

# Violence, co-optation, and postwar voting in Guatemala

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## Abstract

Wartime civilian victimization produces a counter-reaction against the perpetrator. However, this effect hinges on the creation of collective memories of wartime events. In many countries, former fighting actors and political elites try to redirect memories of wartime events through denial, propaganda, and co-optation. Previous works have ignored these aspects. I argue that the effect of violence is conditional on the capacity of local communities to build collective memories and bypass those efforts. I test this argument using local-level data from Guatemala. Results show that the effects of state violence on postwar voting depend on prewar exposure to political mobilization.

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## Introduction

Conflicts leave deep scars in postwar societies, but they do not always do so the way it is usually implied. We know that civilian victimization triggers a counter-mobilization against the perpetrator that lasts for a long time ([Balcells, 2012](#); [Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017](#); [Fontana et al., 2017](#); [Rozenas et al., 2017](#); [Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019](#)), but we are agnostic about the conditions that determine how civilians remember violent events. One factor that can influence this remembering process are efforts by political elites to steer memories of wartime events, by changing the official discourse or spreading misinformation. A related strategy is the co-optation of local elites by state authorities or rebel groups, with the goal of avoiding counter-mobilization as a result of violence.

These strategies are sometimes successful. For example, in Sri Lanka and Spain, violence against civilians was denied, blamed on the opposite side, or interpreted as a necessary means to bring peace and national unity, with relative success ([Seoighe, 2017](#); [Palomares, 2004](#)). In Argentina, state authorities managed to cover up the extent of the repression carried out during the dictatorship, and people only learned about it after its defeat in 1982 ([Robben, 1995](#)). In Mozambique, according to [Finnegan \(1992\)](#), civilians who had been captives of Renamo did not show grievances towards the *majubas*, the local enforcers of Renamo, perhaps because of the personal and family links they shared.

How do these strategies alter the effect of wartime victimization on political preferences after the war? The theoretical framework found in previous research is not able to answer this question, as past works do not usually account for any local factor that could mediate the long-term effect of civilian victimization. Individuals are assumed to objectively interpret violent events, and no attention is paid to those external factors that might influence this interpretation, such as propaganda or co-optation efforts by the perpetrator.

This paper tries to address this limitation, studying the effect of violence on post-war preferences and how this effect can vary depending on the exposure and reactions to propaganda and co-optation strategies. I argue that the effect of wartime violence is the product of the construction of collective memories, which is influenced both by the perpetrator's efforts to stave off blame on wartime atrocities and by the capacity of local

communities to build the collective memories that lead to counter-mobilization. In particular, the local ideological context determines whether local communities react negatively to victimization or, on the contrary, victimization is successful is crushing dissent.

I focus on the case of Guatemala, where there was an active debate about the responsibility of wartime events and where state authorities actively engaged in cooptation strategies as part of the counterinsurgency campaign. In the aftermath of the victimization campaign that took place in Guatemala in the early 1980s, the state tried to deny war events, set up a discourse that justified military actions as a necessary step to bring peace to the country, and forcefully recruited civilians into paramilitary units of local defense. This example is far from unique, as in many postwar contexts there is a controversy about blame attribution, where active political actors take an active role in trying to define the mainstream discourse. The fact that a civil war is usually a high-uncertainty context makes it an ideal space for rumors and propaganda to spread ([Schon, 2021](#)), a situation that in many cases strongly defines the postwar context.

My argument states that in Guatemala, where before the war many areas had been isolated from national politics and political illiteracy was rampant, co-optation strategies were to a large extent successful. Some of the areas that were most brutally hit by state violence during the early 1980s became years later the electoral strongholds of the right-wing political party led by the same dictator who had ordered many of the killings ([Ball, 1999](#)). However, some communities had been exposed to leftist political mobilization in the years before the most violent phase of the war. I argue that this exposure made them more resilient to the co-optation efforts of state authorities and the discoursed imposed by the government. Prewar political mobilization provided these communities with a better understanding of political divisions and shaped local reactions to violence, which translated into increased electoral support for the former rebels.

Using extensive local-level data, I show that state-led violence against civilians had different effect on postwar voting for the URNG and the FRG, the two parties linked to the former guerrilla and the military regime of the early 1980s, respectively. In particular, proxying prewar mobilization with two measures of road accessibility, I show that in more accessible municipalities, and thus those that presumably were more exposed to

political mobilization before the victimization campaign of the early 1980s, state violence is linked to an increase in electoral support for the URNG and a decrease in support for the FRG. On the contrary, in isolated places with worse road infrastructures, state violence did not have any meaningful effect on postwar voting patterns. Assuming that road accessibility determined how much exposure local communities had to external political actors, the results support my argument. Complementing the empirical analyses, I show in a separate section qualitative evidence coherent with the accessibility assumption and each of the steps of the theoretical mechanism.

This paper contributes to the literature on the historical legacies of conflict (Daly, 2012; Weintraub et al., 2015; Osorio et al., 2018; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018; Osorio et al., 2021) and the long-term effect of violence on preferences (Balcells, 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Fontana et al., 2017; Rozenas et al., 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019) in three ways. First, it highlights that the political reaction to wartime events is influenced by the efforts of political elites to steer memories of conflict and the capacity of individuals or communities to resist these efforts. Second, I show that the effects of wartime violence on political preferences are not homogenous, but depend on the degree of political mobilization at the local level. Finally, I offer new empirical evidence from a case that has received little attention in the literature, compared to other Latin American countries.

## **Long-term effects of civilian victimization**

An emerging research agenda explores the long-term effects of violence against civilians, finding evidence for the so-called backfiring effect: violence against civilians causes a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity. Using data at the individual level, Balcells (2012) studies the long-term effect of violence in Spain. Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) do a similar study in Ukraine, tracking the inter-generational transmission of preferences at the level of individuals. Both these works find that violence produces a backfiring effect among those who suffered violence or their relatives.

Other works focus on local-level effects. Balcells (2010) analyzes the effect of civilian victimization on voting patterns in Catalonia, Spain, without finding conclusive results.

[Fontana et al. \(2017\)](#) explore the effect of the Nazi occupation of Italy during World War II and find that Nazi violence increased local electoral support for communist parties many decades later. [Rozenas et al. \(2017\)](#) find that the forced deportations by Stalin that took place in Ukraine in the 1940s are linked to less support for pro-Russian political parties in the long run.

These works suffer from a few limitations. Previous research has treated the process that leads from violent events to a change in political preferences as a black box. In other words, we know little about potential heterogeneous effects or the factors that explain why legacies of violence might be present in some cases but not in others. An exception is [Rozenas and Zhukov \(2019\)](#), who study the long-term effects of the Holodomor in Ukraine and find that the effect of state repression is conditional on the structure of political opportunities. In particular, opposition in communities exposed to repression was only visible during periods when the Soviet state could not credibly commit to repress contentious activities.

Focusing on Guatemala, the closest work to this article is [Vogt and Sáenz de Tejada \(2019\)](#). Using a similar research design, they show that state violence during the civil war in Guatemala led to higher electoral support for leftist parties in the postwar period. They argue that the effect of violence depends on the “victims’ embeddedness in their communities” and show that the effect of state violence is more persistent in municipalities with a higher share of indigenous population. However, linking the share of indigenous population to community cohesion is problematic, particularly when some authors report fierce local conflicts and an increase of distrust in indigenous municipalities as a consequence of the counter-insurgency campaign (e.g. [Burrell, 2013](#)). In any case, these findings are not at odds with the argument developed here, and the role of social cohesion has more to do with the persistence of political identities than with their emergence as a result of violence.

All these works relatively ignore the local-level conditions of the effect of violence and how these influence the subjective interpretation of wartime events. As [Basta \(2018, 1244\)](#) says, “scholars usually take the meaning of events for granted, examining their causal efficacy without accounting for the processes of political contestation through which this

meaning is created.” Little theoretical attention has been paid to those local conditions that might explain the heterogeneous effects of violence.

This paper tries to overcome this limitation. I assume that the process leading from violent events to a change in political preferences is not a direct, homogenous one. The translation of wartime events into a change in preferences depends on the political interpretation of these events and the creation of collective memories of the conflict. Efforts by the perpetrator in changing the interpretations and thus steering collective memory can effectively alter the response to wartime events. Previous research has shown that different individuals can hold very different views of the same wartime events ([Driscoll and Maliniak, 2016](#)), a variation that can follow political factors ([Silverman, 2019](#)).

The political response to events involves a social process of interpretation and remembering. Individuals cope with trauma collectively ([Lyons et al., 1998](#)). The type of political interpretations an individual is faced with in face-to-face interactions is probably a more important determinant of her political response to these events than the events themselves ([Dyrstad, 2012](#); [Molina, 2014](#); [Glaudić and Vuković, 2016](#)). These processes are related to what in the literature on misinformation is referred to as rumors, or “fringe beliefs ... [that] acquire their power through widespread social transmission.” ([Berinsky, 2017](#), 243). My theoretical argument thus hinges on the idea that the local ideological context will determine the local creation of collective memories which, otherwise, will be more exposed to top-down co-optation and propaganda strategies. This idea speaks to previous research on the role of social contexts in the persistence of political attitudes ([Wittenberg, 2006](#); [Tavits, 2013](#)).

## Historical context

The Guatemalan civil war started in 1960 when a group of young officers led a revolt against the US-sponsored government. The rebel officers approached the urban leftist movement and formed a guerrilla group based in the rural areas in eastern Guatemala ([Arias, 1992](#)), ruling out the Maya population as a potential base of social support ([Smith, 1990](#)). The conflict remained at a low intensity for the next years, until a successful coun-

terinsurgency campaign put down the insurrection in the late 1960s. Many of the rebel leaders fled into exile.

Parallel to these events, the Guatemala countryside was rapidly changing. The Catholic Action movement started to develop strongly during the 1960s. The foreign Catholic clergy linked to the Liberation Theology expanded throughout the country, bringing new ideas and a new style of Pastoral work that criticized economic and political discrimination ([Arias, 1992](#); [Nelson, 2009](#); [Stoll, 1999](#)).

The conflict entered a new phase in the 1970s. Some of the defeated rebels joined forces with a younger generation and launched a new insurgency, this time with the idea of heading to the western highlands, the traditional homeland of the Maya. The new guerrilla leaders identified the Indigenous population as a promising source of support, due to their age-old situation of political and economic discrimination ([Payeras, 1981](#); [Arias, 1992](#)). They tried to contact Catholic priests, which took place in an environment of mutual distrust (e.g. [Manz, 2004](#)).

The peasant movement was already fairly developed at this point. It had emerged during the previous democratic period between 1944 and 1954 and, similar to Catholic Action, was fighting for land redistribution and the economic rights of the rural population ([Handy, 1994](#); [Forster, 2001](#)). It introduced new forms of economic organization and organized local political groups. By the late 1970s, when the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC) was formed, they were in contact with both the Catholic priests and the guerrilla.

With a guerrilla movement getting stronger and leftist mobilization expanding through the country, violence escalated quickly. After 1980, all of the efforts concentrated on the armed struggle that was being waged by the four active guerrilla groups, which in 1982 merged into the URNG. As the conflict entered a new phase, the Guatemalan government responded with a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. The government focused on the civilian population that they thought constituted the base of rebel support, which for the most part were the rural Maya of the western highlands. Violence intensified after 1978 and, by the early 1980s, reached genocidal levels. More than 200,000 civilians were killed during the civil war, and over 90% of the killings were committed by state forces ([Ball et al., 1999](#); [CEH, 1999](#)).

Civilian victimization was first carried out in a relatively haphazard way under the regime of Lucas Garcia (1978–1982). It later became more strategic under Ríos Montt (1982–1983), who engaged in a ‘scorched earth’ campaign and sponsored a system to ensure compliance from the local population: the Civil Defense Patrols, or *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil* (PAC). This system was “established in virtually every municipio of the western highlands between 1982 and 1983” (Smith, 1990, 272).

The counterinsurgency campaign was successful. Although it did not manage to end the conflict, the strength of the rebel movement decreased significantly in the late 1980s and the war reached an impasse. The peace talks finally culminated in a peace agreement signed in December 1996, and the guerrillas became a legal political party in 1998. The war had ended, but its legacy endured in Guatemalan politics.<sup>1</sup>

## **Violence, co-optation, and mobilization in Guatemala**

The victimization campaign of the early 1980s disrupted local communities, which partly explains why it did not have the expected backfiring effect everywhere. It pitted neighbors against neighbors and installed a climate of fear and distrust that would leave long-term consequences (Burrell, 2013). The government successfully destroyed Maya social organizations and gained forced cooperation from local people. Stoll (1999, 101) tells how in “Baja Verapaz, the army’s reaction to CUC roadblocks was so savage that some of CUC’s surviving members (...) changed sides and helped the army massacre one unarmed village after another.”

Additionally, the PAC system was designed to ensure compliance within the countryside. It forced local civilians to ‘defend’ themselves from the guerrilla and, in many cases, successfully convinced them that they were on the good side and that violence and insecurity was the rebels’ fault. In more than a few instances, the PAC also assisted the army in massacring civilians. The system aimed to destroy community networks and erode local interpersonal trust, which presumably had helped the guerrillas organize a local

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<sup>1</sup>Among other things, the worsening situation in terms of violence that the country experienced after 1999 has been linked to the organizational legacies of the war combined with institutionalized state corruption, which also affects law-enforcement bodies such as the police (Peacock and Beltrán, 2003; Beltrán, 2016; Booth et al., 2010). Some also link the presence of youth gangs to these dynamics (Levenson, 2013).



base of support (Sáenz de Tejada, 2004). Although civilians could in theory take part in the PAC without changing their beliefs, the system was designed with the goal of doing so. As Bateson (2017, 641) says, “during the Guatemalan civil war, the military made a concerted effort to socialize and re-educate the civilians of the Western Highlands.” The government explicitly recruited soldiers from the Maya communities into the army, including into the infamous Kaibil, the elite units that carried out many of the atrocities. A woman described to Green (1995, 112) “the particularly gruesome death of her husband at the hands of the army, while behind her on the wall prominently displayed was a photograph of her son in his Kaibil uniform.”

Beyond forced recruitment, the army also purposely established a climate of fear, which “made individuals more receptive to the military’s propaganda, as they were desperate for some narrative to make sense of the chaotic, unpredictable violence surrounding them” (Bateson, 2017, 643). The ideological warfare included rightist propaganda against communist ideas and any non-traditional form of social organization. Given that the Maya population eventually became the social base of support sought by the rebels, the “program [was] based on eroding ethnic identity among Guatemala’s Mayan Indian majority, and on brainwashing” (Black, 1985, 21).

The co-optation strategy had major consequences. People from all across the political spectrum in Guatemala regarded the PAC system as the most successful element of the army counterinsurgency campaign (Garrard-Burnett, 2010). The whole plan and the uncertainty that prevailed in the countryside during the 1980s helped convince the local population of the army’s anti-rebel theses and left a long-term distrust for politics (Green, 1995).

I argue that the strategy carried out by state authorities was key to understand the long-term consequences of victimization in Guatemala. First, this strategy was in many cases successful in establishing a narrative favoring the state’s discourse. In these areas, the state managed to avoid being blamed for acts of wartime victimization, through a fear-based mechanism and the co-optation of local communities, inhibiting the creation of collective memories. On the contrary, some communities were more capable of resisting state propaganda and building memories of the conflict which led to long-term

counter-mobilization as a response to violence. My argument states that this resistance was possible in places that had been exposed to prewar leftist mobilization, as they had the ideological tools to interpret wartime events differently.

### *The role of prewar mobilization*

The propaganda and co-optation campaign of the government was successful in building an alternative discourse of the war and shaving off culpabilities in many areas. But not in all of them. Some communities were better prepared to confront it than others. They had been more in contact with leftist ideas of political and economic discrimination, which equipped them to better understand the conflict and develop collective memories. [Kobrak \(2013, 223\)](#) illustrates this argument, saying that “living under army control, many guerrilla supporters learned to forget they had even been attracted to the struggle at all. But not in Colotenango.” In that community, peasant organizations managed “to challenge the mind-set of submission the army had tried to establish through the civil patrols” ([Kobrak, 2013, 226](#)).

Mainly two types of actors carried out these mobilization activities during the 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand, Catholic Action priests inspired by Liberation Theology, which was already becoming a key political influence in Latin American (e.g. [Wood, 2003](#)). In Guatemala, these religious activities took place throughout the countryside and had a clear political dimension ([Carmack, 1988](#); [Manz, 1988, 2004](#); [Le Bot, 1992](#); [Bateson, 2013](#)). On the other hand, a peasant movement developed parallel to the expansion of the Liberation Theology clergy, and both eventually intertwined. Much of the work that Catholic priests carried out involved developing new forms of social and agricultural organization. One of these was cooperativism, which had profound political consequences as it organized the local population and showed them alternative options to the existing economic and social regime ([Arias, 1992](#); [Nelson, 2009](#); [Bateson, 2013](#)).

These activities were a key factor in developing ideological affinities in a country where many areas had not been exposed to political mobilization before. As [Löfving \(2005, 84\)](#) affirms, “in the population as a whole the absence of ideology and the presence

of violence at the time loyalties were decided upon existed parallel to the presence of a defined cause in politically active circles.”

I argue that communities with a previous history of political mobilization interpreted information about the war and the reasons behind the violence differently. Previous research points to how everyday social networks act as vectors of information during a conflict ([Shesterinina, 2016](#)) and influence the political reactions to past violence ([Rydgren, 2007](#); [Dorff, 2017](#)). Communities that had been more exposed to this form of leftist mobilization before the war were more resilient to the co-optation strategies carried out by the government. They were better equipped to understand what violence meant, to create collective memories of violent events, and to develop political identities as a response.

An alternative mechanism would be that some local communities reacted differently to state violence not because they were less sensitive to propaganda and co-optation but because they had leftist preferences to start with. Previous research shows that the short-term effect of wartime violence on combatant support varies depending on whether the perpetrator is part of the in-group or not ([Lyall et al., 2013](#)), as civilians evaluate wartime events according to their previous political orientation ([Silverman, 2019](#); [Pechenkina and Argo, 2020](#)). Left-leaning communities would judge wartime events and assign blame according to their preferences. Thus, even without taking into account propaganda and co-optation strategies by the state, areas that had been more exposed to prewar leftist mobilization should judge wartime state actions more negatively.

This mechanism hinges on an ideology-driven active judgment of state violence, but it is not at odds with the former discussion on the capacity of some communities to resist state propaganda, which is also driven by local ideology. During the civil war, information about wartime events in Guatemala was likely very limited, so beliefs about wartime events were formed in a context of high uncertainty. Along these lines, recent research suggests that rumor evaluation in wartime contexts is largely determined by surrounding social networks ([Schon, 2021](#)). Active judgment of wartime events is thus very much intertwined with the ‘narrative contests’ that unfold in a situation where state actors are actively trying to spread misinformation about what happened during the war. The key

aspect here is whether propaganda and co-optation had an effect on those communities that did not react against violence.

The quantitative evidence can only offer limited evidence about these mechanisms. However, in a separate section below, I discuss qualitative evidence in support of the assumptions of the argument and the proxy variables used, including the role of state propaganda.

### *Expectations on postwar voting*

In the empirical analyses, I track the effects of wartime violence on postwar electoral support to two political parties: the URNG and the FRG. While the URNG was the party that emerged out of the former guerrilla group, the FRG was the party founded by General Ríos-Montt in 1989 that represented the right-wing nationalism put forward by the army during the conflict. Even though more parties might have a similar ideology to the URNG and FRG, these were the more representative of the wartime cleavage.

Following the argument, the expectation is that state violence during the conflict should have produced a counter-reaction in the form of increased support for the URNG and decreased support for the FRG, but only in those communities where they were able to interpret wartime events and form collective memories:

**H1:** In municipalities exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians increased long-term local support for the URNG.

**H2:** In municipalities exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians decreased long-term local support for the FRG.

On the contrary, in communities that had not been exposed to prewar leftist mobilization, the state should have been able to successfully co-opt the local population and avoid being blamed for the violence. The implication is that violence did not have any effect or even that it had the opposite one: increased support for the FRG and a rejection of the URNG:

**H3:** In municipalities not exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians decreased long-term local support for the URNG.

**H4:** In municipalities not exposed to prewar political mobilization, wartime violence against civilians increased long-term local support for the FRG.

## Empirical design

I build a local-level dataset covering all 325 municipalities in Guatemala across the 22 departments.<sup>2</sup> With this setup, I analyze the effect of wartime violence against civilians committed by state authorities on postwar electoral support for the URNG and FRG, adding an interaction term for the level of prewar exposure to leftist mobilization.

I run OLS models pooling observations from every municipality in all five general elections between 1999 and 2015, including election-year fixed effects.<sup>3</sup> All models include department fixed effects. Given that wartime violence was geographically concentrated, I also run the main models using a subset of the most affected departments.

### *Electoral results*

The main dependent variables are the share of votes to the URNG and the FRG in each election. The URNG, which became a political party in 1998, was originally founded in 1982 as the umbrella group that included the four main rebel groups fighting against the government at the time. The FRG was created in 1989 by General Efraín Ríos-Montt, the president of Guatemala between 1982 and 1983 who was behind much of the victimization campaign and designed the PAC system. The FRG represented the anti-communist, right-wing nationalism that the army had sponsored during the war. It still maintained the view that the conflict, and the violence it enfolded, had been the guerrillas' fault.<sup>4</sup>

Using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE, 2019), I calculated the share of total valid votes received by each party in each municipality in every election between 1999 and 2015.<sup>5</sup> Table 1 shows the share of total votes received by both parties in each

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<sup>2</sup>Although Guatemala currently has 340 municipalities, the sample is reduced because of the territorial changes that municipalities have experienced since 1970. See Appendix ??.

<sup>3</sup>I show results for separate cross-sectional models on each election in Appendix ??.

<sup>4</sup>I also estimate models aggregating support for more political parties, both rightist and leftist, shown in Appendix ??.

<sup>5</sup>The FRG did not participate in 2011 elections. The URNG share includes its coalition partners: DIA in 1999; Winaq, ANN, and MNR in 2011; Winaq in 2015.

election. Figure 1 shows the geographical variation in support for each party in 1999 elections.




Figure 1: Electoral results in 1999

Table 1: Electoral results of URNG and FRG

	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
URNG	12.33%	2.58%	2.14%	3.26%	2.12%
FRG	47.75%	19.34%	7.3%	—	0.87%

### *Civilian victimization*

To gather data on wartime violence against civilians I rely on and merge two different datasets, the records of the CEH and the *Centro Internacional para Investigaciones en Derechos Humanos* (International Center for Human Rights Investigations, CIIDH), following previous research on political violence in Guatemala ([Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011](#); [Sullivan, 2012](#)). Both CEH and CIIDH datasets are event databases built after extensive field research and together constitute a comprehensive picture of victimization events throughout the Guatemalan Civil War.

The CIIDH is a Guatemala-based NGO that carried out thousands of interviews and reviewed a variety of secondary sources to produce a list of more than 17,000 human rights violations by both sides, including more than 40,000 killings (Ball et al., 1999). The CEH was a UN-sponsored truth commission that focused on the massacres committed by the government against the civilian population and revealed that over 200,000 civilians were killed or disappeared during the conflict and that over 90% of the killings had been committed by state authorities or related paramilitary groups (CEH, 1999). The CEH data was obtained from the replication data for Sullivan (2012), who hand-coded massacres, defined as events of indiscriminate violence where at least 5 people were killed. Combining both data sources offers a comprehensive picture of the conflict events in Guatemala.<sup>6</sup>

Only events of fatal violence against civilians were selected and those whose location was unknown were removed (0.1% of all events). In the analyses, data on violence against civilians is limited to the period 1978–1985, which was by far the most violent period of the conflict. I also include violence committed by the civil patrols, although the army participated in 98% of the killings during this period.

For each municipality, I calculate the number of killings by state forces for every 1,000 inhabitants (using 1973 census data) and include it in the models in logarithmic form. Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of state violence.




Figure 2: State violence against civilians in Guatemala, 1978–1985

<sup>6</sup>I show in Appendix ?? that results do not change if only using data from the CEH.

### *Proxying prewar mobilization*

Prewar exposure to political mobilization was a major factor determining the response of civilians to state violence in Guatemala. Ideally, data on the presence and activities of leftist political actors before the most intense phase of the conflict would help to test this mechanism. However, to my best knowledge, such data is not available.

Instead, I use two proxies for prewar exposure to political mobilization based on road infrastructure: distance to the Pan-American Highway, a major road-building project completed in the 1960s, and the share of non-paved roads in each municipality around 1970. I assume that accessibility in terms of road infrastructure determined how much exposure local communities had to external political actors, who expanded throughout the country from the capital and main cities to bring new political ideas and organize the local population. I provide further qualitative evidence supporting this claim in another section below.

The Pan-American Highway was a major US-sponsored development project completed in the 1960s. The highway crosses Guatemala from West to East and extends through the heart of the western highlands. The location of the route, originally planned to follow the Pacific coast, was chosen because of commercial reasons ([Rutkow, 2019](#)). In a country where former connections consisted of dirt tracks or even mule trails, the construction of the highway brought about a great improvement in transportation in the early 1960s. Precisely the time when peasant associations and priests linked to the Liberation Theology began to expand throughout the country.

Municipalities closer to the Pan-American Highway should have had more exposure to prewar mobilization activities due to the easier logistics of arriving in these areas. In other words, I assume that better transport infrastructure facilitated the continuous arrival of more political actors from Guatemala City and abroad. I calculate how far away each municipality is from the road, and expect that municipalities closer to the Highway had a stronger exposure to leftist political mobilization during the 1960s and early 1970s. Figure 3 shows the distance between the boundary of each municipality and the Pan-American Highway (shown as a blue line), used in the analyses as  $\log(km + 1)$ .






Figure 3: Distance to Pan-American Highway

Distance to the Pan-American Highway provides more exogenous variation since the location of the highway did not respond to local political dynamics. However, it might leave out some variation across municipalities further away from the highway. Thus, I use a second proxy: the share of non-paved roads in each municipality. Local road infrastructure would facilitate transportation within a community, thus leading to generally higher exposure to the activities of these actors.

Data comes from the National Geographic Institute of Guatemala ([Segeplán, 2019](#)) and corresponds to the road network around 1970.<sup>7</sup> It constitutes the best approximation for the period of interest, namely, road infrastructure right before the conflict escalated in the late 1970s.

The left panel (a) in figure 4 shows the road network in Guatemala, with non-paved roads in grey and paved roads in black. The right panel (b) shows the variable used in the analyses, the share of non-paved roads out of total road length.

Neither of these two variables is correlated with patterns of state or rebel violence during the civil war, as I show in Appendix ???. The largest concern would be that accessibility drives rebel mobilization, which in turn would increase postwar electoral support for the rebels. But the relationship between accessibility and rebel support through this

<sup>7</sup>Source: Email communication with the National Geographic Institute of Guatemala.




Figure 4: Local road infrastructure

mechanism would probably run the opposite way. Namely, state reach decreases in more isolated areas and facilitates rebel activity, weakening the observed relationship.

These variables introduce one potential alternative explanation related to state-building. Namely, state violence did not have the same effect in isolated areas because of their lack of access to information and a general insularity from national politics. Although I emphasize the importance of state propaganda and co-optation in driving political preferences in these areas, this explanation is not at odds with the theory. In areas far away from the centers of power, lack of information and higher political illiteracy was probably part of the reason why the reaction to the violence was different. At the same time, these factors also made it easier for the state to use propaganda and co-opt local communities.

### *Controls*

Using data from the 1973 census, obtained from the replication data for [Sullivan \(2012\)](#), I include the logged population of each municipality, the share of indigenous population, and the literacy rate, which were important drivers of both wartime violence and postwar electoral results. To control for geographic factors that determined wartime dynamics, I include two measures of terrain ruggedness: the standard deviation of elevation within each municipality ([Mapzen, 2018](#)) and the share of forest cover from the GlobCover Land

Cover Maps (Arino et al., 2012). I include a measure of rebel violence before 1978, the logged number of killings for every 1000 inhabitants following the CIIDH dataset (Ball et al., 1999), to control for early rebel presence. I also include the logged distance (km) from each municipality to Guatemala City and the logged area of each municipality (in  $km^2$ ), to control for the isolation mechanisms related to both wartime violence and electoral behavior. In Appendix ?? I show that these variables are not strongly correlated among themselves, along with descriptive statistics.

## Results

Table 2 shows the results of the base models, those that analyze the relationship between state violence and vote for the URNG and the FRG, in both the whole sample and only in the departments most affected by the violence.<sup>8</sup> In every case the data pools together observations from all elections. The first column (1) shows a positive relationship between state-led killings and URNG vote, but no relationship in the case of the FRG (2). When looking at the most affected departments, the effect of state violence on leftist vote decreases, suggesting that the general trend indicates a concentration of both violence and leftist vote in the western highlands and Petén, rather than a robust relationship across the whole country.

Table 3 replicates the previous models but includes the interaction between state violence and distance to the Pan-American Highway. In the case of URNG vote, the effect of state violence in municipalities contiguous to the highway is much stronger than in the base model. The effect remains virtually the same in the sample limited to the most affected departments. As distance from the Pan-American Highway increases, the effect of state violence on leftist vote decreases. Moreover, in the absence of violence, being closer to or further away from the highway does not have any effect on URNG vote.

These results can be more clearly seen in figure 5, which shows the predicted effect of state violence on URNG vote depending on distance to the highway. State violence has a positive impact on leftist vote in the first case, but it decreases and becomes negative as

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<sup>8</sup>Full tables in Appendix ??.

Table 2: Base models on wartime violence and postwar voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.000 (0.039)	0.511*** (0.067)	0.021 (0.101)	0.448** (0.167)
State-led killings	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.442	0.814	0.387	0.731
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.430	0.809	0.364	0.719

Note: + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

distance increases. Assuming the variable is a good proxy for prewar mobilization, these results indicate that state violence only increased leftist vote in municipalities that had been exposed to political mobilization before the conflict intensified.




Figure 5: Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 1 in Table 3.

Table 3: Wartime violence, distance to PanAm Highway, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.015 (0.038)	0.506*** (0.067)	0.052 (0.100)	0.433* (0.168)
State-led killings	0.024*** (0.004)	−0.004 (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	−0.003 (0.009)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am	−0.006*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	−0.006*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.453	0.814	0.407	0.732
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.441	0.809	0.382	0.718

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

In the case of FRG vote, however, the results are not statistically significant. State violence does not seem to have any meaningful effect, regardless of the value of the proxy for prewar mobilization. Figure 6 illustrates this result, showing that, if anything, the results for the predicted FRG go in the opposite direction than the models explaining URNG vote.




Figure 6: Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 2 in Table 3.

Table 4 shows the results for the same models but including the interaction with the local share of non-paved roads. The results are stronger than those that use the first accessibility proxy. State violence has a large positive effect on URNG vote in those municipalities which have all roads paved, and as the share of non-paved roads increases, the effect of state violence disappears. In the most affected departments, the relationship is stronger and remains significant at the 99.9% level. The FRG models mirror these results but in the opposite direction. State violence is linked to fewer votes for the FRG in municipalities where most roads are paved. As the share of non-paved roads increases, this effect disappears.

These results are illustrated in figures 7 and 8. State violence has a large effect on leftist vote in more accessible municipalities. In the case of FRG, the effect goes in the opposite direction, less robust but still significant. Violence decreases FRG vote in municipalities where most roads are paved, but the effect disappears in more isolated municipalities.

These findings are in line with the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, and particularly with those that refer to URNG vote (H1 and H3). In the case of the FRG hy-

Table 4: Wartime violence, local road network, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	−0.032 (0.039)	0.530*** (0.068)	−0.158 (0.108)	0.602*** (0.181)
State-led killings	0.044*** (0.007)	−0.031* (0.013)	0.081*** (0.017)	−0.069* (0.028)
% Non-paved roads	0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.016)	0.078* (0.038)	−0.042 (0.064)
Violence × Non-paved	−0.043*** (0.008)	0.034* (0.014)	−0.084*** (0.018)	0.077* (0.030)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.453	0.815	0.415	0.737
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.440	0.810	0.390	0.723

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.




Figure 7: Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 1 in Table 4.




Figure 8: Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 2 in Table 4.

potheses, the results are mixed. The analyses provide empirical evidence for hypothesis H2, which predicts a decreasing effect of violence on support for the FRG in municipalities more exposed to prewar mobilization. However, hypothesis H4 is not directly supported by the data.

Results do not change if the independent variable measuring wartime violence only includes data from CEH (Appendix ??) or when the dependent variable includes more parties (Appendix ??). In Appendix ?? I also include results using a cross-section of the data for each election. These results show that the effects of victimization was mainly present in the 1999 elections, and waned after that year. In principle, this is coherent with the argument, since the difference between municipalities exposed to prewar mo-



bilization and the rest should be, if anything, stronger right after the war and become less relevant after democracy was restored, for at least two reasons. First, new issues different from wartime events emerged and increasingly defined voting patterns. And second, new possibilities for political mobilization opened up, blurring the effect of the mechanisms discussed here.

Finally, an important source of concern in the use of the accessibility variables as proxies for the level of exposure to prewar mobilization is that these two proxies could be related to patterns of violence against civilians. In Appendix ??, I show that neither of these two variables is correlated with wartime violence by the state or the rebels. If anything, the analyses show that wartime state violence was slightly more intense in municipalities further away from the Pan-American Highway. Thus, none of the two proxies seems to be related to local conflict intensity.

Overall, the results show evidence that violence only backfired in municipalities that were allegedly exposed to prewar leftist mobilization. The lack of support for the last hypothesis means that it is unlikely that state propaganda and co-optation was successful in increasing support as a result of victimization, but this does not mean that it was successful in avoiding counter-mobilization. As discussed above, the quantitative analyses can offer only limited evidence on the mechanisms. In the next section, I offer qualitative evidence on several steps of the mechanism, including the role of state propaganda in preventing victimization from backfiring.

## **Identifying the mechanism**

The empirical analyses do not test all the steps of the theoretical mechanism and hinge on the road accessibility assumption. In response to these limitations, I provide in this section qualitative evidence identifying each step of the mechanism. In particular, I discuss four main points: how the road infrastructure was a crucial factor explaining the diffusion of political mobilization in the years before the violence, the relationship between the presence of priests and activists and local mobilization activities, the role of state propaganda, and the existence of local commemoration activities in the postwar period. The

qualitative evidence provided here comes from a mix of sources, including anthropological studies and archives, but does not constitute a strict test of the process. Rather, it offers a series of non-decisive, 'straw in the wind' tests ([Collier, 2011](#)) for several steps of the mechanism and the proxy variables used that cannot be directly confirmed in the quantitative analyses.

### *Road infrastructure and the diffusion of political activists*

First, there is qualitative evidence that road accessibility was related to political mobilization before the worst phases of the war. In a study of Chupol, Chichicastenango, [Esparza \(2018\)](#) illustrates this point:

for communities lying off the main road, facilitating the introduction of the new liberation theology gospel was the expansion of the Interamerican Highway in 1956. Chupolenses used the highway to increase their economic, social, and political networks throughout El Quiché. ... As their geographical isolation was now reduced by easier access to el pueblo and other adjacent townships, and particularly to Guatemala City, merchants both traveled to meet and were visited by outside institutions: rural Catholic Action catechists and Spanish and North American missionaries ([Esparza, 2018](#), 93–94).

Besides the role of these crucial actors and the importance of the Pan-American Highway, the argument states that accessible communities should have had more intense and continued contact with leftist activists. Along these lines, [Bran \(1985\)](#), writing in late 1980, explains that it was not only the main peasant or religious organizations that engaged in political mobilization, but also other types of local organizations that did not have explicit political goals but were also used as platforms for mobilization. For example, he talks about a local soccer team where “young revolutionaries make use of the weekly tours of regional championships to communicate with young peasants ... to exchange information, reading materials, ask for or offer help and other support activities for the organized popular movement” ([Bran, 1985](#), 15). It makes sense to expect that all these day-to-day activities would be more common in areas with better road connections. Contrary to these

areas, [Esparza \(2018\)](#) also discusses the so-called “white communities”, those that were co-opted by the army and collaborated with the state. “Among the poorest and those isolated from the Interamerican Highway, the army found a captive, obedient, and easily controlled support base to become complicit in the bloodshed” [Esparza \(2018, 138\)](#).

### *Priests, activists and political mobilization*

Second, the role of priests and activists in leftist mobilization activities is also documented. For instance, there are several reports of priests being expelled from the country because of political activities around the time of the 1974 elections ([El Imparcial, 1974a,c](#)). One article published in late March 1974 affirms that these priests were expelled because of promoting local cooperatives in the department of Huehuetenango, and mentions six municipalities in particular where these activities took place: San Gaspar Ixchil, San Ildefonso Ixtahuacán, San Pedro Necta, San Rafael Petzal, Colotenango, and Santiago Chimaltenango ([El Imparcial, 1974b](#)).

In table 5, I show these municipalities along with the number of victims that they later experienced in the early 1980s and the electoral share to the URNG in 1999. Even though this is just anecdotal evidence, it is interesting to see that the two of them that experienced significant levels of victimization during the conflict (San Ildefonso and Colotenango) also reported high levels of support—above 40%—for the former rebels in 1999, well above the nation-wide results (12.3%). Indeed, as mentioned above in the theoretical argument, [Kobrak \(2013, 223–226\)](#) explains that Colotenango was one of the municipalities that resisted the co-optation strategies carried out by the army precisely because of the strong presence of local peasant organizations.

### *The role of propaganda*

Third, both archival and qualitative evidence supports the idea that the state engaged in a strategy of propaganda that was in many cases successful. For example, the army explicitly said in the *Victoria 82* plan that one of their goals was “to use the same procedures and techniques developed by the insurgency in the organization of the masses, since in this war the winner is the one who better organizes the people and has the greatest pop-

Table 5: Huehuetenango municipalities mentioned in [El Imparcial](#) (1974b)

Municipality	Victims in state violence	URNG share in 1999
San Gaspar Ixchil	0	13.4%
San Ildefonso Ixtahuacán	228	42.3%
San Pedro Necta	22	16.2%
San Rafael Petzal	0	6.9%
Colotenango	299	41.7%
Santiago Chimaltenango	0	31.4%

ular support.” (quoted in [CEH, 1999](#), II, 191) By the late 1980s, when the war was waning and the first civilian president rose to power, the state was still involved in a full-fledged propaganda effort:

Civil Affairs units continue to wage psychological propaganda operations of disinformation (OPSIC) by imputing blame on the guerrilla for the past destruction. Loudspeakers from helicopters and Civil Affairs patrols emphasize hardship for families, amnesty, and rewards for weapon turn-ins ... Leaflets dropped from airplanes and helicopters characterize the URNG as terrorists preying on peasants ... A radio OPSIC propaganda spot run every hour or so the week of President Cerezo’s inauguration also fixed the blame for violence ([Schirmer, 1998](#), 111)

[Bran \(1985, 16\)](#) says that “one of the most effective channels for the Guatemalan bourgeoisie to disseminate foreign and conservative ideologies among the people is the radio: falsified news, concealment of information, radio soap operas, official radio stations, ideologized messages, propaganda, etc.” Contrary to the municipalities that had been exposed to leftist political mobilization, [Esparza \(2018\)](#) discusses how the army succeeded in co-opting local communities through a discourse based on demonizing the rebels and praising the army’s development projects.

#### *Postwar commemoration activities*

Finally, one of the steps of the theoretical mechanism is that areas that had been exposed to prewar political mobilization were able to create their own collective memories of

wartime events. For this to happen, some form of commemoration activity is needed. Qualitative sources also show evidence of these, even though a large part of the memory creation process probably took place in day-to-day interactions that were not recorded. [Falla \(2006\)](#) describes how a Maya community in Ixcán, northern Quiché, could speak freely about past atrocities as they were free from military control. Public discussion of wartime events allowed local people to challenge the army's misinformation campaign, particularly successful among younger people who had grown up away.

There are examples of more formal commemoration activities. [Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza \(2008\)](#) talk about a few communities that established some form of local community museums to commemorate wartime massacres. These local initiatives were of major importance to the creation of collective memories, particularly because "in some communities, people have never spoken of what happened to them even within their own families" ([Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza, 2008](#), 161). Other accounts of local memorials also underscore the role they played in facilitating a collective discussion of wartime events. For example, talking about a memorial cross built by a local community in Alta Verapaz, [Viaene \(2011, 170–171\)](#) explains that the "cross also created space for openly challenging and offering a counter-narrative against the army discourse that all the people who hid in the mountains were guerrilleros ... and therefore responsible for the atrocities."

These activities, however, did not take place everywhere. [Viaene \(2011\)](#) talks about an isolated community in the same area that did not participate in the memorial construction, as both the army and the PAC enjoyed local control and had threatened local people. [Esparza \(2018, 178\)](#) discusses the case of communities where militarization was intense and where "collective fear of reprisals from former militia men continued to shape families' capacity to engage in grassroots action." In these communities, she affirms, "the army replaced Indigenous peoples' shared memory with its own institutional memory" (192).

## Conclusion

In many conflicts, political actors actively try to alter collective memories. Propaganda, co-optation strategies, and local processes of mobilization define the political response to violence in each community. In this article, I point to the importance of these overlooked dynamics in understanding conflict legacies.

Using local-level data from Guatemala, I show that in many areas the government managed not to be blamed for the brutal campaign of victimization carried out during the civil war. However, some communities had been exposed to leftist political mobilization right before the war, which made them capable of interpreting violent events in political terms and more resilient to state propaganda. Contrary to other areas, in these communities state violence backfired in the form of long-term support for the rebels.

Even though this study focuses on Guatemala, the insights here motivate future research and inform policy-making. The main takeaway is that we should take into account the social processes that determine the consequences of violence. A better understanding of the social and political legacies of conflict is of major importance for postwar societies. In these contexts, the main goal is to avoid a new outbreak. Knowing how violence might have heterogeneous effects across different areas of the country can help to identify potential hot-spots of radicalization. Moreover, the fact that memories of a conflict and the political responses to it are sensitive to the efforts of different political actors to change them can help to avoid such radicalization and to promote reconciliation. A wrong reading of these findings would be that hiding facts could be a good strategy to avoid further violence. But we do know little about how differential access to information about the conflict can bring about polarization, which constitutes a potential avenue for future research. Instead, the discussion here suggests that peacebuilding programs should monitor the translation of collective memories into political responses and how these can lead to polarized identities. In an unstable context, even a small fire can quickly grow in size and ignite another outbreak of violence.

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Online appendix for:  
Violence, co-optation, and postwar voting in Guatemala

Francisco Villamil

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## A Territorial changes in municipalities

A ‘minimum denomination’ of municipalities was developed by joining together those municipalities where changes took place, which consisted mainly of splits. Thus, if a new municipality was created by splitting off a bigger one, the two are merged again in the dataset, so as to ensure compatibility between data sources across time. In particular, the dataset contains observations that range from 1973 to 2015, during which there were 15 territorial changes at the local level. Although one variable goes further back in time (namely rebel activity before 1978) only two territorial changes took place before that date: the formation of Melchor de Mencos in 1962 and Poptún in 1966. Given that no rebel activity was recorded in the whole territory of Petén before 1971, these two changes were not implemented. Table A1 below lists new municipalities that formed since 1973, along with the parent municipality they are merged to in the dataset.

**Table A1:** Municipality changes in Guatemala, 1973–2015

Department	New municipality	Date	Parent municipality
Alta Verapaz	Fray Bartolomé de las Casas	1980	Santa María Cahabón
Alta Verapaz	La Tinta	1999	Panzás
Alta Verapaz	Raxruhá	2008	Chisec
Escuintla	Nueva Concepción	1974	Tiquisate
Escuintla	Sipacate	2015	La Gomera
Huehuetenango	Unión Cantinil	2005	Chiantla
Peten	El Chal	2014	Dolores
Peten	Las Cruces	2011	La Libertad
Quiche	Chicamán	1984	Uspantán
Quiche	Ixcán	1985	Uspantán
Quiche	Pachalúm	1986	Joyabaj
San Marcos	La Blanca	2014	Ocós
Suchitepequez	San Jose La Maquiná	2014	Cuyotenango
Zacapa	San Jorge	2014	Zacapa


## B Summary statistics

Table A2 shows the summary statistics for all the covariates included in the analyses, while figure A1 shows a correlation matrix of these same variables.

**Table A2:** Summary statistics for the covariates

Variable	Min	Q1	Median	Mean	Q3	Max
Log. State killings / 1000hab	0	0	0	0.63	0.66	5.36
% Non-paved roads	0	0.73	0.84	0.8	1	1
Log. Distance to PanAm Hwy	0	1.86	2.95	2.64	3.65	5.62
Log. Population 1973	6.34	8.59	9.16	9.17	9.75	13.46
% Indigenous 1973	0	0.11	0.61	0.52	0.9	1
% Literate 1973	0.04	0.24	0.39	0.38	0.5	0.89
Elevation SD	4.38	140.17	224.15	262.36	351.29	764.9
% Forest cover	0	0.29	0.54	0.52	0.74	0.99
Log. distance to capital	0	3.94	4.47	4.32	4.86	5.61
Log. Area	1.53	4.06	4.88	4.88	5.52	9.01





**Figure A1:** Correlation matrix among covariates

## C Accessibility and violence against civilians

This section tests the assumption that road accessibility was not a driver of wartime violence by either the state or the rebels. As in the main text, the dependent variables are log-transformed and weighted by population, i.e. logged number of killings for every 1000 inhabitants.

Table A3 shows the results of linear models explaining wartime violence by the state, while table A4 repeats these analyses for a subsample of the most affected departments. In both cases, models with and without control variables, and with and without department fixed effects are included.

State violence does not have any relevant relationship with the two proxy variables used as interactions. If anything, it has a positive relationship with the share of non-paved roads in Model 1 in table A3, but the effect disappears once either control variables or department fixed effects are included (or both). Regarding the other variables, state violence is mainly explained by the share of indigenous population in each municipality and by its size. However, when limiting the sample to the most affected departments and including fixed effects, the share of indigenous population stops being significant, suggesting regionally concentrated dynamics.

Table A5 shows the results for models equivalent to the previous ones but using rebel violence as the dependent variable, while table A6 shows the same models but for municipalities in the most affected departments. Although patterns of rebel violence should not be as relevant to the theoretical argument, it is important to check whether any of the two accessibility proxies is related to local wartime activity. Again, none of the two proxies shows any relationship to rebel violence. Rebel violence is also poorly explained by the rest of the variables, perhaps because of the relatively low incidence of violence by the rebels.

The results show that the two accessibility variables used as proxies for the level of exposure to prewar mobilization are not related to the intensity of the conflict in each municipality.

**Table A3:** Determinants of wartime violence by the state

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	−0.250 (0.261)	1.208** (0.394)	−0.196 (0.915)	−0.185 (1.217)
% Roads non-paved	0.900** (0.314)	−0.139 (0.263)	−0.169 (0.309)	−0.328 (0.273)
Log. Distance to Pan-Am Hwy	0.062 (0.046)	0.089 (0.056)	−0.026 (0.049)	0.101 <sup>+</sup> (0.058)
Log. Population 1973			−0.110 (0.085)	0.030 (0.085)
% Indigenous 1973			1.130*** (0.229)	0.487 <sup>+</sup> (0.262)
% Literate 1973			−0.901 <sup>+</sup> (0.485)	0.177 (0.489)
Elevation SD			−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover			0.211 (0.274)	0.216 (0.253)
Log. Dist to capital			−0.071 (0.094)	−0.208 (0.201)
Log. Area			0.422*** (0.070)	0.271** (0.083)
Rebel violence pre-78			2.053 (1.553)	2.080 (1.300)
Department FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	325	325	325	325
R <sup>2</sup>	0.037	0.529	0.285	0.575
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.493	0.262	0.530

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Department FEs not shown.

**Table A4:** Determinants of wartime violence by the state (most affected departments)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	1.524 (1.059)	1.008 (1.159)	-3.137 (2.926)	-3.999 (4.097)
% Roads non-paved	-0.003 (1.256)	-0.783 (1.386)	0.114 (1.461)	-0.947 (1.382)
Log. Distance to Pan-Am Hwy	0.091 (0.099)	0.266 (0.171)	0.043 (0.135)	0.190 (0.169)
Log. Population 1973			0.473 <sup>+</sup> (0.257)	0.333 (0.252)
% Indigenous 1973			0.783 (0.828)	1.069 (0.855)
% Literate 1973			-1.052 (1.383)	1.279 (1.583)
Elevation SD			-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Forest cover			-1.154 (0.720)	0.422 (0.741)
Log. Dist to capital			-0.206 (0.302)	-0.511 (0.748)
Log. Area			0.373 <sup>+</sup> (0.198)	0.601 <sup>**</sup> (0.212)
Rebel violence pre-78			5.043 (6.798)	3.329 (6.325)
Department FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	99	99	99	99
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.242	0.234	0.412
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.010	0.183	0.147	0.305

*Note:* <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; <sup>\*</sup> $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>\*\*</sup> $p < 0.01$ ; <sup>\*\*\*</sup> $p < 0.001$ . Department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

**Table A5:** Determinants of wartime violence by the rebels

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-0.021 (0.038)	-0.049 (0.080)	0.031 (0.153)	-0.276 (0.257)
% Roads non-paved	0.024 (0.046)	-0.005 (0.054)	-0.043 (0.052)	-0.048 (0.058)
Log. Distance to Pan-Am Hwy	0.011 (0.007)	0.012 (0.011)	0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.012)
Log. Population 1973			-0.017 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.018)
% Indigenous 1973			0.057 (0.038)	0.016 (0.055)
% Literate 1973			-0.006 (0.081)	-0.024 (0.103)
Elevation SD			0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover			-0.028 (0.046)	0.012 (0.053)
Log. Dist to capital			-0.002 (0.016)	0.034 (0.042)
Log. Area			0.034** (0.012)	0.034+ (0.018)
Rebel violence pre-78			0.138 (0.260)	0.196 (0.275)
Department FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	325	325	325	325
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.070	0.046	0.097
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	-0.002	0.016	0.002

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Department FEs not shown.

**Table A6:** Determinants of wartime violence by the rebels (most affected departments)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.019 (0.188)	-0.090 (0.231)	0.309 (0.567)	-0.592 (0.882)
% Roads non-paved	-0.004 (0.223)	0.052 (0.276)	-0.138 (0.283)	-0.172 (0.298)
Log. Distance to Pan-Am Hwy	0.017 (0.018)	0.009 (0.034)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.036)
Log. Population 1973			-0.045 (0.050)	-0.029 (0.054)
% Indigenous 1973			0.045 (0.160)	0.065 (0.184)
% Literate 1973			-0.108 (0.268)	-0.035 (0.341)
Elevation SD			0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover			-0.056 (0.139)	0.012 (0.160)
Log. Dist to capital			-0.025 (0.058)	0.133 (0.161)
Log. Area			0.067 <sup>+</sup> (0.038)	0.056 (0.046)
Rebel violence pre-78			1.829 (1.317)	1.367 (1.362)
Department FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	99	99	99	99
R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.050	0.091	0.137
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.010	-0.023	-0.012	-0.019

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

## D Full tables (main text)

Tables A7, A8, and A9 show full results, i.e. including coefficients for control variables, for the results tables shown in the main text.

**Table A7:** Base models on wartime violence and postwar voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.000 (0.039)	0.511*** (0.067)	0.021 (0.101)	0.448** (0.167)
State-led killings	0.007*** (0.002)	−0.001 (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Log. Population 1973	0.006* (0.003)	−0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.035*** (0.008)	−0.014 (0.014)	0.043* (0.021)	−0.021 (0.035)
% Literate 1973	−0.040* (0.016)	0.002 (0.027)	−0.046 (0.039)	0.087 (0.064)
Elevation SD	−0.000+ (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.016* (0.008)	−0.022 (0.014)	0.042* (0.018)	−0.032 (0.030)
Log. Dist to capital	0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.010)	0.008 (0.018)	0.002 (0.030)
Log. Area	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.011 (0.041)	0.015 (0.071)	−0.054 (0.156)	−0.027 (0.258)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.442	0.814	0.387	0.731
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.430	0.809	0.364	0.719

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

**Table A8:** Wartime violence, local road network, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	−0.032 (0.039)	0.530*** (0.068)	−0.158 (0.108)	0.602*** (0.181)
State-led killings	0.044*** (0.007)	−0.031* (0.013)	0.081*** (0.017)	−0.069* (0.028)
% Non-paved roads	0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.016)	0.078* (0.038)	−0.042 (0.064)
Violence × Non-paved	−0.043*** (0.008)	0.034* (0.014)	−0.084*** (0.018)	0.077* (0.030)
Log. Population 1973	0.006* (0.003)	−0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.038*** (0.008)	−0.018 (0.014)	0.050* (0.021)	−0.029 (0.035)
% Literate 1973	−0.030 <sup>+</sup> (0.016)	−0.007 (0.027)	−0.025 (0.039)	0.062 (0.064)
Elevation SD	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.014 <sup>+</sup> (0.008)	−0.021 (0.014)	0.033 <sup>+</sup> (0.018)	−0.024 (0.030)
Log. Dist to capital	0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.028 (0.019)	−0.019 (0.031)
Log. Area	0.006* (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.007 (0.041)	0.019 (0.071)	−0.026 (0.153)	−0.062 (0.256)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.453	0.815	0.415	0.737
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.440	0.810	0.390	0.723

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.



**Table A9:** Wartime violence, distance to PanAm Highway, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.015 (0.038)	0.506*** (0.067)	0.052 (0.100)	0.433* (0.168)
State-led killings	0.024*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.009)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)
Violence $\times$ Dist to Pan-Am	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Log. Population 1973	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.008 (0.011)
% Indigenous 1973	0.037*** (0.008)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.043* (0.021)	-0.024 (0.035)
% Literate 1973	-0.035* (0.015)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.046 (0.039)	0.082 (0.064)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.014+ (0.008)	-0.024+ (0.014)	0.038* (0.018)	-0.034 (0.031)
Log. Dist to capital	0.004 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.009 (0.018)	0.000 (0.030)
Log. Area	0.007** (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.020 (0.041)	0.011 (0.071)	-0.019 (0.154)	-0.037 (0.259)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.453	0.814	0.407	0.732
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.441	0.809	0.382	0.718

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

## E Results using only CEH data for violence variables

Tables A10 and A11 replicate the main results using only CEH data to measure wartime state violence.

**Table A10:** Wartime violence (using only CEH), local road network, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	−0.029 (0.038)	0.516*** (0.066)	−0.072 (0.106)	0.548** (0.178)
State-led killings	0.050*** (0.009)	−0.028+ (0.015)	0.077*** (0.018)	−0.054+ (0.030)
% Non-paved roads	−0.001 (0.009)	0.013 (0.015)	0.024 (0.034)	0.017 (0.058)
Violence × Non-paved	−0.047*** (0.010)	0.031+ (0.017)	−0.077*** (0.020)	0.061+ (0.033)
Log. Population 1973	0.004 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.000 (0.006)	0.007 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.047*** (0.007)	−0.016 (0.012)	0.053*** (0.015)	−0.050+ (0.026)
% Literate 1973	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Elevation SD	0.014+ (0.008)	−0.021 (0.014)	0.034+ (0.018)	−0.035 (0.030)
Forest cover	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.011)	0.017 (0.018)	−0.009 (0.031)
Log. Dist to capital	0.007** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.009+ (0.005)	−0.007 (0.009)
Log. Area	0.017 (0.041)	0.014 (0.071)	−0.045 (0.154)	−0.011 (0.258)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.451	0.815	0.410	0.734
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.438	0.809	0.387	0.721

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

**Table A11:** Wartime violence (using only CEH), distance to PanAm Hwy, and voting

	URNG	FRG	URNG	FRG
			Most affected departments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.012 (0.038)	0.509*** (0.065)	0.071 (0.101)	0.458** (0.170)
State-led killings	0.031*** (0.004)	−0.000 (0.007)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.011)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	0.001 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.007)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am	−0.007*** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.007*** (0.002)	−0.001 (0.003)
Log. Population 1973	0.002 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.007 (0.006)	0.008 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.045*** (0.007)	−0.014 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.015)	−0.056* (0.026)
% Literate 1973	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Elevation SD	0.012 (0.008)	−0.024 <sup>+</sup> (0.014)	0.032 <sup>+</sup> (0.018)	−0.044 (0.031)
Forest cover	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.011)	0.004 (0.018)	0.006 (0.030)
Log. Dist to capital	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.012* (0.005)	−0.007 (0.009)
Log. Area	0.013 (0.041)	0.008 (0.071)	−0.021 (0.153)	−0.027 (0.258)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,281	491	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.454	0.814	0.413	0.731
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.442	0.809	0.389	0.718

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.

## F Results aggregating several parties

Table A12 replicates the main results but including as the dependent variable the combined share of several related right-wing parties: FRG (as in main results), *Partido Patriota* (PP), and *Frente de Convergencia Nacional* (FCN). Table A13 shows results for similar models but using a combined share of related left-wing parties: URNG (as in main results) and *Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza* (UNE).

Figure A2 and figure A3 shows the predicted share of right-wing support (FRG + PP + FCN) depending on the number of non-paved roads and the distance to the Pan-American Highway, respectively. Figure A4 and figure A5 do the same but with the predicted left-wing or revolutionary support (URNG + UNE).

Results are similar to the ones in the main text, suggesting that the effect of wartime violence on political preferences corresponds to an ideological shift and is not mainly limited to the main parties analyzed (URNG and FRG).

**Table A12:** Wartime violence, prewar mobilization, and voting for FRG, Partido Patriota, and FCN


	Most affected departments			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.573*** (0.076)	0.525*** (0.074)	0.958*** (0.196)	0.660*** (0.183)
State-led killings	-0.047** (0.014)	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.013 (0.010)
% Non-paved roads	-0.004 (0.017)		-0.132+ (0.070)	
Violence $\times$ Non-paved	0.051** (0.016)		0.121*** (0.033)	
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy		-0.006 (0.004)		0.002 (0.008)
Violence $\times$ Dist to Pan-Am		0.006** (0.002)		0.004 (0.003)
Log. Population 1973	0.000 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.038* (0.016)	-0.038* (0.016)	-0.050 (0.038)	-0.044 (0.038)
% Literate 1973	0.124*** (0.030)	0.129*** (0.030)	0.130+ (0.070)	0.151* (0.070)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.062+ (0.033)	-0.076* (0.034)
Log. Dist to capital	-0.007 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.056+ (0.034)	-0.031 (0.033)
Log. Area	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.003 (0.079)	-0.007 (0.079)	0.219 (0.278)	0.223 (0.281)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,601	491	491
R <sup>2</sup>	0.465	0.464	0.450	0.439
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.453	0.452	0.427	0.415

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.


**Table A13:** Wartime violence, prewar mobilization, and voting for URNG and UNE

	Most affected departments			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	−0.039 (0.068)	0.028 (0.066)	−0.423* (0.170)	−0.138 (0.158)
State-led killings	0.062*** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.026)	0.032*** (0.009)
% Non-paved roads	0.007 (0.016)		0.112+ (0.060)	
Violence × Non-paved	−0.062*** (0.014)		−0.118*** (0.029)	
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy		0.009** (0.003)		0.008 (0.007)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am		−0.010*** (0.002)		−0.009*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1973	0.002 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)	0.013 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)
% Indigenous 1973	0.033* (0.014)	0.033* (0.014)	0.034 (0.033)	0.019 (0.033)
% Literate 1973	−0.088** (0.027)	−0.091*** (0.027)	−0.069 (0.061)	−0.105+ (0.061)
Elevation SD	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	−0.001 (0.014)	−0.004 (0.014)	0.006 (0.028)	0.008 (0.029)
Log. Dist to capital	0.016 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)	0.061* (0.029)	0.035 (0.028)
Log. Area	0.011* (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	0.008 (0.008)	0.014 (0.009)
Rebel violence pre-78	−0.053 (0.071)	−0.038 (0.071)	−0.191 (0.241)	−0.179 (0.242)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,601	1,601	491	491
R <sup>2</sup>	0.586	0.589	0.494	0.490
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.577	0.579	0.472	0.468


*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . All models pool all observations across all elections. Election and department FEs not shown. Most affected departments include Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, and Petén.




**Figure A2:** Wartime state violence and FRG + PP + FCN share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 1 in Table [A12](#)



**Figure A3:** Wartime state violence and FRG + PP + FCN share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 2 in Table [A12](#)



**Figure A4:** Wartime state violence and URNG + UNE share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 1 in Table A13.



**Figure A5:** Wartime state violence and URNG + UNE share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway), calculated for a municipality in Quiché, in 1999 elections, keeping all other variables at their mean, using Model 2 in Table A13



## G Results of cross-sectional models by election

Table [A14](#) shows results for the base models (without interactions) on URNG vote using a cross-section of each election. Tables [A15](#) and [A16](#) include the interaction with the share of non-paved roads and distance to the Pan-American Highway, respectively. Table [A17](#) shows these same base models for the FRG vote, while tables [A18](#) and [A19](#) include the interaction with the share of non-paved roads and distance to the Highway, respectively. All these cross-sectional models include as well turnout as a control variable (except in 2007, for which no data is available).

Results can be clearly seen in the predicted shares plots. Figure [A6](#) shows the predicted share of URNG votes in each election depending on state violence and the share of non-paved roads. Figure [A7](#) uses distance to the Pan-American Highway as the interaction variable. Figure [A8](#) and figure [A9](#) repeat these same graphs, respectively, but using FRG vote share as the predicted value.

**Table A14:** Wartime violence and URNG share, by year (base models)

	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(Intercept)	−0.072 (0.136)	0.077 (0.076)	−0.085 (0.062)	−0.092 (0.090)	−0.020 (0.054)
State-led killings	0.022*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Turnout	−0.061 (0.056)	−0.057 (0.035)		−0.033 (0.052)	−0.028 (0.027)
Log. Population 1973	0.012 (0.009)	−0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	−0.000 (0.003)
% Indigenous 1973	0.084** (0.027)	0.014 (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.044** (0.015)	0.024* (0.010)
% Literate 1973	−0.045 (0.050)	−0.029 (0.029)	−0.024 (0.025)	−0.045 (0.029)	−0.010 (0.019)
Elevation SD	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	0.029 (0.026)	0.022 (0.015)	0.007 (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)	0.005 (0.010)
Log. Dist to capital	0.008 (0.019)	−0.006 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.009 (0.011)	0.001 (0.007)
Log. Area	0.008 (0.008)	0.006 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.008* (0.003)
Rebel violence pre-78	−0.008 (0.132)	0.014 (0.072)	0.018 (0.067)	0.013 (0.077)	0.015 (0.049)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	261	323	320	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.444	0.263	0.232	0.365	0.280
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.385	0.167	0.153	0.297	0.201

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election. Department FE not shown.

**Table A15:** Wartime violence and URNG share, by year (interaction, roads)

	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(Intercept)	−0.185 (0.134)	0.061 (0.078)	−0.114 <sup>+</sup> (0.062)	−0.140 (0.091)	−0.039 (0.055)
State-led killings	0.115*** (0.023)	0.007 (0.013)	0.021 <sup>+</sup> (0.012)	0.030* (0.014)	0.017 <sup>+</sup> (0.009)
% Non-paved roads	0.013 (0.028)	0.003 (0.016)	0.008 (0.015)	−0.002 (0.017)	−0.007 (0.011)
Violence × Non-paved	−0.107*** (0.026)	−0.007 (0.015)	−0.021 (0.013)	−0.032* (0.015)	−0.018 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)
Turnout	−0.039 (0.054)	−0.059 <sup>+</sup> (0.036)		−0.025 (0.052)	−0.020 (0.027)
Log. Population 1973	0.013 (0.009)	−0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.003)
% Indigenous 1973	0.096*** (0.021)	0.022 <sup>+</sup> (0.012)	0.026* (0.011)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.028*** (0.008)
% Literate 1973	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Elevation SD	0.024 (0.025)	0.023 (0.015)	0.007 (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)	0.005 (0.010)
Forest cover	0.018 (0.019)	−0.006 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)	0.004 (0.007)
Log. Dist to capital	0.010 (0.008)	0.007 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.008 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)
Log. Area	−0.020 (0.129)	0.008 (0.072)	0.014 (0.066)	0.005 (0.076)	0.011 (0.049)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	261	323	320	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.474	0.261	0.236	0.370	0.292
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.417	0.161	0.155	0.300	0.211

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election. Department FE not shown.

**Table A16:** Wartime violence and URNG share, by year (interaction, PanAm)

	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(Intercept)	−0.044 (0.131)	0.070 (0.076)	−0.089 (0.061)	−0.101 (0.089)	−0.022 (0.053)
State-led killings	0.063*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.007)	0.012* (0.006)	0.017* (0.007)	0.008+ (0.004)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	0.000 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)
Violence × Dist to Pan-Am	−0.013*** (0.003)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.005* (0.002)	−0.002+ (0.001)
Turnout	−0.069 (0.054)	−0.061+ (0.035)		−0.031 (0.053)	−0.025 (0.027)
Log. Population 1973	0.005 (0.009)	−0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.003)
% Indigenous 1973	0.098*** (0.021)	0.022+ (0.012)	0.027* (0.011)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.027*** (0.008)
% Literate 1973	−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)
Elevation SD	0.027 (0.025)	0.023 (0.015)	0.007 (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)	0.004 (0.010)
Forest cover	0.010 (0.020)	−0.007 (0.011)	0.001 (0.010)	0.009 (0.012)	−0.000 (0.008)
Log. Dist to capital	0.015+ (0.008)	0.007 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)
Log. Area	0.009 (0.129)	0.010 (0.072)	0.018 (0.066)	0.014 (0.076)	0.016 (0.049)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	261	323	320	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.476	0.260	0.237	0.374	0.287
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.419	0.160	0.155	0.304	0.206

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election. Department FE not shown.

**Table A17:** Wartime violence and FRG share, by year (base models)

	1999	2003	2007	2015
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.516** (0.176)	0.362* (0.164)	0.143 (0.102)	0.030+ (0.017)
State-led killings	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)
Turnout	-0.129+ (0.073)	0.073 (0.077)		-0.028** (0.008)
Log. Population 1973	0.005 (0.011)	-0.019+ (0.010)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.011 (0.032)	0.006 (0.022)	0.004 (0.003)
% Literate 1973	0.206** (0.065)	-0.179** (0.062)	-0.026 (0.041)	0.006 (0.006)
Elevation SD	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Forest cover	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.052 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.003)
Log. Dist to capital	0.024 (0.025)	0.008 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.002)
Log. Area	-0.005 (0.011)	0.006 (0.010)	0.009 (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)
Rebel violence pre-78	0.034 (0.172)	0.087 (0.156)	-0.031 (0.109)	-0.004 (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	261	323	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.319	0.393	0.388	0.201
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.247	0.314	0.325	0.114

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election. Department FE not shown.

**Table A18:** Wartime violence and FRG share, by year (interaction, roads)


	1999	2003	2007	2015
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.684*** (0.179)	0.263 (0.171)	0.147 (0.101)	0.037* (0.017)
State-led killings	-0.103*** (0.031)	0.015 (0.029)	-0.026 (0.019)	0.000 (0.003)
% Non-paved roads	-0.015 (0.037)	0.058 (0.036)	0.004 (0.024)	-0.006 <sup>+</sup> (0.003)
Violence $\times$ Non-paved	0.107** (0.034)	-0.016 (0.032)	0.033 (0.022)	0.000 (0.003)
Turnout	-0.124 <sup>+</sup> (0.073)	0.043 (0.078)		-0.027** (0.009)
Log. Population 1973	0.010 (0.012)	-0.020 <sup>+</sup> (0.011)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.098*** (0.028)	0.038 (0.027)	0.014 (0.018)	0.003 (0.003)
% Literate 1973	-0.000 <sup>+</sup> (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Elevation SD	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.044 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.003)
Forest cover	0.013 (0.026)	0.003 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.002)
Log. Dist to capital	-0.013 (0.011)	0.009 (0.010)	0.009 (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)
Log. Area	0.068 (0.172)	0.055 (0.157)	-0.031 (0.109)	-0.004 (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	261	323	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.319	0.378	0.393	0.208
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.245	0.294	0.328	0.118

*Note:*  $+p < 0.1$ ;  $*p < 0.05$ ;  $**p < 0.01$ ;  $***p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election. Department FE not shown.

**Table A19:** Wartime violence and FRG share, by year (interaction, PanAm)


	1999	2003	2007	2015
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.567** (0.177)	0.308 <sup>+</sup> (0.165)	0.131 (0.100)	0.034* (0.017)
State-led killings	-0.038* (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.005 (0.010)	0.003* (0.001)
Log. Dist to Pan-Am Hwy	-0.007 (0.008)	0.017* (0.008)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.001)
Violence $\times$ Dist to Pan-Am	0.009* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.000)
Turnout	-0.103 (0.073)	0.054 (0.077)		-0.027** (0.008)
Log. Population 1973	0.015 (0.012)	-0.024* (0.010)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)
% Indigenous 1973	-0.101*** (0.028)	0.040 (0.027)	0.015 (0.018)	0.002 (0.002)
% Literate 1973	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 <sup>+</sup> (0.000)
Elevation SD	-0.040 (0.034)	-0.050 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.003)
Forest cover	0.029 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.017)	0.000 (0.002)
Log. Dist to capital	-0.016 (0.011)	0.014 (0.010)	0.010 (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)
Log. Area	0.050 (0.174)	0.066 (0.157)	-0.036 (0.109)	-0.001 (0.015)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	325	261	323	315
R <sup>2</sup>	0.306	0.383	0.390	0.217
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.230	0.300	0.325	0.128

*Note:* + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Each model includes cross-sectional data on a specific election. Department FE not shown.




**Figure A6:** Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads)






**Figure A7:** Wartime state violence and URNG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway)



**Figure A8:** Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by % non-paved roads)



**Figure A9:** Wartime state violence and FRG share depending on prewar political mobilization (proxied by distance to Pan-American Highway)