

# Re-working the Sensible in the Age of Digital Music

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# Chapter 1

## Preface

Little intro...

For this reason, that I believe *radical music* today can not be defined by neither the anti-mimetic notion of *modernism* nor its reaction that now—under the *postmodern* banner—challenges the emancipatory potential of music, its autonomy and its capacity to accomplish.

It is then of utmost importance that *radical music* is redefined again positively, given the inability that the two main aesthetic proposals in music have to inspire radical thought. Today we live in a world facing unprecedented problems of global magnitude:

Another obstacle in redefining *radical music* has been the recent trend to find new terms which apply to practices relating to sound that defy the conventional definitions and functions of music. New terms such as Sonic Arts, Sound Art and Audio Arts have emerged in an attempt to justify these new practices. It has been precisely the cultural resistance and unwillingness toward accepting *radical music* that has motivated the invention of new definitions that try to identify these sonic practices as ‘other’ arts and not as music. The reluctance to widening the definition of *what music is* has motivated some to search for new definitions that they believe will give some acceptance and legitimacy to their practices. Instead of embracing this approach, I propose one should struggle more with the concept of *music*, and in my opinion, one should strive to redefine *what music is* rather than following the fashionable rebranding of sound related practices.

One problem I have had in my own musical career is the rejection by some musicians and musicologists of my work on the grounds that ‘it is not music.’ To avoid getting into semantic quibbles, I have therefore entitled this book *On Sonic Art* and wish to answer the question what is, and what is not, ‘sonic art.’ We can begin by saying that sonic art includes music and electro-acoustic music. At the same time, however, it will cross

over into areas which have been categorized distinctly as *text-sound* and as *sound-effects*. Nevertheless, focus will be upon the structure and structuring of sounds themselves. I personally feel there is no longer any way to draw a clear distinction between these areas. This is why I have chosen the title *On Sonic Art* to encompass the arts of organizing sound-events in time. This, however, is merely a convenient fiction for those who cannot bear to see the use of the word ‘music’ extended. For me, all these areas fall within the category I call ‘music’.<sup>1</sup>

Is it possible today to rethink a musical avant-garde that can inspire new forms of political thought? Can a connection be established at present time between music and other forms of radical thought?

In the first two chapters, I will attempt to tackle different concerns regarding a single question that I consider to be central to my approach in recent years to the way I compose, perform, listen and think about music. The question being: what is radical music today? The idea of *radical music* has fundamentally changed in recent years and today it is hard to think of any music as being radical. This is partly due to the fact that for some years now the prevailing ideology in thinking and writing about music has been one of skepticism and indifference towards radical ideas and innovation in how we make, present and perceive music. By radical ideas and innovation, I do not mean music that is technologically ground breaking or innovative only in specific considerations to a particular set of musical parameters or new ideas that are relevant only to the specialist’s theoretical interest. What I mean is music that is perceived as radical within our contemporary culture and redefines what *music is* in the community, what it means to us, how it is perceived and defined.

It is in my attempt to rethink what *radical music* is today, that I believe Jaques Rancière’s work proves to be helpful, particularly in establishing a relationship between *music* and *radical thought*, and more specifically *radical thought* as it relates to politics. Therefore, in **Chapter 2**, I will give theoretical background based on Rancière’s views on the relationship between aesthetics and politics. Additionally, I undertake the task of trying to apply his concepts as they pertain to music.

In **Chapter 3**—more theory

In **Chapter 4**—computer applications

In **Chapter 5**—compositions: Etudes, On Violence, Zizek, FreuPinta

In **Chapter 6**—conclusions

I would like to thank:

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<sup>1</sup>Trevor Wishart, “What is Sonic Art?”, in *On Sonic Art*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996, p. 4.

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# Chapter 2

## Background

In this chapter, I will attempt to give the philosophical and historical background necessary to understand the aesthetic preoccupations and ideas behind my work.<sup>1</sup> I will endeavor to do so by closely examining the theoretical edifice of French philosopher Jaques Rancière. I have chosen Rancière's work as I think it successfully rethinks the relationship between art and politics as well as invigorating the concept of *aesthetics*. It does so by clarifying crucial concepts, explaining important aesthetic questions and demystifying misconceptions about certain notions and views that are too often carelessly thrown around in discussions about art. My central interest is in how Rancière's concepts relate to music and more specifically to the musical discourse of western avant-garde composers.

I will start by addressing some concerns and questions regarding the notion of modernity and how it manifests in music as compared to other artistic disciplines, particularly that of the fine arts. Then, I will attempt to explain Rancière's idiosyncratic and revealing view on aesthetics and its relationship to politics—later going into a more in-depth analysis of what he calls the 'regimes of art.' Having given the theoretical tools necessary examination, I will attempt to clarify some of the misunderstandings and misconceptions that are usually ascribed to the notion of modernism in music. In doing so, I will discuss certain elements about the work of early twentieth century composers, whose innovations shook up the musical status-quo—focusing on Schönberg's departure from tonality. I will analyse these developments in relationship to the initial premises of the modernist project that later would come to be simplified and misunderstood by the next generation of avant-garde composers who embraced the rejection of tonality and references to other music as one of their central premises. In addition, I will argue that a link was established between 'modernist' composers and the idea of a political revolution. As the concepts of emancipation and utopia became scrutinized as a result of the fall of the communist block, this link would contribute to the 'decline' of the modernist aesthetic

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<sup>1</sup>These ideas and concepts will be introduced, elaborated and discussed in [Chapter 3](#).



in music. Finally, I will discuss the so called *postmodern* position in music that attempted to break against everything that *modernism* stood for but more recently has developed into something more than a criticism of *modernity*.

The aim of this chapter is therefore to contextualize the situation in which the music that is being submitted was conceived. The ideas that are presented actively informed the composition of the works but most importantly encouraged reflection regarding the urgency to find new approaches to some of the problems that are exposed by Rancière's analysis.

## 2.1 Rancière and the Re-evaluation of the Notion of Modernity

Jaques Rancière in his book *The Politics of Aesthetics* examines the relationship between the concept of modernity and the break from figurative representation in the visual arts. He argues that the departure from representation of images through figurative means is often confused with aesthetic modernity, which is specific to a single regime of the arts. That is, "a specific type of connection between ways of producing works of art or developing practices, forms of visibility that disclose them, and ways of conceptualizing the former and the latter."<sup>2</sup> If one is to think about the confusion that is associated with the concept of *modernism* in the realm of music, some questions come into mind: Does this confusion apply to the musical domain when compared to the other arts and if so how does it manifest itself? Is it possible to talk about representation in music and if so within what context? Could one compare the breaking from figurative representation to the departure from tonality at the beginning of the twentieth century? Has 'the musician' gone through a corresponding redefinition of *what is expected* from him by the community the same way as 'the fine artist' has through the process of modernisation?

In the following discussion, I will attempt to read Rancière's text as applied to music not only with the purpose of tracing parallels and discrepancies between music and fine art, but to try to find out something particular about music itself. Also, I will venture to examine the limitations of the notion of modernity within music and its relationship to the wider modernist political project.

### 2.1.1 The Distribution of the Sensible

Before starting the discussion on the notion of modernity and its political and aesthetic consequences, I will first try to examine the relationship of aesthetics and politics in the work of Rancière. According

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<sup>2</sup>Jaques Rancière, 'The Distribution of the Sensible,' in *The Politics of Aesthetics*, Trans. Gabriel Rockhill, London: Continuum, 2004, p. 20.

to Rancière, the political and the aesthetic spheres are intrinsically linked through what he calls ‘The distribution of the sensible.’

I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution.<sup>3</sup>

It is precisely this system of division of spaces, times and forms of activity that defines aesthetics and is also at the heart of politics. Therefore, aesthetics takes part in the political act of governing and in determining who the rulers are and how they come to power; as well as how the commons are distributed within a community. Here though, Rancière points out, in order to make the relationship between politics and aesthetics, one must understand aesthetics “in a Kantian sense—re-examined perhaps by Foucault—as the system of *a priori* forms determining what presents itself to sense experience.”<sup>4</sup> Aesthetics therefore should be seen here beyond the conventional view as strictly belonging to the confines of art and should not be seen merely as the ‘aesthetic practices’ manifested in different artistic disciplines. In contrast, in order to think of aesthetics in a context that could be applied outside of the arts, it requires its abstraction as modes of action, production, perception and thought; a system of “delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience.”<sup>5</sup> Therefore, through the work of Rancière, it is possible to think of aesthetics in politics with a broader understanding of aesthetics as the distribution of the sensible. Moreover, for Rancière, ‘aesthetic practices’ that disclose visibility in artistic practices reveal ‘ways of doing and making’ that exist and have visibility within the community. There are different manifestations of these practices that confine an aesthetic distribution.

These forms define the way in which works of art or performances are ‘involved in politics,’ whatever may otherwise be the guiding intentions, artists’ social modes of integration, or the manner in which artistic forms reflect social structures or movements. . . . In

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

this way, a sensible politiccity exists that is immediately attributed to the major forms of aesthetic distribution such as theater, the page, or the chorus. There ‘politics’ obey their own proper logic, and they offer their services in very different contexts and time periods.<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, it could be argued that there is an inherent political core in the way these artistic forms are constituted. Moreover, within each major aesthetic discipline there lies a political project that renders a distribution of ‘ways of doing and making,’ an internal mode of organization and a delimitation of what remains visible or invisible.

### 2.1.2 The Regimes of Art

In order to understand Rancière’s reevaluation of the notion of modernity one must first understand what he calls the three ‘regimes of art,’ which are modes of identification and articulation between ‘ways of doing and making’ and forms of visibility, as well as their conceptualization. In other words, the ‘regimes of art’ simply distinguish different ways of making and thinking about ‘art’ and how it is perceived.

#### The Ethical Regime of Images and the Poetic Regime of Art

To begin with, Rancière defines the *ethical regime of images* as the Platonic notion of the use and distribution of images in relationship to the community’s *ethos*. This regime therefore uses images as ‘true’ imitations of the original and are distributed and valued by their purpose of educating the community in accordance to its social order. Therefore, within this regime ‘art’ is not evaluated by qualities within itself but by their purpose in the community. He goes on to define a *poetic regime of art* (also referred to as *representative regime of art*) as that which breaks away from the *ethical regime of images* and values the arts in terms of their own *substance*.

I call this regime *poetic* in the sense that it identifies the arts—what the Classical Age would later call the ‘fine arts’—within a classification of ‘ways of doing and making,’ and it consequently defines proper ‘ways of doing and making’ as well as means of assessing imitations. I call it *representative* insofar as it is the notion of representation or *mimēsis* that organizes these ways of doing, making, seeing and judging. Once again, however, *mimēsis* is not the law that brings the arts under the yoke of resemblance. It is first of all a fold in the distribution of ‘ways of doing and making’ as well as in social occupations,

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-15.

a fold that renders the arts visible. It is not an artistic process but a regime of visibility regarding the arts.<sup>7</sup>

If one is to apply Rancière's notion of the 'regimes of art' to music and understand the difference between the *ethical regime of images* and the *poetic regime of art* outside the domain of the visual and fine arts, one must first remember that music not only has different social functions and visibility, but within its unique organization, it has particular 'ways of doing and making' that are specific to its own discipline. Even though music occupies a different and particular position in the ways of distributing the sensible, I will continue to argue that it is still possible to refer to the *ethical* and the *poetic* regimes in music.

Following Rancière categorization, I will refer to music within the *ethical regime* as music that is made, heard and judged for its purpose within the community. By this, I mean music that is not assessed by its own qualities—or as Rancière would say 'by its own *substance*'—but by the purpose it performs within the community. Examples of this in western tradition would include church, court and military music, to mention just a few. It is easy to find music that falls within the *ethical regime* in other cultures where in some cases music is not even differentiated from other disciplines, like dance or storytelling, and is performed (in some cultures everyone partakes in music-making) and valued by members of the group by its communal and ceremonial purposes (celebration, mourning, war, etc). Of course, one can still find many examples of the *ethical regime* today in music for theater, dance, television, films and religious purposes. Here, I want to make clear that I am not attempting to devalorize or make a value judgment about music that falls within the *ethical regime*. Furthermore, some music might also qualify within more than one regime simultaneously.

I will define music that falls within the *poetic regime* as that which is appreciated for its own *substance* but still follows or imitates a model.<sup>8</sup> Namely, music that is judged by its own 'musical' qualities, and that is made with the main purpose of being listened to and evaluated according to its own subject matter. This music would be *representative* insofar as it imitates or resembles a musical model (for example rules of harmony, counterpoint or sonata form, to mention just a few). A lot of western 'concert music' would fall in this category in that it is made, heard and valued for its 'musical' qualities and judged as good or bad, adequate or inadequate, satisfactory or not, dependent on how the performer or composer follows certain models—in the case of the performer,

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>8</sup>By model I not only mean the written but also the unwritten rules in music performance and composition. The written rules could be for example treatises of harmony and orchestration whereas the unwritten rules could be performance practices and conventions in composition and improvisation, to name a few.

models of performance practice, and in the case of the composer, compositional models such as chord progressions, voice-leading, musical themes, variations, etc.

It is interesting to note that within the visual arts the breaking from the *ethical regime of images* and the establishment of the *poetic regime of art* is what now separates the ‘fine arts’ from other modes and techniques of production (of images, shapes, objects, etc), whereas within music there is not such a change in definition. That is to say, in the visual arts this break between *ethical* and *poetic* regimes identifies the arts as such but in music it does not change its identification. Why is it that in the musical domain it is still plausible to call the ‘ways of doing and making’ in both regimes *music*? At this moment, I will not draw any conclusions about this enquiry as one needs first to examine other aspects of Rancière’s postulation in order to fully understand the consequences of this difference. However, in the following chapter I will come back to this question and look at the possible reasons and implications of this disparity.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, for the moment I will continue the discussion by examining the *aesthetic regime of art* to have a better understanding of Rancière’s thesis.

### **The Aesthetic Regime of Art and the Shortcomings of the Notion of Modernity**

Rancière calls the *aesthetic regime of art* that which liberates art from the *poetic regime* by breaking with its identification as the division of ‘ways of doing and making.’ The *aesthetic regime* therefore puts an end to the models used by the *poetic regime* and breaks the barriers of identification in the arts. It does so by distinguishing art as an occupation that establishes, questions and alters the concept of what art is, its hierarchies, subject matter and genres.

The aesthetic regime of the arts is the regime that strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres. Yet it does so by destroying the mimetic barrier that distinguished ‘ways of doing and making’ affiliated with art from other ‘ways of doing and making,’ a barrier that separated its rules from the order of social occupations. The aesthetic regime asserts the absolute singularity of art and, at the same time, destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating this singularity.<sup>10</sup>

Hence, the *aesthetic regime* establishes the autonomy of art and at the same time makes art independent of its own forms. As a result, the artist becomes a practitioner of a discipline specific to whatever falls into the category of art.

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<sup>9</sup>See pp. 28-29.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

At this point, I want to examine the *aesthetic regime* in the domain of music. I will propose that music that falls within this regime is music that challenges the *poetic regime* and the very notion of *what music is* at a given point in time. It should also be thought as a regime that makes music independent from its own subject matter, rules, conventions and genres, and frees it from specific ‘ways of doing and making.’ It changes music’s visibility and makes it autonomous from the very notion of itself, from its expected ‘musical’ and social functions.<sup>11</sup> In the history of music, it is easy to think of examples of music that breaks with the musical practices of its time and redefines itself<sup>12</sup>. It is even possible to think of brief historical periods before the twentieth century where one can observe some form or manifestation of the *aesthetic regime* in music. Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of music as an autonomous discipline, freed from its own *substance*. That is to say, even though the definition of music has changed and was challenged on several occasions, it was not until the twentieth century that the concept fully emerged of ‘the musician’ as someone who creates music as whatever he considers suitable and is not expected to follow traditional formulas of music-making. To this day, this concept of music and ‘the musician’ is not completely widespread within the community.<sup>13</sup>

Rancière goes further to examine the limitations of the notion of modernity and its relationship to the *aesthetic regime of art*. He describes what is commonly referred to as *modernism* in art as an ‘incoherent’ label applied to what truly should be referred to as the *aesthetic regime of art*. There is a sort of simplicity ascribed to the notion of modernity that is viewed as a clear line of transition or rupture from the old to the new and in the case of the visual arts between figurative and non-figurative representation. Rancière argues that the break from figurative representation is a confusion that emerged from the simplistic view that this break would mean a rupture from the *poetic regime of art*.

The basis for this simplistic historical account was the transition to non-figurative representation in painting. This transition was theorized by being cursorily assimilated into artistic ‘modernity’s’ overall anti-mimetic destiny. . . . However, it is the starting point that is erroneous. The leap outside of *mimēsis* is by no means the refusal of figurative representation.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Here, I refer to ‘social functions’ not as in the purpose or use of music within the *ethical regime*, but the social functions it performs within the *poetic regime*.

<sup>12</sup>There are too many examples for me to list them here.

<sup>13</sup>See p. 23-24 for a further discussion on the possible reasons for this problem.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 24.

Therefore, the break from figurative representation does not mean the establishment of a new visibility for art nor a break from the mimetic barrier. Moreover, Rancière asserts that the contradiction of the *aesthetic regime of art*—which on the one hand establishes the autonomy of art and on the other hand questions the distinction between art and other activities—leads to two big misunderstandings of the notion of modernity. The first confusion was to simply associate the modernist movement with the autonomy of art. The modernist project was therefore reduced only to an anti-mimetic<sup>15</sup> movement that concentrates on the idealistic concept of stripping away from all references to previous art forms and works in order to reveal art’s ‘purity’ of form and reach its ‘essence.’ They attempted this by exploring only the formal aspects of art by focusing on the capabilities of its own medium. The second big confusion, according to Rancière, is the idea that the forms of the *aesthetic regime of art* were somehow related to other forms that would materialize by accomplishing a task or fulfilling a destiny specific to modernity; in other words, the revolution that rendered autonomy to art became the example for the Marxist revolution. The failure of both the anti-mimetic principles of modernism and the political revolution resulted in a ‘crisis of art’ caused by these paradigms of modernism. Modernism in art therefore “became something like a fatal destiny based on a fundamental forgetting.”<sup>16</sup>

## 2.2 Modernity and Music: Misconceptions and Misunderstandings

I will propose that a similar confusion has taken place in western music, which leads to analogous misunderstandings regarding the so called modernist project. However, in order to avoid simplifications, one should first remember certain aspects about the state of western music at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. It is important first of all to realize that by the end of the nineteenth century there was a clear specialization of musicians—some were trained specifically as performers and others as composers. This division of occupations in music led to a greater dichotomy in the ‘ways of doing and making’ music. The specificity of the performer’s creative decisions therefore became mostly linked to the realization of a given score. The composer’s role, on the other hand, was to provide a score to the performers and establish certain directions and instructions on parameters such as pitch, rhythm, musical form and instrumentation. During this time, the role of the composer became more prominent concerning music innovation and there-

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<sup>15</sup>From now on, I will use the term ‘anti-mimetic’ as referring to the *erroneous* modernist notion that associates *mimēsis* with figurative representation in the visual arts and tonal music as well as references to other musical styles and traditions in music

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

fore these developments are mostly attributed to composers in western music. Hence, I will mostly refer to composers when attempting to explain the limitations of the notion of modernity in music. Nevertheless, by no means am I attempting to discredit or ignore the performers' role—I am just referring to the more widespread view of these developments. Later in this chapter, I will explain how this division of occupations in western music has been questioned and how performers have also attempted to establish themselves within the *aesthetic regime*; but first, I will analyse the work of some composers that reflect the misunderstandings usually ascribed to the modernist project.

At the end of the nineteenth century, composers such as Wagner, Mahler and Debussy were already expanding the tonal system through what became widely known as the 'emancipation of dissonance,' signaling what was to become a radical break in western music—that is, Schönberg's moving away from the tonal system altogether and starting to compose freely. This *event*—as Alain Badiou would describe it<sup>17</sup>—signals a step towards the *aesthetic regime* in that this gesture attempts to free music from previous models thus venturing to unleash music from its own *substance*. Schönberg, in his period of so called "free atonality"<sup>18</sup> and later with his twelve-tone method<sup>19</sup>, breaks away from the convention that a composer should follow previous models of composition and starts to define a new notion of the composer as someone who decides what he considers music to be and chooses how it is to be organized. Therefore, the rupture from the tonal system at the beginning of the twentieth century challenges the definition of music in western society and contributes to redefine 'the musician' as someone who does not follow existing models, but can invent his own modes and systems of music-making. However, it is important to note that the break from tonality by no means represents the establishment of an *aesthetic regime* in music nor a leap outside representation and the *poetic regime*. Stravinsky's *Le Sacre du Printemps*, is a clear example of a work that points towards the *aesthetic regime* but does so not by abandoning tonality, but by breaking with other models of concert music. The radicality of *Le Sacre du Printemps* comes from developments in musical parameters such as rhythm, tonality (polytonality, etc), timbre and form, but not from a complete renunciation of tonality. Stravinsky's use of folk-music, primitive rhythms, asymmetric structures and orchestral textures was music never heard before and stretched the definition of concert music as well as proposing new ways of organizing its subject matter, freeing music from specific 'ways of

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<sup>17</sup>See Alain Badiou, 'The Ethics of Truths' in *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, Trans. Peter Hallward, p. 41-42, and Alain Badiou, 'Scholium: A Musical Variant of the Metaphysics of the Subject,' in *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II*, Trans. Alberto Toscano, p. 46, 79-85, for a further discussion on what he calls the Schönberg-event.

<sup>18</sup>The period between 1908 and 1923 in which Schönberg abstained from using tonality and did not adhere to a systematic method of pitch organization.

<sup>19</sup>Devised by Schönberg in 1921 and first described to his inner circle in 1923.



doing and making.’ At the same time Stravinsky invents new rules and defies traditional genres and styles, which are all characteristics of the *aesthetic regime*.

Schönberg’s importance in the establishment of the *aesthetic regime* is also not to be discredited and I believe that by departing from tonality, he certainly redefined *what music is* and questioned music’s subject matter. Moreover, through his revolutionary shock on the community’s notion of music, he certainly contributed to changing the notion of ‘the musician’ as someone who produces what *he considers music to be*. It is also compelling to see that Schönberg’s use of dissonance was not with the purpose of centering his musical discourse around pitch organization or being non-referential to previous styles and genres. Paradoxically, even though his way of organizing pitches was radically new, he was fairly traditional in his use of other musical parameters such as form<sup>20</sup>, timbre and gesture. In his essay entitled *A Self-Analysis*, Schönberg describes how his methods to organize notes or achieve atonality were not very important elements in his work: “I personally do not find that atonality and dissonance are the outstanding features of my works. They certainly offer obstacles to the understanding of what is really my musical subject.”<sup>21</sup> This attitude clearly separates him from the next generation of composers who embraced his twelve-tone system and whose main compositional objective focused on the organization of these twelve pitches.

### 2.2.1 Anti-mimetic Tendencies and the Influence of Serialism

It is by trying to understand this next generation of serialist composers’ work that Rancière’s analysis of the confusion of the notion of modernity becomes useful. It is crucial to remember the first confusion, which is simply to seek the autonomy of art through anti-mimetic strategies. In the case of music, this was attempted by focusing on formal aspects of music such as how to organize pitches, rhythms, dynamics and all other possible ‘musical’ parameters. By giving importance to the formal aspects of the compositional medium, they sought to stretch music’s capabilities and to seek music’s autonomy by stripping away all references to other musics. It is fascinating to read that when Schönberg showed his twelve-tone method to his associates in 1923, he already noticed the potential problems of looking at music only in terms of the formal techniques implemented to compose it.

What I feared, happened. Although I had warned my friends and pupils to consider this as a change in compositional regards, and although I gave them the advice to consider it only as a means to fortify the logic, they started counting the tones and finding out the methods with which I used the rows. Only to explain understandably and thoroughly the

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<sup>20</sup>He constantly used traditional forms such as sonata form, suite and theme and variations.

<sup>21</sup>Arnold Schönberg, *Style and Idea*, Trans. Leo Black, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984, p. 77.

idea, I had shown them a certain number of cases. But I refused to explain more of it, not the least because I had already forgotten it and had to find it myself. But principally because I thought it would not be useful to show technical matters which everybody had to find for himself and could do so. This is also the error of Mr. Hill. He also is counting tones and wants to know how I use them and whether I do it consequently.<sup>22</sup>

Schönberg's use of the twelve-tone method did not have an anti-mimetic purpose and he devised it to be able to have a systematic approach to form and to compose melodies, themes, phrases and chords. He also made clear his abandonment of the tonal system was not more important than other aspects of his work. It is important to note as well that after the invention of his method, he relied on gestures, orchestration and structures that were related to traditional styles and genres—especially those of the Germanic tradition. Therefore, Schönberg's invention of the twelve-tone method was mostly pragmatic and did not have the purpose of not referring to other musics or focusing only on music's formal aspects. It is precisely these aspects of Schönberg's use of dodecaphony that later Boulez would criticize in his article "Schönberg is dead."

From Schönberg's pen flows a stream of infuriating clichés and formidable stereotypes redolent of the most wearily ostentatious romanticism: all those endless anticipations with expressive accent on the harmony note, those fake appoggiaturas, those arpeggios, tremolandos, and note-repetitions, which sound so terribly empty and which so utterly deserve the label 'secondary voices'; finally, the depressing poverty, even ugliness, of rhythms in which a few tricks of variation on classical formulae leave a disheartening impression of bonhomous futility.<sup>23</sup>

For what interested Boulez in the twelve-tone system were the formal aspects of the *series*—an approach closer to Webern's dodecaphony. One can already see here in Boulez's position an anti-mimetic preoccupation to avoid clichés and references to previous traditional music as well as a modernist concern towards the formalization of music through the capabilities of serialism.

It has to be admitted that this ultra-thematicization is the underlying principle of the *series*, which is no more than its logical outcome. Moreover, the confusion between theme and series in Schönberg's serial works is sufficiently expressive of his inability to envisage the world of sound brought into being by serialism. For him dodecaphony is nothing

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>23</sup>Pierre Boulez, 'Schönberg is dead,' in *Stocktakings from an Apprenticeship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 212-213.

more than a rigorous means for controlling chromaticism; beyond its role as regulator, the serial phenomenon passed virtually unnoticed by Schönberg.<sup>24</sup>

It was through the development of serialism in the fifties and sixties—led by Boulez and Stockhausen—that composers would seek music’s pure form through the serialization of all conceivable ‘musical’ parameters, thus focusing only in an exploration of the formal capabilities of music and sound. The confusion caused by the establishment of the *aesthetic regime* that identifies modernity only with the autonomy of art and which led to an anti-mimetic revolution became endemic in postwar European avant-garde music. Serialism thus would seek through its self-contained system an ideal of music that would avoid any external or ‘impure’ elements and would attempt to escape any reference to other existing music. The scope of the serialist movement and its influence over the avant-garde and ‘modernist’ composers across the world should not be overlooked. Even composers who did not adhere to the serialist camp were influenced by the leading focus on the abstract organization of sound and ‘musical’ parameters and they too adopted the anti-mimetic ideal as an important aesthetic principle.<sup>25</sup>

### 2.2.2 The Political Revolution and the Crisis of Modernism in Music

Another misconception of the notion of modernity in music was the association of the *aesthetic regime* with the fulfillment of a Marxist revolution.<sup>26</sup> The aesthetic revolution was confused with its materialization in the social and political domains. Therefore, the revolution that attempted autonomy for music was identified with the modernist political project and the social application of its ideals of egalitarianism, solidarity and liberty. Leftist politics were associated with the artistic avant-garde and a misleading link was formulated between modernism in music and the political revolution. Curiously enough, Schönberg again detected the fallacy of establishing a direct relationship between serialism and leftist politics—in fact, with any other political association—and like Rancière,<sup>27</sup> makes the point that progressive artistic innovation can produce developments within art but bears no direct correspondence in the political sphere.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>25</sup>Some examples of composers who were influenced by these ideals at some point in their career include John Cage, Morton Feldman, Alvin Lucier and Earle Brown in America and Pierre Schaeffer, Iannis Xenakis, György Ligeti, Helmut Lachemann and Cornelius Cardew in Europe.

<sup>26</sup>It is important to note here that this association was only made by a number of composers (such as Luigi Nono, Stephan Wolpe, Hans Werner Henze, Frederic Rzewski, Cornelius Cardew, Christian Wolff and Alvin Curran). Many dominant figures of *modernism* in music remained indifferent or critical towards this idea. In some cases, important ‘modernist’ composers were known to be apolitical (most notably Boulez) and in some cases even politically conservative.

<sup>27</sup>See Rancière, ‘Politicized Art,’ in *The Politics of Aesthetics*, pp. 60-66.

It has become a habit of late to qualify aesthetic and artistic subjects in terms borrowed from the jargon of politics. Thus mildly progressive works of art, literature or even music might be classified as ‘revolutionary’ or ‘left-wing,’ when they only evolve artistic possibilities. . . . No wonder, then, that there are people who call the method of composing with twelve tones ‘bolshevik.’ They pretend that in a ‘set of twelve tones,’ upon which such compositions are founded, since there is no tonic nor dominant, every tone is considered independent, and consequently exerts equal functions. This is wrong in every respect. . . . Whether this concept is an advantage or a handicap to the composer or to the listener, certainly it has nothing in common with ‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity,’ neither with the bolshevik, fascist, nor any other totalitarian brand.<sup>28</sup>

Despite Schönberg’s warning, many associations were made between modernity in music and the Marxist revolution. This notion was also fueled by the political affiliation of many composers and by their general plea for revolution in both the aesthetic and political spheres. Marxist themes were also incorporated in music identified as modernist using leftist texts, images and sounds based on the struggle of the proletariat, student demonstrations and other revolutionary events. Luigi Nono most notably was engaged with political activism and at the same time used Marxist dialectics and other themes related to leftist ideology in his compositions. Nono viewed music as a form of activism and at the same time embraced strategies related with the aesthetic revolution. Many of his works use titles and texts that are politically engaged and at the same time reject musical representation. He viewed his work as a continuation of the developments of the Second Viennese School and his approach to musical material can be closely linked with serialism and the Darmstadt School—despite certain differences he had with Boulez and Stockhausen.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, there is an interesting contradiction inherent in Nono’s *oeuvre*: on the one hand his work uses many ‘extra-musical’ references to address political concerns; on the other hand his music fits within the modernist aesthetic that was on the most part anti-mimetic and avoided ‘musical’ references that could have been used to appeal to the proletariat and identify music with the class struggle and political revolution.

Other composers that followed a leftist political affiliation but used strategies that were considerably different to the serialist approach were a group whose most prominent figures included Rzewski, Cardew, Wolff and Curran. Some of their compositions rejected the modernist notion of an anti-mimetic ideal with the purpose of introducing political themes as musical material in their

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<sup>28</sup>Schönberg, pp. 249-250.

<sup>29</sup>Nono was against Boulez and Stockhausen’s interest in the music of John Cage and the use of indeterminism and chance operations. See Luigi Nono, *Texte. Studien zu seiner Musik*, ed. Jürg Stenzl, Zürich: Atlantis, 1975, pp. 34-40.

compositions and others questioned the division of occupations imbedded in western music-making. Georgina Born argues that these composers were more politicized than what she calls the ‘postserialist camp.’

Beginning in the later 1960s, inspired in part by Marxist-Leninism or Maoism, there emerged out of this a set of experimental composers, including Wolff, Cardew, Frederic Rzewski, and their followers, who were more frankly politicized than those in the postserialist camp. In some cases they attempted to produce political effects through the use of or by reference to, revolutionary popular musical material or lyrics. Another strategy, developed by some of the same composers but more widely influential, extended the critiques of the musical division of labor. Composers such as Cardew, Wolff, and groups such as the Italian-American MEV (*Musica Elettronica Viva*), the British Scratch Orchestra, and AMM, emphasized changes in the social relations of music production and performance in their attempt at a new interactive, collective, and nonhierarchical group practice. The social dimension of music was seen as a crucible for experiments in collective and democratic social relations.<sup>30</sup>

According to Born, the later strategy as implemented by these groups questioned the power structures and division of occupations in western music through collective compositional strategies based on group improvisation as a method of creating music. By avoiding hierarchical forms of composition and performance these groups attempted to challenge the traditional roles of composer, conductor and performer. Their purpose was to pursue an ideal of an egalitarian division of the group and democratic relations between musicians. Born suggests that there was a conscientious attempt by these groups to invigorate the principle of equality and freedom within the politicized of western music production and performance. Nevertheless, a counter-argument could easily be raised against Born’s position if one just questions the effectiveness of these two approaches within the political and aesthetic spheres.<sup>31</sup> Despite the ineffectiveness of their strategies, the contribution of this group

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<sup>30</sup>Georgina Born, *Rationalizing Culture : IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, pp. 58-59.

<sup>31</sup>Isn’t the way in which this group improvisation was implemented more characteristic of our liberal democratic model than a true form of egalitarianism? The idea that everyone in the group can improvise and play ‘freely’ giving the appearance of a permissive mode of performance is highly questionable. Even though it is implied that every improviser could play whatever they want, in practice there are many unwritten rules in this kind of group performance. For example, in many of these groups anti-mimetic principles dominate the improvisational setting and it is not allowed to play a recognizable tune or musical quotation. Therefore, within an apparent freedom these improvisers might actually have many prohibitions that are imposed by the unwritten rules of each group. Another problem of this position is

of composers to the association between a leftist political revolution and the notion of modernity in music should not be underestimated.

### **The Fall of Communism and the Critique of Utopian Thinking**

Given the association between musical modernity and the Marxist revolution, ‘the fall of Communism’ was later conceived as a failure of modernist aesthetics. The aesthetic revolution in music and its ontological model came under scrutiny and close examination. The corruption and abuses that came with the implementation of Marxist ideals in communist countries brought disillusionment and skepticism toward utopian ideals in politics and contributed to a further examination of utopia as it manifests itself in other aesthetic practices. Richard Taruskin, one of the prominent critics of utopianism in music, asserts that the fundamental problem of utopia is that it imagines a ‘perfect world’ instead of a ‘better world.’

But what utopians envision is not a better world. It is a perfect world—or in Kant’s two-centuries-old formulation, “a perfectly constituted state”—that utopians wish to bring about. And that is what makes them dangerous, because if perfection is the aim, and compromise taboo, there will always be a shortfall to correct—a human shortfall. . . . When communism “fell,” the intellectual world divided into two camps: those who said it was time to go back to the drawing board and those who said it was time to get rid of drawing boards. I am utterly of the latter persuasion.<sup>32</sup>

According to Taruskin, there is a gap between the imagined state of perfection and its implementation in reality. It is this gap that is dangerous as it depends on a deficit that has to be corrected and that may result in human casualties and suffering.

He argues that one of the shortfalls of utopian thinking has been the decline in popularity and dominance of classical music in contemporary culture. This has been partly attributed to the dominance of utopian ideals in modern performance-practice that has been the governing attitude of professional performers in their rendition of classical music’s ‘masterpieces.’ Edward Said has written about how musical performance, with the specialization of musicians and the division of labour in western classical music during the twentieth century, has become what he calls an ‘extreme occasion’ that it presupposes that each player will have an equal voice in the group and that no structures of power will emerge. To assume that a collective form of organization will be egalitarian just by giving the appearance that everyone within the group has an equal voice is deceiving and the idea that these improvisations are ‘free’ is naive and misleading.

<sup>32</sup>Richard Taruskin, ‘Against Utopia,’ in *The Danger of Music*, Berkley: University of California Press, 2009, p. xii.

sion.’<sup>33</sup> The phenomenon of viewing an abstract piece of music as represented in a score as a ‘utopia’ gives the performer the ‘heroic’ opportunity to display their virtuosity and physical dexterity in their attempt at a ‘perfect’ rendition of the composition. This extreme musical practice in classical music, Said suggests, has gone as far as to displace the composer from the center of classical music. Despite the dominance and relative popularity of these ‘superstar’ performers, the influence of classical music in western culture has declined, even within the intellectual elite.<sup>34</sup>

Revise this paragraph: (Ed’s comments)

It is precisely the fact that western music performance has focused primarily on the utopian practice of giving renditions to music from the past that has resulted in the classical establishment’s loss of relevance to contemporary culture. The works that are most widely performed in classical concert music were written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; hence, western music performance has taken a similar role of that of the museum—the musical works are taken out of their original and historical context and are exposed and presented in an artificial environment for the public to admire—and therefore might be seen by some as something that is not relevant or can not relate to the current condition.

In twentieth century composition, utopian thinking may be associated with the other main misunderstanding of musical modernity that I have previously discussed. That is, the utopian ideal of an aesthetic revolution that would seek music’s autonomy by stripping it away from all possible references to other types of music.<sup>35</sup> This was attempted by focusing on music’s formal aspects and the capacities of its own medium in order to attempt music’s ‘perfect’ construction. One of the shortfalls of this utopian way of thinking was that contemporary composition became extremely unappealing to a general public that was not educated in the formal aspects of music and found this music extremely difficult as it also lacked any reference to any other music that was familiar to them. This resulted in an unfortunate seclusion of the musical avant-garde that found its main refuge in academia, which became a comfortable yet alienated new home for composers to test their musical ‘experiments’—composition at universities consequently became an academic specialization<sup>36</sup> which

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<sup>33</sup>See Edward W. Said, ‘Performance as an Extreme Ocation,’ in *Musical Elaborations*, London: Vintage, 1992, pp. 1-34.

<sup>34</sup>Said refers to an anecdote about Michel Foucault commenting to Pierre Boulez about the ignorance that contemporary intellectuals have about popular and classical music. See Ibid., p 15.

<sup>35</sup>This was mostly true in regard to making reference to other existing western music as some modernist composers looked for alternatives to the western aesthetic by researching non-western musical traditions.

<sup>36</sup>Here, one can not avoid making reference to Babbitt’s famous article ‘Who cares if you listen.’ See Milton Babbitt, “The Composer as Specialist,” in *The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt*. ed. Stephen Peles, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. pp. 48-54.

for the most part focused on technical aspects of music.

The failure of the anti-mimetic principles of modernity in combination with the ‘fall of Communism’ resulted in a major crisis in music that was caused by the decline of modernist aesthetics and the loss of confidence in utopian thinking. After this crisis, musical modernist tendencies remain to this day on ‘life support’ and one cannot but avoid noticing their nostalgic attitude and unyielding acceptance of defeat—they remain as vigilant victims of a lost utopia, endlessly waiting for a comeback that will never take place. Taruskin points that this attitude of continuing new music’s ‘quiet’ presence in contemporary culture in the hope that one day it becomes more widely recognized as important or relevant—an attitude according to him dominant in academic circles—is yet another consequence of utopian thinking that he associates with communist revolutionary ideals and to the Soviet order.<sup>37</sup>

## 2.3 The Postmodern Label

The first music that later would become labelled as *postmodern* came as a reaction to everything that modernist composers stood for: the formalization of music’s subject matter, the quest for non-resemblance, the desire for musical progress and emancipation, the association of the aesthetic and political revolutions, and the search for music’s ‘essence’ and ‘purity’ of construction. Therefore, at the beginning, composers who were identified as *postmodern* pointed to the confusion ascribed to the notion of modernity and the *aesthetic regime* and attempted to rectify it by reversing all modernist ideals in music. Rancière attributes postmodernism, at first to “the name under whose guise certain artists and thinkers realized what modernism had been: a desperate attempt to establish a ‘distinctive feature of art’ by linking it to a simple teleology of historical evolution and rupture.”<sup>38</sup> In other words, these thinkers and artists detected that there was no necessity to link the realization of a fundamental characteristic of art as represented by the *aesthetic regime* to a historical break or a beginning of a new era. Consequently, *postmodernism* at first aimed to give an alternative to the drawbacks of the modernist position. This was first attempted in music by breaking away from the ‘abstract’ treatment of musical parameters by reintroducing tonality and references to other traditional and popular music either by quotation or resemblance.

Luciano Berio was one of the first European avant-garde composers who started to reintroduce references to other existing music in his work. Most notably in the third movement of *Sinfonia*, Berio uses quotations as well as different treatments of material by other composers as a driving

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<sup>37</sup>See Taruskin, p. xiv.

<sup>38</sup>Rancière, ‘The Distribution of the Sensible,’ p. 28.



force for his compositional discourse. In this movement, Berio uses most prominently the scherzo from Mahler's Second Symphony against quotations and transformations from excerpts of works by many composers including: Bach (First Brandenburg Concerto), Beethoven (Ninth Symphony and Sixth Symphonies), Berg (Violin Concerto and *Wozek*), Berlioz (*Symphonie fantastique*), Boulez (*Pli selon pli*), Brahms (Violin Concerto and Fourth Symphony), Debussy (*La Mer*), Globokar (*Voie*), Hindemith (*Kammermusik Nr.4*), Mahler (Second, Fourth and Ninth Symphonies), Pousseur (*Couleurs croisées*), Ravel (*La Valse* and *Daphnis et Chloé*), Schönberg (*Fünf Orchesterstücke, Op.16*), Stockhausen (*Gruppen*), Strauss (*Der Rosenkavalier*), Stravinsky (*La Sacre du printemps* and *Agon*), Webern (*Kantate*), as well as other unknown sources and Berio's own music.<sup>39</sup> The material derived from the variety of scores is treated carefully by Berio taking into consideration its 'musical' qualities, such as pitch and rhythm, as well as its semantic characteristics—all the quotations are related to Berio's own interpretation of Lévi-Strauss's *Le cru et le cuit*.<sup>40</sup> It is precisely the semiotic value of the musical references that attracted Berio to use already existing music as material for his own work and this itself was a step against the principles of so called 'modernist' composers. In his book *The Future of the Image*, Rancière has discussed a similar phenomenon that is usually ascribed to the *postmodernist* label in the visual arts, that is, the reintroduction of images and representation.

And the time came when the semiologist discovered that the lost pleasure of images is too high a price to pay for the benefit of forever transforming mourning into knowledge.

Especially when this knowledge itself loses its credibility, when the real movement in history that guaranteed the traversal of appearances itself proved to be an appearance.<sup>41</sup>

Similarly in music, for composers who were interested in semiotics like Berio, the price to pay for only focusing on 'abstract' musical thought and anti-mimetic ideals was too high.

Other strategies were also attempted by so called *postmodern* composers who wanted to break away from everything that modernism stood for: the reintroduction of melody, ornamentation and intervallic consonance that violated the consistency and functionality of serial techniques; the use of improvisatory elements which blurred the line between composer and performer; the crossing between artistic disciplines which questioned the integrity of each artistic and musical disciplines; the break from notation which disturbed the focus on abstract musical models which depend on

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<sup>39</sup>See David Osmond-Smith, 'In ruhig fliessender Bewegung' in *Playing with Words: a Guide to Luciano Berio's Sinfonia*, London: The Royal Musical Association, 1985, pp. 39-71 for a detailed analysis of the third movement of *Sinfonia*.

<sup>40</sup>David Osmond-Smith, '*Sinfonia* and its Precursors' in *Playing with Words: a Guide to Luciano Berio's Sinfonia*, London: The Royal Musical Association, 1985. p. 7.

<sup>41</sup>Jaques Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, Trans. Gregory Elliot, London: Verso, 2007, pp. 21-22.

notation; the search for alternatives to the concert hall by presenting work in different venues not designed for contemporary music concerts attacked the ideal of musical performance in a sterile and specifically designed acoustic environment that would be perfect for listening to the intricacies of crafted compositions.

Nevertheless, very quickly *postmodernism* started to signify something more than a criticism of the modernist aesthetic. The music created by the next generation of composers labeled as ‘postmodern’ started to be characterized by a permissive attitude in the mixing of all different musical styles and genres, the hybridization between pop, world, jazz and classical music, the disregard for stylistic consistency and the joy of simulacra, the glorification of music primarily as a path for entertainment and primal enjoyment. The permissive attitude of the *postmodern* composer produced in some cases results that reinvigorated the idea of the musical performance as a spectacle. That is to say, the avant-garde attitude towards achieving something new within music itself was forgotten by some, in favor of music that is created only to please its audience.<sup>42</sup> This is precisely why Rancière argues that art under the label of *postmodernism* “came to challenge the freedom or autonomy that the modernist principle conferred—or would have conferred—upon art the mission of accomplishing.”<sup>43</sup>

The *postmodern* artistic discourse thus embraces Lyotard’s notion of the ‘decline of grand narratives’ by questioning the modernist concept of achieving an ideal of emancipation.

In the course of the past fifty years, each grand narrative of emancipation—regardless of the genre it privileges—has, as it were, had its principle invalidated. *All that is real is rational, all that is rational is real*: “Auschwitz” refutes the speculative doctrine. At least this crime, which is real, is not rational. *All that is proletarian is communist, all that is communist is proletarian*: “Berlin 1953,” “Budapest 1956,” “Czechoslovakia 1968,” “Poland 1980” (to name a few) refute the doctrine of historical materialism: the workers rise up against the Party. . . . *Everything that promotes the free flow of supply and demands is good for general prosperity, and vice versa*: the “crisis of 1911 and 1929” refute the doctrine of economic liberalism. . . . The investigator records the names of these events as so many signs of the failing of modernity. The grand narratives have become scarcely credible. One is then tempted to give credence to a grand narrative of the decline of the grand narratives.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>This type of music has also become a commodity in a consumer society in which the musician produces with the aim of seducing the consumer to buy a product and make profits.

<sup>43</sup>Rancière, ‘The Distribution of the Sensible,’ p. 28.

<sup>44</sup>Jean-François Lyotard, ‘To Mathias Khan’ in *The Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondance 1982-1985*, Trans. Julian Pefanis and Morgan Thomas, London: Turnaround, 1992, p. 40.

The *postmodern* position is therefore one of mourning metanarratives as identified in scientific postulations, theology, the ideas of self-emancipation and utopia in politics and aesthetics. For this reason, *postmodernism* became a celebration of that which is unattainable and impossible to reduce, identify, rationalize or define. The establishment of the *aesthetic regime*—which signifies the emancipation or autonomy of art—consequently comes under scrutiny under Lyotard’s viewpoint. Nevertheless, Lyotard also links the recognition of the impossibility of emancipation to a historical break, in a similar fashion to the *modernist* association of the autonomy of art to a particular historical period; it is precisely for this reason that his argument loses legitimacy as one can interpret the ‘end of grand narratives’ as a ‘grand narrative’ in itself.

Alain Badiou has also been a vivid critic of postmodern thought and of Lyotard’s position. Badiou argues that Lyotard’s concept of the ‘end of metanarratives’ is linked to the end of the idea of truth as put forward by classical philosophy. Therefore, what postmodern thought proposes instead of truth is the idea of a plurality of meanings which is indisputably related to language. Badiou denounces the reduction of the function of philosophy to a meditation on language and a multiplicity of language games as well as a premature proclamation of the end of the search for truth and the questions that philosophy has been involved with for a long time. Therefore, Badiou’s criticism of postmodern thought is prompted by its insufficiency to “give philosophy the means to sustain its desire under the quadruple form of revolt, logic, universality and risk.”<sup>45</sup>

## 2.4 Re-thinking the Avant-garde

Rancière has persuasively argued that if there is a connection to be established between the aesthetic and the political, it is suggested by the original *modernist* vision of the avant-garde. The basis for this association is not the connection between artistic innovation and politically motivated change, but the suggestion of a link between two different kinds of ‘avant-gardes.’ The first kind being characterized by an abstract and militant notion of a movement that symbolizes a force that chooses a historical direction and ideological position—the embodiment of a type of subjectivity (political or artistic) to a specific form (a party or an artistic movement). The second kind of avant-garde is rooted in Schiller’s model of *aesthetics* as a projection of the future. The meaning of the avant-garde in the *aesthetic regime of art* is therefore not that of artistic innovation as seen by a particular movement that links artistic subjectivity to a determinate form, but the idea of “the invention of sensible forms

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<sup>45</sup>Alain Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Desire’ in *Infinite Thought*, Trans. Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, London: Continuum, 2006, p. 35.

and material structures for a life to come.”<sup>46</sup> This is where the aesthetic avant-garde may inform, inspire and encourage the political avant-garde and bring about transformations in the anticipation of the future. Moreover, Rancière makes a very interesting theoretical observation when he draws a parallel between these two kinds of avant-garde and two forms of political philosophy:

The history of the relations between political parties and aesthetic movements is first of all the history of confusion, sometimes complacently maintained, at other times violently denounced, between these two ideas of the avant-garde, which are in fact two different ideas of political subjectivity: the archi-political idea of a party, that is to say the idea of a form of political intelligence that sums up the essential conditions for change, and the meta-political idea of global political subjectivity, the idea of the potentiality inherent in the innovative sensible modes of experience that anticipate a community to come.<sup>47</sup>

The ideas that have led to the notions of *modernity* and *postmodernity* in the arts—as well as to the ‘crisis of art’ as ascribed by many—have therefore developed as a consequence of the confusion between these two forms of political philosophy. Rancière points that this confusion is expected but rejects Lyotard’s explanation that the emancipation of art leads to totalitarianism. The confusion has been rather caused by a division which exists between the *strategic* and *aesthetic* conceptions of the avant-garde as manifested in art. This division of the avant-garde is also to be found within the political sphere, which not only clarifies the presence of aesthetics in politics, but also the inherent politicacy within the artistic disciplines.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Rancière, ‘The Distribution of the Sensible,’ p. 29.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>48</sup>See Jacques Rancière, ‘Aesthetics as Politics’ in *Aesthetics and Its Discontents*, Trans. Steven Corcoran, Cambridge: Polity, 2009, for a further discussion about the relationship between the ‘aesthetics of politics’ and the ‘politics or aesthetics.’

# Chapter 3

## Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, I will attempt to examine...

### 3.1 Redefining the Musical Subject?

It appears that the dominant position at this moment regarding music is characterized by a skeptical and often cynical attitude towards new forms of thought in music. However, this attitude is dominant not without a reason: it has to do with the notion that today music is—as Alain Badiou has stated—‘negatively defined.’ Badiou clearly expresses this view in his essay entitled ‘Scholium: A Musical Variant of the Metaphysics of the Subject.’

Today, the music-world is negatively defined. The classical subject and its romantic avatars are entirely saturated, and it is not the plurality of ‘musics’—folklore, classicism, pop, exoticism, jazz and baroque reaction in the same festive bag—which will be able to resuscitate them. But the serial subject is equally unpromising, and has been for at least twenty years. Today’s musician, delivered over to the solitude of the interval—where the old coherent world of tonality together with the hard dodecaphonic world that produced its truth are scattered into unorganized bodies and vain ceremonies—can only heroically repeat, in his very works: ‘I go on, in order to think and push to their paradoxical radiance the reasons that I would have for not going on.’<sup>1</sup>

Here, Badiou precisely delineates the situation in which so called ‘art’ music or contemporary music is created and received today, where the only two main options seem to embrace either the joyful and permissive attitude towards mixing genres and styles now commonly ascribed to *postmodernism*

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<sup>1</sup>Badiou, ‘Scholium: A Musical Variant of the Metaphysics of the Subject’, p. 89.

or the desolate notion of *modernist* aesthetics that to this day heroically stands in ‘life support’ for more than thirty years. These two positions also seem unable at present time to inspire a profound change in the way we create, perform, perceive and think about music; nor to respond to the original premise of the *modernist* vision of the musical avant-garde, which establishes a connection between new forms of musical and political subjectivity.

Rancière’s analysis gives us strong theoretical tools that can help imagining new ways of reinvigorating the *modernist* idea of the avant-garde in music without falling back to the misunderstandings that led to the ‘crisis of modernity.’ Nevertheless, Rancière’s notion of the *avant-garde* is considerably different from the conventional one, and in order to understand his definition and relate it to music, it is important to separate it from its former association to a particular movement in music history. Even though the idea of the avant-garde in music emerged as it became associated to a group of so called ‘modernist’ composers, the concept remains useful to us now only as a way of understanding the importance of the *aesthetic regime* in the relationship between music and politics. To avoid further misunderstandings, one also needs to take special care and remember the clear differentiation Rancière makes between the *strategic* and *aesthetic* types of avant-garde.

### 3.1.1 The *Strategic* and *Aesthetic* Types of Avant-garde in Music

The *strategic* type of avant-garde as manifested in music is one that can be associated to a particular group of people (composers, performers, critics and other people who make, think and/or listen to music), musical institution or movement that consolidates a type of subjectivity. It is important to remember that a common ideological position is what triggers the conception of this type of group.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the *aesthetic* type of avant-garde as manifested in music is that which—through new ways of thinking and making music as expressed by the creation of new musical forms and structures—has the capacity to inspire and encourage new forms of thought about the life to come. Furthermore, it is crucial that the *strategic* type of avant-garde is not confused with the *aesthetic* type in as much as it will lead to further misunderstandings within the music-world.

It is important to note that one can find these two types of avant-gardes both in the musical and political spheres (as well as in the other artistic disciplines). Additionally, as they manifest themselves in music, the *aesthetic* and *strategic* types of avant-garde are intrinsically related; but

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<sup>2</sup>Slovoj Zizek has repeatedly emphasized how ideology is not an abstract notion or theory one simply ascribes to, but it is a type of subjectivity that is reflected in the way we act, on what we do and how we carry on living our lives. Therefore, a musical ‘movement’ doesn’t necessarily have to be one in which there is a ‘conscious’ or openly declared agenda that follows a particular ideology.

only in as much as music is concerned. This relationship becomes evident in the causality that exists between musical groups, institutions and movements; and the creation and reception of music. The *strategic* avant-garde as manifested in music is therefore useful to the political sphere only as much as it contributes to the *aesthetic* avant-garde—specifically as it provides a platform for the creation of ‘new sensible forms and structures.’ Hence, the way in which the two types of avant-gardes dwell within music can not be directly compared to the way in which they reside in politics. Here lies another vital point in Rancière’s enquiry: the *strategic* type of avant-garde manifests itself *differently* in music as it does in politics. Therefore, the activism of a musician or group of musicians as they become directly involved in politics does not express the relationship between music and politics, but only the involvement of a group of people—which happen to have the same occupation—in a political movement. The true relationship between music and politics is rather reflected in the *aesthetic* type of avant-garde. This argument makes evident why it is misleading to attempt to identify a movement with concerns that are specific to music with a particular political affiliation or party. The position put forward by some critics of *modernism* in music—which concludes that the emancipatory project which seeks the autonomy of music leads to totalitarianism—is therefore flawed.

Moreover, I will claim that it is very important to consider the intrinsic relationship between the two types of avant-gardes, exclusively as they manifest themselves within music. The basis of this way of thinking stems from the assertion that the *strategic* type of avant-garde has a considerable effect on the *aesthetic* type in numerous significant ways. In my opinion, the impact that musical movements, institutions, ensembles and other organized groups of musicians and people dealing with music, have on the actual musical results, is often underrated. Too often, the people involved in creating (particularly composers in my experience) and receiving (listening and experiencing) music avoid or forget how these strategic forms of collectivity condition and influence the aesthetic result.

I will even go as far as to suggest that, in music, the type of subjectivity that is synthesized in the *strategic* avant-garde is reflected or ‘embodied’ in the *aesthetic* avant-garde. That is to say, the ideology of the people involved in the creation, presentation and dissemination of music is expressed in the musical modes of action, production, perception and thought. Furthermore, the notion that the composer is the only person whose ideology is reflected in the music and that the *musical work*<sup>3</sup> is the only carrier of meaning—an idea that up to this moment remains widespread in western culture—is also misleading. In contrast to the more limited concept of a *musical work*, I will therefore introduce the notion of a *musical result* as that which describes the complex set of percepts given by all aspects

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<sup>3</sup>See Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, for a thorough discussion on the philosophy of musical works.

of a musical experience. These include for example: all sorts of aural and visual elements in a musical performance; the space and time in which the music is performed; the way in which the music is presented to the audience (including the participation and role they perform in the presentation of music); different modes of action in performance (performance practice) and composition (act of composing); the relationships established between composer, performer and audience; the context (cultural, sociological, political) in which music is presented; the way music is created, consumed and distributed; *etc.* A particular kind of musical result consequently discloses a type of collective subjectivity which encompasses the ideology of *all* the people involved in the music.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, within the musical result lies a system of elaborate symbols that synthesizes the relationships between the people involved in the collective act of music.

### ***Musicking***

According to Christopher Small, this set of complex relationships that are formed between people involved in music is that which gives meaning to music. His interest lies particularly on the collective action surrounding music and defines this activity as *musicking*.

The act of *musicking* establishes in the place where it is happening a set of relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies. They are to be found not only between those organized sounds which are conventionally thought of as being the stuff of musical meaning but also between the people who are taking part . . . relationships between person and person, between individual and society, between humanity and the natural world.<sup>5</sup>

By giving priority to the verb *to music*, as opposed to the noun *music*, he also questions the notion of the *musical work* and gives emphasis to the human action of *musicking*. Small argues that music is not an object and that *musical works* only give material for the musicians to perform, in contrast to the notion (developed as a consequence of western concert music) of performance only as a presentation of a *musical work*. He also defines the verb *to music* to include any type of action that contributes to a musical performance, which includes performing, listening, practicing, composing and dancing. He goes as far as to include actions such as selling and collecting tickets and cleaning the concert

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<sup>4</sup>I am not implying however that the ideology of all of the people is represented *equally* in the musical result. The question of how much someone is represented widely depends on their role in the musical result and the audience's interpretation of it.

<sup>5</sup>Christopher Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening*, Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1998, p. 13.



hall after a performance within his notion of *musicking*. Therefore, *musicking* encompasses all social relationships and actions that are related to music-making. Furthermore, he argues that *musicking*, together with speaking, are characteristics that are at the very core of what makes us human.

I am certain, first, that to take part in a music act is of central importance to our very humanness, as important as taking part in the act of speech, which it so resembles (but from which it also differs in important ways), and second, that everyone, every normally endowed human being, is born with the gift of music no less than with the gift of speech.<sup>6</sup>

Recent scientific studies in a variety of specialities including neuroscience, psychology, archaeology, anthropology and cognitive musicology have also pointed towards the same hypothesis. The idea put forward by Steven Pinker that music is ‘auditory cheesecake’—that it is only a byproduct of the evolution of language and has no biological value for humans—has been challenged recently within the scientific community. These studies have shown how music plays an important role, amongst others, in human communication, social bonding, cooperation, sexual selection, conveying emotions, psychological well-being, development of coordination and motor skills, expression of empathy, communication between infants and parents and exercising intelligence.<sup>7</sup> In addition, various theories have emerged regarding the relationship between music and language; some of them even suggesting that ‘proto-language’—the predecessor of language—was a pre-linguistic, non-verbal form of communication that was a “musical” form of action and thought.<sup>8</sup> It appears that language and music have a similar evolutionary starting-point and the common purpose of communicating emotion and meaning through sound. Therefore, Small is right in suggesting that *musicking*, like speaking, is at the core of being human and performs important social, cultural and biological functions.

### **The Definition of Music and the *Ethical Regime*.**

The important functions *musicking* performs in the development of individuals and the way in which they establish and nurture relationships within a community is what defines music as a vital human act. Using Rancière’s notion of ‘the regimes of art,’ isn’t this precisely the reason why, in the musical domain, the ‘ways of doing and making’ within the *ethical regime* is still defined as music? In other words, if one goes back to the question of why within music there is no change of identification with the break between the *ethical* and *poetic* regimes; I will suggest that it is because there is a

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>7</sup>See Steven Mithen, *The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind and Body*, London: Phoenix, 2006, for an overview of these studies.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 147-150.

strong *ethical* core implicit in the very meaning of *what music is*. That is to say, as opposed to the definition of *art* in the visual domain, the definition of *music* has been tied to the *ethical* functions that it performs for individuals and their communities. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that dance, like music, can also be defined as such within the *ethical regime*, which points towards the deep-seated relationship between both disciplines and the reason why Small includes dance within his concept of *musicking*. On the contrary, other artistic disciplines including ‘fine’ art, poetry and theater are identified only with the break between the *ethical* and *poetic* regimes.

Rhythm and melodies provide us with images of states of character, which come closer to their actual nature than anything else can do—images of anger and of calm, of courage and of temperance, and of their opposites, images, in fact of every state of character. This is a fact which is clear from experience; to listen to these images is to undergo a real change of soul. Now to acquire a habit of feeling pain or taking delight in an image is something closely allied to feeling pain or taking delight in the actual reality. . . . Objects of sight may do so, but only to a slight extent. . . . With musical compositions, however, the case is different. They involve representations of states of character themselves. This is an evident fact. In the first place, the nature of the modes varies; and listeners will be differently affected according as they listen to different modes.<sup>9</sup>

Put briefly, then, those charged with care of the city must hold fast to this, so that the city may not be corrupted unawares; but beyond all else, they must guard against innovation in gymnastic and music contrary to the established order, and to the best of their ability be on guard lest when someone says that people care more “for the newest song on the singer’s lips,” the poet may be understood to mean not new songs but a new style of singing, and to comment it. One must not praise such a thing, nor so interpret the poet, but guard against changing to a new form of music, as endangering the whole. For styles of music are nowhere disturbed without disturbing the most important laws and customs of political order—as Damos says and I believe.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Aristotle, ‘The Aims and Methods of Education in Music’ in *Politics*, Trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 309-310.

<sup>10</sup>Plato, ‘Music and the Constitution’ in *The Republic*, Trans. R.E. Allen, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 117

## Potential for an Analogy between Musical and Political Action?

### 3.1.2 Strategic Views on Aesthetic Forms

If a positive redefinition of music is to take place, and a link between music and other new forms of thought and subjectivity is to be reestablished; it is crucial first to rethink the fundamental aspects of how music is created, performed, presented and disseminated. This includes a significant revision and modification of the *strategic* forms of collectivity in music. In other words, in order to reinvigorate (within the musical sphere) the *aesthetic* type of avant-garde, the *strategic* type of avant-garde also needs to be rethought and reworked. Furthermore, if the creator of music subscribes to this position, he should consider the role musical groups, institutions, ensembles, industry and movements might have in the musical result he is involved with, in order to determine whether these groups might help in the establishment of new *aesthetic* forms. Moreover, it is vital to consider the context, time, space and audience where the music is to be presented as this too affects the *aesthetic* result and its visibility, and plays a significant part in the disclosure of a particular type of subjectivity.

Moreover, as a creator of music the potential exists in one should think the creative potential if one is to re-think a new kind of avant-garde

### 3.1.3 Appropriation and Ideology

The contemporary era constantly proclaims itself as post-ideological, but this denial of ideology only provides the ultimate proof that we are more than ever embedded in ideology. Ideology is always a field of struggle—among other things, the struggle for appropriating past traditions.<sup>11</sup>

Start on appropriation and past traditions...

My approach to appropriation??

Characters on stage should be flat, like clothes in a fashion show: what you get should be no more than what you see. Psychological realism is repulsive, because it allows us to escape unpalatable reality by taking shelter in the “luxuriousness” of personality, losing ourselves in the depth of individual character. The writer’s task is to block this manoeuvre, to chase us off to a point from which we can view the horror with a dispassionate eye.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Slavoj Zizek, “It’s Ideology, Stupid!”, in *First As Tragedy, Then as Farce*, London: Verso, 2009, p. 37.

<sup>12</sup>Elfriede Jelinek, quoted in Slavoj Zizek, *First As Tragedy, Then as Farce*, p. 40.

- Zizek on Fukuhama. Crisis of Capitalism. Ecological Catastrophy. Unsustainability. Need for Radical Reform in Politics? Critique of liberal democracy - need for new alternatives. - ethical regime - defined as music - elaborate. . . . Close relationship to culture and musiking. - aesthetic regime in music - still pending - emancipatory potential?

I will also argue that music has a particular emancipatory potential given its particular position within the artistic regimes.<sup>13</sup>

the confusion Rancière has described caused by the the two different ideas of artistic subjectivity.

Therefore, the aim of the body of work here presented is very modest: it is to put forward a set of propositions<sup>14</sup> that I hope can be used to radicalize the *strategic* as well as the *aesthetic* idea of the avant-garde in music.

## 3.2 Technology, Appropriation and Postproduction

“Consumption is simultaneously also production, just as in nature the production of a plant involves the consumption of elemental forces and chemical material” K. Marx

Sound Transformations:

“With the power of the computer, we can transform sounds in such radical ways that we can no longer assert that the goal sound is related to the source sound merely because we have derived one from the other.” (T. Wishart)

In my work, sound transformations are used for the transformation of existing music.

Why transformation of musical sources? Because they may carry complex cultural symbolism.

The amount of processing can affect our ability to recognize the source sound or musical sample. Therefore, there is a wide palette of derivative music available to us: from the radically processed less recognizable source more ‘abstract’ extreme; to the less processed more recognizable source more ‘referential’ and quotation type music.

Performance practice and other sonic characteristics of many original musical sources is lost in the transcription to a fully notated score for ensembles of western classically trained musicians. Many aspects of sound production (intonation, groove, spectral characteristics of instruments/voices, etc) is lost via this process.

Process of derivation and sound transformation is not directly apparent to the audience. The act of appropriation is not transparent.

Nicolas Bourriaud: Postproduction, 2002.

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<sup>13</sup>See pp. 4-8 for a discussion on Rancière’s ideas regarding the artistic regimes.

<sup>14</sup>The set of propositions are presented both as musical output and written commentary.

“Starting with the language imposed upon us (the system of production), we construct our own sentences (acts of everyday life), thereby reappropriating for ourselves, through these clandestine microbricolages, the last word in the productive chain.”<sup>15</sup>

“By listening to music or reading a book, we produce new material, we become producers. And each day we benefit from more ways in which to organize this production: remote controls, VCRs, computers, MP3s, tools that allow us to select, reconstruct, and edit. Postproduction artists are agents of this evolution, the specialized workers of cultural reappropriation.”

“Throughout the eighties, the democratization of computers and the appearance of sampling allowed for the emergence of a new cultural configuration, whose figures are the programmer and DJ. The remixer has become more important than the instrumentalist, the rave more exciting than the concert hall. The supremacy of cultures of appropriation and the reprocessing of forms calls for an ethics: to paraphrase Philippe Thomas, artworks belong to everyone. Contemporary art tends to abolish the ownership of forms, or in any case to shake up the old jurisprudence. Are we heading toward a culture that would do away with copyright in favor of a policy allowing free access to works, a sort of blueprint for a communism of forms?” (N. Bourriaud)

### 3.2.1 The postmodern condition in the digital age

resurgence of image / music quotations/references - first as reaction to the anti-mimetic later with digital technology, easy reproduction, etc, etc = the use of images becomes the same as before the establishment aesthetic regime : commodification, capitalism, DJ culture, digital quotations (in hip-hop, sound libraries, etc, etc)

### 3.2.2 The liberal-comunists: Open Source, etc.

There is no music by John Oswald on the net free to download. Hypocrisy from the appropriator? Or does he fall into the logic of late-capitalism - no communism of forms? I plunder but dont plunder me. Or, at least not for free?

I propose an attitude towards music appropriation similar to that of hacker communities and the open source initiative. Not with the purpose of suggesting a communist utopia, but of being consequent with my creative process. By giving away my music, recorded sounds and experiments, code, etc, through the net, I will hopefully instigate others to do so as well. If this attitude is followed,

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<sup>15</sup>Nicolas Bourriaud, *Postproduction. Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World*, New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2005.

it could promote the organization of music cyber communities that would plunder, engage with and promote each other, hopefully producing more subversive types of music.

We are far from the Bourriauds utopia. The only people who have access to (artistic) shareware are commoditized people, mostly in western countries. Isn't the DJ approach towards plunderphonics one that appropriates to make more profit and diminish costs only to thereafter feed back their product into the music industry system?

The music we compose and perform can convey our thoughts and express our feelings. As listeners we interpret . . . make us feel and think. Empathy. Exchange.

### **3.2.3 Compositional Strategies based on reshaping relationships in music making**

### **3.2.4 Reshaping relationships in music making through technology?**

The introduction of electroacoustic resources into live musical performance has changed the relationship between the composer and the performer.

The use of computer technology has also fostered new collaborative possibilities between performers of different cultures.

Musicians of different backgrounds (improvisation and notated music) and traditions (Western and non-Western) may now share the stage simultaneously and productively through technology; in spite of previously incompatible performance conventions.

Real-Time computer processing allows the possibility of using the audio signal (as well as other information - like MIDI) from several live performances simultaneously as building blocks for a composition.

### **3.2.5 Musica Derivata and Plunderphonics**

“A good composer does not imitate; he steals” I. Stravinsky

Musica Derivata:

“music that is compositionally based on other music” (K. Barlow)

Plunderphonics:

John Oswald, 1985. “Plunderphonics, or Audio Piracy as Compositional Prerogative”

Use of audio samples as a technique for composition.

Different from Musica Derivata in that it appropriates the recording of the original musical source. Information from recording (timbre, rhythm, performance practice, etc) is plundered from the original

source to create a new composition.

“As a listener my own preference is the option to experiment. My listening system has a mixer instead of a receiver, an infinitely variable speed turntable, filters, reverse capability, and a pair of ears. An active listener might speed up a piece of music in order to perceive more clearly its macrostructure, or slow it down to hear articulation and detail more precisely.”<sup>16</sup>

### 3.2.6 plunderphomes, ideology and the use of references

While some start up a prolonged lamentation for the lost image, others reopen their albums to rediscover the pure enchantment of images- that is, the alterity of the *was*, between the pleasure of pure presence and the bit of the absolute Other.

Evidence of exhibitions devoted to ‘images’, but also the dialectic that affects each type of image and mixes its legitimations and powers with those of the other two.

Plunderphones reflect ideology . . . Žižek/Adorno but. . . . The artist can present their own view of these references by rearranging them modifying them. The plunderphonics artist doesn’t necessarily adhere to the ideology of the appropriated material, but reflects it by the use of the plunderphones - how are they presented, modified, etc?

### 3.2.7 On Appropriation

What?

Code, compositional techniques, what piece of music? Do we plunder from the “flea market or (the) airport shopping mall”? (N. Bourriaud). From the top 20 list - J. Oswald approach-, or from the hidden CDs at the back of the music store?

Who?

Music Industry? Pop/commercial? Historical (dead composers)? Music from different cultures?

Appropriation of the Other. What relationship do we want to establish with the Other? Impersonal like the 1st/3rd World relationships?

Liberal multiculturalists approach? “Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight)?” (Slavoj Žižek, 2003)

Why?

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<sup>16</sup>John Oswald, “Plunderphonics, or Audio Piracy as a Compositional Prerogative,” in *Wired Society Electro-Acoustic Conference*, Toronto, 1985. URL: <http://www.plunderphonics.com/xhtml/xplunder.html>.

For the meaning of the cultural object you are appropriating? For its symbolism? To suggest a metaphor?

For its use? “Don't look for the meaning, look for the use” - L. Wittgenstein - for example for the sonic qualities of the appropriation (intonation, groove, etc.)

How?

### **3.2.8 Real-Time Plunderphonics**

Appropriation of audio signals from live music performances as material for a new composition

Creates a cognitive dissonance between audio and visuals.

The amount of processing of the audio signals is visible. The more processed the performances are, the more contrasting they will look in relationship with what is heard through speakers.

In contrast to acousmatic tradition, Real-Time Plunderphonics makes the process of appropriation transparent to the audience through the cognitive association between audio and visuals.

Changes relationship with the appropriated Other: The performer becomes an accomplice in the process of appropriation (or themselves).

Deals with the problematic of the lack of visual clues and theatrical elements in electronic music performance by introducing a dynamic group of live performers and an interesting and unusual visual scenario.

#### **Some ideas of how to plunder**

Get to know what and who you are plundering and figure why you are doing so before you decide how to plunder. (Know your performers, their music and why you want to work with them)

Appropriate and plunder yourself.

Plundering not as central purpose of the creative process, but rather a tool for creating new idiosyncratic audio/visual result.

Use “from raw to cooked” (Lévi-Strauss) techniques to create a narrative that navigates, in literary terms, between the real (actual performance) and the ‘surreal’ (extreme processed audio).

Combinations of Real-Time Plunderphonics, (Real-Time) Musica Derivata and Sound Transformations

Use plunderphones as data: reprogram, not just remix.

Micro and macro plundering.

Use also Non Real-Time tools (Scores, Samples, etc.) if suitable.

Using plunderphones as data



An example: Use FFT data of your plunderphone to trigger samples of recorded instruments.

## **Micro and Macro Plundering**

### **Microplunderphonics**

Plundering just microelements of sound. Not the whole spectrum of the original sound file.

Generate noise with your plunderphones and use it instead of white noise for sound synthesis

### **Macroplundering**

Appropriate a compositions form. Use the structure as blueprint for a new composition.

Use variables of the appropriated piece (pitch, dynamics, etc.) as control structures for new output.

## **3.2.9 Crossing Cultural Borders?**

A discussion of Simon Emmerson's Crossing Cultural Boundaries through Technology. Žižek's view of Multiculturalism.

## **3.2.10 Interpassivity**

Interpassivity, like interactivity, thus subverts the standard opposition between activity and passivity: if in interactivity (or the cunning of Reason), I am passive while being active through another, in interpassivity, I am active while being passive through another. More precisely, the term interactivity is currently used in two senses: (1) interacting with the medium, that is, not being just a passive consumer: (2) acting through another agent, so that my job is done, while I sit back and remain passive, just observing the game. While the opposite of the first mode of interactivity is also a kind of interpassivity, the mutual passivity of two subjects, like two lovers passively observing each other and merely enjoying each others presence, the proper notion of interpassivity aims at the reversal of the second meaning of interactivity: the distinguishing feature of interpassivity is that, in it, the subject is incessantly (frenetically even) active, while displacing on to another the fundamental passivity of his or her being.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>From The Fantasy in Cyberspace by Slavoj Žižek