

# Conflict termination and postwar politics

Francisco Villamil

War, peace, and political violence

UC3M, Fall 2022

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- How can we enforce peace?

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
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- There is another explanation to sons-of-the-soil longer duration: ethnic exclusion → group solidarity & mobilization → longer wars




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**Figure 1.** Duration of civil wars by technology of rebellion, in months (TR dataset).

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- Also impacts outcome: irregular wars are more likely to be won by governments and conventional wars by rebels

Balcells & Kalyvas (2014)

# Colombia and Farc sign historic peace deal

Marxist rebels to form political party as western-hemisphere's longest-running conflict ends



Colombia's president Juan Manuel Santos (left) and Farc commander Rodrigo Londono shake hands after signing the peace accord  
© AP

# How can wars end?


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- Ceasefires



— Ceasefire/Truce — Military victory — Negotiated settlement

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- Recent trends on this?

# External peace interventions

- International organizations play a role
- Mediation, credible commitments, enforcing or strengthening peace, etc
- Different types of interventions

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- **Peacebuilding:** create the conditions so peace is self-kept

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
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- Before 1990: few missions, focus on interstate disputes
- After 1990: no more deadlock in Security Council, focus on peace *within* states, not between

# Total size of United Nations peacekeeping forces



## Late 1990s pessimism



Dutch Blue Helmets in Bosnia

- Srebrenica Massacre (July 1995)
- >8000 Bosniaks killed by the Bosnian Serb Army in a UN-designated “safe area” protected by Dutch Blue Helmets

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

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- This pessimism was present in both theory and practice

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
# Give War a Chance

*Edward N. Luttwak*

## PREMATURE PEACEMAKING

AN UNPLEASANT truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat.

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  - We cannot look only at the outcome of conflicts with PKO (we know that the Bosnia mission failed in protecting civilians, but do we know what would have had happened without them?)

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- Main finding: PKO are **effective**
- Also in practice, strong increase in PKO missions after around 2000: Kosovo, Sierra Leone, DRC...
- Self-critical reports on Rwanda and Bosnia, Kofi Annan had been head of the Dept of PKO, new US Ambassador, 'Brahimi Report,' increased UN resources to PKO, ...

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- Many successful cases: Croatia, El Salvador, Mozambique, etc

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  5. Demand from local actors

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  3. Multidimensional peacekeeping (military & civilian)
  4. Peace enforcement



# Peacebuilding strategies

- Peacebuilding strategies (avoiding conflict *recurrence*) follow similar logics to the study of civil war onset
- 1. Greed-based: postconflict peace more stable if there is economic growth
- 2. Opportunity-based: focus on strengthening state capacity after a conflict, and commitment problems in power-sharing
- 3. Grievance-based: postconflict peace more stable if there are power-sharing agreements
- Of all of this, power-sharing and other negotiated settlements are often part of peacebuilding strategies

# The role of power-sharing

- Peace agreements can include provisions of political, territorial, military, and economic power-sharing
- Each of these dimensions is different
- Early studies found that multi-dimensional agreements are more effective in preventing conflict recurrence
- However, their effect might depend on timing and be more problematic in cases of ethnic conflict
- For example: Territorial power-sharing (autonomy) seems to prevent conflict onset but not recurrence: once conflict has taken place, the commitment problem is worse and effective agreements might need government power-sharing as well

# Khartoum clinches peace deal with most Sudan rebel groups

Accord aims to end almost two decades of fighting in Darfur and violence in South Kordofan and Blue Nile



From right, Abdalla Hamdok, Sudan's prime minister, Salva Kiir, South Sudan's president, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan with copies of the peace deal in Juba, South Sudan, on Sunday © REUTERS

2 minute read · October 21, 2022 9:25 AM GMT+2 · Last Updated a month ago

# At least 151 people killed in renewed violence in Sudan's Blue Nile state

Reuters

KHARTOUM, Oct 20 (Reuters) - At least 151 people were killed and 86 injured in fighting in Sudan's Blue Nile state over recent days, medical sources said on Thursday, the latest outbreak of violence to rock remote conflict-weary regions.

Despite a peace deal signed in 2020 with some of Sudan's rebel groups in the western Darfur region and in Blue Nile and southern Kordofan, tribal fighting has steadily increased.

Analysts blame the fighting on unresolved issues of land and citizenship as well as the militarisation of tribal groups. It threatens to further destabilise the country which has been in political and economic turmoil since the military seized power and disbanded a civilian-led government a year ago.

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  - Reality? A bit of everything

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
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  - If there has already been a war, **central power-sharing** needed



# Map of the Philippines showing the still majority Moro Muslim areas in Mindanao

This map shown the Christian and Islam areas in the Philippines



*This is based on the census and the referendum for Bangsamoro Autonomous Region*

Map: Philippine History • Map data: © OSM • Created with Datawrapper

# Moro conflict



- MNLF (1968)
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1977)





## 1996 Final Peace Agreement (MNLF)



# Moro Islamic Liberation Front



# Access to central power?



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  - Postwar elections might undermine peace if held too soon, and democratization during a war might bring about civilian victimization