

Fachhochschule Aachen  
Campus Jülich

Fachbereich: Medizintechnik und Technomathematik  
Studiengang: Technomathematik

# Secure Multi-Party Computation for Decentralized Distributed Systems

Masterarbeit von Frederic Klein

Diese Arbeit wurde betreut von:

1. Prüfer: Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Alexander Voß
2. Prüfer: Dr. Stephan JONAS

Aachen, Januar, 2017

Diese Arbeit ist von mir selbständig angefertigt und verfasst. Es sind keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt worden.

Frederic Klein .....  
Unterschrift

## Abstract

In recent years gamification has become a part in many areas of our daily routine. In regard to our personal life, companies like Amazon or Runtastic can base their gamification approach on publicly sharing personal achievements and statistics to improve user commitment. In contrast, gamification concerning our work life has to satisfy much higher privacy demands. Since comparison is a key component for gamification, privacy protecting computations of system wide statistical values (for example minimum and maximum) are needed. The solution comes in the form of secure multi-party computation (SMPC), a subfield of cryptography. Existing frameworks for SMPC utilize the Internet Protocol, though access to the Internet or even a Local Area Network (LAN) cannot be provided in all environments. Facilities with sensible measuring systems, e.g. medical devices in hospitals, often avoid Wi-Fi to reduce the risk of electromagnetic interference. To be able to utilize SMPC in environments with Wi-Fi restrictions, this thesis studies the characteristics of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) and proposes the design of a SMPC framework for MANET, especially based on Bluetooth technology, and the implementation as a C library.

Since MANETs have a high probability for network partition, a centralized architecture for the computation and data preservation is unfavorable. Therefor a blockchain based distributed database is implemented in the framework. Typical problems of distributed systems are addressed with the implementation of algorithms for clock synchronization and coordinator election as well as protocols for the detection of computation partners and data distribution. Since the framework aims to provide distributed computations of comparable values, protocols for secure addition and secure comparison are implemented, enabling the computation of minimum, maximum and average.

Devices of diverse computational power will be used to verify the applicability for wearables and Internet of Things (IoT) grade devices. Also field-tests with a smart phone ad hoc network (SPAN)(20-50 nodes) will be conducted to evaluated real life use cases. In contrast, the security of the framework and attack scenarios will be discussed. In summary, this thesis proposes a framework for SMPC for decentralized, distributed systems.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Case Study: "The Hygiene Games" . . . . .	1
<b>2</b>	<b>Background</b>	<b>2</b>
2.1	Secure Multi-Party Computation . . . . .	2
2.1.1	Secret Sharing . . . . .	4
2.1.2	Secure Addition Protocol . . . . .	6
2.1.3	Secure Comparison Protocol . . . . .	10
2.1.4	Existing Frameworks . . . . .	13
2.2	Mobile Ad Hoc Networks . . . . .	15
2.2.1	Network Topologies . . . . .	15
2.2.2	Practicability of an implementation on Android Devices . . . . .	16
<b>3</b>	<b>Design</b>	<b>19</b>
3.1	Requirements . . . . .	19
3.1.1	Functional Requirements . . . . .	19
3.1.2	Non-Functional Requirements . . . . .	21
3.2	Decentralized, Distributed Computing . . . . .	21
3.2.1	Coordinator Election and Coordinator Role . . . . .	23
3.2.2	Clock Synchronization . . . . .	26
3.2.3	Non-termination Detection . . . . .	29
3.2.4	Distributed Databases . . . . .	29
3.2.5	Securing the Communication Channel . . . . .	31
3.3	Architecture . . . . .	34

<b>4 Implementation</b>	<b>35</b>
4.1 Development Tools . . . . .	35
4.2 Module Structure . . . . .	37
4.2.1 Node Module . . . . .	38
4.2.2 Cryptography Module: wolfCrypt . . . . .	41
4.2.3 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module . . . . .	42
4.3 Interfacing the Library . . . . .	44
4.3.1 Configuration . . . . .	44
4.3.2 Usage in C . . . . .	45
4.3.3 Usage in Android . . . . .	45
<b>5 Evaluation</b>	<b>48</b>
5.1 Power Consumption for Bluetooth States . . . . .	48
5.2 Examination of Computation Time Dependent on Number of Participants	50
5.3 Examination of Computation Time Dependent on Computing Power . . .	52
<b>6 Discussion</b>	<b>54</b>
6.1 Requirement Satisfaction in Real-Life Settings . . . . .	54
6.1.1 User Acceptance . . . . .	54
6.1.2 Required Time for Computation . . . . .	55
6.2 Design Flaws Detected Through Evaluation . . . . .	57
<b>7 Conclusion</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>61</b>

# List of Figures

2.1	Simple secure sum protocol for ring . . . . .	6
2.2	Existing SMPC software grouped by properties . . . . .	15
3.1	General functional requirements of a node . . . . .	20
3.2	Use-case diagram for coordinator requirements . . . . .	21
3.3	UML use case diagram for developer . . . . .	21
3.4	UML activity diagram for exponential backoff algorithm . . . . .	24
(3.6)	Formation of fully meshed computation group . . . . .	26
3.6	UML sequence diagram for passing of communication token t . . . . .	27
3.7	Distributed clock synchronization . . . . .	28
3.8	Heartbeat messages for termination control . . . . .	30
3.9	Database synchronization scheme . . . . .	32
3.10	Securing communication with RSA and AES . . . . .	33
3.11	UML component diagram . . . . .	34
4.1	Doxygen function documentation . . . . .	36
4.2	Off-line preparation for online computation . . . . .	39
4.3	Node module state machine . . . . .	40
4.4	JNI bridge between Java and C code . . . . .	46
5.1	Battery stats for different Bluetooth states (logarithmic scale) . . . . .	50
5.2	Computation time over number of nodes for secure sum . . . . .	51
5.3	Computation time over number of nodes for secure maximum . . . . .	52
5.4	Computation time over CPU Power for 20 nodes . . . . .	53
6.1	Walking range in computation time . . . . .	56
6.2	Broadcast optimization . . . . .	58

# List of Tables

2.1	Binary representation of secrets $s_i$ . . . . .	11
2.2	Randomized binary representation of secrets . . . . .	11
2.3	Secure maximum protocol example: 2 <sup>nd</sup> round . . . . .	12
2.4	Secure maximum protocol example: 3 <sup>rd</sup> round . . . . .	12
2.5	Negation of binary representation for minimum determination . . . . .	12
3.1	Functional requirements . . . . .	22
3.2	Non-functional requirements . . . . .	23
4.1	Share matrix for secret sharing . . . . .	39
4.2	Message body . . . . .	41

# List of Acronyms

**2PC** secure two-party computation.

**ADB** Android Debug Bridge.

**AES** Advanced Encryption Standard.

**API** Application Programming Interface.

**GCC** GNU Compiler Collection.

**GSM** Global System for Mobile Communications.

**HTML** HyperText Markup Language.

**HTTPS** HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS).

**IDE** Integrated Development Environment.

**IoT** Internet of Things.

**JNI** Java Native Interface.

**L2CAP** Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol.

**LAN** Local Area Network.

**LSB** least significant bit.

**MAC** media access control.

**MANET** mobile ad hoc network.

**MSB** most significant bit.

**NDK** Native Development Kit.

**OS** operating system.

**RFCOMM** Radio Frequency Communication.

**RSA** Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.

**RTT** Round Trip Time.

**SDK** software Development Kit.

**SMP**C secure multi-party computation.

**SPAN** smart phone ad hoc network.

**TI-RTOS** Texas Instruments Real-Time Operating System.

**TLS** Transport Layer Security.

**UML** Unified Modeling Language.

**UTC** Coordinated Universal Time.

## List of Symbols

$\mathbb{N}$  set of natural numbers.

$\mathbb{P}$  set of prime numbers.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Case Study: "The Hygiene Games"

Gamification

Wireless Networks in Hospitals

# Chapter 2

## Background

In this chapter a general understanding of secure multi-party computation (SMPC) and the key features of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) is established.

First the idea for SMPC is introduced in 2.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation. Since secret sharing is used for the development of SMPC protocols, Shamir's secret sharing scheme is presented in 2.1.1 Secret Sharing. Protocols for secure addition and secure comparison with passive security are introduced in 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 and existing frameworks for SMPC are briefly discussed in 2.1.4.

To be able to define requirements for the new framework (see 3.1), the key features of MANETs are identified in 2.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, with a focus on the wireless technology standards Bluetooth and Wi-Fi and the differences to similar network types like mesh networks.

### 2.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation

SMPC is a subfield of cryptography. The target of SMPC is to run computations over inputs from multiple parties while keeping these inputs secret. In 1982 Yao described the problem of two millionaires trying to find out, which one is wealthier, without giving each other information about their actual capital (Yao 1982). Yaos solution for this secure two-party computation (2PC) is considered to be the basis for general SMPC protocols. Cramer, Damgård, and Nielsen (2015) describe for example benchmark analysis as a use-cases for SMPC: companies want to know how well they are doing in their business area compared to other companies, while they do not want to share their current busi-

ness numbers with competitors. Using a protocol for secure comparison (as described in 2.1.3 Secure Comparison Protocol) the companies can calculate the best performer without leaking business information. Clifton et al. (2002) describe privacy preserving data mining as another use-case: data mining on patient data can for example be used to indicate disease outbreaks but there is of course a privacy concern. Using SMPC algorithms, statistics can be computed while keeping the personal patient data private.

For SMPC two types of adversaries have to be considered: semi-honest and malicious adversaries. Semi-honest adversaries "follow the protocol specification, yet may attempt to learn additional information by analyzing the transcript of messages received during the execution" (Aumann and Lindell 2007). Malicious adversaries "are not bound in any way to following the instructions of the specified protocol" (Aumann and Lindell 2007). SMPC protocols that can tolerate semi-honest parties (up to a specific threshold) provide semi-honest or passive security. SMPC protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries achieve malicious or active security. Cramer, Damgård, and Nielsen (2015, p. 82) also differentiate between unconditional or perfect security and computational security: if security can be proven for an adversary with unlimited computation power a protocol has unconditional security. In contrast, computational security can only be proven for a polytime adversary.

Since the target group for the protocols used in this thesis are gamification systems potential adversaries are likely of the semi-honest type. Gamification system are usually based on intrinsic motivation. Especially in the context of workplace related gamification without public recognition, there is nothing to be gained from trying to corrupt the system, only the significance of the computation results is reduced.

Honest, but curious parties are more likely, but providing the majority of semi-honest parties (which is the requirement for gaining additional information from combined shares, see 2.1.1), requires considerable efforts. Even if single scores are revealed, their isolated information content is almost valueless for the adversaries and targeting specific nodes over a longer amount of time adds additional complexity because of the spatial degree of freedom of the nodes (compare 2.2). Therefor, in context of gamification systems, this thesis focuses on practical SMPC protocols for passive security based on secret sharing.

### 2.1.1 Secret Sharing

Cramer, Damgård, and Nielsen (2015, p. 32) describe secret sharing schemes as the main tool to build a SMPC protocol with passive security. In 1979 Adi Shamir described a  $(k, n)$  threshold scheme for sharing secret data  $D$ : "Our goal is to divide  $D$  into  $n$  pieces  $D_1, \dots, D_n$  in such a way that: (1) knowledge of any  $k$  or more  $D_i$  pieces makes  $D$  easily computable; (2) knowledge of any  $k - 1$  or fewer  $D_i$  pieces leaves  $D$  completely undetermined (in the sense that all its possible values are equally likely)" (Shamir 1979). Shamir's secret sharing scheme is based on polynomials of degree  $k - 1$  with  $a_0 = D$  (compare 2.1).

$$q(x) = \underbrace{D}_{a_0} + a_1 \cdot x + \dots + a_{k-1} \cdot x^{k-1} \quad (2.1)$$

To divide  $D$  into  $n$  pieces the polynomial is evaluated:  $D_i = q(i)$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . For cryptographic protocols it is not practical to work with real arithmetic, instead a finite field is used: Shamir (1979) specifies that modular instead of real arithmetic is used. A prime  $p$  with  $p > D$ ,  $p > n$  is selected and used to define the set  $[0, p)$ . "The coefficients  $a_1, \dots, a_{k-1}$  in  $q(x)$  are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution over the integers in  $[0, p)$ , and the values  $D_1, \dots, D_n$  are computed modulo  $p$ " (Shamir 1979, p. 613) (compare 2.2).

$$q(x) = D + a_1 \cdot x + \dots + a_{k-1} \cdot x^{k-1} \mod p \quad D, a_i \in [0, p), \quad p \in \mathbb{P} \quad (2.2)$$

Cramer, Damgård, and Nielsen (2015, p. 7) declare the set restricted by  $p$  as  $\mathbb{Z}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$ . They also use the notion *secret*  $S$  for the data to be shared and *shares*  $s_i$  for the computed pieces of the secret.

The reconstruction of a secret  $S$  can be done using Lagrange interpolation (compare 2.3).

$$S = \sum_i s_i \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{-x_j}{x_i - x_j} \mod p \quad (2.3)$$

$k$  shares  $s_i$  are needed to reconstruct  $S$ , so only the associated values for  $i$  are used in the Lagrange interpolation.

## Example Computation

Consider the following task: a secret  $S = 8$  is supposed to be shared among  $n = 4$  parties  $P_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 4$ . The threshold for the number of needed shares for the reconstruction of the secret shall be  $k = 3$  (public).

First a prime  $p$  has to be chosen, which has to be larger than the secret ( $p > S$ ) and the number of parties ( $p > n$ ):  $p = 17$  (public information)

Since  $k = 3$ , the polynomial has a degree of  $k - 1 = 2$  (compare 2.4).

$$f(x) = S + a_1 \cdot x + a_2 \cdot x^2 \pmod{p} \quad (2.4)$$

The coefficients are selected randomly uniformly out of  $\mathbb{Z}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\} = \{0, 1, \dots, 16\}$ :  $a_1 = 13$  and  $a_2 = 4$  and the shares  $s_i$  are computed (compare 2.5).

$$f(x) = 8 + 13 \cdot x + 4 \cdot x^2 \pmod{17} \quad (2.5)$$

⇓

$$f(x_1) = f(1) = 25 \pmod{17} = 8 = s_1$$

$$f(x_2) = f(2) = 50 \pmod{17} = 16 = s_2$$

$$f(x_3) = f(3) = 83 \pmod{17} = 15 = s_3$$

$$f(x_4) = f(4) = 124 \pmod{17} = 5 = s_4$$

If for example parties  $P_2$ ,  $P_3$  and  $P_4$  pool their shares, they can reconstruct the secret  $S$  using Lagrange interpolation (using also the public information:  $p = 17$ ):

$$S = \sum_i s_i \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{-x_j}{x_i - x_j} \pmod{17} \quad \text{with } i, j \in \{2, 3, 4\} \quad (2.6)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= s_2 \cdot \frac{-x_3}{x_2 - x_3} \cdot \frac{-x_4}{x_2 - x_4} + s_3 \cdot \frac{-x_2}{x_3 - x_2} \cdot \frac{-x_4}{x_3 - x_4} + s_4 \cdot \frac{-x_2}{x_4 - x_2} \cdot \frac{-x_3}{x_4 - x_3} \pmod{17} \\ &= 16 \cdot \frac{-3}{2 - 3} \cdot \frac{-4}{2 - 4} + 15 \cdot \frac{-2}{3 - 2} \cdot \frac{-4}{3 - 4} + 5 \cdot \frac{-2}{4 - 2} \cdot \frac{-3}{4 - 3} \pmod{17} \end{aligned}$$

$$= 96 - 120 + 15 \pmod{17}$$

$$= -9 \pmod{17} \quad (2.7)$$

$$= 8$$

*Note:* in cryptography  $a \pmod{n}$  for  $a < 0$  (negative dividend) is calculated by adding a

multiple of  $n$  ( $mn \bmod n = 0$ ), so that  $m \cdot n + a > 0$ : e.g.  $-9 \bmod 17 = (\underbrace{1 \cdot 17 - 9}_{>0}) \bmod 17$  (compare 2.7), which resolves to:  $a \bmod n = n - (|a| \bmod n)$ ,  $a < 0$ .

When performing the Lagrange interpolation there are also cases with modulo operations on fractions (Equation 2.8). Here the modular multiplicative inverse (Equation 2.9) has to be calculated using the extended Euclidean algorithm. For example  $\frac{1}{3} \bmod 17 = 6$  since  $6 \cdot 3 \bmod 17 = 1$ .

$$\frac{1}{a} \bmod n \quad (2.8)$$

$$m \cdot a \bmod n = 1 \quad (2.9)$$

$$\rightarrow \frac{1}{a} \bmod n = m \quad (2.10)$$

### 2.1.2 Secure Addition Protocol

For an environment with honest parties there are simple SMPC protocols to compute the sum over shares. Clifton et al. (2002) describe a ring based method, where the initializing party adds a random number  $R$  to the secret input  $s_1$  before passing it to the next node. Each node then adds its secret until the first party receives the result. By removing  $R$  the party can then reconstruct the sum over all secret inputs (see figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1: Simple secure sum protocol for ring

This method is efficient ( $2n$  messages for computation and announcing the sum in a  $n$ -node ring) but if parties collude, party  $P_i$  only needs the output of  $P_{i+1}$  as received by party  $P_{i+2}$  to reconstruct the secret input of  $P_{i+1}$ . Clifton et al. (2002) propose using shares in combination with permutation of the ring order, so neighbors change in each iteration and the number of parties in need to pool their data increases. This approach was

extended in the "k-Secure Sum Protocol" (Sheikh, Kumar, and Mishra 2009). Especially with a focus on security ( $k \rightarrow n$ ) the permutation of the ring approaches share-exchanges between each node. To reduce the complexity through the ring permutation and motivated by the restrictions of the network (see subsection 2.2.2), for which the protocol is intended, this thesis uses a Shamir based protocol for a fully connected mesh network.

In 2.1.1 it was demonstrated how a secret can be reconstructed from the shares using Lagrange interpolation. It is also possible to reconstruct the sum of secrets by using the sums of shares for a Lagrange interpolation.

Proof:

$n$  shares for  $m$  secrets  $s_l$ :

$$s_{l,i} = f_l(x_i) = s_l + \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \alpha_{l,i} x_i^i \mod p \quad (2.11)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} s_{1,i} = f_1(x_i) = s_1 + \alpha_{1,1}x_i + \alpha_{1,2}x_i^2 + \dots + \alpha_{1,k-1}x_i^{k-1} \mod p \\ \vdots \\ s_{m,i} = f_m(x_i) = s_m + \beta_{m,1}x_i + \beta_{m,2}x_i^2 + \dots + \beta_{m,k-1}x_i^{k-1} \mod p \end{cases}$$

with  $\{l \in \mathbb{N} \mid 1 \leq l \leq m\}$ ,  $\{i \in \mathbb{N} \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ ,  $\{p \in \mathbb{P} \mid p > \sum_l s_l\}$ ,

$$\{\alpha \in \mathbb{N} \mid 0 \leq \alpha \leq p\}, \quad \{k \in \mathbb{N} \mid 2 < k \leq n\}$$

Lagrange-interpolation for secret  $s_l$ :

$$s_l = \sum_{i=1}^n s_{l,i} \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{-x_j}{x_i - x_j} \mod p \quad (2.12)$$

Sum  $s$  over secrets  $s_l$ :

$$s = \sum_{l=1}^m s_l \stackrel{\text{with 2.12}}{=} \sum_{l=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n s_{l,i} \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{-x_j}{x_i - x_j} \mod p \quad (2.13)$$

with  $\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m a_{ij} = \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n a_{ij}$  follows for 2.13

$$s = \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^n \underbrace{\sum_{l=1}^m s_{l,i}}_{\text{sum over shares}}}_{\text{Lagrange-interpolation for sum over shares}} \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{-x_j}{x_i - x_j} \mod p \quad (2.14)$$

### Example Computation

Public information:  $n = 4, p = 67, k = 4$

Secrets:  $s_1 = 13, s_2 = 27, s_3 = 17, s_4 = 1$

Target computation: sum  $s$  over secrets  $s = \sum_{i=1}^4 s_i = 58$  without revealing ones secret to another party.

$$s_{1,i} = f_1(x_i) = 13 + 35x + 22x^2 + 7x^3 \mod 67 \quad (2.15)$$

$$s_{2,i} = f_2(x_i) = 27 + 3x + 19x^2 \mod 67 \quad (2.16)$$

$$s_{3,i} = f_3(x_i) = 17 + 9x^2 + 27x^3 \mod 67 \quad (2.17)$$

$$s_{4,i} = f_4(x_i) = 1 + 13x + 31x^2 + 40x^3 \mod 67 \quad (2.18)$$

with  $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 2, x_3 = 3, x_4 = 4$  follows

$$\begin{aligned} &\stackrel{2.15}{\Rightarrow} s_{1,1} = 10 & s_{1,2} = 26 & s_{1,3} = 36 & s_{1,4} = 15 \\ &\stackrel{2.16}{\Rightarrow} s_{2,1} = 49 & s_{2,2} = 42 & s_{2,3} = 6 & s_{2,4} = 8 \\ &\stackrel{2.17}{\Rightarrow} s_{3,1} = 53 & s_{3,2} = 1 & s_{3,3} = 23 & s_{3,4} = 13 \\ &\stackrel{2.18}{\Rightarrow} s_{4,1} = 18 & s_{4,2} = 2 & s_{4,3} = 59 & s_{4,4} = 27 \\ &\Rightarrow \sum_l s_{l,1} = 130 & \sum_l s_{l,2} = 71 & \sum_l s_{l,3} = 124 & \sum_l s_{l,4} = 63 \end{aligned}$$

Lagrange-interpolation:

$$\begin{aligned}
s &= \sum_{i=1}^4 \sum_{l=1}^4 s_{l,i} \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{-x_j}{x_i - x_j} \mod 67 \\
&= 130 \frac{-2}{1-2} \frac{-3}{1-3} \frac{-4}{1-4} + 71 \frac{-1}{2-1} \frac{-3}{2-3} \frac{-4}{2-4} \\
&\quad + 124 \frac{-1}{3-1} \frac{-2}{3-2} \frac{-4}{3-4} + 63 \frac{-1}{4-1} \frac{-2}{4-2} \frac{-3}{4-3} \mod 67 \\
&= 527 \mod 67 = 58 = \sum_{i=1}^4 s_i
\end{aligned} \tag{2.19}$$

As expected, the result of the Lagrange-interpolation for the sum over shares is equal to the sum over the initial secrets (compare 2.19).

## Protocol Description

Assumptions:

- number of parties  $n > 2$
- secure communication channel
- no malicious adversaries
- upper bound of sum  $s \leq b$  can be estimated, so a prime  $p > b$  can be chosen

The secure addition protocol, as used in this thesis, consists of six phases:

1. The coordinator announces the number of parties for the computation and the indexation of each party.
2. Each party  $j$  sends shares  $s_{j,i}$  of the secret input  $s_j$  to the other parties.
3. Each party  $i$  computes the sum over the received shares  $s_{j,i}$ .
4. Each party sends the computed sum to the coordinator.
5. The coordinator reconstructs the sum over the inputs using Lagrange-interpolation.
6. The coordinator broadcasts the reconstructed sum.

In total  $(n+3) \cdot (n-1) = n^2 + 2n - 3$  messages are exchanged, so the traffic increases with the number of parties squared. Selecting a lower threshold for the secret reconstruction  $\frac{n}{2} \leq k < n$  lowers the total messages by  $\Delta_{\text{messages}} = n^2 - n(k - 1)$ .

For a secure channel this protocol is information-theoretically secure: independent from computation power an adversary with  $m_{\text{leaked}} < k$  shares will gain no information regarding the inputs.

### 2.1.3 Secure Comparison Protocol

The secure comparison protocol compares the secret inputs and provides the minimum or maximum in a set without revealing the inputs or the parties holding the minimum or the maximum.

The protocol is based on the privacy preserving protocol for maximum computation as described in Hasan et al. (2013). The general idea is to use bit-decomposition and utilize the secure addition protocol bit-wise. In iterations the secure-sum for the bits  $(0 \vee 1)$  of the secrets multiplied with a random value are computed, starting from the most significant bit (MSB), limited by a predefined upper bound, to the least significant bit (LSB). The announced sum gives each party the information that at least one party has this bit set, if the sum is unequal zero. If a party has this bit not set itself it has a lower value and commits only zeros in the following iterations. Storing the result of each iteration, the parties can reconstruct the maximum. For finding the minimum the protocol from Hasan et al. (2013) needs an extension as described in 2.1.3: inputs are negated (using the binary operation NOT), making the minimum in the set the largest value. Afterwards the maximum is determined as described above. Finally the found maximum is negated again to reconstruct the minimum in the set.

#### Example Computation

Public information:  $n = 3$ ,  $p = 67$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}_p = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ ,  $k = 3$ ,  $s_i < b = 64$  (upper bound for secret value range)

Secrets:  $s_1 = 13$ ,  $s_2 = 27$ ,  $s_3 = 17$

Target computation:  $\min(s_i) = 13$ ,  $\max(s_i) = 27$

Since  $64_{10} = 1000000_2$  is defined as upper bound for the secret values the MSB is the sixth bit (second column in table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Binary representation of secrets  $s_i$

Decimal $s_{i,10}$	Binary $s_{i,2}$					
13	0	0	1	1	0	1
27	0	1	1	0	1	1
17	0	1	0	0	0	1

Each party multiplies each bit with a random within  $\mathbb{Z}_1$ :

Table 2.2: Randomized binary representation of secrets

Decimal $s_{i,10}$	Binary $s_{i,2}$						Randomized					
13	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	45	61	0	57
27	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	12	31	0	5	15
17	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	24	0	0	0	9

There are six bits, therefore six rounds of secure addition ( $\sum_{secure}$ ) are computed:

$$1^{st} \text{ round: } \sum_{secure} = 0 \Rightarrow 6^{th} \text{ bit of the maximum is } 0$$

$$2^{nd} \text{ round: } \sum_{secure} = 36 > 0 \Rightarrow 5^{th} \text{ bit of the maximum is } 1$$

Party  $p_1$  disqualifies itself as the maximum (see table 2.3)

$$3^{rd} \text{ round: } \sum_{secure} = 31 > 0 \Rightarrow 4^{th} \text{ bit of the maximum is } 1$$

Party  $p_3$  disqualifies itself as the maximum (see table 2.4)

$$4^{th} \text{ round: } \sum_{secure} = 0 \Rightarrow 3^{rd} \text{ bit of the maximum is } 0$$

$$5^{th} \text{ round: } \sum_{secure} = 5 > 0 \Rightarrow 2^{nd} \text{ bit of the maximum is } 1$$

$$6^{th} \text{ round: } \sum_{secure} = 15 > 0 \Rightarrow 1^{st} \text{ bit of the maximum is } 1$$

In total, each party has the bits 0|1|1|0|1|1 stored and can reconstruct the correct maximum  $\max(s_i) = 27$ .

Table 2.3: Secure maximum protocol example: 2<sup>nd</sup> round

Decimal $s_{i,10}$	Randomized					
13	0	0	45 <sup>0</sup>	61 <sup>0</sup>	0	57 <sup>0</sup>
27	0	12	31	0	5	15
17	0	24	0	0	0	9

Table 2.4: Secure maximum protocol example: 3<sup>rd</sup> round

Decimal $s_{i,10}$	Randomized					
13	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	0	12	31	0	5	15
17	0	24	0	0	0	0

### Protocol Extension for Minimum Determination

Using the negation of the binary representation, the order of the corresponding values in decimal numeral system is inverted (compare table 2.5). The computation is then the same as for the maximum search. The reconstructed maximum is finally negated to result in  $\min(s_i)$ .

Table 2.5: Negation of binary representation for minimum determination

Decimal $s_{i,10}$	Binary $s_{i,2}$						Negated $\bar{s}_{i,2}$				
13	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
27	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
17	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0

In the second round booth  $P_2$  and  $P_3$  disqualify themselves as maximum. After six rounds each party holds: 1|1|0|0|1|0 as the maximum (see red markings in table 2.5). Negated this gives the minimum as  $0|0|1|1|0|1_2 = 13_{10}$

### Protocol Description

Assumptions:

- number of parties  $n > 2$
- secure communication channel
- no malicious adversaries
- upper bound of sum  $s \leq b$  can be estimated, so a prime  $p > b$  can be chosen

The secure comparison protocol, as used in this thesis, consists of the phases for secure addition within iterations for the bitwise length of a predefined upper bound for the inputs:

1. The coordinator announces the number of parties for the computation and the indexation of each party.
2. For minimum-search: each party negates the secret input.
3. For each bit in the secret input starting from MSB to LSB each party runs through iterations:
  - (a) If input is flagged as lower than maximum, then use  $s_j = 0$  as the input. Otherwise multiply actual bit  $b$  with a random value  $R$ :  $s_j = b \cdot R$ .
  - (b) Each party  $j$  sends shares  $s_{j,i}$  of the input  $s_j$  to the other parties.
  - (c) Each party  $i$  computes the sum over the received shares  $s_{j,i}$ .
  - (d) Each party sends the computed sum to the coordinator.
  - (e) The coordinator reconstructs the sum over the inputs using Lagrange-interpolation.
  - (f) The coordinator broadcasts the reconstructed sum.
  - (g) Each party stores if the sum for the bit was equal 0 (set bit 0) or unequal 0 (set bit 1).
  - (h) Each party compares if bit from the computed sum is greater than own bit. If so input is flagged as lower than maximum.
4. For minimum-search: each party negates the stored sum-result.

Note: the assumption  $n > 2$  for the secure addition and secure comparison protocols is not strict enough, if sum, min and max are computed for the same parties, since for  $n = 3$  the secret between minimum and maximum can be restored (for a honest majority the mapping of values to parties is still secure though).

#### 2.1.4 Existing Frameworks

In this section a short overview over existing SMPC solutions is given. While SMPC is an intensely researched field, practical work is less common.

The following solutions were considered

- MpcLib (see Zamani (2016))
- SEPIA (see Burkhart et al. (2012))
- SPDZ (see Keller et al. (2016))
- Sharemind (see sharemind.cyber.ee (2011))
- Enigma (see Zyskind, Nathan, and Pentland (2016))

Some key-features of the solutions are illustrated in figure 2.2. All projects emerged from university research. With the exception of Sharemind and Enigma, the frameworks seem to target primarily other researchers, reflecting in the lack of documentation and thereby reduced usability. The open-source library MpcLib is C# based, SPDZ uses C++ and Python and SEPIA is a Java library. Sharemind and Enigma are also booth based on university research (Enigma at MIT and Sharemind at University of Tartu) but evolved into market-ready business solutions. While Sharemind uses dedicated application-server, Enigma uses a distributed system of nodes based on Blockchain technology for SMPC, booth with a focus on scalable secure data analysis. All solution are based on the Internet protocol suite and require at least locally run server or Internet access.

While all frameworks exceed the requirements regarding the SMPC functionality, they don't provide a solution for local ad-hoc networks without permanently available servers. Also the support for low-level devices is either undocumented or not given through programming language dependencies. The development of a framework with a focus on cross-platform usage, usability for developers without cryptographic research background and applicability for local ad-hoc networks for the described gamification use-cases is therefore justified.




Figure 2.2: Existing SMPC software grouped by properties

## 2.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The framework developed as part of this thesis focuses on providing SMPC for MANETs or MANET-like networks. In this section the network topologies related to MANETs are briefly described (see 2.2.1) and the practicability of an implementation based on current technology standards are examined (see 2.2.2).

### 2.2.1 Network Topologies

Dorri, Kamel, and Kheirkhah (2015) describe a MANET as an "infrastructure-independent network with wireless mobile nodes" (Dorri, Kamel, and Kheirkhah 2015, p. 15). A MANET is similar to a mesh network, but the distinctive feature is the nodes' spatial degree of freedom. In comparison to a star network, there is no central switch dedicated to routing messages. Instead each node provides message passing abilities and acts as a multi-hop relay. The advantage of MANETs is the open network boundary: nodes can freely join and leaving nodes do not affect the functionality of the MANET. The

key-features are:

- continuously self-configuring
- self-forming
- self-healing
- infrastructure-less
- peer-to-peer
- mobility of nodes (main difference to mesh network)

The message passing in a MANET can either be done by routing or flooding. Since the nodes can move freely, the neighbors will change often, so maintaining routing tables is expensive. The passing of messages without the availability of authentication protocols like HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) makes the communication also vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attacks. Of course flooding means broadcasting and is not cheap either in regard to message quantity and network load.

The mentioned key-features of MANETs make it a good network choice for a gamification setting based on mobile devices (smartphones, wearables, etc.), because it promises unobtrusive usage for participants without administrative maintenance effort. In the next section the availability and the practicability of an implementation for Android devices is discussed, because of Androids dominant position as the globally leading smartphone operating system (OS) with a market share of above 80% (see Forni and Meulen (2016)).

### **2.2.2 Practicability of an implementation on Android Devices**

MANETs are especially of interest for military applications and disaster management but they are also gaining research focus for civil usage for example in context of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Demonstrations of an implementation can be found for example in Open Gardens MeshKit software Development Kit (SDK) (Opengarden.com 2016a), which offers MANET abilities for Android and iOS devices and thereby forming a smart phone ad hoc network (SPAN). MeshKit is also the foundation for Open Gardens FireChat (Opengarden.com 2016b), which is for example known in context of

pro-democracy demonstrations. Since Android does not provide an Application Programming Interface (API) for MANET functionality on Android devices (API 24 at the time of writing) and the MeshKit SDK is not open source and only available through Open Gardens partner program, a simplified (but extendable) implementation of MANET-like behavior is developed in the application layer (compare 3.2.1). Both for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth based connections, there can be limitations in regard to maximum concurrent connections. Vendor specific restrictions (hardware, driver) are hard to compensate reactive at runtime, so this issue has to be addressed proactive in 3.3 Architecture.

## Bluetooth Based MANET

Usually Bluetooth connections with smartphones require pairing and user actions. This is not a useful process flow to build a MANET-like network, since nodes cannot simply join. Using the Bluetooth protocol Radio Frequency Communication (RFCOMM) an insecure connection can be established, without the need for pairing and user interaction. Andersson et al. (2012) describe RFCOMM as the emulation of serial ports over Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP), supporting the emulation of multiple ports between two devices and ports between multiple devices (device dependent). Since multiple simultaneous connection have to share the available bandwidth per node, it takes  $\frac{n}{2}$  times longer to share the same amount of data when using only one-to-one connections sequentially. For the targeted number of computation partners in this thesis, this is a tolerable overhead and practical system parameters will be evaluated in chapter 5 and chapter 6. The Bluetooth Special Interest Group has announced mesh networking protocols for upcoming specifications (Hegendorf 2016). This is very promising in regard of system provided MANET features, though it will take time (from experience with Bluetooth LE likely years) until enough devices are equipped with compliant Bluetooth modules.

## Wi-Fi Based MANET

Situations in which we can use Wi-Fi (or Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)) usually provide Internet access, so Wi-Fi is not the primary target technology for this thesis. Generally, the callback-based architecture of the developed framework (compare 3.3 Architecture) enables the usage of different wireless technologies though.

Even the interconnection of MANET-like networks is conceivable (as demonstrated with MeshKit), but it complicates the forming of the computation group (compare 3.2.1), because different optional channels between nodes have to be evaluated. With Android 4.0 (API level 14) the Wi-Fi Peer-to-Peer framework was introduced, which complies with the Wi-Fi Alliance's Wi-Fi Direct certificate program. Wi-Fi Direct states that one-to-one or group (many-to-one) connections are possible. One device acts as a group owner (soft access point), so it forms a star topology. To imitate a SPAN with Wi-Fi Direct multi-group communication has to be provided. In Funai, Tapparello, and Heinzelman (2016) limitations of Android in regard of multi-group networking as well as solutions are discussed. Other solutions (compare Thomas (2014)) include usage of custom kernels on rooted smartphones. Even though demonstrations on selected devices have shown the feasibility, such system modifications neglect the target group and the intentions of this framework.


# Chapter 3

## Design

Based on the findings in chapter 2 Background and extended with use-cases the requirements for the framework are specified in 3.1 Requirements. In 3.2 Decentralized, Distributed Computing specific requirements in context of complex processes are substantiated with algorithms for decentralized, distributed computing. Finally, a draft design is presented in 3.3 Architecture.

### 3.1 Requirements

In general this thesis follows the FURPS+ system for requirements as described by Eeles (2005): requirements are categorized into functional and non-functional requirements:



The functional and non-functional requirements are specified in 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.

#### 3.1.1 Functional Requirements

Functional requirements define the functions the framework has to offer to meet the acceptance criteria. Based on chapter 2 Background we can divide the requirements into

two main fields: features regarding the accurate computation of the SMPC protocols and functions required to compensate the lack of a MANET API and technical limitations. Figure 3.1 presents the general functionality a party - respectively a node - expects from the system: especially the need for a secure channel and the limitation to run the SMPC only with nearby computation partners is caused by the missing multi-hop capabilities.




Figure 3.1: Unified Modeling Language (UML) use-case diagram for the general functional requirements of a node

Since most functions (like the time synchronization and the multi-party computation) require the interaction between nodes, these processes need to be coordinated. In a distributed system there is no central authority, so a node has to become the temporal leader or coordinator for the duration of a process. In figure 3.2 the processes requiring coordination are described as use-cases from the view of a temporal coordinator.

Based on the use-cases functional requirements can easily be identified and specified. In table 3.1 the functional requirements are stated as user-stories, alongside assumptions and targeted tests.




Figure 3.2: UML use-case diagram for the functional requirements for the coordinator

### 3.1.2 Non-Functional Requirements

Non-functional requirements describe quality attributes the system has to comply to.

Two use-cases from a developer view are illustrated in figure 3.3.




Figure 3.3: UML use case diagram for developer

Based on the use-cases for developers and general demands regarding the maintainability, expandability and performance to make the framework applicable for real-life settings, non-functional requirements can be specified as listed in table 3.2.

## 3.2 Decentralized, Distributed Computing

While the protocols for secure addition and secure comparison and thereby the requirement *FR06 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module* are already well-defined (compare subsection 2.1.1, subsection 2.1.2 and subsection 2.1.3), other functional requirements need further methodical substantiation. *FR04 Coordinator Election* and *FR05 Token-Passing* are addressed in subsection 3.2.1, *FR02 Heartbeat* and *FR03 Non-termination*

Table 3.1: Functional requirements

Name	<b>FR01 Pairing-less Connection</b>
Requirement	As a node I want to join the system without having to pair with other devices so that the system remains unobtrusive.
Assumptions	Device has Bluetooth capabilities with RFCOMM protocol.
Name	<b>FR02 Heartbeat</b>
Requirement	As a node I need to inform my coordinator if my computation is running longer than expected so that the system does not assume that the process has failed. As a coordinator I need to inform all group nodes if a computation is running longer than expected.
Assumptions	Hosting system provides system time.
Name	<b>FR03 Non-termination Detection</b>
Requirement	As a node I must be able to detect a communication problem so that I can reset my status.
Assumptions	Hosting system provides system time.
Name	<b>FR04 Coordinator Election</b>
Requirement	As a node I want to become coordinator for nearby nodes so that communication can be organized.
Name	<b>FR05 Token-Passing</b>
Requirement	As coordinator I want to be able to assign a group-member to coordinate a subprocess so that direct communication between group-members can be established.
Name	<b>FR06 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module</b>
Requirement	As a coordinator I want to form a group of fully meshed nodes and coordinate the execution of the secure addition and secure comparison protocols using a secure communication channel.
Assumptions	Group size > 2. All group-members are time-synchronized and have a score within the same time-frame limits.
Testability	Unit tests to proof correctness of implementation. Performance-tests with different number of computation partners and validation of result.
Name	<b>FR07 Clock Synchronization</b>
Requirement	As coordinator I want to synchronize the clocks of nearby nodes so that computation results are not biased because of different time settings.
Testability	Unit tests to proof correctness of implementation.
Name	<b>FR08 Database Synchronization</b>
Requirement	As coordinator I want to compare my database status with nearby nodes and exchange missing entries without having to compare all entries.
Assumptions	Participating nodes are idle and not waiting for a computation.

Table 3.2: Non-functional requirements

Name	<b>NFR01 Usability</b>
Requirement	The framework shall be configurable, so that a developer using the framework can configure the settings for the SMPC.
Name	<b>NFR02 Maintainability</b>
Requirement	The framework shall be maintainable, so that the code and documentation make it clear for a developer what callbacks have to be implemented and how the framework can be used in an Android device.
Name	<b>NFR03 Performance</b>
Requirement	The framework shall be secure while providing enough performance, that computations can properly terminate for nodes that move at walking speed ( $\approx 1 \frac{m}{s}$ ).
Name	<b>NFR04 Expandability</b>
Requirement	The frameworks coupling with the wireless technology shall be loosely, so that the system can be extended without having to touch core functionalities regarding the SMPC.

*Detection* are discussed in subsection 3.2.3, an algorithm for *FR07 Clock Synchronization* is provided in subsection 3.2.2 and finally *FR08 Database Synchronization* is covered in subsection 3.2.4.

### 3.2.1 Coordinator Election and Coordinator Role

As discussed in subsection 2.2.2 fully featured MANETs are currently not provided and mapping it completely in the application layer is beyond the scope of this thesis. Overcoming the technical limitations, the system can be build with sequential communications instead of parallel. As stated in 2.2.1 Network Topologies communication in context of SMPCs is only done in a fully meshed subgroup of the network, which also simplifies the coordinator election.

A node will try to become the coordinator, when

1. it enters the network after longer disconnection: event driven.
2. a new personal score is ready for SMPC: event driven.
3. all SMPC computations for a score are done: event driven.
4. an event driven attempt failed and a certain amount of time passed: timer based.

Extending requirement *FR04 Coordinator Election* and to avoid situations of competing nodes trying to become coordinator and thereby booth repeatedly failing because neither can acquire enough computation partners, the timer based approach is supported by the exponential backoff algorithm. Ganga et al. (2010, p.67) describe the exponential backoff algorithm for collision detection and retransmission: if a coordinator appointment failed (equivalent to collision detection in original description) a factor for the waiting time till the next attempt is selected uniformly random from an increasing range, reducing the probability for competing coordinator candidates. The process is outlined in form of an UML activity diagram in figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4: UML activity diagram for exponential backoff algorithm

In regard to the execution of the SMPC protocols in *FR06 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module*, the coordinator has to find a computation group. In a mesh network with routing and point-to-point encryption as displayed in 3.5a, the green marked coordinator can simply broadcast a computation request and responding nodes form the

computation group. Caused by the technical limitations (see subsection 2.2.2), the coordinator has to find a fully meshed group within its reach: this guarantees that each node can directly communicate with all computation partners and messages required for securing the channel are not passed through other nodes. First the coordinator  $n_1$  discovers nearby nodes (see 3.5b). Then a list of these devices (identified by media access control (MAC) address) is sent to every neighboring node (see  $n_2$  to  $n_7$  in 3.5c). Each node responds with the intersection of the received device list with the own list of discovered devices (see 3.5d). To reduce the payload of the responses, they only contain a list of booleans, indication if the device with the same index in the received device list is seen by the node. The coordinator then computes the maximum group of fully meshed nodes and sends computation partners an associative array assigning new 8-bit ids (see 3.5e), which reduce the payload in following steps. Nearby nodes, that are not part of the computation group, receive an indicator to abort the computation. Each node in the computation group has a list of the group and the assigned ids and can exchange public keys with group members, forming a fully meshed, end-to-end encrypted group (see figure 3.5f).

Since parallel message exchange for the computation group cannot be guaranteed (see subsection 2.2.2), the coordinator controls sequential message exchanges with token passing in accordance with *FR05 Token-Passing*. For example when  $n$  nodes want to exchange  $n$  secrets divided into  $n$  shares each, the coordinator first requests successively the shares for himself ( $s_i, 1$ ) from the other  $n - 1$  nodes, while transmitting his own shares ( $s_1, j$ ) with the request. Then the communication token gets passed to the next node, which in turn requests the shares for himself from the other  $n - 2$  nodes while transmitting his own shares and so on. An exemplary share-exchange for  $n = 3$  with token-passing is illustrated in figure 3.6.

The combination of processes with the same communication partners, single-digit bytes of payloads and short process termination is a good option to reduces the total message-occurrence in the network: for example when a coordinator requests the states of nearby nodes, it can be combined with the clock synchronization.




Figure (3.6) Formation of fully meshed computation group

### 3.2.2 Clock Synchronization

For statistical data in a gamification system, the sequence of events in infinitesimal time units is not as important as comparing the data for the same durations in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), so a synchronization of physical clocks is needed as requested in




Figure 3.6: UML sequence diagram for passing of communication token  $t$

*FR07 Clock Synchronization.* In this thesis the well known Berkeley-algorithm for internal clock synchronization in distributed systems is used as described in Ghosh (2015).

The coordinator

1. requests the current time values  $t_i$  from participating nearby nodes  $i$ .
2. computes the average of these values  $t_{\text{average}}$ .
3. reports back the adjustments  $\Delta_i = t_{\text{average}} - t_i$

Since the communication between the coordinator and a node takes time, the received response is already outdated. This is compensated by observing the Round Trip Time (RTT) and using half of the duration as a correction value (compare 3.1). The RTT is herein the timespan between sending a request to a node and receiving its response (see figure 3.7a).

$$t'_i = t_i + \underbrace{\frac{RTT}{2}}_{\text{correction value}} = t_i + \frac{t_e - t_s}{2} \quad (3.1)$$

By sending the adjustments  $\Delta_i$  instead of the adjusted time, the receiving nodes do not need to compensate the received value with the RTT. Figure 3.7b depicts the computation of the adjustments using Berkeley with RTT correction for three nodes.




Figure 3.7: Internal clock synchronization in distributed networks

For further improvement of the accuracy the processing duration between receiving a request and sending the response  $t_{process}$  can be measured and send to the coordinator. In this thesis the simple approximation for  $t_{response}$  is used, since the additional payload extends the transmission duration. The RTT has to be below an upper bound though, otherwise there is too much uncertainty regarding the influence of  $t_{request}$ ,  $t_{process}$  and  $t_{response}$ . Also bounds for the deviation of the time can be defined to reduce the influence of outliers.

The framework does not change the actual clock setting on the hosting system, but stores the computed time difference  $\Delta_t$  and applies the value to all time-related actions.

To make sure that a node is time-synchronized before scores and computations are acquired, it is reasonable to trigger a synchronization when the node joins the network.

### 3.2.3 Non-termination Detection

Especially since the coordinator gives temporarily away the message token and goes into a waiting state, there has to be a protocol to detect non-termination for processes. Meeting *FR03 Non-termination Detection* each request to another node and each local computation initializes the start of timers. The local timer triggers the transmission of a heartbeat message (compare *FR02 Heartbeat*) to the coordinator, signaling that the process is still intact, but not yet finished. If the coordinator receives a heartbeat message, it informs the other nodes in the computation group (causing them to reset their local timers), and resets its local timeout-timer. If the coordinator reaches a limit for the timer without receiving a heartbeat message, non-termination is assumed and all group members are informed, that the computation failed. The heartbeat protocol for the coordinator waiting for response is outlined in figure 3.8a, while the protocol for a node in possession of the message token is displayed in figure 3.8b.

### 3.2.4 Distributed Databases

A distributed system without central servers, that guarantee availability throughout the network, has to provide a distributed database model. This means, that nodes need to compare their database states with each other and synchronize differences. Since the nodes can enter and leave the network freely, preservation of the data in the system as well as consistency has to be considered.

The framework deals only with entry-sets of the database and lets the hosting system handle the actual storage. Since each node hosts its own database, transactions for concurrent access is not an issue.

An entry consists of:

- Hash over the entry
- Unix timestamp
- size of computation group




Figure 3.8: Avoidance of false non-termination detection through heartbeat messages

- indicator for min, max or sum
- value

The combination of hash and Unix timestamp generates a key for the entry that is most likely collision free. The size of the computation group is needed to compute the arithmetic average from multiple entry-sum-values in a specified time-window (compare

Equation 3.2).

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \underbrace{s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5}_{n_1=5} \\ \underbrace{s_6, s_7, s_8}_{n_2=3} \end{array} \right\} v_1 = \sum_i s_i \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} v_2 = \sum_i s_i \end{array} \right\} \bar{v}_i = \frac{v_1 + v_2}{n_1 + n_2} \quad (3.2)$$

Since the framework offers three types of SMPCs, the entry must reflect the source of the value. By comparing and updating, each node will have eventually all entries, so a distributed database has eventual consistency. To meet with the requirement *FR08 Database Synchronization* each node holds the sum of the entries' hashes within a specified time-window. This value is used to compare the database-states between nodes: if the values are equal, the databases are likely consistent (collisions are possible though but only for short durations until new SMPC results are generated or collision free nodes are encountered), otherwise entries are compared and exchanged. First the coordinator request the hash-sum. If they match an acknowledgment is send, otherwise up to  $n$  (predefined upper bound) hashes of the entries in anti-chronological order are sent in an array to the node. The node response with an array of booleans, representing if the hashes are known. If the response-array contains zeros, then the unknown entries are transmitted. After an entry-exchange the hash-sums are compared, to determine if consistency is reached (coordinator request hash-sum if needed, compare figure 3.9). If the hash-sums do not match, the node sends up to  $n$  entry-hashes to the coordinator, skipping already evaluated entries. This is repeated until consistency is reached or a request times out and the process is aborted. Figure 3.9 displays the basic process for  $n = 2$ , with ASCII-values as mock-up hashes:

### 3.2.5 Securing the Communication Channel

As requested in requirement *FR06 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module* and noted in 2.1.2 the SMPC protocols need secure communication channels. Listen in on wireless communication means receiving the radio signals, so for common wireless technologies this is easily accomplished. Since the physical layer is more or less public, the communication needs encryption. For this framework two kinds of encryption are used: first asymmetric cryptography is used to exchange a session-key, which is then used to secure messages with




Figure 3.9: Database synchronization scheme

symmetric encryption, as displayed in figure 3.10. This principle is well known from TLS encryption used in HTTPS. For the asymmetric encryption the public-key cryptosystem RSA as described by Delfs and Knebl (2015, pp. 49-76) is used. For the symmetric encryption the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as described by Delfs and Knebl (2015, pp. 19-25) is used. AES encrypts and decrypts faster than Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA), because RSA requires long keys (2048 bit and longer recommended) for proper security. But AES needs sender and receiver to know the shared/symmetric key, and the exchange of this key over an insecure channel only with AES is not possible.

The basis for the cryptosystem by RSA is the prime-factorization, which requires super-polynomial time. RSA is asymmetric, since there is one key for encryption and one key for decryption. In this setting, the public key is used for encryption, so only the receiver with the private key can decrypt the secret. For the key generation two large prime numbers are selected:  $p, q \in \mathbb{P}$  with  $p \neq q$ . The product  $n = p \cdot q$  is computed. Euler's Phi function  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$  is computed and a coprime integer  $e$  is selected  $1 < e < \phi(n)$ . A common value for  $e$  is 65537. The public key is formed by  $n$  and  $e$ . The private key is formed from  $n$  and  $d$ , where  $d$  meets  $e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ .

For the symmetric encryption, booth partners use the same key. AES is an iterated block cipher with a block length of 128 bits and key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The iterations (called rounds) follow the Rijndael algorithm. A detailed description of the algorithm can be found in Delfs and Knebl (2015, pp. 20-25).




Figure 3.10: Securing communication with RSA and AES

### 3.3 Architecture

Based on 3.2.1 it is sensible, that the central element in this framework is a node component. Figure 3.11 displays the UML component diagram for the framework design and illustrates the basic conjunctions between the components, as well as key-functionalities. The node component can also act as the coordinator and in either state communications and computations let it pass through different states of activity. This framework therefore uses the state pattern: the current state determines the behavior and abilities of the node. In regard to the hosting system the node component utilizes an API component, which uses callbacks to bind the communication layer and the system clock to the framework in accordance with *NFR02 Maintainability*. To handle the message encryption a cryptography module is needed, providing the functionality described in 3.2.5. As described in 3.2.3 a handler for timeout detection and heartbeat message triggering is provided. Parameters for communication, cryptography and SMPC need to be accessible in a central component to meet *NFR01 Usability*.




Figure 3.11: UML component diagram

Since it is likely, that the technical limitations described in subsection 2.2.2 will be overcome in future releases, the framework's core functionality is independent from the efforts to provide the self-forming network abilities (avoidance of code smell known as change preventer or shotgun surgery). So in case of availability of full MANET capabilities (secure multi-hop routing and parallel communications) only the node component has to be adopted.

# Chapter 4

## Implementation

While the algorithms and protocols described in chapter 2 and chapter 3 are language-independent, it is sensible to use the programming language C for the development, since it is widely supported on most OSs including embedded OSs. To evaluate the practicability of the proposed framework design for real-life usage, the core system is implemented. To simplify the utilization and further development of the framework, first the development environments and tools used for the implementation of the core system are described.

Since the project will be hosted as an open-source project alongside a generated API, important features of the modules are introduced along with notes regarding experienced problems.

### 4.1 Development Tools

The core implementation was developed on Arch Linux using the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) version 6.2.1. JetBrains CLion 2016.3.1 was selected as Integrated Development Environment (IDE), because it is cross-platform, offers code completion and analysis and supports Doxygen.

Doxygen is a tool for generating documentation based on annotated sources (Listing 4.1), similar to Javadoc. Maintaining the documentation in the source files simplifies the process of keeping the documentation up to date after code changes and the documentation generation can be included in the build pipeline. This helps to avoid version conflicts between API and source code, since developers can generate the API on their

local system from the sources, guaranteeing that the documentation at hand is the correct one for the used release of the source code. Doxygen offers the documentation as HyperText Markup Language (HTML) (Figure 4.1) and LaTeX, making it easy to provide platform independent documentation.

Listing 4.1: Doxygen function annotation

```
/*
Computes the modulo x mod p based on the cryptographic modulo
definition.

\param x is an integer and the dividend.
\param p is an integer and the divisor.
\return The remainder of x mod p as an unsigned integer.
*/
unsigned int mod (long long x, int p);
```




Figure 4.1: Doxygen function documentation

For managing changes to documents, the distributed version control git is used and the project is hosted on GitHub. Besides providing access to the project and easy maintainability the intention is to let other developers suggest improvements using pull requests.

To validate the correctness of implemented functions, the unit test library Unity<sup>1</sup> is used as a submodule. Using the parameter `--recursive` the GitHub repository for Unity is embedded in the Security Games repository.

For unit tests with Unity, test files are added to the project including validations of predefined test cases with known output (Listing 4.2). When build for testing (`make test`), the defined tests are executed and the results are displayed (Listing 4.3).

---

<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/ThrowTheSwitch/Unity>

Listing 4.2: Unity test file

```
#include "../src/SMPC_math.h"
#include "../lib/Unity/src/unity.h"

void test_mod(void)
{
    /* All of these should pass */
    TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(1779, mod(-2255,2017));
    TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL(238, mod(2255,2017));
}

int main(void)
{
    UNITY_BEGIN();
    RUN_TEST(test_mod);
    return UNITY_END();
}
```

Listing 4.3: Unity test result

```
test/SMPC_math_test.c:30:test_mod:PASS
-----
1 Tests 0 Failures 0 Ignored
OK
```

## 4.2 Module Structure

As described in section 3.3 the central module for the framework is the Node module. The header file `node.h` provides the interface to the host system. Settings and parameters for communication and computation are defined in `configurations.h`. For the usage of the framework only those two header files are relevant: the settings in `configurations.h` need to be adjusted to the use-case and `node.h` needs to be included in the own source file, to access functions and register function pointers for needed callbacks. The core implementation contains the following files:

- `node.h`: provides function prototypes for setting function pointers for callbacks from the framework to host functions as well as function prototypes for passing messages to the framework.
- `node.c` contains the implementation for the functions defined in `node.h` and is the central managing unit. The processed messages define states for the node and it acts accordingly (state machine).

- `configurations.h` is the central place for settings regarding network and computation parameters. Both `node.c` and `smpc.c` access the definitions in `configurations.h` and no other files need adjustment for the usage of the system.
- `smpc.h` provides function prototypes to `node.c` for the generation of the share matrix, the computation of the shares for the different SMPC types and the Lagrange interpolation for recombination of shares.
- `smpc.c` provides the implementation of the functions defined in `smpc.h` as well as needed helper functions like the cryptographic modulo operation for negative values and fractions.
- wolfCrypt<sup>2</sup> cryptography engine provides asymmetric RSA as well as symmetric AES encryption (`rsa.h`, `aes.h`, `random.h`) for securing the communication.

#### 4.2.1 Node Module

The node module is the core of the framework and the only module interacting with the host system (see section 4.3). Since nodes handle the formation of the computation group, they need to be aware of the host's identity, namely the MAC, therefore the host passes the MAC to the node when initializing it.

For the computation group a share matrix is required, that describes which nodes share secrets when the threshold for needed shares ( $k$ ) is lower than the computation group size. The share matrix is a symmetric matrix with same row-sum and column-sum for all rows and columns. For example Table 4.1 displays the share matrix for  $n = 5$  and  $k = 3$  (so at least three shares are required for the Lagrange interpolation and two adversaries can be tolerated), where node  $n_3$  will send his shares  $s_{3,1}$  to  $n_1$ ,  $s_{3,3}$  to itself and  $s_{3,5}$  to  $n_5$  while receiving  $s_{1,3}$   $s_{3,3}$  and  $s_{5,3}$ .

To compute the share matrix, the number of nodes in the computation group needs to be known. The framework offers the setting for varying values for the minimum and the maximum computation group size. Small group sizes make it more likely that a computation is completed, in contrast larger group sizes improve the security. In general it is advised to settle for a value and define minimum and maximum group size with

---

<sup>2</sup><https://www.wolfssl.com/wolfSSL/Products-wolfcrypt.html>

Table 4.1: Share matrix for secret sharing with threshold

	1	2	3	4	5
1	0	0	1	1	1
2	0	1	0	1	1
3	1	0	1	0	1
4	1	1	0	1	0
5	1	1	1	0	0

it. This enables the node to compute also all shares needed for the SMPC computations without the interaction with other nodes and the online phase can be minimized (see ??).

Once the host system passes a score to the node, the behavior of the node is controlled by different states. Figure 4.3 displays a simplified state diagram for coordinators and regular nodes once a score is passed.




Figure 4.2: Off-line preparation for online computation

## Message Protocol

Initialized by the coordinator, nodes pass messages between each other. The normal communication flow is:

1. send request
2. await response
3. handle response

To identify the purpose of a received message, an enumeration for message types is implemented, avoiding magic numbers and providing readable condition checks.




Figure 4.3: Node module state machine

Listing 4.4: Message type enumeration

```
typedef enum { BROADCAST, ACK, STATE_REQUEST, STATE_RESPONSE,
    DISCOVERY_START_REQUEST, ... COMPUTATION_RESULT_RESPONSE }
type_message;
```

Table 4.2: Message body

BROADCAST (optional)	_REQUEST or _RESPONSE	Payload (optional)
----------------------	-----------------------	--------------------

Even though a regular broadcasting is not provided by the network (compare subsection 2.2.2), the node module provides a pseudo-broadcast: a broadcast request requires a direct acknowledgment as a response. This was implemented to trigger longer processes, like discovery in all nodes in a more parallel way, instead of waiting for each node. For a broadcast the communication flow is:

1. For each node in a passed list
  - (a) send broadcast request: start long action
  - (b) await **ACK**
2. For each node in a passed list
  - (a) send request: get result of long action
  - (b) await response

The receiving node checks for each incoming message if the message begins with the broadcast enumerator, and responds with the **ACK**, before reading and handling the additionally contained enumerator for the task request.

All messages are byte arrays (respectively char arrays), with varying length, depending on the payload (see Table 4.2).

The transmitted SMPC shares are encrypted using AES encryption provided by the cryptography module.

### 4.2.2 Cryptography Module: wolfCrypt

The cryptography engine wolfCrypt is open-source (GPLv2) and was selected because of the following reasons:

- Provides asymmetric encryption with RSA (for exchanging the symmetric key)
- Provides symmetric encryption with AES (for exchanging encrypted messages)
- Provides hash algorithms, which will be utilized for the database features
- Lightweight library, usable on embedded systems (e.g. Texas Instruments Real-Time Operating System (TI-RTOS))

Like the Unity framework, wolfCrypt is referenced int the repository as a submodule. Using the parameter `--recursive` the GitHub repository for Unity is embedded in the Security Games repository, ensuring relative paths in header includes and in the makefile are preserved. Submodules also reference a specific commit, so build errors through different source code versions can be reduced.

To meet up-to-date security demands (see subsection 3.2.5), RSA keys of length 3072 bits are generated and AES keys with 192 bit are used (see subsection 4.3.1) as defaults, though changes can be made in `configurations.h`.

For the generation of the RSA private key `WOLFSSL_API int wc_MakeRsaKey(RsaKey* key, int size, long e, WC_RNG* rng);` is used, which is only available when `WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN` is defined, therefore `rsa.o` is compiled with the `-DWOLFSSL_KEY_GEN` option.

Specific required modules from the library are embedded in the framework but not altered or extended, hence for further information the extensive wolfCrypt documentation<sup>3</sup> can be consulted.

### 4.2.3 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module

The SMPC module provides functions to create shares for the secure sum, minimum and maximum computation. As described in subsection 2.1.3 the shares for following rounds change, when a node disqualifies itself as the maximum. For the off-line preparation the SMPC module therefore generates for each computation round additional shares for the disqualification case. For large computation groups and large upper limits for the maximum score storage has to be considered, especially when running the framework on embedded system.

---

<sup>3</sup><https://www.wolfssl.com/wolfSSL/Docs-wolfssl-manual-18-wolfcrypt-api-reference.html>

Listing 4.5: Public function prototypes in smpc.h

```
void smpc_generate_shares(int shares[], int n, int k, int secret,
    smpc_share_type type);
int smpc_lagrange_interpolation(int involved_parties[], int shares[],
    int k);
```

For example, the upper bound for the maximum score is 10000 and the computation group has a size of 20 and scores are 4 byte integers:

$$\begin{aligned} n = 20, b_{10} = 10000 &\quad \Rightarrow \quad b_2 = 10\ 0111\ 0001\ 0000 \\ \text{Secure sum:} &\quad 1 \text{ round: } 20 \cdot 4 \text{ byte} = 80 \text{ byte} \\ \text{Secure max:} &\quad 14 \text{ rounds: } 14 \cdot 20 \cdot 4 \text{ byte} = 1120 \text{ byte} \\ \text{Secure max disqualified:} &\quad 14 \text{ rounds: } 14 \cdot 20 \cdot 4 \text{ byte} = 1120 \text{ byte} \\ \text{Secure min:} &\quad 14 \text{ rounds: } 14 \cdot 20 \cdot 4 \text{ byte} = 1120 \text{ byte} \\ \text{Secure min disqualified:} &\quad 14 \text{ rounds: } 14 \cdot 20 \cdot 4 \text{ byte} = 1120 \text{ byte} \end{aligned}$$

In total: 4560 byte need to be stored for the given example values.

The SMPC module also offers the restoration of the secret using Lagrange interpolation (see Listing 4.5). The interpretation of the result remains in the control of the node module. If the Lagrange interpolation for a round in the secure max protocol returns a value unequal to zero the node has to set the related bit for the maximum result and so on.

All computations need to be in the finite ring defined by the upper bound prime. For larger computation groups the intermediate values in the Lagrange interpolation can leave the range, so potential risk operations have to be casted in a larger type and afterwards returned into the ring using modular operations. The SMPC module therefore offers the cryptographic modulo for negative values and a modulo for fractions based on the Euclidean algorithm. Also for power operations with the risk of reaching undefined type ranges a power function with modulo application on intermediate values is provided (see Listing 4.6)

Listing 4.6: Modular operations in smpc.c

```
int mod_power(int base, int power, int mod);
unsigned int mod (long long , int );
int mod_fraction(long long x, int p);
```

Listing 4.7: Definitions in configurations.h

```
#define CONFIGURATIONS_MINIMUM_COMPUTATION_GROUP 20
#define CONFIGURATIONS_MAXIMUM_COMPUTATION_GROUP 20
#define CONFIGURATIONS_MAX_SCORE 10000
// wolfCrypt settings
#define CONFIGURATIONS_AES_KEY_SIZE 192
#define CONFIGURATIONS_RSA_KEY_SIZE 3072
#define CONFIGURATIONS_BOUNDING_PRIME 2147483647
```

## 4.3 Interfacing the Library

As mentioned in subsection 4.2.1 for the usage of the library `node.h` provides the prototypes for function callbacks, that need to be provided from the host system, to give the library access to the communication layer. In the current implementation the system is intended for the usage with Bluetooth and devices are identified by MAC, but with moderate effort the system is portable to an IP address based system: only the arrays containing the discovery results and related messages in the node module need adjustments, otherwise the computations are independent from the communication layer. Based on tests on various Android device with different API levels only the RFCOMMBleutooth protocol offers the ability to connect devices without (with minimum) user-interaction.

### 4.3.1 Configuration

Before the system is used, the settings in `configuration.h` should be adjusted to the demands of the own system. The default values are displayed in Listing 4.7.

As previously described the value for minimum and maximum computation group size are set to the same value, making the group size static and enabling the computation of the shares in the off-line phase (see Figure 4.2).

Smaller computation groups offer better performance and reduce the risk of network separation, but for security reasons no adversaries should be tolerated. Providing a narrow estimation for the possible scores thorough the maximum score value is important

Listing 4.8: Function prototypes int node.h

```
void node_init(char *mac);
void node_pass_score(int score);
void node_pass_message(char *source, char *message);
void node_set_discovery_function(void(*func)(char macs [] [18], int*
    result_count));
void node_set_send_function(void(*func)(char *target, char *message));
void node_set_await_function(int (*func)(char * source, char []));
```

Listing 4.9: Prototypes for host callbacks

```
void host_function_send_message(char *target, char *message);
void host_function_discovery(char macs [] [18], int* result_count);
int host_function_await_response(char *source, char response []);
```

for the secure maximum and minimum protocols, because it determines the number of needed rounds.

The selected key sizes for RSA and AES meet currently considered secure settings.

### 4.3.2 Usage in C

After including `node.h` the host has access to the functions to initialize the node, pass a score or pass a message (see Listing 4.8).

Using the provided setters, the host system needs to provide the function pointers for the functions to send from the node, run discovery of Bluetooth devices and await the response from a specified node (see Listing 4.9). After setting the callbacks the node can be initialized before passing the first score (see Listing 4.10).

### 4.3.3 Usage in Android

Using the Android Native Development Kit (NDK) it is possible to utilize C and C++ libraries inside of activities, to reuse existing code base.

Listing 4.10: Node setup and system start

```
node_set_discovery_function(&host_function_discovery);
node_set_await_function(&host_function_await_response);
node_set_send_function(&host_function_send_message);
node_init(mac);
node_pass_score(score);
```

Listing 4.11: Method signature in MainActivity.java

```
public native void nodePassMessage(String source, String message);
```

Listing 4.12: Function implementation in node\_wrapper.c

```
JNIEEXPORT void JNICALL  
Java_[package]_MainActivity_nodePassMessages(JNIEnv *env, jobject this,  
        jstring source, jstring message) { ... }
```

To develop native code for Android with Android Studio the following SDK Tools are needed and are provided through the integrated SDK Manager

- LLDB: a debugger, providing debugging of native code to Android Studio
- CMake: an open-source, cross-platform build tool, working alongside the Gradle Build Tool embedded in Android Studio

To call functions from the library in Java code the function calls are wrapped in native methods implemented by the native-lib. The signature of the function is marked with the native keyword and the function name follows a strict naming convention.



Figure 4.4: Java Native Interface (JNI) bridge between Java and C code

To provide a callback function, JNI class lookup can be used. To call a Java method defined as `public void sendMessage(String target, String message){ ... }` class and method references can be stored (see Listing 4.13) and the reference to a wrapping function is passed to the C library.

## Android Bluetooth Observations

In regard to the implementation of the RFCOMM communication, different versions of Android showed different behavior: when trying to set the visibility, older test devices running Android 4.0 up to Android 4.3 issued the initial user confirmation to become indefinitely discoverable (see Listing 4.14), but stopped without notification after the

Listing 4.13: Using a Java method as callback for native method

```
jclass mainClass = (*env)->FindClass(env, "[package]/MainActivity")
;
jmethodID id = (*env)->GetMethodID(env, mainClass, "sendMessage", "(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V");
jobject javaObjectRef = (*env)->NewObject(env, mainClass, id);
(*env)->CallVoidMethod(javaObjectRef, id, "some mac", "some message");
```

Listing 4.14: Android discoverable intent

```
Intent discoverableIntent = new Intent(BluetoothAdapter.
    ACTION_REQUEST_DISCOVERABLE);
discoverableIntent.putExtra(BluetoothAdapter.
    EXTRA_DISCOVERABLE_DURATION, 0);
context.startActivity(discoverableIntent);
```

duration set in the Bluetooth settings, deviation from the android documentation. In contrast Android 5 devices became discoverable indefinitely (until Bluetooth was disabled and re-enabled).

Also one device (Kindle Fire HDX based on Android 4.2.2) showed unexpected behavior when establishing the insecure RFCOMM connection, showing briefly the pairing request before hiding it, yet denying the connection. From these first tests - though not representative - the downward compatibility for devices running Android 4.3 and below might be problematic.

# Chapter 5

## Evaluation

While the correctness of the implemented methods is verified using unit tests (see section 4.1), the influence of configurable options (see 4.3.1 Configuration), like the group size has to be evaluated. Also the impact of devices with significant lower computation power is of interest when targeting wearables and IoT grade devices. For the usage of the framework embedded in an Android application running battery powered devices like the personal smartphone, the power consumption is also an important topic.

### 5.1 Power Consumption for Bluetooth States

To evaluate the power consumption of Android devices in different Bluetooth states an application was developed enabling Bluetooth states for a specific amount a time. Then a report can be imported from the devices which contains estimated power usage<sup>1</sup>.

1. Using Android Debug Bridge (ADB) with a connected device, the battery stats are reseted to reduce the produced analysis file to the duration of interest: `adb shell dumpsys batterystats --reset`
2. The device is disconnected from the development system, so battery stats are recorded
3. The application is executed for a fixed time duration
4. The device is reconnected to the development system and using ADB the report is pulled from the device: `adb bugreport > bugreport.txt`

---

<sup>1</sup><https://developer.android.com/studio/profile/battery-historian.html>

5. The report contains a section labeled estimated power use (see Listing 5.1)

Listing 5.1: Android battery stats report

```
Estimated power use (mAh):  
Capacity: 2300, Computed drain: 229, actual drain: 184-207  
Screen: 146  
Bluetooth: 12,0
```

All test were realized on a Sony Experia Z1 Compact:

- Android 5.1.1
- Software Version 14.6.A.1.236
- disabled power saving modes

Each test case has a runtime of one hour, to reduce the significance of measuring inaccuracy. At the beginning and after completion of the tests Bluetooth is disabled. Discoverable state is periodically verified during the test with another Android device in range. Tests:

1. Bluetooth enabled, not discoverable, not discovering and not connected
2. Bluetooth enabled, discoverable, not discovering and not connected
3. Bluetooth enabled, discoverable, not discovering and connected over RFCOMM
4. Bluetooth enabled, discoverable, not discovering, connected over RFCOMM and exchanging small messages
5. Bluetooth enabled, discoverable, and discovering, not connected
6. Wi-Fi enabled, connected and receiving video-stream

The results of the power consumption tests are displayed in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1: Batterystats for different Bluetooth states (logarithmic scale)

## 5.2 Examination of Computation Time Dependent on Number of Participants

For the evaluation of the influence of computation power and computation group size a tester application was developed, that utilizes the framework by including node.h and providing the needed callbacks. Using a bash script, the group size  $n$  can be passed as a parameter to the application and the script generates  $n$  processes and assigns a MAC to each process as well as a score value.

The processes communicate using named pipes, with the MAC as name, so the communication flow is very similar to the communication over a RFCOMM socket.

To take the discovery duration into account, the tester application forces a sleep for 3 seconds, when discovery is called by the node module. Also a sleep duration based on the lower end for Bluetooth transmission rates (732,2 kbit/s) is applied for outgoing messages depending on the message length.

The time critical part is the online phase of the computations (see ??), therefore the coordinator measures the time (using the `<time.h>` library) from sending the state request to all nodes nearby until the computation is concluded with the acknowledgment from all nodes in response to the computation result announcement.

Test settings for secure sum protocol:

1. Secure sum with 5 nodes
2. Secure sum with 10 nodes
3. Secure sum with 20 nodes
4. Secure sum with 40 nodes
5. Secure sum with 80 nodes
6. Secure sum with 100 nodes

Test execution: each test was repeated three times and the displayed durations in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 are the arithmetic average to reduce the significance of disturbances through other processes.




Figure 5.2: Computation time over number of nodes for secure sum

Test settings for secure maximum protocol:

1. Secure minimum/maximum with 5 nodes
2. Secure minimum/maximum with 10 nodes
3. Secure minimum/maximum with 20 nodes

4. Secure minimum/maximum with 40 nodes
5. Secure minimum/maximum with 80 nodes
6. Secure minimum/maximum with 100 nodes




Figure 5.3: Computation time over number of nodes for secure maximum

### 5.3 Examination of Computation Time Dependent on Computing Power

To evaluate the influence of computational power, the virtualization software VirtualBox was used: a Linux client running the tester application is limited through the CPU limit setting of VirtualBox. In VirtualBox the guest CPU setting can not be reduced beyond a lower bound (40% on the development environment). Within these limits, the total computation time did not change reliable or reproducible.

As an alternative approach cpulimit<sup>2</sup> was used to limit the cpu usage of the tester processes. Again the online time was not affected besides for very small limit-values (1

---

<sup>2</sup><https://github.com/opsengine/cpulimit>

to 5%). The measurements embedded in the code revealed however, that the usage of **SIGSTOP** and **SIGCONT** signals distort the measurements and the results are not reproducible.

Finally the power management of the hosting system provided reproducible results. The changes in the related computations (encryption, decryption, summation, Lagrange interpolation) are very small, therefore the fixed value for discovery was removed, to highlight the differences (see Figure 5.4).

For all tests the computation group size was defined as 20. The power management was then used to limit the CPU to levels of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%.




Figure 5.4: Computation time over CPU Power for 20 nodes

# **Chapter 6**

## **Discussion**

The evaluation of the core implementation in chapter 5 demonstrates that the framework reaches a performance grade that makes it applicable for smaller computation group sizes. Besides the computation performance, the unobtrusiveness for the end-user is also important for the successful integration of the system for example in a work environment. The demands toward the system were outlined in section 3.1 and the requirement coverage is reviewed. Finally solutions and improvement potential for design flaws, which were uncovered through the simulations and analysis of subroutines, are proposed for next he evaluation also revealed first design flaws and improvement potential and solutions are proposed for the next development iterations.

### **6.1 Requirement Satisfaction in Real-Life Settings**

#### **6.1.1 User Acceptance**

The results of the power consumption tests for Android (see 5.1 Batterystats for different Bluetooth states (logarithmic scale) ) show, that having Bluetooth enabled, being discoverable and holding a RFCOMM connection have no significance for the daily usage of a smartphone: being discoverable and connected for 24 hours consumes around the same amount of power as having the display activated for a few minutes (also analyzed through the battery stats, compare Listing 5.1). The discovery phase is expensive in regard of power consumption, but device dependent this phase is usually only active for around one to five seconds. Even for multiple retries to form a computation group, the total power consumption per hour for discovery will range significantly below 1 mA, for

example if for all three SMPC protocols 10 retries to form a computation group were needed and the device runs discovery for 5 seconds, then the power consumption for the discovery phase is 0,5 mA in an hour.

In regard of the power consumption the framework is therefore fit for usage and worries regarding drainage of the battery can be easily invalidated.

Further the Android tests (see section 4.3.3) have shown, that at least for Android devices running Android 5.0 and up, the user interaction required for joining the system is limited to the permission of becoming discoverable. Until Bluetooth is disabled, no further interactions are required and no system settings have to be manually altered. Therefore requirement *FR01 Pairing-less Connection* is also met.

For developers *NFR02 Maintainability* is met through the doxygen documentation, the clean interface provided by `node.h` and the implementations in the tester application and the Android example. For *NFR01 Usability* all settings are adjusted in `configurations.h`, simplifying the framework adaption and integration. As described in section 4.3, *NFR04 Expandability* is not fully met yet. The MAC address bound identification of devices will be further abstracted to decouple the framework from a specific wireless technology.

### 6.1.2 Required Time for Computation

Since the system is intended for a MANET, the computation time has to stay within limits, so that the computation can complete before the fully meshed computation group network is separated.

In the secure sum protocol for lower node numbers, the discovery is the major time consumer and up to 20 nodes, the computational costs are comparatively negligible. For larger computation groups, the time needed to compute the secure sum reaches durations that make a network separation for moving nodes likely. Bluetooth range varies significantly among Bluetooth modules and power settings, but a range of 10 meters is a good rule of thumb. Considering a typical walking speed of 1,4 meters per second (Mohler et al. 2007), the distance after 7 seconds (compare Figure 6.1) makes it likely that the connection to other nodes is lost because of the distance or shielding walls, especially if the other nodes are moving as well.

The core implementation provided in chapter 4 meets requirements *FR04 Coordina-*




Figure 6.1: Walking range in computation time

*tor Election, FR05 Token-Passing and FR06 Secure Multi-Party Computation Module,* though based on the current performance simulations of the system (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3) *NFR03 Performance* is only met for small computation groups ( $n < 20$ ). Since the simulations in chapter 5 do not take into account durations needed for establishing the RFCOMM connections, the simulations need to be adjusted based on further measurements on different Android devices. The development goal for the tester application is to make it a tool for analyzing the performance of the framework in the intended system configuration.

The tests regarding computational power have shown, that the reduction of the online phase through scale up of the nodes is limited: the message driven nature of the system and the high amount of massages (raising with the number of nodes squared) passed between the nodes in a sequential manner are not transmitted faster when upscaling. This demonstrates that the framework can tolerate nodes with comparatively low computational power, but the influence of the messages also request optimization of the message system (see section 6.2).

## 6.2 Design Flaws Detected Through Evaluation

Since the sequential message passing between the nodes is causing a significant computation delay, the design needs to be optimized. The message format holds potential for optimization as well as the message exchange protocol. Message format improvements:


- Currently the messages are zero terminated strings, which simplified the first implementation, but it also generates overhead: each message holds the additional termination character and numbers are digit-wise converted into ASCII characters. For a signed integer of eleven digit length, this produces an overhead of 8 bytes. Therefore all messages with known payload size can be transmitted in the native data type to reduce overhead. For encrypted messages this provides no message reduction though, because short messages are padded to the block size (16 byte).
- The MAC addresses are transmitted as passed from the host in the colon-separated form. Removing the separating colons removes 5 byte per MAC address.
- The `Broadcast_Request` enumerator can be defined as the upper bound for all message types. Instead of concatenating the broadcast and the message request, the sum of booth can be used as message type. Using 127 as the broadcast value leaves 0 to 126 as message type values, while keeping the sum within a byte's length. The receiving node checks if the message type is larger than the broadcast request value to identify a broadcast request. This reduces the broadcast requests by 3 bytes.

Similar to software parallelization, where load is distributed among threads, in some cases the sequential message passing can be distributed among nodes:


- Instead of sending each node in the computation group sequentially a broadcast message (compare 6.2a), the coordinator can distribute broadcasts with large payloads among nodes, which in turn transmit the message to a subgroup of nodes. The coordinator then sends `ACK`-requests to each node to verify all nodes are ready (see 6.2b).

Protocol improvements:

- The sum protocol currently limits the computation group, because an 32 bit integer is computed and returned. For larger scores, this can cause a integer overflow if the



(a) Current implementation of computation group announcement



(b) Improved computation group announcement

Figure 6.2: Broadcast optimization

computation group is larger than the maximum value of the data type divided by the maximum score. Because of the expected group sizes based on chapter 5, using a 64 bit integer will fix the overflow risk.

- A fixed size computation group reduces the online-phase and is therefore the preferred setting, but this will leave single nodes without the option to commit their scores. The computation priority should increase for these node. When a threshold is reached, the computation can tolerate a number of nodes (similar to the threshold for adversaries) using computation results as inputs. This has to be evaluated for correctness and privacy.

For the real-life usage a quality of service feature will be useful: if the configurations of the framework provide a high grade of privacy (larger computation group) but cause many network separation while computing, the user should be informed. For the assessment the following events should be collected:

1. Forming of computation group was unsuccessful.
2. Computation was aborted due to network separation.

Using these values as a metric for system performance, the maintainer can then change the computation group size to improve the chances for computation completion.

# **Chapter 7**

## **Conclusion**

# References

- Andersson, Christian et al. (2012). *RFCOMM WITH TS 07.10*. Bluetooth Special Interest Group. [online] Available at: URL: [https://www.bluetooth.org/docman/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc\\_id=263754](https://www.bluetooth.org/docman/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=263754) (visited on 11/25/2016).
- Aumann, Yonatan and Yehuda Lindell (2007). “Security Against Covert Adversaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries”. In: *Theory of Cryptography: 4th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2007, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, February 21-24, 2007. Proceedings*. Ed. by Salil P. Vadhan. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 137–156. ISBN: 978-3-540-70936-7. URL: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7\\_8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_8).
- Burkhart, Martin et al. (2012). *SEPIA library*. [online] Available at: URL: <http://www.sepia.ee.ethz.ch/index.html> (visited on 12/08/2016).
- Clifton, Chris et al. (2002). “Tools for Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining”. In: *SIGKDD Explor. Newsl.* 4.2, pp. 28–34. ISSN: 1931-0145. URL: <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/772862.772867>.
- Cramer, Ronald, Ivan Bjerre Damgård, and Jesper Buus Nielsen (2015). *Secure Multiparty Computation and Secret Sharion*. Cambridge University Press.
- Delfs, H. and H. Knebl (2015). *Introduction to Cryptography: Principles and Applications*. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN: 9783662479742.
- Dorri, Ali, Seyed Reza Kamel, and Esmaeil Kheirkhah (2015). “Security challenges in mobile ad hoc networks: A survey”. In: *arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.03233*.
- Eeles, Peter (2005). *Capturing Architectural Requirements*. IBM. [online] Available at: URL: <http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/4706.html#N10073>(archived at: %20<http://web.archive.org/web/20161129163620/http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/4706.html#N10073>

//www.ibm.com/developerworks/rational/library/4706.html) (visited on 11/28/2016).

Forni, Amy Ann and Rob van der Meulen (2016). *Gartner Says Five of Top 10 Worldwide Mobile Phone Vendors Increased Sales in Second Quarter of 2016*. Gartner, Inc. [online] Available at: URL: <http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3415117> (visited on 12/06/2016).

Funai, Colin, Cristiano Tapparello, and Wendi B. Heinzelman (2016). “Supporting Multi-hop Device-to-Device Networks Through WiFi Direct Multi-group Networking”. In: *CoRR* abs/1601.00028. URL: <http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.00028>.

Ghosh, Sukumar (2015). *Distributed Systems: An Algorithmic Approach, Second Edition*. Chapman & Hall/CRC Computer and Information Science Series. CRC Press. ISBN: 9781498760058.

Hasan, O. et al. (2013). “A Privacy Preserving Prediction-based Routing Protocol for Mobile Delay Tolerant Networks”. In: *2013 IEEE 27th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA)*, pp. 546–553.

Hegendorf, Steve (2016). *Get ready for Bluetooth mesh!* Bluetooth Special Interest Group. [online] Available at: URL: [http://blog.bluetooth.com/\\_trashed/](http://blog.bluetooth.com/_trashed/) (archived at: %20[http://web.archive.org/web/20161125191028/http://blog.bluetooth.com/\\_trashed/](http://web.archive.org/web/20161125191028/http://blog.bluetooth.com/_trashed/)) (visited on 11/25/2016).

Ganga, Ilango S. et al., eds. (2010). *IEEE Standard for Information Technology — Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems — Local and Metropolitan Area Networks-Specific Requirements Part 3: Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications Amendment 4: Media Access Control Parameters, Physical Layers and Management Parameters for 40 Gb/s and 100 Gb/s Operation*. New York, NY, USA: LAN/MAN Standards Committee. URL: <http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.3.html>.

Keller, Marcel et al. (2016). *Bristol University — Department of Computer Science*. [online] Available at: URL: <https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/SPDZ/> (visited on 12/08/2016).

Mohler, Betty J. et al. (2007). “Visual flow influences gait transition speed and preferred walking speed”. In: *Experimental Brain Research* 181.2, pp. 221–228. ISSN: 1432-1106.

- Opengarden.com (2016a). *Mesh networking made easy - Open Garden*. Open Garden. [online] Available at: URL: <https://www.opengarden.com/meshkit.html>(archived at: %20<http://web.archive.org/web/20161126105839/https://www.opengarden.com/meshkit.html>) (visited on 11/26/2016).
- (2016b). *Start Something - Open Garden*. Open Garden. [online] Available at: URL: <https://www.opengarden.com/firechat.html>(archived at: %20<http://web.archive.org/web/20161126110144/https://www.opengarden.com/firechat.html>) (visited on 11/24/2016).
- Shamir, Adi (1979). “How to Share a Secret”. In: *Communications of the ACM*.
- sharemind.cyber.ee (2011). *Sharemind - analyze confidential data without compromising privacy*. Cybernetica AS. [online] Available at: URL: <https://sharemind.cyber.ee/> (visited on 12/08/2016).
- Sheikh, Rashid, Beerendra Kumar, and Durgesh Kumar Mishra (2009). “Privacy Preserving k Secure Sum Protocol”. In: *CoRR* abs/0912.0956. URL: <http://arxiv.org/abs/0912.0956>.
- Thomas, Josh (2014). *The SPAN Project*. [online] Available at: URL: <https://github.com/ProjectSPAN> (visited on 11/25/2016).
- Yao, Andrew C. (1982). “Protocols for Secure Computations”. In: *Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*. SFCS '82. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, pp. 160–164. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1982.88>.
- Zamani, Mahdi (2016). *GitHub - mahdiz/mpclib: MpcLib - A Multi-Party Computation Library*. [online] Available at: URL: <https://github.com/mahdiz/mpclib> (visited on 12/08/2016).
- Zyskind, Guy, Oz Nathan, and Alex Pentland (2016). *Enigma*. [online] Available at: URL: <http://www.enigma.co/> (visited on 12/08/2016).