The mobilizing potential of mass migration: Experimental evidence from Honduras

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Abstract

Can mass migration foster public support for anti-government demonstrations? Scholarly research has produced mixed results on the effect of emigration on political protests and mobilization. In this paper, we focus on whether the framing of migration as a private or public act influences support for and participation in protests. Using a survey experiment conducted in Honduras, we assess how the migrant caravan, framed as a public exit, affected public opinion about protests in 2021. We find that a private framing of migration is more likely to produce support for protests. The treatment effects are stronger when respondents have strong disapproval of the incumbent, live close to a highway, and lack transnational linkages. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the circumstances under which migration serves as a safety valve to reduce dissidence, and when it has a backlash effect, contributing to anti-government mobilization.

Keywords: anti-government protests, protest support, survey experiments, emigration, public opinion

Introduction

Recent events in Latin America have seen the rise of anti-government protests while also experiencing large emigration out of their respective countries. For example, protests broke out in Nicaragua in 2018 and they were met with a brutal response from the Ortega regime (Bermúdez and Robles, 2022; Orozco, 2019). Before and since then, Nicaragua has returned to being a major migrant-sending country in Latin America. Nicaragua is not alone in experiencing protests and migration simultaneously. Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico are also countries that have experienced large emigration parallel to political protests. However, we still know relatively little about the relationship between emigration and contentious activities. Most research on migration and political participation focus on factors that form after migration. Less attention has been paid to how exodus concurrently affects political attitudes and social unrest in the origin country. Witnessing mass migration could increase disaffection with the regime or feelings of apathy, which could lead to citizens' distrust of political institutions (Dalton, 1999). Therefore, it is relevant to have a better understanding of the effect of mass migration on the public opinion of those individuals who remain in the country, as they could potentially mobilize for political change, or conversely, contribute to the consolidation of the status quo.

Does migration help or hurt protests? Since Hirschman (1970), scholars have applied the concepts of exit and voice to understand the political consequences of migration and whether it fosters or hinders political change. Migration can be detrimental to the prospects of protests because of the loss of (opposition) citizens, eroding network effects, and lowering prospects for the opposition's success (Sellars, 2019; Pfaff and Kim, 2003). For instance, emigration in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution contributed to the consolidation of Castro's regime since most detractors decided to leave the country, resulting in the attrition of opposition voices (Hoffmann, 2005).

However, migration can also act as a signal of common grievances even for those who are not migrating. For instance, after Lithuania joined the European Union in 2004, the country experienced an increase in emigration, well above other neighboring countries.

Woolfson (2010) argued that many of those who stayed were overwhelmed by feelings of entrapment and increasingly impoverished. Some countries, such as Ireland, have historically responded to hardships with either revolution or migration (Power, 2018). This has led the literature to view migration as the manifestation of discontent where it can produce quiet exit and mobilize voice simultaneously but also undermine each other.

Migration can lay the foundation for future political participation such as protests when considering how exit is framed. Previous research has drawn on the voice-exit framework elaborated by Hirschman (1993), which serves as a basis to assess how recent migration processes affect political attitudes and behaviors. However, when studying the dynamics of migration and politics from this framework, most research overlooks the conceptualization of different types of exit: a private act or a public display. While migration is largely a personal choice made by the individual or household (Massey et al., 1993), we need to recognize that there are many different types of exit, as Hirschman (1993) puts forth. The framing of exit can explain the mixed results from migration and political stability. For instance, when reacting to economic grievances, some countries such as Ireland reacted to the 2008 economic crisis with an increase in emigration, but others, such as Greece or Spain, saw the emergence of strong social movements (O'Connor, 2017). Can we better understand these diverse responses based on how migration is framed in a given society?

This paper will test the effect of how the framing of migration affects support for protests. Specifically, we are interested in exploring the mobilization potential of emigration as a public display of discontent. Our study uses Honduras as a test case, leveraging the recent migrant caravans as a public display of exit. Through a survey experiment, we randomize the framing of the recent Honduran migration process, providing two types of treatment. One group received information about recent Honduran migration framed as a private decision, while the second treatment group received information about the migrant caravan. We initially hypothesized that this public display of a crisis was more likely to increase protest support. We do not find conclusive evidence that the caravan increased support for protest. However, we do

find that the private framing of migration did lead to greater support for protest. We find that the experimental treatments yield clear effects among respondents with no transnational linkages, suggesting that information about migration indeed produces greater support for protests. We also examine proximity to the caravan route as an exogenous measure of exposure to the exodus. Due to ceiling effects, we could not find evidence that the treatment effects were produced by how migration produces a nationalized signal of grievances.

The fidnings show how the framing of migration, as opposed to large numbers, raises demand for accountability. Previous research has explored the externalization of voice among recent emigrants since they might be more vocal regarding their discontent given that they have no fear of repression (Hoffmann, 2005; Nugent and Siegel, 2022). However, public displays of discontent in the form of mass emigration can also have a mobilization potential, being capable of fostering support for contentious activities targeting the government from within the migrate-sending country. Becoming part of the mobilization potential is a necessary condition for the arousal of motivation to participate (Kriesi, Saris, and Wille, 1993), which, together with overcoming the barriers, are key to participation (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). Knowing under which circumstances social movements are able to foster adherence is key to comprehending how movements survive and grow, and how they can ultimately enter the political arena and achieve goals within it (Ennis, 1987).

Emigration, Protests, and the Safety Valve Debate

The literature on social movements and public opinion has extensively explored the potential that public displays of discontent, such as street demonstrations, may have on public opinion. Lohmann (1993) seminal work on the signaling effect of protests theorized about protests as information-providing activities. Given that mass migration can also be considered as a process that reveals dissatisfaction and grievances produced by the regime, it could be possible that this public display of discontent manifested through migration processes can also possess an information potential and, related to it, a mobilization potential (Pfaff and Kim, 2003). Mobilization involves the process of turning bystanders and opponents into adherents to the goals of a social movement and its associated organizations (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Could mass migration also produce mobilization, and subsequently, make individuals that were not previously involved in the migration process itself more supportive of collective action as a manifestation of those grievances?

Hirschman's (1970) exit and voice framework has been influential in studying the relationship between migration and political behavior. His seminal essay on the role of emigration in the fall of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has influenced research on how emigration can suppress or complement protests (Hirschman, 1993). The central puzzle of his work revolved around why emigration acted as a safety valve in the 1950s, but not in 1989 when citizens were fleeing East Berlin at similar levels. He argued that the mass exodus in 1989 was public in nature than that of the 1950s, distinguishing between exit as a private act (emigration) and a public act (exodus). The mass exit of people from East Berlin was seen on television sets and signaled displeasure with the regime in similar ways to a protest. Furthermore, the public display of exit complemented and may have encouraged, protests among those who had no intentions of leaving.

Some scholars have found that mass migration can spur protests and political demands for change. For instance, after Lithuania joined the European Union in 2004, the country experienced an increase in emigration, well above other neighboring

countries. Woolfson (2010) argued that many of those who stayed were overwhelmed by feelings of entrapment and increasingly impoverished. Additionally, recent research focused on the 2008 economic crisis has found that the most affected countries responded differently in terms of migration: for instance, countries such as Greece or Spain saw the emergence of strong social movements, whereas Ireland experienced an increase in emigration, mostly from the young labor force affected by unemployment (O'Connor, 2017). In this regard, discontent about the economy and austerity measures does not necessarily correspond hand-in-hand with the size and duration of protests (Cisar and Navratil, 2015; Kriesi, 2014). Karadja and Prawitz (2019) find that mass emigration from 19th century Sweden is associated with increased labor movement membership and strikes. However, Pfaff and Kim (2003) suggest that the relationship between migration and protest is non-linear as too much migration can hurt the network effects that facilitate protest.

Scholarship has used Hirschman's (1993) framework to understand under what conditions migration acts as a safety valve and when it contributes to heightened political pressure. The literature on emigration as a safety valve focuses on political self-selection of migrants. Several cases highlight the emigration of regime opponents as a deterrent of collective action and a way to consolidate authoritarian rulers (Hoffmann, 2005; Kelemen, 2020; Peters and Miller, 2022; Sellars, 2019; Pfaff and Kim, 2003). Citizen coordination becomes more difficult when there are exit options available since those who can migrate will be less likely to engage in collective action given the existence of their outside option. This may reduce the assessment that collective action will be successful, which overall diminishes the incentive to take part in it. Thus, regimes benefit from the emigration of potential opponents and decrease potential challenges to their political power.

Emigration brings economic benefits to the population and governments, which can further decreases political contestation. One of these factors are migrant remittances, which have the potential to raise income, reduce economic risk, and improve financial conditions for recipients and the country. Scholarship has identified that remittances

tend to increase during economic downturns and shocks (Frankel, 2011; Yang and Choi, 2007). This inflow of external income could stabilize exchange rates, increase consumption, and allow access to private goods (Singer, 2010; Combes and Ebeke, 2011). The economic benefits from remittances can potentially translate to favorable political attitudes towards incumbents (Tertytchnaya et al., 2018; Germano, 2018; Ahmed, 2017). Remittances can produce a passive constituency where their economic benefits allow incumbents to divert resources to consolidate power (Abdih et al., 2012; Ahmed, 2012). Even though remittances will decrease dependence on on government provisions, they also lower the costs of political participation, which can result in greater protests in areas that receive these external financial flows (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer Yebra, and Wright, 2022; 2018; 2015).

However, migration can also produce political contestation through channels formed long after migrants left their homelands. Migrants residing in democracies can influence political attitudes through norm diffusion, which is often referred to as 'social remittances' (Levitt, 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). With migrants living in democratic countries overseas and consistently communicating with the household in the home country, citizens in the country of origin will also adopt democratic norms and behaviors (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010; Peters and Miller, 2022; Córdova and Hiskey, 2015). Members of diasporas can involve themselves as supporters of violent conflict in their home countries, without paying the consequences of living in societies marked by political violence (Adamson, 2013). Diasporas can provide financial support to rebel organizations through donations, establishing the link between a country's diaspora and the incidence of civil war in that country (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998).

The effects of social and financial remittances and political participation often focus on those individuals with transnational linkages, causing any spillover to those without linkages to be overlooked. As Pfaff and Kim (2003) points out, "exit, especially if it is a large-scale defection that becomes 'common knowledge', can signify to those left behind that the exiters, and by extension the public in general, are discontented with the system"

(p. 408). However, the limitation of the work on financial and social remittances is that collective action is based from abroad long after migration.

Migration as a public display of exit and its mobilization potential

The literature on social movements and public opinion has paid a lot of attention to the potential of protests to shape public opinion. Protests may have the capacity to advance their values among the public (Jiménez-Sánchez, Fraile, and Lobera, 2022) or to shift voters' evaluation of political candidates through the placement of issues on the political agenda (Gillion and Soule, 2018). In this regard, protests work as information-providing activities (Lohmann, 1993). But could mass migration also serve as a signaling mechanism for collective grievances, subsequently affecting public opinion? Results have been mixed. Some authors state that emigration can reduce domestic political violence since it provides exit opportunities for aggrieved citizens, leaving fewer potential recruits for opposition movements (Peters and Miller, 2022). According to Sellars (2019), citizen coordination becomes more difficult when there are exit options available since those who can migrate will be less likely to engage in collective action given the existence of their outside option. This may reduce the assessment that collective action will be successful, which overall diminishes the incentive to take part in collective action. Ultimately, this could strengthen the regime. For instance, in the case of Cuba, the mass emigration in the aftermath of the evolution contributed to the consolidation of Castro's regime since most detractors decided to leave the country, resulting in an erosion of opposition voices (Hoffmann, 2005). Emigration can also improve the well-being of those who decide to stay, due to remittances sent back by migrants (Clemens, 2011). According to Peters and Miller (2022), this "reduces economic deprivation, leading to fewer grievances and higher opportunity costs for joining opposition movements" (p. 2). Recipients may misattribute their economic fortunes to incumbents (Tertytchnaya et al., 2018).

But, conversely, given that mass migration can also be considered as a process that reveals dissatisfaction and grievances produced by the regime, it is possible that this public display of discontent (manifested through migration) possesses an information potential and, related to it, a mobilization potential. Previous research has observed

that, in other countries, mass emigration increased the local demand for political change. As Karadja and Prawitz (2019) note, "rather than inhibiting the use of voice, higher emigration appears to have brought about more political organization and left-wing preferences among ordinary citizens" (p. 1867). The mechanism is manifold. Some studies have focused on the role of having a returnee in the household. This prompts demands for political and social change, particularly if returnees come from Western European countries who have been exposed to more democratic norms in their destination country (Tuccio, Wahba, and Hamdouch, 2019). Other studies have focused on the role of remittances in undermining clientelistic relationships between the government and its constituents (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer Yebra, and Wright, 2022; Pfutze, 2012). However, there is still a lack of empirical research regarding how mass emigration mobilizes domestic dissent. Recent research has centered mostly on how emigrants to democracies have greater room to organize opposition movements abroad, an argument that is tested by Peters and Miller (2022) using the cases of Morocco and Taiwan.

Mobilization involves the process of turning bystanders and opponents into adherents to the goals of a social movement and its associated organizations (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). This perspective puts the focus on the structural shifts that provide the resources to collectively address longstanding grievances (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Successful mobilization gradually brings demand and supply together: if substantial proportions of the population are aggrieved, and if the movement's organization stages collective action to voice those grievances, a massive protest movement may develop (Klandermans, Stekelenburg, and Toorn, 2008, 369). Klandermans, Stekelenburg, and Toorn (2008) argues that economic hardships increase political mobilization, especially when individuals perceive their situation to be unjust, or when they think their situation can be changed. This is also supported by Kurer et al. (2019), who found that both economic and political grievances are relevant to explain mobilization: dissatisfaction with the political system emerges alongside worsening economic conditions, reinforcing each other.

We argue that exodus motivates the use of both private and public forms of voice. In the established literature, the effects of migration on politics are observed through those with transnational linkages, which are the consequence of earlier private migration decisions. An exodus should affect the political attitudes of citizens regardless of whether they have transnational connections or not. Given public attention to the exodus, citizens will perceive the mass exit of their fellow citizens as a signal of a deteriorating state of affairs. This should motivate citizens to voice their concerns whether through supporting or participating in protests. Mass migration could potentially act as a way to express grievances, but only if done publicly. However, when migration is framed as a private decision, then there will be no effect on protest support or participation. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Individuals' opinions about anti-government demonstrations will be influenced by how migration is framed.*

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): *When framed as a public act, migration is more likely to elicit support for protests.*

Hypothesis 1b (H1b): *When framed as a private act, migration will not have an effect on protest support.*

Migration is a private decision but an exodus is a public act. Models of migration decisions are often at the individual or household level (Massey et al., 1993). The literature often aggregates these individual decisions to explain the effects of migration on politics. An exodus can be conceptualized as the large-scale aggregation of these individual decisions. However, an exodus of such magnitude should attract the attention of those who are not migrating. What the exodus from East Germany in 1989 and the caravans from Honduras since 2018 have in common is how they made migration politically salient. Both were covered by the media and generated concern for incumbents. Subsequently, we argue that when protest actions are capable of broadcasting an attractive collective identity, showing that they possess diverse, united, numerous, and committed participants, they have the potential to trigger supportive

reactions from observers through increasing identification with protesters (Wouters, 2019). Therefore, regarding about protest participation, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *Individuals' propensity to participate in anti-government demonstrations will be influenced by how migration is framed.*

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): *When framed as a public act, migration is more likely to increase individual's participation in protests.*

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): *When framed as a private act, migration will not have an effect on protests participation.*

Case and Research Design

Honduras

Honduras is our case study for testing the effects of private and public migration on protest support. Honduran politics has experienced democratic backsliding since the 2009 coup. Throughout the 20th century, two parties dominated Honduran politics: Partido Nacional and Partido Liberal (Booth, Wade, and Walker, 2019; Taylor-Robinson and Ura, 2013). However, President Manuel Zelaya of the Liberal Party shook up national politics with his perceived left turn. His call for a referendum to change the constitution led elites to believe that he was planning a Bolivarian-style revolution like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Zelaya's Liberal party was divided and the National party had strongly opposed his call for a referendum (Pérez, Booth, and Seligson, 2010; Ruhl, 2010). The military stepped in and overthrew Zelaya.

The following years were marked by growing protest movements and government repression. Protest movements emerged in the aftermath of the coup and continued through the following decade (Sosa, 2017; Sosa, Menjívar, and Almeida, 2022; Vommaro and Briceño-Cerrato, 2018; Ramirez and Trochez, 2022). Honduran protests were based on different grievances such as the privatization of education and health care, neoliberal policies such as the ZEDES program, and corruption under the Hernandez administration. Protests also grew in response to allegations of fraud in the 2017 presidential election that saw Hernandez become reelected. Protest movements continued in Honduran politics in the lead-up to the 2021 presidential elections. Sosa, Menjívar, and Almeida (2022) argue that these protest movements benefited the growing opposition party, LIBRE, in their successful presidential bid in 2022.

While large-scale migration from Central America began in the 1980s due to civil conflict, Honduran migration began to rise at the turn of the century due to economic stagnation, civil violence, and natural disasters (Bermeo and Leblang, 2021; Corson and Hallock, 2021). Honduras has among the highest emigration rates from Latin America and is the fastest-growing Latino immigrant group in the United States (Cohn et al.,

2017). Due to increasing barriers to migration, a significant share of Hondurans arrive in the United States as unauthorized immigrants (Quijada and Sierra, 2019; Batalova, 2021).

Migrant caravans began to congregate and garner international attention in 2018. While caravans are not new to the region, that year was the first whose origin was in Honduras and gathered thousands from all over the country (Frank-Vitale, 2023). Aspiring migrants congregated in San Pedro Sula, the economic hub in the northwestern part of the country, to walk towards the border with Guatemala (Figure 1). The caravans represented both the difficulties of staying in Honduras and the dangers of migrating through Mexico (Frank-Vitale, 2023). The caravans offered a safer alternative to traveling in small groups through Mexico to reach the United States. As these caravans received attention from the international news media, this display of exodus attracted attention from the incumbent government where officials blamed the opposition for organizing them (La Vanguardia, 2020).

Figure 1: Caravan Routes in Honduras



Note: San Pedro Sula is the capital of Cortés department, and represent one of the main transportation hubs in Honduras.

Survey Experiment

We use an original survey of Honduran citizens conducted in October and November of 2021.[1] The data collection was completed one week before the presidential elections of November 28. The fieldwork for the survey was done by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) based at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras. The survey was face-to-face with enumerators following COVID-19 protocols for their safety and for the safety of the respondents[2].

The survey data included more than 2000 respondents from across five different regions of Honduras. Two of the regions include the most urban parts of the country. The capital region consists of municipalities in and around Tegucigalpa. Respondents from the north region are from the departments of Yoro and Cortés, where the latter is home to San Pedro Sula, which is the economic hub of the country. The central region samples from the departments of Comayagua and La Paz. The survey includes respondents from the border regions with Guatemala and Nicaragua. The west region samples from departments near the Guatemalan border: Copán, Lempira, and Ocotopeque. The South region includes Choluteca and Valle, which are near the border with Nicaragua.[3] The total number of respondents in the sample is 2231 with at least 400 respondents in each region.

The first protest variable asks respondents about their approval of recent protests against the incumbent on a five-point scale from strong disagreement with protests to strong agreement. This approval variable may be interpreted as whether the caravans expressed approval for recent protests. The second protest variable asks a hypothetical question as to whether the respondent would participate in an upcoming protest. This variable is on a four-point scale from definite no to definite yes. This participation variable can be interpreted as a public act of voice. These two variables allow us to sense how respondents feel about protests against the Hernandez presidency. They also

[1]The study was pre-registered with EGAP/OSF and can the pre-analysis plan can be found here: https://osf.io/4gnb2

[2]The study was approved by the University of Denver IRB (DU 1759834-1)

[3]A map of departments in Honduras is available in Figure A.2.

provide more flexibility for respondents to address recent protests by not restricting the survey to a protest participation question.

The survey included an embedded experiment where respondents were primed with different information regarding migration from Honduras. Respondents were randomly assigned to three experimental groups: (1) control, (2) private migration, and (3) public migration. The private migration group was told that Honduras is a major migrant-sending country in Latin America and migrants use their own resources to emigrate. Thus, the private migration treatment emphasized migration as a private decision. The public migration treatment group was informed about caravans departing Honduras in recent years. Specifically, they were told that thousands of Hondurans congregate to form caravans to migrate by land to the United States (Table A.1). Furthermore, respondents in the public migration treatment group were shown a photo of the caravan and an image of the front page of the Spanish newspaper *El Pais* that featured the caravan image (Figure A.1). These images are meant to emphasize how public and visible this form of Honduran migration is.

Estimation

We use fixed-effects models to estimate the treatment effects on the support of anti-government protests, fixing by the department level in order to account for non-observed factors. Given the proximity to the presidential elections, we add a control for days until the election. In additional models, we control for socio-demographic variables to account for minor imbalances between the treatment groups.[4]

We estimated the following models, for each dependent variable:

$$protest\ approval_{i,d} = \gamma_d + \delta(Treated_i) + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_c + \beta_2 \mathbf{W}_i + \epsilon_{m,t} \tag{1}$$

where *protest approval* is a 5-level scale response to the question "To what extent do you agree or disagree that the recent anti-government protests are justified?", that ranges

[4]However, as seen in Table B.1, the control and treatment groups are similar in key sociodemographics.

from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. We estimated the second model using the following equation:

$$protest\ participation_{i,d} = \gamma_d + \delta(Treated_i) + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_c + \beta_2 \mathbf{W}_i + \epsilon_{i,m} \tag{2}$$

where *protest participation* is a 4-level scale response to the question "If there were a protest next week to address the problems in the country, would you consider participating?", that ranges from *no* to *yes*. For both equations (1) and (2), γ_d represents the fixed effects by department. The vector $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ denotes country-levels controls, such as the days to the election. The vector $\mathbf{W}_i$ denotes individual controls, such as age, gender, income, education, and urban, and $\epsilon_{i,m}$ is the error term, clustered at the municipal level. δ is the treatment effect that captures the effect of public or private treatment in relation to the control group.

Results

The main results show the migration framed as a private decision is more likely to produce protest support. Figure 2 shows that the private migration treatment increases protest approval by 0.09 percentage points (pp), compared to the control group. We do not see an effect of the public treatment on protest approval, nor for both treatments on protest participation. The results of this preliminary estimation probe that, when framed as a private display of voice, migration increases approval for anti-government protests.

Figure 2: Effect of treatment on protest approval and protest participation



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table C.1 and Table C.2 of Appendix C.

How can we explain that the public framing of migration does not affect individual perceptions of protests, but when framed as a private display of voice, it does? One way to make sense of this initial result is the fact that Honduras is among the highest migrant-sending countries in the western hemisphere. The country has suffered from democratic backsliding in the last decades and experienced a military overthrow of a democratically elected president in 2009, which led to years of political turmoil. This means that Hondurans are no strangers to migration or public displays of exit such as the caravan. In this case, when the treatment emphasizes the individual effort that people make in order to flee the country despite the risks, the priming effect might increase the approval of public demonstrations of discontent, such as anti-government protests, which

aim to publicly demonstrate the conditions in the country that lead people to migrate in the first place.

When people know that others are emigrating in a mass caravan, it may be seen as a group decision and a response to specific circumstances –in this case, economic and social grievances produced by government mismanagement. Conversely, when they know that others are emigrating privately, it may be seen as a personal decision reflecting a more general dissatisfaction with the country's situation. Additionally, people may also be more likely to pay attention to the private manner of migration as it may be perceived as a more reliable indicator of the general population's sentiment towards the country's situation, as opposed to mass caravans, which may be viewed as a more specific and transient response. This could ultimately produce frame alignment, which is crucial to explain protest sympathizers and potential participation, particularly the alignment of individual interests, values, and beliefs, with the social movement activities, goals, and ideology (Snow et al., 1986). Therefore, there is not enough evidence to support Hypothesis 1a. Conversely, 1b shows the opposite effect of what was initially hypothesized.

It is possible that the positive effect of the private treatment on increasing protest approval is driven by other factors, such as government approval. Intuitively, it makes sense that the more an individual approves government performance, the less he or she will approve of anti-government demonstrations, which has been proven to be true in multiple contexts.[5] Therefore, we need to account for the fact that approval for anti-government protests might be largely conditioned by the respondent's approval of the incumbent government: those who have a positive opinion regarding the government might be unaffected by the treatment. Figure 3 shows the interaction effect between treatment and incumbent approval. The incumbent's approval plays a major role in influencing the relationship between migration and protest mobilization. In this model, the effect of private treatment remains statistically significant and positive on protest approval for the non-approving, but with a smaller effect than in the previous model.

[5]See Cheung, Kun Ma, and Chan (2021) or Johnston, Hamann, and Field (2022) for recent studies.

Figure 3: Interaction between incumbent approval and treatment effect



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table C.1 and C.2 of Appendix C (Model 5).

It is also possible that the treatment effect might be conditioned by the geographical proximity that respondents have to different routes of migration. Therefore, we explore whether there is an interaction effect between treatment and accessibility in the respondents' municipalities. We include two different types of access: access to a major highway, and access to a highway that leads to Guatemala. We code municipalities with access to highways towards the Agua Caliente and Florido border crossings. Figure 4 shows that those respondents with access to a major highway have significantly higher levels of protest approval, regardless of the type of treatment. However, when examining protest participation, we see that the positive effect of access only happens for respondents that were primed with the public treatment. Given that political mobilization takes place when there is a demand for political protests in society, along with a supply of chances for people to participate (Klandermans, Stekelenburg, and Toorn, 2008, 361), access to highways can be regarded as a supply of opportunities for participation, having a considerable effect on protest participation when migration is framed as a public act. The framing of migration as a public display of voice reinforces the effect that living near a highway has on the population. Regardless of whether it is a major highway or a highway that leads directly to Guatemala, the public treatment possesses a positive and statistically significant effect.

Figure 4: Effect of treatment on protest approval and participation by type of access



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table C.3 of Appendix C.

Transnational Linkages

It is possible that Hondurans' response to the survey experiment could be conditional on having transnational connections. Those with family abroad may perceive information about recent Honduran migration in a way that reinforces their prior beliefs about the state of the country. The different frames about migration will more likely update the priors of respondents with no transnational linkages. We interact the treatments with two variables that capture different types of transnational linkages: communication abroad (social remittances) and receiving financial remittances. Each of these linkages can have its own distinctive effects on protest approval through mechanisms described earlier in this paper. In our sample of Honduran citizens, 35% of respondents communicate at least

weekly or more with family members overseas, and 20.5% receive financial remittances. In contrast, 58% of respondents have no such linkages.

Given the literature, we should expect those with frequent communications abroad to be more supportive of protests. Latin Americans with frequent communication abroad tend to be critical of their home country's democracy (Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz, 2018). Recent information about migration may resonate among those with regular contact with family members overseas. One would expect that communication abroad would bolster support for protests as migrants abroad reinforce negative views about the home-country government. Table D.1 shows that frequent communication with family members overseas significantly increases protest approval. The private migration treatment is consistent with support for protests across each model in the table. While the interaction coefficient for communication and private migration is significantly negative, Figure D.1 suggests that the marginal effect is not statistically significant nor do the treatment groups differ in their marginal effects.

In contrast, those with less communication abroad were more likely to support protests if they received the private migration treatment. The interaction results yield negative coefficients between the public migration treatment and weekly communication (Table D.2). However, the marginal effects in Figure D.2 show that both migration treatments produce significant and positive effects for participation among those with little to communication abroad. Thus, the treatement effects should be stronger among those with little to no communication abroad.

In regards to remittances, it is possible that receiving income from abroad can bolster additional support for protests or depress support. Remittances have been found to increase protest participation in autocracies (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer Yebra, and Wright, 2018; 2022). However, remittances could weaken support for protests against incumbents as recipients tend to have favorable views of government (Ahmed, 2017; Tertytchnaya et al., 2018). The results in Table D.3 suggest that receiving remittances increases support for protests. Similar to frequent communication, the marginal effects in Figure D.3 show that receiving financial remittances does not

respond to the experimental treatments. Rather, non-recipients were responsive to the treatments as both private and public frames of exit produced positive, and statistically significant, marginal effects.[6] In regards to protest participation, remittances do not have a consistent independent effect on participation (Table D.4), and the marginal effects do not yield significant results (Figure D.4).

The interaction models with transnational linkages reveal the importance of migration on protests through information signaling. The marginal effects of the treatment were pronounced among those who had no transnational connections. Therefore, those with no family members overseas are more likely to have their priors updated by migration. Frequent communication and remittances have their own independent effects on protest support, which corroborates the literature's findings on their democratic effects. However, it is relevant that those with transnational linkages may already be exchanging contemporary information about Honduran migration information. Thus, grievances and signals are constantly shared between transnational households. For those with no linkages, migration has a strong effect on their perceptions of local politics. Given that a majority of citizens and households do not have transnational linkages, even in a high-sending country like Honduras, the political effects of migration have the potential to mobilize citizens throughout the country. What these interaction results suggest is that migration can have political effects but the mechanisms will vary based on whether one holds any transnational linkages.

To corroborate the interaction models, we examined the treatment effects on subsets of the data. We divided the data into a subset of Hondurans with no transnational linkages –no communication abroad and no remittances. The other subset includes respondents that either receive remittances, communicate with family abroad weekly or more, or both. Figure 5 presents the coefficients based on subset regression analysis.footnoteRegression results available in tables (D.5 and D.6). The regression results from the subset with no transnational linkages show that the private

[6]The marginal effect for non-recipients receiving the caravan treatment is statistically significant at 90% confidence (Figure D.3).

migration treatment has positive effects on protest approval and participation. The effect of the caravan is significant at 90% confidence level among those with no linkages. Meanwhile, Hondurans with transnational linkages show negative coefficients, but the results are not statistically significant.

Figure 5: Treatment effects based on subsets analysis: Transnational Linkages



Note: Thick bars show 90% C.I.s and thin bars show 95% C.I.s. Full models available in Table D.5 and Table D.6 of Appendix D.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study examines the role of the framing of migration on attitudes toward mass mobilization in the context of ongoing anti-government demonstrations. We initially hypothesized that the Honduran caravan, as an example of a mass exodus, could signal a crisis to respondents, which could lead them to increase their support for anti-government demonstrations. Using a survey experiment, we find that, contrary to what we hypothesized, it is the private framing of migration that sparks support for protests, but only among respondents who do not approve of the incumbent government. However, when respondents live in localities with access to highways –which increases their proximity to points through which the caravan passes– the public treatment becomes relevant to both protest approval and protest participation. We also find that the treatments have the strongest effects among Hondurans with no transnational linkages.

Peters and Miller (2022) argue that emigration impedes social movements by reducing the resources available, particularly manpower and leadership. Since dissidents have the option to leave the country, the availability of these organizational resources and latent grievances decreases, which limits the possibility of political contestation. Our results run counter to this literature by showing that emigration can potentially foster mobilization, even when it is conducted privately. When framed as a private decision, emigration can also signal grievances that could trigger feelings of relative deprivation (Folger, 1986; Galais and Lorenzini, 2017). As recent research has found, grievances are one of the most influential factors of participation in street protest, even in anomalous periods such as the pandemic, where perceived health risks did not diminish the propensity of protest participation (Donoso et al., 2022).

Honduras is in a special situation. The 2017 presidential elections were marred by fraud, which saw the reelection of Juan Orlando Hernández. After leaving office in early 2022, Hernández is currently facing extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges. Meanwhile, Honduran immigration to the United States has grown since 2000, often outpacing their Central American neighbors. In 2018, as a response to

both deteriorating conditions at home and the dangers of traveling to the United States via Mexico, thousands of Honduras formed caravans to migrate north. The political environment in Honduras caused it to rank among the Latin American countries with the highest level of government dissatisfaction and lowest support for democracy (Pérez, Pizzolitto, and Plutowski, 2021). Hence, there is a possibility of a ceiling effect caused by baseline perceptions of the country. As was previously mentioned, the distribution of specific variables, particularly about the incumbent's approval and the country's evaluation could make it difficult to detect the mechanism through which migration prompts mobilization.

Future research could address two potential lines of inquiry, given the results of our study. The first one is how formal political behavior, for instance, in electoral instances, could change when faced with migration and protest proximity. Recent studies have found an increase in turnout for individuals living in localities where demonstrations developed, in elections that occurred after a protest cycle (Castro and Retamal, 2023). Given the mobilizing effect of migration, it would be worthwhile investigating if turnout or electoral preferences could be affected by this phenomenon as well. Secondly, since transnational networks are a relevant factor to explain the mobilizing effect of migration, assessing how emigrant communities participate in protests inside their destination countries, but also mobilize for protests in their origin country, is also a topic worth exploring. Recent social movements, such as the ongoing Iranian protests, or the 2019 *Estallido Social* that occurred in Chile, have triggered widespread demonstrations of support around the world. Examining how individuals abroad use their networks to promote mobilization and influence specific political outcomes is definitely a topic worth exploring when assessing the relationship between migration and protest mobilization.

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Online Appendix

The mobilizing potential of mass migration: Experimental evidence from Honduras

February 2023

Contents

A Survey Experiment

The survey experiment was to test different primes about migration. First treatment describe migration as private. The second treatment, the caravan, frames migration as public and and exodus. The treatment was in the intro of the survey:

Table A.1: Scripts for Experimental Treatments

Type of treatment	Survey Treatment (English Translation)
Private	In recent years, tens of thousands of Hondurans have migrated to the United States, making Honduras one of the largest contributors to migration flows in Latin America. Men, women, and children use their own resources to migrate. Many choose to travel overland through Guatemala and Mexico despite the risks because they are desperate to flee the country.
Public	In recent years, tens of thousands of Hondurans from all over the country have gathered to form caravans to migrate to the United States by land. The men, women, and children who form these caravans are desperate to flee the difficult conditions facing the country. The caravans help reduce the risks of overland travel. The large size of the caravans has attracted international media attention, further highlighting the country's problems to the world to explain the current exodus. *Show the images to the interviewee.*

Figure A.1: Effect of treatment on protest participation by type of access

Note:

Figure A.2: Departments in Honduras



Note:

B Variables and Measurement

Descriptive Statistics

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics

	All Respondents		Control Group		Private Treatment		Public Treatment	
Variable	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Female	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.43	0.53	0.50
Urban	0.76	0.43	0.75	0.43	0.76	0.43	0.78	0.41
Age	33	13	33	13	34	13	33	13
Ideology	5.78	2.27	5.84	2.29	5.68	2.28	5.83	2.25
Education								
No Education	0.04	0.19	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.17
Primary	0.14	0.35	0.14	0.35	0.14	0.34	0.15	0.36
Secondary	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.50
University or more	0.32	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.32	0.47	0.31	0.46
Income (Lempiras)								
Up to L2450	0.27	0.44	0.29	0.45	0.26	0.44	0.27	0.44
L2451 - L5000	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.35	0.15	0.36	0.16	0.36
L5000 - L9000	0.19	0.39	0.18	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38
More than L9000	0.29	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.45	0.30	0.46

Note: XXX

C Models

C.1 Protest Approval

Table C.1: Effect of treatment on protest approval (Full models for Figure 2 and 3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	3.805***				
	(0.043)				
Treatment Private	0.108*	0.100*	0.100*	0.090*	0.087
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Treatment Public	0.068	0.075	0.075	0.090	0.103
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.065)
Days to Election				0.011	0.011
				(0.020)	(0.020)
Approves Incumbent				−0.937***	−0.896***
				(0.152)	(0.122)
Urban				−0.088	−0.087
				(0.078)	(0.078)
Female				−0.008	−0.007
				(0.087)	(0.088)
Age				0.001	0.001
				(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary				0.132	0.139
				(0.234)	(0.233)
Education: Secondary				0.365	0.375
				(0.219)	(0.221)
Education: University or more				0.504*	0.514*
				(0.239)	(0.238)
Treat. Private × Approves Inc.					0.053
					(0.312)
Treat. Public × Approves Inc.					−0.149
					(0.201)
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2036	2036
R2	0.002	0.035	0.035	0.100	0.100
R2 Adj.	0.0006	0.030	0.030	0.092	0.091
R2 Within		0.001	0.001	0.069	0.070
R2 Within Adj.		0.0005	0.0005	0.065	0.064
AIC	6489.8	6433.0	6433.0	6019.4	6022.4
BIC	6512.5	6500.9	6500.9	6131.8	6146.0
Log. Lik.	−3240.912				
F	1.641				
RMSE	1.12	1.10	1.10	1.05	1.05
Std. Errors		IID	Department	Department	Department
FE Department		✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Model 1 estimated through OLS. Model 2 has fixed effects at the department level. Models 3 to 5 have fixed effects at the department level and clustered SE. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

C.2 Protest Participation

Table C.2: Effect of treatment on protest participation (Full models for Figure 2 and 3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.291***				
	(0.046)				
Treatment Private Migration	0.097	0.063	0.063	0.042	0.030
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.047)
Treatment Public Migration	0.078	0.088	0.088*	0.079	0.081*
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.041)
Days to Election				0.020	0.020
				(0.020)	(0.020)
Approves Incumbent				−0.598**	−0.634**
				(0.185)	(0.204)
Urban				0.018	0.018
				(0.084)	(0.085)
Female				−0.071	−0.070
				(0.074)	(0.075)
Age				−0.006	−0.006
				(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary				0.151*	0.159
				(0.082)	(0.088)
Education: Secondary				0.211**	0.224**
				(0.070)	(0.072)
Education: University or more				0.477***	0.488**
				(0.142)	(0.154)
Treat. Private × Approves Inc.					0.164
					(0.276)
Treat. Public × Approves Inc.					−0.026
					(0.213)
Observations	2047	2047	2047	1958	1958
R2	0.001	0.065	0.065	0.117	0.117
R2 Adj.	0.0003	0.060	0.060	0.108	0.108
R2 Within		0.001	0.001	0.049	0.050
R2 Within Adj.		0.000 06	0.000 06	0.044	0.044
AIC	6486.4	6366.3	6366.3	5996.5	5999.8
BIC	6508.9	6433.8	6433.8	6108.1	6122.5
Log. Lik.	−3239.186				
F	1.280				
RMSE	1.18	1.14	1.14	1.11	1.11
Std. Errors		IID	Department	Department	Department
FE Department		✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Model 1 estimated through OLS. Model 2 has fixed effects at the department level. Models 3 to 5 have fixed effects at the department level and clustered SE. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

C.3 Access to caravan routes

Table C.3: Effect of treatment on protest approval and participation based on caravan routes (Full models for Figure 4)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Treatment Private Migration	0.061	0.064	0.096	0.022
	(0.113)	(0.063)	(0.093)	(0.037)
Treatment Public Migration	0.059	0.101*	0.014	0.029
	(0.106)	(0.054)	(0.116)	(0.057)
Highway Access	−0.138		−0.341**	
	(0.145)		(0.129)	
Treat. Private × Highway Access	0.073		−0.075	
	(0.117)		(0.093)	
Treat. Public × Highway Access	0.041		0.089	
	(0.151)		(0.136)	
Highway to Guatemala		0.108**		−0.258*
		(0.037)		(0.121)
Treat. Private × Highway to Guatemala		0.173		0.115
		(0.135)		(0.082)
Treat. Public × Highway to Guatemala		0.027		0.270***
		(0.100)		(0.066)
Approves Incumbent		−0.947***	−0.577**	−0.591**
		(0.157)	(0.204)	(0.193)
Days to Election	0.011	0.010	0.025	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Urban	−0.068	−0.108	0.075	0.026
	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.072)
Female	−0.046	−0.005	−0.089	−0.092
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.076)	(0.072)
Age	−0.003	0.0007	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary	0.165	0.096	0.085	0.104
	(0.311)	(0.263)	(0.077)	(0.085)
Education: Secondary	0.401	0.323	0.159**	0.176**
	(0.278)	(0.247)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Education: University or more	0.538	0.458	0.449***	0.461***
	(0.313)	(0.275)	(0.131)	(0.141)
N	2028	2005	1928	1928
R2	0.055	0.104	0.132	0.121
R2 Adj.	0.045	0.094	0.122	0.111
R2 Within	0.023	0.073	0.065	0.054
R2 Within Adj.	0.017	0.067	0.058	0.047
AIC	6111.1	5916.7	5869.2	5892.1
BIC	6234.6	6045.5	5997.2	6020.1
RMSE	1.08	1.05	1.10	1.10
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table C.4: Models with additional control variables

	Model 1	Model 2
Treatment Private Migration	0.073	0.040
	(0.059)	(0.055)
Treatment Public Migration	0.028	0.054
	(0.057)	(0.058)
Days to election	0.013	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.020)
Approves Incumbent	−1.018***	−0.637***
	(0.132)	(0.174)
Urban	−0.082	−0.021
	(0.087)	(0.079)
Female	−0.021	−0.102
	(0.088)	(0.072)
Age	0.003	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary	0.187	0.090
	(0.187)	(0.088)
Education: Secondary	0.375	0.095
	(0.222)	(0.078)
Education: University or more	0.488*	0.368**
	(0.219)	(0.151)
Receives Remittances	−0.004	0.045
	(0.053)	(0.097)
Family in USA	0.193	0.077
	(0.115)	(0.087)
Intention to leave Honduras	0.121*	0.257**
	(0.063)	(0.094)
N	1782	1711
R^2	0.122	0.128
R^2 Adj.	0.111	0.116
R^2 Within	0.089	0.066
R^2 Within Adj.	0.082	0.059
AIC	5187.0	5241.1
BIC	5313.2	5366.3
RMSE	1.02	1.10
Std. Errors	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

D Interactions with Transnational Linkages

Table D.1: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Approval

	Protest Approval			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.424***	3.384***	3.187***	3.155***
	(1.006)	(1.001)	(0.746)	(0.742)
Treatment Private	0.097*	0.181**	0.085*	0.163**
	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.051)	(0.073)
Treatment Public Migration	0.052	0.048	0.060	0.045
	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.054)	(0.082)
Weekly Communication	0.276**	0.356***	0.234*	0.298**
	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.118)
Treat. Private × Weekly Comm.		−0.244*		−0.224**
		(0.135)		(0.111)
Treat. Public × Weekly Comm.		0.006		0.034
		(0.114)		(0.111)
Days to Election	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.011
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Approves Incumbent			−0.921***	−0.921***
			(0.159)	(0.160)
Urban			−0.066	−0.061
			(0.072)	(0.070)
Female			−0.036	−0.034
			(0.081)	(0.082)
Age			0.0003	0.0004
			(0.005)	(0.005)
Education: Primary			0.149	0.145
			(0.203)	(0.204)
Education: Secondary			0.357*	0.349*
			(0.204)	(0.201)
Education: University or more			0.476**	0.470**
			(0.210)	(0.209)
N	2,029	2,029	1,957	1,957
R^2	0.048	0.051	0.110	0.113
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table D.2: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Participation

	Protest Participation			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.211	1.154	1.317	1.264
	(0.886)	(0.887)	(0.829)	(0.835)
Treatment Private Migration	0.066	0.130**	0.046	0.113**
	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Treatment Public Migration	0.082	0.143**	0.079	0.146***
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.048)
Weekly Communication	0.149*	0.275***	0.125*	0.258**
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.073)	(0.102)
Private × Weekly Communication		−0.191		−0.197
		(0.150)		(0.143)
Public × Weekly Communication		−0.177**		−0.190**
		(0.087)		(0.086)
Days to Election	0.023	0.024	0.021	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Approves Incumbent			−0.583***	−0.584***
			(0.180)	(0.178)
Urban			0.036	0.036
			(0.077)	(0.077)
Female			−0.095	−0.094
			(0.078)	(0.077)
Age			−0.006*	−0.006*
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Education: Primary			0.141	0.133
			(0.089)	(0.087)
Education: Secondary			0.173**	0.164**
			(0.077)	(0.077)
Education: University or more			0.444***	0.436***
			(0.160)	(0.163)
N	1,955	1,955	1,881	1,881
R^2	0.070	0.072	0.117	0.118
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure D.1: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Support



Figure D.2: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Weekly Communication Abroad, and Protest Participation



Table D.3: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Approval

	Protest Approval			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.418***	3.392***	3.089***	3.038***
	(0.962)	(0.971)	(0.783)	(0.801)
Treatment Private Migration	0.097*	0.161*	0.082	0.161**
	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.074)
Treatment Public Migration	0.070	0.087	0.072	0.112*
	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Remittances	0.172	0.299***	0.195*	0.377***
	(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.106)
Treatment Private × Remittances		−0.327		−0.396*
		(0.211)		(0.207)
Treatment Public × Remittances		−0.075		−0.175
		(0.131)		(0.130)
Days to Election	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.013
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Approves Incumbent			−1.005***	−1.014***
			(0.140)	(0.142)
Urban			−0.083	−0.077
			(0.090)	(0.086)
Female			−0.022	−0.020
			(0.077)	(0.077)
Age			0.002	0.002
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary			0.151	0.144
			(0.199)	(0.201)
Education: Secondary			0.437**	0.435**
			(0.204)	(0.202)
Education: University or more			0.566***	0.564***
			(0.216)	(0.217)
N	1,959	1,959	1,892	1,892
R^2	0.036	0.038	0.110	0.113
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table D.4: Interaction Results: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Participation

	Protest Participation			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.385	1.377	1.486*	1.463*
	(0.907)	(0.924)	(0.848)	(0.868)
Treatment Private Migration	0.065	0.090	0.036	0.074
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.065)
Treatment Public Migration	0.070	0.073	0.056	0.073
	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.062)
Remittances	0.062	0.107	0.092*	0.177
	(0.042)	(0.116)	(0.055)	(0.125)
Private × Remittances		−0.133		−0.195
		(0.239)		(0.221)
Public × Remittances		−0.011		−0.075
		(0.192)		(0.197)
Days to Election	0.020	0.020	0.019	0.019
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Approves Incumbent			−0.648***	−0.654***
			(0.187)	(0.183)
Urban			0.009	0.013
			(0.082)	(0.084)
Female			−0.101	−0.100
			(0.073)	(0.072)
Age			−0.006	−0.006
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Education: Primary			0.112	0.111
			(0.104)	(0.101)
Education: Secondary			0.171**	0.170**
			(0.074)	(0.072)
Education: University or more			0.428***	0.427***
			(0.157)	(0.155)
N	1,885	1,885	1,815	1,815
R^2	0.066	0.066	0.117	0.117
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure D.3: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Support



Figure D.4: Marginal Effects: Migration Treatment, Remittances, and Protest Participation



Table D.5: Subset Analysis I: Protest Approval (Full models for Figure 5)

	Protest Approval			
	No Linkages		With Linkages	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.756**	2.494**	3.904***	3.316***
	(1.237)	(0.985)	(0.644)	(0.650)
Treatment Private Migration	0.218*	0.207*	−0.058	−0.098
	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.088)	(0.076)
Treatment Public Migration	0.088	0.094	0.016	0.004
	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.069)
Days to Election	0.014	0.016	0.011	0.010
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Approves Incumbent		−0.841***		−1.149***
		(0.199)		(0.177)
Urban		−0.067		−0.109
		(0.089)		(0.208)
Female		−0.145		0.148**
		(0.120)		(0.072)
Age		−0.001		0.007*
		(0.006)		(0.004)
Education: Primary		0.189		0.283
		(0.300)		(0.181)
Education: Secondary		0.421		0.537***
		(0.333)		(0.146)
Education: University or more		0.517		0.747***
		(0.326)		(0.136)
N	1,087	1,047	831	806
R^2	0.069	0.127	0.048	0.152
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table D.6: Subset Analysis I: Protest Participation (Full models for Figure 5)

	Protest Participation			
	No Linkages		With Linkages	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.349	1.620*	1.279	1.085
	(1.055)	(0.933)	(1.077)	(1.138)
Private Migration	0.178**	0.164**	−0.072	−0.129
	(0.079)	(0.068)	(0.108)	(0.100)
Public Migration	0.148*	0.143**	−0.026	−0.065
	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.090)	(0.104)
Days to Election	0.015	0.016	0.030	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Approves Incumbent		−0.652***		−0.653**
		(0.146)		(0.270)
Urban		−0.019		0.071
		(0.104)		(0.101)
Female		−0.126*		−0.106
		(0.074)		(0.093)
Age		−0.005		−0.005
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Education: Primary		−0.033		0.428***
		(0.214)		(0.113)
Education: Secondary		−0.120		0.614***
		(0.158)		(0.112)
Education: University or more		0.091		0.980***
		(0.197)		(0.158)
N	1,065	1,023	782	756
R^2	0.063	0.103	0.088	0.163
Std. Errors	Department	Department	Department	Department
FE Department	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01