



Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

Modeling the Ideal Cipher in Linicrypt

Master Thesis

Frederik Semmel

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Advisors: Fabio Banfi, Ueli Maurer

Institute of Theoretical Computer Science, ETH Zürich

Abstract

Linicrypt is a mathematical framework introduced by Carmer and Rosulek (Crypto 2016), that is used to prove cryptographic properties of programs that only make calls to a random oracle and perform linear operations in a field \mathbb{F} . We introduce new abstractions which allow us to extend Linicrypt to work with ideal ciphers instead of random oracles. In Linicrypt, the execution of a program is viewed as a vector in a finite-dimensional vector space over \mathbb{F} . We describe the set of such vectors in an alternative way and use this formalism to characterize a weakness regarding collision resistance called a collision structure. Because of the new level of abstraction, this characterization is applicable simultaneously in the ideal cipher model and the random oracle model. We show that one can transform a program with a collision structure into its own attack by performing a basis change on an algebraic representation of itself and then reversing its input and output. The characterization is sound and complete in the case of Linicrypt programs making only a single query. We apply these concepts in deriving an attack taxonomy for the Merkle-Damgård construction obtained from the 64 compression functions introduced by Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle (Crypto 1993).

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In this thesis, we use the recently introduced Linicrypt model to revisit a set of well-known cryptographic constructions. The goal is twofold: On the one hand, we hope to increase our understanding of their security properties and the attacks on them. On the other hand, we aim to improve and extend the Linicrypt framework.

1.1 Background and Motivation

It has been well studied that we can construct hash functions securely from block ciphers. Moreover, since the success of very strong block ciphers such as AES, the trust in the security of modern block cipher constructions is very high. Therefore, it makes sense to use a block cipher that is believed to be secure as a building block for other systems and express their security in terms of the security of the block cipher. The ideal cipher model, which Shannon introduced in [Sha49], is a useful technique in this context. This model assumes that the block cipher is an independent uniformly random permutation for any key. Consequently, security properties can be proven in absolute terms, depending only on the number of queries an adversary makes to the ideal cipher. The number of queries acts as a proxy for the time and resources needed to break the construction, as we assume that the execution of the ideal cipher program has a fixed cost.

In a well-known paper from 1993 [PGV94], the authors Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle analyze the 64 most basic constructions of a compression function from a block cipher. 12 lead to secure hash functions in the Merkle-Damgård construction, including the Davies-Meyer compression function. This construction is used, for example, in the popular hash function family SHA-2. A follow-up paper by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [BRS02] in 2002 confirms these results by providing tight security proofs in the ideal cipher model. In addition, they find that 8 insecure compression functions of the 64 PGV constructions still lead to collision resistant Merkle-Damgård hash function constructions.

The PGV compression functions, as well as the Merkle-Damgård construction itself, consist of linear operations in a field, mixed with calls to a primitive. They are just two of many examples of this type of cryptographic construction. The Linicrypt model was introduced by Carmer & Rosulek [CR16] to analyze such constructions at a higher level

of abstraction. The central idea of this proof model is the abstraction of a cryptographic construction from its program representation to an algebraic representation.

The Linicrypt framework has several benefits. Firstly, attacks and security proofs work for a significant class of constructions at once. It is easier to create a characterization for a given security definition at the algebraic representation level than at the program description level. Therefore, one can write proofs that work for all constructions that fulfill this characterization. Secondly, characterizations can often be checked efficiently by a machine. For example, in [CR16], two inputless Linicrypt programs were shown to be indistinguishable if and only if their algebraic representation are equivalent under a relation they define. Another example is Theorem 1 from [HRR22], where authors describe a sufficient condition for a program to be IND\$-CPA secure in terms of its algebraic representation. Both these characterizations can be computed in polynomial time.

1.2 Our Contribution

This thesis focuses on the results from [MSR19] by McQuoid, Swope, and Rosulek. They find a complete and sound characterization of collision resistance for a Linicrypt program if the program uses only distinct nonces in its calls to a random oracle. It turns out that collision resistance is equivalent to second-preimage resistance. We replace the random oracle with an ideal cipher and adapt the algebraic representation accordingly. Following the philosophy of the Linicrypt model, we try to unify the proofs for both primitives.

To do so, we make a set of definitions that differ slightly in the case of the random oracle and the ideal cipher. Some basic lemmas have to be proven separately for both cases, but their statements are identical. Our characterization of the existence of a second-preimage attack is then expressed in terms of these lemmas. This way, the characterization and proof for the attack work for both primitives simultaneously. If a program fulfills our condition, we say it has a collision structure, following [MSR19]. But our more general definition of collision structure includes the case of degeneracy as an edge case, which they had to treat separately. Unfortunately, the security proof from [MSR19] cannot be used directly in the ideal cipher model, because a block cipher does not take a nonce as input. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to single query constructions for our security proof. The existence of a collision structure is then a complete and sound characterization of collision resistance and second-preimage resistance for single query constructions.

We then apply this ideal cipher based Linicrypt model to the 64 compression functions from [PGV94]. We can derive an attack taxonomy for the Merkle-Damgård constructions using the new concepts based on these compression functions. Such a derivation of the types of attacks was not given in the works mentioned above. Our categorization for second-preimage attacks agrees mostly with the categories developed by [PGV94] and [BRS02] for collision attacks. However, we consider ours to be more fine-grained. We

could not find a second-preimage attack for 13 schemes. 8 of them have been proven to be collision resistant by [BRS02], hence also second-preimage resistant. The remaining 5 are not collision resistant due to very particular collisions between different length inputs. We suspect, however, that they are second-preimage resistant.

The high degree of geometric symmetry in the derivation, the 5 remaining schemes and the schemes vulnerable to an input permutation attack point to possible future research on Linicrypt. In particular, a theorem about collision resistance and second-preimage resistance for general Linicrypt programs using repeated nonces should fill these gaps in the derivation. Towards this goal, we identify two weaknesses a Linicrypt program with repeated nonces can have in addition to a collision structure. The problem of collapsing queries has been briefly described in [MSR19]. Adding to this, we describe a permutation attack that can be carried out when the queries made by the program and its output follow a certain symmetry. The permutation attack includes the attacks which permute the inputs but is not limited to them.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

2.1 Linicrypt


2.1.1 Definition of a Linicrypt program

The Linicrypt model for cryptographic constructions was introduced by Carmer & Rosulek in [CR16]. Summarizing the formalization from that paper, a pure Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} is a straight line program whose intermediate variables are elements in a field \mathbb{F} . The only operations allowed to create an intermediate variable are:

- Retrieve an input, which is in \mathbb{F}
- Perform a linear combination of existing internal variables with fixed parameters
- Call a random oracle $H : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{F}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$
- Sample from \mathbb{F} uniformly

Finally, the program \mathcal{P} is allowed to output one or more of its variables. One can formalize a Linicrypt program as a sequence of commands, where each command creates a new intermediate variable. The input size and the specification of which variables form the output are also part of the formal description in [CR16].

Below is an example of a Linicrypt program \mathcal{P}^H , written in conventional pseudocode on the left and in explicit Linicrypt on the right.



We usually work with programs in conventional pseudocode and use suggestive names for the intermediate variables instead of v_i . Nevertheless, one should keep in mind, that

such programs could be formalized as a sequence of Linicrypt commands, where each generates a new intermediate variable. The superscript highlights that \mathcal{P} has access to a random oracle H . As this is often clear from the context, we will usually drop the superscript. When a Linicrypt program contains no sampling operations, it is called a deterministic Linicrypt program. In the context of collision resistance, this is the case we care about the most.

2.1.2 Type of adversaries

The Linicrypt model only imposes computational restrictions on the cryptographic constructions, not on the adversaries. We consider computationally unbounded adversaries \mathcal{A} , which have bounded access to the random oracle H . Therefore, an adversary's behavior is described in terms of the number of queries it makes. The additional power granted to an adversary by allowing unbounded computations is usually not helpful in this model. For example, we will show in the collision resistance case: A successful attack is either not possible for information-theoretical reasons, or it can be carried out by another Linicrypt program.

2.1.3 Algebraic Representation

One of the advantages of restricting the computational model is that one can characterize Linicrypt programs with an algebraic representation. We will introduce the concept of the algebraic representation as it was developed in previous Linicrypt papers. Some definitions, in particular, the definition of an oracle constraint, will be generalized in the following chapters. Let \mathcal{P} be a Linicrypt program with intermediate variables v_1, \dots, v_n . These are sorted in the order in which they are created in the program.

A **base variable** is an intermediate variable that was created by retrieving an input, calling the random oracle H or sampling from \mathbb{F} . These are special because they are not intrinsically linearly dependent on other intermediate variables. A **derived variable** is an intermediate variable created by performing a linear combination of existing intermediate variables. Note that derived variables can always be written as a unique linear combination of base variables. Let d be the number of base variables, and let us call them $b_1, \dots, b_d \subset \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$. We fix the ordering of the base variables by their order in v_1, \dots, v_n . We denote by $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$ the column vector consisting of the values that the base variables take in a specific execution of \mathcal{P} . The i th component of \mathbf{v} is set to the value that b_i takes in that execution. One should think of \mathbf{v} as a vector containing the whole state of the program execution. An intermediate variable, base or derived, can then be seen as a linear function going from the vector space \mathbb{F}^d to the actual value it adopts during an execution.

Let v_i be an intermediate variable. We define the **associated row vector** \mathbf{v}_i to be the unique row vector in $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$ representing this function. That means that for every execution of \mathcal{P} : If base variables take the values \mathbf{v} , the variable v_i has the value $\mathbf{v}_i \mathbf{v}$. Here we use the ordinary matrix product. For example for the i th base variable b_i we

have $\mathbf{b}_i = [0 \ \cdots \ 1 \ \cdots \ 0]$ where the 1 is in the i th position. We follow the convention used in the previous papers about Linicrypt to write matrices and vectors using a bold font.

The outputs of \mathcal{P} can be described by a matrix with entries in \mathbb{F} . Let $o_1, \dots, o_l \in \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$ be the output variables of \mathcal{P} . Then the **output matrix** \mathbf{O} of \mathcal{P} is defined by

$$\mathbf{O} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{o}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{o}_l \end{bmatrix}.$$

By the definition of the associated vectors \mathbf{o}_i , we have $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = [o_1 \ \cdots \ o_l]^\top$. The output matrix describes the linear correlations in the output of \mathcal{P} .

In the same way, we also define the **input matrix** of \mathcal{P} . If $i_1, \dots, i_k \in \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$ are the intermediate variables created by retrieving an input, then we write

$$\mathbf{I} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{i}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{i}_k \end{bmatrix}.$$

As i_1, \dots, i_k are base variables, the rows of \mathbf{I} are canonical basis row vectors. If the Linicrypt program first retrieves all its inputs, then \mathbf{i}_m is simply the m 'th canonical basis row vector.

The input and output matrices describe the linear correlations between the input and output of the program and its base variables. But the base variables are not entirely independent of each other. The relationship between the queries and answers to the random oracle H needs to be captured algebraically. Let $a_i = H(t_i, (q_1, \dots, q_n))$ be an operation in \mathcal{P} . The **associated oracle constraint** c of this operation is the tuple

$$c = \left(t_i, \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{q}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{q}_n \end{bmatrix}, \mathbf{a}_i \right) = (t_i, \mathbf{Q}_i, \mathbf{a}_i).$$

An associated oracle constraint should be interpreted as a constraint on \mathbf{v} , which requires $\mathbf{a}_i\mathbf{v} = H(t_i, \mathbf{Q}_i\mathbf{v})$. We denote the set of all (associated) oracle constraints of \mathcal{P} by \mathcal{C} .

As we want the base variables to be linearly independent of each other, we restrict ourselves to Linicrypt programs, which don't make multiple calls to the random oracle with the same input. In the language of the algebraic representation: We assume wlog that no two constraints in \mathcal{C} share the same t and \mathbf{Q} .

Wrapping up these definitions, we define the **algebraic representation** of the program \mathcal{P} to be the tuple $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$. A natural question that arises at this point is: Does the algebraic representation determine the behavior of \mathcal{P} completely?

The answer is yes; the algebraic representation does not lose any relevant information about the operations executed in \mathcal{P} . Informally, this is because the constraints in \mathcal{C} have a particular form, which makes it clear in which order the oracles calls have to be executed. Furthermore, this ordering and the input matrix determine which variables must be sampled and cannot be derived. Finally, the output matrix completely describes how to construct the output from the input, the results of the queries, and the additional randomly sampled values.

The authors of the original paper on Linicrypt [CR16] establish a much stronger result for inputless programs. First, they define the normalized form of an algebraic representation. It can be efficiently generated from any inputless program description. They prove that two programs are indistinguishable if and only if their normalized algebraic representations are the same up to a basis change. We will discuss the concept of basis change extensively in the following chapters.

2.1.4 Collision Resistance in Linicrypt

In a paper by McQuoid, Swope and Rosulek [MSR19, Characterizing Collision and Second-Preimage Resistance in Linicrypt], the authors introduced a necessary condition for collision resistance and second-preimage resistance for a deterministic Linicrypt program. Collision resistance means finding a pair of inputs for which the program computes the same output is hard. Such an input pair is called a collision. Second-preimage resistance is a weaker condition: Given a uniformly random chosen input, it is hard to find a second input that collides with it.

They identified two reasons why a *deterministic* Linicrypt \mathcal{P} program can fail to be second-preimage resistant. One can describe them roughly as follows:

1. It is degenerate, meaning that it doesn't use all of its inputs independently
2. It has a collision structure, which means that one can change some intermediate variable and compute what the input needs to be to counteract this change

Below are two example Linicrypt programs, $\mathcal{P}_{\text{deg}}^H$ is degenerate and $\mathcal{P}_{\text{cs}}^H$ has a collision structure.

$\mathcal{P}_{\text{deg}}^H(x, y)$ <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> $v := x + y$ return $H(v)$	$\mathcal{P}_{\text{cs}}^H(x, y)$ <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> $w := x + y$ return $H(w) + x$
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Note that you can set $w' \neq w$ to any value, then find an x' such that the output of $\mathcal{P}_{\text{cs}}^H$ stays the same, and finally solve for y' according to $w' = x' + y'$.

The authors show that for any deterministic Linicrypt program that is degenerate or has a collision structure, second-preimage resistance (and hence collision resistance) is completely broken. The main result of [CR16] is that they show that the converse of

this is also true, but only for Linicrypt programs that use distinct nonces in each call to the random oracle. Explicitly, if an adversary wins the collision game against such a Linicrypt program with a certain probability, then the program either has a collision structure, or it is degenerate. Furthermore, checking for degeneracy and the existence of a collision structure can be done efficiently.

In the following chapters, a similar result will be presented for a variant of Linicrypt where we replace the random oracle H with an ideal cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$. Along the way, we will merge the notions of degeneracy and collision structure by considering the former as an edge case of a collision structure.

2.2 Notation

We have already introduced some notational conventions. For reference, we summarize the notation we will use throughout the argument. Variables of a Linicrypt program and their values will be denoted with letters from the Latin alphabet in regular font. For example, depending on the context, x denotes the variable itself, or it stands for the value it takes in \mathbb{F} during a specific execution of the program. Their associated row vectors will have the same letter in bold font, e.g., $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Column vectors and matrices are also denoted by bold letters. We use $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$ to denote the column vector containing all the values for the base variables in the program's execution. In a slight overload of notation, we will denote both the canonical basis column vectors and the canonical basis row vectors by \mathbf{e}_i . Also, in order to simplify the notation, we will write $\mathbf{i} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ to denote the column vector $[i_1 \ \dots \ i_k]^\top$. We allow a Linicrypt program to take such a column vector as input, writing $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{i})$ for the output of \mathcal{P} when given the input i_1, \dots, i_k .

Linicrypt statements are often about the span of the rows of matrices. If $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}^{a \times d}$ for arbitrary $a \in \mathbb{N}$, then we define the rowspace of \mathbf{A} as $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A}) := \text{span}(\text{rows}(\mathbf{A})) \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Here we see rows as a function mapping a matrix in $\mathbb{F}^{a \times d}$ the set of its rows, where each row is in $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Note that rowsp is sometimes defined as a subset of \mathbb{F}^d instead of $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. We do not do this to simplify the notation in many statements and to emphasize that elements in $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A})$ should be considered as possible intermediate variables. For convenience, we also define for $\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n$ matrices with d columns: $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_n) := \sum_i^n \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A}_i)$. The concept of rowspace is helpful, for example, in the following style of arguments: If $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{v}$ has been determined, then $\mathbf{w}\mathbf{v}$ is determined for any $\mathbf{w} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A})$.

The kernel of a matrix \mathbf{A} as above is also used in Linicrypt proofs. As a reminder, $\ker(\mathbf{A}) := \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d \mid \mathbf{A}\mathbf{v} = 0\}$. We will use the following facts from Linear Algebra:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A})^\top &= \ker(\mathbf{A})^\perp \\ (V_1 + V_2)^\perp &= V_1^\perp \cap V_2^\perp \quad \text{for } V_1 \text{ and } V_2 \text{ subspaces of } \mathbb{F}^d \end{aligned}$$

For example: If $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{A}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{B}) = \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$, then $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{v}'$ and $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{v}'$ implies $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v}'$ for any $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}' \in \mathbb{F}^d$.

2.3 Security Definitions

We state our security definitions in the ideal cipher model, and we follow the notation from Boneh-Shoup [BS20]. Let \mathcal{P} be a Linicrypt program taking k inputs. The collision game and the second-preimage game in the ideal cipher model are defined as:

$\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A})$	$\text{SPRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A})$
instantiate an ideal cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$ $(i, i') \leftarrow \$\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{E}}$ return $(i \neq i') \wedge (\mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}(i) = \mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}(i'))$	instantiate an ideal cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$ $i \leftarrow \$\mathbb{F}^k$ $i' \leftarrow \$\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{E}}(i)$ return $(i \neq i') \wedge (\mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}(i) = \mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}(i'))$

Definition 2.1 (Collision Resistance). *Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary, and \mathcal{P} be a Linicrypt program. We define \mathcal{A} 's advantage as*

$$\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] = \Pr[\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}) = 1].$$

We call \mathcal{P} collision resistant if $\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}]$ is negligible for all (possibly not efficient) adversaries \mathcal{A} .

Definition 2.2 (Second-preimage Resistance). *Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary, and \mathcal{P} be a Linicrypt program. We define \mathcal{A} 's advantage as*

$$\text{SPRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] = \Pr[\text{SPRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}) = 1].$$

We call \mathcal{P} second-preimage resistant if $\text{SPRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}]$ is negligible for all (possibly not efficient) adversaries \mathcal{A} .

Because the program depends on the field \mathbb{F} it is defined over, the security definitions also depend on \mathbb{F} . Usually, a result that limits an adversary's advantage against a program depends on the size of \mathbb{F} . If one wants to have security definitions depending on a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, then one can choose a family of fields \mathbb{F}_λ where $|\mathbb{F}_\lambda|$ is exponential in λ . The parameterization of the field forces you to argue about the security of a family of programs \mathcal{P}_λ . If the coefficients are in a subfield of every \mathbb{F}_λ , then changing λ will usually not affect the relevant properties of the program. For example, a \mathcal{P}_λ with coefficients in $\{0, 1\}$ has a collision structure for some λ if and only if it has a collision structure for all λ .

In Definition 2.1 and 2.2 we use the term negligible in the same sense as Boneh-Shoup [BS20, Section 2.3.1 - 2.3.4]. If one parametrizes the program with the security parameter λ , then the advantage of any adversary can be bounded by a function $\epsilon(\lambda)$. The advantage is called negligible if the function $1/\epsilon(\lambda)$ is super-polynomial in λ .

Chapter 3

A new level of abstraction for Linicrypt

This chapter introduces new concepts that help adapt Linicrypt to the ideal cipher model. We encapsulate the properties of the oracle model in a small set of definitions and lemmas. This way, the proofs building on top of them can work independently of which oracle model we consider. In this chapter, we introduce these concepts for standard Linicrypt and apply them to redefine collision structures. First, we describe a condition that causes a Linicrypt program to be a bijection from its input to its output. In this case, both programs have the same associated oracle constraints up to basis change, and their input and output matrices are switched. Similar reasoning is used to define collision structures, which enable a second preimage attack. Our definition for a collision structure incorporates the definitions of collision structure and degeneracy from [MSR19].

3.1 Revisiting Algebraic Representations

In the previous chapter, we defined the algebraic representation for a Linicrypt program. It consists of the input matrix $\mathbf{I} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$, the output matrix $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{F}^{l \times d}$ and the set of constraints $\mathcal{C} = \{(t_i, \mathbf{Q}_i, \mathbf{a}_i) \mid i = 1, \dots, n\}$, with $\mathbf{Q}_i \in \mathbb{F}^{m_i \times d}$ and $\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. These matrices have a very particular form; not every combination of such matrices is the algebraic representation of a program. We encourage the reader to think of them in the following sense: We constrain an initially unknown $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$ with $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ for some arbitrary input, then the program computes the rest of the components of \mathbf{v} according to \mathcal{C} via oracle queries, and finally, it outputs $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$.

The algebraic representation suggests that the input and output matrix play similar roles: They are linear constraints for the base variables. Therefore, collision resistance should be expressible in terms of the ability to solve the constraints \mathcal{C} while setting $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}$ to some value. We will formalize this idea in this section. A question that arises is: Which combination of matrices with the above structure can be seen as a Linicrypt program? We need to define a random oracle constraint abstractly to answer this question.

Definition 3.1 (Random oracle constraint). *A random oracle constraint of dimension d taking m inputs is a tuple $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$ for $t \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $\mathbf{Q} \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times d}$ and $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$.*

This definition is a generalization of the definition in the preliminaries. When constructing the algebraic representation for a Linicrypt program, we always have the special case that $\mathbf{a} = [0 \ \cdots \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ \cdots \ 0]$. We call t the nonce and refer to \mathbf{Q} as the query matrix and to \mathbf{a} as the answer matrix. If the nonce is the empty string, then we just write (\mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a}) instead of $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$. Usually we simply say “a constraint” when the other variables are clear from the context.

The constraint $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$ encodes the relationship via the random oracle between the base variables in a program. This semantic meaning of the constraints is encoded in the following definition.

Definition 3.2 (Solution of constraints). *Let \mathcal{C} be a set of constraints of dimension d . We say a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$ **solves** \mathcal{C} if $\mathbf{a}\mathbf{v} = H(t, \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v})$ for all $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathcal{C}$. Such a vector \mathbf{v} is called a **solution** of \mathcal{C} . The set of all solutions to \mathcal{C} is called $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$.*

Because H is a well-defined function, and not just any relation, these requirements extend to the constraints.

Definition 3.3 (Well-defined). *A set of (random oracle) constraints \mathcal{C} is **well-defined** if for any pair of constraints $c = (t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$ and $c' = (t', \mathbf{Q}', \mathbf{a}')$ in \mathcal{C} we have $(t, \mathbf{Q}) = (t', \mathbf{Q}') \implies \mathbf{a} = \mathbf{a}'$.*

When we use a set of constraints, we will implicitly also require that it is well-defined. Highlighting the function like properties of a constraint $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$, we will also use the shorthand $(t, \mathbf{Q}) \mapsto \mathbf{a}$, or $\mathbf{Q} \mapsto \mathbf{a}$ in case that t is an empty string. This notation was introduced in [HRR22].

We want to analyze which sets of constraints have solutions and how these solutions can be computed. First, every Linicrypt program is a method to solve the constraints \mathcal{C} from its algebraic representation. If we run a program \mathcal{P} on some input (i_1, \dots, i_k) , it will query the random oracle and solve each random oracle constraint one by one in the order of the corresponding queries in \mathcal{P} . Let us call the resulting vector containing the values of the base variables in this execution $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$. This \mathbf{v} is a solution of \mathcal{C} satisfying $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$.

If a set of constraints is well-defined, it might still not correspond to a valid Linicrypt program. Consider the set

$$\mathcal{C} = \{[1 \ 0] \mapsto [0 \ 1], [0 \ 1] \mapsto [1 \ 0]\}.$$

Although it is well-defined, it would correspond to the two calls to the random oracle that are not compatible with the Linicrypt model. Specifically, such constraints would correspond to a program which contains the commands $y = H(x)$ and $x = H(y)$, where x, y are intermediate variables. There is no order in which these two calls can be executed without doing a reassignment, which does not exist in Linicrypt. Still, this set of constraints might have solutions. For every $x \in \mathbb{F}$ with the property that

$x = H(H(x))$ the vector $(x, H(x))$ is a solution of \mathcal{C} . In other words, the set \mathcal{C} expresses a condition on the base variables which a Linicrypt program cannot represent.

To characterize which constraints can be solved by a Linicrypt program, we need to consider the concept of basis change as it was introduced in [CR16].

Definition 3.4 (Basis change). *Let \mathbf{B} be any matrix in $\mathbb{F}^{d \times d}$ and $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a Linicrypt program. We define*

$$\mathcal{CB} := \{(t, \mathbf{QB}, \mathbf{aB}) \mid (t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathcal{C}\}.$$

*If \mathbf{B} is invertible, we say $\mathcal{PB} := (\mathbf{IB}, \mathbf{OB}, \mathcal{CB})$ is a **pseudo algebraic representation** of \mathcal{P} .*

The concept of base change combines well with the definition of the solution set for some constraints. Let \mathcal{C} be any set of constraints and consider the basis change matrix \mathbf{B} . Note the following equivalence, which follows from the associativity of the matrix product:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{v} \text{ solves } \mathcal{CB} \\ \iff & H(t, \mathbf{QBv}) = \mathbf{aBv} \quad \text{for all } (t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathcal{C} \\ \iff & \mathbf{Bv} \text{ solves } \mathcal{C} \end{aligned}$$

This implies that $\mathbf{B}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{CB})} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{CB}) \rightarrow \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ is a well-defined bijection.

We aim to understand which oracle constraints can be solved given linear constraints. As a step towards this, we focus on characterizing which matrices \mathbf{I} and \mathbf{O} and constraints \mathcal{C} are pseudo algebraic representations of some program \mathcal{P} . This program is a method to find solutions to \mathcal{C} for any constraint to \mathbf{Iv} .

This characterization is desirable because it enables us to choose an arbitrary input matrix \mathbf{I} for a given set \mathcal{C} and check whether there exists a Linicrypt program that computes solutions to \mathcal{C} for this new input matrix \mathbf{I} . For example, the degeneracy and collision structure attacks described in [MSR19] are both attacks that could be performed as Linicrypt programs.

First, we describe the form $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ need to have such that they are the algebraic representation of a Linicrypt program.

Lemma 3.5. *Let \mathcal{C} be a finite well-defined set constraints of dimension d with $|\mathcal{C}| = n$, let $\mathbf{I} = [\mathbf{1}_k \ 0] \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$ for $k = d - n$ and let $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{F}^{l \times d}$ for some $l \in \mathbb{N}$.*

$(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ is the algebraic representation of a deterministic Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} if there exists an ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C} such that for all $i = 1, \dots, n$:

1. $\text{rows}(\mathbf{Q}_i) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{k+i-1})$
2. $\mathbf{a}_i = \mathbf{e}_{k+i}$

Proof Sketch. This is only a sketched proof. In order to formalize it, one first has to formalize the Linicrypt model as has been done in [CR16].

Assume there is such an ordering as in the statement of the lemma. We will construct the program \mathcal{P} . First, \mathcal{P} will store its k inputs into intermediate variables v_1, \dots, v_k , hence its input matrix is $\mathbf{I} = [\mathbf{1}_k \ 0]$. Then each of the random oracle constraints is converted into Linicrypt commands of the form $v_{k+i} = H(q_1, \dots, q_{k+i-1})$. Condition 1. from the lemma ensures that q_1, \dots, q_{k+i-1} are linear combinations solely of previously defined intermediate variables. Condition 2. from the lemma guarantees that the variable v_{k+i} has not been used previously, so the command is a valid Linicrypt command.

Finally, because $k = d - n$, we have instantiated all base variables and can output according to \mathbf{O} . \square

We will now generalize the condition from this lemma to make it independent of the chosen basis of \mathbb{F}^d . This leads to the characterization of pseudo algebraic representations.

Definition 3.6 (Deterministically Solvable). *Let \mathcal{C} be a finite and well-defined set of constraints of dimension d , and let $\mathbf{I} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. \mathcal{C} is **deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I}** (or fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$) if there exists an ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C} such that for all $i = 1, \dots, n$:*

1. $\text{rows}(\mathbf{Q}_i) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{i-1})$
2. $\mathbf{a}_i \notin \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{i-1})$

Additionally we require that $\text{rows}(\mathbf{I}) \cup \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n\}$ form a basis of $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. We call (c_1, \dots, c_n) a solution ordering of \mathcal{C} fixing \mathbf{I} (or fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$).

The definition of deterministically solvable constraints is similar to the definition of collision structure in [MSR19]. Indeed, we will use it to combine the collision structure and degeneracy attack defined in their work.

Intuitively, \mathcal{C} being deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I} means the following. We can constrain $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$ by $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ for an arbitrary input $i_1, \dots, i_k \in \mathbb{F}$, and then compute each oracle query deterministically (condition 1 in Definition 3.6) one by one, without creating a contradiction (condition 2 in Definition 3.6).

If we construct the algebraic representation $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ of a deterministic Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} , then \mathcal{C} is a deterministically solvable set of constraints fixing \mathbf{I} . Indeed, the solution ordering of \mathcal{C} fixing \mathbf{I} can be precisely the order of the corresponding queries in the execution of \mathcal{P} .

Lemma 3.7. *Let $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be the algebraic representation of a deterministic Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} taking k inputs. Then \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I} .*

Proof. Consider a constraint $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$ in \mathcal{C} . Because of the definition of algebraic representation, $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{e}_i$ for some i . Also, \mathbf{Q} has zeros in the columns to the right of and including column i . We can sort $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$, such that the \mathbf{a} 's are sorted. Indeed, this is the same order as the associated oracle calls in the execution of \mathcal{P} .

Condition 2 from Definition 3.6 is then fulfilled. Because \mathcal{P} is deterministic, the queries to the oracle are linear combinations of input variables and results of previous queries. Therefore, condition 1 must also be fulfilled. Finally, as \mathcal{P} contains no sampling operation, we know $d = k + n$. The set of associated vectors to the input variables, $\text{rows}(I) = \{\mathbf{i}_1, \dots, \mathbf{i}_k\}$, are linearly independent, hence it follows that $\{\mathbf{i}_1, \dots, \mathbf{i}_k, \mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n\}$ is a basis of $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. \square

The following lemma shows that the reversed direction also works, meaning that we can recover a deterministic Linicrypt program from deterministically solvable constraints by applying a basis change. The fact that a basis change is necessary is not surprising. In the definition of the algebraic representation, we make an arbitrary choice while ordering the base variables. Any other choice of ordering should not change the properties of the algebraic representation. The basis change corresponds to rewriting the program in trivial ways, e.g., varying the order in which inputs are retrieved.

Lemma 3.8. *Let \mathcal{C} be a set of deterministically solvable constraints fixing $\mathbf{I} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{F}^{l \times d}$ be an arbitrary output matrix for some $l \in \mathbb{N}$. Then there is a basis change $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{F}^{d \times d}$ and a deterministic Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} , such that $(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}\mathbf{B})$ is its algebraic representation.*

Proof. Let (c_1, \dots, c_n) be the solution ordering of \mathcal{C} fixing $\mathbf{I} = [\mathbf{i}_1^\top \dots \mathbf{i}_k^\top]^\top$. We choose the new basis for $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$ as $(\mathbf{i}_1, \dots, \mathbf{i}_k, \mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n)$, hence the basis change matrix is defined by

$$\mathbf{B}^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{i}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{i}_k \\ \mathbf{a}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{a}_n \end{bmatrix}.$$

In the following we denote by \mathbf{e}_i the i th canonical row vector in $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. By definition of \mathbf{B} we have for $i = 1, \dots, n$

$$\mathbf{I} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{e}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{e}_k \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{B}^{-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{a}_i = \mathbf{e}_{k+i} \mathbf{B}^{-1},$$

which is equivalent to

$$\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{e}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{e}_k \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{a}_i\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{e}_{k+i}.$$

Additionally, because \mathcal{C} is solvable via the ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) , we have for every $i \leq n$:

$$\text{rows}(\mathbf{Q}_i\mathbf{B}) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{i}_1\mathbf{B}, \dots, \mathbf{i}_k\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{a}_1\mathbf{B}, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{i-1}\mathbf{B}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{k+i-1})$$

This shows that $(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}, \mathcal{C}\mathbf{B})$ fulfills the conditions in Lemma 3.5, therefore we can construct the program \mathcal{P} which has $(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}, \mathcal{C}\mathbf{B})$ as its algebraic representation. \square

To complete the abstraction to the level of the algebraic representation, we need to show that every vector in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ canonically corresponds to a unique execution of the program.

Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a deterministic Linicrypt program taking k inputs and returning l outputs. First, we note that one can see a deterministic Linicrypt program as a function from its input space to its output space. We associate to \mathcal{P} the function $f_{\mathcal{P}} : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^l$ which maps (i_1, \dots, i_k) onto the output of $\mathcal{P}(i_1, \dots, i_k)$.

Lemma 3.9. *Let \mathcal{C} be deterministically solvable fixing some \mathbf{I} . If we view \mathbf{I} as a function $\mathbb{F}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^k$, then $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ is a bijection.*

Proof. If we set $\mathbf{O} = \mathbf{1}_d$ then we can apply Lemma 3.8 to get a deterministic program \mathcal{P} and basis change \mathbf{B} such that, $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}, \mathcal{C}\mathbf{B})$. The associated function $f_{\mathcal{P}} : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^d$ is injective, because \mathcal{P} is deterministic. We will first show that $\text{im}(f_{\mathcal{P}}) \subseteq \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. Consider the execution of \mathcal{P} on an arbitrary input $\mathbf{i} \in \mathbb{F}^k$, and its corresponding vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$. \mathbf{v} is in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C}\mathbf{B})$ by the definition of the algebraic representation. Because $\mathbf{B}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C}\mathbf{B})} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}\mathbf{B}) \rightarrow \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ is a bijection, we get that $f_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathbf{i}) = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. Therefore $f_{\mathcal{P}} : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ is an injective function.

Now we show that the input matrix $\mathbf{I} : \mathbb{F}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^k$ is injective when restricted to $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. This completes the proof because \mathbb{F}^k is a finite set.

Assume we have $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}' \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ with $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}'$. Also, assume that \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I} using the ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C} . We will prove by induction that $\mathbf{a}_i\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{a}_i\mathbf{v}'$ for all $i = 1, \dots, n$.

Assume this is true for all $j \leq i$. Because of the solution ordering of \mathcal{C} , we know that $\text{rows}(\mathbf{Q}_{i+1}) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_i)$. This means there is a λ such that $\mathbf{Q}_{i+1} = \lambda [\mathbf{I}^\top \ \mathbf{a}_1^\top \ \dots \ \mathbf{a}_n^\top]^\top =: \lambda \mathbf{A}_i$. Therefore, we have $\mathbf{Q}_{i+1}\mathbf{v}' = \lambda \mathbf{A}_i\mathbf{v}' = \lambda \mathbf{A}_i\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{Q}_{i+1}\mathbf{v}$. Because \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{v}' are solutions to \mathcal{C} we know that $\mathbf{a}_{i+1}\mathbf{v}' = H(\mathbf{Q}_{i+1}\mathbf{v}') = H(\mathbf{Q}_{i+1}\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{a}_{i+1}\mathbf{v}$.

Because $\text{rows}(\mathbf{I}) \cup \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n\}$ is a basis, the matrix $\mathbf{C} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{a}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{a}_n \end{bmatrix}$ is invertible.

Using the assumptions and the results from the induction, we have shown that $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{C}\mathbf{v}$ and therefore $\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{v}$. As \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{v}' were arbitrary, we have shown that $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}) \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^k$ is injective. \square

Corollary 3.10. *Let \mathcal{C} be deterministically solvable fixing some \mathbf{I} . For each element in \mathbb{F}^k , its inverse under $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ can be computed with $|\mathcal{C}|$ queries to the random oracle.*

Proof. Consider the function $f_{\mathcal{P}}$ from the proof of Lemma 3.9. It can be computed with $|\mathcal{C}|$ queries to the random oracle. Because $(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}\mathbf{B})$ is an algebraic representation, we have $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{1}_k \mid 0$. If we run \mathcal{P} on (i_1, \dots, i_k) , we compute the values of the remaining base variables. As usual, we call the vector containing the values of the base variables $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$. Clearly $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$. Also, \mathcal{P} outputs $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v}$, so $f_{\mathcal{P}}((i_1, \dots, i_k)) = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{v}$. Therefore,

$$\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{I} \circ f_{\mathcal{P}})((i_1, \dots, i_k)) = (i_1, \dots, i_k). \quad (3.1)$$

As $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ and $f_{\mathcal{P}} : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ are bijective, (3.1) shows that $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ and $f_{\mathcal{P}}$ are inverses of each other. \square

The benefit of this bijection is that every solution of \mathcal{C} corresponds to a unique input. It follows that any question regarding the input and output of a Linicrypt program can be translated to the level of algebraic representations and solutions of \mathcal{C} . Explicitly, we can formulate the following corollary.

Corollary 3.11. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a deterministic Linicrypt program. The following two statements are equivalent:*

1. *Running \mathcal{P} on input (i_1, \dots, i_k) gives output (o_1, \dots, o_l) .*
2. *There exists a \mathbf{v} solving \mathcal{C} such that $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ and $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$.*

Proof. The direction 1. \implies 2. is clear by definition of the algebraic representation.

For the other direction, assume we have such a $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$. If we run \mathcal{P} on $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ we compute the base variables $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathbb{F}^d$. Again by definition of the algebraic representation \mathbf{v}' is a solution to \mathcal{C} with $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}' = (i_1, \dots, i_k) = \mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}$. By Lemma 3.9 $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ is bijective, so we have $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v}'$. Running \mathcal{P} on (i_1, \dots, i_k) gives output $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$. \square

3.2 Revisiting Collision Structures

Using this language, we can argue about the invertibility and second preimage resistance of a Linicrypt program. The goal of this section is to describe collision structures in a

more abstract form that works for the ideal cipher model, too. We will describe collision structures as the condition for a program being partially invertible with extra degrees of freedom. As a stepping stone towards this goal, we start by describing a sufficient condition for a Linicrypt program to be invertible.

Lemma 3.12. $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a deterministic Linicrypt program. If \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{O} , then $f_{\mathcal{P}}$ is bijective, and $f_{\mathcal{P}}^{-1}$ is the associated function of a deterministic Linicrypt program which we call \mathcal{P}^{-1} .

Proof. Assume \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{O} . Applying the Lemma 3.8 we get a basis change \mathbf{B} and a Linicrypt program \mathcal{P}^{-1} with algebraic representation $(\mathbf{OB}, \mathbf{IB}, \mathcal{CB})$. Note, that \mathbf{O} and \mathbf{I} have the same number of rows, because both $\text{rows}(\mathbf{I}) \cup \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n\}$ and $\text{rows}(\mathbf{O}) \cup \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n\}$ are bases of $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$.

Because of the bijection $\mathbf{B} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{CB}) \rightarrow \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ we have the following equivalence:

$$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{v} \text{ solves } \mathcal{C} \text{ with } \mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k) \text{ and } \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l) \\ \Updownarrow \\ \mathbf{B}^{-1}\mathbf{v} \text{ solves } \mathcal{CB} \text{ with } \mathbf{OB}(\mathbf{B}^{-1}\mathbf{v}) = (o_1, \dots, o_l) \text{ and } \mathbf{IB}(\mathbf{B}^{-1}\mathbf{v}) = (i_1, \dots, i_k) \end{array}$$

Combining this equivalence with the one from Lemma 3.11 we get: Running \mathcal{P} on input i_1, \dots, i_k giving output o_1, \dots, o_l is equivalent to running \mathcal{P}^{-1} on input o_1, \dots, o_l with output i_1, \dots, i_k . This means that $f_{\mathcal{P}^{-1}} = f_{\mathcal{P}}^{-1}$, which is what we wanted to prove. \square

For example, the lemma applies to the following program \mathcal{P} . The proof constructs the algebraic representation of the inverse program \mathcal{P}^{-1} .

$\frac{\mathcal{P}(x, y)}{\text{return } (y + H(x), x)}$	$\frac{\mathcal{P}^{-1}(w, z)}{\text{return } (z, w - H(z))}$
--	---

To simplify the notation, we extend the linear algebra operators **rowsp** and **ker** to be able to use them naturally with constraints and sets of constraints. We define for a constraint $c = (t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a})$:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rowsp}(c) &= \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{Q}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{a}) \\ \text{ker}(c) &= \text{ker}(\mathbf{Q}) \cap \text{ker}(\mathbf{a}) \end{aligned}$$

For a set of constraints \mathcal{C} we write:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}) &= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \text{rowsp}(c) \\ \text{ker}(\mathcal{C}) &= \bigcap_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \text{ker}(c) \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 3.13. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a deterministic Linicrypt program. Assume we can write $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{cs} \cup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$ and \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing some \mathbf{I}_{cs} such that*

$$\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) \supsetneq \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}). \quad (3.2)$$

Then an attacker can find second preimages with $|\mathcal{C}_{cs}|$ queries. We say a program has a collision structure if it fulfills condition (3.2).

This lemma is similar to Lemma 3.12 in the sense that both describe a condition for being able to find a \mathbf{v} solving \mathcal{C} while fixing $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$. The difference is that here we consider an easier case (from an attacker’s perspective): We already have a solution \mathbf{v}' with $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}' = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$ and only require a different one.

The definition of collision structure in Lemma 3.13 is slightly more general than the one from [MSR19]. It also includes the case of degeneracy, namely it corresponds to choosing $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \{\}$ and $\mathbf{I}_{cs} = \mathbf{1}_d$. Degeneracy means precisely that $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d} \supset \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O})$. Note that it is crucial that the space on the left is \supsetneq and not only \supseteq , as this gives the extra degree of freedom to find a different preimage. It plays the same role as \mathbf{q}_{i^*} in the definition of collision structure from [MSR19].

Here we only give a proof sketch; a more formal proof is in the next section when we adapt Linicrypt to the ideal cipher model.

Proof Sketch. Assume we are given a \mathbf{v}' solving \mathcal{C} such that $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}' = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ and $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}' = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$. The goal is to find a different \mathbf{v} solving \mathcal{C} with $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$. By (3.2) we can constrain \mathbf{v} to fulfill $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}'$ as well as $\mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}'$ and $\mathbf{a}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{a}\mathbf{v}'$ for every $(t, \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathcal{C}_{fix}$. Even doing so, we still have at least one degree of freedom before we have uniquely determined what $\mathbf{I}_{cs}\mathbf{v}$ is. We can therefore choose these further constraints to be arbitrary such that $\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}'$. Because \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I}_{cs} , we can uniquely determine \mathbf{v} such that it solves \mathcal{C}_{cs} . But we chose $\mathbf{I}_{cs}\mathbf{v}$ in such a way that \mathbf{v} also solves \mathcal{C}_{fix} , hence \mathbf{v} solves $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{cs} \cup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$.

Finally, because \mathcal{P} is deterministic, \mathbf{I} is injective and therefore $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}$ is a second preimage to $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}'$ for the Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} . \square

The main benefit of this new perspective on collision structures is that it directly describes the collision structure attack as a Linicrypt program. In [MSR19], the collision structure attack is described as a program computing a set of linear constraints, which a linear constraints solver then solves. If we apply Lemma 3.8 to \mathcal{C}_{cs} while fixing \mathbf{I}_{cs} , the resulting “attack program” is one taking as input the desired output, some values determined by the execution on the given preimage, and some extra values which we can set freely.

The following is the running example from [MSR19].

$\mathcal{P}(x, y, z)$ <hr style="width: 80%; margin: 5px auto;"/> $w = H(x) + H(z) + y$ return $(H(w) + x, H(z))$
--

The base variables are (informally) $x, y, z, H(x), H(z), H(w)$. The algebraic representation of this program is $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C} = \{(\mathbf{q}_1, \mathbf{a}_1), (\mathbf{q}_2, \mathbf{a}_2), (\mathbf{q}_3, \mathbf{a}_3)\})$ for:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{I} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
 \mathbf{O} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
 \mathbf{q}_1 &= [1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0] \\
 \mathbf{a}_1 &= [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0] \\
 \mathbf{q}_2 &= [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0] \\
 \mathbf{a}_2 &= [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0] \\
 \mathbf{q}_3 &= [0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0] \\
 \mathbf{a}_3 &= [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1]
 \end{aligned}$$

We set $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \{c_1, c_3\}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{fix} = \{c_2\}$. Then (c_3, c_1) is a solution ordering for \mathcal{C}_{cs} fixing

$$\mathbf{I}_{cs} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{O} \\ \mathbf{q}_2 \\ \mathbf{q}_3 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Condition (3.2) is fulfilled because

$$\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) = (\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})) \oplus \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{q}_3).$$

The direct sum symbol \oplus means that \mathbf{q}_3 is not in $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$. Then Lemma 3.8 gives us the basis change \mathbf{B} such that $(\mathbf{I}_{cs}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathcal{C}_{cs}\mathbf{B})$ is the algebraic representation of some \mathcal{P}_{cs} . For this example, we have

$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix},$$

which leads to the representation:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}_{cs}\mathbf{B} &= \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0] \mapsto [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0] , \\ [1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ -1 \ 0] \mapsto [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1] \end{array} \right\} \\ \mathbf{I}_{cs}\mathbf{B} &= [\mathbf{1}_4 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{I}\mathbf{B} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

The corresponding Linicrypt program \mathcal{P}_{cs} to this algebraic representation can be written as:

$\mathcal{P}_{cs}(o_1, o_2, q_2, q_3)$ <hr style="width: 80%; margin: 5px auto;"/> $a_3 = H(q_3)$ $v = H(o_1 - a_3)$ return $(o_1 - a_3, q_3 - o_2 - v, q_2)$
--

This program computes second preimages to the input (x, y, z) if we set its inputs $(o_1, o_2) = \mathcal{P}(x, y, z)$, $q_2 = z$ and $q_3 \neq H(x) + H(z) + y$ arbitrarily.

Chapter 4

Adapting Linicrypt to the Ideal Cipher Model

In this chapter, we modify the Linicrypt model by replacing the random oracle with an ideal cipher. This means that a Linicrypt program gets access to a block cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$ instead of the hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{F}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$. The functions E and D have the function signature $\mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$. The definition of a block cipher states that $E_k := E(k, \cdot)$ is a permutation of \mathbb{F} for all $k \in \mathbb{F}$ and $D_k := D(k, \cdot)$ is its inverse. In the ideal cipher model, we assume that the block cipher has no weakness. This is modeled by choosing each permutation E_k uniformly at random at the beginning of every security game. We will call these programs with access to a block cipher instead of a hash function ideal cipher Linicrypt programs.

The command $y = E(k, x)$ in an ideal cipher Linicrypt program has to be treated differently from the command $y = H(k, x)$ when considering collision resistance, because an attacker has access to both directions of the block cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$. Consider these two programs, \mathcal{P}^H in standard Linicrypt and $\mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}$ in ideal cipher Linicrypt.

$\mathcal{P}^H(k, x)$ <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> return $H(k, x)$	$\mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}(k, x)$ <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> return $E(k, x)$
---	---

While \mathcal{P}^H is collision resistant, it is trivial to find second preimages for $\mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{E}}$. For any $k' \in \mathbb{F}$ the input (k', x') for $x' = D(k', E(k, x))$ is a second preimage to (k, x) .

This invertibility property of block ciphers has to be taken into account in both the algebraic representation and the characterization of collision resistance.

4.1 Algebraic Representation for Ideal Cipher Linicrypt

The definitions and lemmas in this section are parallel to the ones in section 3.1. Only some basic lemmas need to be proven separately; the others have identical proofs.

Definition 4.1 (Ideal cipher oracle constraint). *An **ideal cipher oracle constraint** of dimension d is a tuple $(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ for \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} in $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$.*

We will just say “constraint” to mean ideal cipher oracle constraint or random oracle constraint depending on the context.

Definition 4.2 (Solution of constraints). *Let \mathcal{C} be a set of ideal cipher constraints of dimension d . We say a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^d$ **solves** \mathcal{C} if $\mathbf{y}\mathbf{v} = E(\mathbf{k}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x}\mathbf{v})$ for all $(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{C}$. Such a \mathbf{v} is called a **solution** of \mathcal{C} . The set of all solutions to \mathcal{C} is called $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$.*

Let \mathcal{P} be an ideal cipher Linicrypt program. Base variables and associated vectors are defined exactly as in standard Linicrypt. The only difference is that the base variables can now be instantiated with calls to the ideal cipher instead of calls to the random oracle. For each command in \mathcal{P} of the form $v_3 = E(v_1, v_2)$ we define the **associated ideal cipher constraint** $(\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2, \mathbf{v}_3)$. Note that the bold variant of the intermediate variable denotes its associated vector. Correspondingly, each query to D of the form $v_3 = D(v_1, v_2)$, is associated with the constraint $(\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_3, \mathbf{v}_2)$. We call the set of all associated constraints \mathcal{C} . The input matrix \mathbf{I} and output matrix \mathbf{O} are defined in the same way as in standard Linicrypt. We call $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ the algebraic representation of \mathcal{P} . Then, the following statement holds. It is the trivial direction of Corollary 3.11 in standard Linicrypt.

Lemma 4.3. *Let \mathcal{P} be an ideal cipher Linicrypt program with algebraic representation $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$. Let \mathbf{v} denote the values of the base variables in an execution of \mathcal{P} with input (i_1, \dots, i_k) and output (o_1, \dots, o_l) . Then \mathbf{v} is a solution to \mathcal{C} with $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ and $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$*

Proof. The statements $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ and $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$ follow from the definition of the algebraic representation as in standard Linicrypt. Each constraint in \mathcal{C} comes from a command in \mathcal{P} with a query to the ideal cipher.

Take some $(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{C}$. After renaming the intermediate variables of \mathcal{P} , it is associated to either the command $y = E(k, x)$ or the command $x = D(k, y)$. In the first case we have $\mathbf{y}\mathbf{v} = y = E(k, x) = E(\mathbf{k}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x}\mathbf{v})$. In the second case we have $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{v} = D(\mathbf{k}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{y}\mathbf{v})$ which is equivalent to $\mathbf{y}\mathbf{v} = E(\mathbf{k}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x}\mathbf{v})$ by the properties of the ideal cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$. Therefore, \mathbf{v} is a solution to \mathcal{C} . \square

The primary definition that changes with ideal cipher Linicrypt is the definition for \mathcal{C} being deterministically solvable. This definition captures the properties of the black box to which \mathcal{P} and the attacker have access. In standard Linicrypt, the black box is a one-way random function. However, in ideal cipher Linicrypt, the black box is a random permutation that can be computed both ways, as both the Linicrypt program and the attacker have full access to the ideal cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$.

To simplify the notation, we extend the linear algebra operators `rowsp` and `ker` to be able to use them naturally with constraints and sets of constraints. We define for a

constraint $c = (\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{rowsp}(c) &= \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{x}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{y}) \\ \ker(c) &= \ker(\mathbf{k}) \cap \ker(\mathbf{x}) \cap \ker(\mathbf{y})\end{aligned}$$

For a set of ideal cipher constraints \mathcal{C} we write:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}) &= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \text{rowsp}(c) \\ \ker(\mathcal{C}) &= \bigcap_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \ker(c)\end{aligned}$$

Definition 4.4 (Deterministically Solvable). *Let \mathcal{C} be a well-defined finite set of ideal cipher constraints of dimension d , and let $\mathbf{I} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. \mathcal{C} is **deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I}** (or fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$) if there exists an ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C} such that for all $i = 1, \dots, n$, the following holds.*

Let the components of c_i be called $(\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i)$. One can write either

$$\mathbf{Q}_i = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{k}_i \\ \mathbf{x}_i \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } \mathbf{a}_i = \mathbf{y}_i \text{ (Case a) or } \mathbf{Q}_i = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{k}_i \\ \mathbf{y}_i \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } \mathbf{a}_i = \mathbf{x}_i \text{ (Case b),}$$

such that:

1. $\text{rows}(\mathbf{Q}_i) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{i-1})$
2. $\mathbf{a}_i \notin \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{i-1})$

Additionally we require that $\text{rows}(\mathbf{I}) \cup \{\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n\}$ form a basis of $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. We call (c_1, \dots, c_n) a solution ordering of \mathcal{C} fixing \mathbf{I} (or fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$).

Note that the case distinction (Case a and Case b) is what models the invertibility of the ideal cipher. It is indeed an exclusive “or” because condition 1. of Case a implies that condition 2. of Case b is false. With these definitions in place, the lemmas from Chapter 3.1 can be formulated similarly.

Lemma 4.5. *Let $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be the algebraic representation of a deterministic ideal cipher Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} taking k inputs. Then \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I} .*

Proof Sketch. For each constraint $c = (\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ in \mathcal{C} we set $\mathbf{Q} = [\mathbf{k}^\top \ \mathbf{x}^\top]^\top$ and $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{y}$ if c is associated to a call to E . If c is associated to a call to D , we set $\mathbf{Q} = [\mathbf{k}^\top \ \mathbf{y}^\top]^\top$ and $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{x}$. The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.7. \square

Lemma 4.6. *Let \mathcal{C} be a finite well-defined set of ideal cipher constraints of dimension d with $|\mathcal{C}| = n$, let $\mathbf{I} = [\mathbf{1}_k \ 0] \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$ for $k = d - n$ and let $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{F}^{l \times d}$ for some $l \in \mathbb{N}$.*

$(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ is the algebraic representation of a deterministic ideal cipher Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} if there exists an ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C} such that for all $i = 1, \dots, n$, the following holds. Let $(\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i) = c_i$, then either

- (a) $\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{e}_{k+i}$ and $\{\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\} \subseteq \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{k+i-1})$ or
 (b) $\mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{e}_{k+i}$ and $\{\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{y}_i\} \subseteq \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{k+i-1})$.

Proof Sketch. The proof idea is the same as for Lemma 3.5. The k inputs are handled as in standard Linicrypt. Consider the constraint c_i . If case (a) holds, then we convert this constraint into a command of the form $v_{k+i} = E(q_1, q_2)$, for q_1 and q_2 being intermediate variables created by a linear combination. Then condition $\{\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\} \subseteq \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{k+i-1})$ ensures that these linear combinations are well-defined. As $d = k + n$, all base variables have been instantiated after n query commands. We can use the rows of \mathbf{O} to define the Linicrypt commands for the output variables. \square

Lemma 4.7. *Let \mathcal{C} be a set of deterministically solvable ideal cipher constraints fixing $\mathbf{I} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times d}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $\mathbf{O} \in \mathbb{F}^{l \times d}$ be an arbitrary output matrix for some $l \in \mathbb{N}$. Then there is a basis change $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{F}^{d \times d}$ and an ideal cipher Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} , such that $(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}, \mathcal{C}\mathbf{B})$ is its algebraic representation.*

Proof Sketch. By setting \mathbf{Q}_i and \mathbf{a}_i as in the definition 4.4 we can copy the proof of Lemma 3.8. \square

Lemma 4.8. *Let \mathcal{C} be deterministically solvable fixing some \mathbf{I} . If we view \mathbf{I} as a function $\mathbb{F}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^k$, then $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ is a bijection.*

Proof Sketch. By setting \mathbf{Q}_i and \mathbf{a}_i as in the definition 4.4 we can copy the proof of Lemma 3.9. \square

Corollary 4.9. *Let \mathcal{C} be deterministically solvable fixing some \mathbf{I} . For each element in \mathbb{F}^k , its inverse under $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ can be computed with $|\mathcal{C}|$ queries to the ideal cipher.*

Proof Sketch. The proof is identical to the proof of Corollary 3.10. \square

Corollary 4.10. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a deterministic ideal cipher Linicrypt program. The following two statements are equivalent:*

1. *Running \mathcal{P} on input (i_1, \dots, i_k) gives output (o_1, \dots, o_l) .*
2. *There exists a \mathbf{v} solving \mathcal{C} such that $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$ and $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = (o_1, \dots, o_l)$.*

Proof Sketch. The proof is identical to the proof of Corollary 3.11. \square

4.2 Collision Structure

We have all the prerequisites to prove the analog of Lemma 3.13. That is, we can give a sufficient condition for a program to be susceptible to a constant time second preimage attack.

Proposition 4.11. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a deterministic ideal cipher Linicrypt program. Assume we can write $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{cs} \sqcup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$ and \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing some \mathbf{I}_{cs} such that*

$$\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) \supsetneq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix}). \quad (4.1)$$

Then an attacker can find second preimages with $|\mathcal{C}_{cs}|$ queries. We say a program has a collision structure if it fulfills condition (4.1).

Here we will give a formal proof of this statement.

Proof. The proof describes how to find a second preimage to some input (i_1, \dots, i_k) to \mathcal{P} . By executing \mathcal{P} on (i_1, \dots, i_k) we compute the values of the base variables $\mathbf{v} \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. Recall the bijection $\mathbf{I}_{cs}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C}_{cs})} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}_{cs}) \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^{k'}$ where k' is the number of rows of \mathbf{I}_{cs} . Instead of seeing this bijection as a map into the input space of \mathcal{P} , we will see it as a map into the quotient space $\mathbb{F}^d / \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$. This quotient space is defined by the equivalence relation $\mathbf{v} \sim_{cs} \mathbf{w} \iff \mathbf{v} - \mathbf{w} \in \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$. We denote it by:

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{\mathbf{I}}_{cs} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}_{cs}) &\rightarrow \mathbb{F}^d / \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) \\ \mathbf{v} &\mapsto [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{cs}} \end{aligned}$$

Using condition (4.1) we will map $\mathbb{F}^d / \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$ to $\mathbb{F}^d / (\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix}))$ non injectively. First we rewrite the condition (4.1) using a series of equivalences:

$$(4.1) \iff \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})^\perp \supsetneq \ker(\mathbf{O})^\perp + \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix})^\perp \quad (4.2)$$

$$\iff \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})^\perp \supsetneq (\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix}))^\perp \quad (4.3)$$

$$\iff \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) \subsetneq \ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix}) \quad (4.4)$$

Let \sim_{fix} denote the equivalence relation defining the quotient $\mathbb{F}^d / (\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix}))$. Consider the map

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda : \mathbb{F}^d / \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) &\rightarrow \mathbb{F}^d / (\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix})) \\ [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{cs}} &\mapsto [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{fix}}. \end{aligned}$$

To show that it is well-defined, we need to show that it is independent of the chosen representative. Let $[\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{cs}} = [\mathbf{w}]_{\sim_{cs}}$ for arbitrary $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{F}^d$. By definition $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{w} \in \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$. Using (4.4) we have $[\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{fix}} = [\mathbf{w}]_{\sim_{fix}}$. Now we show that λ is not injective. Let $\mathbf{w} \in \ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$ but $\mathbf{w} \notin \ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$, so $[\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w}]_{\sim_{cs}} \neq [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{cs}}$. This is possible because by (4.4) $\ker(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$ is strictly smaller than $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$. Then

$$\lambda([\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w}]_{\sim_{cs}}) = [\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w}]_{\sim_{fix}} = [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{fix}} = \lambda([\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{cs}}).$$

As a consequence the concatenation $\lambda \circ \widetilde{\mathbf{I}}_{cs}$ is not injective. Therefore, there exists a $\mathbf{v}' \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}_{cs})$ with $\mathbf{v}' \neq \mathbf{v}$ such that $[\mathbf{v}']_{\sim_{fix}} = [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{fix}}$. The latter is equivalent to

$\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}$ and $\mathbf{v}' - \mathbf{v} \in \ker(c)$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C}_{fix}$. As \mathbf{v} is a solution to \mathcal{C}_{fix} , it follows that \mathbf{v}' is a solution, too. Summing up, $\mathbf{v}' \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}_{cs}) \cap \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}_{fix}) = \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ and $\mathbf{v}' \neq \mathbf{v}$.

By the bijection argument, we know that $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}' \neq \mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}$ and hence $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}'$ is a second preimage to $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$.

We argue why the second preimage is computable with $|\mathcal{C}_{cs}|$ queries. To compute such a \mathbf{v}' we need to compute preimages of $\lambda \circ \widetilde{\mathbf{I}}_{cs}$. Because λ is just a linear map, the space of preimages to any element in its image can be computed without queries to H . We can choose a preimage $[\mathbf{v}']_{\sim_{cs}}$ to $[\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{fix}}$ from its space of preimages arbitrarily while making sure that $[\mathbf{v}']_{\sim_{cs}} \neq [\mathbf{v}]_{\sim_{cs}}$. The inverse of the bijection $\widetilde{\mathbf{I}}_{cs}$ is computable with $|\mathcal{C}_{cs}|$ queries by Corollary 4.9. \square

We present an example of a program with a collision structure that is owed to the invertibility of E .

$\mathcal{P}_{col}^{\mathcal{E}}(a, b, c)$	Algebraic Representation
$k_1 = c$	$\mathbf{O} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$
$x_1 = b$	$\mathbf{k}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$y_1 = E(k_1, x_1)$	$\mathbf{x}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$k_2 = a$	$\mathbf{y}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$x_2 = y_1$	$\mathbf{k}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$y_2 = E(k_2, x_2)$	$\mathbf{x}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
return $y_1 + y_2$	$\mathbf{y}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$

We can set $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \{(\mathbf{k}_1, \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{y}_1)\}$, $\mathcal{C}_{fix} = \{(\mathbf{k}_2, \mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{y}_2)\}$ and $\mathbf{I}_{cs} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{O} \\ \mathbf{k}_2 \\ \mathbf{x}_2 \\ \mathbf{k}_1 \end{bmatrix}$.

Then $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) = (\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})) \oplus \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k}_1)$, so condition (4.1) is fulfilled.

We can check that \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I}_{cs} : We can set $\mathbf{Q}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{k}_1 \\ \mathbf{y}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ and $\mathbf{a}_1 = \mathbf{x}_1$, and then we have:

1. $\text{rows}(\mathbf{Q}_1) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$
2. $\mathbf{a}_1 \notin \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs})$

This makes Lemma 4.11 applicable, and this lemma describes how to construct an attack in the form of a Linicrypt program.

In plain language, we can fix the output, set the second query and answer to the same values as for the given preimage and choose k_1 arbitrarily. This determines the key k_1

and answer y_1 of the first query to E , but not the query itself. By using D , we get the unique corresponding query x_1 . Then (k_2, x_1, k_1) is a second preimage.

Now will work towards the converse of this statement. That is, we are trying to answer the question: If \mathcal{P} doesn't have a collision structure, is it collision resistant? We will confirm this for the case of a Linicrypt program which makes only a single query to the ideal cipher. The following definition and the small lemmas are noteworthy on their own and simplify the security proof.

Definition 4.12. *A set of ideal cipher constraints \mathcal{C} is called **unsolvable** fixing a space $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$ if for every ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C} , we have some $c_i = (\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i)$ such that both*

1. $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{F} + \text{rowsp}(\{c_1, \dots, c_{i-1}\}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x})$ and
2. $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{F} + \text{rowsp}(\{c_1, \dots, c_{i-1}\}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y})$.

This definition is almost the converse of a set of constraints being deterministically solvable. But “ \mathcal{C} is not deterministically solvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$ ” could also mean that the space $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$ is just too small, and condition 1. fails for some i (see 4.4). The definition of unsolvable forces condition 2. to fail.

Lemma 4.13. *If $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ does not have a collision structure, then for every split $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{cs} \sqcup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$, we have one of the following:*

1. \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$
2. \mathcal{C}_{cs} is unsolvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$

Proof. Assume \mathcal{P} does not have a collision structure. Let $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{cs} \sqcup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$ be an arbitrary split of the set of constraints. Then for any matrix \mathbf{I}_{cs} with $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I}_{cs}) \supsetneq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$ we have \mathcal{C}_{cs} is not deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I}_{cs} . We now assume condition 2. from Lemma 4.13 not true and show that this implies 1. from Lemma 4.13 is true. So we assume \mathcal{C}_{cs} is not unsolvable fixing $\mathcal{F} = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$. Then there is an ordering (c_1, \dots, c_n) of \mathcal{C}_{cs} such that for every i we have $\mathbf{y} \notin \mathcal{F} + \text{rowsp}(\{c_1, \dots, c_{i-1}\}) + \text{rowsp}(\{\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}\})$ or $\mathbf{x} \notin \mathcal{F} + \text{rowsp}(\{c_1, \dots, c_{i-1}\}) + \text{rowsp}(\{\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}\})$. From this, condition 2. of the definition of deterministically solvable follows. Hence, we can add some dimensions to \mathcal{F} and call it $\mathcal{F}' \supset \mathcal{F}$ such that \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathcal{F}' . But if $\mathcal{F}' \supsetneq \mathcal{F}$ this would contradict the assumption that \mathcal{P} does not have a collision structure. Therefore, we know that \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing $\mathcal{F} = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix})$. \square

Corollary 4.14. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a program making only a single call to the ideal cipher. Then $\mathcal{C} = \{(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})\}$ for some $\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Assume \mathcal{P} does not have a collision structure but there exists $\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}'$ in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ with $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}'$. Then all of the following hold:*

1. $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \{0\}$

2. $\mathbf{y} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x})$
3. $\mathbf{x} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y})$

Proof. If we set $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \{\}$ then case 2. from Lemma 4.13 cannot be true. Because $\{\}$ is deterministically solvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C})$ we have a bijection between $\text{sol}(\{\}) = \mathbb{F}^d$ and $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C})$. Because $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O})^\top = \ker(\mathbf{O})^\perp$ and $\text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C})^\top = \ker(\mathcal{C})^\perp$ this implies $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \{0\}$.

If we set $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \mathcal{C}$ on the other hand, then case 1. from Lemma 4.13 cannot be true. This is because if it was, then there wouldn't exist vectors $\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}'$ in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ with $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}'$. Therefore, \mathcal{C} is unsolvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O})$ which means precisely $\mathbf{y} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\{\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}\})$ and $\mathbf{x} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\{\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}\})$. \square

Let us first state a small mathematical lemma, which serves to simplify the bounds on the advantages without giving away too much.

Lemma 4.15. *Let a, b, c be in \mathbb{R}_+ with $a, b > c$. Then*

$$\frac{a - c}{b - c} \leq \frac{a}{b} \iff a \leq b.$$

We give a short proof of this statement.

Proof. Assume a, b, c fulfill the stated conditions. Then we can write the following sequence of equivalent statements:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{a - c}{b - c} &\leq \frac{a}{b} \\ \iff \log(a - c) - \log(b - c) &\leq \log(a) - \log(b) \\ \iff \log(b) - \log(b - c) &\leq \log(a) - \log(a - c) \\ \iff \log(b) - \log(b - c) &\leq \log(a) - \log(a - c) \\ \iff a &\leq b \end{aligned}$$

The last equivalence follows from the derivative of the logarithm being monotonically decreasing. \square

Proposition 4.16. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a program making only a single call to the ideal cipher, i.e. $\mathcal{C} = \{(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})\}$ for some $\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Assume there is an adversary \mathcal{A} making N queries to the ideal cipher and winning the collision resistance security game with*

$$\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] > \frac{(N + 1)N}{2|\mathbb{F}|}.$$

Then \mathcal{P} has a collision structure.

This proof is based in part on the proofs from McQuoid, Swope and Rosulek in [MSR19, Lemma 10] and from Boneh-Shoup in [BS20, Theorem 8.4 (Davies-Meyer)].

Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is such an adversary \mathcal{A} making N queries and that \mathcal{P} does not have a collision structure. We will work with the transcript between the adversary and the ideal cipher. Let $\mathcal{T} : \{1, \dots, N\} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^3$ be the function defined by $\mathcal{T}(i) = (k, x, y)$, if the i th query of \mathcal{A} is $E(k, x)$ with response y or if it is $D(k, y)$ with response x .

We consider the event that \mathcal{A} successfully outputs a collision (i, i') . Our goal is to bound the probability of this event. As \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{I} , these two inputs to \mathcal{P} correspond to unique vectors $\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}'$ in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. We make a case distinction on whether \mathcal{A} makes the two queries corresponding to \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{v}' , respectively. Let us denote by Z the event that \mathcal{A} makes the two queries, i.e. that $(k\mathbf{v}, x\mathbf{v}, y\mathbf{v})$ and $(k\mathbf{v}', x\mathbf{v}', y\mathbf{v}')$ are in $\text{im}(\mathcal{T})$.

We first bound the conditional probability of \mathcal{A} winning, given that Z is the case. Let i and j be defined by $\mathcal{T}(i) = (k\mathbf{v}, x\mathbf{v}, y\mathbf{v})$ and $\mathcal{T}(j) = (k\mathbf{v}', x\mathbf{v}', y\mathbf{v}')$. That is, at query i , the adversary has determined the values involved in the query for $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{i})$ and at query j , it has determined the values involved in the query for $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{i}')$.

Consider the case $i = j$. This means $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}' \in \ker(\mathcal{C})$. By assumption \mathbf{i} and \mathbf{i}' are collisions, so $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}' \in \ker(\mathbf{O})$. Corollary 4.14 states $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \{0\}$, so $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v}'$. This is a contradiction to $\mathbf{i} \neq \mathbf{i}'$.

Therefore, we have $i \neq j$. By modifying \mathcal{A} , we can assume it outputs the value it fixes first as its first output. Because i corresponds \mathbf{i} and j to \mathbf{i}' , we have $i < j$. Consider the point where \mathcal{A} sent its j th query and is waiting to receive the answer from the ideal cipher. If this query was to E we define $\mathbf{Q} = (k, x)$ and $\mathbf{a} = y$, otherwise we define $\mathbf{Q} = (k, y)$ and $\mathbf{a} = x$.

In either case, we know from Corollary 4.14 that

$$\mathbf{a} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{Q}), \quad \text{which means} \quad \mathbf{a} = \lambda\mathbf{O} + \gamma\mathbf{Q} \quad \text{for some } \lambda, \gamma. \quad (4.5)$$

At query j the vectors $\mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{a}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}'$ and $\mathbf{O}(\mathbf{v}' - \mathbf{v})$ are determined. The latter is equal to 0 by the assumption that \mathbf{i} and \mathbf{i}' are a collision. Therefore, we can apply (4.5) to get

$$\mathbf{a}(\mathbf{v}' - \mathbf{v}) = \lambda\mathbf{O}(\mathbf{v}' - \mathbf{v}) + \gamma\mathbf{Q}(\mathbf{v}' - \mathbf{v}),$$

which is equivalent to

$$\mathbf{a}\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{a}\mathbf{v} + \gamma\mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}' - \gamma\mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}. \quad (4.6)$$

All the values on the right of (4.6) have been determined, while $\mathbf{a}\mathbf{v}'$ is sampled uniformly from a set of size at least $|\mathbb{F}| - j + 1$. We call the event that equation (4.6) holds Z_{ij} , so

$$\Pr[Z_{ij}] = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - j + 1}.$$

Using the union bound, we get

$$\Pr[\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid Z] \leq \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} \Pr[Z_{ij}] \quad (4.7)$$

$$\leq \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \frac{j}{|\mathbb{F}| - j} \quad (4.8)$$

$$\leq \frac{(N-1)N}{2(|\mathbb{F}| - N)} \quad (4.9)$$

$$\leq \frac{(N+1)N}{2|\mathbb{F}|}. \quad (4.10)$$

The bound holds trivially in the case of $N \geq \sqrt{2|\mathbb{F}|}$. If $N < \sqrt{2|\mathbb{F}|}$, the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.15 with $a = (N+1)N$, $b = 2|\mathbb{F}|$ and $c = 2N$.

What remains is the case that \mathcal{A} wins without making the corresponding oracle queries. Intuitively, \mathcal{A} has just won by chance in this event, as the output of \mathcal{P} has to depend on the query it makes. If \mathcal{P} makes a query to E , we define $\mathbf{Q} = (\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x})$ and $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{y}$, otherwise we define $\mathbf{Q} = (\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y})$ and $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{x}$. Because \mathcal{P} is a deterministic program, we know $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{Q}) \subseteq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$. Then, using Corollary 4.9 again, we have $\mathbf{a} \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{I})$, which means $\mathbf{a} = \lambda \mathbf{O} + \gamma \mathbf{I}$ for some γ, λ . By applying this equation to $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}'$ and using the fact that we are in the event of a successful collision, we get:

$$\mathbf{a}(\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}') = \gamma(\mathbf{i} - \mathbf{i}')$$

The lefthand side value is sampled uniformly from at least $|\mathbb{F}| - (N+1)$ values, while the value on the right is fixed. The winning probability for \mathcal{A} given that Z is not the case is bounded by the probability that this equation holds, which means for $N \geq 3$

$$\Pr[\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid \bar{Z}] \leq \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - (N+1)} \leq \frac{N+2}{|\mathbb{F}|} \leq \frac{(N+1)N}{2|\mathbb{F}|}. \quad (4.11)$$

We can put equations (4.10) and (4.11) together to bound the probability of \mathcal{A} winning altogether.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] &= \Pr[\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid Z] \cdot \Pr[Z] \\ &\quad + \Pr[\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid \bar{Z}] \cdot \Pr[\bar{Z}] \\ &\leq \frac{(N+1)N}{2|\mathbb{F}|} \end{aligned}$$

This inequality gives the contradiction, and therefore \mathcal{P} must have a collision structure. \square

We can achieve a similar result for the second-preimage game.

Proposition 4.17. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a program making only a single call to the ideal cipher, i.e. $\mathcal{C} = \{(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})\}$ for some $\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Assume there is an adversary \mathcal{A} making N queries to the ideal cipher, winning the second-preimage security game with*

$$\text{SPRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] > \frac{2N}{|\mathbb{F}|}$$

Then \mathcal{P} has a collision structure.

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of 4.16, and therefore, we will refer to it for the details. Let \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{P} be as stated. We assume, towards contradiction, that \mathcal{P} does not have a collision structure. Let \mathcal{T} , \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{v}' be defined as in Proposition 4.16. Also, let Z denote the event that $(\mathbf{k}\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{x}\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{y}\mathbf{v}')$ is in $\text{im}(\mathcal{T})$.

By the same argumentation as before, we bound the winning probability given that \mathcal{A} does not make this query by

$$\Pr[\text{SPRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid \bar{Z}] \leq \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - (N + 1)} \leq \frac{N + 2}{|\mathbb{F}|} \leq \frac{2N}{|\mathbb{F}|}, \quad (4.12)$$

for $N \geq 2$.

Now, assume Z is the case and let i be defined by $\mathcal{T}(i) = (\mathbf{k}\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{x}\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{y}\mathbf{v}')$. Consider the time when \mathcal{A} makes its i th query and waits for the response. We define \mathbf{Q} and \mathbf{a} as in Proposition 4.16 and use Corollary 4.14 to get for some γ that

$$\mathbf{a}\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{a}\mathbf{v} + \gamma\mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}' - \gamma\mathbf{Q}\mathbf{v}. \quad (4.13)$$

Let us call the event that equation (4.13) holds Z_i . Then, as before, we can bound \mathcal{A} 's advantage as follows:

$$\Pr[\text{SPRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid Z] \leq \sum_{i=1}^N \Pr[Z_i] \leq \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}| - i} \leq \frac{N}{|\mathbb{F}| - N} \leq \frac{2N}{|\mathbb{F}|}. \quad (4.14)$$

Putting (4.12) and (4.14) together leads to the contradiction. \square

Following [MSR19, Main Theorem], we summarize these results in the following theorem.

Theorem 4.18. *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a program making only a single call to the ideal cipher. Then the following are equivalent:*

1. \mathcal{P} has a collision structure.
2. There is an adversary making 2 queries that always finds second preimages.
3. There is an adversary \mathcal{A} making N queries with $\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] > 2N/|\mathbb{F}|$.
4. There is an adversary \mathcal{A} making N queries with $\text{SPRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}] > (N + 1)N/2|\mathbb{F}|$.

4.3 Application: Compression Schemes

The papers [BRS02] and [PGV94] have analyzed the 64 most basic constructions for a compression function based on a single call to a block cipher $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$. These compression schemes $f : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ are of the form $f(h, m) = E(a, b) + c$ for $a, b, c \in \{h, m, h+m, v\}$. Here $v \in \mathbb{F}$ is a fixed constant. As these compression schemes are often used in the Merkle-Damgård construction, one should consider h as the chaining value and m as the message block. If not for the constant v , the 64 compression functions would be Linicrypt programs. But, as we will show, one can set $v = 0$ without loss of generality. Then Corollary 4.18 applies, determining that 12 of these constructions are collision resistant, which agrees with the results achieved by [BRS02]. However, they go further and identify 8 compression functions that are not collision resistant, but for which the Merkle-Damgård construction is collision resistant.

First, we argue why we can set $v = 0$. Assume that an adversary \mathcal{A} can find collisions for some f as described above in the case that $v = 0$. If $a = v = 0$, then we can replace the block cipher $E(\cdot, \cdot)$ by $E(\cdot + v', \cdot)$ for some $v' \in \mathbb{F}$. From the adversary's perspective, this is still an ideal cipher, so its success probability could not have been affected. But this is equivalent to \mathcal{A} being able to find collisions for the same compression scheme f but with the constant set to v' . If $b = 0$ we replace E with $E(\cdot, \cdot + v')$ and if $c = 0$ we replace it with $E(\cdot, \cdot) + v'$. All three modifications to an ideal cipher E yield another ideal cipher, even when we apply them simultaneously.

4.3.1 The PGV compression schemes in Linicrypt

We will give the algebraic representation of the compression schemes described above. First, let us write them as an ideal cipher Linicrypt program.

$\mathcal{P}(h, m)$
$y = E(ch + dm, eh + fm)$
return $ah + bm + y$

Algebraic Representation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{O} &= \begin{bmatrix} a & b & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{k} &= \begin{bmatrix} c & d & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{x} &= \begin{bmatrix} e & f & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{y} &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

The base variables are $\{h, m, y\}$, and we have ordered them as (h, m, y) in the algebraic representation. The algebraic representation is $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ for $\mathbf{I} = \begin{bmatrix} 1_2 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ and $\mathcal{C} = \{(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})\}$. \mathcal{P} depends on the constants $a, b, c, d, e, f \in \{0, 1\}$ (we redefine the parameters a, b, c which were used above; also, d should not be confused with the number of base variables, which is 3). Each choice of these 6 binary constants corresponds to one of the compression schemes. The is, $f_{\mathcal{P}} = f : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ for some compression scheme f as described above. Using Lemma 4.13 and Corollary 4.18, one can derive that \mathcal{P} is collision resistant and second preimage resistant if and only if

$$\begin{bmatrix} a & b \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} c & d \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} e & f \end{bmatrix} \neq \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{bmatrix} a & b \end{bmatrix} \neq \begin{bmatrix} c & d \end{bmatrix} \neq \begin{bmatrix} e & f \end{bmatrix}. \quad (4.15)$$

$f(h, m) =$	a	b	c	d	e	f	Name
$E(h, m) + m$	0	1	1	0	0	1	Matyas-Meyer-Oseas
$E(h, h + m) + m$	0	1	1	0	1	1	
$E(h + m, m) + m$	0	1	1	1	0	1	
$E(h + m, h) + m$	0	1	1	1	1	0	Davies-Meyer
$E(m, h) + h$	1	0	0	1	1	0	
$E(m, h + m) + h$	1	0	0	1	1	1	
$E(h + m, m) + h$	1	0	1	1	0	1	
$E(h + m, h) + h$	1	0	1	1	1	0	
$E(m, h) + h + m$	1	1	0	1	1	0	Miyaguchi-Preneel
$E(m, h + m) + h + m$	1	1	0	1	1	1	
$E(h, m) + h + m$	1	1	1	0	0	1	
$E(h, h + m) + h + m$	1	1	1	0	1	1	

Table 4.1: Parameters for the 12 secure compression schemes according to equation (4.15). These are the group-1 schemes in [BRS02]

There are exactly 12 schemes fulfilling this condition, which we list in Table 4.1. The authors of [BRS02] denote these as the group-1 schemes. If condition (4.15) is not met, then the compression function is susceptible to a second preimage attack needing a single query to the ideal cipher, at most.

4.3.2 Merkle-Damgård in Linicrypt

In the context of the Merkle-Damgård construction, the classification of the compression schemes is more nuanced. Some broken schemes as a compression function can be used to form collision resistant Merkle-Damgård constructions. This is because the initialization vector (IV) is fixed and cannot be chosen by the attacker. Therefore, a second preimage attack on the compression scheme is useless if it gives no control over the chaining value. We define the Merkle-Damgård construction in the Linicrypt model to formalize this idea.

Definition 4.19 (Merkle-Damgård construction). *Let \mathcal{P} be an ideal cipher Linicrypt program taking 2 inputs and returning one output, i.e. $f_{\mathcal{P}} : \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$. We define the Linicrypt program $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n$ by*

$H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n(m_1, \dots, m_n)$
$h_0 = 0$
$h_1 = \mathcal{P}(h_0, m_1)$
\vdots
$h_n = \mathcal{P}(h_{n-1}, m_n)$
return h_n

We call the program $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n$ the Linicrypt Merkle-Damgård construction using $f_{\mathcal{P}}$ as its compression function.

The $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n$ in the definition is a Linicrypt program as the calls to the Linicrypt program \mathcal{P} could be expanded into regular Linicrypt commands. In the standard Merkle-Damgård construction, the IV, which corresponds to h_0 , is chosen to be any fixed constant. Linicrypt does not allow for fixed constants. But because 0 is a linear combination of the input variables, we can use 0 as the IV.

Another way in which the definition varies from the usual definition, is that $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n$ takes n inputs for some fixed n . Usually, the Merkle-Damgård Hash function is allowed to take any number of inputs. The Linicrypt model does not allow for variable input length. One has to consider H_f^n to be a different Linicrypt program from $H_f^{n'}$ for $n \neq n'$. Therefore, H_f^n is a compression function with a compression ratio of n -to-1, not a hash function.

We will restate the classical result for collision resistance of the Merkle-Damgård construction: An adversary against the Merkle-Damgård construction can be converted into an adversary against the underlying compression function.

Theorem 4.20 (Linicrypt Merkle-Damgård collision resistance). *Let \mathcal{P} be a Linicrypt program taking 2 inputs and returning a single output. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n$ for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against \mathcal{P} such that*

$$\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n] = \text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{P}].$$

Proof. The adversary \mathcal{B} simply runs \mathcal{A} to completion until it gets its output, two messages $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_n)$ and $\mathbf{m}' = (m'_1, \dots, m'_n)$. He checks whether $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n(\mathbf{m}) = H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n(\mathbf{m}')$ and $\mathbf{m} \neq \mathbf{m}'$. If this is not the case, then \mathcal{B} outputs \perp . We will refer to the intermediate chaining values computed in $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n(\mathbf{m})$ and $H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n(\mathbf{m}')$ with h_i and h'_i respectively for $i = 1, \dots, n$. If \mathcal{A} did output a valid collision then \mathcal{B} outputs the first pair $((h_{i-1}, m_i), (h'_{i-1}, m'_i))$ where i goes from n to 1 such that $(h_{i-1}, m_i) \neq (h'_{i-1}, m'_i)$. At least one pair fulfills this condition because $\mathbf{m} \neq \mathbf{m}'$.

From the definition of \mathcal{B} it is clear that \mathcal{B} wins $\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{P})$ if and only if \mathcal{A} wins $\text{CRgame}^{\text{ic}}(\mathcal{A}, H_{f_{\mathcal{P}}}^n)$. \square

We have to remark that this is a result about the collision resistance of the Linicrypt Merkle-Damgård construction, as this is what we need in the further argumentation. It only proves that it is hard to find collisions between inputs of the same length n .

Different approaches are taken in the literature to fix this. One method is to change the definition of collision resistance for the compression function to allow the adversary to win when it finds a preimage to the IV, as in [BRS02]. Without adding a separate definition for collision resistance of compression functions, we could also bound $\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, H_{f_P}^n]$ by the sum of the maximal advantage against \mathcal{P} in the collision game and the maximal advantage against \mathcal{P} in a preimage game for the chosen IV. Although, this bound would not be tight. Another approach, commonly done in practice, is to encode the length of the message in the last input of the message, which is called Merkle-Damgård strengthening. But, to analyze the effect of Merkle-Damgård strengthening, one has to step out of the Linicrypt framework, as this would not be a Linicrypt program.

4.3.3 Deriving a taxonomy of attacks from Linicrypt

The authors of [PGV94] and [BRS02] classify the 64 compression schemes by the attacks they enable on the Merkle-Damgård construction. The attack types are stated in a table, but no derivation or intuition for the stated structure is given. We will briefly present their attack categorization. It serves as a comparison to the categories which we will later derive from the Linicrypt theorems. Our classification agrees, for the most part, with theirs, although a few interesting differences remain.

In [BRS02], the authors classify the schemes into 3 groups. There are 12 group-1 schemes that are secure compression functions and therefore make up secure Merkle-Damgård constructions. Then they define 8 additional group-2 schemes. Although these are insecure compression functions, the Merkle-Damgård construction is still collision resistant. Finally, the remaining 44 schemes are defined as group-3, and they state that a collision resistance attack using at most 3 queries to the ideal cipher exists. In Figure 1 of said paper, each scheme is assigned an attack type ranging from (a) to (g). The group-1 schemes correspond to attack types (d) and (e), while group-2 schemes are susceptible to attack type (c).

Their attack categorization agrees almost completely with the one created by [PGV94]. The capital letters, (✓) and (-) are the attack types from [PGV94].

- **Trivially weak (-) ↔ (a):** f only depends on one of its inputs.
- **Direct Attack (D) ↔ (b):** Given $o \in \mathbb{F}$ and $h \in \mathbb{F}$ one can find the corresponding $m \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $f(h, m) = o$.
- **Permutation Attack (P) ↔ (f):** The chaining value h is not used in the query to E , hence the order of inputs for H_f^n does not matter.
- **Forward Attack (F) ↔ 5 schemes from (g):** Given $o, h, m, h' \in \mathbb{F}$ one can find an $m' \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $f(h', m') = o = f(h, m)$.

- **Backward Attack (B) \leftrightarrow (c) and 5 schemes from (g):** Given $o \in \mathbb{F}$ one can find $h, m \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $f(h, m) = o$.
- **Fixed Point Attack (FP) \leftrightarrow (e):** One can find $h, m \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $f(h, m) = h$.
- **Secure (\checkmark) \leftrightarrow (d):** f has none of the weaknesses above.

The most interesting schemes are the ones only susceptible to a backward attack (B). 13 schemes are in this category. According to [BRS02], 8 of them are secure in the Merkle Damgard construction. For the other 5, they claim a collision can be found by at most 2 ideal cipher queries, but these collisions are only for different length messages. Some of them also rely on the fact that they only consider the field $\mathbb{F} = \{0, 1\}^n$, for which $x + x = 0$ for any $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$. We will analyze this in more detail below.

Both papers [PGV94] and [BRS02] do not give a derivation for which schemes correspond to which attack types, something we can do thanks to the Linicrypt approach. In [BRS02] they prove the security of group-1 (type (d) and (e)) and group-2 schemes (type (c)). The proof is done by choosing a representative scheme of the attack type and performing the proof for that scheme. But, to convince yourself that the proof works for the other compression schemes with the same attack type, one needs to recheck the proof. Ideal cipher Linicrypt has enabled us to prove collision resistance for all 12 group-1 compression functions (type (\checkmark) and (FP) in [PGV94]) in an abstract manner. The sufficient and necessary condition (4.15) for a scheme to belong to group-1 can be easily derived from the more general Corollary 4.18. Intuitively, using the language introduced in the previous chapters, a compression function is secure if the associated ideal cipher constraint is unsolvable fixing the output.

The ideal cipher Linicrypt model can also be used to derive the conditions for a scheme f to be of type -, D, F, or P. These attack types have in common that they allow for an easy second-preimage attack on H_f^n for $n \geq 2$. We will define 3 Linicrypt attack types:

1. Degenerate
2. Deterministically solvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h})$
3. Permutation attack

We will define category 1) and 2) by deriving them from Lemma 4.13. On the other hand, the permutation attack can only be explained from a Linicrypt perspective once you take into account interactions that can happen between different ideal cipher queries.

This categorization is guided by visual intuition. As defined above, the parameters (a, b, c, d, e, f) determine the vectors \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k} and \mathbf{x} . Each attack type can be derived from the relationship these three vectors have with each other and the basis vectors $\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{y}$. The graphical representation introduced in Figure 4.1 of a compression function might assist the visual intuition.

Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be the Linicrypt program corresponding to a scheme f which insecure as a compression function (condition (4.15) does not hold). This is equivalent to the




Figure 4.1: Visual representation of the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas compression function (left) and two insecure compression functions (middle, right). The base variables are h (right), m (outwards) and y (up). The arrows represent \mathbf{O} (black), \mathbf{k} (red) and \mathbf{x} (blue). A violet arrow means $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{x}$. One should remember that $\text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C})$ includes the vector \mathbf{y} , which is omitted as it always points up. A gray plane is sometimes drawn to highlight the fact that \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{k})$.

statement: \mathcal{P} has a collision structure. By definition of collision structure, there is a split $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{cs} \sqcup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$ such that \mathcal{C}_{cs} is deterministically solvable fixing a space

$$\mathcal{F} \supsetneq \text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}_{fix}) + \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}). \quad (4.16)$$

As $\mathcal{C} = \{(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})\}$ contains only a single element, there are only two cases for this split.

Case 1: $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \{\}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{fix} = \mathcal{C}$.

In this case, we know that \mathcal{F} has to be the whole space $\mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. Therefore, equation (4.16) translates to $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \neq \mathcal{F} = \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$. This equation is precisely the condition by which the authors of [MSR19] call \mathcal{P} degenerate.

Definition 4.21. Let f be one of the 64 PGV compression functions. We assign it to the Linicrypt attack category “Degenerate” if $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \neq \mathbb{F}^{1 \times d}$.

Lemma 4.22. (Degenerate Attack) Let f be a compression scheme from the Degenerate category. Then there is a second preimage attack on H_f^n if $n > 1$. There are 22 such compression schemes.

Proof. Let (m_1, \dots, m_n) be an input for H_f^n . We will describe how to find a second-preimage for it. Note, that

$$\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})^\top = \ker(\mathbf{O})^\perp + \ker(\mathcal{C})^\perp = (\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}))^\perp.$$

Recall, that the space $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C})$ carries the following meaning: Let $\mathbf{w} \in \ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C})$ be arbitrary. If \mathbf{v} is in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ then $\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w}$ is in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ with $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{O}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w})$. In other words: $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{I}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w})) = \mathbf{O}(\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w}) = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v})$.

As f is degenerate, $\dim(\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})) \leq 2$. Also, $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{e}_3 \in \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$. Therefore, $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C})$ can only be one of 4 subspaces. We do a case separation for these 4 subspaces.

Case 1.1: $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{m})^\top = \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_1, \mathbf{e}_2)$.

It follows that $\text{rowsp}(\mathcal{C}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{e}_3)$, i.e. $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{x} = 0$ and $\mathbf{O} = \mathbf{e}_3$. This is the scheme $f(h, m) = E(0, 0)$. The function H_f^n is constant, so every input is a collision

with every other input. The following is the graphical representation of its algebraic representation.




Case 1.2: $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{m})^\top = \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_2)$.

Let $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & \delta & 0 \end{bmatrix} \in \ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C})$ be arbitrary. By the argument above, we have $f(h, m) = f(h, m + \delta)$ for any $h, m \in \mathbb{F}$. We set $m'_i = m_i$ for $i < n$ and choose an $m'_n \neq m_n$. Then

$$H_f^n(m'_1, \dots, m'_n) = h'_n = f(h_{n-1}, m'_n) = f(h_{n-1}, m_n) = h_n = H_f^n(m_1, \dots, m_n).$$

There are $2 \times 3 + 1 = 7$ compression schemes that fulfill the condition from his case.




Case 1.3: $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{h})^\top = \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_1)$.

By the same argument as in the previous case, we get $f(h, m) = f(h', m)$ for any $h' \in \mathbb{F}$. We set $m'_i = m_i$ for $i < n - 1$, $m'_{n-1} \neq m_{n-1}$ and $m'_n = m_n$. Then

$$H_f^n(m'_1, \dots, m'_n) = h'_n = f(h'_{n-1}, m_n) = f(h_{n-1}, m_n) = h_n = H_f^n(m_1, \dots, m_n).$$

There are $2 \times 3 + 1 = 7$ compression schemes that fulfill the condition from his case.




Case 1.4: $\ker(\mathbf{O}) \cap \ker(\mathcal{C}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{h} - \mathbf{m})^\top = \text{span}(\mathbf{e}_1 - \mathbf{e}_2)$.

This implies that $f(h, m) = f(h + \delta, h - \delta)$ for any $\delta \in \mathbb{F}$. We set $m'_i = m_i$ for $i < n - 1$, $m'_{n-1} \neq m_{n-1}$, $\delta = h_{n-1} - h'_{n-1}$ and $m'_n = m_n + \delta$. Then

$$h'_n = f(h'_{n-1}, m'_n) = f(h_{n-1} + \delta, m_n - \delta) = f(h_{n-1}, m_n) = h_n.$$

There are $2 \times 3 + 1 = 7$ compression schemes that fulfill the condition from his case.




In total we found that $1 + 3 \times 7 = 22$ compression schemes are degenerate. \square

This completes the analysis of case 1. Now we consider the other split of \mathcal{C} into $\mathcal{C}_{cs} \sqcup \mathcal{C}_{fix}$.

Case 2: $\mathcal{C}_{cs} = \mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{fix} = \{\}$.

By the assumption that f has a collision structure, we get: \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing $\mathcal{F} \supsetneq \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O})$. Recall that this means one can arbitrarily fix $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}$ and some other dimension and still find a $\mathbf{v} \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. \mathcal{F} has to be 2 dimensional because of the bijection from the inputs of a program to $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. The 2-dimensional subspace \mathcal{F} can only be one of these 7, as these are all subspaces one can span using vectors in the unit cube.



In the case that $\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{F}$, a second preimage attack is possible. Only the first and the 5th subspace pictured above fulfill this condition.

Case 2.1: \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{O} and \mathbf{h} .

Definition 4.23. Let f be one of the 64 PGV compression functions with algebraic representation $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$. We assign it to the Linicrypt attack category “ $\langle \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h} \rangle$ -Collision Structure” if \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing \mathbf{O} and \mathbf{h} .

Lemma 4.24. Let f be a compression scheme from the $\langle \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h} \rangle$ -Collision Structure category. Then there is a second-preimage attack on H_f^n , making a single query to the ideal cipher. Also, its attack type is (b) in [BRS02] and (D) in [PGV94]. There are 12 such compression schemes.

Proof. Assume we are given any $o, h \in \mathbb{F}$. We show that a corresponding $m \in \mathbb{F}$ can be found such that $f(h, m) = o$. This is the definition of the direct attack (D) from [PGV94] which corresponds to attack (b) from [BRS02]. Assume as stated in the Lemma: \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable fixing $\mathbf{I}_{cs} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{O} \\ \mathbf{h} \end{bmatrix}$.

By Lemma 4.8, $\mathbf{I}_{cs}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})} : \text{sol}(\mathcal{C}) \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^2$ is a bijection. Corollary 4.9 states that the preimage to (o, h) can be computed using $|\mathcal{C}| = 1$ queries. We call this preimage $\mathbf{v} \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. By definition of \mathbf{I}_{cs} we have $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = o$ and $\mathbf{h}\mathbf{v} = h$. We set $m = \mathbf{m}\mathbf{v}$. Then $f(h, m) = f(\mathbf{h}\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{m}\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = o$ as required.

This allows for an easy second-preimage attack on H_f^n . Let (m_1, \dots, m_n) be an input to H_f^n . We set $m'_i = m_i$ for $i < n - 1$ and $m'_{n-1} \neq m_{n-1}$. According to the argument above, we can compute an m'_n , such that

$$H_f^n(m'_1, \dots, m'_n) = h'_n = f(h'_{n-1}, m'_n) = h_n = H_f^n(m_1, \dots, m_n).$$


We will now list and count the schemes described by the lemma. First, note that $\mathbf{k} \in \text{span}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h})$ by definition of deterministically solvable. Therefore, $\mathbf{k} = 0$ or $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{h}$.

We can derive these two implications:


$$\mathbf{k} \neq 0 \implies \mathcal{C} \text{ deterministically solvable fixing } \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{k} \quad (4.17)$$

$$\mathbf{k} = 0 \implies \mathcal{C} \text{ deterministically solvable fixing } \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{y} \text{ or fixing } \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{x} \quad (4.18)$$

Assume $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h})$. Then these 6 schemes correspond to this subcase:



Now assume $\text{rowsp}(\mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h}) = \text{rowsp}(\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{h})$. Then these 6 schemes correspond to this subcase:



Altogether these are 12 compression schemes. □

At this point, out of the 52 schemes with a collision structure, 18 are left. Unfortunately, the categorization of these does not follow directly from the Linicrypt model as the first two categories do. The reason is that the attacks rely on causing interactions between different queries. Neither our security proof, which is restricted to single query constructions nor the proof from [MSR19, Theorem 1], which is restricted to constructions using distinct nonces, can explain these behaviors.


Consider the Permutation Attack from [PGV94]. It can be described by the following condition on the algebraic representation of f .

Case 2.2: $\mathbf{h}^\top \in \ker(\mathcal{C})$.

This case overlaps with both Case 1 and Case 2.1. $\mathbf{h}^\top \in \ker(\mathcal{C})$ equivalent to setting the parameters c and e to 0. That is, $f(h, m) = ah + f_2(m)$ for some function f_2 and $a \in \{0, 1\}$. Then


$$H_f^n(m_1, \dots, m_n) = f(h_{n-1}, m_n) = ah_{n-1} + f_2(m_n) = \dots = a^n h_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a^{n-i} f_2(m_i).$$

Therefore, $H_f^n(m_0, \dots, m_n) = H_f^n(m_{\pi(0)}, \dots, m_{\pi(n)})$ for a permutation π of $\{1, \dots, n\}$. If $n \geq 1$, this allows for a second preimage attack which does not need any queries to the ideal cipher. One can identify $2^{6-2} = 16$ schemes f such that H_f^n is susceptible to this permutation attack. The 5 schemes that meet this requirement and have not yet been categorized are:



Case 2.3: None of the above cases.

Finally, we are left with 13 schemes. These are the 13 schemes of the type Backward Attack (B) from [PGV94]. 8 of those schemes are secure if composed in the Merkle-Damgård construction as shown by [BRS02]. They call them the group-2 schemes with attack type (c). The following is the visual representation corresponding to them:



In [BRS02] it is proven that the group-2 schemes are collision resistant. Specifically, they prove $\text{CRadv}^{\text{ic}}[\mathcal{A}, H_f^n] \leq 3(N+1)N/|\mathbb{F}|$ for an arbitrary \mathcal{A} , so the 8 group-2 schemes are just as collision resistant as the 12 group-1 schemes, up to a constant factor.

The 5 remaining schemes are marked with attack type (g). That means that the authors [BRS02] identified a collision attack making 2 or fewer queries. These collisions are particular, as they can be produced only for different input lengths. Take for example the compression scheme $f(h, m) = E(0, h + m) + m$. Let n be fixed. For $i \leq n$, we define the message blocks:


$$m_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for odd } i \\ -E(0, 0) & \text{for even } i \end{cases}$$

Then the Linicrypt Merkle-Damgård construction computes to:

$$H_f^n(m_1, \dots, m_n) = \begin{cases} E(0, 0) & \text{for odd } n \\ 0 & \text{for even } n \end{cases}$$

All the collisions we found are then: $H_f^n(m_1, \dots, m_n) = H_f^{n-2}(m_1, \dots, m_{n-2})$.

For the two schemes where $\mathbf{O} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ the collisions are very similar in structure, if one assumes the field \mathbb{F} has characteristic 2, i.e. $x + x = 0$ for any $x \in \mathbb{F}$.



To conclude this section, we have summarized the comparison of the Linicrypt attack taxonomy and the previous taxonomies in Table 4.2. The bounds for second-preimage resistance are copied from the collision resistance bounds, and are, therefore, probably not tight. From the derivation, it is clear that the subspaces for which \mathcal{C} is deterministically solvable contain a lot of information about the security properties of the scheme.

Linicrypt Attack			#	SPRadv ^{ic} $[\mathcal{A}, H_f^n]$	CRadv ^{ic} $[\mathcal{A}, H_f^n]$
	BRS	PGV			
Degenerate	a	-	15	1	1
	b	D	2	1	1
	g	F	5	1	1
$\langle \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h} \rangle$ -Collision Structure	b	D	12	1	1
Permutation attack	f	P	5	1	1
Secure	d	✓	4	$\leq (N+1)N/2 \mathbb{F} $	$\leq (N+1)N/2 \mathbb{F} $
	e	FP	8	$\leq (N+1)N/2 \mathbb{F} $	$\leq (N+1)N/2 \mathbb{F} $
Other Collision Structure	c	B	8	$\leq 3(N+1)N/ \mathbb{F} $	$\leq 3(N+1)N/ \mathbb{F} $
	g	B	5		

Table 4.2: A comparison of the classification derived by the Linicrypt model and the ones found by [PGV94] and [BRS02]. The f in H_f^n stands for the associated function to one of the compression schemes in that row. The \mathcal{A} denotes the best possible adversary. This table, including the Linicrypt attack type, has been generated automatically. The code is accessible in [Sem22].

Chapter 5

Limitations and Future Work

5.1 On the Permutation Attack and the 5 Remaining Schemes

The attacks on the collision resistance of the schemes from Case 2.2 and the schemes marked with both attack types (g) and (B) are different in nature than the attacks on those in the categories Degenerate or $\langle \mathbf{O}, \mathbf{h} \rangle$ -Collision Structure. They make use of the fact that the block cipher takes no nonces, and hence independent oracle calls can be switched around or made to collapse.

Consider a compression function f such that the Permutation Attack applies and some message $\mathbf{m} = (m_0, \dots, m_n)$. Let $\pi\mathbf{m} := (m_{\pi(1)}, \dots, m_{\pi(n)})$ for some permutation π of $\{1, \dots, n\}$. The queries in the execution of $H_f^n(\mathbf{m})$ are the same as those for $H_f^n(\pi\mathbf{m})$, just in a different order. This attack can be described in Linicrypt.

Lemma 5.1 (Permutation Attack). *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{O}, \mathcal{C})$ be a (standard or ideal cipher) Linicrypt program. Assume there exists a basis change $\mathbf{B} \neq 1$ such that $\mathbf{O} = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}$ and $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}\mathbf{B}$. Let $\mathbf{v} \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ with $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}$. Then $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v}$ is a second preimage to $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}$.*

Proof. The basis change \mathbf{B} is a bijection from $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C}\mathbf{B}) = \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ to $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. Using the assumptions from the lemma, this means that $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v}$ is in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$. Also, $\mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v}$. By the definition of the algebraic representation, we have $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{O}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v})$. Lemma 3.9 states that $\mathbf{I}|_{\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})}$ is a bijection. Therefore $\mathbf{I}\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{I}\mathbf{v}$ follows from $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}$. \square

The program H_f^n for an f susceptible to the Permutation Attack does fulfill the conditions from Lemma 5.1. In the context of second preimage resistance and collision resistance, the extra condition in the lemma that $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}$ is not a strong restriction. One can expect $\text{span}(\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})) = \mathbb{F}^d$. If $\mathbf{B} \neq 1$ then its eigenspace to eigenvalue 1 has dimension $\leq d-1$. Therefore choosing a random $\mathbf{v} \in \text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$, which equates to choosing a random input, has a very low probability of landing in the eigenspace of \mathbf{B} , i.e., $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{v} \neq \mathbf{v}$. Consider the example H_f^n again. A random message has a very low probability of not being susceptible to a permutation attack, as only the message with all equal message blocks is immune to all permutation attacks.

Now let us consider f to be one of the 5 compression functions for which we found collisions only for different input lengths. That is, f has an attack of type (g) by

[BRS02] and an attack of type (B) by [PGV94]. In order to be concrete, let us consider the same example as before: $f(h, m) = E(0, h + m) + m$. Let $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_n)$ be the message we have defined before that causes the collisions. In the execution of $H_f^n(\mathbf{m})$ only a single independent query is made, that is $E(0, 0)$. By carefully choosing an input, we have caused the n different queries to collapse to a single one. The authors of [MSR19] discuss this issue in the section “Why the Restriction to Distinct Nonces”. They give the example program $\mathcal{P}(x, y) = H(H(x)) - H(y)$. For this example, setting $x = y$ causes the program to “collapse” to $\mathcal{P}(x) = 0$, clearly a program that is degenerate. In our case, setting \mathbf{m} in that specific way, causes the program to collapse to $H_f^n() = 0$ for even n and $H_f^n() = E(0, 0)$ for odd n . We put the phrase “collapse a program” in quotes here, as this needs to be rigorously defined. Such a collapse attack can probably be defined similarly to the permutation attack by considering the symmetries contained in $\text{sol}(\mathcal{C})$ and how they interact with \mathbf{O} . We refrain from doing so, as this idea is not fully developed yet.

5.2 Collision Resistance for Linicrypt with Repeated Nonces

The missing pieces in the derivation of the attack taxonomy for the 64 PGV compression functions hints towards other attack types apart from the collision structure attack. A further generalization of the collision structure attack could contain the attacks described above as a special case. We believe this is a promising area for future research towards solving collision resistance for Linicrypt programs that use repeated nonces.

We identify these two simple programs that are not collision resistant but exemplify the attacks described above.

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{P}_{\text{collapse}}(x, y) \\ \hline \text{return } H(x) - H(y) \end{array}}$$

Algebraic Representation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{O} &= [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ -1] \\ \mathbf{q}_1 &= [1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{a}_1 &= [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{q}_2 &= [0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{a}_2 &= [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1] \end{aligned}$$

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{P}_{\text{permutation}}(x, y) \\ \hline \text{return } H(x) + H(y) \end{array}}$$

Algebraic Representation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{O} &= [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1] \\ \mathbf{q}_1 &= [1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{a}_1 &= [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{q}_2 &= [0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0] \\ \mathbf{a}_2 &= [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1] \end{aligned}$$

All inputs of the form (x, x) collide under $\mathcal{P}_{\text{collapse}}$. In contrast to that, every (x, y) is a collision with (y, x) under $\mathcal{P}_{\text{permutation}}$ if $x \neq y$. A general characterization of collision resistance would have to explain these two examples.

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Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
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