

Applying dynamic taint propagation in order to enforce domain driven security

FREDRIK ADOLFSSON

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Supervisor: Musard Balliu

Examiner: Mads Dam

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School of Computer Science and Communication

Abstract

Sammanfattning

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Chapter 1

Introduction

One of the greatest problems, but in the same time greatest strength, with deploying applications on the web is that they are accessible from everywhere where there exists a internet access. This means that they are also easily accessible for people who wishes to harm or abuse the application. Two of the more common security risks for a web application is Injection Attack and Cross-Site Scripting. [13, 4]

To prevent accidentally introducing security flaws in the application have a variety of tools and methodologies been created. One of these is the Domain Driven Security which aim to secure the secure the application by focusing on the core domain models and making certain that validation of the value object is correct. Another example, which is a tool, is Dynamic Taint Analysis which marks input from the user with a taint value. This taint value follows the input trough out the system and propagates into the other values it comes in contact with. The taint value is later checked in sinks and execution is halted if a tainted variable tries to access certain sensitive areas of code.

1.1 Problem

The big question is if we can combine Dynamic Taint Propagation and Domain Driven Security and therefor creating a safer environment for the developer. Where it is harder to accidentally introducing security flaws.

1.2 Aim

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate if we can enforce users of dynamic taint propagation to follow the programming paradigm Domain Driven Design. This will hopefully result in a resource which helps developers to create more secure applications.

1.3 Definitions

Trough out this thesis will a consistent terminology be used. Some terms might be new or it might just be able to use it in different ways. To remove confusion will a list of definitions be introduced in this section.

Definition 1.3.1. Application is used to denote a computer program witch is design constructed to solve one or more tasks for the user.

Definition 1.3.2. Domain is explained in **Secure By Design REFERENCES!!!** as part of the real world where something happens.

Definition 1.3.3. Domain Model is a fraction of the domain where each model have a specific meaning.

1.4 Delimitations

One delimitation taken in the thesis is to ony focus on web application when evaluating and discussing Domain Driven Security and Dynamic Taint Propagation. The subject could be expanded to a brother range of plattforms but to keep the focus have the decision been made.

1.5 Methodology

Chapter 2

Background

This Chapter will present some background knowledge with needed information to comprehend the chapters that follow. The chapters starts with a generally description about how a web application work which then is followed by two of the most common security vulnerabilities to a web application. After that is the two recourses Dynamic Taint Propagation and Domain Driven Security introduced.

2.1 Web Application

The most common architectural design for a web application is based on three tires. The first is the presentation tire which is the visual components rendered by a browser. The second is the logic tire which can be seen as the brain of the application. The last and third is the storage tier, where the second tier can store data as needed. [3]

LÄGG TILL BILD PÅ STRUKTUREN

As can be seen in picture **BILD** dose the tires only communicate with the tire closest to itself. This causes the second tire to become a safe guard for the tire three where the valuable information for a attacker lies. The storage tier contains all the information the application needs to provide the wanted service. Such information might for example be name, email, personal number and credit card information. [3]

2.2 Security Vulnerabilities

The organization Open Web Applications Security Project, mostly known for its shortening (OWASP), is a online community which aim to help to secure web applications. [13] OWASP produces a report about the top 10 security risks with a web application. The report contains information about the ten most common application security risks that for the current year. Information such as how the security risk is exploited and possible prevention method is also presented. [14] This report will look at the number one and eight security risks of 2017 which is injection attacks and cross-site scripting. [14]

2.2.1 Injection

The most common security risk is Injection Attacks. [14] A Injection Attack is any attack where the attacker's input changes the intent of the execution and executes malicious code. Common result of Injection Attacks are file destruction, lack of accountability, denial of access and data loss. [19]

There is two kinds of different Injection Attacks. These two are SQL Injection and Blind SQL Injection. [19] Both will be described below.

SQL Injection

SQL Injection is when a SQL query is tampered with which then results in gaining data from the database which were not intended. Listing 2.1 displays a possible SQL Query which is open to SQL Injections. This is due to the fact that the variable `UserId` is never validated before it is being used to query the database. [3, 19]

Listing 2.1: Code Acceptable to SQL Injection

```
userId = userInput
"SELECT * FROM Users WHERE userId = " + userId
```

The query will work as intended as long as the user input, notated with *userInput*, only is a user id. But what happens if the user input is *10* or *1 = 1*? This user input would result in the query seen in listing 2.2.

Listing 2.2: SQL Injection

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE userId = 10 or 1 = 1
```

This query would result in that the database returns the whole table of users since the second or parameter is always true. This problem can be prevented in a couple of different ways. The first is through validation of the input. In our example do we expect the input to be an Integer. By verifying that the input as seen in listing 2.3 can we protect the query from being injected with unwanted commands.

Listing 2.3: Preventing SQL Injection through Verification

```
userId = userInput
isInteger (userId)
"SELECT_*_FROM_Users_WHERE_userId=_ " + userId
```

A second more common alternative is to use SQL Parameters which handles the verification for the user. This leaves the verification and validation of input up to the SQL engine. Our example written with SQL Parameters can be seen in listing 2.4.

Listing 2.4: Preventing SQL Injection through SQL Parameters

```
userId = userInput
sqlQuery = "SELECT_*_FROM_Users_WHERE_userId=_@0"
db.Execute (sqlQuery , userId)
```

Blind SQL Injection

Blind SQL Injection is very similar to SQL Injection. The only difference is that the attacker does not receive the wanted information from the database. The information is instead received by monitoring variables such as how long time the response took or what kind of error messages it returns. An example of the first is to create a Blind SQL Injection where the query tells the SQL engine to sleep depending on a condition an example of this can be seen in listing 2.5. [3, 19]

Listing 2.5: Time Based Blind SQL Injection

```
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE userId = 1 WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5 '
```

The second variant of Blind SQL Injection is by analyzing the error messages and depending on what they return build a image off the wanted answer. [3, 19]

2.2.2 Cross-site Scripting

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) have been a vulnerability since the beginning of the internet. One of the first XSS attacks created just after the release of JavaScript. The attack was passible by loading another web-site into a frame on the site that the attacker controls. The attacker could then trough JavaScript access any content that is visible or typed into the loaded frame. To prevent this from being possible were the standard of Same-Origin Policy which restricted JavaScript to only access content on it's own origin. [7, 17]

But the introduction of the Same-Origin Policy did not stop the attackers from preforming XSS attacks. The next wave of attacks were mostly towards chat roms where it was possible to inject JavaScript tags into the input of the message. Which would then later be reflected by the server itself, when displaying the message for other users, and thereby bypassing the Same-Origin Policy. [7]

Reflected vs Persistent

2.3 Dynamic Taint Propagation

Taint propagation, also known as taint analysis and taint checking [SOURCE NEEDED?], is a tool to analyse the flow of information in a domain. [15] It works by giving input data a tainted property which follows the data and propagate onto other data which it is in contact with. The taint property is later checked in security sensitive sinks. [15]

Perl and Ruby are two programming languages which have adapted to user dynamic taint checking. [16, 10] And there are some tools who enables taint checking for other languages such as TaintDroid [11] and FlexTaint [20].

Two of OWASP top 10 application security risks of 2017 is Injection and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). [14] Protection against these two attacks are best done by validating input data which taint propagation reminds and forces the developer to do.

2.4 Domain Driven Security

There exists a plethora of tools who aim to help in the process of developing complex domain models, but Domain Driven Design (DDD) is not one of them. [2, 8] DDD is more of a thought process and methodology to follow every step of the process. [6] In *Domain-driven design reference: definitions and patterns summaries* do Evans [5] describe DDD through three core ideas:

- Focus on the core domain.
- Explore models in a creative collaboration of domain practitioners and software practitioners.
- Speak a ubiquitous language within an explicitly bounded context.

The core domain is the part of your product that is most important and often is your main selling point compared to other similar products. [12] A discussion and even possible a documentation describing the core domain is something that will help the development of the product. The idea is to keep everybody on the same track heading in the same direction. [6]

The second idea is to explore and develop every model in collaboration between domain practitioners, who are experts in the given domain, and software developers. This ensures that important knowledge needed to successfully develop the product is communicated back and forth between the two parties. [12] The third idea is important to enable and streamline the second. By using a ubiquitous language will miscommunication between domain and software practitioners be minimized and the collaboration between the two parties can instead focus on the important parts which is to develop the product. [5]

Evans [5] do as well argue about the weight of clearly defining the bounded contexts for each defined model, and this needs to be done

in the ubiquitous language created for the specific product. The need of this exists because of the otherwise great risk of misunderstandings and erroneous assumptions in the collaborations between the different models. [12]

Wilander [21] and Johnsson [9] created 2009 a blog post each in a synchronous manner where they together introduces the concept of Domain Driven Security (DDS) to the public. They describe DDS as the intersection between Domain Driven Design (DDD) and application security. DDD is about developing complex domain models and one of the most basic rule of application security is to always validate input data. DDS in other hand, is about the importance of creating and maintaining domain models who are reflecting the product correctly and they are validated so they cant be populated with erroneous data. [21, 9, 1, 18]

Chapter 3

Implementation

3.1 Plain (Bad name)

3.2 Taint Propagation?

3.3 Domain Driven Security

Chapter 4

Result

Chapter 5

Discussion

Chapter 6

Future Work

Chapter 7

Conclusion

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