


User Authentication

Based on slides by Ninghui Li (Purdue U)

Readings for This Lecture

- Wikipedia
 - Password
 - Password strength
 - Salt_(cryptography)
 - Password cracking
 - Trusted path
 - One time password



Three A's of Information Security

- Security is about differentiating among authorized accesses and unauthorized accesses
 - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability all require this
- Authentication
 - Figures out who is accessing
- Access control
 - Ensure only authorized access are allowed
- Auditing
 - Record what is happening, to identify attacks later and recover

Authentication & Access Control according to Wikipedia

- **Authentication** is the act of establishing or confirming something (or someone) as *authentic*, that is, that **claims made by or about the subject are true**. This might involve **confirming the identity of a person**, tracing the origins of an artifact, ensuring that a product is what its packaging and labeling claims to be, or **assuring that a computer program is a trusted one**.
- **Access control** is a system which enables an authority to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility or computer-based information system.

User Authentication


- Using a method to validate users who attempt to access a computer system or resources, to ensure they are authorized
- Types of user authentication
 - Something you know
 - E.g., user account names and passwords
 - Something you have
 - Smart cards or other security tokens
 - Something you are
 - Biometrics

Variants of Passwords

- Password
- Passphrase
 - a sequence of words or other text used for similar purpose as password
- Passcode
- Personal identification number (PIN)

Scenarios Requiring User Authentication

- Scenarios
 - Logging into a local computer
 - Logging into a computer remotely
 - Logging into a network
 - Access web sites
- Vulnerabilities can exist at client side, server side, or communications channel.



Threats to Passwords

- Eavesdropping (insecure channel between client and server)
- Login spoofing (human errors), shoulder surfing, keyloggers
- Offline dictionary attacks
- Social engineering (human errors)
 - e.g., pretexting: creating and using an invented scenario (the pretext) to persuade a target to release information or perform an action and is usually done over the telephone
- Online guessing (weak passwords)

Guessing Attacks: Two Factors for Password Strength

- The average number of guesses the attacker must make to find the correct password
 - determined by how unpredictable the password is, including how long the password is, what set of symbols it is drawn from, and how it is created.
- The ease with which an attacker can check the validity of a guessed password
 - determined by how the password is stored, how the checking is done, and any limitation on trying passwords

Password Entropy

- The entropy bits of a password, i.e., the information entropy of a password, measured in bits, is
 - The base-2 logarithm of the number of guesses needed to find the password with certainty
 - A password with, say, 42 bits of strength calculated in this way would be as strong as a string of 42 bits chosen randomly.
 - Adding one bit of entropy to a password doubles the number of guesses required.
 - On average, an attacker will have to try half the possible passwords before finding the correct one
- Aka. Guess entropy

Estimating Password Entropy

- People are notoriously remiss at achieving sufficient entropy to produce satisfactory passwords.
- NIST **suggests** the following scheme to **estimate** the entropy of human-generated passwords:
 - the entropy of the first character is four bits;
 - the entropy of the next seven characters are two bits per character;
 - the ninth through the twentieth character has 1.5 bits of entropy per character;
 - characters 21 and above have one bit of entropy per character.
- This would imply that an eight-character human-selected password has about 18 bits of entropy.

Towards Better Measurement of Password Entropy

- NIST suggestion fails to consider usage of different category of characters:
 - Lower-case letters, digits, upper-case letters, special symbols
- Orders also matter:
 - “Password123!” should have different entropy from “ao3swPd!2s1r”

Example of Weak Passwords (from Wikipedia)

- Default passwords (as supplied by the system vendor and meant to be changed at installation time): *password*, *default*, *admin*, *guest*, etc.
- Dictionary words: *chameleon*, *RedSox*, *sandbags*, *bunnyhop!*, *IntenseCrabtree*, etc.
- Words with numbers appended: *password1*, *deer2000*, *john1234*, etc.,
- Words with simple obfuscation: *p@ssw0rd*, *l33th4x0r*, *g0ldf1sh*, etc.
- Doubled words: *crabcrab*, *stopstop*, *treetree*, *passpass*, etc., can be easily tested automatically.

Example of Weak Passwords (from Wikipedia)

- Common sequences from a keyboard row: *qwerty*, *12345*, *asdfgh*, *fred*, etc.
- Numeric sequences based on well known numbers such as 911, 314159, or 27182, etc.,
- Identifiers: *jsmith123*, *1/1/1970*, *555–1234*, "your username", etc.,
- Anything personally related to an individual: license plate number, Social Security number, current or past telephone number, student ID, address, birthday, sports team, relative's or pet's names/nicknames/birthdays, etc.,
 - can easily be tested automatically after a simple investigation of person's details.

Mechanisms to Avoid Weak Passwords

- Allow long passphrases
- Randomly generate passwords where appropriate
 - Though probably inappropriate for most scenarios
- Check the quality of user-selected passwords
 - use a number of rules of thumb
 - run dictionary attack tools
- Give user suggestions/guidelines in choosing passwords
 - e.g., think of a sentence and select letters from it, “It’s 12 noon and I am hungry” => “I’S12&IAH”
 - Using both letter, numbers, and special characters

Balancing Password Entropy & Usability Concerns

- Forcing randomly generated passwords is often bad.
 - A user needs to remember passwords for tens, if not hundreds of accounts
 - High entropy passwords are difficult to remember
- Often times, guessing passwords is not the weakest link
 - One can use various ways to reduce adversary's abilities to test password guesses
 - When a user cannot remember the password for an account, there must be a way to allow a user to retrieve it.
 - The recovering method either has low security, or costs lots of money
 - It creates a weaker link.
- Usability matters

Storing Passwords (UNIX Case Study)

- Old UNIX
 - The file `/etc/passwd` stores $H(\text{password})$ together with each user's login name, user id, home directory, login shell, etc.
 - H is essentially a one-way hash function
 - The file `/etc/passwd` must be world readable
 - Brute force attacks possible even if H is one-way
 - how to most effectively brute-force when trying to obtain password of any account on a system with many accounts?

Password Salts

- More modern UNIX
 - Divide /etc/passwd into two files: /etc/passwd; and /etc/shadow (readable only by root)
- Store $[r, H(\text{password}, r)]$ rather than $H(\text{password})$ in /etc/shadow
 - r is randomly chosen for each password
 - r is public, similar to Initial Vector in CBC & CTR modes
- Benefits
 - dictionary attacks much more difficult
 - cost of attacking a single account remains the same
 - if two users happen to choose the same password, it doesn't immediately show

Mechanisms to Defend Against Dictionary and Guessing Attacks

- Protect stored passwords (use both cryptography & access control)
- Disable accounts with multiple failed attempts
- Require extra authentication mechanism (e.g., phone, other email account, etc.)

Mechanisms to Defend Against Login Spoofing: Trusted Path

- Login Spoofing Attacks:
 - a program showing a login window on screen and record the passwords
- Defense: Trusted Path
 - Mechanism that provides confidence that the user is communicating with the real intended server
 - attackers can't intercept or modify whatever information is being communicated.
 - defends attacks such as fake login programs
 - Example: Ctrl+Alt+Del for log in on Windows
 - Causes a non-maskable interrupt that can only be intercepted by the operating system, guaranteeing that the login window cannot be spoofed

Spoofing & Defenses on the Web

- Phishing attacks
 - attempting to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in electronic communication.
- Website forgery
 - Set up fake websites that look like e-commerce sites and trick users into visiting the sites and entering sensitive info
- Defense methods
 - Browser filtering of known phishing sites
 - Extended Validation Certificates to authenticate servers
 - User-configured authentication of servers
 - Ensures that the site is the one the human user has in mind
 - E.g., site key, pre-selected picture/phrases

KeyLogging

- Threats from insecure client side
- Keystroke logging (keylogging) is the action of tracking (or logging) the keys struck on a keyboard, typically in a covert manner so that the person using the keyboard is unaware that their actions are being monitored.
- Software -based
 - key-stroke events, grab web forms, analyze HTTP packets
- Hardware-based
 - Connector, wireless sniffers, acoustic based
- Defenses:
 - Anti-spyware, network monitors, on-screen soft keyboard, automatic form filler, etc.
- In general difficult to deal with once on the system



Using Passwords Over Insecure Channels

- One-time passwords
 - Each password is used only once
 - Defend against passive adversaries who eavesdrop and later attempt to impersonate
- Challenge response
 - Send a response related to both the password and a challenge
- Zero knowledge proof of knowledge
 - Prove knowledge of a secret value, without leaking any info about the secret

How to do One-Time Password

- Shared lists of one-time passwords
- Time-synchronized OTP
 - E.g., use $\text{MAC}_K(t)$, where K is shared secret, and t is current time
- Using a hash chain (Lamport)
 - $h(s), h(h(s), h(h(h(s)))), \dots, h^{1000}(s)$
 - use these values as passwords in reverse order



Challenge-Response Protocols

- Goal: one entity authenticates to other entity proving the knowledge of a secret, 'challenge'
- Approach: Use time-variant parameters to prevent replay, interleaving attacks, provide uniqueness and timeliness
 - e.g., nonce (used only once), timestamps

Other Defenses

- Alternatives to passwords
 - graphical passwords
- Go beyond passwords
 - security tokens
 - biometrics
 - 2-factor authentication
 - Uses two independent authentication methods
 - US Banks are required to use 2-factor authentication by end of 2006 for online banking
 - Out of band authentication: uses a channel other than the internet
 - E.g., phone

Open Problems

- Alternatives to passwords?
 - The secret should be easy to remember, difficult to guess, and easy to enter into the system.
- Better ways to make user choose stronger passwords?
- Better ways to use other devices for authentication
- Effective 2-factored and/or out of band authentication for the Web
- Phishing defense