Guatemala became a democracy and the former rebels were allowed to become a political party and compete in elections after the conflict, contrary to Spain, it can be assumed that political actors were free to modify wartime memories and use them to mobilize people. The fact that the effect of violence is stronger in the first elections supports this point, and mimics the findings from Spain. Together, the results from Guatemala and Spain suggest that the contextual theory on the effects of violence on political preferences is valid to explain the consequences of violence in two very different contexts.

In this chapter, I first give a brief overview of the recent history of Guatemala, highlighting the development of the conflict. Then, I discuss what determined the consequences of violence against civilians in Guatemala, and derive my hypotheses. In the following sections, I present the data and methods used to test these hypotheses, and discuss the results. The last section concludes.

## 6.1 Historical background

Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America, bordering Mexico and Belize to the North, and Honduras and El Salvador to the South, and home to more than 17 million people ([UN, 2019](#)). Around half of its population is indigenous: most of them belong to the Maya, and a small minority are related to other Meso-American or Afro-Caribbean groups. The other half are identified as *Ladinos*, a local term for non-indigenous people. Virtually the whole population has indigenous roots, product of a long historical mixing dating back to the Spanish conquest, and thus the distinction between the *Ladinos* and the Maya is socially constructed. While the Maya self-identify as indigenous, practice social and religious Mayan traditions, and speak one of the twenty-one Mayan languages—notably Quiché, with over a million native speakers—, *Ladinos* adopted the Spanish language and European customs. Traditionally, Guatemalan political institutions and economy have been dominated by *Ladinos*, and discrimination against the Maya has been a pervasive constant since the Spanish conquest ([Perera, 1995](#); [Kobrak, 1997](#)).

Geographically, Guatemala is also a very diverse country. Guatemala City is centrally located between different regions, and to its South, the low fertile plains extend across the Pacific coast, which traditionally hosted many of the coffee and fruit plantations. The western highlands, which reach 4,000 meters above sea level,

is the traditional territory of the Maya and its population nowadays is still mostly indigenous. The northernmost region, Petén, is an ethnically mixed Tropical region filled with rainforests, while the East is a mainly Ladino area with much lower mountains. Figure 6.1 shows a physiographic map of Guatemala.



Figure 6.1: Physical Map of Guatemala

Source: CIA (2019).

The recent history of Guatemala is marked by the conflict that the country experienced between 1960 and 1996. In this section I present the antecedents of the civil war, the development of the conflict itself, and the democratic period after the end of the war that extend to this day.

### 6.1.1 Antecedents to the civil war

The closest antecedent to the Guatemalan Civil War is the October Revolution, also known as the 'Ten Years of Spring,' that started with the popular uprising that over-

threw Jorge Ubico in 1944, the dictator that had ruled Guatemala since 1931, and ended with the US-planned 1954 coup d'état. These ten years were the first period of representative democracy in Guatemala. The two elected presidents, Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951) and, particularly, Jacobo Árbenz (1951–1954), implemented a political program of social and political reform—including an attempt by Árbenz to carry out a comprehensive agrarian reform—that, for the first time, benefited the lower classes.

Besides political reform, during this period Guatemala also witnessed a steep increase in political mobilization. Trade unions and peasant organizations sprang up throughout the country, particularly in the lowland plantations and the coffee belt in San Marcos ([Handy, 1994](#); [Forster, 2001](#)). The success of these organizations varied across Guatemala, and while labor struggles were more intense in the coffee areas, in the highlands they had a more communal dimension, which would later facilitate the local mobilization that took place after the 1960s. As [Carmack \(1981, 360\)](#) says, “the peasant leagues and committees organized by the revolutionary government [after 1944] apparently were ineffective in the Quiché area. Nevertheless, the government created a favorable climate for the introduction of the Catholic Action (Reformed Catholic) movement.”

In the early 1950s the social and political changes in the Guatemalan countryside brought about concerns among local Ladino elites which, together with the leftist stance of the Árbenz government, which was perceived as increasingly communist in the US, led to the 1954 coup, planned by the CIA. Carlos Castillo Armas became the new President of Guatemala, initiating a long series of US-backed military dictatorships that would last until the late 1980s.

The impact of the 1954 coup on the leftist movement is key to understand the outbreak of the conflict a few years later. As [Forster \(2001, 213\)](#) noted, “many Guatemalans drew a harsh conclusion from the failure of the October Revolution: that the enemies of social justice were so powerful that only armed revolution could wrest freedom from their grip.”

### 6.1.2 The conflict (1960–1996)

#### *Initial phase*

In late 1960, a group of young leftist officers led a revolt against the autocratic government, headed by General Ydígoras Fuentes, motivated by the recent decision of Ydígoras of letting US forces train in Guatemala for the incoming Bay of Pigs Invasion. The revolt failed, however, and the young rebel officers fled to the eastern hills.

At the same time, responding to the 1954 coup, the small, urban leftist movement, mainly linked to the communist *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (Guatemalan Labor Party, PGT), had developed and radicalized. The rebel officers made contact with the PGT and other leftist organizations, and formed what would be the nascent guerrilla movement, the *Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes* (Rebel Armed Forces, FAR). They initially sought a social base among the rural, non-indigenous population in eastern Guatemala ([Arias, 1992](#)). These guerrilla leaders ruled out the Maya population as a potential base of support, considering them to be politically inactive and not suitable to support a revolutionary movement ([Smith, 1990b](#)).

The conflict continued in a relatively low-scale form throughout the 1960s, at least compared to what was to come, until the state carried out a successful counterinsurgency campaign in 1966–1967, which also included some violence against civilians, and managed to put down the insurrection. The defeated rebels retreated and many fled into exile.

Parallel to these events, whose main scenario were the eastern provinces, the Guatemalan countryside was changing rapidly. The *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action, AC) movement started to develop strongly after the mid-1950s, and the foreign Catholic clergy expanded throughout the country, bringing new ideas, both religious and social. AC fought against the Indigenous *costumbrismo*—the traditional Indian agricultural methods and religious beliefs—and developed new forms of social and agricultural organization, notably the cooperative movement, while at the same time the Catholic priests preached following a new style of Pastoral work that criticized economic and political discrimination, particularly after the Second Vatican Council in 1962 ([Arias, 1992](#); [Nelson, 2009](#); [Stoll, 1999](#)).

These new developments clashed again with local Ladino elites and the government, to which the cooperative movement and the Catholic priests responded by stepping up their organizational structures, with the founding of the *Liga Campesina* (Peasant League) in 1965 by AC organizers ([Arias, 1992](#)).

### *Escalation in the 1970s*

In the early 1970s, some remains of the defeated rebels joined forces with a new generation of leftist leaders to launch another insurgency. They worked with underground leftist organizations to develop an urban guerrilla in Guatemala City and, at the same time, a new group of insurgents finally crossed the border into Guatemala after a period of training and planning in Mexico, setting foot in the northwestern rainforest, and heading towards the western highlands. This move responded to a changed in strategy where, after realizing that the 1960s insurrec-

tion had failed partly because of the lack of popular support, the new guerrilla leaders identified the Maya as a potential base of support, due to their age-old situation of political and economic discrimination ([Payeras, 1981](#); [Arias, 1992](#)).

In this context, the new guerrilla movement started to make contact with the Catholic priests who were also working to improve the social conditions of the indigenous population in the western highlands. These contacts took place in an environment of mutual distrust (see [Manz, 2004](#), for an account from the Ixcán rainforest), although there is no agreement over the early involvement of the Church in the guerrilla movement, and the sympathies between the Catholic clergy and the guerrilla were varied from place to place (see also [Remijnse, 2002](#); [Carmack, 1988](#); [Kobrak, 1997](#)).

During the 1970s, violence started to escalate, particularly in the form of selective repression against leaders of the emerging social movements. In 1976, an unexpected event changed the course of the conflict, when a magnitude 7.5 earthquake struck Guatemala. The earthquake brought together student and union organizations with peasants from the countryside, the most affected population by the earthquake ([Ball, Kobrak & Spirer, 1999](#); [Remijnse, 2002](#); [Burrell, 2013](#)). Although the epicenter was close to the northeastern Caribbean shore, it strongly affected the western highlands, where homes were built with poor construction methods. The local leadership also gained legitimacy because of their role in the middle of the unexpected crisis: "They were effectively forced to exercise all political and social responsibilities, with minimal resources and no communication with either the departmental or national capitals" ([Arias, 1992](#), 243).

At this point, the peasant movement was already fairly developed and in contact with both AC and the growing guerrillas. The most important of the labor organizations in rural Guatemala was the *Comité de Unidad Campesina* (Committee for Peasant Unity, CUC), which emerged clandestinely in the mid-1970s and was finally made public on 1 May 1978, after having stayed underground until the organization "was strong enough to resist the reactionary onslaught" of those years ([Arias, 1992](#), 248). The CUC, which drew heavily on the ideas of cooperativism and liberation theology, had its focus on the western highlands and was the first national organization with a Maya leadership. In 1978, state repression against the rebels and the civilian population associated with them took on another level. The Panzós massacre in late May 1978, in the department of Alta Verapaz, when the army killed hundreds of peasants who were peacefully protesting over land rights, is usually considered the first event of importance in the campaign of civilian victimization that the government would carry out until the mid-1980s. When General Lucas García assumed power the following month, this pattern only became

worse, and the western highlands became the scenario of one of the most brutal counterinsurgency campaigns of the 20th Century.

In this climate of escalating violence, the CUC still pushed for non-violent action, and met a violent response by the government. In January 1980, a group of Maya peasants—among them the CUC activist Vicente Menchú, father of the Nobel laureate Rigoberta Menchú—went to the capital to protest the violence carried out by the army against civilians in the Quiche department, and ended up occupying the Spanish Embassy. The response of the government was blunt. The police set the building on fire, killing almost all the people inside and leaving only two survivors: the Spanish ambassador and a Guatemalan lawyer. This event marked the end of the non-violent campaign, and from then on, all the efforts concentrated on the armed struggle that was being waged by the guerrilla groups, namely, the *Ejército Guatemalteco de los Pobres* (Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP), the *Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas* (Organization of Armed People, ORPA), the FAR, and the PGT. The January 1980 events also marked the final incorporation of the Maya population into the rebel movement,<sup>1</sup> as Arias (1992, 253–254) testifies:

“The burning of the embassy was the definitive watershed for most Indians. For them, there were now no options left other than to join the popular war being waged against the reactionary regime. And, from that date on, a latent state of massive insurrections against the state began in both the central highlands and the northwest.”

These events and other dynamics—the Sandinista’s victory in Nicaragua also contributed to the rebel expansion in Guatemala—set the tone for the intensification of the conflict in the early 1980s, which would be accompanied by the infamous victimization campaign by the government. In 1982, the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG) was formed as the umbrella group that hosted all the major rebel groups listed above. And “while the war in Guatemala lasted almost four decades, it was the early to mid-1980s that definitively changed the scope and terms of the conflict” (Burrell, 2013, 26).

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<sup>1</sup>There are competing accounts regarding the participation of the Maya in the insurrection (see below), but what is out of doubt is that from the late 1970s on, the scenario of the war centered around the western highlands and the Maya, willing or unwillingly, were perceived as the main base of social support for the rebel groups.

*Counterinsurgency and violence against civilians*

When the conflict escalated in the late 1970s, the Guatemalan government responded with a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, directly aimed at the social group that they thought constituted the base of support for the rebels, the rural Maya. Violence increased sharply after 1978 (see figure 6.5 in the section 6.3) and, by the early 1980s, it reached genocidal levels. More than 200,000 civilians were killed during the Guatemalan conflict, and over 90% of the killings were committed by state forces, most of them during the period between 1980 and 1983 (CEH, 1999; Ball, 1999).

Burrell (2013) tells how the victimization campaign played out at the local level, pitting neighbors against neighbors and installing a climate of fear and distrust that would leave long-term consequences. And indeed, this campaign was successful in destroying Maya social organizations and gaining the cooperation of local communities, at least forcefully. Stoll (1999, 101) reports how in "Baja Verapaz, the army's reaction to CUC roadblocks was so savage that some of CUC's surviving members (...) changed sides and helped the army massacre one unarmed village after another."

Civilian victimization was first carried out in a more haphazard way under the regime of Lucas García (1978–1982), and it followed a more strategic pattern under Ríos Montt (1982–1983), who engaged in a 'scorched earth' campaign and later designed a system to ensure compliance from the local population: the Civil Defense Patrols, or *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil* (PAC).

The PAC system involved the forced recruitment of local civilians into paramilitary groups that were tasked with patrolling the surroundings and warding off the guerrillas from entering the communities. Moreover, in more than a few instances, the PAC also assisted the army in massacring civilians, and in many cases they were forced to do so in neighboring villages. This also had the effect of intensifying local conflicts and increasing mistrust among the Maya population which, together with the victimization campaign and the ideological warfare waged by the army during those years, explains the comprehensive strategy of the Guatemalan state. As Bateson (2017, 641) says, "during the Guatemalan civil war, the military made a concerted effort to socialize and re-educate the civilians of the Western Highlands."

During the last phase of the counterinsurgency campaign, the military carried out the forced resettlements of population in the so-called development poles, which involved a milder approach towards the civilian population but had nonetheless a similar goal (Smith, 1990b). These were villages controlled by the military where local civilian could be controlled and where some of the

factors attributed to the support for the guerrillas—a general state of economic underdevelopment—were addressed.

“The present program differs from Phase I in that the civilian population is not being shot at and killed. They are now being rounded up and, after they are in the bag, treated relatively well: they are given clothes, food, health care and protection from the marauding guerrilla. The military wants to win the hearts and minds (while still using a fair measure of intimidation) of the refugees” ([Cultural Survival, 1988](#), 15).

Overall, all these tactics used by the military to win the battle on hearts and minds were fairly successful. In many places, the combination of violence, the co-optation of the local population through the PAC system, and the ideological warfare really paid off, and the myth of a pacifying military committed with the well-being of the population was firmly established in some areas. However, “what is unclear is the extent to which this mythology has been internalized or whether it is all part of the defensive mask put on in order to survive” ([Nelson, 1986](#), 5).

#### *Final years*

In the 1990s, even after the intensity of the war had strongly decreased and the strength of the rebel movement was nowhere where it had once been, the army continued with their ideological campaign, tracking and prosecuting those who were sympathetic with leftist ideas and the Maya movement. For instance, in the fall of 1992, when Rigoberta Menchú had been nominated to the Nobel Peace Prize, the army surveyed local opinions about the Menchú nomination, while at the same time intimidating and threatening those who were in favor of it ([Equipo de Apoyo Sindical, 1992](#)).

During the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a rise in Maya mobilization as well, together with an increased protagonism of women and a growing influence of the Catholic Church within popular movements, even after the brutal repression suffered during the 1980s and the growth of Evangelism ([Jonas, 2000](#); [Nelson, 2009](#)).

At this point, although the social base of the guerrilla movement had been almost entirely destroyed or ‘deactivated’, the army did not manage to win the war military, and some remnants of the URNG or small pockets of popular support still remained active in some isolated areas ([Jonas, 2000](#)). At this point, the URNG changed its strategy, realizing that taking power through an insurrection was impossible, and “moved toward a strategy of gaining a share of power for the popular classes through political means” ([Jonas, 2000](#), 31). The peace talks, which started

in 1994 in Mexico, took place in this context. The talks would finally culminate in the signing of the 'Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace' in December 1996, putting an end to almost four decades of conflict. For the rebels, a new political space opened, and the URNG became a legal political party in 1998.

### 6.1.3 Postwar period

After the peace agreement of 1996, the country remained in a relatively unstable situation, particularly in those areas that had been hardly hit by the conflict. Besides economic underdevelopment, crime rates rose steeply, and during the 2000s Guatemala became one of the most crime-ridden countries in the world, with a violent death rate that surpassed many war zones. On the countryside, the PACs had formally demobilized when the war ended. However, they remained an important social actor, with high coercive capacity, the ability to exert power both at the local and national levels and, in many cases, became the self-proclaimed solution to the crime problem, which brought about an increase in collective vigilantism ([Sáenz de Tejada, 2004](#); [Bateson, 2013, 2015](#))

#### *The Issue of Memories*

Guatemala witnessed a fierce battle over the memories of the conflict, discussing the scope of the violence against civilians and issues of responsibility. This debate also took place in the academic spheres as, even acknowledging that the army had committed most of the violations, anthropologists debated the "the responsibility of the URNG and its relationship to the indigenous civilian population in the highlands conflict zones" ([Jonas, 2000](#), 33). Some anthropologists argued that the war had been externally imposed on the Maya, who just happened to be caught 'between two armies' ([Stoll, 1993](#)), while other did acknowledged that some Maya group did support the rebellion consciously (see [Carmack, 1988](#); [Arias, 1992](#); [Smith, 1990a](#); [Le Bot, 1992](#); [Stoll, 1993](#); [Hale, 1997](#); [Stoll, 1999](#); [Sanford, 2001](#); [Manz, 2004](#); [Garrard-Burnett, 2010](#)).

In was in this context that the *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico* (Commission for Historical Clarification, CEH), a UN-sponsored truth commission, carried out the research for a report on what had actually happened, and in 1999 they revealed that the army had been responsible for 93% of the human rights violations, while only around 3% were attributed to the URNG (4% could not be identified) ([CEH, 1999](#)). Although this had a clear impact in the country, some people claim that the CEH and other reports about the conflict did not have the resonance they should ([Nelson, 2009](#), 80). During the presentation of the CEH report, Otilia Lux, a

Maya activist, repeated the story that the Maya had been *engañosos* (conned), that they “became involved in an armed conflict that was imposed on [them] and that was not [theirs]” ([McAllister & Nelson, 2013](#), 6).

Regarding electoral politics, the first properly postwar elections took place in 1999, when the URNG participated as a political party. The FRG won in 1999, and Alfonso Portillo became the new President. The FRG was the party founded by Ríos Montt, although the General himself could not ever be the main candidate because of a constitutional ban on former coup leaders. Support for the FRG came from the conservative urban sectors of Guatemala but, surprisingly, also from areas hardly hit by the war, where the state propaganda campaign had arguably been successful and “more than a few indigenous survivors spoke of the Ríos Montt era as one in which the nature of the violence changed for the better” ([Garrard-Burnett, 2010](#), 11; see also [Ball, Kobrak & Spirer, 1999](#)). In 2003, however, the FRG would suffer an important defeat and would not again attain the same level of electoral support.

On the leftist side, the URNG never managed to attract mass support in any elections, and although in 1999 it got around 12% of the votes, its support has starkly declined since then. Similarly, the Maya movement in Guatemala has not been electorally successful either, for a variety of reasons, including institutional rules and the legacies of state repression that have increased the fragmentation and localism of the Guatemalan indigenous movements ([Martí i Puig, 2008](#); [Pallister, 2013](#); [Vogt, 2015](#)).

## 6.2 Consequences of violence in Guatemala

In this section I apply the theoretical framework from chapter 3 to the specific case of Guatemala, discussing the specific factors that explain the effect that state violence had on long-term political preferences, and how this effect varies spatially. The theory states that the long-term impact of victimization on political preferences hinges upon the local ideological context. In particular, a long-term rejection of the perpetrator’s political identity only takes place when local communities have the tools to through all the steps of the process: framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization. In other words, a leftist ideological context ensures that local civilians interpret wartime events politically, develop collective memories, and translate them into political behavior, in this case, electoral choices.

The reasons that explain the existence of this ideological context in Guatemala can be found in the prewar period.<sup>2</sup> In chapters 4 and 5 I showed that, in the case of Spain, wartime violence by rightist forces only increased long-term leftist vote in those municipalities where, during the Francoist dictatorship, there were local, underground political networks that helped to create and maintain collective memories and thus mobilized leftist electoral support. While the existence of this type of local ideological context in Spain was explaining mainly by postwar factors, in Guatemala the relevant factors explaining this variation are found in the period *before* the violence.

In particular, building upon the argument developed above in chapter 3, I argue that the effect of state violence against civilians depended on the exposure of municipalities to the political mobilization carried out by Catholic priests and peasant organizations during the 1960s and early 1970s, which determined the local ideological context present in each local community after the war. Without this exposure, which I measure using infrastructure accessibility as a proxy, as I explain in section 6.3 below, local municipalities were less likely to experience the process described in the theoretical framework and thus less able to cope with the ‘brain-washing’ plan that the government carried out after the victimization campaign. In other words, in the absence of a left-leaning ideological context, violence did not have any effect in Guatemala municipalities or, if anything, it increased support for the perpetrator’s political identity.

This section explains two aspects of this argument. First, I discuss how, in the aftermath of violence, fear together with the co-optation strategies developed by the government could have convinced civilians that the army was not the main one to blame for the violence and that, in any case, they ultimately helped pacifying the Guatemalan countryside. This idea speaks to the part in the theoretical argument where I discuss how, in the absence of a facilitating ideological context, violence is much more likely to show a demobilization effect.

Second, I explain the main pillar of the argument for Guatemala: the role that the foreign clergy and the peasant movement played in the Guatemalan countryside before the conflict escalated in the 1970s, setting up a political mobilization that helped communities bypass the army co-optation and propaganda strategies.

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<sup>2</sup>Throughout this chapter I refer to the period before 1978 as the period before the violence took place, and refer to prewar mobilization as political mobilization that took place before 1978. Even though the Guatemalan Civil War started in 1960, violence intensity during the 1960s and early 1970s was very low (see section 6.3 below, and figure 6.5 in particular). Thus, many communities in the country effectively experienced the conflict for the first time during the late 1970s, and especially those that suffered the harshest violence in the early 1980s. Indeed, most analyses on violence against civilians in Guatemala focus exclusively on the years after 1978 or even after 1981–1982 (e.g. [Sullivan, 2012](#); [Kubota, 2017](#); [Vogt & Sáenz de Tejada, 2019](#)).

The role of these two actors was key for the development of a leftist ideological context in certain municipalities, which ensured that the whole process outlined in the theory took place in the aftermath of violence, explaining the backfiring effect of violence in these areas.

### 6.2.1 Co-optation and fear after violence

Although violence against civilians had been used in a relatively arbitrary way under Lucas García, when Ríos Montt rose to power, violence was part of a comprehensive strategy that also included a plan to co-opt the population, directly through the forced recruitment of local civilians into the PAC system and, indirectly, through the state of fear and insecurity that had prevailed after the height of the violence.

The PAC system, “established in virtually every municipio of the western highlands between 1982 and 1983” ([Smith, 1990b](#), 272), was designed to ensure compliance within the countryside, forcing local civilians to ‘defend’ themselves from the guerrilla and, in many cases, successfully convincing them that they were on the good side and that violence and insecurity was the rebels’ fault. Moreover, one of the goals of the PAC program was to destroy community networks and erode the trust among local people, which presumably had helped the guerrillas to organize a local base of support ([Sáenz de Tejada, 2004](#)). Actually, the local social structures that were established with the PAC system, by arming and empowering a new group of local men, completely changed the power dynamics in local communities and had long-term consequences ([Bateson, 2013, 2015](#)).

The co-optation strategies went beyond the local PAC militias, and the government explicitly recruited soldiers from the Maya communities into the army, including the infamous Kaibil, the elite units that carried out many of the atrocities. A woman described to [Green \(1995, 112b\)](#) “the particularly gruesome death of her husband at the hands of the army, while behind her on the wall prominently displayed was a photograph of her son in his Kaibil uniform.”

As discussed in the theory, the co-optation of local people through forced collaboration is not exclusive to Guatemala, nor is the fact that people often talk in a positive way about the new enforcers, either because of family links within the community or because of the consequences of living under this constant state of insecurity. Without a certain ideological context, a left-leaning one in this case, the government would be successful with this cooptation strategy and violence would not have any backfiring effect. Thus, the expected effect would be demobilization

or, if the ideological context leans towards the political ideology of the perpetrator, it might even increase support for the perpetrator.

Beyond forced recruitment, the army also purposely establish a climate of fear, which indeed “made individuals more receptive to the military’s propaganda, as they were desperate for some narrative to make sense of the chaotic, unpredictable violence surrounding them” (Bateson, 2017, 643). This ideological warfare that mainly took place right after the harshest phase of the war included rightist propaganda against communist ideas and any non-traditional form of social organization, which effectively meant the cooperative movement, and put the blame of violence on those activities. This mantra was “repeated until the idea became so deeply embedded that when cadavers appeared on the streets (...), good-hearted [people] could turn away, saying ‘they were involved in something (...) It’s their own fault’” (McAllister & Nelson, 2013, 5).

Thus, the military occupation that took place in the Guatemalan countryside after the early 1980s had, beyond its security goals, the aim of convincing the local population that the army had pacified the country, and that the situation of insecurity and violence was the guerrilla’s fault. In essence, they tried to win the battle on hearts and minds. Also, given that the Maya population eventually became the social base of support sought by the rebels, the army “program [was] based on eroding ethnic identity among Guatemala’s Mayan Indian majority, and on brain-washing” (Black, 1985, 21).

All this strategy had important consequences in the long term. The PAC system, in particular, was widely regarded by people across the political spectrum in Guatemala as the most successful element of the army counterinsurgency campaign (Garrard-Burnett, 2010, 101). And in any case, the whole co-optation plan and the insecurity and uncertainty that prevailed in the countryside during the 1980s helped convince the local population of the army’s anti-rebel theses, and left a long-term distrust for politics (Green, 1995). Bateson (2017, 635) acknowledges that

“Through the mechanisms of fear and learning, a critical mass of civilians emerged from the war either acquiescing to or fully embracing two narratives that facilitate postwar patrolling: the idea that repression is a necessary and effective way to provide security, and the claim that during the civil war, the civil patrols served the public good by fending off the guerrillas.”

Considering all this, the key question is to explain the variation in success of this counterinsurgency campaign. Here I argue that it is the local ideological con-

text what explains this variation. In particular, it was the role of political organizations, active before state violence took place, what explains why certain communities were resilient to the counterinsurgency campaign by the army and instead became more likely to support the rebels' political project and reject the army's one, as a consequence of the process that leads to violence to a change in political preferences through framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization. [Kobrak \(2013, 223\)](#) gives a glimpse of this argument, stating that "living under army control, many guerrilla supporters learned to forget they had even been attracted to the struggle at all. But not in Colotenango." In that community, he continues, peasant organizations had been particularly strong and managed "to challenge the mindset of submission the army had tried to establish through the civil patrols" ([Kobrak, 2013, 226](#)).

Below I discuss the role that these organizations, namely Catholic Action and the peasant movement, active during the 1960s and early 1970s, played in providing communities with the tools to react differently to wartime violence and thus set up the local ideological context that determined the direction of the effect of violence.

### 6.2.2 Prewar mobilization and local ideological context

The argument for Guatemala states that exposure to prewar mobilization was key for local communities to develop a left-leaning ideological context that ensured that all the steps of framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization took place. In other words, this context ensured that local civilians were able to interpret wartime state violence politically, to form collective memories and to respond by changing political preferences in the expected direction, that is, an increase in support for the leftist rebels, URNG, and a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity, later represented in the FRG party.

Two types of actors were the ones who carried out this political mobilization: the Catholic Action movement by foreign priests inspired by the liberation theology, and the peasant movement that initially developed in the 1940s during the Árbenz regime and then again after the 1960s, pushing for land rights and organizing rural communities. Both types of actors were interrelated, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, when the Catholic movement and the peasant organizations established strong links and later founded the CUC in the late 1970s.

The peasant movement had already developed in the 1940s and early 1950s, during the ten-year October Revolution ([Forster, 2001; Handy, 1994](#)). The formation of local peasant organizations and the Peasant League introduced the first

political experiences in many local communities and taught the local population about their economic condition and their rights, becoming “a socializing force whose effects have continued to this day” ([Carmack, 1981](#), 360–361). However, it is unclear whether the increase in peasants and workers organization had clear consequences in terms of political mobilization. [Forster \(2001](#), 215) explains that “the struggles on different plantations often had more to do with employers’ attacks on human dignity than with particular national events,” and that “only rarely did rank-and-file plantation workers use the political language that inspired outside organizers.”

The main events, at least relevant to the consequences of state violence studied in this chapter, were yet to happen. During the 1960s and early 1970s, a new wave of pastoral work carried out under the new guidelines of the Second Vatican Council coincided with a reemergence of the peasant movement, which together brought about an intense political activity to many areas of Guatemala.

Although foreign priests had been visiting Guatemala for a long time before the 1960s, the type of pastoral work carried out, and the political education associated with it, changed completely during that time. The new liberation theology, which developed among the Catholic clergy in Latin America after the late 1950s, was to become a key political influence in Guatemala and in many other places in Latin America ([Wood, 2003](#), e.g.). These religious activities took place at the local level throughout a large part of the Guatemalan countryside, and they had a clear political dimension, as [Manz \(2004](#), 50–51) discusses:

“Beginning in 1968, in isolated peasant villages, in crowded urban slums, in *cantones* throughout the highlands, activist clergy, nuns, and priests interacted with their parishioners in new ways. (...) [They] spoke about the hardship, the indignities, the desolation people confronted in their daily lives and how faith could be key to challenging their exploitation and improving their condition. A frequently posed question was, ‘What would Jesus do if he were here?’ But also, ‘What would Jesus, who gave his life for us, expect of us?’ The answers became a vehicle to inform the struggle for change.”

This new work carried out by the Catholic clergy introduced the concepts and tools necessary to interpret the wartime violence politically, and to understand why the civilian population in the countryside were being collectively targeted (see also [Carmack, 1988](#); [Manz, 1988](#); [Le Bot, 1992](#); [Bateson, 2013](#)). It is not a surprise, then, that in the mid-1970s, the Catholic Church was already a strong political actor leaning strongly towards the theses of the nascent guerrilla movement. Indeed, after

the 1974 elections many priests were expelled from Guatemala, with the excuse that they had been participated in politics. And in many cases, local peasants spoke up and asked the government to reconsider the decision to expel some of these missionaries, citing all the work that had done for the community—including literacy programs and cooperativism—as the reasons for them to stay (e.g. [Imparcial, 1974a,b](#)).

The peasant movement in Guatemala developed parallel to the expansion of the liberation theology clergy, and they eventually became deeply intertwined. Actually, much of the work that Catholic priests carried out involved developing new forms of social and agricultural organization, namely the cooperative movement, which also had profound political consequences since it organized the local population and show them alternative options to the existing economic and social regime ([Arias, 1992](#); [Nelson, 2009](#); [Bateson, 2013](#)). Indeed, according to [Sáenz de Tejada \(2004, 41\)](#), one of the reasons later given by the army to explain support for the rebels was “the introduction—in the rural communities—of new forms of social organization, such as agrarian leagues or cooperatives, without them being properly supervised and somewhat controlled [by the government].”

In the late 1970s, the formation of the CUC was the culmination of these organizing activities by both the peasant movement and Catholic Action. At this point, the political dimension of these activities was clear, and so it was their connection with the nascent guerrilla movement, led in that movement by the EGP. As [Stoll \(1999, 103\)](#) argued, “the EGP turned [the doctrine of *concientización* from liberation theology] into a cover for transforming catechists into guerrilla organizers.” [Löfving \(2005\)](#) also links participation in the rebel movements in the late 1970s to prior exposure to political mobilization, and makes clear the crucial importance of these activities in places that did not have an extensive history of political mobilization:

“In the population as a whole the absence of ideology and the presence of violence at the time loyalties were decided upon existed parallel to the presence of a defined cause in politically active circles” ([Löfving, 2005, 84](#)).

Building upon the theoretical argument developed in chapter 3, my expectation is that these political activities that took place before the victimization campaign would create an ideological context that helped the full process of framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization to take place. Thus, I argue that the exposure to local communities to these activities is what explains the backfiring effect of wartime violence on political preferences. And, in particular, I expect that in municipalities with this exposure, state violence increased long-term support for the

rebels, while at the same time decreasing support for the FRG, the party founded by Ríos Montt that represented the army's ideology. Similarly, without this exposure and the ideological context it produced, the army propaganda campaign should have been successful, and therefore violence had the opposite effects, increasing support for the rightist ideas linked to the army, and therefore to the FRG, while decreasing support for the URNG. Following this, I outline the main hypotheses for the analyses on Guatemala:

- H6.1 In municipalities exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians *increased* long-term local support for the URNG.
- H6.2 In municipalities exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians *decreased* long-term local support for the FRG.
- H6.3 In municipalities *not* exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians *decreased* long-term local support for the URNG.
- H6.4 In municipalities *not* exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians *increased* long-term local support for the FRG.

### 6.3 Data and methods

In this section, I discuss the empirical strategy used to test hypotheses H6.1 to H6.4. To do so, I build a dataset at the level of municipalities, covering 325 municipalities in Guatemala across all 22 departments of the country. Figure 6.2 shows the sample of municipalities and departments.

The unit of analysis is the municipality.<sup>3</sup> Although Guatemala currently has 340 municipalities, the sample is reduced because of the territorial changes that municipalities have witnessed since 1973, the earliest observed year in the dataset.<sup>4</sup> The strategy to deal with these changes was the same as the one used for Spain (see section A.1 in the Appendix), i.e. to reduce the list to a 'minimum denomination' of municipalities to standardize all data sources across different periods. In the case of Guatemala, however, the procedure was much simpler because of the low number of changes. Section B.1 of the Appendix lists these changes and specifies how they were addressed.

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<sup>3</sup>As I explain below, some models pool observations across all elections for all municipalities, in which case the unit of analysis is the municipality-year.

<sup>4</sup>There is one exception: the variable on pre-1978 rebel violence, coded from the CIIDH dataset (Ball, 1999), which goes as back as 1961. Two municipalities were created in the 1960s in the department of Petén, Melchor de Mencos (1962) and Poptún (1966). However, no event took place in any municipality of Petén before 1971, so no changes were implemented for these two municipalities.




Figure 6.2: Sample of municipalities and departments included

Below I explain the data sources and coding rules used for each of the variables included, as well as the details of the models. In the Appendix, I also include descriptive statistics of all the variables (section B.2).

### 6.3.1 Postwar electoral results

The main dependent variable refers to the electoral results of the URNG. The URNG, which became a political party in 1998 and has participated in all national elections since 1999, was originally founded in 1982 as the umbrella group that included all the major rebel groups fighting against the government: EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT. Therefore, this variable should capture pretty well the ideological sympathy for the former rebels, and more generally, for the ideology they represented.

Moreover, I also analyze the electoral results of the FRG, the political party created in 1989 by the former dictator General Efraín Ríos Montt, who was President of Guatemala between March 1982 and August 1983, arguably the most violent phase of the conflict. Indeed, Ríos Montt was one of the designers of the scorched-earth campaign and the plan to co-opt the rural population through the forced recruitment of local peasants into paramilitary groups. Later, in the 2010s, he was formally ruled for genocide and crimes against humanity. During the war, Ríos Montt, together with other sectors within the army, had tried to impose the view that the leftist rebels were the ones responsible for the killings and, ideologically, he supported a form of far-right populism and Guatemalan nationalism. The FRG represented this point of view after the civil war ended, and was actually supported by many ex-patrollers in rural areas that had been hardly hit during the civil war. Indeed, the FRG had tried to incorporate the PAC local structures within its political project since its foundation ([Sáenz de Tejada, 2004](#)).

In both cases, I calculate the share of total valid votes received by each party in each municipality across all elections between 1999 and 2015, with the exception of 2011 for the FRG, when it did not participate. Including both the share to URNG and FRG allows me to measure not only the ‘backfiring’ mechanism, by which state killings translate into support for the opposite side, but also the degree of support for the army’s counterinsurgency campaign and, to some extent, the success of the government in co-opting the local population. Table 6.1 shows the share of total votes received by URNG and its coalition partners across all the national elections in the recent democratic period in Guatemala. Both parties had its best result in 1999 when, arguably, the wartime divisions were at its height. Later on, other parties received a larger share of the votes and the party structure underwent some changes. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the geographical distribution of the voting share to the URNG and FRG, respectively, in 1999. Although in the main analyses I pool all observations across all election years, I also run analyses on a cross-section of the data for each election and show the results in the Appendix (section B.3)

### 6.3.2 Violence against civilians

To gather data on wartime violence against civilians I rely on and merge two different datasets, the records of the CEH and the *Centro Internacional para Investigaciones en Derechos Humanos* (International Center for Human Rights Investigations, CIIDH), following previous research on political violence in Guatemala ([Chamarbagwala & Morán, 2011](#); [Sullivan, 2012](#)). Both CEH and CIIDH datasets are event

Table 6.1: Electoral results of URNG and FRG

	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
URNG	12.33%	2.58%	2.14%	3.26%	2.12%
FRG	47.75%	19.34%	7.3%	-	0.87%

Note: FRG did not participate in 2011 elections, and in 2015 it had been renamed to PRI. Coalition partners of URNG: DIA in 1999; WINAQ, ANN, and MNR in 2011; WINAQ in 2015.




Figure 6.3: URNG results in 1999 elections

databases built after extensive field research and together constitute a comprehensive picture of victimization events throughout the Guatemalan Civil War.

The CIIDH is a Guatemala-based NGO that carried out thousands of interviews and reviewed a variety of secondary sources—including press and human right agencies reports—to produce a list of more than 17,000 human rights violations by both sides, including more than 40,000 killings (Ball, 1999).<sup>5</sup> The dataset is available

<sup>5</sup>Each violation refers to an event with at least a recorded victim, 69% of which were fatal events. In 9.5% of the fatal events there is more than one victim, and some record more than 100.




Figure 6.4: FRG results in 1999 elections

online. The CEH was a UN-sponsored truth commission that focused on the massacres committed by the government against the civilian population and published in 1999 a 12-volume report titled *Memoria del Silencio* (Memory of Silence), which revealed that over 200,000 civilians were killed or disappeared during the conflict and that over 90% of the killings had been committed by state authorities or related paramilitary groups (CEH, 1999). The CEH data was obtained from the replication data for Sullivan (2012), who hand-coded massacres, defined as events of indiscriminate violence where at least 5 people were killed, from the CEH reports. In both cases, only events of fatal violence against civilians were selected (in CIIDH, including those violations coded as 'Killed' or 'Disappeared, later found killed'), and those whose location was unknown were removed (0.1% of all events). In the analyses, data on violence against civilians is limited to the period 1978–1985, which was by far the most violent period of the conflict (more on this below).

As Sullivan (2012, 382) explains, "the three sources used to generate the CIIDH/CEH data (interviews, human rights reports, and newspaper listings) present a more accurate portrayal of the distribution of violence across Guatemala than any one source would have on its own," and although interviews were collected based

on a non-random sampling procedure, selection bias is likely to be minimal given the scope of the data collection. All in all, the Guatemalan data are some of the best datasets available on wartime violence against civilians.

Figure 6.5 shows the temporal distribution of violence against civilians by state authorities, including the army and paramilitary groups (PACs), in both normal (a) and logarithmic (b) scales. As mentioned above, the analyses limit the data on violence to the period 1978–1985 (marked in dotted lines), in order to be able to include ‘prewar’ variables, or in other words, observations previous to the most intense phase of the war. Indeed, before 1978 the levels of violence were far below what took place in the early 1980s and because the initial phase of the conflict was limited to the eastern provinces, the war had not effectively started in the relevant areas: the western highlands and Petén.




Figure 6.5: State violence against civilians in Guatemala over time

For the analyses, I calculate the number of killings by state forces that took place in each municipality during the 1978–1985 period, for every 1,000 inhabitants (using data from the 1973 census). This is the main explanatory variable, which is included in the models in its logarithmic form, given that it is natural to expect that

the marginal effect of an additional victim decreases as violence intensifies. Figure 6.6 shows the geographical distribution of state violence.




Figure 6.6: State violence against civilians in Guatemala, 1978–1985




Figure 6.7: State-linked violence over time by perpetrator

Although state violence also includes here violence committed by the paramilitary groups linked to the government, the PACs, the army participated in most killings. Figure 6.7 shows the participation share of each actor (or both) across the years by number of killings. In most years, and particularly during the period

1978–1985, the government was the sole actor in 64 to 98% of the killings, while the PAC were the only responsible of only 1% to 10% of the killings.

Violence by the rebels against the civilian population was never anywhere close to the levels reached by the state forces, and in terms of geographical extent, it was limited to a very small number of municipalities. Although the analyses include an indicator of rebel violence prior to 1978 to control for previous rebel activity, rebel violence has not been included as an explanatory variable. Figure 6.8 shows the temporal distribution of rebel violence, and figure 6.9 maps its occurrence across municipalities during the most intense period of the conflict. Both figures demonstrate that it was a rare phenomenon, at least compared to the scope and intensity of state violence.




Figure 6.8: Rebel violence against civilians in Guatemala over time

### 6.3.3 Proxying prewar exposure to political mobilization

I state in the theoretical expectations for Guatemala that prewar exposure to political mobilization was a major factor determining the response of civilians to state violence. Previous knowledge about political divisions and domestic cleavages were key to understand why they were targeted and who was the perpetrator, and therefore, to develop local accounts of the violence and a response in the form of political preferences. Ideally, data on the presence and activities of leftist political actors—mainly peasant organizations and both foreign and local priests—before the most intense phase of the conflict would help testing this mechanism. However, to my best knowledge, such data is not available.

Instead, I use two proxies for prewar exposure to political mobilization based on road infrastructure. In particular, I assume that accessibility in terms of road infrastructure determined how much exposure local communities had to these external political actors, who came to bring new political ideas and organize the local population. This assumption should be especially true in the western highlands




Figure 6.9: Rebel violence against civilians in Guatemala, 1978–1985

and the northwestern part of the country, where local terrain made communications extremely difficult and where, in addition, the conflict took place with more intensity.

Below I explain the two variables used: distance to the Pan-American Highway, a major road-building project that was completed around the 1960s and crossed the country from West to East, and the share of non-paved roads in each municipality.<sup>6</sup> In section 6.4.2 below, I show that neither of these two variables is related to patterns of state or rebel violence during the civil war.

Actually, I use these two variables to increase the overall validity of the analyses. Distance to the Pan-American Highway should in principle be a more exogenous variable, given the way this highway was built and its course chosen, as I explain below. However, it might leave out some variation across municipalities in departments that are far away from the highway but still connected to the capital and other urban centers. The use of the share of non-paved roads thus comple-

<sup>6</sup>I use the share of non-paved roads, rather than its opposite, to facilitate the interpretation of the regression tables, i.e., to spot more easily the effect of violence when all roads are paved, where % non-paved equals 0.

ments the first proxy and tries to solve this limitation, giving a measure more comparable across different departments, even though it could be more correlated with other confounders, some of which might not be observed. In any case, given that they are not highly correlated among them (0.23), they function as two different proxies for accessibility at the local level from two different angles, thus increasing the overall robustness and validity of the results.

#### *Distance to the Pan-American Highway*

The Pan-American Highway, finally completed in the early 1960s, was a major development project sponsored by the United States and carried out after the Second World War. Initially planned to be a railroad, its aim was to join the Americas by a transport link that would foster Inter-American cooperation and trade. Although the dream of driving uninterruptedly from the United States to Patagonia could not be accomplished because of the Darien Gap, an insurmountable section of rainforest between Panama and Colombia, the construction of the Pan-American Highway greatly improved communications. This was particularly true in rural areas, where previous roads consisted of mule trails or larger dirt tracks that became impassable during the rainy season. The technical challenges that engineers found when planning and building this road demonstrates the difficulties of moving around these areas. A section along the Selegua River next to the border with Mexico in the western highlands of Guatemala was one of the major hurdles:

“The distance involved in closing the gap was not especially great, but the required engineering made it a major undertaking. Surveys had revealed that the only practical way to link the two road systems necessitated building for twenty-five miles through the valley of Guatemala’s Selegua River, where narrow canyons and loose volcanic rock fields promised nightmarish construction. On a per mile basis, the amount of excavation the job demanded would rival what had taken place at Cerro de la Muerte in Costa Rica” ([Rutkow, 2019](#), 381).

In Guatemala, the Pan-American Highway crosses the country from West to East, entering from Mexico in the Huehuetenango Department, crossing the western highlands, Guatemala City, and the Southeastern lowlands, and entering El Salvador from the Jutiapa Department. The planning of actual route, although following the easiest possible terrain and previous tracks where possible, was relatively exogenous, especially the fact that it crossed the Highlands rather than the

Pacific coast. As [Rutkow \(2019\)](#), 298) shows, this choice was made because of to political reasons:

"The survey, by this point, had moved on to its next destination, Guatemala. James's men had arrived there shortly before the conference began and were busily trying to select the best route from among the nation's four-thousand-mile wagon road network. Their options included a route through the populous highlands and one along the fertile lowlands. Ultimately the team settled on the upland course, in part to avoid upsetting the International Railways of Central America, Minor C. Keith's former company, which had already built a line along the flatter terrain near the Pacific Coast."

In any case, and particularly in its northwestern section across the western highlands, which was the technically most difficult section and the last one to be completed, the Pan-American Highway brought about a great improvement in transport infrastructure in a key moment in time: the late 1950s and early 1960s. As discussed above in the previous section, this was the period when the conflict in Guatemala officially started in the eastern provinces, and both Guatemalan peasant associations and foreign missionaries together with local priests—encouraged by the new guidelines set in the Second Vatican Council in 1962—took up the mission of mobilizing large sections of the rural Maya population into leftist politics or, at least, ideas of land redistribution, labor rights, and freedom from political injustices.

The assumption I make here is that municipalities closer to the Pan-American Highway had a more intense exposure to these mobilization activities due to the easier logistics of arriving to these areas. In other words, I assume that better transport infrastructure facilitated the arrival of more political actors from Guatemala City and abroad. Although these actors were explicitly interested in mobilizing the rural, isolated population, and in a few notorious cases they literature hiked through the jungle for days to accomplish their mission,<sup>7</sup> I assume that, on average, areas more easily reached had a more intense exposure to political mobilization throughout these years.

Therefore, for the case of the Pan-American Highway, I calculate how far away each municipality is from the road, and expect that municipalities closer to the

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<sup>7</sup>A famous example is the story of Santa María Tzejá, documented by [Manz \(2004\)](#), a new settlement founded by a few landless Maya peasants in the 1970s who, accompanied by the Spanish Priest Luis Gurriarán, hiked for weeks through the dense rainforest of northern Quiché to find land. Gurriarán was one of those young priests who represented the new Liberation Theology and would later have to flee the country amid serious death threats by the government.

Highway had a stronger exposure to leftist political mobilization during the 1960s and early 1970s. Figure 6.10 shows the final variable, which indicates the distance between each municipality and the Pan-American Highway (shown as a blue line), measured as a straight line between the boundary of each municipality and the road. This means that municipalities where the Pan-American Highway passes through have a value of 0. In the analyses, this variable is used in its logarithmic form, i.e.  $\log(km + 1)$ .




Figure 6.10: Distance to Pan-American Highway

#### *Road infrastructure at the local level*

The second variable I use to measure accessibility is the share of non-paved roads in each municipality. The idea behind this choice is to complement the analyses using the distance to the Pan-American Highway with another proxy that could capture local accessibility from a different point of view. Assuming that political actors would go beyond areas adjacent to the Pan-American Highway, local road infrastructure would facilitate transportation within a municipality and, therefore, generally higher exposure to the activities of these actors. By including both mea-

sures, I attempt to introduce a more robust way of using an accessibility proxy to prewar exposure to political mobilization, using two variables that refer to a similar aspect but are not correlated, as I show in section 6.4.2, which discusses alternative explanations and the robustness of the results.

Data comes from the road network developed by the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, publicly available at the *Sistema Nacional de Información Territorial* (National System for Territorial Information) ([Segeplán, 2019](#)), which corresponds to the road network existent around 1970. Although the specific date could not be found, the National Geographic Institute in Guatemala affirmed that data is based on raw information from the 1960s and 1970s, which constitutes the best approximation for the period of interest, namely, the road infrastructure right before the conflict escalated in the late 1970s.

The left panel (a) in figure 6.11 shows the road network in Guatemala, with non-paved roads in grey and paved roads in black. The right panel (b) shows the variable used in the analyses, which calculates the share of non-paved roads out of the total length of existing roads. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the maximum level of road infrastructure, in other words, that all roads in that municipality are paved.<sup>8</sup> I use the share of non-paved roads instead of the total length to keep a measure that is independent from the territorial extension of each municipality.

#### 6.3.4 Controls

I also include in every model a set of variables that control for both patterns of wartime violence and electoral results in the postwar period. Using data from the 1973 census, obtained from the replication dataset for [Sullivan \(2012\)](#), I include the logged population of each municipality and the share of indigenous population.

I also control for terrain ruggedness, which strongly influenced the degree of wartime victimization and presence of the rebel groups during the war, including the standard deviation of elevation within each municipality and the share of forest cover. Data on elevation was obtained from the Digital Elevation Map of Guatemala ([Mapzen, 2018](#)), while data on forest cover was drawn from the Global-Cover Land Cover Maps ([Arino et al., 2012](#)).

To control for the presence of rebel groups previous to the period under study, which could have determined targeting patterns by state forces, I include a measure of rebel violence prior to 1978, calculated in the same fashion as state violence, i.e.

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<sup>8</sup>I use the share of non-paved roads instead of the share of paved roads for better interpretation of the regression tables. This way, the coefficient for state violence corresponds to the expectations laid out in the hypotheses.




Figure 6.11: Road infrastructure in Guatemala

the logged number of killings for every 1000 inhabitants. Data was obtained from the CIIDH dataset ([Ball, 1999](#)).

I also include the logged distance to Guatemala City from each municipality (in km) and the logged area of each municipality (in  $km^2$ ), both obtained using GIS tools.

### 6.3.5 Models

In every case, I run OLS regressions on the vote share of URNG or FRG. As explained above, I run models pooling data from all elections between 1999 and 2015, and include in the Appendix models using separate cross-sectional data for each election (section B.3). Every model includes department fixed effects, in order to compare only municipalities within the same department. Models using the pooled data also include election fixed effects.

Given that wartime violence was strongly concentrated in a few areas of the country, I also run the same models using a subset of the most affected departments, namely, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén. Figure 6.12 shows the level of violence in each department, measured in killings per 1000 inhabitants.




Figure 6.12: State violence by department (1978–1985)

## 6.4 Results

In this section I discuss the results of the statistical analyses. I first present the main models, which analyze the relationship between state violence during 1978–1982 and postwar vote for both the URNG and FRG, and the impact of road accessibility on that effect. Finally, I check the robustness of the results to alternative explanations, assessing the determinants of state and rebel violence against civilians, and whether the two proxies for prewar mobilization are correlated with violence patterns.

In particular, if the theoretical argument is correct about the consequences of state violence in Guatemala, we should observe a positive effect of violence on leftist vote in those municipalities closer to the Pan-American Highway and those with a lower share of non-paved roads. In municipalities further away from the Pan-American Highway or those with more non-paved roads, the effect should be the opposite, namely, that violence either does not have any effect or increases support for the FRG.

### 6.4.1 Main results

Table 6.2 shows the results of the base models, i.e. those that analyze the relationship between state violence and vote for the URNG and the FRG, in both the whole sample and only in the departments most affected by the violence. In every case the data pools together observations from all elections. The first column (1) shows a positive relationship between state-led killings and URNG vote, but no relationship in the case of the FRG (column 2). Moreover, in both cases the election dummies show that vote for URNG and FRG was much higher in the 1999 elections.

When looking at the most affected departments, the effect of state violence on leftist vote decreases, and it only stays significant at the 90% level, which suggests that the general trend found in the first model could indicate a concentration on both violence and leftist vote in the western highlands and Petén, without a very robust relationship.

Regarding the control variables, they show unsurprising effects. Leftist vote is higher in municipalities with a higher share of indigenous population, and in municipalities with a higher share of forest cover. Both these results are even stronger when limiting the sample to the most affected areas. In the case of FRG vote, no control variable has a clear effect, with the exception of the share of indigenous population, which decreases vote for the FRG in the limited sample.

Table 6.3 replicates the previous models but includes the interaction between state violence and the first proxy for prewar mobilization, distance to the Pan-American Highway. In the case of URNG vote, the effect of state violence when distance to the highway equals 0 is much stronger than in the base model, and the effect remains virtually the same in the limited sample. As the distance from the Pan-American Highway increases, the effect of state violence on leftist vote decreases.

These results can be more clearly seen in figure 6.13, which shows the predicted effect of state violence on URNG vote in three municipalities located next to the highway, 20km away, and 400km away; keeping all other variables at their mean. State violence has a positive impact on leftist vote in the first case, but it decreases and even becomes negative as distance increases. Assuming the variable is a good proxy for prewar mobilization, as discussed in the previous section (6.3.3), the interpretation of these results is that state violence only increased leftist vote in municipalities that had been exposed to political mobilization before the conflict intensified. The effect is substantial. In a municipality contiguous to the highway, as state violence increases from 0 to around 150 killings per 1000 inhabitants—which

Table 6.2: Base models on wartime violence and postwar voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Most affected departments (4)
(Intercept)	-0.020 (0.038)	0.512*** (0.065)	0.009 (0.101)	0.471** (0.166)
State-led killings	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004+ (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Log. Population 1973	0.004+ (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)	0.006 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.048*** (0.007)	-0.015 (0.011)	0.060*** (0.015)	-0.053* (0.026)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.018* (0.008)	-0.023 (0.014)	0.045* (0.018)	-0.037 (0.030)
Log. Dist to capital	0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.010)	0.004 (0.018)	0.009 (0.030)
Log. Area	0.007** (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.009+ (0.005)	-0.006 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.006 (0.041)	0.015 (0.071)	-0.056 (0.156)	-0.025 (0.258)
2003 election	-0.097*** (0.005)	-0.247*** (0.007)	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.174*** (0.015)
2007 election	-0.107*** (0.005)	-0.408*** (0.007)	-0.131*** (0.010)	-0.343*** (0.015)
2011 election	-0.094*** (0.005)		-0.112*** (0.010)	
2015 election	-0.109*** (0.005)	-0.473*** (0.007)	-0.134*** (0.010)	-0.441*** (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.440	0.814	0.385	0.730
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.428	0.809	0.363	0.719

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections, including election FEs. Department FEs included, not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

Table 6.3: Wartime violence, prewar mobilization, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG Most affected departments	FRG
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-0.002 (0.038)	0.508*** (0.065)	0.042 (0.100)	0.453** (0.168)
State-led killings	0.024*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.009)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Log. Population 1973	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.009 (0.011)
% Indigenous 1973	0.048*** (0.007)	-0.014 (0.011)	0.060*** (0.015)	-0.055* (0.026)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.015+ (0.008)	-0.024+ (0.014)	0.041* (0.018)	-0.041 (0.030)
Log. Dist to capital	0.004 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.006 (0.018)	0.006 (0.030)
Log. Area	0.009*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.014** (0.005)	-0.008 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.015 (0.041)	0.011 (0.071)	-0.021 (0.154)	-0.035 (0.259)
2003 election	-0.097*** (0.005)	-0.247*** (0.007)	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.175*** (0.015)
2007 election	-0.107*** (0.005)	-0.408*** (0.007)	-0.131*** (0.010)	-0.343*** (0.015)
2011 election	-0.094*** (0.005)		-0.111*** (0.010)	
2015 election	-0.109*** (0.005)	-0.473*** (0.007)	-0.134*** (0.010)	-0.441*** (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.452	0.814	0.405	0.731
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.439	0.809	0.381	0.718

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections, including election FEs. Department FEs included, not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

was the case of, for instance, Nebaj (Quiché), Chajul (Quiché), or Rabinal (Baja Verapaz)—the expected vote for URNG goes from 10% to almost 25%.




Figure 6.13: Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway)

Predicted share of URNG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (distance to Pan-American Highway). Model includes department and election FEes. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean.

In the case of FRG vote, however, the results are not statistically significant, and state violence does not seem to have any meaningful effect, regardless of the value on the proxy for prewar mobilization. Figure 6.14 shows this result graphically, although it shows that, if anything, the results are the opposite than in the models explaining URNG vote.

Table 6.4 shows the results for the equivalent models substituting distance to the Pan-American Highway with the local share of paved roads, as the alternative accessibility proxy for prewar mobilization. The results are stronger than those that rely on the previous variable. State violence has a large positive effect on URNG vote in those municipalities which have all roads paved, and as the share of non-paved roads increases, the effect of state violence disappears. In the most affected departments, the relationship is even stronger, and remains significant at the 99.9% level. The models on vote for the FRG mirror these results but in the opposite direction, although the effect is only significant at the 5% level. State violence is linked to less votes for the FRG in municipalities where most roads are paved, but as the share of non-paved roads increases, this effect disappears.

Again, for better interpretation, these results are shown visually in figures 6.15 and 6.16. Similarly to the results using the other proxy, state violence has a large effect on leftist vote in more accessible municipalities, as expected vote for URNG rises from 10% to more than 30%, when going from 0 killings to around 150 killings

Table 6.4: Wartime violence, prewar mobilization, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG Most affected departments	FRG
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-0.048 (0.038)	0.526*** (0.066)	-0.165 (0.107)	0.620*** (0.180)
State-led killings	0.046*** (0.007)	-0.030* (0.013)	0.082*** (0.017)	-0.071* (0.028)
% Non-paved roads	0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.016)	0.075* (0.038)	-0.035 (0.064)
Violence × Non-paved	-0.045*** (0.008)	0.033* (0.014)	-0.085*** (0.018)	0.079** (0.030)
Log. Population 1973	0.005+ (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.006)	0.007 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.047*** (0.007)	-0.016 (0.012)	0.059*** (0.015)	-0.052* (0.025)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.015+ (0.008)	-0.020 (0.014)	0.034+ (0.018)	-0.028 (0.030)
Log. Dist to capital	0.009 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.026 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.031)
Log. Area	0.007** (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.009+ (0.005)	-0.006 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.003 (0.041)	0.018 (0.071)	-0.026 (0.153)	-0.063 (0.256)
2003 election	-0.097*** (0.005)	-0.247*** (0.007)	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.175*** (0.015)
2007 election	-0.107*** (0.005)	-0.408*** (0.007)	-0.131*** (0.010)	-0.343*** (0.015)
2011 election	-0.094*** (0.005)		-0.111*** (0.010)	
2015 election	-0.109*** (0.005)	-0.473*** (0.007)	-0.134*** (0.010)	-0.441*** (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.451	0.815	0.414	0.736
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.439	0.810	0.391	0.723

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections, including election FEs. Department FEs included, not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.




Figure 6.14: Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway)

Predicted share of FRG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (distance to Pan-American Highway). Model includes department and election FEes. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean.

per 1000 inhabitants. In the case of FRG vote, the effect goes in the opposite direction, less robust but still significant. FRG vote decreases in municipalities where most roads are paved, while it has virtually no effect in more isolated municipalities.




Figure 6.15: Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads)

Predicted share of URNG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (% non-paved roads in a given municipality). Model includes department and election FEes. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean.

All in all, the results are in line with the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, and particularly with those that refer to URNG vote, H6.1 and H6.3. In




Figure 6.16: Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads)

Predicted share of FRG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (% non-paved roads in a given municipality). Model includes department and election FE. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean.

In the case of the FRG hypotheses, the results are mixed. The analyses provide empirical evidence for hypothesis H6.2, which predicts a decreasing effect of violence on support for the FRG in municipalities more exposed to prewar mobilization. However, hypothesis H6.4 is not directly supported by the data. Although the expectation was that in municipalities not exposed to prewar mobilization, state violence should have been successful in increasing support for its political project (represented by the FRG), the results show there is no effect in this case.

In any case, an important assumption made in these analyses, and key for the interpretation I defend here, is that the accessibility variables I use are a good proxy for the level of exposure to prewar mobilization. I have already discussed in the previous section why I think this is the case, using qualitative information. Unfortunately, a quantitative test of this assumption is impossible given the absence of relevant data. Yet, what I do in the next section is to test a potential problem that would invalidate the results and go against the assumption made: the relationship between the accessibility proxies and patterns of violence against civilians, particularly state violence. Moreover, I show in the Appendix (section B.3) additional results using subsets of the data for each election.

#### 6.4.2 Alternative explanations and robustness

In this section I provide further evidence testing the robustness of the empirical design. As said above, there is one main concern when interpreting the results.

Namely, if state violence was more intense in more accessible places, either those closer to the Pan-American Highway or those that had more paved roads, it could mean that the increase of leftist vote in these places is explain by state violence alone. The same pattern could be found if conflict activity was higher in these same places. Here I show that none of these two proxy variables are able to explain state violence or even rebel violence.<sup>9</sup>

Table 6.5 shows the results of linear models explaining wartime violence by the state. Models in the first two columns run the analyses for the whole sample, including department fixed effects in column 2. Columns 3 and 4 show equivalent models but restricting the sample to only the most affected departments. As can be seen, state violence does not have any relevant relationship with the two proxy variables used as interactions and, if anything, has a positive relationship with the distance to the Pan-American Highway in column 2. That is, violence was slightly more intense in municipalities further away from the highway, whereas the problematic result would be the opposite. State violence is mainly explained by the share of indigenous population in each municipality, as well as by its area, which is not surprising considering previous research on the Guatemalan conflict reviewed above.

Table 6.6 shows the results for models equivalent to the previous ones but using rebel violence as the dependent variable. And again, none of the accessibility proxies shows any relationship to rebel violence. In this case, rebel violence is also poorly explained by the rest of the variables, and no robust relationship if found, perhaps due to the relatively low incidence of violence by the rebels.

In brief, these results show that the two accessibility variables used as proxies for the level of exposure to prewar mobilization are not good indicators of the intensity of the conflict in each municipality, which should increase their validity or, at least, alleviate some concerns over a potential selection bias.

## 6.5 Conclusion

In chapters 4 and 5 I showed how the local ideological context after the war defined the effects that Francoist violence against civilians would have on long-term political preferences in Spain. In this chapter I have focused on the prewar determinants of the ideological context, arguing that prior political mobilization strongly defined

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<sup>9</sup>Moreover, by using two different accessibility variables as a measure of prewar exposure I tests whether the results hold when proxying the real variable from two different points of view. Indeed, the correlation between these two variables is just 0.23 (figure B.1 in the Appendix), which suggests that they are not measured the exact same thing.

Table 6.5: Determinants of wartime violence by the state

	Most affected departments			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-0.922 (0.831)	-0.097 (1.190)	-4.045 (2.665)	-3.786 (4.080)
% Roads non-paved	-0.129 (0.310)	-0.322 (0.272)	0.057 (1.456)	-0.786 (1.364)
Log. Distance to Pan-Am Hwy	-0.028 (0.050)	0.100 <sup>+</sup> (0.057)	0.052 (0.134)	0.200 (0.168)
Log. Population 1973	-0.114 (0.085)	0.035 (0.084)	0.487 <sup>+</sup> (0.256)	0.360 (0.249)
% Indigenous 1973	1.396*** (0.179)	0.431* (0.211)	1.233* (0.579)	0.598 (0.623)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Forest cover	0.207 (0.275)	0.211 (0.252)	-1.187 (0.717)	0.333 (0.732)
Log. Dist to capital	-0.058 (0.094)	-0.208 (0.200)	-0.192 (0.301)	-0.430 (0.739)
Log. Area	0.454*** (0.069)	0.263** (0.080)	0.390 <sup>+</sup> (0.196)	0.551** (0.203)
Rebel violence pre-78	1.847 (1.555)	2.105 (1.296)	4.449 (6.737)	3.326 (6.312)
Department FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	325	325	99	99
R <sup>2</sup>	0.277	0.575	0.229	0.407
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.256	0.531	0.151	0.308

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

the way local communities would be able to interpret wartime events and form collective opinions about it. The empirical analyses on Guatemala show that exposure to prewar mobilization explain in which cases state violence led to an increase in electoral support for the leftist, ex-rebel political party, instead of not leaving any meaningful legacies.

The Guatemalan Civil War differs in many aspects from the Spanish Civil War. It was a conflict where several guerrilla-based rebel groups fought against a military dictatorship, there was no firm territorial control by the rebels, and the state-led civilian victimization campaign relied much more on indiscriminate forms of violence, besides being considerably larger in scope. Yet, the basic theoretical framework developed to explain the long-term effects of violence for political preferences is also valid to explain the case of Guatemala.

Table 6.6: Determinants of wartime violence by the rebels

	Most affected departments			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.026 (0.138)	-0.287 (0.251)	0.216 (0.515)	-0.598 (0.875)
% Roads non-paved	-0.043 (0.052)	-0.049 (0.057)	-0.144 (0.281)	-0.176 (0.293)
Log. Distance to Pan-Am Hwy	0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.036)
Log. Population 1973	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.044 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.054)
% Indigenous 1973	0.059* (0.030)	0.023 (0.045)	0.091 (0.112)	0.078 (0.134)
Elevation SD	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	-0.028 (0.046)	0.013 (0.053)	-0.060 (0.139)	0.015 (0.157)
Log. Dist to capital	-0.002 (0.016)	0.034 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.058)	0.130 (0.159)
Log. Area	0.034** (0.011)	0.035* (0.017)	0.069+ (0.038)	0.057 (0.043)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.136 (0.259)	0.193 (0.274)	1.768 (1.302)	1.367 (1.354)
Department FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	325	325	99	99
R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.097	0.090	0.137
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.005	-0.003	-0.007

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

All in all, the empirical evidence showed up to this point supports the contextual theory on the consequences of violence. A change in political preferences as a result to exposure to violence does not take place only at the individual level, but it is the product of a local-based process of collective memory formation, remembrance and political mobilization. In the next chapter, I explore the consequences of state violence in a very different context and at a different level of analysis. In particular, I look at patterns of ethnic conflict recurrence and probe whether they are related to ethnically based violence against civilians by state authorities. I also use survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa to test some of the individual-level mechanisms that underpin this relationship.



# 7

## Collective targeting and ethnic mobilization

In the previous chapters, I showed that the contextual theory on the consequences of wartime violence developed in chapter 3 is able to explain the legacies of violence in Spain and Guatemala. The previous, unconditional theories, particularly the backfiring or demobilization arguments, failed to account for the intra-country variation we find and thus are not sufficient to explain why violence seems to have divergent consequences across different areas within a same country. The empirical evidence shows that the effect of wartime violence depends on the existence of a facilitating ideological context ensuring that the whole process from violent events to a change in political preferences takes place.

However, it is still unclear whether those findings are only valid in these two cases. Spain and Guatemala constitute two contrasting contexts, where the historical background, conflict dynamics, and sociopolitical characteristics are very different. But the fact that I rely on two single cases still leaves a question open about the external validity of the findings. In this chapter I try to offer some light on this issue, relying on a global data on violence against ethnic groups and two sets of analyses on a larger sample.

A direct test of the theory across a global sample is beyond the scope of this dissertation because of data availability reasons. In principle, collecting data on the local ideological context across multiple postwar countries should be possible. However, it would require too many resources, particularly if the goal is to code information on local organizational and social activities across several postwar countries where, in most cases, information is not easily available. Such an endeavor is outside the reach of this dissertation. My strategy here is slightly different, and relies on two sets of empirical evidence.

First, I look at a global sample of ethnic conflicts and focus on whether civilian victimization by state authorities makes conflict recurrence more likely. Here I try to show that the unconditional theories—the ones that suggest the existence of a non-conditional backfiring or demobilization effect of violence—are not able to explain global patterns of conflict recurrence.

Second, I offer complementary empirical evidence using survey data from several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, matching the survey responses to data on collective targeting of ethnic groups. In particular, I test some of the individual-level

mechanisms usually proposed to explain the aggregated effects of civilian victimization and, more importantly, analyze whether the effect of violence is dependent on the sociopolitical surroundings of the individuals. Because of data availability reasons, I cannot operationalize the concept of ideological context. Rather, I approximate it by measuring how politically active an individual is.

In both cases, I rely on the Ethnic One-Sided Violence (EOSV) data ([Fjelde et al., 2019, 2016](#)), a new dataset that identifies the ethnic identity of victims in OSV events in UCDP data ([Eck & Hultman, 2007](#)) and whether there was evidence of indiscriminate collective targeting. The data covers ethnic groups across the world in the period between 1989 and 2013. In the conflict recurrence analyses, I build a dataset on conflict incidence at the level of ethnic groups, using a dataset that links conflicts from the UCDP database to the Ethnic Power Relations list of ethnic groups ([Vogt et al., 2015](#)). I restrict the sample to those groups that have experienced a conflict since 1989, and code whether they have suffered wartime ‘ethnic targeting’ by state authorities, i.e. collective targeting based on the ethnic identity of the victims. In the survey analyses, I rely on geo-referenced survey data from [Afrobarometer \(2016\)](#), and combine it with the Ethnic One-Sided Violence (EOSV) dataset mentioned above, and the UCDP One-Sided Violence event dataset ([Eck & Hultman, 2007](#)).

The results are in line with my aims. With regards to the conflict recurrence analyses, the results show that state-led collective targeting of ethnic groups does not have any unmediated effect on conflict recurrence nor does it clearly increase or decrease the effect of other conflict triggers, particularly, ethno-political exclusion. Even though this does not constitute direct evidence for my theoretical argument on the role of the ideological context, it does point to the need for further research on the topic and suggests that the effect of violence is probably more complex than previously thought. The results from the survey analyses show that being exposed to civilian victimization because of own’s ethnic identity has a positive effect on ethnic self-identification and ethnic grievances. This effect is higher if individuals are politically active, namely, if they often discuss about politics with friends or family or if they are interested in politics. Interestingly, civilian victimization does not have any significant effect on individual attitudes about the use of political violence, a mechanism that underlines much of previous research on the consequences of violence. Thus, the analyses show that victimization has a higher impact on political preferences for those individuals who are more politically active, even though it has differential impacts on outcomes that are usually taken as parallel mechanisms of the same process.

This chapter contributes to both this dissertation and current literature in several ways. First, I show that, even beyond Spain and Guatemala, neither of the unconditional theories—the backfiring and demobilization arguments—constitutes a completely satisfying explanation of the consequences of wartime violence against civilians. This does not mean that I am able to prove that my contextual theory, and particularly the argument on the role of the ideological context in mediating the effect of violence, is able to explain global patterns of conflict recurrence or the consequences of violence in general. However, the results underscore the need of further research on the explanations of the legacies of violence, and point to a potential way out of this puzzle: to acknowledge that the effects of violence are not homogenous.

Second, I focus here on ethnicity as the conceptual match between the perpetrator, the victims, and the rebel groups. In other words, following the terms I used in the theoretical framework, this chapter focuses on ethnicity as the defining ideological divide in civil wars. This focus stands in contrast to the other empirical chapters, where the ideological divide mainly followed the left-right cleavage, even in the case of Guatemala where there was a strong ethnic component. Here, it also means that many of the mechanisms discussed take place at a larger level of analyses than municipalities, which also explains some of the empirical limitations.

Third, I develop a first exploratory analyses of the conditional effects of violence relying on a much larger sample across Sub-Saharan Africa where I use two proxy variables that are coherent with the concept of ideological context: individual interest in politics and political activity, measured as how often an individual talks about politics with friends or family. These two variables, however, do not have any information on the ‘direction’ of the ideological context, that is, on the ideological content or identity of those networks that surround the individual. This limitation means that it is not possible to know how facilitating this ideological context is, in the way it was done in the cases of Spain and Guatemala. Yet, the results, which show that the effect of violence is stronger in the case of more politically active individuals, suggest that the theoretical argument developed in chapter 3 might be a good starting point to understand the effects of wartime violence against civilians.

And finally, this chapter is a reminder that this is not a closed topic, and that further efforts in understanding the legacies of violence are needed. In particular, further data on the local ideological context, or an equivalent proxy, should be collected in order to test a contextual theory of the consequences of violence on a global sample, advancing our understanding of the legacies of violence and improving our models on process of radicalization or conflict recurrence as a result of previous war experiences.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews both previous literature and my own theoretical argument to define the hypotheses for each of the two analyses. I then briefly summarize my empirical strategy for this chapter, and how the two sets of empirical evidence complement each other and contribute to this dissertation. Two separate sections discuss the data and methodology and present the results for the conflict recurrence and survey analyses. The next sections discuss the results and conclude the chapter.

## 7.1 Violence and postwar politics in ethnic contexts

Here I revisit both the previous literature and the theoretical argument from chapter 3 in order to spell out the expectations for the two analyses carried out in this chapter. First, I focus on the effect of violence against ethnic groups on the risk of conflict recurrence. I briefly review previous literature and discuss how the backfiring and demobilization arguments can be applied to this issue. I do not focus here on my contextual theory as I do not have data to test it. Rather, the theory and hypotheses refer to the two unconditional theories, namely, the backfiring and demobilization arguments.

The focus on conflict recurrence is explained by both its relevance and practical reasons. On the one hand, the relapse of a civil war is probably the worst possible consequence of wartime violence, given its humanitarian and political cost. Indeed, early research on the consequences of violence was motivated by this question, as seen in chapter 2. One the other hand, conflict recurrence constitutes a straightforward measure of many other processes that might not be as easily observable across a large sample, such as radicalization or recruitment into rebel groups.

Second, for the survey analyses on the individual-level consequences of state violence along ethnic lines, I again review previous literature to present the mechanisms that underscore the unconditional arguments, and discuss how the contextual argument developed in this dissertation could be applied to better understand the impact of violence.

### 7.1.1 Violence against civilians and conflict recurrence

The theoretical framework usually employed to understand conflict recurrence follows the same explanations used for conflict onsets in general, pointing to factors that affect the motivation and opportunity of rebel groups to rise up against the government (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). The only difference is that studies focusing on conflict recurrence look at the impact of a

previous conflict on these factors (Walter, 2004; Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2008; Toft, 2010). Following this idea, previous research on the consequences of political violence suggests that wartime collective victimization<sup>1</sup> could have two effects on the risk of future recurrence, which resemble the backfiring and demobilization arguments reviewed extensively in chapter 2.

On the one hand, engaging in indiscriminate violence against civilians could make conflict recurrence more likely. First, state violence against civilians produces moral outrage among victimized groups and increases grievances, potentially intensifying those that caused the conflict in the first place, particularly when violence is carried out by state authorities (Goodwin, 2001; Wood, 2003). Indeed, this effect should already be present during the conflict (Condra & Shapiro, 2012; Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013).

Once the conflict ends, these violence-induced grievances are still strong and produce an increase in support for violent methods in case there is a new political conflict, either motivated by the grievances themselves or because there is an incompatibility that triggers another situation of political instability. Indeed, grievances, particularly when shared by an identity group and felt as group-based discrimination, have been identified as a powerful explanation of civil war onset in general (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). Moreover, in cases of state violence, the state has shown how far it can go in crushing potential challengers by resorting to indiscriminate violence against civilians. Thus, in case of renewed tensions, when the likelihood of a conflict increases, expectations about a violent response by the state could also explain further recruitment into rebel groups, as they might provide a safe haven for fearful civilians (Mason & Krane, 1989; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).

Again, all these processes could be even more relevant in the context of ethnic groups, as state violence along ethnic lines could strengthen group identities, reinforcing the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dichotomies and decreasing trust in the other group (Bakke, O’Loughlin & Ward, 2009; Beber, Roessler & Scacco, 2014). This process could freeze conflict divisions, bringing about an unmanageable situation in the long term (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013).

Therefore, following this reasoning, the use of ethnic targeting by state authorities during a war should increase the motivation of the targeted group to fight again, as it amplifies the grievances felt by the group. Both the strengthened group identification and the idea that violence is a necessary means to advance their po-

<sup>1</sup> Across this chapter I use the terms collective victimization, collective targeting, indiscriminate violence against civilians or ethnic targeting interchangeably. In this case, I refer to the use of collective targeting against members of a particular ethnic group.

itical goals should facilitate the opportunity of rebel groups to recruit and organize an insurgent movement. Following this discussion, the first hypothesis is defined as follows:

H7.1 Wartime exposure to ethnic targeting by state authorities makes a group *more* likely to rebel again against the government.

On the other hand, violence against ethnic groups could have very different effects. In particular, collective targeting might reduce the likelihood of recurring conflicts. In this case, there are reasons to think that although wartime indiscriminate violence could still increase ethnic grievances and group identification, and thus have a similar effect on the motivation dimension, it would make more difficult the processes of mobilization and recruitment by increasing the cost of rebellion.

Civilian victimization produces extreme fear among the exposed population, particularly in cases where certain social groups are being collectively targeted. The uncertainty associated with this type of targeting could be particularly prone to stop people from participating in political activities and falsify their political preferences (García-Ponce & Pasquale, 2015; Young, 2019). And even among potential rebel elites the effect could be similar, as the threat of repression, highlighted by the action of the state in a previous conflict, can even deter the process of mobilization (Lacina, 2014). Indiscriminate violence has also been shown to be linked to less insurgency activity (Lyall, 2009) or even effective in crushing insurgencies, particularly in the case of rebel groups linked to small groups and without access to an external pool of resources (Downes, 2007).

Thus, even though indiscriminate violence could still make victimized groups feel more aggrieved and reinforce group identification among them, the fear of victimization associated with a previous conflict could make participation in another conflict much more difficult. In this scenario, rebel groups would have a much harder time recruiting and mobilizing civilians to mount an insurgency, and the leaders themselves might even be less willing to use violent methods again, knowing the type of state repression they face. At the very least, rebel leaders would expect a harsher response by the state and a more violent conflict overall. This means that a conflict would only be viable if they can match that response, which should make conflict less likely. The second hypothesis stems from this discussion:

H7.2 Wartime exposure to ethnic targeting by state authorities makes a group *less* likely to rebel again against the government.

These two hypotheses refer to base effects of ethnic targeting, which resemble the backfiring and demobilization arguments. However, the discussion above also suggests that rather than having an effect on its own, civilian victimization could change the impact of other conflict triggers. In other words, even though past victimization might make more likely the outbreak of renewed conflicts, it might not be enough on its own to produce a new onset. Here I consider two options. On the one hand, if violence increases group identification and grievances and makes more likely the use of violent methods, it could increase the risk that a political incompatibility brings about the outbreak of an armed conflict. On the other hand, if civilian victimization along ethnic lines hinders recruitment and participation because civilians are more afraid to get involved in politics, violence could actually invalidate the effect of other conflict triggers. Therefore, I define another two hypotheses that account for these potential indirect effects.

H7.3 Wartime exposure to ethnic targeting by state authorities *increases* the effect of other ethnic conflict triggers.

H7.4 Wartime exposure to ethnic targeting by state authorities *decreases* the effect of other ethnic conflict triggers.

Below I turn to the empirical expectations at the individual level, drawing on both the mechanisms that underscore these group-level hypotheses and how these effects would be mediated by other variables according to the contextual theory developed in this dissertation.

### 7.1.2 Violence against civilians and individual political attitudes

The hypotheses above refer to the general effects of civilian victimization on conflict recurrence. These expectations, however, are based on several mechanisms that are assumed to take place at the level of individuals. I review here some of these mechanisms by which those general effects take place and spell out the corresponding hypotheses, which are tested using individual-level survey evidence. Furthermore, I discuss how the contextual theory developed in chapter 3 could be applied, defining additional hypotheses on a conditional effect of violence.

The first mechanism discussed above is based on the effects of violence on ethnic identification and group grievances. Namely, collective targeting of ethnic groups should increase their levels of group identification, as being targeted precisely because of their ethnic identity boosts collective perceptions of a common enemy and intensify the feeling that their own group is being unfairly treated. This

is an effect coherent with the backfiring argument, and underpins much of the previous research supporting this view on the legacies of violence.

Current research supports this point, particularly in regards with the group-specific effects (Wood, 2003; Condra & Shapiro, 2012; Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013), and it is coherent with the theory of diversionary conflict, which points to the role of an external enemy in increasing domestic support for political leaders (Sobek, 2007; Theiler, 2018). Moreover, the fact that wartime violence increases cohesion within a community is a long-held observation in conflict studies (Simmel, 1955; Stein, 1976). Although some previous works suggest a polarizing effect of violence against civilians, they point to an effect observable at the community level, rather than at the level of individuals (e.g. Weidmann & Zürcher, 2013). This reasoning yields the following hypothesis:

H7.5 Exposure to ethnic targeting *increases* ethnic group identification.

H7.6 Exposure to ethnic targeting *increases* ethnic group grievances.

Alternatively, following the demobilization argument, violence could have the opposite effect. Namely, violence against civilians could draw the exposed population away from politics and thus reduce the reported group identification and grievances. Even though most of the previous literature that supports the demobilization effect focus on fear-based mechanisms that make political participation more difficult (see Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Padró i Miquel & Yared, 2012), fear could still lead to demobilization and preference falsification (García-Ponce & Pasquale, 2015; Young, 2019). Moreover, the deterrence effect of state violence among rebel elites mentioned above can also produce this demobilization, particularly if it brings about a reduction of mobilization activities by rebel leaders (Lacina, 2014). Thus, violence could have the opposite effect, as reflected in the following hypotheses:

H7.7 Exposure to ethnic targeting *decreases* ethnic group identification.

H7.8 Exposure to ethnic targeting *decreases* ethnic group grievances.

Another mechanism is based on the idea that people who have been exposed to victimization are more likely to support the use of violence as a political means. This logic assumes that once the government uses such extreme methods as collective targeting of civilians, the population realizes that the only alternative way to pursue their political interests is to use violent methods (Goodwin, 2001). This reasoning is summarized in the next hypothesis:

H7.9 Exposure to ethnic targeting *increases* support for the use of violent methods in politics.

Alternatively, however, suffering targeted violence could also mean that exposed civilians are less likely to support the use of violence in politics. [Young \(2019\)](#) reports experimental evidence from Zimbabwe showing that fear can reduce dissent by increasing the risk aversion of civilians and their pessimism about the likelihood of future success in the opposition activities. Thus, in a context of prior exposure to collective victimization, civilians could be less prone to support the use of violence because of the risks associated with it. The next hypothesis is formulated as follows:

H7.10 Exposure to ethnic targeting *decreases* support for the use of violent methods in politics.

The discussion above focuses on the direct effect of violence. The main theoretical innovation of this dissertation is to discuss conditional effects and, in particular, the role of the local ideological context in mediating this relationship. My argument states that the existence of a facilitating ideological context at the local level influences the way the whole process from violent events to a change in political behavior takes place. The two mechanisms discussed above are also the product of such a process, given that group identification, collective grievances, and attitudes on the use of political violence are also the product of a process that involves framing violent events, the creation and maintenance of collective memories, and translating these memories into political behavior through mobilization. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the effects of civilian victimization should also be dependent on the ideological context surrounding the individual.

As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, I cannot measure the ideological context using the available survey data. However, I can assess the degree of political activity an individual reports to have. Even though this factor does not provide information on the ideological component of the social environment, is it deeply related to many of the steps discussed in chapter 3. In other words, the framing, collective remembrance, and mobilization mechanisms all depend on social activities in which individuals discuss political events and experiences. Here I argue that the effect of violence against ethnic groups on these political attitudes—group identification, ethnic grievances, and support for violence—should be higher if individuals are more interested in political affairs or are more politically active. These two mediating factors should indicate a higher degree of exposure to the

type of political interactions that ensure that violence has a durable effect on political attitudes. Following this, I define the last two hypotheses as follows:

H7.11 The effect of exposure to ethnic targeting on political attitudes is *higher* if the individual is more interested in political affairs.

H7.12 The effect of exposure to ethnic targeting on political attitudes is *higher* if the individual is more politically active.

## 7.2 A two-level empirical strategy

This chapter follows a double-level empirical strategy. The theoretical expectations defined above refer to two different levels of observation. On the one hand, hypotheses H7.1 to H7.4 summarize the expected effect of state-led violence targeted at entire ethnic groups on the risk of conflict recurrence, and are meant to test the unconditional theories on the effect of violence. The data corresponding to these expectations track patterns of ethnic conflict around the world. On the other hand, hypotheses H7.5 to H7.10 dig deeper into some of the individual-level mechanisms that sustain the aggregated observations and introduce two mediating variables that roughly approximate the concept of ideological context developed in the theoretical argument. In this case, the survey data correspond to dynamics on individual preferences and behavior.

As explained above, these two parts aim to test whether previous theories on the effects of civilian victimization are able to explain patterns of conflict and conflict-related individual behavior, and to offer some hints on the external validity of the contextual theory developed in chapter 3. Although this strategy does not constitute a direct test on the theoretical argument of this dissertation, at least in the way it was done in chapters 4, 5, and 6, the goal is to provide evidence on global dynamics of conflict and see whether the results suggest a more complex story than usually assumed. By performing a two-level analysis, I attempt to provide a more comprehensive picture on the consequences of violence against civilians.

The theoretical framework states that the effect of violence is heavily dependent on the social context, and thus we cannot think of aggregated patterns as simple averages of individual-level effects. I expect to find evidence supporting two ideas related to this argument. First, that state-led violence against civilians does not have a general, independent effect on conflict recurrence, nor does it clearly increase or decrease the effect of other conflict triggers. Given that such an effect is mediated by the local context in which violence and mobilization take place, violence, if anything, should make conflict patterns much more uncertain. Second,

that the effect of violence on individual patterns of political preferences and behavior is at least dependent on some variables related to the exposure to political activity of the survey respondents. In this case, the aim is not to test the argument on the role of the ideological context, but to point to conditional effects of violence that motivate further research and data collection on this issue.

Given the breath of the empirical analyses, there is a loss in internal validity. Moreover, the type of data used here in each of the two sections explained below makes more difficult to design an effective identification strategy. The results consist of correlations and thus no strong claims about causality are made in this chapter. In any case, the focus here is on external validity and on finding empirical results that, at the very least, suggest that the unconditional arguments are not able to successfully explain broader patterns on the effect of victimization.

The next two sections present the data, methods, and results of each of the two analyses separately. First, I focus on the effect of violence against civilians on ethnic conflict recurrence. And second, I discuss the analyses on individual-level mechanisms using survey data. A final section reflects on both set of analyses jointly.

### 7.3 Ethnic civil war recurrence

This section tests the group-level hypotheses (H7.1 to H7.4), analyzing the impact of violence against civilians on the probability of conflict recurrence, using data at the level of ethnic groups. The goal is to probe whether collective targeting of ethnic groups has any effect on conflict recurrence on its own and whether it affects other conflict triggers. As I said above, rather than a direct test of the theoretical argument developed in chapter 3, this section tests the unconditional theory on the consequences of violence, namely, the backfiring and demobilization arguments.

#### 7.3.1 Data and methods

I build a dataset using three main data sources. First, I draw data on conflict from the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) ([Gleditsch et al., 2002](#)) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which tracks conflict dynamics across the globe since 1946. Second, using the ACD2EPR dataset ([Wucherpfennig et al., 2012](#)), I link the UCDP conflict data to ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset ([Vogt et al., 2015](#)) to create a data set on ethnic conflict at the group-year level. This dataset indicates, among other things, the ethno-political status of all ethnic groups and an indicator of civil conflict onset between the government and one or more rebel groups linked to each ethnic group. I select a sample of all ethnic groups that

have suffered a conflict since 1989, and delete all observations before the first observed conflict ends.<sup>2</sup> The dependent variable for these analyses comes from this dataset as well, and indicates the onset of a new civil war. I also extract a dummy variable indicating whether the ethnic group was politically excluded from central executive power. Following the convention of previous studies of civil war onset that use this dataset (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013), I drop politically irrelevant ethnic groups and those whose political status was coded as ‘dominant’ or ‘monopoly’, given that, by definition, they cannot rebel against the state.

I then merge this data with the recently collected Ethnic One-Sided Violence (EOSV) dataset (Fjelde et al., 2019, 2016), which links the EPR data with UCDP One-Sided Violence dataset (Eck & Hultman, 2007), covering all ethnic groups between 1989 and 2013. The EOSV dataset identifies the ethnic identity of the victims in OSV events and codes whether in a given year there was evidence that at least half the victims from a given ethnic group were explicitly targeted because of their ethnic identity. In other words, the dataset indicates whether there was ethnicity-based collective targeting, here referred to as ‘ethnic targeting’. Using this dataset, I code whether ethnic groups have suffered ethnic targeting using three different specifications. First, I indicate whether ethnic targeting took place in the past, i.e. in the previous conflict years observed since 1989, and keep that indicator for all the subsequent years. Second, I restrict this indicator to the previous conflict episode, setting it to 0 once a new conflict breaks out. This means that the indicator is only valid for the postwar period following a conflict. And third, I include the cumulative number of conflict years when ethnic targeting took place since 1989, and include this variable in its logarithmic form. Together, these three versions are included to keep track of a potential effect of previous ethnic targeting regardless of the choice of specification.

Using this setup, I analyze whether prior ethnic targeting has an effect on the risk of conflict recurrence, in other words, on the likelihood that a new conflict breaks out. In addition, I also assess how prior ethnic targeting influences the effect of other common triggers of conflict. Following prior research (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013) and the results of the base models, I focus on ethno-political exclusion and interact it with the prior occurrence of ethnic targeting. These analyses resemble those that traditionally assess the determinants of civil war onset, but

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<sup>2</sup>I include both conflicts that were ongoing in 1989 and those that broke out after that year. Ethnic groups that experienced a conflict before 1989 but not after that year are not included, as it is not possible to include information on ethnic targeting. In the appendix, I also show results with a restricted sample that only includes groups that had a fully-observed onset after 1989, thus excluding those whose only observed conflict was already underway in 1989.

focusing only on ethnic groups that have experienced conflict before and including a measure of prior exposure to ethnic targeting.

In addition to the variables mentioned above, I include a number of extra variables controlling for confounders. First, at the level of ethnic groups I include the number of previous conflicts, a variable indicating whether the group was downgraded in the previous two years, and the size of the group relative to the national population. All these variables were obtained from the EPR dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). Second, I include a number of control variables coded at the level of countries. Namely, I include population and GDP per capita, both in logarithmic form and obtained from the World Bank (2019) data, and an indicator of whether there was a conflict involving another ethnic group in the country, also obtained from EPR (Vogt et al., 2015). These three variables were lagged one year. Finally, I control for the length of a peaceful episode by including three peace-years polynomials.

I include a series of descriptive statistics in the appendix, including the list of observations per country and whether there was ethnic targeting or not (tables C.1 and C.2), descriptive statistics of all the variables included (table C.3), and a correlation plot (figure C.1).

All analyses performed are logistic regressions, using the conflict onset as the dependent variable. Given that the EOSV dataset only covers the years between 1989 and 2013, and the variables refer to the past, I restrict the sample for the period from 1990 to 2014.

In order to better interpret the results, I also show the estimated effects graphically, obtained through simulation. In particular, I draw 1000 sets of coefficients from the estimated distribution, generate the predicted outcome using different scenarios, and subtract the predicted probabilities from the corresponding scenarios to generate the mean effect of the variable of interest on conflict recurrence, along with its 95% confidence intervals.

### 7.3.2 Results

Table 7.1 shows the results of the base analyses on conflict recurrence, including a base model (column 1) without any ethnic targeting variable, and three models with each of the three specifications of the state-led ethnic targeting variable (columns 2, 3, and 4). According to my expectations, ethnic targeting should not have any effect on the risk of conflict recurrence, which would suggest that none of the previous arguments is successfully explaining the observed patterns.

State-led ethnic targeting does not have any significant effect on conflict recurrence, regardless of the specification used. Beyond statistical significance, the

Table 7.1: Previous government-led EOSV and conflict recurrence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-2.901*	-3.085*	-2.642 <sup>+</sup>	-2.971*
	(1.362)	(1.442)	(1.437)	(1.395)
Govt EOSV (past)	0.119			
	(0.293)			
Govt EOSV (prev episode)		-0.158		
		(0.295)		
Govt EOSV (cumulative, log)			0.047	
			(0.196)	
Political exclusion	0.756*	0.775*	0.762*	0.763*
	(0.321)	(0.325)	(0.321)	(0.322)
Previous conflicts	0.129	0.118	0.130	0.119
	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.124)
Status downgraded	0.623	0.655	0.574	0.636
	(0.782)	(0.786)	(0.789)	(0.784)
Log. Population (lag)	0.093	0.104	0.079	0.099
	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.096)
Log GDP pc (lag)	-0.030	-0.024	-0.041	-0.029
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Group size	1.416*	1.396 <sup>+</sup>	1.431*	1.405 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.720)	(0.720)	(0.723)	(0.720)
Ongoing conflict (lag)	0.751*	0.729*	0.788**	0.736*
	(0.297)	(0.302)	(0.305)	(0.304)
Observations	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258
Log Likelihood	-243.578	-243.496	-243.433	-243.549
Akaike Inf. Crit.	509.156	510.993	510.865	511.098

Note: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.

magnitude and sign of the effect of ethnic targeting is different across the three specifications, which again suggests that the effect is not distinguishable from zero. Moreover, the inclusion of any of the ethnic targeting variables does not change the effect of the control variables nor the results of the base model. Ethno-political exclusion remains to be a major trigger of conflict recurrence across all models, and so is the size of the group—larger groups have a higher risk of recurrence—and the existence of another conflict in the same country during the previous year. Figure 7.1 plots the effect of the ethnic targeting variable on conflict recurrence, obtained through simulation. Again, it clearly shows the state-led ethnic targeting does not have any independent effect on the risk of renewed conflict.

These results show the neither hypothesis H7.1 nor hypothesis H7.2 are supported by the data. In other words, the argument that suffering prior collective tar-




Figure 7.1: Base effect of EOSV variables on conflict recurrence

getting by the state makes a group either more or less prone to rebel again against the state is not sufficient to explain patterns of conflict recurrence.

Table 7.2 shows the results of three models replicating the ones in the previous table, but including an interaction between the ethnic targeting variables and ethno-political inclusion, in order to test whether state violence alters the effect of other conflict triggers. Again, I expect that ethnic targeting does not significantly increase or decrease the effect of ethno-political exclusion on conflict recurrence.

As can be seen in the base model (1) in table 7.1, ethno-political exclusion constitutes the main conflict trigger<sup>3</sup> and clearly points to a situation which, at least following previous arguments, should be amplified by the occurrence of prior victimization.

In all three specifications, the positive effect on conflict of political exclusion is higher and of higher significance than in the base model in table 7.1. However, the occurrence or prior state-led ethnic targeting reduces this effect, although the interaction term is not significant and introduces more uncertainty into the estimate.

To see these results more clearly, figure 7.2 shows the effect of political exclusion on conflict in cases with and without prior ethnic targeting, for each of the three specifications of the victimization variable, obtained again through simulation. Interestingly, although being excluded from power significantly increases the risk of a renewed conflict, if there is prior ethnic targeting, the effect of exclusion, although it remains to be positive, decreases and becomes much more uncertain.

These results do not offer any supporting evidence for hypotheses H7.3 or H7.4. Ethnic targeting does not have any positive or negative impact on the effect of other conflict triggers and, if anything, it introduces much more uncertainty into the way these others triggers affect conflict. Overall, the results from the conflict recurrence

<sup>3</sup>Although the coefficient for group size is bigger, it refers to a not very realistic difference between a group that constitutes the 0% of the country population and a case where an ethnic group is 100% of the country population. In any case, analyses using this variable as the interaction do not show meaningful results. Moreover, the lagged incidence of another conflict points to a more external factor and, again, the results using this variable do not differ from the ones shown in the chapter.

Table 7.2: Government-led EOSV and conflict recurrence triggers

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-3.473*	-2.798 <sup>+</sup>	-3.388*
	(1.503)	(1.469)	(1.427)
Political exclusion	1.117*	0.892*	1.185**
	(0.498)	(0.403)	(0.452)
Govt EOSV (past)	0.623		
	(0.593)		
Govt EOSV (prev episode)		0.117	
		(0.567)	
Govt EOSV (cumulative, log)			0.590
			(0.399)
EOSV × Exclusion	-0.662		
	(0.668)		
EOSV × Exclusion		-0.370	
		(0.656)	
EOSV × Exclusion			-0.683
			(0.446)
Political exclusion	0.117	0.136	0.122
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.124)
Previous conflicts	0.686	0.588	0.679
	(0.789)	(0.790)	(0.789)
Status downgraded	0.110	0.079	0.096
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Log. Population (lag)	-0.020	-0.037	-0.019
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Log GDP pc (lag)	1.371 <sup>+</sup>	1.457*	1.173
	(0.717)	(0.722)	(0.739)
Group size	0.724*	0.799**	0.739*
	(0.301)	(0.305)	(0.303)
Observations	1,258	1,258	1,258
Log Likelihood	-242.988	-243.275	-242.380
Akaike Inf. Crit.	511.975	512.550	510.759

Note: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure 7.2: Effect of political exclusion depending on Government EOSV

analyses suggest that the process by which state violence influences further conflict is much more complex than usually assumed. Not only it does not have an independent effect on conflict, but it also introduces much more uncertainty to the impact of other triggers. Although this does not constitute supporting evidence to the theoretical argument of this dissertation, it is coherent with the idea that there is not a homogenous effect of violence independent of local factors.

The next section relies on survey data from several African countries to test the individual-level mechanisms that uphold previous arguments on the consequences of violence against civilians, analyzing potential conditional effects of violence as well.

#### 7.4 Survey evidence on individual political attitudes

In the second part of the empirical analyses in this chapter, I complement the evidence on the impact of ethnic targeting on conflict recurrence using survey data from several African countries. In particular, I test the individual-level effect of exposure to ethnic targeting on three different outcomes regarding political attitudes, which correspond to the expectations laid out in hypotheses H7.5 to H7.10. In addition, I test whether this effect is conditional on two variables referring to political interest and activity, which corresponds to hypotheses H7.11 and H7.12.

### 7.4.1 Data and methods

I combine three different datasets. First, I use georeferenced survey data from the first six rounds of [Afrobarometer \(2016\)](#), fielded between 2001 and 2015. I draw the dependent variables from this dataset, building three different indicators, all of them in binary form. In particular, 1) ‘ethnic self-identification’ indicates that the respondent identifies herself more by her ethnic group than by her national identity; 2) ‘ethnic grievances’ is coded as 1 when the respondent feels her ethnic group is often or always treated unfairly by the government; and 3) ‘violence justified’ indicates that the respondent agrees that the use of violence is justified in politics. The two mediating variables meant to test hypotheses [H7.11](#) and [H7.12](#) are also drawn from this same dataset: ‘interest in politics’ indicates that the respondent claims to be interested in public affairs, while ‘discuss politics’ is coded as 1 when respondents say they often discuss about political affairs with friends or family. Except the third dependent variable on the use of violent methods, which was only asked in rounds 2, 3, and 5, the rest were present in the six survey rounds included. Table [7.3](#) summarizes these variables and their operationalization and specifies in which rounds of Afrobarometer they were present. Section [C.2.1](#) in the appendix gives further details about the items in which they are based.

Second, I merge the Afrobarometer data with the EOSV dataset ([Fjelde et al., 2019, 2016](#)) presented in the previous section. Using the ethnicity variable in Afrobarometer, I identify the labels corresponding to those groups that appear in the EOSV data since 1989. Thus, I am able to identify those individuals who belong to an ethnic group that suffered ethnic targeting before the survey was fielded. Given that I only make within-country comparison, as explained below, this merge limits the dataset to those countries that have survey data and where there are ethnic groups that have experience prior government-led EOSV, as listed in table [C.7](#) in the appendix. In particular, the analyses include observations from Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Data from Ethiopia had to be excluded from the sample because there is no geographical information, and Afrobarometer advises against using these data in a cross-country sample. Moreover, Sudan and Egypt had to be excluded as well, given that the surveys in those countries do not offer information on ethnicity. Figure [7.3](#) maps the Afrobarometer respondents included in the sample, while table [C.6](#) in the appendix shows the round coverage in each of these countries and the number of observations for each round and country.

Finally, I use the UCDP One-Sided Violence event dataset ([Eck & Hultman, 2007](#)) dataset and select OSV events by the government in the countries included in

Table 7.3: Main survey variables operationalization

Variable	Binary operationalization	Rounds
<i>Dependent variables</i>		
Ethnic self-identification	Respondent feels more or only as her ethnic identity, versus the national identity	All
Ethnic grievances	Respondent feels her ethnic group is often or always treated unfairly by the government	All
Violence justified	Respondent agrees that the use of violence in support of a just cause is sometimes necessary in her country	2, 3, 5
<i>Mediating variables</i>		
Interest in politics	Respondent reports being very interested in public affairs	All
Discuss politics	Respondent says she often or frequently discusses about politics with friends or family	All

the sample. Figure 7.4 shows the geographical distribution of these events. Using the georeferenced information in the Afrobarometer data, I then code whether the respondent lives within 50km<sup>4</sup> of a one-sided violence event that took place *before* the corresponding survey was fielded.

The main independent variable combines the information from the EOSV dataset with the UCDP OSV georeferenced events. Respondents are coded as having been exposed to ethnic targeting if they belong to an ethnic group that suffered prior ethnic targeting *and* live within 50km of previously recorded OSV events by the government. For these respondents, I include in the models the logged count of OSV events that took place before the survey was fielded within this 50km radius.

In addition to the main variables, I also include a number of control variables drawn from the Afrobarometer surveys that could determine both the exposure to ethnic targeting and the respondent's political attitudes: the respondent's gender, whether the respondent lives in an urban area, and her employment situation as a numeric variable that takes the values of 0, 1, or 2 depending on whether the

<sup>4</sup>In the appendix I also show the results using 25km and 10km thresholds.



Figure 7.3: Afrobarometer respondents in the sample, rounds 1–6

respondent is not employed, partially employed, or full employed, respectively. Section C.2.2 in the appendix shows further descriptive statistics of both the dependent and independent variables.

Using these data, I build a sample that covers more than 35,000 individuals. I then run logistic regressions on each of the three outcome variables described above, including the mentioned controls. In order to isolate the effect of ethnic targeting as much as possible, I only compare individuals within a same country and within a same survey round, including country-round fixed effects in every model. The interaction models are exactly the same, but including the interaction between the ethnic targeting variable and each of the two mediating variables.

As in the previous section, I also show the estimated effects graphically, obtained through simulation. I draw 1000 sets of coefficients from the estimated distribution, generate the predicted outcome for the scenarios of being exposed or not to ethnic targeting, and subtract the corresponding simulated probabilities to generate the mean effect of ethnic targeting on each of the dependent variables, to-



Figure 7.4: UCDP state-led OSV events in the countries included

gether with its 95% confidence intervals. In particular, the graphs show the effect of having been exposed to 1 logged event, which corresponds to 2.72 real events.<sup>5</sup>

#### 7.4.2 Results

Table 7.4 shows the results of the main analyses on the effect of ethnic targeting—operationalized as the combination of geographical proximity to OSV events *and* group-level ethnic targeting—on individual political attitudes. The three columns show the results of a separate model on each of the three dependent variables. Figure 7.5 conveys the results graphically, showing the effect of ethnic targeting on each of these outcomes. As mentioned above, the estimate shown is the simulated change in the outcome variable of going from being exposed to 0 events to one logged event.

The results show that exposure to ethnic targeting has a positive and significant effect on both group identification and ethnic grievances. Particularly in the

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<sup>5</sup> $\exp(1) \approx 2.7$  events. The mean number of events among those individuals who have been exposed to OSV events and belong to an ethnic group that has been collective targeted is  $\exp(2.4) \approx 23.5$ . In any case, the number is not very relevant as the goal is to compare the effect among different outcomes.

Table 7.4: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes

	Ethnic self id	Ethnic grievances	Violence justified
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-3.489*** (0.163)	-1.926*** (0.102)	-1.103*** (0.088)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.106*** (0.022)	0.068*** (0.018)	-0.005 (0.023)
Female	0.242*** (0.027)	-0.071* (0.028)	-0.011 (0.037)
Urban	-0.131*** (0.028)	-0.212*** (0.029)	0.010 (0.038)
Employment status	-0.076*** (0.019)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,545	34,987	18,889
Log Likelihood	-17,503.830	-16,275.980	-9,388.498
Akaike Inf. Crit.	35,063.670	32,607.960	18,810.990

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure 7.5: Government EOSV and individual political attitudes

latter case, each logged event that individuals who belong to a previously targeted group has been exposed to increases the likelihood that they feel their own group is unfairly treated by the state by a factor of 1.10. In the case of ethnic identification, there is an increase by a factor of 1.07. These results thus support hypotheses H7.5 and H7.6, rejecting hypotheses H7.7 and H7.8.

When it comes to the effect on attitudes regarding the use of violent methods, ethnic targeting by the state does not have any significant effect on that outcome, as the coefficient is very close to 0 and the uncertainty is considerable. Thus, neither H7.9 nor H7.10 find any support in the data. This is an interesting result since support for violence is one of the main mechanisms that sustains the arguments that predict either a conflict-inducing or conflict-decreasing effect of violence. In

other words, support for violent methods is a major expectation among those who think that violent repression makes people more likely to resort to violence, and so is its opposite when it comes to those who affirm that prior repression makes people more afraid of engaging in violent conflict. Thus, the results show that micro-level mechanisms do not always behave in the consistent manner expected by previous research.

In the appendix, I show that the results remain very similar when the distance threshold is reduced to 25km (table C.10 and figure C.3), but most of the estimates stopped being significant when the threshold is set at 10km (table C.11 and figure C.4), even though the direction of the effects remain the same.

Turning now to the models including the interaction with the two mediating variables, table 7.5 includes the same models as before but interacting ethnic targeting with the variable indicating that the respondent is interested in politics. Figure 7.6 shows the results graphically, showing the effect of ethnic targeting in each of the two scenarios: whether or not respondents say they are interested in politics.

Table 7.5: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes, depending on political interest (50km threshold)

	Ethnic self id (1)	Ethnic grievances (2)	Violence justified (3)
(Intercept)	-3.471*** (0.165)	-1.936*** (0.104)	-1.153*** (0.091)
Interest in politics	-0.097** (0.031)	-0.051 (0.033)	0.099* (0.042)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.093*** (0.024)	0.048* (0.020)	-0.005 (0.025)
Targeting × Interest	0.064 (0.041)	0.087** (0.034)	-0.000 (0.038)
Female	0.227*** (0.027)	-0.074** (0.028)	0.003 (0.038)
Urban	-0.132*** (0.028)	-0.213*** (0.029)	0.011 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.076*** (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,197	34,684	18,699
Log Likelihood	-17,307.190	-16,137.130	-9,274.554
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,674.390	32,334.260	18,587.110

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure 7.6: Effect of government-led EOSV depending on individual political interest (50km)

In this case, the overall results are similar to the main models, although the main effect of ethnic targeting is not significant in any of the three models. The interaction term is positive in all cases, but it only reaches statistical significance (at 90% level) in the model with ethnic self-identification as the dependent variable. As seen in figure 7.6, the simulated effect of exposure to violence is not significant for those individuals who do not report an interest in politics, but it is positive and significant (95% level) for those individuals who are interested in political affairs. In the case of ethnic grievances and attitudes regarding the use of political violence, the effect of violence is positive but it does not reach statistical significance in any of the two scenarios.

Table 7.6 repeats these same analyses but includes the variable on political activity (an indicator that the respondents say they often discuss about politics with friends or family) in the interaction with ethnic targeting. Again, figure 7.7 displays the results, showing the simulated effect of violence on each of the three outcomes depending on whether individuals say they often discuss about politics or not.

Again, the results show overall patterns coherent with the main models that do not include any interaction, in terms of the direction of the effects. The main effect of ethnic targeting, however, is not significant for any of the three outcomes. Regarding the interaction term, it is again positive in the models using ethnic self-identification and ethnic grievances as dependent variables, but it only reaches statistical significance (90%) in the latter. Contrary to the models above using political interest as the interacting variable, both the results shown in table 7.6 and in figure 7.7 show that the effect of violence on ethnic self-identification is essentially the same under the two scenarios. In the case of ethnic grievances, however, the effect

Table 7.6: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes, depending on political activity (50km threshold)

	Ethnic self id	Ethnic grievances	Violence justified
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-3.487*** (0.165)	-1.923*** (0.103)	-1.101*** (0.089)
Discuss politics	-0.026 (0.035)	0.011 (0.037)	0.021 (0.048)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.092*** (0.023)	0.055** (0.020)	-0.004 (0.024)
Targeting × Discuss	0.051 (0.045)	0.068 <sup>+</sup> (0.037)	-0.013 (0.046)
Female	0.234*** (0.027)	-0.067* (0.028)	-0.008 (0.038)
Urban	-0.126*** (0.028)	-0.212*** (0.029)	0.009 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.077*** (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,225	34,714	18,781
Log Likelihood	-17,341.490	-16,153.730	-9,342.044
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,742.970	32,367.460	18,722.090

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure 7.7: Effect of government-led EOSV depending on individual political activity (50km)

of violence is higher and more significant for those individuals that report being interested in politics.

In the appendix I replicate these same analyses changing the distance threshold for the victimization variable. The results using a 25km threshold (table C.12 and C.5) essentially replicate the main results, with the same or even higher significance levels, as it is the case of the interaction term in the models including political interest as the mediating variable. When using a 10km threshold (table C.14 and C.7), the results again replicate the main ones and show similar significance levels for the variables of interest.

All in all, these last models including interaction terms with the mediating variables show partial evidence in support of hypotheses H7.11 and H7.12. The evidence is slightly weak, and varies depending on which mediating variable is included in the model. However, the results point out that the effect of ethnic targeting on political attitudes is probably conditional on other variables. Again, a limitation of these analyses that might explain these inconsistencies is that these two mediating variables are not good measures of the ideological context as defined in chapter 3, but are rather agnostic to the ideological content of those political networks surrounding the individual. All in all, the results point to the importance of the social environment in mediating the effect of violence and motivate further research on this question.

## 7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the relationship between state-led violence against civilians and conflict recurrence, testing previous arguments found in the literature, in particular, those that predict a backfiring or demobilization effect of violence. Moreover, I have tested the individual-level mechanisms that underpin these arguments using survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Together, the analyses shown in this chapter suggest that we need to revisit current theories on the impact of violence against civilians on further conflict dynamics and political preferences. The conflict recurrence analyses show that state-led violence against ethnic groups does not have an independent effect by itself and it actually makes the effect of other conflict triggers become statistically not significant. The results from the survey analyses are not consistent with previous arguments on the consequences of violence either. While ethnic targeting shows a positive correlation with group identification and ethnic grievances, the relationship with other outcomes such as support for violent means in politics is indistinguishable from zero.

The picture that emerges from these analyses is that the way ethnic targeting impacts further conflict dynamics through its effect on political preferences does

not follow a simple logic. Although motivational factors—group identification and grievances—might increase, the cost of launching a rebellion probably increases as well, as not all individuals show an increased preference for violence. The results interacting ethnic targeting with the two mediating variables—political interest and activity—suggest that the effect of violence might also be dependent on the collective experience of past victimization.

This last point speaks to the theoretical argument of this dissertation and the findings from Guatemala and Spain, as it is coherent with the idea that the local ideological contexts greatly determines the way people learn, interpret, and react to violent events. Further research should explore this issue. In particular, future data collection efforts should focus on measuring the local ideological context in a comparable way across countries, collecting information on the density and activities of political organizations and local networks, and the exposure of civilians to them.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I do not attempt to offer a direct test of my theoretical argument here. Rather, I put to test previous arguments on the consequences of violence that this dissertation tries to overcome. In doing so, I attempt to show that global patterns on the consequences of civilian victimization for conflict and political preferences are more complex than usually assumed. I cannot make causal claims here nor directly offer evidence for the theoretical framework I develop in this dissertation, but I suggest that we need to revisit our arguments on the consequences of civilian victimization for political mobilization and conflict. Further work is needed in order to analyze how the local social context impacts the relationship between civilian victimization and political preferences, as this dissertation has shown using detailed data from Spain and Guatemala in chapters 5 and 6. Although I cannot provide such specific evidence in a global sample, the aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the need to carry out further work on the consequences of violence against civilians, and to suggests a direction to do so.

The next section revisits the findings from all the previous empirical chapters and discusses their implications, reflecting on the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3 and the contribution of this dissertation to the literature on political violence.



# 8

## Conclusion

Despite its importance, the consequences of wartime violence against civilians on political preferences have been relatively overlooked in conflict research until recently. Although there is now an emerging body of research on this topic, current studies still suffer from limitations. In particular, the processes by which violence leaves long-term legacies have not been properly analyzed. Instead, scholars usually assume them to be direct and unconditional. Little attention has been paid to the role of mediating factors on the way violent events are interpreted and used to create collective memories, sidelining the role of the social environment in this process.

In this dissertation I have argued that the local ideological context—the existence of ideologically-aligned social networks—determines whether violence has a backfiring or a demobilization effect. The process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences of behavior consists of several steps. Specifically, it is the existence of a facilitating ideological context at the local level that allows the whole process to take place through the framing of violent events, the creation and maintenance of collective memories, and the translation of these memories into political behavior through mobilization. This new theoretical framework allows me to understand the effects of wartime violence on political preferences in a more profound way than previous research, accounting for divergent effects of violence within the same conflict.

In this concluding chapter I review my main empirical findings and how they contribute to the literature. I discuss the limitations of this dissertation and possible avenues for further research, while highlighting its policy implications.

### 8.1 Main findings and contributions

The theoretical argument developed in chapter 3 has been tested using a variety of empirical evidence. In particular, I tested the empirical implications of my argument using detailed data from two specific cases, Spain and Guatemala. Both quantitative analyses were accompanied by extensive qualitative evidence drawn from historiography, especially in the case of Spain. Finally, I relied on a global database of violence against ethnic groups to show that previous arguments on the

consequences of wartime victimization cannot account for the observed patterns in ethnic conflict recurrence, and showed, using survey evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, that my contextual argument might offer a way to improve our understanding of this problem.

The first chapter of the empirical part (chapter 4) focuses on Spain. After introducing the Spanish background, I revisit my theoretical argument for the specific case of Spain. In particular, I argue that Francoist violence during the civil war only increased popular support for leftist parties—in other words, produced a backfiring effect—in those areas where there was a facilitating ideological context. This context was found in the form of leftist, underground social networks that were active in some municipalities during the Franco regime, and played a crucial role in the interpretation of wartime events, the creation of collective memories and the mobilization of popular support based on these memories.

The last section of this chapter reviews previous historiography to offer qualitative evidence supporting this argument. I focus on two issues. First, I show that the Franco regime was highly successful in establishing a climate of apathy and de-politization, repressing personal memories of the war. These efforts explain why in the absence of a facilitating social environment, personal memories of the violence did not lead to a rejection of the Francoist identity and an increase in leftist sympathies. Second, I show how underground leftist networks played a crucial role in disrupting these demobilization efforts, and the way they made possible that a political interpretation of wartime events and the triggering of collective memories that were translated into electoral support.

Chapter 5 retains the focus on Spain. In this case, however, I test the implications of my argument quantitatively, using an original dataset that covers over 2,000 municipalities across 13 provinces. I use a difference-in-differences setup and analyze the effect of wartime Francoist violence on leftist vote increase between the 1936 prewar elections and every election since 1977, and how it varies depending on the local presence of clandestine leftist activity during the dictatorship. Data come from several different sources, including archival sources, secondary historical research, and other existing datasets. Moreover, in order to test the effect of the local ideological context, I rely on an unexploited dataset on judicial sentences during the dictatorship in order to track the presence of underground leftist networks in each municipality.

Supporting the argument, I find that wartime victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share four decades later, but mainly in those municipalities where the clandestine opposition was active during the dictatorship. Moreover, I test two additional set of hypotheses. First, I assess the organizational

loyalty of the increase in leftist vote, analyzing communist electoral support. Second, I analyze the effect of wartime violence for cross-cutting cleavages, particularly Basque nationalism. The results indicate that Francoist violence increased leftist preferences in a generic way, as neither the Communist Party monopolized the increasing in leftist vote nor there was an increase in Basque nationalism.

Chapter 6 turns to Guatemala, and again tests the main theoretical argument, however this time in the context of the Guatemalan Civil War. Here I analyze the effects of state-led violence against civilians during the counterinsurgency campaign in the early 1980s on postwar electoral support for the political party that emerged out of the former rebels—the URNG. Revisiting my theoretical argument for the case of Guatemala, I again argue that state violence only backfired in the form of increased support for former rebels in those areas where there was a facilitating ideological context needed to build collective memories of the violence and capitalize on them to mobilize a political response. In the case of Guatemala, this ideological context was present in those areas where there was leftist political mobilization before the war, which mainly consisted of political activities carried out by Catholic priests and the peasant movement. Thus, while in the Spanish case I operationalized the facilitating ideological context by the existence of underground leftist activity during the dictatorship, in Guatemala I do so focusing on the exposure to political mobilization by left-leaning organizations.

In the empirical analyses, I proxy prewar exposure to political mobilization using road infrastructure, particularly distance to the Pan-American Highway and the local share of paved roads. Supporting the argument, I show that in more accessible municipalities, where there was more exposure to prewar political mobilization, state violence is linked to an increase in electoral support for the URNG and a decrease in support for the FRG. In isolated places with worse road infrastructures, state violence did not have any meaningful effect in postwar voting patterns.

The chapters on Spain and Guatemala contribute to the current literature by showing that violence has divergent effects depending on the local context. In particular, I show that the local ideological context determines whether civilian victimization brings about a backfiring effect or, rather, demobilizes the targeted population. This is the main contribution of this dissertation, both theoretically and empirically. My theoretical and empirical approach goes beyond previous arguments on the consequences of violence against civilians that predict either a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity as a result of victimization ([Balcells, 2012](#); [Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017](#); [Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017](#); [Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017](#)) or the demobilization of the targeted population ([Lyall, 2009](#); [Zhukov, 2015](#); [Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016](#)). Thus, I am able to bridge the two existing arguments

on the consequences of violence and contribute in solving one of the limitations of current research.

Finally, by raising the level of analysis to a cross-sectional sample across several countries, chapter 7 attempts to explore the external validity of the previous analyses. Here I focus on the consequences of state violence against ethnic groups and how this affects postwar ethnic mobilization. On the one hand, I assess the effect of wartime violence against ethnic groups on the likelihood of conflict recurrence by analyzing a global sample of ethnic groups since 1989. On the other hand, I use survey data to assess the individual-level impact of victimization on several political attitudes, and test whether the effect of violence is conditional on individuals' political activity and interest. Rather than directly testing my theoretical argument, the goal is to show that the unconditional arguments—backfiring and demobilization—are not able to explain the consequences of violence against civilians and to offer some guidelines on the direction of future research.

The results show that state-led collective targeting of ethnic groups does not have any effect on conflict recurrence, nor does it clearly alter the effect of other conflict triggers, namely, ethno-political exclusion. Analyses using survey data show that being exposed to ethnicity-based victimization a positive effect on ethnic self-identification and ethnic grievances, but no effect in the support of violence as a political means. These positive effects of victimization are higher for individuals who say they often discuss about politics with friends or family and those who say they are interested in politics. These two indicators, which are used as mediating variables for the effect of violence, do not offer any information on the ideological direction of the social environment, which is an essential component of the concept of facilitating ideological context. However, they do indicate that violence might have different effects depending on the sociopolitical activities that individuals participate on, which is coherent with the contextual theory developed in chapter 3.

This last chapter thus illustrates the limitations of the current literature on the consequences of violence. Moreover, the findings on the conditional effect of violence, although not very robust, speak to the idea that developing a contextual theory might bring advances into the study of the legacies of violence.

Besides the theoretical and empirical innovations, I have also developed new tools to analyze historical data, particularly in the case of Spain. Besides the digitalization of data that was not previously available, I developed an R package to deal with territorial changes over time in Spanish municipalities, which I describe in detail in section A.1 of the Appendix. This, together with the replication data and other software tools that will be made public, facilitate future research on political legacies in Spain.

## 8.2 Limitations and further research

This dissertation has a number of limitations that call for further research. The first limitation is related to the definition of exposure to violence. As I discussed in the theoretical framework in chapter 3, this dissertation adopts a restricted definition of exposure which is based on geographic distance, assuming that people within the same community bond together through personal links, including both family networks and everyday interactions. These links are the channels that determine the effect of victimization within the same community. However, other links that do not involve face-to-face contact might exist, justifying a different conceptualization of exposure, both in terms of learning about violent effects and feeling a connection with the victim. Knowing about a relative or a friend who has been murdered, even if that event takes place far away, could produce similar effects than if it even happened within the same local community. In modern conflicts, where communication technologies are a channel both for establishing this type of relationships and for learning about violence, could completely change the way the effects of violence are theorized and accounted for empirically. Indeed, recent research has shown that communication technologies might influence the risk of political violence ([Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013](#); [Warren, 2015](#)) and conflict diffusion ([Weidmann, 2015](#)). There are strong reasons to think that the consequences of violence are also influenced by these same technologies, and they certainly call for further research on the topic. A more complex framework on how violence affects those around the victim and the way in which these links are thought of and accounted for in the empirical analyses would greatly improve the literature on the consequences of violence.

Second, another unanswered question revolves around the within-community variation in the effects of violence and potential polarization effects. In my theoretical framework, all those who are within the same community are assumed to experience a similar change in political preferences as a result of victimization. But this does not have to be the case. In particular, considering that every community should contain a wide variation in terms of ideological preferences, individuals who are closer to the perpetrator might not experience a change in the same direction. Rather, they might strengthen their political affinities to the perpetrator, particularly considering that they witness how much of the local population drifts away to the other side in the political spectrum. Thus, violence could bring about a process of local polarization as people move further towards each of the ideological poles. Previous research has already acknowledged that wartime violence can increase community-level polarization ([Weidmann & Zürcher, 2013](#)). This process

even makes more sense when we think that blame attribution, which is an important factor in the process leading from violent events to a change in preferences, is dependent on political factors ([Condra & Shapiro, 2012](#); [Pechenkina, Bausch & Skinner, 2019](#)). This is part of my ongoing project. Indeed, further research would be necessary to fully understand the local-level effects of victimization.

Third, any study of the consequences of violence would benefit from better identification strategies to account for endogeneity. This dissertation tries to solve this problem in this dissertation through a data-intensive approach that controls for as many factors as possible and, in the case of Spain, benefits from the existence of prewar electoral data. Yet, further studies could improve the internal validity of these analyses by finding a suitable source of exogenous variation for victimization patterns and developing a good causal identification strategy.

Fourth, and related to endogeneity as well, further studies should investigate the ways civil wars impact local social networks. This dissertation tried to control for endogenous sources of local-level variation in victimization and ideological contexts. However, the impact of victimization on the local ideological context could be the focus of future research. Previous works have already pointed out that civil wars bring about important social processes that change the configuration of social networks and institutions ([Wood, 2008](#)). Violence usually targets networks of political support for the opposition, and the militarization of local life creates and empowers new social structures ([Bateson, 2013](#)). Considering that these networks mostly explain the local ideological context, further work should explore these endogenous dynamics, showing how victimization can bring about local changes that explain the long-term legacies themselves. For instance, killing local political leaders could disrupt the processes of mobilization that explain the backfiring effect, resulting in a general demobilization of the local population.

Finally, one of the most important limitations of this dissertation is the question of the findings' external validity, and the possibility of carrying out analyses that use global data or, at least, data with a much larger scope. Chapter 7 starts to address this question by developing some introductory analyses, but it still remains to be seen whether the theoretical framework can be confirmed globally. Future research could thus try to collect data on local ideological contexts across a much higher number of countries, even though it definitely entails a resource-rich project.

### 8.3 Policy implications

Taking into account its findings and limitations, this dissertation offers important insights into how to design policies to pacify postwar countries and avoid renewed

conflicts and radicalization resulting from wartime violence. In particular, the main contribution is to show how to guard against the methodological individualism that dominates in the existing literature and to design policy programs that avoid this trap.

Radicalization is a social phenomenon, and the same applies to any change in political preferences that results from wartime victimization. This insight means that one needs to account for the social context in understanding how victimization takes place and in the way we design policy tools to prevent it. I have argued that a backfiring effect as a result of violence only takes place when there is a facilitating ideological context, which means that we might not necessarily have to pay attention to areas where violence was more intense but to those where the ideological context fosters a spiral of radicalization as a result of violence. Previous research has already highlighted that radicalization needs to be understood as a relational process (Rink & Sharma, 2018; Sharma, 2018), but greater attention to these local-level processes would improve our chance to curb radicalization dynamics.

In terms of peacebuilding programs, the approach should be similar to the one outlined above, particularly when the focus is on building cooperation and improving reconciliation. A possibility would be to find 'vectors' of mobilization, in other words, areas where a few relevant actors are carrying out activities to increase hatred or feelings of revenge, and try to improve the situation with a local-level, top-down approach. For example, areas where there are both previous experiences of victimization and a well-connected network of political organizations might quickly turn into hotspots of radicalization. Any peacebuilding or reconciliation program that assumes the effect of violence to be homogenous across different areas and individuals and sidelines the influence of the social context risks being much more ineffective than a more nuanced approach.

Relatedly, when the goal is to address grievances produced by past victimization by creating truth commissions and giving those related to the victims their right to mourn their deaths and publicly honor them, it is important to account for these divergent effects. Specifically, it should be noted that the public remembrance of past victimization is a local phenomenon and thus may not be present with the same intensity in all areas. While some individuals lived in areas where this remembrance was possible, others might have experienced a life of denial and private rather than public sorrow.

Ultimately, this dissertation advances the idea that political preferences are not brewed individually according to some action-reaction process, but are the product of a social process in which events, reactions, and ideas are discussed and shaped collectively. This might seem obvious, but it is too often ignored in current think-

ing about victimization. Political preferences emerge collectively. Any political reaction to an event is related to the social context in which it materializes, and do not always do so in the expected direction. This is true even under the most extreme—and most obvious, some would say—of circumstances, that of suffering violence by those who are supposed to protect you.

## **Part III**

## **Appendices**



# A

## Appendix I: Spain

### A.1 Adapting municipalities to territorial changes

Standardizing datasets at the level of municipalities in Spain across different time periods is a complicated task. Since 1857, Spanish municipalities have suffered around 10,000 changes, which range from small territorial changes to merges of municipalities into bigger ones because of loss of population. This problem was also present for the analyses in this dissertation, as while in 1930 there were 2,517 municipalities in the provinces included, in the 2011 that number had gone down to 2,162. Most of the changes during this period involved a municipality (whose population had usually decreased) disappearing into a bigger one, but in some cases, there were also splits, sometimes temporary. In the case of Spain, this problem becomes even worse because of the change in municipality names, particularly in regions where a language different from Spanish is also official, namely, Galicia, the Basque Country, and Catalonia.

The strategy to deal with these changes was to come up with a 'minimum list' of municipalities. This strategy allows any local-level data collected at any point in time during the period considered to be effectively merged with other datasets. Thus, for instance, if a municipality splits to form two new ones, they are considered as merged during the whole period. This logic also extends to double- or even triple-level changes, when a spin-off municipality later splits itself. Some quality datasets such as census data or even section-level electoral data would in theory allow for a finer aggregation using sub-local units, without having to group together municipalities. However, this is not possible in most cases.

Given the number of changes (unlike in Guatemala, see section B.1), these were implemented automatically from the public list of historical changes. The original information on territorial changes comes from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (National Statistical Institute, INE). In the census website, INE lists all changes that each municipality experienced since 1842, including name changes (the script that scraps the census data from INE also downloads this information). However, it contains errors and inconsistencies. [Goerlich & Ruiz \(2018\)](#) compiled this information and detected and corrected some mistakes, developing typology of boundary

changes in territorial units, as part of a project to develop homogenous population series for Spain.

All the maps shown in this dissertation were adapted to the final list of municipalities. Figure A.1 shows those municipalities that suffered some changes, in other words, that do not correspond to the original municipality in 1930. In any case, although the original territorial borders found in 1930 has changed substantially to the one used in these analyses, this does not mean that the current map is very different. Most of the municipalities that suffered a change were merged into a bigger municipality, and that situation still lasts to this day (as in Huesca and northern Catalonia). In a few cases, currently existing municipalities were part of another one during a few years between 1930 and 2011, but that is not the usual case. Figure A.2 shows the Bilbao (Bizkaia) region in detail, which is the one most affected by this type of cases. In particular, many municipalities around the city of Bilbao were part of Bilbao between the 1940s and 1990s, and thus they had to be merged again to Bilbao.




Figure A.1: Municipalities with territorial changes between 1930 and 2011




Figure A.2: Comparing actual current divisions with the modified map used in the analyses (Bizkaia province)

### A.1.1 R package 'muniSpain'

The strategy to deal with municipality changes is implemented in an R package, *muniSpain*,<sup>1</sup> which also accounts for territorial changes since 1857.

This is an R package designed to deal with territorial changes in Spanish municipalities when working with historical local-level data from different periods. It relies on the municipality codes from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) and the list of municipality changes compiled and corrected by *Goerlich & Ruiz (2018)* (see also *Goerlich & Mas, 2006*, for more information about the project to develop homogenous series of population data, breaking down municipalities and using data from sub-local units). The package also allows converting municipality names (including old and multi-language denominations) to INE codes.

## A.2 Descriptive statistics

Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables used in the models, while figure A.3 shows the correlation between these same variables.

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<sup>1</sup>Available at <https://github.com/franvillamil/muniSpain>.

Table A.1: Summary statistics for the Spain data

Variable	Min	Q1	Median	Mean	Q3	Max	NA
Rightist violence (cont)	0	0	0.51	0.73	1.28	4.12	4
Rightist violence (binary)	0	0	1	0.56	1	1	4
Leftist violence (binary)	0	0	1	0.62	1	1	383
Networks (TOP, 10km)	0	0	1	0.62	1	1	0
Pop. change 1940-60	-0.63	-0.22	-0.11	-0.04	0.04	3.45	0
Pop. change 1940-70	-0.96	-0.43	-0.26	-0.05	0.03	11.93	0
Log. Population 1930	4.49	6.32	6.98	7.1	7.67	13.77	0
Log. Population 1960	3.93	6.07	6.81	6.99	7.67	14.24	0
Log. Population 1970	2.3	5.81	6.65	6.84	7.68	14.37	0
Prewar CNT	0	0	0	0.11	0	1	0
Prewar UGT	0	0	0	0.05	0	1	0
Prewar Unions	0	0	0	0.14	0	1	0
Leftist support 1936	0	0.21	0.38	0.39	0.55	0.97	51
Electoral compet. 1936	0	0.63	0.88	0.76	0.97	1	51
Elevation SD	1.42	44.59	80.38	107.49	137.09	560.26	0




Figure A.3: Correlation plot of explanatory variables for Spain

### A.3 Selection of municipalities in Spain

The analyses in the main text uses data from slightly over 2,000 municipalities, which correspond to roughly a quarter of all municipalities in Spain, covering 13 provinces out of a total of 50 provinces (plus two autonomous cities). This sample responds to issues of data availability and, in principle, the sample offers a wide range of variation in terms of social, political and economic differences. An open question however is whether we can expect that these 2,000+ municipalities are a good representation of the full Spanish territory.

Although most data used in the main analyses is not available for all municipalities, I compare here the municipalities in the sample with the rest, using two datasets that are available for the whole country: population data and electoral results after 1977.

Figure A.4 shows the population in 1940 for all municipalities, displaying those included in the sample along with those in provinces not covered by the dataset. The average population in the municipalities in the sample is 2963, in those out of the sample is 3079. Although the difference between both distributions (when using the logged population) is statistically significant, mainly because of the sample size, the magnitude is minimal. Figure A.5 shows the change in population between 1940 and 1970 between municipalities in and out of the sample. Again, although municipalities in the sample experienced more population growth, the differences are not large: the coefficient for being out of sample in a linear regression of population change is -0.097.




Figure A.4: Population in 1940

Turning to electoral data, figure A.6 shows the share of vote to leftist parties (see table A.2) in all municipalities in and out of the sample, across all the elections since 1977. Municipalities in the sample are slightly more leftist, but in this case




Figure A.5: Population change 1940–1970

the difference is even smaller: the coefficient term for being out of sample on leftist vote share is just -0.001.




Figure A.6: Municipality-level vote share to leftist parties since 1977

Figure A.7 shows the evolution in the average vote share to leftist parties in each province across all elections. Again, the graph suggests that there are no large differences between those provinces included in the sample and those that are not. Perhaps the biggest outliers are found in the Basque Country (see figure A.8), but in any case, in the last section of this appendix the main results are replicated excluding the three Basque provinces from the sample (see section A.7).

All in all, although this does not constitute definite evidence, comparing municipalities in and out of the sample based on population data and electoral results after 1977 suggests that the provinces included in the sample do represent well the whole territory of Spain. As argued in the main text, we should not expect any significant biases when extrapolating the results to the whole country.




Figure A.7: Mean vote share to leftist parties in each province




Figure A.8: Mean vote share to leftist parties in each province

#### A.4 Political parties included in the analyses

Table A.2 shows which political parties were coded as leftist in every election after 1977. Among them, I include both major, country-wide parties such as PSOE or PCE, as well as the leftist nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, such as Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), Herri Batasuna (HB), or Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC).

Table A.3 shows the political parties coded as Basque nationalist, included in the analyses in section 5.4, including both the center-right PNV and those in the Basque independentist left, such as HB or EE.

Table A.2: Political parties coded as leftist in each election

1977	PSOE, PCE, PSP-US, EC-FED, FDI, ASDCI, AET, EE, FUT, ESB, PSG, BNPG, PSOE-H, CUPS, CCIA
1979	PSOE, PCE, PTE, HB, PSOE-H, ORT, EE, MC-OIC, BNPG, Unidade Galega, IR, BEAN, PCT, LCR, OCE-BR
1982	PSOE, PCE, HB, ERC, PST, EE, PSA-PA, PCC, NE, UCE
1986	PSOE, IU, HB, MUC, EE, ERC, PST, PCC, PSG-EG, Verdes, UPR
1989	PSOE, IU, HB, LV, EA, LVE, PTE-UC, EE, ERC, BNG, AV-MEC, ENV-URV
1993	PSOE, IU, HB, ERC, Verdes, EA-EUE, BNG, PST, PAS
1996	PSOE, IU, BNG, HB, ERC, EA
2000	PSOE, IU, BNG, ERC, IC-V, EA, CHA, Verdes, LV-GV
2004	PSOE, IU, ERC, BNG, CHA, EA, Aralar, POSI
2008	PSOE, IU, ERC, BNG, EA, CHA, Aralar
2011	PSOE, IU-LV, Amaiur, ERC, Equo, BNG, PACMA, Anticapitalistas, UCE
2015	PSOE, Podemos, En Comú Podem, IU, ERC, En Común, PACMA, EH Bildu, Nós
2016	PSOE, Unidos Podemos, En Comú Podem, ERC, En Marea, EH Bildu, PACMA, Recortes Cero-Grupo Verde, PCPE
2019	PSOE, Unidas Podemos, ERC-Sobiranistes, En Comú Podem, EH Bildu, En Común, PACMA, Front Republicá, BNG, PUM+J, PCTE

AET, Agrupación Electoral de los Trabajadores; ASDCI, Alianza Socialista Democrática; AV-MEC, Alternativa Verda - Moviment Ecologista de Catalunya; BEAN, Bloc d'Esquerra d'Alliberament Nacional; BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Galego; BNPG, Bloque Nacional Popular Galego; CCIA, Centro Izquierda de Albacete; CHA, Chunta Aragonesista; CUPS, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular per Socialisme; EA, Eusko Alkartasuna; EA-EUE, Eusko Alkartasuna - Euskal Ezkerra; EC-FED, Esquerre de Catalunya-Front Electoral Democràtic; EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra; ENV-URV, Esquerra Nacionalista Valenciana - Unió Regional Valencianista; ERC, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; ESB, Euskal Sozialista Biltzarrea; FDI, Frente Democrático de Izquierdas; FUT, Frente Unidad de los Trabajadores; HB, Herri Batasuna; IC-V, Iniciativa per Catalunya - Verds; IR, Izquierda Republicana; IU, Izquierda Unida; LCR, Liga Comunista Revolucionaria; LV, Los Verdes; LV-GV, Los Verdes - Grupo Verde; LVE, Los Verdes Ecologistas; MC-OIC, Movimiento Comunista - Organización Izquierda Comunista; MUC, Mesa por la Unidad de los Comunistas; NE, Nacionalistes d'Esquerra; OCE-BR, Organización Comunista de España - Bandera Roja; ORT, Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores; PACMA, Partido Animalistas contra el Maltrato Animal; PAS, Partíu Asturianista; PCC, Partit dels Comunistas de Catalunya; PCE, Partido Comunista de España; PCPE, Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España; PCT, Partido Comunista del Trabajo; PCTE, Partido Comunista de los Trabajadores de España; POSI, Partido Obrero Socialista Internationalista; PSA-PA, Partido Socialista de Andalucía - Partido Andaluz; PSG, Partido Socialista Galego; PSG-EG, Partido Socialista Galego - Esquerda Galega; PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PSOE-H, Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Sección Histórica); PSP-US, Partido Socialista Popular-Unión Socialista; PST, Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores; PTE, Partido de los Trabajadores de España; PTE-UC, Partido de los Trabajadores de España - Unidad Comunista; PUM+J, Por un Mundo Más Justo; UCE, Unificación Comunista de España; UPR, Unidad Popular Republicana.

Table A.3: Political parties coded as Basque nationalist in each election

1977	PNV, EE, ESB
1979	PNV, EE, HB
1982	PNV, EE, HB
1986	PNV, EE, HB
1989	PNV, EE, HB, EA
1993	PNV, HB, EA-EUE
1996	PNV, HB, EA
2000	PNV, EA
2004	PNV, EA, Aralar
2008	PNV, EA, Aralar
2011	PNV, Amaiur
2015	PNV, EH Bildu
2016	PNV, EH Bildu
2019	PNV, EH Bildu

EA, Eusko Alkartasuna; EA-EUE, Eusko Alkartasuna - Euskal Ezkerra; EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra; ESB, Euskal Sozialista Biltzarrea; HB, Herri Batasuna; PNV, Partido Nacionalista Vasco.

### A.5 Base models and matching

A potential problem with the results shown in the main text is that the distribution of violence could be related to the subsequent evolution of leftist vote. In other words, the allocation of the treatment might not be independent from the outcome. To some extent, this is a valid concern: violence during the Spanish Civil War had a strong ideological dimension. However, I argue that because of the bottom-up nature of victimization patterns during the civil war, the way violence evolved endogenously during the conflict, and the relatively exogenous distribution of territorial control ([Balcells, 2017](#)), there should be enough variation in terms of exposure to violence to credibly support the argument. Moreover, rather than the plain effect of violence, the focus of this article is on the mediating effect of postwar underground activity and the conditions under which a long-term effect of violence is possible.

Because of the focus on this post-treatment variable, it would not be ideal to apply matching techniques or other statistical methods of causal inference that attempt to model the probability of being assigned into treatment based on pre-treatment variables. In other words, matching on pre-violence variable would not attain balance on the variable of interest. Despite this, as an additional test, I estimate here a matched difference-in-differences (MDID) ([Abadie, 2005](#)) on the base model without the main interaction with the network variable (model 1 in the main text) and including only prewar control variables: leftist support in 1936, electoral competition in 1936, log. population in 1930, presence of prewar trade unions, and terrain ruggedness. This design follows recent works that also attempt to measure the local-level effect of violence on different outcomes ([Barceló, 2018](#); [Carrasco, Durán-Bustamante et al., 2018](#)). The goal of these analyses is to test the robustness of the base model to a more conservative inferential method, checking that using a matching design does not fundamentally alter the base effect of violence.

In particular, I run three models using the complete sample and two matched datasets using two standard methods: nearest neighbor with replacement and coarsened exact matching (CEM) ([Ho et al., 2007](#); [Iacus, King & Porro, 2012](#)). Figure A.9 shows the results, and table A.4 shows the balance statistics of the matched datasets, including the improvement of each matching method in terms of the difference in means between the control and treatment groups, and results of a t-test between the distribution of each variable in the control and treatment groups.

The goal of these analyses is to test the robustness of the base model to a more conservative inferential method. Again, victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote during the first half of the democratic period in Spain,

particularly during the mid-1980s. Although selecting on observables still has limitations, results show here that the basic result on the effect of victimization, without the network interaction, holds when estimating the model on a matched dataset.




Figure A.9: Base model and matched datasets

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to model 1 in main text. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown. Using only prewar variables as controls and for matching.

Table A.4: Balance statistics matching

All data			
Treated = 1158, Control = 889			
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff
Distance	0.66	0.44	0.23
Leftist support 1936	0.4	0.37	0.04
Competition 1936	0.79	0.73	0.05
Log Population 1930	7.52	6.57	0.95
Trade unions	0.21	0.05	0.16
Ruggedness	102.71	112.52	-9.81

Matched data (nearest neighbor)						
Treated = 1158, Control = 429						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff	% Improv.	T-test	P-value
Distance	0.66	0.66	0	0	0.08	0.93
Leftist support 1936	0.4	0.39	0.01	0.01	1.01	0.31
Competition 1936	0.79	0.77	0.02	0.02	1.27	0.2
Log Population 1930	7.52	7.47	0.05	0.05	0.89	0.38
Trade unions	0.21	0.16	0.06	0.06	2.5	0.01
Ruggedness	102.71	90.22	12.49	12.49	2.76	0.01

Matched data (coarsened exact matching)						
Treated = 673, Control = 631						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff	% Improv.	T-test	P-value
Distance	0.57	0.56	0.02	0.02	1.63	0.1
Leftist support 1936	0.37	0.38	0	0	-0.19	0.85
Competition 1936	0.79	0.79	0	0	0.12	0.9
Log Population 1930	7.02	6.95	0.06	0.06	1.52	0.13
Trade unions	0.07	0.07	0	0	0	1
Ruggedness	79.97	82.29	-2.32	-2.32	-0.73	0.47

## A.6 Full DiD tables

Table A.5 (continued in tables A.6, A.7 and A.8) shows the full results of the main models displayed graphically in the main text, corresponding to figure 5.8.

Table A.9 (continued in tables A.10, A.11 and A.12) shows the full results of the models on organizational persistence displayed graphically in the main text, corresponding to figure 5.10.

Table A.13 (continued in tables A.14, A.15 and A.16) shows the full results of the models on PCE vote displayed graphically in figure 5.12 in the main text.

Finally, table A.17 (continued in tables A.18, A.19 and A.20) shows the full results of the models on Basque nationalist vote displayed graphically in figure 5.14 in the main text.

Table A.5: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (I)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.174*** (0.009)	0.157*** (0.010)	0.154*** (0.009)	0.144*** (0.010)
Election 1977	-0.087*** (0.006)	-0.087*** (0.009)	-0.089*** (0.008)	-0.088*** (0.009)
Election 1979	-0.052*** (0.006)	-0.051*** (0.009)	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.051*** (0.009)
Election 1982	0.003 (0.006)	0.022* (0.009)	0.027** (0.008)	0.022* (0.009)
Election 1986	-0.015* (0.006)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.009)
Election 1989	0.008 (0.006)	0.052*** (0.009)	0.057*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.009)
Election 1993	0.007 (0.006)	0.041*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.009)
Election 1996	0.036*** (0.006)	0.078*** (0.009)	0.082*** (0.008)	0.079*** (0.009)
Election 2000	-0.020*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.009)
Election 2004	0.114*** (0.006)	0.135*** (0.009)	0.133*** (0.008)	0.135*** (0.009)
Election 2008	0.109*** (0.006)	0.138*** (0.009)	0.138*** (0.008)	0.138*** (0.009)
Election 2011	0.017** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.046*** (0.009)
Election 2015	0.120*** (0.006)	0.126*** (0.009)	0.125*** (0.008)	0.126*** (0.009)
Election 2016	0.134*** (0.006)	0.122*** (0.009)	0.121*** (0.008)	0.123*** (0.009)
Election 2019	0.173*** (0.006)	0.155*** (0.009)	0.156*** (0.008)	0.155*** (0.009)
Wartime victimization	-0.007 (0.006)	0.012 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.009 (0.009)
Networks (TOP activity)		0.029*** (0.009)	0.017* (0.008)	0.029*** (0.009)
Change pop 1940-70	0.029*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.028*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1970	0.014*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)

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Table A.6: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (II)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unions (CNT)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)
Unions (UGT)	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)
Leftist vote 1936	0.241*** (0.005)	0.241*** (0.005)	0.240*** (0.005)	0.232*** (0.005)
Elec. competition 1936	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)
Elevation SD	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
1977 x Victimization	0.019* (0.008)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.013)
1979 x Victimization	0.033*** (0.008)	0.012 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.010 (0.013)
1982 x Victimization	0.038*** (0.008)	0.014 (0.013)	0.003 (0.008)	0.014 (0.013)
1986 x Victimization	0.043*** (0.008)	0.006 (0.013)	0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.013)
1989 x Victimization	0.045*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.013)
1993 x Victimization	0.037*** (0.008)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.001 (0.013)
1996 x Victimization	0.024** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.013)
2000 x Victimization	0.014+ (0.008)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.013)
2004 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.013)
2008 x Victimization	0.003 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.013)
2011 x Victimization	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.020 (0.013)
2015 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.013)
2016 x Victimization	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.013)
2019 x Victimization	-0.020* (0.008)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.013)

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Table A.7: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (III)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1977 x TOP	0.001 (0.012)	0.014 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.012)	
1979 x TOP	-0.002 (0.012)	0.009 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.012)	
1982 x TOP	-0.033** (0.012)	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.035** (0.012)	
1986 x TOP	-0.081*** (0.012)	-0.067*** (0.011)	-0.083*** (0.012)	
1989 x TOP	-0.078*** (0.012)	-0.066*** (0.011)	-0.080*** (0.012)	
1993 x TOP	-0.062*** (0.012)	-0.050*** (0.011)	-0.063*** (0.012)	
1996 x TOP	-0.076*** (0.012)	-0.064*** (0.011)	-0.077*** (0.012)	
2000 x TOP	-0.093*** (0.012)	-0.087*** (0.011)	-0.094*** (0.012)	
2004 x TOP	-0.037** (0.012)	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.038** (0.012)	
2008 x TOP	-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.050*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.012)	
2011 x TOP	-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.046*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.012)	
2015 x TOP	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)	
2016 x TOP	0.022+ (0.012)	0.028** (0.011)	0.021+ (0.012)	
2019 x TOP	0.032** (0.012)	0.035** (0.011)	0.031* (0.012)	
Victimization x TOP	-0.034** (0.012)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.033** (0.012)	
1977 x Vict. x TOP	0.040* (0.017)	0.014 (0.010)	0.029+ (0.017)	
1979 x Vict. x TOP	0.032+ (0.017)	0.012 (0.010)	0.023 (0.017)	
1982 x Vict. x TOP	0.041* (0.017)	0.023* (0.010)	0.034* (0.017)	
1986 x Vict. x TOP	0.069*** (0.017)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.017)	

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Table A.8: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1989 x Vict. x TOP	0.074*** (0.017)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.071*** (0.017)	
1993 x Vict. x TOP	0.063*** (0.017)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.017)	
1996 x Vict. x TOP	0.060*** (0.017)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.017)	
2000 x Vict. x TOP	0.060*** (0.017)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.017)	
2004 x Vict. x TOP	0.023 (0.017)	0.017+ (0.010)	0.031+ (0.017)	
2008 x Vict. x TOP	0.025 (0.017)	0.017+ (0.010)	0.032+ (0.017)	
2011 x Vict. x TOP	0.038* (0.017)	0.019+ (0.010)	0.043* (0.017)	
2015 x Vict. x TOP	0.017 (0.017)	0.004 (0.010)	0.023 (0.017)	
2016 x Vict. x TOP	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.017)	
2019 x Vict. x TOP	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.022* (0.010)	-0.016 (0.017)	
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	30,673	30,673	30,673	28,573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.393	0.400	0.400	0.390
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.392	0.399	0.399	0.388

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results of the same model split among several tables because of length. Difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, corresponding to models in figure 5.8 in the main text. Models 2-4 include an interaction with the network variable. Model 3 includes wartime victimization variable in its continuous form, while Model 4 restricts the sample to towns below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.

Table A.9: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase, conditional on prewar unions (I)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.185*** (0.009)	0.175*** (0.008)	0.164*** (0.009)
Election 1977	-0.092*** (0.006)	-0.086*** (0.006)	-0.093*** (0.006)
Election 1979	-0.057*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.006)	-0.057*** (0.006)
Election 1982	-0.001 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)
Election 1986	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.010+ (0.006)	-0.019** (0.006)
Election 1989	0.006 (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
Election 1993	0.005 (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
Election 1996	0.036*** (0.006)	0.045*** (0.006)	0.035*** (0.006)
Election 2000	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.006)
Election 2004	0.114*** (0.006)	0.114*** (0.006)	0.113*** (0.006)
Election 2008	0.109*** (0.006)	0.111*** (0.006)	0.109*** (0.006)
Election 2011	0.017** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)
Election 2015	0.121*** (0.006)	0.126*** (0.006)	0.121*** (0.006)
Election 2016	0.137*** (0.006)	0.140*** (0.006)	0.136*** (0.006)
Election 2019	0.176*** (0.006)	0.180*** (0.006)	0.176*** (0.006)
Wartime victimization	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.013* (0.006)
Trade Unions	0.010 (0.019)	0.019 (0.013)	0.002 (0.020)
Change pop 1940-70	0.029*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1970	0.013*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)

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Table A.10: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase, conditional on prewar unions (II)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Networks (TOP activity)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Leftist vote 1936	0.239*** (0.005)	0.240*** (0.005)	0.232*** (0.005)
Elec. competition 1936	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.011* (0.004)
Elevation SD	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
1977 x Victimization	0.015+ (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)	0.011 (0.009)
1979 x Victimization	0.032*** (0.009)	0.007 (0.005)	0.028** (0.009)
1982 x Victimization	0.038*** (0.009)	0.016** (0.005)	0.035*** (0.009)
1986 x Victimization	0.044*** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.009)
1989 x Victimization	0.048*** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.009)
1993 x Victimization	0.042*** (0.009)	0.015** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.009)
1996 x Victimization	0.031*** (0.009)	0.010+ (0.005)	0.029*** (0.009)
2000 x Victimization	0.021* (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.021* (0.009)
2004 x Victimization	0.005 (0.009)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.009)
2008 x Victimization	0.012 (0.009)	0.007 (0.005)	0.013 (0.009)
2011 x Victimization	0.010 (0.009)	0.004 (0.005)	0.010 (0.009)
2015 x Victimization	0.005 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.009)
2016 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.009)
2019 x Victimization	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.009 (0.009)
1977 x Unions	0.091*** (0.027)	0.064*** (0.018)	0.090** (0.028)

*(Continues next page)*

Table A.11: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase, conditional on prewar unions (III)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
1979 x Unions	0.092*** (0.027)	0.063*** (0.018)	0.094*** (0.028)
1982 x Unions	0.076** (0.027)	0.043* (0.018)	0.078** (0.028)
1986 x Unions	0.059* (0.027)	0.029 (0.018)	0.062* (0.028)
1989 x Unions	0.038 (0.027)	0.014 (0.018)	0.042 (0.028)
1993 x Unions	0.025 (0.027)	0.007 (0.018)	0.029 (0.028)
1996 x Unions	0.011 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.015 (0.028)
2000 x Unions	0.021 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.018)	0.025 (0.028)
2004 x Unions	0.002 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.018)	0.005 (0.028)
2008 x Unions	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.028 (0.018)	0.002 (0.028)
2011 x Unions	-0.010 (0.027)	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.006 (0.028)
2015 x Unions	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.037* (0.018)	-0.024 (0.028)
2016 x Unions	-0.043 (0.027)	-0.033+ (0.018)	-0.039 (0.028)
2019 x Unions	-0.059* (0.027)	-0.040* (0.018)	-0.056* (0.028)
Victimization x Unions	0.014 (0.021)	0.000 (0.010)	0.041+ (0.023)
1977 x Vict. x Unions	-0.050+ (0.030)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.078* (0.032)
1979 x Vict. x Unions	-0.066* (0.030)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.086** (0.032)
1982 x Vict. x Unions	-0.058+ (0.030)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.069* (0.033)
1986 x Vict. x Unions	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.060+ (0.032)
1989 x Vict. x Unions	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.058+ (0.032)

*(Continues next page)*

Table A.12: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase, conditional on prewar unions (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
1993 x Vict. x Unions	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.055+ (0.032)
1996 x Vict. x Unions	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.049 (0.032)
2000 x Vict. x Unions	-0.054+ (0.030)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.048 (0.032)
2004 x Vict. x Unions	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.035 (0.032)
2008 x Vict. x Unions	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.035 (0.032)
2011 x Vict. x Unions	-0.039 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.045 (0.032)
2015 x Vict. x Unions	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.031 (0.032)
2016 x Vict. x Unions	-0.010 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.032)
2019 x Vict. x Unions	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.032)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	30,673	30,673	28,573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.396	0.396	0.385
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.395	0.394	0.384

Note: +p < 0.1; \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001. Note: +p < 0.1; p < 0.05; \*p < 0.01; \*\*p < 0.001. Results of the same model split among several tables because of length. Difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections conditional on the existence of prewar trade unions, corresponding to models in figure 5.10 in the main text. Column 2 includes wartime victimization continuous form, while column 3 excludes towns above 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.

Table A.13: Wartime victimization and PCE vote increase (I)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.340*** (0.005)	0.319*** (0.005)	0.329*** (0.005)	0.320*** (0.006)
Election 1977	-0.312*** (0.003)	-0.306*** (0.005)	-0.313*** (0.005)	-0.306*** (0.005)
Election 1979	-0.312*** (0.003)	-0.303*** (0.005)	-0.309*** (0.005)	-0.303*** (0.005)
Election 1982	-0.347*** (0.003)	-0.328*** (0.005)	-0.337*** (0.005)	-0.328*** (0.005)
Election 1986	-0.349*** (0.003)	-0.329*** (0.005)	-0.337*** (0.005)	-0.329*** (0.005)
Election 1989	-0.335*** (0.003)	-0.315*** (0.005)	-0.324*** (0.005)	-0.315*** (0.005)
Election 1993	-0.334*** (0.003)	-0.314*** (0.005)	-0.323*** (0.005)	-0.314*** (0.005)
Election 1996	-0.331*** (0.003)	-0.310*** (0.005)	-0.320*** (0.005)	-0.310*** (0.005)
Election 2000	-0.350*** (0.003)	-0.329*** (0.005)	-0.338*** (0.005)	-0.328*** (0.005)
Election 2004	-0.335*** (0.003)	-0.322*** (0.005)	-0.331*** (0.005)	-0.321*** (0.005)
Election 2008	-0.336*** (0.003)	-0.321*** (0.005)	-0.330*** (0.005)	-0.320*** (0.005)
Election 2011	-0.311*** (0.003)	-0.284*** (0.005)	-0.297*** (0.005)	-0.284*** (0.005)
Election 2015	-0.348*** (0.003)	-0.317*** (0.005)	-0.329*** (0.005)	-0.316*** (0.005)
Election 2016	-0.287*** (0.003)	-0.240*** (0.005)	-0.256*** (0.005)	-0.240*** (0.005)
Election 2019	-0.313*** (0.003)	-0.271*** (0.005)	-0.286*** (0.005)	-0.270*** (0.005)
Wartime victimization	0.024*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.007* (0.003)	0.029*** (0.005)
Networks (TOP activity)		0.038*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.005)
Change pop 1940-70	0.008*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
Log. Population 1970	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)

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Table A.14: Wartime victimization and PCE vote increase (II)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unions (CNT)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Unions (UGT)	0.007** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Leftist vote 1936	0.098*** (0.003)	0.098*** (0.003)	0.097*** (0.003)	0.092*** (0.003)
Elec. competition 1936	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Elevation SD	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
1977 x Victimization	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.014+ (0.007)
1979 x Victimization	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.013+ (0.007)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.013+ (0.007)
1982 x Victimization	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.007)
1986 x Victimization	-0.027*** (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.007)
1989 x Victimization	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.007)
1993 x Victimization	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.007)
1996 x Victimization	-0.023*** (0.004)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.007)
2000 x Victimization	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.007)
2004 x Victimization	-0.030*** (0.004)	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.007)
2008 x Victimization	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.035*** (0.007)	-0.011* (0.004)	-0.035*** (0.007)
2011 x Victimization	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.007)
2015 x Victimization	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.037*** (0.007)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.007)
2016 x Victimization	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.047*** (0.007)
2019 x Victimization	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.044*** (0.007)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.045*** (0.007)

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Table A.15: Wartime victimization and PCE vote increase (III)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1977 x TOP	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.011+ (0.007)	
1979 x TOP	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.011+ (0.006)	-0.017* (0.007)	
1982 x TOP	-0.033*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.034*** (0.007)	
1986 x TOP	-0.036*** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.007)	
1989 x TOP	-0.036*** (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.007)	
1993 x TOP	-0.036*** (0.007)	-0.034*** (0.006)	-0.037*** (0.007)	
1996 x TOP	-0.037*** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.006)	-0.038*** (0.007)	
2000 x TOP	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.006)	-0.039*** (0.007)	
2004 x TOP	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.007)	
2008 x TOP	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.028*** (0.007)	
2011 x TOP	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.045*** (0.006)	-0.048*** (0.007)	
2015 x TOP	-0.056*** (0.007)	-0.053*** (0.006)	-0.057*** (0.007)	
2016 x TOP	-0.085*** (0.007)	-0.074*** (0.006)	-0.086*** (0.007)	
2019 x TOP	-0.076*** (0.007)	-0.068*** (0.006)	-0.076*** (0.007)	
Victimization x TOP	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.007)	
1977 x Vict. x TOP	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.015** (0.005)	0.000 (0.009)	
1979 x Vict. x TOP	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.011* (0.005)	0.003 (0.009)	
1982 x Vict. x TOP	0.004 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.016+ (0.009)	
1986 x Vict. x TOP	0.004 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.017+ (0.009)	

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Table A.16: Wartime victimization and PCE vote increase (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1989 x Vict. x TOP	0.010 (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)	0.020* (0.009)	
1993 x Vict. x TOP	0.012 (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)	0.021* (0.009)	
1996 x Vict. x TOP	0.017+ (0.009)	0.004 (0.005)	0.024** (0.009)	
2000 x Vict. x TOP	0.013 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.024* (0.009)	
2004 x Vict. x TOP	0.008 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.017+ (0.009)	
2008 x Vict. x TOP	0.006 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.018+ (0.009)	
2011 x Vict. x TOP	0.018+ (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)	0.029** (0.009)	
2015 x Vict. x TOP	0.020* (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)	0.033*** (0.009)	
2016 x Vict. x TOP	0.059*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.067*** (0.009)	
2019 x Vict. x TOP	0.042*** (0.009)	0.018** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.009)	
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	30,673	30,673	30,673	28,573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.623	0.628	0.628	0.619
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.623	0.627	0.627	0.618

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results of the same model split among several tables because of length. Difference-in-difference models on PCE vote respective to 1936 elections (FP share), corresponding to models in figure 5.12 in the main text. Models 2-4 include an interaction with the network variable. Model 3 includes wartime victimization variable in its continuous form, while Model 4 restricts the sample to towns below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.

Table A.17: Wartime victimization and Basque nationalist vote increase (I)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.348*** (0.021)	0.296*** (0.034)	0.284*** (0.033)	0.202*** (0.037)
Election 1977	0.088*** (0.018)	-0.056 (0.044)	-0.060 (0.042)	-0.056 (0.044)
Election 1979	0.234*** (0.018)	0.223*** (0.044)	0.220*** (0.042)	0.223*** (0.044)
Election 1982	0.310*** (0.018)	0.331*** (0.044)	0.324*** (0.042)	0.331*** (0.044)
Election 1986	0.339*** (0.018)	0.386*** (0.044)	0.381*** (0.042)	0.386*** (0.044)
Election 1989	0.378*** (0.018)	0.431*** (0.044)	0.428*** (0.042)	0.431*** (0.044)
Election 1993	0.319*** (0.018)	0.380*** (0.044)	0.371*** (0.042)	0.380*** (0.044)
Election 1996	0.309*** (0.018)	0.383*** (0.044)	0.371*** (0.042)	0.383*** (0.044)
Election 2000	0.243*** (0.018)	0.297*** (0.044)	0.286*** (0.042)	0.297*** (0.044)
Election 2004	0.287*** (0.018)	0.362*** (0.044)	0.353*** (0.042)	0.362*** (0.044)
Election 2008	0.204*** (0.018)	0.319*** (0.044)	0.310*** (0.042)	0.319*** (0.044)
Election 2011	0.322*** (0.018)	0.375*** (0.044)	0.370*** (0.042)	0.375*** (0.044)
Election 2015	0.215*** (0.018)	0.322*** (0.044)	0.315*** (0.042)	0.322*** (0.044)
Election 2016	0.179*** (0.018)	0.290*** (0.044)	0.284*** (0.042)	0.290*** (0.044)
Election 2019	0.269*** (0.018)	0.393*** (0.044)	0.388*** (0.042)	0.393*** (0.044)
Wartime victimization	0.052** (0.016)	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.002 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.053)
Networks (TOP activity)		0.131*** (0.034)	0.161*** (0.032)	0.119*** (0.034)
Change pop 1940-70	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.105*** (0.005)
Log. Population 1970	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.006 <sup>+</sup> (0.003)

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Table A.18: Wartime victimization and Basque nationalist vote increase (II)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unions (CNT)	-0.026*	-0.015	-0.014	0.055 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.031)
Unions (UGT)	-0.023**	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Leftist vote 1936	-0.291***	-0.285***	-0.278***	-0.220***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Elec. competition 1936	-0.090***	-0.066***	-0.059***	-0.066***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Elevation SD	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1977 x Victimization	-0.037	0.002	0.010	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
1979 x Victimization	-0.033	-0.045	-0.026	-0.045
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
1982 x Victimization	-0.063**	-0.119	-0.062	-0.122
	(0.023)	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.076)
1986 x Victimization	-0.073**	-0.113	-0.069	-0.113
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
1989 x Victimization	-0.066**	-0.115	-0.072	-0.115
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
1993 x Victimization	-0.087***	-0.115	-0.062	-0.115
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
1996 x Victimization	-0.095***	-0.142 <sup>+</sup>	-0.074	-0.142 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2000 x Victimization	-0.090***	-0.110	-0.053	-0.110
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2004 x Victimization	-0.089***	-0.130 <sup>+</sup>	-0.071	-0.130 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2008 x Victimization	-0.097***	-0.149*	-0.085 <sup>+</sup>	-0.149*
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2011 x Victimization	-0.061**	-0.118	-0.070	-0.118
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2015 x Victimization	-0.081***	-0.130 <sup>+</sup>	-0.076 <sup>+</sup>	-0.130 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2016 x Victimization	-0.075***	-0.114	-0.068	-0.114
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)
2019 x Victimization	-0.067**	-0.120	-0.073	-0.120
	(0.023)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.074)

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Table A.19: Wartime victimization and Basque nationalist vote increase (III)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1977 x TOP		0.170*** (0.047)	0.152*** (0.045)	0.176*** (0.048)
1979 x TOP		0.012 (0.047)	0.004 (0.045)	0.020 (0.048)
1982 x TOP		-0.026 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.045)	-0.018 (0.048)
1986 x TOP		-0.056 (0.047)	-0.077+ (0.045)	-0.048 (0.048)
1989 x TOP		-0.064 (0.047)	-0.081+ (0.045)	-0.056 (0.048)
1993 x TOP		-0.071 (0.047)	-0.086+ (0.045)	-0.063 (0.048)
1996 x TOP		-0.088+ (0.047)	-0.100* (0.045)	-0.079+ (0.048)
2000 x TOP		-0.064 (0.047)	-0.070 (0.045)	-0.055 (0.048)
2004 x TOP		-0.088+ (0.047)	-0.096* (0.045)	-0.080+ (0.048)
2008 x TOP		-0.136** (0.047)	-0.140** (0.045)	-0.128** (0.048)
2011 x TOP		-0.063 (0.047)	-0.074+ (0.045)	-0.055 (0.048)
2015 x TOP		-0.127** (0.047)	-0.141** (0.045)	-0.119* (0.048)
2016 x TOP		-0.132** (0.047)	-0.146** (0.045)	-0.125** (0.048)
2019 x TOP		-0.147** (0.047)	-0.159*** (0.045)	-0.141** (0.048)
Victimization x TOP		0.058 (0.055)	0.012 (0.035)	0.063 (0.055)
1977 x Vict. x TOP		-0.060 (0.077)	-0.034 (0.049)	-0.060 (0.078)
1979 x Vict. x TOP		0.012 (0.077)	0.009 (0.049)	0.019 (0.078)
1982 x Vict. x TOP		0.060 (0.079)	0.032 (0.049)	0.071 (0.080)
1986 x Vict. x TOP		0.049 (0.077)	0.044 (0.049)	0.059 (0.078)

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Table A.20: Wartime victimization and Basque nationalist vote increase (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1989 x Vict. x TOP	0.058 (0.077)	0.046 (0.049)	0.069 (0.078)	
1993 x Vict. x TOP	0.037 (0.077)	0.020 (0.049)	0.053 (0.078)	
1996 x Vict. x TOP	0.059 (0.077)	0.029 (0.049)	0.078 (0.078)	
2000 x Vict. x TOP	0.028 (0.077)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.051 (0.078)	
2004 x Vict. x TOP	0.053 (0.077)	0.020 (0.049)	0.075 (0.078)	
2008 x Vict. x TOP	0.070 (0.077)	0.026 (0.049)	0.093 (0.078)	
2011 x Vict. x TOP	0.067 (0.077)	0.045 (0.049)	0.083 (0.078)	
2015 x Vict. x TOP	0.065 (0.077)	0.043 (0.049)	0.081 (0.078)	
2016 x Vict. x TOP	0.055 (0.077)	0.039 (0.049)	0.066 (0.078)	
2019 x Vict. x TOP	0.073 (0.077)	0.051 (0.049)	0.086 (0.078)	
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,402	3,402	3,402	2,832
R <sup>2</sup>	0.744	0.765	0.766	0.764
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.741	0.761	0.761	0.758

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results of the same model split among several tables because of length. Difference-in-difference models on Basque nationalist vote respective to PNV 1936 share, corresponding to models in figure 5.14 in the main text. Models 2-4 include an interaction with the network variable. Model 3 includes wartime victimization variable in its continuous form, while Model 4 restricts the sample to towns below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.

## A.7 Robustness tests for main analyses

### A.7.1 Spatial dependency

Another source of concern for the main results is spatial dependency among neighboring municipalities. In other words, the increase in leftist vote in a given municipality could be due to the exposure to victimization in a neighboring municipality, either because people learn of violence in nearby areas and react in the same way as if it had taken place in their own territory, or because the exposed population experience a change in preferences and this outcome affects nearby municipalities.

Accounting for this problem, figure A.10 replicates the main result (model 2 in figure 5.8 main text) including a spatial lag of violence across three different specifications: controlling for the existence of victimization in contiguous municipalities, and neighboring municipalities (1) within 5km (2) and 10km (3). The distance-based specifications refer to the minimum distance between borders.


Figure A.10 shows that the results are identical when including the spatial lags, which suggests that spatial dependency or spill-over effects should not be a concern when interpreting the results.

### A.7.2 Excluding the Basque Country

Figure A.11 shows the results of replicating the main analyses testing hypothesis H2 (models 2-4 in figure 5.8 main text) but excluding all municipalities from the three Basque provinces (Bizkaia, Alava, and Gipuzkoa). The reason for doing this is that the victimization data for the Basque Country is a preliminary list and thus subject to changes, although they are likely to be minimal. Moreover, the main mediator variable, the indicator of underground opposition activity, might work differently in the Basque Country because of the probable higher repressive activity due to the existence of violent terrorism in the Basque region during the late Francoism. In any case, the three models in figure A.11 show that the results excluding the Basque Country are essentially similar to the full sample and, if anything, evidence for the main argument is stronger.


### A.7.3 Distance buffer in underground networks variable

Figure A.12 shows the results of estimating model 2 in main text using different specifications of the network variable. In particular, the three models use, respectively, an indicator of network activity in the municipality or in neighbors within 5km, within 10km, or removing the neighbor condition. Results are again similar



**Figure A.10: Coefficient plot for main results, controlling for spatial dependency**

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to model 2 in main text, including a spatial lag of violence. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.



**Figure A.11: Coefficient plot for main results, excluding Basque Country**

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to models 2-4 in main text. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

to the main model, with the exception of the fourth model (4), in which the network variable only indicates network activity in the same municipality. This result suggests that the effect of underground activity extended to municipalities in the immediately surrounding areas. Interestingly, when included a limited version of the network variable (i.e. only in the municipalities where there was such activity), the effect of the existence of networks in municipalities without victimization is positive which, together with the absence of a significant interaction, suggests that in municipalities where opposition networks originated there was an increase in leftist vote irrespectively of wartime victimization.

#### A.7.4 Leftist victimization

Finally, figure A.13 estimates models that take into account leftist victimization, using data from those provinces where data on victimization by Republican forces is available (the analyses exclude Lugo, Albacete, Bizkaia, Alava, and Gipuzkoa). The first models (1 and 2) include leftist victimization as a control variable, using a binary and a continuous (log. killings per 1,000 population) version, respectively. Results do not change from the ones in the main text. The third model (3) uses leftist victimization as the main victimization variable in the interaction, as a sort of placebo analyses. If results were similar to those using rightist victimization, it would either provide support for the alternative explanation on organizational persistence, or suggest another confounding problem. However, leftist victimization does not show any significant effect.





Figure A.12: Coefficient plot for main results, different networks specifications

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.



**Figure A.13: Coefficient plot for main results, accounting for victimization by leftist (Republican) forces**


Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

### A.8 Basque nationalism (only PNV)

In section 5.4, I analyze the effects of wartime Francoist violence on Basque nationalist voting patterns, using the prewar PNV electoral support as the reference points. However, as it is already mentioned in the main text, comparing PNV vote in 1936 with post-1977 vote to all Basque nationalist parties might be biased, as it could be argued that the center-right, Christian democratic nature of the PNV cannot be compared to support for parties like Herri Batasuna o Euskadiko Ezkerra, which had a much more leftist ideology, despite shared ideas on Basque nationalism.

Here I replicate these analyses but only including vote for the PNV during the democratic period after 1977. Thus, figure A.14 is equivalent to figure 5.14 in the main text, while figure A.15 is equivalent to figure 5.15.

Results do not change much. Although some estimates are a bit different, the overall picture is the same. Francoist violence did not increase Basque nationalist vote and, if anything, it had a negative effect in some elections, particularly during the early 2000s, in those municipalities with underground opposition during Francoism. Moreover, no statistical differences are observed between municipalities with and without such underground opposition activity.



**Figure A.14: Effect of wartime victimization on PNV vote conditional on the presence of political networks**

Coefficient plot for four difference-in-difference models on PNV vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.




Figure A.15: DiD estimates of wartime victimization on PNV vote depending on the presence of political networks

DiD estimates show the effect of wartime violence against civilians on the increase of PNV vote in each election relative to PNV share in prewar (1936) elections.

# B

## Appendix II: Guatemala

### B.1 Adapting municipalities to territorial changes

As explained in the main text, Guatemalan municipalities have not changed much during the last century, so all changes were accounted for manually, in contrast with the case of Spain. The procedure, however, was the same (see section A.1 in [Appendix I: Spain](#) for further details). A ‘minimum denomination’ of municipalities was built, by joining together those municipalities where changes took place which, in the case of Guatemala, consisted mainly of splits. Thus, if a new municipality was formed out of a bigger one, the two are merged again in the dataset, so as to ensure compatibility between data sources across time. In particular, the dataset contains observations that range from 1973 to 2015, during which time there has been 15 territorial changes at the local level. Although one variable goes further back in time, namely rebel activity before 1978, only two territorial changes took place before that date: the formation of Melchor de Mencos (1962) and Poptún (1966), both in the department of Petén. Given that no rebel activity was recorded in the whole territory of Petén before 1971, these two changes were not implemented. Table B.1 below shows the municipalities that were formed, along with the data and the parent municipality they are merged to in the dataset.

Table B.1: Municipality changes in Guatemala, 1973–2015

Department	New municipality	Date	Parent municipality
Alta Verapaz	Fray Bartolomé de las Casas	1980	Santa María Cahabón
Alta Verapaz	La Tinta	1999	Panzás
Alta Verapaz	Raxruhá	2008	Chisec
Escuintla	Nueva Concepción	1974	Tiquisate
Escuintla	Sipacate	2015	La Gomera
Huehuetenango	Unión Cantinal	2005	Chiantla
Peten	El Chal	2014	Dolores
Peten	Las Cruces	2011	La Libertad
Quiche	Chicamán	1984	Uspantán
Quiche	Ixcán	1985	Uspantán
Quiche	Pachalúm	1986	Joyabaj
San Marcos	La Blanca	2014	Ocós
Suchitepequez	San Jose La Maquiná	2014	Cuyotenango
Zacapa	San Jorge	2014	Zacapa

## B.2 Descriptive statistics

Table B.2 shows descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables used in the models, while figure B.1 shows the correlation between these same variables. In addition, figure B.2 shows the spatial distribution of URNG vote in all elections after 1999, while figure B.3 does so for FRG vote (in 2007 the FRG did not participate).

Table B.2: Summary statistics for the Guatemalan data

Variable	Min	Q1	Median	Mean	Q3	Max
Log. State killings / 1000hab	0	0	0	0.63	0.66	5.36
% Non-paved roads	0	0.73	0.84	0.8	1	1
Log. Distance to PanAm Hwy	0	1.86	2.95	2.64	3.65	5.62
Log. Population 1973	6.34	8.59	9.16	9.17	9.75	13.46
% Indigenous 1973	0	0.11	0.61	0.52	0.9	1
Elevation SD	4.38	140.17	224.15	262.36	351.29	764.9
% Forest cover	0	0.29	0.54	0.52	0.74	0.99
Log. distance to capital	0	3.94	4.47	4.32	4.86	5.61
Log. Area	1.53	4.06	4.88	4.88	5.52	9.01
Rebel violence pre-1978	0	0	0	0.01	0	0.59




Figure B.1: Correlation plot of explanatory variables for Guatemala




Figure B.2: URNG results in 2003–2015 elections




Figure B.3: FRG results in 2003–2015 elections

### B.3 Additional results

Table B.3 shows results of running the base model without interactions for the voting share of URNG using a cross-sectional data for each election since 1999. In the case of URNG, state violence shows a positive effect in the first elections in 1999, but this effect disappears after that year. However, the other meaningful variable explaining URNG vote, the share of indigenous population in each municipality, stays significantly positive across all years. These results suggest that state violence might have played a relevant role at the very beginning of the democratic period, but ceased to have local effects thereafter, perhaps because of a nation-wide discussion on the memories of the conflict.

Table B.3: Wartime violence and URNG share, by year (base)

	1999 (1)	2003 (2)	2007 (3)	2011 (4)	2015 (5)
(Intercept)	-0.163 (0.120)	-0.045 (0.073)	-0.098 (0.061)	-0.149* (0.070)	-0.054 (0.045)
State-led killings	0.022*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Log. Population 1973	0.014+ (0.008)	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.000 (0.003)
% Indigenous 1973	0.096*** (0.021)	0.032* (0.013)	0.027* (0.011)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.026*** (0.008)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.029 (0.026)	0.027+ (0.016)	0.008 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)	0.006 (0.010)
Log. Dist to capital	0.009 (0.019)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.003 (0.010)	0.009 (0.011)	0.001 (0.007)
Log. Area	0.012 (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.008+ (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)
Rebel violence pre-78	-0.012 (0.132)	0.007 (0.080)	0.015 (0.066)	0.009 (0.076)	0.014 (0.049)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	325	318	323	320	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.439	0.259	0.230	0.359	0.277
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.384	0.185	0.153	0.295	0.203

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election.

Table B.4 shows the same models for the FRG. State violence does not play any meaningful effect in explaining local-level FRG vote in any election, and neither do the rest of the variables. Although municipalities with a higher share of indigenous

population were less likely to support the FRG in 1999, this effect disappears in the following elections.

Table B.4: Wartime violence and FRG share, by year (base)

	1999 (1)	2003 (2)	2007 (3)	2011 (4)
(Intercept)	0.479** (0.158)	0.322* (0.135)	0.130 (0.099)	0.004 (0.014)
State-led killings	-0.010 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)
Log. Population 1973	0.016 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.009)	0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.103*** (0.028)	0.029 (0.024)	0.014 (0.018)	0.001 (0.002)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	-0.048 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.003)
Log. Dist to capital	0.025 (0.025)	0.004 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.002)
Log. Area	-0.011 (0.011)	0.016+ (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.066 (0.174)	0.028 (0.148)	-0.034 (0.109)	-0.003 (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	318	323	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.292	0.359	0.387	0.169
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.222	0.294	0.327	0.084

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election.

Models in table B.5 again analyze URNG vote in each of the election years separately, in this case including the interaction with the distance to the Pan-American Highway. Table B.6 does the same, but including the interaction with the share of non-paved roads. Figures B.4 and B.5 show these results visually.

In both cases, state violence has a positive and significant effect on URNG vote when the proxies for prewar mobilization are set at 0, that is, when the distance to the Pan-American Highway is at its minimum or when all roads in a municipality are paved. Again, assuming these variables proxy prewar mobilization as discussed in the main text, state violence increases support for the URNG in those municipalities where exposure to prewar mobilization was higher. The effect is positive and significant across all years in both cases, although in a couple cases it

Table B.5: Wartime violence and URNG share, by year (interaction)

	1999 (1)	2003 (2)	2007 (3)	2011 (4)	2015 (5)
(Intercept)	-0.121 (0.117)	-0.029 (0.073)	-0.089 (0.061)	-0.134 <sup>+</sup> (0.070)	-0.048 (0.045)
State-led killings	0.063*** (0.011)	0.022** (0.007)	0.012* (0.006)	0.017* (0.007)	0.008 <sup>+</sup> (0.004)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	0.001 (0.006)	0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.002 <sup>+</sup> (0.001)
Log. Population 1973	0.008 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.003)
% Indigenous 1973	0.096*** (0.021)	0.032* (0.013)	0.027* (0.011)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.026*** (0.008)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.025 (0.025)	0.025 (0.016)	0.007 (0.013)	0.017 (0.015)	0.004 (0.010)
Log. Dist to capital	0.010 (0.020)	0.001 (0.012)	0.001 (0.010)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.008)
Log. Area	0.016* (0.008)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.010* (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.012 (0.129)	0.017 (0.079)	0.018 (0.066)	0.016 (0.076)	0.017 (0.049)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	318	323	320	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.474	0.282	0.237	0.373	0.285
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.418	0.204	0.155	0.306	0.206

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election.

only reaches a 90% significance level. As expected, the effect is highest in 1999, and becomes smaller after that year.

Tables B.7 and B.8 replicate these previous analyses for FRG vote, including the interaction with distance to the Pan-American Highway and with the share of non-paved roads, respectively. Again, results are shown visually in figures B.6 and B.7 for better interpretation.

Here, as in the results in the main text, the effect of state violence on FRG is much weaker, even when including the interaction with the two proxies. Only in 1999 it shows a negative and significant effect on FRG in those places that were arguably more exposed to prewar mobilization. The hypothesized positive effect in

Table B.6: Wartime violence and URNG share, by year (interaction)

	1999 (1)	2003 (2)	2007 (3)	2011 (4)	2015 (5)
(Intercept)	-0.230 <sup>+</sup> (0.119)	-0.075 (0.074)	-0.114 <sup>+</sup> (0.062)	-0.166* (0.071)	-0.061 (0.046)
State-led killings	0.116*** (0.023)	0.042** (0.014)	0.021 <sup>+</sup> (0.012)	0.030* (0.014)	0.018* (0.009)
% Non-paved roads	0.013 (0.028)	0.006 (0.017)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.011)
Violence × Non-paved	-0.109*** (0.025)	-0.044** (0.016)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.032* (0.015)	-0.019 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)
Log. Population 1973	0.015 <sup>+</sup> (0.008)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.003)
% Indigenous 1973	0.095*** (0.021)	0.031* (0.013)	0.026* (0.011)	0.057*** (0.013)	0.027*** (0.008)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.023 (0.025)	0.024 (0.016)	0.007 (0.013)	0.017 (0.015)	0.004 (0.009)
Log. Dist to capital	0.019 (0.019)	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)	0.003 (0.007)
Log. Area	0.011 (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.008 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)
Rebel violence pre-78	-0.019 (0.129)	0.005 (0.079)	0.014 (0.066)	0.006 (0.076)	0.012 (0.049)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	318	323	320	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.473	0.279	0.236	0.370	0.290
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.418	0.201	0.155	0.302	0.213

Note: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election.

municipalities without that exposure (hypothesis H6.4), however, is not supported by the data.




Figure B.4: Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway)

Predicted share of URNG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (distance to Pan-American Highway). Each model was estimated separately with data on each specific election. Model includes department FEs. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, keeping all other variables at their mean.




Figure B.5: Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads)

Predicted share of URNG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (% paved roads in a given municipality). Each model was estimated separately with data on each specific election. Model includes department FEs. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, keeping all other variables at their mean.

Table B.7: Wartime violence and FRG share, by year (interaction)

	1999 (1)	2003 (2)	2007 (3)	2015 (4)
(Intercept)	0.453** (0.158)	0.328* (0.134)	0.131 (0.100)	0.006 (0.014)
State-led killings	-0.038* (0.015)	0.015 (0.013)	0.005 (0.010)	0.003* (0.001)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	-0.005 (0.008)	0.016* (0.007)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.001)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am	0.009* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.000)
Log. Population 1973	0.019+ (0.011)	-0.023* (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.001)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.103*** (0.028)	0.030 (0.024)	0.015 (0.018)	0.001 (0.002)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)
Forest cover	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.029)	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.003)
Log. Dist to capital	0.029 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.002)
Log. Area	-0.014 (0.011)	0.016+ (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.001 (0.001)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.054 (0.174)	0.027 (0.147)	-0.036 (0.109)	-0.001 (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	318	323	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.302	0.372	0.390	0.189
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.228	0.304	0.325	0.100

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election.

Table B.8: Wartime violence and FRG share, by year (interaction)

	1999 (1)	2003 (2)	2007 (3)	2015 (4)
(Intercept)	0.542*** (0.160)	0.295* (0.138)	0.147 (0.101)	0.007 (0.015)
State-led killings	-0.097** (0.031)	0.000 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.019)	0.002 (0.003)
% Non-paved roads	-0.014 (0.038)	0.047 (0.032)	0.004 (0.024)	-0.006+ (0.004)
Violence × Non-paved	0.100** (0.034)	0.002 (0.029)	0.033 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.003)
Log. Population 1973	0.015 (0.011)	-0.021* (0.010)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.001)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.102*** (0.028)	0.023 (0.024)	0.014 (0.018)	0.002 (0.003)
Elevation SD	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	-0.042 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.003)
Log. Dist to capital	0.016 (0.026)	-0.000 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.002)
Log. Area	-0.011 (0.011)	0.012 (0.009)	0.009 (0.007)	0.001 (0.001)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.072 (0.172)	0.034 (0.147)	-0.031 (0.109)	-0.004 (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	318	323	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.312	0.364	0.393	0.180
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.240	0.295	0.328	0.090

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election.




Figure B.6: Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway)

Predicted share of FRG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (distance to Pan-American Highway). Each model was estimated separately with data on each specific election. Model includes department FEs. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, keeping all other variables at their mean.




Figure B.7: Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads)

Predicted share of FRG in the postwar period depending on wartime state violence and road infrastructure (% paved roads in a given municipality). Each model was estimated separately with data on each specific election. Model includes department FEs. Predicted probabilities calculated for a municipality in Quiché, keeping all other variables at their mean.

# C

## Appendix III: Postwar Ethnic Mobilization

### C.1 Ethnic civil war recurrence

#### C.1.1 Descriptive statistics

Tables C.1 and C.2 show the list of countries included in the paper, along with the number of observations from each country (at the ethnic group-year level), the number of recurrence onsets in each country and whether there were cases of state-led ethnic targeting.

Table C.3 shows summary statistics for all the variables included, while figure C.1 plots the correlation between these variables.

#### C.1.2 Only groups with post-1989 onsets

Table C.4 shows the main results, i.e. the base effect of state-led ethnic targeting on conflict recurrence, including in the sample only groups that had any onset after 1989, thus excluding those whose only conflict was already ongoing in 1989. Given that the EOSV dataset starts in 1989, this restriction avoids recording conflicts that might have had ethnic targeting before 1989 without being observable in the dataset. Table C.5 does the same but repeating the analyses interacting the ethnic targeting variable with ethno-political exclusion.

Table C.1: Sample overview of recurrence analyses (I)

Country	Observations	Groups	Onsets	State-led EOSV
Afghanistan	92	4	1	Yes
Angola	52	2	7	No
Azerbaijan	26	1	4	No
Bangladesh	29	1	0	Yes
Bosnia and Herzegovina	49	2	0	Yes
Burundi	29	1	1	Yes
Central African Republic	27	2	0	Yes
Chad	83	3	2	Yes
China	9	1	0	No
Comoros	20	1	0	No
Congo	19	1	2	No
Congo, DRC	165	8	6	Yes
Cote d'Ivoire	30	2	0	Yes
Croatia	25	1	0	Yes
Djibouti	26	1	1	No
Ethiopia	174	6	4	Yes
Georgia	50	2	2	No
Guatemala	29	1	0	No
India	203	8	10	Yes
Indonesia	56	2	3	No
Iran	40	2	4	No
Iraq	71	3	6	Yes
Israel	29	1	1	No
Laos	28	1	0	Yes
Lebanon	29	1	1	No
Liberia	58	2	2	Yes
Macedonia	16	1	0	No
Mali	50	2	2	Yes
Mexico	23	1	0	No

Table C.2: Sample overview of recurrence analyses (II)

Country	Observations	Groups	Onsets	State-led EOSV
Morocco	29	1	0	No
Myanmar	194	7	11	Yes
Nepal	42	2	0	No
Nicaragua	58	2	0	No
Niger	48	2	1	Yes
Nigeria	13	1	0	No
Pakistan	56	2	2	No
Papua New Guinea	27	1	0	No
Philippines	29	1	1	No
Russia	77	3	1	Yes
Rwanda	48	2	2	Yes
Senegal	27	1	1	Yes
Serbia and Montenegro	38	3	0	Yes
South Africa	87	3	0	No
South Sudan	14	3	0	Yes
Spain	29	1	1	No
Sri Lanka	29	1	0	Yes
Sudan	216	9	5	Yes
Suriname	29	1	0	No
Syria	34	2	1	Yes
Tajikistan	20	1	0	No
Thailand	14	1	0	No
Trinidad and Tobago	27	1	0	No
Turkey	29	1	0	No
Uganda	58	2	2	No
Ukraine	3	1	0	No
United Kingdom	29	1	1	No
Yemen	30	4	0	No

Table C.3: Summary statistics for the group-level dataset

Variable	Min	Q1	Median	Mean	Q3	Max	NA
Govt EOSV (past)	0	0	0	0.37	1	1	0
Govt EOSV (prev epis)	0	0	0	0.33	1	1	0
Govt EOSV (cum, log)	0	0	0	0.44	0.69	3	0
Political exclusion	0	0	1	0.68	1	1	213
Previous conflicts	1	1	1	1.64	2	7	0
Status downgraded	0	0	0	0.03	0	1	190
Log. Population (lag)	5.98	9.11	10.3	10.25	11.04	14.11	242
Log GDP pc (lag)	4.89	6.9	7.58	7.61	8.29	10.38	242
Group size	0	0.02	0.06	0.12	0.14	0.85	148
Ongoing conflict (lag)	0	0	1	0.62	1	1	404




Figure C.1: Correlation plot of explanatory variables in group-level analyses

Table C.4: Previous government-led EOSV and conflict recurrence (only groups with post 1989 onsets)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-3.148*	-2.635 <sup>+</sup>	-3.107*
	(1.430)	(1.426)	(1.384)
Govt EOSV (past)	0.047		
	(0.299)		
Govt EOSV (prev episode)		-0.265	
		(0.299)	
Govt EOSV (cumulative, log)			0.021
			(0.198)
Political exclusion	0.776*	0.772*	0.770*
	(0.334)	(0.329)	(0.331)
Previous conflicts	0.032	0.035	0.032
	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.126)
Status downgraded	0.474	0.377	0.467
	(0.784)	(0.787)	(0.782)
Log. Population (lag)	0.123	0.092	0.121
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Log GDP pc (lag)	-0.003	-0.020	-0.005
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Group size	1.609*	1.668*	1.614*
	(0.749)	(0.754)	(0.749)
Ongoing conflict (lag)	0.632*	0.712*	0.635*
	(0.302)	(0.304)	(0.303)
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047
Log Likelihood	-234.526	-234.141	-234.533
Akaike Inf. Crit.	493.051	492.281	493.065

Note: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table. Only including ethnic groups whose first recorded onset took place after 1989.

Table C.5: Government-led EOSV and conflict recurrence triggers (post 1989 onsets)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-3.326*	-2.682 <sup>+</sup>	-3.329*
	(1.467)	(1.442)	(1.400)
Political exclusion	0.986 <sup>+</sup>	0.831*	1.108*
	(0.509)	(0.418)	(0.465)
Govt EOSV (past)	0.334		
	(0.587)		
Govt EOSV (prev episode)		-0.153	
		(0.565)	
Govt EOSV (cumulative, log)			0.424
			(0.403)
EOSV × Exclusion	-0.386		
	(0.671)		
EOSV × Exclusion		-0.154	
		(0.664)	
EOSV × Exclusion			-0.515
			(0.452)
Political exclusion	0.034	0.037	0.039
	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.126)
Previous conflicts	0.499	0.383	0.506
	(0.787)	(0.788)	(0.786)
Status downgraded	0.121	0.091	0.110
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Log. Population (lag)	-0.001	-0.018	0.001
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Log GDP pc (lag)	1.613*	1.685*	1.444 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.746)	(0.756)	(0.764)
Group size	0.632*	0.718*	0.640*
	(0.301)	(0.304)	(0.302)
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047
Log Likelihood	-234.357	-234.114	-233.884
Akaike Inf. Crit.	494.714	494.227	493.767

Note:  $+p < 0.1$ ;  $*p < 0.05$ ;  $**p < 0.01$ ;  $***p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table. Only including ethnic groups whose first recorded onset took place after 1989.

## C.2 Survey evidence

### C.2.1 Afrobarometer data coverage and items

#### *Round coverage*

Table C.6 shows the number of observations in each round for each country included in the analyses. Obviously, not all countries were present in all rounds, although the inclusion of country-round fixed effects should alleviate concerns about over-representation.

Table C.6: Number of observations per country and round

Country	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6
Burundi					1200	1200
Côte d'Ivoire					1200	1199
Liberia				1199	1199	1199
Mali	2089	1283	1244	1232	1200	1200
Niger					1199	1200
Nigeria	3603	2428	2363	2324	2400	2400
Senegal		1200	1200	1200	1200	1200

#### *Dependent variables*

The three dependent variables were all drawn from different Afrobarometer items that were asked in all six rounds, with the exception of the variable on the attitudes on the use of violence. I include below details about the wording of each question, how it was coded in binary form, and the specific variable name in the Afrobarometer datasets.

##### 1. Ethnic self-identification

The question reads (Kenya example) ‘Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?’, and offers as response ‘I feel only Kenyan,’ ‘I feel more Kenyan than –,’ ‘I feel equally Kenyan and –,’ ‘I feel more –,’ or ‘I feel only –.’ In earlier rounds the survey directly asked whether the respondent felt she was most strongly attached to the national identity or the ethnic identity, should she had to choose.

- Coded as 1 if the respondent says she feels closer ('more' or 'only') to her ethnic group.

- Round 6: *q88b*, round 5: *q85b*, round 4: *q83*, round 3: *q82*, round 2: *identity\_choice\_ethnic*, round 1: *identity\_choice\_ethnic*.

## 2. Ethnic grievances

The question reads ‘How often, if ever, are [respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?’, and the optional responses are ‘never,’ ‘sometimes,’ ‘often,’ or ‘always.’ In earlier rounds, the question working was ‘To what extent are [respondent’s ethnic group] people treated unfairly by the government?’, and the responses were ‘never,’ ‘hardly at all,’ ‘to some extent,’ or ‘to a large extent,’ or ‘always.’

- Coded as 1 when the respondent chooses ‘often’/‘to a large extent’ or higher.
- Round 6: *q88A*, round 5: *q85A*, round 4: *q82*, round 3: *q81*, round 2: *q56*, round 1: *pfrfai*.

## 3. Attitudes on the use of violence

The question asks the respondent whether she agrees with the statement that ‘the use of violence is never justified in [country] politics’ or ‘in this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.’ Possible responses are ‘agree very strongly’ or ‘agree’ with some of the statements, or agree with neither.

- Coded as 1 if the respondent says she agrees or agrees strongly with the statement justifying the use of violence in national politics.
- Round 5: *q78*, round 3: *q51*, round 2: *q76*.

## *Mediating variables*

In the same way as the dependent variables, the two mediating variables were also drawn from two Afrobarometer items, which were asked in every round. I again detail below the wording of each question, how it was coded in binary form, and the specific variable name in the Afrobarometer datasets.

### 1. Interest in politics

The question asks the respondent ‘How interested would you say you are in public affairs?’, and offers ‘very interested,’ ‘somewhat interested,’ ‘not at all interested’ (only rounds 3 and later) and ‘not at all interested’ as possible responses.

- Coded as 1 if the respondent says she is very interested.
- Round 6: *q13*, round 5: *q14*, round 4: *q13*, round 3: *q16*, round 2: *q27*, round 1: *scint*.

## 2. Discuss politics often

The question asks ‘When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters?’ and offers ‘frequently,’ ‘occasionally,’ or ‘never’ as possible responses. In round 2 the wording was slightly different, and asked the respondent whether she had ‘discussed politics with friends or neighbors’ during the past year and, in case she had, whether it was ‘often,’ ‘several times,’ or ‘once or twice.’

- Coded as 1 if the respondent says she discusses politics ‘frequently’/‘often.’
- Round 6: *q14*, round 5: *q15*, round 4: *q14*, round 3: *q17*, round 2: *q25a*, round 1: *scdsc*.

### C.2.2 Descriptive statistics

Table C.7 lists the ethnic groups included in the sample that have suffered ethnic targeting, together with the earliest year ethnic one-sided violence took place.

Table C.8 shows the correspondence at the individual-level between being geographically exposed to state-led OSV events within a radius of 50km and belonging to an ethnic group that has suffered collective targeting by state authorities.

Table C.3 shows summary statistics for all the variables included in the survey data analyses, while figure C.2 plots the correlation between them.

Table C.7: Ethnic groups and earliest year of government-led EOSV

Country	Ethnic group	Earliest year
Burundi	Hutu	1995
Côte d'Ivoire	Mandé du Sud	2011
Côte d'Ivoire	Mandé du Nord	2000
Côte d'Ivoire	Gur (Voltaïque)	2000
Côte d'Ivoire	Krou	2011
Liberia	Gio	1990
Liberia	Mano	1990
Liberia	Krahn	2003
Liberia	Mandingo	2000
Mali	Tamasheq	1990
Mali	Arabe	1991
Niger	Touareg	1990
Niger	Tamasheq	1990
Niger	Toubou	1998
Nigeria	Hausa	2008
Nigeria	Fulani	2008
Nigeria	Yoruba	2008
Nigeria	Ijaw	1998
Nigeria	Tiv	2001
Nigeria	Ogoni	1994
Senegal	Diola	1998

Note: Ethnic group denomination follows the 'ethnicity' variable in Afrobarometer.

Table C.8: Government-led EOSV and OSV events (50km threshold)

	No EOSV	Government EOSV	Total
No OSV events within 50km	57.3%	35.4%	100%
Govt-led OSV within 50km	42.7%	64.6%	100%
All	81.6%	18.4%	100%

Table C.9: Summary statistics for the Afrobarometer variables

Variable	Min	Q1	Median	Mean	Q3	Max	NA	% 1
Ethnic self-identification	0	0	0	0.24	0	1	1785	23.6%
Ethnic grievances	0	0	0	0.21	0	1	3478	21.4%
Violence justified	0	0	0	0.2	0	1	21591	20.5%
Interest in politics	0	0	0	0.29	1	1	422	29.4%
Discuss politics often	0	0	0	0.21	0	1	371	21.3%
Govt ethnic targeting	0	0	0	0.28	0	4.81	0	-
Sex (female)	0	0	0	0.5	1	1	0	49.9%
Urban resident	0	0	0	0.42	1	1	0	42.3%
Employment status	0	0	0	0.49	1	2	2238	-




Figure C.2: Correlation plot of dependent and explanatory variables in Afrobarometer analyses

### C.2.3 Additional results

#### *Different distance thresholds for OSV events*

Table C.10 repeats the main analyses changing the distance threshold to OSV events to 25km, while figure C.3 plots the effects of the ethnic targeting variable with this set up. Table C.11 and figure C.4 repeat this but setting the threshold at 10km.

Table C.10: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes (25km threshold)

	Ethnic self id (1)	Ethnic grievances (2)	Violence justified (3)
(Intercept)	-3.339*** (0.158)	-1.847*** (0.096)	-1.098*** (0.080)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.084*** (0.025)	0.063** (0.021)	-0.012 (0.027)
Female	0.242*** (0.027)	-0.071* (0.028)	-0.011 (0.037)
Urban	-0.131*** (0.028)	-0.214*** (0.029)	0.011 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.077*** (0.019)	0.026 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,545	34,987	18,889
Log Likelihood	-17,510.240	-16,278.300	-9,388.428
Akaike Inf. Crit.	35,076.490	32,612.590	18,810.850

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure C.3: Government EOSV and individual political attitudes (25km threshold)

Table C.11: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes (10km threshold)

	Ethnic self id	Ethnic grievances	Violence justified
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-3.233*** (0.153)	-1.768*** (0.091)	-1.106*** (0.073)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.047 (0.032)	0.034 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.035)
Female	0.241*** (0.027)	-0.071* (0.028)	-0.011 (0.037)
Urban	-0.126*** (0.028)	-0.206*** (0.029)	0.011 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.077*** (0.019)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,545	34,987	18,889
Log Likelihood	-17,514.500	-16,282.010	-9,388.431
Akaike Inf. Crit.	35,085.000	32,620.030	18,810.860

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure C.4: Government EOSV and individual political attitudes (10km threshold)

#### Different thresholds for models including mediating variables

Table C.12 repeats the models including the interaction with the political discussion variable shown in the main text (table 7.6), but changing the distance threshold to code ethnic targeting to 25km. Figure C.5 plots the effect of ethnic targeting, depending on whether the individual says she often discusses about politics with friends and family, for each of the three outcomes.

Table C.13 does the same, but using political interest as the mediating variable in the models, and again changing the distance threshold to 25km. Figure C.6 shows the simulated effect of ethnic targeting depending on the two values of the

mediating variable, i.e. whether the respondent often discusses about politics or not.

Table C.14 again repeats the models interacting the ethnic targeting with the political discussion variable, using a distance threshold of 10km. Figure C.7 plots the effect of ethnic targeting after simulating the results of the previous models.

Table C.15 shows again the same models as above, using political interest as the mediating variable, but changing the distance threshold to 10km. Figure C.8 shows the simulated effect of ethnic targeting graphically, depending on whether the individual says she is interested in politics or not.

Table C.12: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes, depending on political activity (25km threshold)

	Ethnic self id (1)	Ethnic grievances (2)	Violence justified (3)
(Intercept)	-3.345*** (0.159)	-1.847*** (0.096)	-1.096*** (0.081)
Discuss politics	-0.023 (0.034)	0.016 (0.036)	0.022 (0.047)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.072** (0.028)	0.049* (0.023)	-0.009 (0.029)
Targeting × Discuss	0.058 (0.057)	0.082 <sup>+</sup> (0.045)	-0.028 (0.062)
Female	0.233*** (0.027)	-0.067* (0.028)	-0.008 (0.038)
Urban	-0.126*** (0.028)	-0.214*** (0.029)	0.010 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.078*** (0.019)	0.024 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,225	34,714	18,781
Log Likelihood	-17,347.430	-16,156.000	-9,341.896
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,754.860	32,372.000	18,721.790

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure C.5: Effect of government-led EOSV depending on individual political activity (25km threshold)

Table C.13: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes, depending on political interest (25km threshold)

	Ethnic self id (1)	Ethnic grievances (2)	Violence justified (3)
(Intercept)	-3.303*** (0.159)	-1.842*** (0.097)	-1.148*** (0.083)
Interest in politics	-0.090** (0.031)	-0.042 (0.032)	0.096* (0.042)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.077** (0.028)	0.045 <sup>+</sup> (0.023)	-0.016 (0.031)
Targeting × Interest	0.042 (0.053)	0.083* (0.042)	0.014 (0.051)
Female	0.227*** (0.027)	-0.074** (0.028)	0.003 (0.038)
Urban	-0.132*** (0.028)	-0.215*** (0.029)	0.013 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.077*** (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,197	34,684	18,699
Log Likelihood	-17,314.840	-16,140.900	-9,274.440
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,689.680	32,341.800	18,586.880

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure C.6: Effect of government-led EOSV depending on individual political interest (25km threshold)

Table C.14: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes, depending on political activity (10km threshold)

	Ethnic self id (1)	Ethnic grievances (2)	Violence justified (3)
(Intercept)	-3.242*** (0.155)	-1.768*** (0.091)	-1.105*** (0.074)
Discuss politics	-0.022 (0.034)	0.021 (0.035)	0.025 (0.047)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.029 (0.035)	0.016 (0.028)	-0.005 (0.037)
Targeting × Discuss	0.090 (0.075)	0.104+ (0.059)	-0.079 (0.089)
Female	0.233*** (0.027)	-0.067* (0.028)	-0.008 (0.037)
Urban	-0.121*** (0.028)	-0.207*** (0.029)	0.011 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.078*** (0.019)	0.024 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,225	34,714	18,781
Log Likelihood	-17,351.330	-16,159.840	-9,341.584
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,762.650	32,379.680	18,721.170

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure C.7: Effect of government-led EOSV depending on individual political activity (10km threshold)

Table C.15: Exposure to government EOSV and individual attitudes, depending on political interest (10km threshold)

	Ethnic self id (1)	Ethnic grievances (2)	Violence justified (3)
(Intercept)	-3.199*** (0.154)	-1.753*** (0.092)	-1.158*** (0.076)
Interest in politics	-0.092** (0.030)	-0.032 (0.032)	0.095* (0.041)
Ethnic targeting (log)	0.021 (0.036)	0.021 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.039)
Targeting × Interest	0.126+ (0.070)	0.069 (0.058)	0.040 (0.072)
Female	0.227*** (0.027)	-0.074** (0.028)	0.003 (0.038)
Urban	-0.126*** (0.028)	-0.208*** (0.029)	0.013 (0.039)
Employment status	-0.077*** (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.025)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,197	34,684	18,699
Log Likelihood	-17,318.130	-16,145.800	-9,274.342
Akaike Inf. Crit.	34,696.270	32,351.590	18,586.680

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Peaceyear correction (3 polynomial) included but omitted in the table.




Figure C.8: Effect of government-led EOSV depending on individual political interest (10km threshold)

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