The mobilizing potential of mass migration: Experimental evidence from Honduras

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Abstract

Migrating can be a deeply personal and private decision made by individuals and their families. But when mass migration occurs, it can be an indicator of collective discontent and grievances. In fragile political settings, can mass migration also foster support for other manifestations of discontent, such as anti-government demonstrations? In this paper, we focus on whether the framing of migration as a private or public act influences support for and participation in protests. Using a survey experiment conducted in Honduras, we assess how the migrant caravan, framed as a public exit in the form of a caravan, affected public opinion about protests in 2021. We find that, when framed as a private act, migration produces protest support. This result is explained by the non-disruptive character of private migration. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the circumstances under which migration serves as a safety valve to reduce dissidence, and when it has a backlash effect, fostering anti-government mobilization.

Keywords: anti-government protests, protest support, survey experiments, emigration, public opinion

Introduction

In recent years, Latin America has seen a rise in anti-government protests while also experiencing significant emigration. For example, protests broke out in Nicaragua in 2018 and were met with a brutal response from the Ortega regime (Bermúdez and Robles, 2022; Orozco, 2019). Before and since then, Nicaragua has returned to being a major migrant-sending country in Latin America. Nicaragua is not alone in experiencing protests and migration simultaneously. Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico have also experienced large emigration parallel to political protests. Despite this recurrent phenomenon, we still know relatively little about the relationship between emigration and other forms of public discontent. Most research on migration and political participation focuses on the dynamics that unfold after migration. Less attention has been paid to how the outflow of citizens concurrently affects political attitudes and social unrest in the origin country. Witnessing mass migration could increase disaffection or apathy toward the regime, leading to citizens' distrust of political institutions (Dalton, 1999). Therefore, it is relevant to better understand the effect of mass migration on the opinion of those individuals who remain in the country, as they could potentially mobilize for political change, or conversely, contribute to the consolidation of the status quo.

Does migration help or hurt anti-government protests? Since Hirschman (1970), scholars have used the concepts of exit and voice to understand the political consequences of migration and whether it fosters or hinders political change. Migration can be detrimental to protest prospects due to the loss of opposition citizens, eroding network effects, and lowering the chances of opposition success (Sellars, 2019; Pfaff and Kim, 2003). An example of this is the emigration process in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, which arguably contributed to the consolidation of Castro's regime as most detractors decided to leave the country, resulting in the attrition of opposition voices (Hoffmann, 2005). However, migration can also act as a signal of common grievances for those who remain in the origin country. For instance, after joining the European Union in 2004, Lithuania experienced an increase in emigration, well above

other neighboring countries. Woolfson (2010) points out that many of those who stayed were overwhelmed by feelings of entrapment and impoverishment. Other countries, such as Ireland, have historically responded to hardships with either revolution or migration (Power, 2018). This has led the literature to view migration as the manifestation of discontent, simultaneously producing quiet exit and mobilizing voice, both actions that can end up undermining each other.

We argue that migration can lay the foundations for future political participation, such as protests, depending on how it is framed. Previous research has drawn on the voice-exit framework elaborated by Hirschman (1993), which serves as a basis to reflect on how recent migration processes have affected political attitudes and behaviors. However, when studying the dynamics of migration and political behavior from this framework, most research overlooks the existing dichotomy between exit as a private act or as a public display of discontent. While migration is mostly a personal choice made by the individual or the household, we need to consider that there are many different types of exit, as Hirschman (1993) puts forth. Recognizing different exit and migration framings can shed light on understanding the relationship between migration and subsequent political stability or unrest. For instance, in the face of economic grievances produced by the 2008 financial crisis, Ireland reacted with an increase in emigration, but other nations, such as Greece or Spain, saw the emergence of strong social movements instead (O'Connor, 2017). Can we better understand these diverse responses based on how migration is framed and subsequently, perceived?

This paper tests the effect of different migration framings on anti-government protest support. Specifically, we explore the mobilization potential of emigration as a public display of discontent, versus a private act. We assess this relationship using the Honduras case, leveraging the country's latest emigration wave. Through a survey experiment, we randomize different ways of framing the recent Honduran migration process, providing two types of treatment. One group received information about recent Honduran migration framed as a personal decision, while the second treatment group received information about the migrant caravan. We test several mechanisms

through which public or private migration can affect anti-government protest support, namely their role in signaling collective grievances, changes in individual political efficacy, changes in the structure of political opportunities, and disruptive characteristics. We find no conclusive evidence that the caravan increased support for protests, which questions the mobilizing role of migration when it is done publicly. Conversely, we find that the private framing of migration led to an increase in protest support. We argue that this result can be explained by the non-disruptive form of voicing political discontent that private migration entails, and a rejection of forms of collective behavior that might not necessarily reflect individual interests or opinions, but instead, a hive mentality that ultimately hinders the mobilization potential of mass migration.

Our findings offer three contributions to the literature on the local effects of migration. Firstly, we study the mobilizing potential of migration as a politically motivated action that can, under certain circumstances, impact the political behavior of those who stay. This represents a novel perspective on migration effects, extending the predominant focus on the economic consequences of migration in the country of origin. Secondly, we contribute to the exit-voice framework by showing that the public display of voice through the caravan constitutes a safety valve, as conceptualized by Hirschman (1993). The caravan limits the opposition's ability to generate change, as it fails to present a threat to the government by gaining the support of the population (Biggs and Andrews, 2015). Thirdly, these results point to the importance of private actions as potential mobilizers. This represents an extension of existing literature that focuses on how migrants are more prone to voice their discontent given they are less at risk of repression (Hoffmann, 2005; Nugent and Siegel, 2022), by showing that not only transnational links could have a mobilizing potential, but also the act of exiting when it is done privately. In this sense, private migration could also threaten the government, despite being a less performative action. When individuals migrate individually, they do not rely on group strength, which appears to be a relevant factor for those who stay.

Flight or Fight: Manifestations of Discontent in Fragile Political Settings

When countries struggle with economic or political instability, citizens may respond in different ways. Growing distrust of the political class, dissatisfaction with democracy, support for populist leaders, protests against the government, and even leaving the country in search of a better life are all possible forms of response. In many cases, several responses occur at the same time. Yet, there is a lot of debate regarding how these responses to crises interact with each other, affecting and even enhancing one another. The two manifestations of discontent we are particularly interested in are migration and protest. On the one hand, we recognize the fact that citizens have overwhelmingly favored exit in the form of migration as the appropriate response when faced with deteriorating economic or political conditions (Herbst, 1990). On the other hand, protests are a powerful tool through which citizens voice their discontent. Taken together, this framework suggests that migration and protests can act as informational cues that signal an unsustainable status quo, potentially facilitating the mobilization for change (Basta, 2018).

Attitudes Toward Protests

To understand the link between migration and protests, and whether migration can affect opinion toward and the propensity to participate in protests, it is necessary to identify what are the relevant factors in assessing individuals' attitudes regarding political demonstrations. The literature that addresses protest support determinants focuses on internal and external factors. Within internal factors, we find individual determinants, whereas external factors contain contextual determinants.

Among internal factors, relative deprivation plays an important role. Gurr (1970) recognized how important deprivation and perceived injustice were to explain manifestations of discontent. Recent research has corroborated this, arguing that individuals who feel their conditions have deteriorated are more likely to take to the

streets (Grasso and Giugni, 2016). This seems to be exacerbated when the feeling of financial loss is assessed relative to others, i.e., when individuals believe their losses are greater than the losses of others (Bernburg, 2015). The opposite direction also holds true: when perceptions of justice increase, protest support decreases (Osborne et al., 2015).

Political efficacy is also relevant to explaining citizen support and participation in street mobilizations. Political efficacy can be understood as the feeling that individual actions could impact the political process (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1971). It is argued that individual efficacy can increase the prospects of achieving the public good being fought over or contested through protest activity, which is a strong motivation for participation (Opp et al., 1995). Higher levels of political efficacy can motivate individuals to participate in collective action, as they feel that their actions can contribute to achieving a desired outcome. This is particularly relevant in cases where traditional political channels, such as voting or participation in political parties, are perceived as ineffective or insufficient.

Regarding external factors, particularly contextual determinants that explain individuals' attitudes toward protests, the literature on political opportunities regards the decrease in authorities' political power as key. This may alter individuals' perceptions of their circumstances, thus providing opportunities for conducting new mobilizing frames (McVeigh, 2009). Under this perspective, the context is crucial to explain activists' capacity for advancing their claims, exerting influence, and mobilizing potential supporters (Meyer, 2004). A declining political power can also affect the cost-benefit evaluation of participating in collective action. According to the resource mobilization theory (Gamson, 1975; Tilly, 1978), cost-benefit calculations are made when individuals decide to participate in collective action, which becomes more likely if the potential benefits are greater than the potential costs. Dissidents perceive repression as costly, which decreases their protest behavior (Rasler, 1996). However, if the government cannot effectively suppress dissent, individuals' assessment of participation costs may change, potentially increasing participation.

Another external factor is the characteristics of contentious activities. Previous research focused on violent versus nonviolent tactics for mobilizing or alienating potential supporters. There are conflicting findings regarding whether disruptive tactics help or harm movement support. Authors such as Crozat (1998) found that less contentious forms of action (e.g. petitions) were more broadly accepted than more disruptive tactics, such as civil disobedience. Nonviolent tactics also increase identification with the protesting group (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg, 2018). Nonviolent civil disobedience, as a strategy that tries to appeal to and persuade members of the majority, is expected to generate, on average, greater sympathetic coverage of the group's claims, increasing public support (Branton et al., 2015; Mazumder, 2018). Through collective identity processes, movement actors develop a shared cultural repertoire of protest methods; if collective identity does not resonate with potential recruits or adherents, they will decide not to join the movement, or leave it altogether. (Robnett, 2002).

Migration and Protests: Between a Safety Valve and a Signaling Mechanism

For social movements opposing the status quo, the development of values and perceptions that encourage confrontation, reform, or challenge of the political system is crucial (Banaszak, 2001). Migration has been regarded as a private display of discontent when done individually, as well as a public display of voice when done collectively. Could these two framings have different mobilization effects?

Hirschman's (1993) framework has been used to understand how migration acts as a safety valve and when it contributes to heightened political pressure. This framework has been influential in studying the relationship between migration and political behavior. His essay on the role of emigration in the fall of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has influenced research on how emigration can suppress or complement protests (Hirschman, 1993). The central puzzle of his work revolved around why emigration acted as a safety valve in the 1950s, but not in 1989 when citizens were fleeing East Berlin

at similar levels. He argued that the mass exodus in 1989 was more public in nature than that of the 1950s, distinguishing between exit as a private act (emigration) and a public act (exodus). The mass exit of people from East Berlin was seen on television sets and signaled displeasure with the regime in ways similar to a protest. Furthermore, the public display of exit complemented, and may have encouraged, protests among those who had no intention of leaving.

The literature on emigration as a safety valve focuses on migrants' political self-selection. Several cases highlight the emigration of regime opponents as a deterrent to collective action and a way to consolidate authoritarian rulers (Hoffmann, 2005; Kelemen, 2020; Peters and Miller, 2022; Sellars, 2019; Pfaff and Kim, 2003). Citizen coordination becomes more difficult when there are exit options available since those who can migrate will be less likely to engage in collective action given the existence of their outside option. This may reduce the assessment that collective action will succeed, which diminishes the incentive to participate. Thus, regimes benefit from the emigration of potential opponents since it diminishes potential challenges to their political power. Under this perspective, exit would impede voice since it weakens civil society by "depriving it of motivated and energetic people who can articulate grievances" (Pedraza, 2007). Therefore, the relationship between migration and protest is non-linear as too much migration can hurt the network that facilitates protests (Pfaff and Kim, 2003).

But conversely, migration can also be understood as a strategy to get access to justice when it turns into an act of resistance toward the incumbent regime. It could represent a threat to the state itself because even in a context where states care very little about what people think, they can potentially be concerned if a significant number of people start to migrate due to economic threats (Herbst, 1990). Current research on migration movements and their effect on politics based on those left behind has caused a lack of research about the effect of emigration on politics, independent of diasporas and transnational linkages. The GDR case exemplifies that, in some contexts, emigration as a public act can prompt other public displays of discontent, such as protests. The

crux of Hirschman's voice-exit argument in explaining the downfall of East Germany is how concurrent emigration signaled information that facilitated protests (Hirschman, 1993). Given recent migratory waves in countries with fragile political settings, revisiting the mobilization potential of mass exodus is key to understanding its role in prompting domestic protest activities.

Migration as a Public Display of Exit and Voice

In the previous section, we summarized key aspects within the literature regarding determinants of attitudes toward protests, grouping them into internal and external factors. In this section, we construct our theoretical argument about why migration is capable of affecting these areas, and how making the distinction between public and private migration can help us understand this relationship. Mobilization involves the process of turning bystanders and opponents into adherents to the goals of a social movement and its associated organizations (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Could mass migration also produce mobilization, and subsequently, make individuals who are not participating in the migration process more supportive of collective action as a manifestation of those grievances?

On individual determinants, there is mixed evidence of migration's influence on relative deprivation. On the one hand, emigration can improve the well-being of those who decide to stay, due to remittances sent back by migrants (Clemens, 2011). According to Peters and Miller (2022), this "reduces economic deprivation, leading to fewer grievances and higher opportunity costs for joining opposition movements" (p. 2). Remittance recipients may misattribute their economic fortunes to incumbents, thus weakening any grievances against them (Tertytchnaya et al., 2018). Conversely, other studies have argued that, when a migratory process occurs, those who stay are overwhelmed by feelings of entrapment and impoverishment (Woolfson, 2010). Klandermans, Stekelenburg, and Toorn (2008) argue that economic hardships increase political mobilization, especially when individuals perceive their situation to be unjust, or when they think their situation can be changed. This is also supported by Kurer et al. (2019), who found that both economic and political grievances are relevant to explain mobilization: dissatisfaction with the political system emerges alongside worsening economic conditions.

We previously mentioned that individuals tend to have more positive views on protests when they change their perceptions of relative deprivation and grievances. In that sense, we expect that the public framing of migration affects grievance

perceptions, now regarded as a collective feeling. We expect migration to have a mobilizing effect when framed as a collective claim of discontent, given that mobilization involves showing people that the issues they face are not particular to them, but a collective problem (Meyer, 2021). As Karadja and Prawitz (2019) note, "rather than inhibiting the use of voice, higher emigration appears to have brought about more political organization and left-wing preferences among ordinary citizens" (p. 1867). Given that mobilization involves turning bystanders and opponents into adherents of a social movement's goals and its associated organizations, we focus on the structural shifts that provide the resources to collectively address longstanding grievances (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Successful mobilization gradually brings demand and supply together: if substantial proportions of the population are aggrieved, and if the movement's organization stages collective action to voice those grievances, a massive protest movement may develop (Klandermans, Stekelenburg, and Toorn, 2008, 369).

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *When framed as a public act, migration signals collective grievances, positively affecting individuals' opinions about anti-government demonstrations.*

A second element of internal determinants was individual efficacy: people are more likely to participate in protests when they feel an increased sense of political efficacy. In this accord, emigration can reduce domestic contention since it provides exit opportunities for aggrieved citizens, leaving fewer potential recruits for opposition movements (Peters and Miller, 2022). According to Sellars (2019), citizen coordination becomes more difficult when exit options are available since those who can migrate will be less likely to engage in collective action given the existence of their outside option. This option may reduce the assessment that collective action will succeed, which overall diminishes the incentive to take part in collective action. We need to consider the possibility that migration decreases political efficacy when framed as a collective experience, negatively affecting individuals' propensity to participate in

anti-government demonstrations. In this way, despite increasing support for protests, participation will shrink.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *When framed as a public act, migration diminishes individual efficacy, negatively affecting protest participation.*

Migration can also affect external determinants. For instance, in the case of Cuba, the mass emigration in the aftermath of the revolution contributed to the consolidation of Castro's regime since most detractors decided to leave the country, resulting in an erosion of opposition voices (Hoffmann, 2005). Therefore, migration can create an environment in which dissenting voices are less likely to be heard, and the regime is faced with less pressure to make concessions or reforms. This can lead to a stabilization of the political system and the preservation of the status quo. Migration may affect political opportunity structures but only when framed as a mass exodus.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *When framed as a public act, migration shows government weakness, increasing the propensity of participation.*

Finally, regarding protest strategies, migration serves as a nonviolent form of discontent. As was previously mentioned, nonviolent opposition is more likely to increase identification with the cause. But when done publicly, migration is disruptive, negatively affecting cause identification: migration can disrupt the functioning of the political system, by reducing the size of the workforce, creating social and economic imbalances, and ultimately undermining the legitimacy of the ruling elites. The act of leaving is regarded as a private solution to people's grievances, rather than a collective action aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): *When framed as a private act, migration is a non-disruptive form of voicing political discontent, positively affecting individuals' opinions on demonstrations.*

Case and Research Design

Honduras

Since 2000, Honduras has experienced political turmoil that has contributed to major migration flows to the United States. During the 20th century, Honduras was relatively stable compared to its Central American neighbors, since it did not experience a large-scale civil war like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. While mass migration from Central America began in the 1980s due to civil conflict, Honduran migration began to rise at the turn of the century due to economic stagnation, civil violence, and natural disasters (Bermeo and Leblang, 2021; Corson and Hallock, 2021). Currently, Honduras has the highest emigration rates in Latin America and is the fastest-growing Latino immigrant group in the United States (Cohn, Passel, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2017).

Honduras is our case study for testing the effects of private and public migration on protest support. The country has experienced democratic backsliding since the 2009 coup. Throughout the 20th century, two parties dominated Honduran politics: Partido Nacional and Partido Liberal (Booth, Wade, and Walker, 2019; Taylor-Robinson and Ura, 2013). However, President Manuel Zelaya of the Liberal Party shook up national politics with his perceived left turn. His call for a referendum to change the constitution led elites to believe he was planning a Bolivarian-style revolution like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Zelaya's Liberal Party was divided and the National Party strongly opposed his call for a referendum (Pérez, Booth, and Seligson, 2010; Ruhl, 2010). The military stepped in and overthrew Zelaya.

As Honduras faced political and economic turmoil following the coup, emigration rose even more. Hundreds of thousands of Hondurans fled the country and traveled north. Hondurans outpaced Salvadorans and Guatemalans as the largest group of migrants entering the United States from Central America. Natural disasters such as hurricanes and drought further contributed to the Honduran flight. Following the disputed elections of 2017, with allegations of fraud from the incumbent candidate and eventual winner Juan Orlando Hernández, migrant caravans began to congregate in San Pedro Sula, the

economic capital in the northwestern region of the country. The caravans represented both the difficulties of staying in Honduras and the dangers of migrating through Mexico since they offered a safer alternative to traveling in small groups through Mexico to reach the United States (Frank-Vitale, 2023).

The economic crisis produced by the coup led to a proliferation of gang activities, which sustained their economic enterprise through the extortion of small businesses and transportation. The full effects of the coup revealed the destruction of the rule of law (Frank and Dana, 2018). The following years were marked by growing protest movements and government repression. Protest movements emerged in the aftermath of the coup and continued through the following decade (Sosa, 2017; Sosa, Menjívar, and Almeida, 2022; Vommaro and Briceño-Cerrato, 2018; Ramirez and Trochez, 2022). Honduran protests were based on different grievances such as the privatization of education and health care, neoliberal policies such as the ZEDES program, and corruption under the Hernandez administration. Protests also grew in response to allegations of fraud in the 2017 presidential election that saw Hernandez become reelected. The wave of protests that started again in 2019 was a manifestation of discontent against inequalities, lack of job opportunities, generalized insecurity, corruption, and the overall political system installed after the 2009 coup that concentrated power in the hands of a few. In that scenario, migrant caravans emerged as a form of collective escape (Sosa and Almeida, 2019). Protest movements continued in Honduran politics leading up to the 2021 presidential elections.

Migrant caravans began to congregate and garner international attention in 2018. Although caravans are not a new phenomenon in the region, that year they originated for the first time in Honduras and gathered thousands of people from all over the country (Frank-Vitale, 2023). Aspiring migrants congregated in San Pedro Sula, the economic hub in the northwestern part of the country, to walk towards the border with Guatemala (Figure 1). As these caravans received attention from the international news media, this exodus attracted attention from the incumbent government, where officials blamed the opposition for organizing them (La Vanguardia, 2020).

Figure 1: Caravan Routes in Honduras



Note: San Pedro Sula is the capital of Cortés department, and represents one of the main transportation hubs in Honduras.

Survey Experiment

We used an original survey of Honduran citizens conducted in October and November of 2021.[1] The data collection was completed one week before the November 28 presidential elections. The survey fieldwork was done by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) based at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras. The survey was face-to-face with enumerators following COVID-19 protocols for their safety and for the safety of the respondents.[2]

The survey data included over 2000 respondents from five Honduran regions. Two of the regions include the most urban parts of the country. The capital region consists of municipalities in and around Tegucigalpa. Respondents from the north region are from the departments of Yoro and Cortés, where the latter is home to San Pedro Sula,

[1]The study was pre-registered with EGAP/OSF and the pre-analysis plan can be found here: https://osf.io/4gnb2

[2]The study was approved by the University of Denver IRB (DU 1759834-1).

which is the economic hub of the country. The central region samples are from the departments of Comayagua and La Paz. The survey includes respondents from Guatemala and Nicaragua border regions. The west region samples from departments near the Guatemalan border: Copán, Lempira, and Ocotopeque. The South region includes Choluteca and Valle, which are near the border with Nicaragua.[3] The total number of respondents in the sample is 2231 with at least 400 respondents in each region.

The first protest variable asks respondents about their approval of recent protests against President Hernández on a five-point scale from strong disagreement with protests to strong agreement. The approval variable indicates whether respondents expressed approval for recent protests. The second protest variable asks a hypothetical question about whether the respondent would participate in an upcoming protest. This variable is on a four-point scale from definite no to definite yes. This participation variable can be interpreted as a public act of voice. These two variables allow us to determine how respondents feel about protests against the Hernandez presidency. They also provide more flexibility for respondents to address recent protests by not restricting the survey to a protest participation question.

The survey included an embedded experiment where respondents were primed with different information regarding Honduran migration. Respondents were randomly assigned to either the control group or two experimental groups: (1) private migration or (2) public migration. The private migration group was told that Honduras is a major migrant-sending country in Latin America and migrants use their own resources to emigrate. Thus, the private migration treatment emphasizes migration as a private decision. The public migration treatment group was informed about caravans departing Honduras in recent years. Specifically, they were told that thousands of Hondurans congregate to form caravans to migrate by land to the United States (Table A.1). Furthermore, respondents in the public migration treatment group were shown a photo of the caravan and an image of the front page of the Spanish newspaper

[3]A map of departments in Honduras is available in Figure A.2.

El Pais that featured the caravan image (Figure A.1). These images are meant to emphasize the public and visible nature of Honduran migration.

Estimation

We use fixed-effects models to estimate treatment effects on anti-government protest support. Department-level fixed-effects account for non-observed factors. Given the proximity to presidential elections, we add a control for days until the election. In additional models, we control for socio-demographic variables to deal with minor imbalances between the treatment groups.[4]

We estimated the following models for each dependent variable:

$$protest\ approval_{i,d} = \gamma_d + \delta(Treated_i) + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_c + \beta_2 \mathbf{W}_i + \epsilon_{m,t} \tag{1}$$

where *protest approval* is a 5-level scale response to the question "To what extent do you agree or disagree that the recent anti-government protests are justified?" that ranges from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. We estimated the second model using the following equation:

$$protest\ participation_{i,d} = \gamma_d + \delta(Treated_i) + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_c + \beta_2 \mathbf{W}_i + \epsilon_{i,m} \tag{2}$$

where *protest participation* is a 4-level scale response to the question "If there were a protest next week to address the problems in the country, would you consider participating?" that ranges from *no* to *yes*. For both equations (1) and (2), γ_d represents the fixed effects by department. The vector $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ denotes country-level controls, such as the days leading up to the election. The vector $\mathbf{W}_i$ denotes individual controls, such as age, gender, income, education, and an urban binary variable, and $\epsilon_{i,m}$ is the error term, clustered at the municipal level. δ is the treatment effect that captures the effect of public or private treatment in relation to the control group.

[4]However, as seen in Table B.1, the control and treatment groups are similar in key sociodemographics.

Results

Given the hypotheses presented in the theoretical framework, we aim to assess whether different forms of framing the migration process in Honduras possess distinctive mobilization potentials. Our main result shows that when migration is framed as a private decision, it is more likely to produce protest support. Figure 2 shows that the private migration treatment increases protest approval by 0.09 percentage points (pp), compared to the control group. However, we do not see an effect of the public treatment on protest approval in any direction, by which Hypothesis 1 and 2 would not be fulfilled. Additionally, the propensity of protest participation is unaffected by both treatments, a result that stands against what we initially hypothesized in Hypothesis 3. The results of this preliminary estimation probe that, when framed as a private display of voice, migration increases approval for anti-government protests.

Figure 2: Treatment Effects on Protest Approval and Protest Participation



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table C.1 and Table C.2 of Appendix C.

The depiction of the migrant caravan size through images may correspond with earlier research that argues that the exit option undermines protest mobilization through eroding network effects or weakening prospects of its success (Sellars, 2019; Pfaff and Kim, 2003). But, in this case, how can we explain that the public framing of migration does not affect individual perceptions of protests, but when framed as a private display of voice, it does? One way to make sense of this initial result is the fact

that Honduras is one of the highest migrant-sending countries in the western hemisphere amid political turmoil. Under this context, when the treatment emphasizes the individual effort that people make in order to flee the country despite the risks, the priming effect might increase the approval of public demonstrations of discontent, such as anti-government protests, which aim to publicly demonstrate the conditions in the country that lead people to migrate in the first place.

When people know that others are emigrating in a mass caravan, it may be seen as a group decision and a response to specific circumstances – in this case, economic and social grievances produced by government mismanagement. Conversely, when they know others are emigrating privately, it may be seen as a personal decision reflecting a more general dissatisfaction with the country's situation. Additionally, people may also be more likely to pay attention to the private manner of migration as it may be perceived as a more reliable indicator of the general population's sentiment towards the country's situation, unlike mass caravans, which may be viewed as a more specific and transient response. This could ultimately produce frame alignment, which is crucial to explain protest sympathizers and potential participation, particularly the alignment of individual interests, values, and beliefs with the social movement activities, goals, and ideology (Snow et al., 1986). These results show that, when framed as a private act, migration acts as a non-disruptive form of voicing political discontent, as stated in Hypothesis 4, which positively affects individuals' opinions on anti-government demonstrations.

Additionally, as was previously mentioned, long-lasting, street-level tactics that disrupt public space tend to be viewed as more negative, and can even deteriorate democratic attitudes (Ketchley and El-Rayyes, 2021). Under this perspective, disruptive tactics carry the risk of alienating support, making it difficult for bystanders to identify with movement activists (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg, 2018), a relevant factor if we consider that support for the movement can be conditioned by the extent to which a bystander can identify with those carrying out a protest (Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019). However, the caravan does not seem to negatively affect anti-government protest support. This can be explained by the institutionalization of

the caravan as a form of exit: public migration is not seen as a violation of norms or a significant disruption but as a regular manifestation of discontent that does not involve physical confrontation or property damage.

On the other hand, the positive effect of the private treatment on increasing protest approval could be driven by other factors, such as government approval. Intuitively, it makes sense that the more an individual approves government performance, the less he or she will approve of anti-government demonstrations, which has been proven to be true in multiple contexts.[5] Therefore, we need to account for the fact that approval for anti-government protests might be largely conditioned by the respondent's approval of the incumbent government: those who have a positive opinion regarding the government might be unaffected by the treatment. Figure 3 shows the interaction effect between treatment and incumbent approval. The incumbent's approval plays a major role in influencing the relationship between migration and protest mobilization. In this model, the effect of private treatment remains statistically significant and positive on protest approval for the non-approving, but with a smaller effect than in the previous model.

Figure 3: Interaction between Incumbent Approval and Treatment Effect



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table C.1 and C.2 of Appendix C (Model 5).

It is also possible that the treatment effect is conditioned by respondents' geographical proximity to different migration routes. According to Andrews, Beyerlein, and Farnum

[5]See Cheung, Kun Ma, and Chan (2021) or Johnston, Hamann, and Field (2022) for recent studies.

(2016), proximity to protests is a key element to understanding individuals' opinions Focusing particularly on demonstrations that occurred in the context of the Civil Rights Movement, they show that exposure to specific tactics, such as sit-ins, fostered sympathy for African Americans and to activists' claims in the South among White Americans living near protest sites. Other authors have provided more nuance to this finding, arguing that proximity to small marches increases political efficacy, whereas large-scale events have the opposite effect (Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2014).

With this in mind, we explore whether an interaction between treatment and accessibility in the respondents' municipalities yields a statistically significant effect. We include two different types of access: access to a major highway, and access to a highway that leads to Guatemala.[6] We code municipalities with access to highways towards the Agua Caliente and Florido border crossings, which were often reported as the major routes for the migrant caravan to enter Guatemala (Avila, 2019). Therefore, these municipalities are more likely to be exposed to caravans. Figure 4 shows that respondents with access to a major highway have significantly higher levels of protest approval, regardless of the type of treatment. However, when examining protest participation, we see that the positive effect of access only happens for respondents primed with the public treatment. Given that political mobilization takes place when there is a demand for political protests in society, along with a supply of chances for people to participate (Klandermans, Stekelenburg, and Toorn, 2008, 361), access to highways can be regarded as a supply of opportunities for participation, having a considerable effect on protest participation when migration is framed as a public act. The framing of migration as a public display of voice reinforces the effect that living near a highway has on the population. Regardless of whether it is a major highway or a highway that leads directly to Guatemala, the public treatment has a positive and statistically significant effect.

[6]We consider highways with the prefix "CA-" as a major highway.

Figure 4: Effect of Treatment on Protest Approval and Participation by Type of Highway Access



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table C.3 of Appendix C.

Alternative Explanations

Who Migrates? The Importance of Identity

Gender, ethnicity, and class shape migration flows (Bastia, 2011). As Hear (2014) points out, "patterns and outcomes of migration are shaped by the resources migrants can mobilize, and those resources are largely determined by socioeconomic background". That not only affects how far they can get, as the author points out, but also *how* they get there. In the last decades, protests around the world have been driven by educated but unemployed people who, at the same time, are also the group that leads global migration (Hear, 2014). In this regard, we need to consider the possibility that some ways of migration, such as the caravan in Central America, just like the migrant boats in the Mediterranean, are seen as a less appropriate way of migrating. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether a class component regarding the caravan's inability to produce mobilizing effects on the population is playing a role. As (Hear, 2014) points out, "in the bigger picture of migration and class, we need to consider both those who leave and those who stay in conjunction with one another."

Figure 5 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between the respondents' income and treatment on protest approval and participation. We see that their reported household income does not moderate the relationship between treatment and protest attitudes. Therefore, we rule out the possibility that the absence of a mobilizing effect of the caravan is explained by a class component.

Figure 5: Departments in Honduras



Transnational Linkages and Remittances

As was previously mentioned, emigration could entail economic benefits for the population and governments, potentially dampening political contestation. It could be that Hondurans' response to the survey experiment depends on having transnational connections. Those Hondurans with family abroad may perceive information about recent Honduran migration in a way that reinforces their prior beliefs about the country's state. The different frames about migration will more likely update the priors of respondents with no transnational linkages. We interact the treatments with two variables that capture different types of transnational linkages: communication abroad (social remittances) and receiving financial remittances. Each of these linkages can have its own distinctive effects on protest approval through mechanisms described earlier in this paper. In our sample of Honduran citizens, 35 percent of respondents communicate at least weekly or more with family members overseas, and 20.5 percent receive financial remittances. In contrast, 58 percent of respondents have no such linkages.

Given the literature, we should expect those with frequent communications overseas to be more supportive of protests. Latin Americans with frequent communication abroad tend to be critical of their home country's democracy (Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz, 2018). Recent information about migration may resonate among those with regular contact with family members overseas. Therefore, one would expect that communication abroad would bolster support for protests as migrants abroad reinforce negative views about the home-country government. Table D.1 shows that frequent communication with family members overseas significantly increases protest approval. The private migration treatment is consistent with support for protests across each model in the table. While the interaction coefficient for communication and private migration is significantly negative, Figure D.1 suggests that the marginal effect is not statistically significant nor do the treatment groups differ in their marginal effects.

In contrast, those with less communication abroad were more likely to support

protests if they received the private migration treatment. The interaction results in negative coefficients between the public migration treatment and weekly communication (Table D.2). However, the marginal effects in Figure D.2 show that both migration treatments produce significant and positive effects on participation among those with little to no communication abroad, making the treatment effect stronger in those groups.

Regarding remittances, it is possible that receiving income from abroad can bolster or damage protest support. Remittances have been found to increase protest participation in autocracies (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer Yebra, and Wright, 2018; 2022). However, they could also weaken support for protests against incumbents as recipients tend to have favorable views of the government (Ahmed, 2017; Tertytchnaya et al., 2018). The results in Table D.3 suggest that receiving remittances increases protest support. Similar to frequent communication, the marginal effects in Figure D.3 show that receiving financial remittances does not respond to the experimental treatments. Rather, non-recipients were responsive to the treatments as both private and public frames of exit produced positive, and statistically significant, marginal effects.[7] In regards to protest participation, remittances do not have a consistent independent effect on participation (Table D.4), and the marginal effects do not yield significant results (Figure D.4).

The saturated models in Table D.3 show that remittances are associated with protest approval. Figure D.3 reveals that the marginal effects of both treatments are positive among those who do not receive remittances. However, they are only statistically significant for those receiving the private treatment. Meanwhile, while remittance recipients are more likely to support protests in general, information about migration does not yield a statistically significant effect. There could be several reasons why social remittances may not encourage protest support. Among those with transnational linkages, Hondurans' ongoing migration may not be perceived as a

[7]The marginal effect for non-recipients that received the caravan treatment is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence (Figure D.3).

reflection of a crisis. For example, those receiving remittances are likely to misattribute their economic fortunes to local political conditions (Tertytchnaya et al., 2018; Ahmed, 2017).

The interaction models with transnational linkages reveal the importance of migration on protests through information signaling. The marginal effects of the treatment were pronounced among those without transnational connections. Therefore, those with no family members overseas are more likely to have their priors updated by migration. Frequent communication and remittances have their own independent effects on protest support, which corroborates the literature's findings on their democratic effects. However, it is relevant that those with transnational linkages may already be exchanging contemporary information about Honduran migration information. Thus, grievances and signals are constantly shared between transnational households. For those with no linkages, migration strongly affects their perceptions of local politics. Given that a majority of citizens and households do not have transnational linkages, even in a high-sending country like Honduras, the political effects of migration have the potential to mobilize citizens throughout the country. What these interaction results suggest is that migration can have political effects. However, the mechanisms will vary based on whether one holds any transnational linkages.

To corroborate the interaction models, we examined the treatment effects on subsets of the data. We divided the data into a subset of Hondurans with no transnational linkages – no communication abroad and no remittances. The other subset includes respondents that either receive remittances, communicate with family abroad weekly or more, or both. Figure 6 presents the coefficients based on subset regression analysis. The regression results from the subset with no transnational linkages show that private migration treatment has positive effects on protest approval and participation. The effect of the caravan is significant at a 90 percent confidence level among those with no linkages. Meanwhile, Hondurans with transnational linkages show negative coefficients, but the results are not statistically significant.

Figure 6: Subset Analysis of the Treatment Effects: Transnational Linkages



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table D.5 and Table D.6 of Appendix D.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study examines the role of migration framing on attitudes toward mass mobilization in the context of ongoing anti-government demonstrations. We initially hypothesized that the Honduran caravan, as an example of a mass exodus, could signal a crisis to respondents, which could lead them to increase their support for anti-government demonstrations. Using a survey experiment, we find that, contrary to what we hypothesized, it is the private framing of migration that sparks support for protests, but only among respondents who do not approve of the incumbent government. However, when respondents live in localities with access to highways – which increases their proximity to points through which the caravan passes – the public treatment becomes relevant to both protest approval and protest participation. We also find that the treatments have the strongest effects on Hondurans with no transnational linkages.

Earlier research found that emigration impedes social movements by reducing the resources available, particularly manpower and leadership (Peters and Miller, 2022; Sellars, 2019; Pfaff and Kim, 2003). Since dissidents have the option to leave the country, the availability of these organizational resources and latent grievances decreases, which limits the possibility of political contestation. Our results run counter to this literature by showing that emigration can potentially foster mobilization, even when it is conducted privately. When framed as a private decision, emigration can also signal grievances that could trigger feelings of relative deprivation (Folger, 1986; Galais and Lorenzini, 2017). As recent research has found, grievances are one of the most influential factors of street protest participation, especially in anomalous periods such as the pandemic, where perceived health risks did not diminish the propensity of protest participation (Donoso et al., 2022).

Honduras provides a special case to test the effect of emigration and protests, but there are also limitations to the analysis. Since the 2009 coup, Honduras has experienced political turmoil that contributed to its high emigration rates. The political environment in Honduras caused it to rank among the Latin American countries with the highest level

of government dissatisfaction and lowest support for democracy (Pérez, Pizzolitto, and Plutowski, 2021). Hence, there is a possibility of a ceiling effect caused by baseline perceptions of the country. As was previously mentioned, the distribution of specific variables, particularly the incumbent's approval and the country's evaluation, could make it difficult to detect the mechanism through which migration prompts mobilization. It is also important to consider how easy or accessible the exit option is. When the exit option is easy, migration tends to be the strategic choice instead of voice (Herbst, 1990). The recent migration wave in Honduras is different from the wave that occurred after the 2009 coup, where the U.S. was an implicit supporter, receiving many refugees from Honduras, many of them minors.

Future research could address two potential lines of inquiry, given the results of our study. The first one is how formal political behavior, such as voting, could change when faced with migration and protest proximity. Recent studies of elections that occurred after a protest cycle have found an increase in turnout for individuals living in localities where demonstrations developed (Castro and Retamal, 2023). Given the mobilizing effect of migration, it would be worthwhile investigating if turnout or electoral preferences could be affected by this phenomenon as well. Secondly, since transnational networks are a relevant factor to explain the mobilizing effect of migration, assessing how emigrant communities perceive or are motivated by protests inside their destination countries is also a topic worth exploring. Recent social movements, such as the ongoing Iranian protests, or the 2019 *Estallido Social* that occurred in Chile, have triggered widespread demonstrations of support around the world. Examining how individuals abroad use their networks to promote mobilization and influence specific political outcomes is definitely a topic worth exploring when assessing the relationship between migration and protest mobilization.

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Online Appendix

The mobilizing potential of mass migration: Experimental evidence from Honduras

May 2023

Contents

A Survey Experiment

The survey experiment was to test different primes about migration. The first treatment describes migration as private. The second treatment, the caravan, frames migration as public and as an exodus. The treatment was in the introduction of the survey:

Table A.1: Scripts for Experimental Treatments

Type of treatment	Survey Treatment (English Translation)
Private	In recent years, tens of thousands of Hondurans have migrated to the United States, making Honduras one of the largest contributors to migration flows in Latin America. Men, women, and children use their own resources to migrate. Many choose to travel overland through Guatemala and Mexico despite the risks because they are desperate to flee the country.
Public	In recent years, tens of thousands of Hondurans from all over the country have gathered to form caravans to migrate to the United States by land. The men, women, and children who form these caravans are desperate to flee the difficult conditions facing the country. The caravans help reduce the risks of overland travel. The large size of the caravans has attracted international media attention, further highlighting the country's problems to the world to explain the current exodus. *Show the images to the interviewee.*

Figure A.1: Images used for the Public Migration (Caravan) Treatment

Figure A.2: Departments in Honduras



B Variables and Measurement

Descriptive Statistics

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics

	All Respondents		Control Group		Private Treatment		Public Treatment	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Female	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.43	0.53	0.50
Urban	0.76	0.43	0.75	0.43	0.76	0.43	0.78	0.41
Age	33	13	33	13	34	13	33	13
Ideology	5.78	2.27	5.84	2.29	5.68	2.28	5.83	2.25
Education								
No Education	0.04	0.19	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.17
Primary	0.14	0.35	0.14	0.35	0.14	0.34	0.15	0.36
Secondary	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50
University or more	0.32	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.32	0.47	0.31	0.46
Income (Lempiras)								
Up to L2450	0.27	0.44	0.29	0.45	0.26	0.44	0.27	0.44
L2451 - L5000	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.35	0.15	0.36	0.16	0.36
L5000 - L9000	0.19	0.39	0.18	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38
More than L9000	0.29	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.45	0.30	0.46

C Models

C.1 Protest Approval

Table C.1: Effect of treatment on protest approval (Full models for Figure 2 and 3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.805***				
	(0.043)				
Treatment Private	0.108*	0.100*	0.100*	0.090*	0.087
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Treatment Public	0.068	0.075	0.075	0.090	0.103
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.065)
Days to Election				0.011	0.011
				(0.020)	(0.020)
Approves Incumbent				−0.937***	−0.896***
				(0.152)	(0.122)
Urban				−0.088	−0.087
				(0.078)	(0.078)
Female				−0.008	−0.007
				(0.087)	(0.088)
Age				0.001	0.001
				(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary				0.132	0.139
				(0.234)	(0.233)
Education: Secondary				0.365	0.375
				(0.219)	(0.221)
Education: University or more				0.504*	0.514*
				(0.239)	(0.238)
Treat. Private × Approves Inc.					0.053
					(0.312)
Treat. Public × Approves Inc.					−0.149
					(0.201)
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2036	2036
R2	0.002	0.035	0.035	0.100	0.100
R2 Adj.	0.0006	0.030	0.030	0.092	0.091
R2 Within		0.001	0.001	0.069	0.070
R2 Within Adj.		0.0005	0.0005	0.065	0.064
AIC	6489.8	6433.0	6433.0	6019.4	6022.4
BIC	6512.5	6500.9	6500.9	6131.8	6146.0
Log. Lik.	−3240.912				
F	1.641				
RMSE	1.12	1.10	1.10	1.05	1.05
Std. Errors		IID	Department	Department	Department
FE Department		✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Model 1 estimated through OLS. Model 2 has fixed effects at the department level. Models 3 to 5 have fixed effects at the department level and clustered SE. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

C.2 Protest Participation

Table C.2: Effect of treatment on protest participation (Full models for Figure 2 and 3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.291***				
	(0.046)				
Treatment Private Migration	0.097	0.063	0.063	0.042	0.030
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.047)
Treatment Public Migration	0.078	0.088	0.088*	0.079	0.081*
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.041)
Days to Election				0.020	0.020
				(0.020)	(0.020)
Approves Incumbent				−0.598**	−0.634**
				(0.185)	(0.204)
Urban				0.018	0.018
				(0.084)	(0.085)
Female				−0.071	−0.070
				(0.074)	(0.075)
Age				−0.006	−0.006
				(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary				0.151*	0.159
				(0.082)	(0.088)
Education: Secondary				0.211**	0.224**
				(0.070)	(0.072)
Education: University or more				0.477***	0.488**
				(0.142)	(0.154)
Treat. Private × Approves Inc.					0.164
					(0.276)
Treat. Public × Approves Inc.					−0.026
					(0.213)
Observations	2047	2047	2047	1958	1958
R2	0.001	0.065	0.065	0.117	0.117
R2 Adj.	0.0003	0.060	0.060	0.108	0.108
R2 Within		0.001	0.001	0.049	0.050
R2 Within Adj.		0.000 06	0.000 06	0.044	0.044
AIC	6486.4	6366.3	6366.3	5996.5	5999.8
BIC	6508.9	6433.8	6433.8	6108.1	6122.5
Log. Lik.	−3239.186				
F	1.280				
RMSE	1.18	1.14	1.14	1.11	1.11
Std. Errors		IID	Department	Department	Department
FE Department		✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Model 1 estimated through OLS. Model 2 has fixed effects at the department level. Models 3 to 5 have fixed effects at the department level and clustered SE. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

C.3 Access to caravan routes

Table C.3: Effect of treatment on protest approval and participation based on caravan routes (Full models for Figure 4)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Treatment Private Migration	0.061	0.064	0.096	0.022
	(0.113)	(0.063)	(0.093)	(0.037)
Treatment Public Migration	0.059	0.101*	0.014	0.029
	(0.106)	(0.054)	(0.116)	(0.057)
Highway Access	−0.138		−0.341**	
	(0.145)		(0.129)	
Treat. Private × Highway Access	0.073		−0.075	
	(0.117)		(0.093)	
Treat. Public × Highway Access	0.041		0.089	
	(0.151)		(0.136)	
Highway to Guatemala		0.108**		−0.258*
		(0.037)		(0.121)
Treat. Private × Highway to Guatemala		0.173		0.115
		(0.135)		(0.082)
Treat. Public × Highway to Guatemala		0.027		0.270***
		(0.100)		(0.066)
Approves Incumbent		−0.947***	−0.577**	−0.591**
		(0.157)	(0.204)	(0.193)
Days to Election	0.011	0.010	0.025	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Urban	−0.068	−0.108	0.075	0.026
	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.072)
Female	−0.046	−0.005	−0.089	−0.092
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.076)	(0.072)
Age	−0.003	0.0007	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary	0.165	0.096	0.085	0.104
	(0.311)	(0.263)	(0.077)	(0.085)
Education: Secondary	0.401	0.323	0.159**	0.176**
	(0.278)	(0.247)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Education: University or more	0.538	0.458	0.449***	0.461***
	(0.313)	(0.275)	(0.131)	(0.141)
N	2028	2005	1928	1928
R2	0.055	0.104	0.132	0.121
R2 Adj.	0.045	0.094	0.122	0.111
R2 Within	0.023	0.073	0.065	0.054
R2 Within Adj.	0.017	0.067	0.058	0.047
AIC	6111.1	5916.7	5869.2	5892.1
BIC	6234.6	6045.5	5997.2	6020.1
RMSE	1.08	1.05	1.10	1.10
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table C.4: Models with additional control variables

	Model 1	Model 2
Treatment Private Migration	0.073	0.040
	(0.059)	(0.055)
Treatment Public Migration	0.028	0.054
	(0.057)	(0.058)
Days to election	0.013	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.020)
Approves Incumbent	−1.018***	−0.637***
	(0.132)	(0.174)
Urban	−0.082	−0.021
	(0.087)	(0.079)
Female	−0.021	−0.102
	(0.088)	(0.072)
Age	0.003	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary	0.187	0.090
	(0.187)	(0.088)
Education: Secondary	0.375	0.095
	(0.222)	(0.078)
Education: University or more	0.488*	0.368**
	(0.219)	(0.151)
Receives Remittances	−0.004	0.045
	(0.053)	(0.097)
Family in USA	0.193	0.077
	(0.115)	(0.087)
Intention to leave Honduras	0.121*	0.257**
	(0.063)	(0.094)
N	1782	1711
R^2	0.122	0.128
R^2 Adj.	0.111	0.116
R^2 Within	0.089	0.066
R^2 Within Adj.	0.082	0.059
AIC	5187.0	5241.1
BIC	5313.2	5366.3
RMSE	1.02	1.10
Std. Errors	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

D Interactions with Transnational Linkages

Table D.1: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Approval

	Protest Approval			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.424***	3.384***	3.187***	3.155***
	(1.006)	(1.001)	(0.746)	(0.742)
Treatment Private	0.097*	0.181**	0.085*	0.163**
	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.051)	(0.073)
Treatment Public Migration	0.052	0.048	0.060	0.045
	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.054)	(0.082)
Weekly Communication	0.276**	0.356***	0.234*	0.298**
	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.118)
Treat. Private × Weekly Comm.		−0.244*		−0.224**
		(0.135)		(0.111)
Treat. Public × Weekly Comm.		0.006		0.034
		(0.114)		(0.111)
Days to Election	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.011
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Approves Incumbent			−0.921***	−0.921***
			(0.159)	(0.160)
Urban			−0.066	−0.061
			(0.072)	(0.070)
Female			−0.036	−0.034
			(0.081)	(0.082)
Age			0.0003	0.0004
			(0.005)	(0.005)
Education: Primary			0.149	0.145
			(0.203)	(0.204)
Education: Secondary			0.357*	0.349*
			(0.204)	(0.201)
Education: University or more			0.476**	0.470**
			(0.210)	(0.209)
N	2,029	2,029	1,957	1,957
R^2	0.048	0.051	0.110	0.113
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table D.2: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Participation

	Protest Participation			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.211	1.154	1.317	1.264
	(0.886)	(0.887)	(0.829)	(0.835)
Treatment Private Migration	0.066	0.130**	0.046	0.113**
	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Treatment Public Migration	0.082	0.143**	0.079	0.146***
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.048)
Weekly Communication	0.149*	0.275***	0.125*	0.258**
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.073)	(0.102)
Private × Weekly Communication		−0.191		−0.197
		(0.150)		(0.143)
Public × Weekly Communication		−0.177**		−0.190**
		(0.087)		(0.086)
Days to Election	0.023	0.024	0.021	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Approves Incumbent			−0.583***	−0.584***
			(0.180)	(0.178)
Urban			0.036	0.036
			(0.077)	(0.077)
Female			−0.095	−0.094
			(0.078)	(0.077)
Age			−0.006*	−0.006*
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Education: Primary			0.141	0.133
			(0.089)	(0.087)
Education: Secondary			0.173**	0.164**
			(0.077)	(0.077)
Education: University or more			0.444***	0.436***
			(0.160)	(0.163)
N	1,955	1,955	1,881	1,881
R^2	0.070	0.072	0.117	0.118
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure D.1: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Support



Figure D.2: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Participation



Table D.3: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Approval

	Protest Approval			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.418***	3.392***	3.089***	3.038***
	(0.962)	(0.971)	(0.783)	(0.801)
Treatment Private Migration	0.097*	0.161*	0.082	0.161**
	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.074)
Treatment Public Migration	0.070	0.087	0.072	0.112*
	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Remittances	0.172	0.299***	0.195*	0.377***
	(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.106)
Treatment Private × Remittances		−0.327		−0.396*
		(0.211)		(0.207)
Treatment Public × Remittances		−0.075		−0.175
		(0.131)		(0.130)
Days to Election	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.013
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Approves Incumbent			−1.005***	−1.014***
			(0.140)	(0.142)
Urban			−0.083	−0.077
			(0.090)	(0.086)
Female			−0.022	−0.020
			(0.077)	(0.077)
Age			0.002	0.002
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary			0.151	0.144
			(0.199)	(0.201)
Education: Secondary			0.437**	0.435**
			(0.204)	(0.202)
Education: University or more			0.566***	0.564***
			(0.216)	(0.217)
N	1,959	1,959	1,892	1,892
R^2	0.036	0.038	0.110	0.113
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table D.4: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Participation

	Protest Participation			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.385	1.377	1.486*	1.463*
	(0.907)	(0.924)	(0.848)	(0.868)
Treatment Private Migration	0.065	0.090	0.036	0.074
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.065)
Treatment Public Migration	0.070	0.073	0.056	0.073
	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.062)
Remittances	0.062	0.107	0.092*	0.177
	(0.042)	(0.116)	(0.055)	(0.125)
Private × Remittances		−0.133		−0.195
		(0.239)		(0.221)
Public × Remittances		−0.011		−0.075
		(0.192)		(0.197)
Days to Election	0.020	0.020	0.019	0.019
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Approves Incumbent			−0.648***	−0.654***
			(0.187)	(0.183)
Urban			0.009	0.013
			(0.082)	(0.084)
Female			−0.101	−0.100
			(0.073)	(0.072)
Age			−0.006	−0.006
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary			0.112	0.111
			(0.104)	(0.101)
Education: Secondary			0.171**	0.170**
			(0.074)	(0.072)
Education: University or more			0.428***	0.427***
			(0.157)	(0.155)
N	1,885	1,885	1,815	1,815
R^2	0.066	0.066	0.117	0.117
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure D.3: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Support



Figure D.4: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Participation



Table D.5: Subset Analysis I: Protest Approval (Full models for Figure 6)

	Protest Approval			
	No Linkages		With Linkages	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.756**	2.494**	3.904***	3.316***
	(1.237)	(0.985)	(0.644)	(0.650)
Treatment Private Migration	0.218*	0.207*	−0.058	−0.098
	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.088)	(0.076)
Treatment Public Migration	0.088	0.094	0.016	0.004
	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.069)
Days to Election	0.014	0.016	0.011	0.010
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Approves Incumbent		−0.841***		−1.149***
		(0.199)		(0.177)
Urban		−0.067		−0.109
		(0.089)		(0.208)
Female		−0.145		0.148**
		(0.120)		(0.072)
Age		−0.001		0.007*
		(0.006)		(0.004)
Education: Primary		0.189		0.283
		(0.300)		(0.181)
Education: Secondary		0.421		0.537***
		(0.333)		(0.146)
Education: University or more		0.517		0.747***
		(0.326)		(0.136)
N	1,087	1,047	831	806
R^2	0.069	0.127	0.048	0.152
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table D.6: Subset Analysis I: Protest Participation (Full models for Figure 6)

	Protest Participation			
	No Linkages		With Linkages	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.349	1.620*	1.279	1.085
	(1.055)	(0.933)	(1.077)	(1.138)
Private Migration	0.178**	0.164**	−0.072	−0.129
	(0.079)	(0.068)	(0.108)	(0.100)
Public Migration	0.148*	0.143**	−0.026	−0.065
	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.090)	(0.104)
Days to Election	0.015	0.016	0.030	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Approves Incumbent		−0.652***		−0.653**
		(0.146)		(0.270)
Urban		−0.019		0.071
		(0.104)		(0.101)
Female		−0.126*		−0.106
		(0.074)		(0.093)
Age		−0.005		−0.005
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Education: Primary		−0.033		0.428***
		(0.214)		(0.113)
Education: Secondary		−0.120		0.614***
		(0.158)		(0.112)
Education: University or more		0.091		0.980***
		(0.197)		(0.158)
N	1,065	1,023	782	756
R^2	0.063	0.103	0.088	0.163
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01