moz://a

# RCE in Firefox beyond memory corruptions

The Call of XUL'thulhu

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# Agenda

Prologue

Motivation and "historic" background information 3. Vulnerabilities

Showcasing the code

Attack Surface

How Web Hacking is Browser Hacking

4. Writing the Exploit

Dealing with strict XML parsing and URL encoding

Low-hanging fruits on the Syntax Tree

> Using a JavaScript linter to find bugs

5. A Dark Shadow

**Future Work** 



# XML User Interface Language

also known as XUL

# HTML, XML, XHTML and XUL

HTML for the 1990s

XML for data

XHTML for future web pages?


XUL for the future of cross-platform interfaces?

# ACT 1

Mapping the Attack Surface

# Privileged Contexts

about:preferences



# XUL & Privileged Contexts

about:preferences

```
jar:file:///home/freddy/opt/nightly/firefox/browser/omni.ja!/chrome/browser/content/browser/preferences/in-content/preferences.xul - Firefox Nig
jar:file:///home/freddy/opt ×
← → C û
                    i view-source:about:preferences
   1 <?xml version="1.0"?>
   2 <!-- This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
        - License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
        - You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/, -->
   6 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://global/skin/global.css"?>
   8 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://browser/skin/preferences/preferences.css"?>
   9 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://global/skin/in-content/common.css"?>
  10 <?xml-stylesheet
  11 href="chrome://browser/skin/preferences/in-content/preferences.css"?>
  12 <?xml-stylesheet
  13 href="chrome://browser/content/preferences/handlers.css"?>
  14 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://browser/skin/preferences/applications.css"?>
  15 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://browser/skin/preferences/in-content/search.css"?>
  16 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://browser/skin/preferences/in-content/containers.css"?>
  17 <?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://browser/skin/preferences/in-content/privacy.css"?>
  19 <!DOCTYPE page>
  21 <!-- @CSP: The 'oncommand' handler for 'focusSearch1' can not easily be rewritten (see Bug 371900)
          hence we are allowing the inline handler in the script-src directive using the hash
          sha512-X8+p/CqXeMdss0oF0f5RV+RpkvnN9pukQ20acGc7LqMgfYLW+1R0WAYT660tSTpFHE/Qgx/ZCBs2RMc4QrA8FQ==
          Additionally we should remove 'unsafe-inline' from style-src, see Bug 1579160 -->
  25 <page xmlns="http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul"
           xmlns:html="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"
           csp="default-src chrome: script-src chrome: 'sha512-X8+p/CqXeMdss0oF0f5RV+RpkvnN9pukQ20acGc7LqMqfYLW+lR0WA'
           role="document"
           data-l10n-id="pref-page"
           data-l10n-attrs="title">
       kset>
         <html:link rel="localization" href="branding/brand.ftl"/>
         <html:link rel="localization" href="browser/branding/brandings.ftl"/>
         <html:link rel="localization" href="browser/branding/sync-brand.ftl"/>
         <html:link rel="localization" href="browser/preferences/preferences.ftl"/>
         < -- Used by fonthuilder is -->
```

# ACT 2

Finding XSS in Privileged Contexts

# Finding XSS

Using Search

\_\_\_ Case-sensitive Search mozilla-central Path filter (suppor... Regexp search

#### Welcome to Searchfox

#### Direct link to mozilla-central | comm-central | nss | WHATWG HTML spec

Searchfox is a source code indexing tool for Mozilla Firefox. It indexes C++, Rust, and JavaScript code. This is the help page for Searchfox. You can contribute to Searchfox! Visit our Github page.

#### **Query Language**

Queries entered into the search box use exact string matching. No search operators are supported. Case insensitive matching and regular expression matching can be requested with the check boxes. Path filtering uses globbing. A path matches even if only a substring of the path is matched by the glob. Use the ^ and \$ operators to match the beginning or end of the path. Here are some examples:

test

Find all paths containing the substring "test".

^js/src

Find all paths starting with js/src.

\*.cpp

Find all paths containing ".cpp".

\*.cpp\$

Find all paths ending with ".cpp".

# Finding XSS

Using Search

```
innerHTML = Case-sensitive

Regexp search
```

Number of results: 785 (maximum is 1000)

#### Textual Occurrences

```
browser / actors / NetErrorChild.jsm
       es.innerHTML = errWhatToDo.innerHTML;
       est.innerHTML = errWhatToDoTitle.innerHTML;
       doc.getElementById("errorShortDescText").innerHTML = desc.innerHTML;
       es.innerHTML = errWhatToDo.innerHTML;
       est.innerHTML = errWhatToDoTitle.innerHTML;
       desc.innerHTML = clockErrDesc.innerHTML;
       sd.innerHTML = errDesc.innerHTML;
       sd2.innerHTML = errDesc2.innerHTML;
       es.innerHTML = errWhatToDo.innerHTML;
       browser / base / content / aboutNetError.js
       document.getElementById("mitmWhatCanYouDoAboutIt3").innerHTML = stsMitmWhatCanYouDoAboutIt3").
       document.querySelector(".title-text").innerHTML = errTitle.innerHTML;
       sd.innerHTML = errDesc.innerHTML;
       ld.innerHTML = errDesc.innerHTML;
       browser / components / newtab / content-src / lib / snippets.js
       snippetsEl.innerHTML = payload;
       browser / components / newtab / data / content / activity-stream.bundle.js
 785
       snippetsEl.innerHTML = payload;
       TEMPLATE.innerHTML = str;
11389
       browser / components / newtab / vendor / react-dom-dev.js
```

!(props.dangerouslySetInnerHTML == null) ? invariant\_1(false, '`dangerouslyS

# Low-hanging fruits on the Syntax Trees

Esprima Parser Demo
foo.innerHTML = evil;

```
"type": "Program",
"body": [
    "type": "ExpressionStatement",
    "expression": {
         "type": "AssignmentExpression",
         "operator": "=",
         "left": {
              "type": "MemberExpression",
              "computed": false,
              "object": {
                   "type": "Identifier",
                   "name": "foo"
              "property": {
                   "type": "Identifier",
                   "name": "innerHTML"
         },
         "right": {
              "type": "Identifier",
              "name": "evil"
"sourceType": "script"
```

# DOM XSS Sinks

and where to find them

- Calls to functions like eval, insertAdjacentHTML, document.write, document.writeln
- 2. Assignments to outerHTML or innerHTML with =
   or +=
- 3. Perform analysis (next slide) on function parameter (1) or right-hand side (2)

# False Positives

- 1. Allow pure literals (numbers, hardcoded strings)
- 2. Ignore code in tests/

https://github.com/mozilla/eslint-plugin-no-unsanitized

# eslint-plugin-no-unsanitized versus mozilla-central

Numbers from Spring 2017

34

linter violations


8

occurrences with no escaping


2

Actual vulnerabilities rated sec-critical





```
let html = `
   <div style="flex: 1;</pre>
                display: flex;
                padding: ${IMAGE PADDING}px;
                align-items: center;
                justify-content: center;
                min-height: 1px;">
     <img class="${imageClass}"</pre>
          src="${imageUrl}"/>
   </div>
// (...)
div.innerHTML = html;
```





#### Daniel Veditz [:dveditz] v

Comment 21 • 2 years ago



Lowering severity to sec-moderate; it's not critical unless it allows script injection and I keep getting "Unable to run script because scripts are blocked internally"

Keywords: csectype-priv-escalation, sec-critical, wsec-xss → csectype-sop, sec-moderate



#### Frederik Braun [:freddyb] v (Reporter)

Comment 22 • 2 years ago



I poked a bit again and I did not get further than <button>i</button> for various reasons

- the payload is in a URL
- the injection happens through an innerHTML assignment, so <script>..</script> won't work
- reading it from the DOM, JavaScript sees the URL with spaces encoded as %20, which limits the HTML payload significantly
- finding a way to execute scripts without <script> tags and with all spaces encoded as %20 limits us greatly
- an obvious avenue for attack would be things like <svg/onload=alert(1)>
- the current document is an XHTML (XUL) document, that parses way stricter than normal HTML
- despite the well-known XHTML strictness that demands proper quoting and ending tags, it also disallows the trick to replace the space that separates the tag name and the attribute with a forward slash

In summary: I'd be amazed to see if someone else gets any farther.

```
let html = `
   <div style="flex: 1;</pre>
                display: flex;
                padding: ${IMAGE PADDING}px;
                align-items: center;
                justify-content: center;
                min-height: 1px;">
     <img class="${imageClass}"</pre>
          src="${imageUrl}"/>
   </div>
// (...)
div.innerHTML = html;
```

# Exploit for <u>Bug 1372112</u> (CVE-2017-7795)

```
<img src='data:bb"/><img src="x"
onerror="alert(Components.stack)" /><img src="x">
```

# Oh Yeah!

sec-critical again



# Fixing all of it Good times Public 24

# The Aftermath

Preventing this from happening again

# Fixed existing violations

Removed XSS and self-XSS issues,

#### Linter in source-tree

- It's checked on all commits
- Violations will be backed out

## Critical Bugs

A great way to impact coding style guidelines

Except some minor
//eslint-disable-next-li
ne no-unsanitized

ACT 5

A Dark Shadow

# Remember this? Good times Public 27



# What is this...

Bug 1432966: Sanitize HTML fragments created for chrome-privileged documents (CVE-2018-5124)

```
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unsanitized/property
doc.getElementById("...").innerHTML = strings.header;
```

### DO NOT BE LIKE FREDDY

```
// eslint-disable-next-line no-unsanitized/property
doc.getElementById("addon-webext-perm-header").innerHTML = strings.header;
// data coming *mostly* from localization-templates
    let strings = {
      header: gNavigatorBundle.getFormattedString("webextPerms.header",
[data.name]),
      text:
gNavigatorBundle.getFormattedString("lwthemeInstallRequest.message2",
                                                 [uri.host]),
// All goes through sanitizeTheme(aData, aBaseURI, aLocal)
// (which does not actually sanitize HTML)
```

Exploiting

Again

# Exploiting is easy

Bug 1432966 / CVE-2018-5124

# Epilogue How we fixed it

# Concerns about getting this fixed too quickly

# Concerned about Odaying ourselves

 Shipping a dot-release is causing lots of attention

# Disallowing linter exceptions?

Still points the metaphorical cross-hair

Slow Updates
Exploit is too easy to write.
1-day exploit can still cause a lot of harm

# What we ended up shipping

Fixing it - srsly

# Changing how we parse HTML

 Sanitize DOM tree for all built-in string-to-HTML parsers (innerHTML and friends) for privileged documents

# Re-use existing Sanitizer

 Battle-tested and used in Thunderbird HTML email support

# Follow-up Fixes

- Added sanitizing not just for scripts, but also forms (i.e., navigations) and form elements
- Added a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to all privileged pages.

The End?

You decide.

moz://a

# Thank You

Exploitation and Remediation were achieved with the support of various people. Thanks to, security folks, Firefox engineers, release engineers, QA testers. *Especially* to Johnathan Kingston (co-maintainer of the eslint plugin), Johann Hofmann, who found the bad 0day in 2018 and helped testing, shaping of and arguing for an unscheduled release of Firefox.