



Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich  
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

# Modeling the Ideal Cipher in Linicrypt

Master Thesis

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## Abstract

Todo

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## Chapter 1

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# Introduction

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## Chapter 2

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# Preliminaries

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Outline:

1. Standard linicrypt introduction
  - a) Type of constructions it captures, examples
  - b) Kind of adversaries considered
  - c) Algebraic representation, introduction of notation
  - d) Normalization and characterization of indistinguishability
2. Collision resistance with linicrypt
  - a) What attacks are captured, degeneracy and collision structure

## 2.1 Linicrypt

### 2.1.1 Definition of a Linicrypt program

The Linicrypt model for cryptographic constructions was introduced by Cramer & Røssulek in [?]. Summarizing the formalization from that paper, a pure Linicrypt program  $\mathcal{P}$  is a straight line program whose intermediate variables are elements in a field  $\mathbb{F}$ . The only allowed operations to create an intermediate variable are:

- Retrieve an input, which is in  $\mathbb{F}$
- Perform a linear combination of existing internal variables
- Call a random oracle  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{F}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^*$
- Sample from  $\mathbb{F}$  uniformly

The program  $\mathcal{P}$  can output one or more of its variables.

### 2.1.2 Type of Adversary

The Linicrypt model only imposes computational restrictions on the constructions, not on the adversaries. Usually one considers arbitrary adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  that are computationally unbounded, but have bounded access to the random oracle  $H$ . Therefore the behaviour of an adversary is typically described in terms of the number of queries it makes.

### 2.1.3 Algebraic Representation

One of the advantages of restricting the computational model is that one can characterize Linicrypt programs with an algebraic representation. Let  $\mathcal{P}$  be a linicrypt program with intermediate variables  $v_1, \dots, v_n$ .

A **base variable** is an intermediate variable which was created by retrieving an input, calling the random oracle  $H$  or sampling from  $\mathbb{F}$ . Let **base** be the number of base variables and let  $\mathbf{v}_{\text{base}} \in \mathbb{F}^{\text{base}}$  denote the vector of the base variables for an execution of  $\mathcal{P}$ . A **derived variable** is one which is created by performing a linear combination of existing intermediate variables. Note, that derived variables are therefore linear combinations of base variables. As base variables are mostly independent of each other, it makes sense to *model them as independent vectors in  $\mathbb{F}^{\text{base}}$* . The derived variables are then modeled by linear combinations of these vectors.

Let  $v_i$  be an intermediate variable. We define the **associated vector**  $\mathbf{v}_i$  to be the unique row vector such that  $v_i = \mathbf{v}_i \times \mathbf{v}_{\text{base}}$  for every execution of  $\mathcal{P}$ . For example, if  $v_i$  is the  $j$ 'th base variable, then  $\mathbf{v}_i = [0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0]$ , where the 1 is in the  $j$ 'th position. We follow the convention to write vectors in  $\mathbb{F}^{\text{base}}$  using a bold font.

The outputs of  $\mathcal{P}$  can be described by a matrix with entries in  $\mathbb{F}$ . Let  $o_1, \dots, o_k$  be the output variables of  $\mathcal{P}$ . Then the **output matrix**  $\mathbf{M}$  of  $\mathcal{P}$  is defined by

$$\mathbf{M} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{o}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{o}_k \end{bmatrix}.$$

By the definition of the associated vectors  $\mathbf{o}_i$  we have  $\mathbf{M} \times \mathbf{v}_{\text{base}} = [o_1, \dots, o_k]^\top$ . The output matrix describes the linear correlations in the output of  $\mathcal{P}$ .

But the output matrix doesn't describe all correlations in  $\mathbf{v}_{\text{base}}$ . Namely, the relationship between the queries and answers to the random oracle  $H$  need to be captured algebraically. Let  $v_i = H(t_i, (q_1, \dots, q_n))$  be an operation in  $\mathcal{P}$ . The **associated oracle constraint**  $c$  to this operation is

$$c = \left( t_i, \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{q}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{q}_n \end{bmatrix}, \mathbf{v}_i \right) = (t_i, \mathbf{Q}_i, \mathbf{v}_i).$$

This should be interpreted as the requirement that  $\mathbf{v}_i \times \mathbf{v}_{\text{base}} = H(t_i, \mathbf{Q}_i \times \mathbf{v}_{\text{base}})$ . We denote the set of all (associated) oracle constraints of  $\mathcal{P}$  by  $\mathcal{C}$ .

Wrapping up these definitions, we define the **algebraic representation** of  $\mathcal{P}$  to be the tuple  $(\mathbf{M}, \mathcal{C})$ . A natural question that arises at this point is: Does the algebraic representation determine the behaviour of  $\mathcal{P}$  completely?



## Chapter 3

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# Extending Linicrypt to Ideal Ciphers

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Let  $\mathcal{P}$  be a Linicrypt program. For each query to  $E$  of the form  $y = E(k, x)$  we define the associated constraint  $(E, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ , where  $\mathbf{k} \in \mathbb{F}^{\text{base}}$  is the row vector corresponding to  $k \in \mathbb{F}$  and similarly for  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{y}$ . Each query to  $D$  of the form  $x = D(k, y)$ , is associated with the constraint  $(D, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x})$

To capture the fact that  $E(k, x) = y$  should be associated to the same constraint as  $D(k, y) = x$  for the same  $k$ ,  $x$  and  $y$ , we introduce an equivalence relation on the constraints. For all  $\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{y}' \in \mathbb{F}^{\text{base}}$  we define

$$\begin{aligned} (E, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) &\sim (E, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}') \\ (E, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) &\sim (D, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}') \\ (D, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}) &\sim (D, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}') \\ (D, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}) &\sim (E, \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}') \end{aligned}$$

The set of constraints  $\mathcal{C}$  corresponding to  $\mathcal{P}$  is then a subset of

$$\left( \{E, D\} \times \mathbb{F}^{\text{base}} \times \mathbb{F}^{\text{base}} \times \mathbb{F}^{\text{base}} \right) / \sim$$

Todo: Include the idea that no constraint with the "same" input queries are used twice.

Each query should only be

Todo: Maybe scrap the idea of the equivalence relation, it seems to hinder more than it helps.

Todo: Instead of doing weird things with equivalence relation in Collision structure definition, explicitly add data of reverse or forward direction.

**Definition 3.1** (Collision structure). *Let  $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbf{M}, \mathcal{C})$  be a Linicrypt program. A **collision structure** is an index  $i^*$  and a tuple  $(c_1, \dots, c_n)$  for  $c_i = (O_i, \mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{q}_i, \mathbf{a}_i)$  and  $O_i \in \{E, D\}$ , such that:*

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1.  $[c_1], \dots, [c_n]$  is an ordering of  $\mathcal{C}$

2. The input or output corresponding to the query  $c_{i^*}$  can be fixed arbitrarily:

$$\text{span}(\{\mathbf{k}_{i^*}, \mathbf{q}_{i^*}\}) \not\subseteq \text{span}(\{\mathbf{k}_1, \dots, \mathbf{k}_{i^*-1}, \mathbf{q}_1, \dots, \mathbf{q}_{i^*-1}, \mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{i^*-1}\} \cup \text{rows}(\mathbf{M}))$$

3. For all  $j \geq i^*$  the constraint  $c_j$  does not contradict previous constraints:

$$\mathbf{a}_j \notin \text{span}(\{\mathbf{k}_1, \dots, \mathbf{k}_{j-1}, \mathbf{q}_1, \dots, \mathbf{q}_{j-1}, \mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{j-1}\} \cup \{\mathbf{k}_j, \mathbf{q}_j\} \cup \text{rows}(\mathbf{M}))$$

This is an mistake



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