

10. Automata-based Model Checking



Computer-Aided Verification

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
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Model checking $\exists\Box$

- Procedure to compute $\text{Sat}(\exists\Box\phi)$
 - given $\text{Sat}(\phi)$
- It again helps to consider expansion laws:
 - $\exists(\phi_1 \cup \phi_2) \equiv \phi_2 \vee (\phi_1 \wedge \exists\bigcirc \exists(\phi_1 \cup \phi_2))$
 - $\exists\Box\phi \equiv \phi \wedge \exists\bigcirc \exists\Box\phi$
- Basic idea: again, backwards search of the LTS
 - $T_0 := \text{Sat}(\phi)$
 - $T_i := T_{i-1} \cap \{ s \in \text{Sat}(\phi) \mid \text{Post}(s) \cap T_{i-1} \neq \emptyset \}$
 - until $T_i = T_{i-1}$
 - $\text{Sat}(\exists\Box\phi) = T_i$
- (i.e. keep removing states that are not predecessors of T_{i-1})

Example – $\exists\Box$

- Model the check CTL formula: $\phi = \forall\Diamond c$
 - convert to ENF: $\forall\Diamond c \equiv \neg\exists\Box\neg c$
 - $\text{Sat}(\neg c) = S \setminus \{s_0, s_3\} = \{s_1, s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7\}$
- Backwards search
 - $T_0 := \text{Sat}(\neg c) = \{s_1, s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7\}$
 - $T_1 := T_0 \cap \{s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6\} = \{s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6\}$
 - $T_2 := T_1 \cap \{s_2, s_4, s_6\} = \{s_2, s_4, s_6\}$
 - $T_3 := T_2 \cap \{s_2, s_4, s_6\} = \{s_2, s_4, s_6\}$
 - $T_3 = T_2$
 - $\text{Sat}(\exists\Box\neg c) = \{s_2, s_4, s_6\}$
 - $\text{Sat}(\phi) = S \setminus \{s_2, s_4, s_6\} = \{s_0, s_1, s_3, s_5, s_7\}$



- So: $M \models \phi$

Model checking $\exists\Box$

- More detailed algorithm:

CheckExistsAlways(Sat(ϕ)):

$E := S \setminus \text{Sat}(\phi)$

$T := \text{Sat}(\phi)$

for all $s \in \text{Sat}(\phi)$ **do** $\text{count}[s] := |\text{Post}(s)|$ **od**

while ($E \neq \emptyset$) **do**

let $s' \in E$

$E := E \setminus \{s'\}$

for all $s \in \text{Pre}(s')$ **do**

if $s \in T$ **then**

$\text{count}[s] := \text{count}[s] - 1$

if ($\text{count}[s] = 0$) **then** $T := T \setminus \{s\}$; $E := E \cup \{s\}$ **fi**

fi

od

od


return T

Alternative algorithm for $\exists\Box$

- An alternative algorithm to model check $\exists\Box\phi$ on LTS M
 - based on **strongly connected components**
- Strongly connected components (SCCs)
 - **SCC** = maximal, connected sub-graph
 - **non-trivial SCC** = SCC with at least one transition
- Model checking $\exists\Box$
 1. construct a modified LTS M' by
 - removing all states not satisfying ϕ , i.e. those in $S \setminus \text{Sat}(\phi)$
 - and removing all transitions to/from those states
 2. find the non-trivial strongly connected components (SCCs) in M'
 3. $\text{Sat}(\phi)$ is the set of states that can reach an SCC in M'

Example revisited – $\exists\Box$

- Model the check CTL formula: $\phi' = \exists\Box\neg c$
 - convert M to produce M'
 - identify non-trivial SCCs in M': $\{s_2, s_6\}$
 - identify states that can reach the SCCs: $\text{Sat}(\phi') = \{s_2, s_4, s_6\}$



Complexity

- The time complexity of CTL model checking
 - for LTS M and CTL formula ϕ
- is: $O(|M| \cdot |\phi|)$
 - i.e. linear in both model and formula size
 - where $|M|$ = number of states + number of transitions in M
 - and $|\phi|$ = number of operators in ϕ
- Worst-case execution:
 - all operators are temporal operators
 - each one performs single traversal of whole model

CTL model checking: Wrapping up

- CTL model checking
 - global model checking algorithm
 - recursive computation of $\text{Sat}(\phi)$
 - based on parse tree of ϕ
- Conversion to existential normal form (ENF)
 - $\exists\bigcirc$, $\exists U$, $\exists\Box$ only
 - i.e. reduces to looking for existence of paths
- Graph-based algorithms on LTS
 - backwards graph traversal or SCCs

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Branching-time vs. linear-time

- So far:
 - model checking for branching-time properties (CTL)
 - e.g. $\phi = (\forall \Box \exists \Diamond a) \wedge (\exists \Box b)$
- Now: linear-time properties, e.g. as specified in LTL
 - e.g. $\Diamond \Box c \wedge \Box (d \rightarrow \bigcirc \neg c)$
- Next lectures: automata-based properties
 - connections between automata and logic
 - first: finite automata and safety properties

Overview


- Recap
 - linear-time properties
 - safety properties
- Nondeterministic finite automata (NFAs)
 - regular languages
 - regular expressions
- Regular safety properties
 - LTS-NFA products
 - model checking
- See [BK08] Sections 4–4.2

Reminder: Notation

- A (finite or infinite) **word** over a finite alphabet Σ is
 - a finite sequence $w = A_0A_1\dots A_n$ where $A_i \in \Sigma$ for all $0 \leq i < n$
 - an infinite sequence $\sigma = A_0A_1\dots$ where $A_i \in \Sigma$ for all $i \geq 0$
- A **prefix** w of word $\sigma = A_0A_1\dots$ is
 - a **finite** word $B_0B_1\dots B_n$ with $B_i = A_i$ for all $0 \leq i \leq n$
- A **suffix** σ' of word $\sigma = A_0A_1\dots$ is
 - an **infinite** word $B_0B_1\dots$ with $B_i = A_{i+j}$ for some $j \geq 0$ and all $0 \leq i \leq n$
- Σ^* denotes the set of finite words over Σ
- Σ^ω denotes the set of infinite words over Σ

Recap – Linear-time properties

- Paths: sequences of connected states
 - e.g. $\pi = s_0 s_2 s_2 s_1 s_1 s_1 \dots$
- Traces: infinite words over 2^{AP}
 - $\text{trace}(\pi) = \{a\} \{b\} \{b\} \{a,b\} \{a,b\} \{a,b\} \dots$
 - $\text{Traces}(M) = \text{traces of all paths}$
- Linear-time properties
 - set of allowable traces $P \subseteq (2^{AP})^\omega$
 - e.g. $\Box(a \rightarrow \Diamond b)$ – "a is always eventually followed by b"
 - $M \models P \Leftrightarrow \text{Traces}(M) \subseteq P \Leftrightarrow \text{trace}(\pi) \in P \text{ for all paths } \pi \text{ of } M$
- Classes of (linear-time) property:
 - invariant, safety property, liveness property...
 - independent of any particular model...



Recap – Safety properties

- Informally:
 - "nothing bad happens", e.g. "a failure does not occur"
 - defined in terms of the “bad” events, which happen in finite time
- More precisely
 - P_{safe} is a **safety property** if any (infinite) word where P_{safe} does not hold has a bad prefix
 - a **bad prefix** is a finite prefix σ' containing the bad event, such that no infinite path beginning with σ' satisfies P_{safe}
 - the bad prefixes define the safety property
- Formally:
 - $P_{\text{safe}} = (2^{AP})^\omega \setminus \{ w.\sigma' \in (2^{AP})^* \mid \text{for some bad prefix } w, \text{ suffix } \sigma' \}$

Example safety properties

- Example safety properties:
 - over $AP = \{\text{red}_1, \text{green}_1, \text{red}_2, \text{green}_2\}$
- "the traffic lights never both show green simultaneously":
 - what are the bad prefixes?
 - any finite word ending in $\{\text{green}_1, \text{green}_2\}$
- " green_1 is always preceded (immediately) by red_1 ":
 - what are the bad prefixes?
 - any finite word where green_1 appears and red_1 did not appear immediately before it

Nondeterministic finite automata

- A **nondeterministic finite automaton** (NFA) is:

- a tuple $\mathcal{A} = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, Q_0, F)$

- where:


- Q is a finite set of states

- Σ is an alphabet

- $\delta : Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow 2^Q$ is a transition function

- $Q_0 \subseteq Q$ is a set of initial states

- $F \subseteq Q$ is a set of “accept” states



- **Example**

- $Q = \{q_0, q_1, q_2\}$, $Q_0 = \{q_0\}$, $F = \{q_2\}$


- $\Sigma = \{A, B\}$, $\delta(q_0, A) = \{q_0\}$, $\delta(q_0, B) = \{q_0, q_1\}$, ...

Runs of an NFA

- For an NFA $\mathcal{A} = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, Q_0, F)$...
- There is an **A transition** from q to q' (written $q \xrightarrow{A} q'$)
 - if $q' \in \delta(q, A)$
- A **run** of \mathcal{A} on a finite word $w = A_0A_1 \dots A_{n-1}$ is:
 - a sequence of automata states $q_0q_1 \dots q_n$ such that:
 - $q_0 \in Q_0$ and $q_i \xrightarrow{A_i} q_{i+1}$ for all $0 \leq i < n$


- **Example**

- a word: **BBA**
- a run: **$q_0q_0q_1q_2$**



Language of an NFA

- An **accepting run** is a run ending in an accept state
 - i.e. a run $q_0q_1\dots q_n$ with $q_n \in F$
- Word **w** is **accepted** by \mathcal{A} iff:
 - there exists an accepting run of \mathcal{A} on w
- **Example**
 - **BBA** (accepted)
 - **BAA** (not accepted)
- The **language** of \mathcal{A} , denoted $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$ is:
 - the set of all words accepted by \mathcal{A}
- Automata \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{A}' are **equivalent** if $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}')$




language:
“penultimate
symbol is B”

Regular expressions

- Regular expressions E over a finite alphabet Σ
 - are given by the following grammar:
 - $E ::= \emptyset \mid \varepsilon \mid A \mid E + E \mid E.E \mid E^*$
 - where $A \in \Sigma$
- Language $\mathcal{L}(E) \subseteq \Sigma^*$ of a regular expression:
 - $\mathcal{L}(\emptyset) = \emptyset$ (empty language)
 - $\mathcal{L}(\varepsilon) = \{ \varepsilon \}$ (empty word)
 - $\mathcal{L}(A) = \{ A \}$ (symbol)
 - $\mathcal{L}(E_1 + E_2) = \mathcal{L}(E_1) \cup \mathcal{L}(E_2)$ (union)
 - $\mathcal{L}(E_1.E_2) = \{ w_1.w_2 \mid w_1 \in \mathcal{L}(E_1) \text{ and } w_2 \in \mathcal{L}(E_2) \}$ (concatenation)
 - $\mathcal{L}(E^*) = \{ w^i \mid w \in \mathcal{L}(E) \text{ and } i \in \mathbb{N} \}$ (finite repetition)

Regular languages

- A set of finite words $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \Sigma^*$ is a **regular language**...
 - iff $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{E})$ for some regular expression \mathbf{E}
 - iff $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$ for some finite automaton \mathcal{A}



$(A+B)^*B(A+B)$

(i.e. penultimate symbol is B)

Operations on NFAs

- Intersection of two NFAs
 - build (synchronised) product automaton
 - cross product of $\mathcal{A}_1 \otimes \mathcal{A}_2$ accepts $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_1) \cap \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_2)$
- Language emptiness of an NFA
 - reduces to reachability
 - $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}) \neq \emptyset$ iff can reach a state in F from an initial state in Q_0
- Other important operations
 - construction of an NFA from a regular expression, inductively
 - determinisation (convert to deterministic finite automaton (DFA))
 - complementation of an NFA (via conversion to a DFA)