

Attentive *might* in inquisitive semantics

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Overview

- Two puzzles for the standard modal account of *might*
- Attentive *might* in inquisitive semantics
- Attentive *might* in inquisitive pragmatics
- Comparison with modal and dynamic accounts

Puzzle 1: *might* meets disjunction and conjunction

Zimmermann's (2000)

The following are all **equivalent**:

- (1) John might be in London **or** in Paris. $\diamond(p \vee q)$
- (2) John might be in London **or** he might be in Paris. $\diamond p \vee \diamond q$
- (3) John might be in London **and** he might be in Paris. $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$

Puzzle 1: *might* meets disjunction and conjunction

Crucially

- *Might* behaves differently in this respect from clear-cut epistemic modals
- The following are clearly **not equivalent**:
 - (4) It is consistent with my beliefs that John is in London
or it is consistent with my beliefs that he is in Paris.
 - (5) It is consistent with my beliefs that John is in London
and it is consistent with my beliefs that he is in Paris.
- This is problematic if *might* is analyzed as an epistemic modal

Puzzle 1: *might* meets disjunction and conjunction

Further observation

- For the equivalence to go through, it is crucial that John **cannot** be **both** in London and in Paris at the same time

Szabolcsi's scenario

- We need an English-French translator, i.e., someone who speaks *both* languages. In that context, (8) is perceived as a useful recommendation, while (6) and (7) are not.

(6) John might speak English **or** French. $\diamond(p \vee q)$

(7) John might speak English **or** he might speak French. $\diamond p \vee \diamond q$

(8) John might speak English **and** he might speak French. $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$

Puzzle 2: *might* meets negation

Basic observation

Standard sentential negation never takes scope over *might*

- (9) John might not be in London. $\Diamond \neg p$

Crucially

Might \neq ‘it is consistent with my information that’

- (10) It is not consistent with my information
that John is in London. $\neg \text{CONSISTENT } p$

Main point

- The notion of meaning that we have in inquisitive semantics is designed to capture informative and inquisitive content
- We will show here that it can be further refined in such a way that it does not only capture informative and inquisitive content, but also a sentence's potential to **draw attention** to certain possibilities
- This allows for a novel analysis of ***might***

Driving intuition

- (11) John might be in London.
- (12) John is in London.
- (13) Is John in London?

Main contrasts

- (11) differs from (12) in that it **does not provide** the **information** that John is in London
- (11) differs from (13) in that it **does not request** information
- 'ok' is an appropriate response to (11) but not to (13)

Main intuition

- The semantic contribution of (11) lies in its potential to **draw attention** to the possibility that John is in London

Attentive content in inquisitive semantics

- Let's refer to a set of possible worlds as a **possibility**
- Then the notion of a proposition as a **set of possibilities** is ideally suited to capture attentive content
- We can simply think of a sentence φ as **drawing attention** to all the possibilities in $[\varphi]$
- At the same time, we can still think of $[\varphi]$ as capturing the **informative** and **inquisitive** content of φ , just as before
 - ⇒ informative, inquisitive, and attentive content are all captured by a single semantic object

A propositional language

Basic ingredients

- Finite set of atomic sentences \mathcal{A}
- Connectives \neg , \wedge , \vee , \diamond




Question and assertion operators

- $!\varphi := \varphi \vee \neg\neg\varphi$
- $? \varphi := !\varphi \vee \neg\varphi$

Worlds, possibilities, and propositions

- **Possible worlds**: functions from \mathcal{A} to $\{0, 1\}$
- **Possibilities**: sets of possible worlds
- **Propositions**: non-empty sets of possibilities

Illustration



Propositions do not have to be downward closed

- In InqB propositions were defined as non-empty **downward closed** sets of states/possibilities
- This was because the possibilities in a proposition $[\varphi]$ were taken to correspond to pieces of information that **settled** the issue embodied by $[\varphi]$
- If a possibility α settles a given issue, then clearly every $\beta \subseteq \alpha$ must settle the issue as well
- That's why propositions had to be downward closed in InqB

Propositions do not have to be downward closed

- This is appropriate if we are only interested in informative and inquisitive content
- But if we want to model attentive content as well, propositions have to be **arbitrary** non-empty sets of possibilities
- In uttering a sentence, a speaker may very well draw attention to a certain possibility α without drawing attention to any $\beta \subseteq \alpha$

Disclaimer

- We will consider here a simple system that solves the puzzles we started out with
(from Ciardelli, Groenendijk and Roelofsen, SALT 2009)
- However, the system presented here has some problems
- We are still thinking about ways to avoid these problems

Atomic sentences

For any atomic sentence p : $[p] = \{ \{w \mid w(p) = 1\} \}$

Example:



p

Negation

Definition

- $[\neg\varphi] = \{ \overline{\bigcup[\varphi]} \}$
- Take the union of all the possibilities for φ ; then take the complement

Example, φ classical:



$[p]$




$[\neg p]$

Negation


Definition

- $[\neg\varphi] = \{ \overline{\bigcup[\varphi]} \}$
- Take the union of all the possibilities for φ ; then take the complement

Example, φ inquisitive:



$[\varphi]$




$[\neg\varphi]$

Disjunction


Definition

- $[\varphi \vee \psi] = [\varphi] \cup [\psi]$

Examples:



$$p \vee q$$



$$?p \; (= p \vee \neg p)$$

Conjunction


Definition

- $[\varphi \wedge \psi] = \{\alpha \cap \beta \mid \alpha \in [\varphi] \text{ and } \beta \in [\psi]\}$
- Pointwise intersection


Example, φ and ψ classical:



p



q



$p \wedge q$

Conjunction


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
Example, φ and ψ inquisitive:



?p



?q




?p \wedge ?q


Might

- $[\Diamond\varphi] = [\varphi] \cup \{W\}$
- **Intuition:** $\Diamond\varphi$ proposes exactly the same updates as φ , but also offers the option to keep the common ground just as it is


Examples



$\Diamond p$




$\Diamond(p \wedge q)$



$\Diamond(p \vee q)$


Informative, inquisitive, and attentive content



In uttering a sentence φ , a speaker:

1. draws attention to all the possibilities in $[\varphi]$
2. provides the information that the actual world is located in at least one of the possibilities in $[\varphi]$
3. requests information from other participants to locate the actual world more precisely in a specific possibility in $[\varphi]$

Informative, inquisitive, and attentive content



In uttering a sentence φ , a speaker:

1. draws attention to all the possibilities in $[\varphi]$
2. provides the information that the actual world is located in at least one of the possibilities in $[\varphi]$
3. requests information from other participants to locate the actual world more precisely in a specific possibility in $[\varphi]$

⇒ a single semantic object embodies informative, inquisitive, and attentive content

Inquisitive content

- φ **requests a response** that provides enough information to locate the actual world in a specific possibility in $[\varphi]$
- Sometimes, it suffices to **accept** the information that φ itself already provides
- If **additional information** is required, we call φ **inquisitive**



non-inquisitive



non-inquisitive




inquisitive



inquisitive

Alternative and residual possibilities




Three possibilities:

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha &= \{w_1, w_2\} \\ \beta &= \{w_1, w_3\} \\ \gamma &= \{w_1\}\end{aligned}$$

- Providing the information that at least one of $\{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$ contains the actual world is the same as providing the information that at least one of $\{\alpha, \beta\}$ contains the actual world
- Requesting a response that establishes at least one of $\{\alpha, \beta, \gamma\}$ is the same as requesting a response that establishes at least one of $\{\alpha, \beta\}$
- So γ does not play a role in determining the informative or inquisitive content of this proposition

Alternative and residual possibilities



Three possibilities:

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha &= \{w_1, w_2\} \\ \beta &= \{w_1, w_3\} \\ \gamma &= \{w_1\}\end{aligned}$$

- In general, for any proposition $[\varphi]$, we can distinguish:
- Alternative possibilities
 - not properly contained in a maximal possibility in $[\varphi]$
 - completely determine the informative & inquisitive content of φ
- Residual possibilities
 - properly contained in a maximal possibility in $[\varphi]$
 - only play a role in capturing the attentive content of φ


Inquisitive, informative, and attentive sentences

Definitions

- φ is **informative** iff it eliminates at least one world, i.e., $\bigcup[\varphi] \neq W$
- φ is **inquisitive** iff $[\varphi]$ contains at least two alternative possibilities
- φ is **attentive** iff $[\varphi]$ contains at least one residual possibility

Example

- $p \vee q \vee (p \wedge q)$ “ p or q or both”
informative, inquisitive, and attentive



Questions, Assertions, and Conjectures

Definitions

- φ is a **question** iff it is **neither informative nor attentive**
- φ is an **assertion** iff it is **neither inquisitive nor attentive**
- φ is a **conjecture** iff it is **neither informative nor inquisitive**


Examples



? p



p




$\diamond p$

Might and conjectures

Every *might* sentence is a conjecture

- $\Diamond\varphi$ is never informative
- $\Diamond\varphi$ is never inquisitive
- So $\Diamond\varphi$ is always a conjecture



$$\Diamond(p \vee q)$$

Every conjecture can be expressed by a *might* sentence

- φ is a conjecture if and only if $\varphi \equiv \Diamond\varphi$

Closure properties of conjectures

For any φ and ψ :

- $\Diamond\varphi$ is a conjecture;
- if φ and ψ are conjectures, then so is $\varphi \wedge \psi$;
- if at least one of φ and ψ is a conjecture, so is $\varphi \vee \psi$;

Examples

- (14) John might be in London. $\Diamond p$
- (15) John might be in London and Bill in Paris. $\Diamond p \wedge \Diamond q$
- (16) John is in London, or he might be in Paris. $p \vee \Diamond q$

Might meets disjunction and conjunction

Zimmermann's (2000)

The following are all **equivalent**:

- (1) John might be in London **or** in Paris. $\diamond(p \vee q)$
- (2) John might be in London **or** he might be in Paris. $\diamond p \vee \diamond q$
- (3) John might be in London **and** he might be in Paris. $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$

Might meets disjunction and conjunction

Further observation

- For the equivalence to go through, it is crucial that John **cannot** be **both** in London and in Paris at the same time

Szabolcsi's scenario


- We need an English-French translator, i.e., someone who speaks *both* languages. In that context, (8) is perceived as a useful recommendation, while (6) and (7) are not.

(6) John might speak English **or** French. $\diamond(p \vee q)$


(7) John might speak English **or** he might speak French. $\diamond p \vee \diamond q$

(8) John might speak English **and** he might speak French. $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$


Might meets disjunction and conjunction



(a) $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$



(b) $\diamond p \vee \diamond q$
 $\equiv \diamond(p \vee q)$



(c) $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$
 $\equiv \diamond p \vee \diamond q$
 $\equiv \diamond(p \vee q)$

- Whenever the disjuncts are mutually exclusive, as in (c), all three sentences are indeed equivalent
- If the disjuncts are not mutually exclusive, then $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$ differs from the other two in that it draws attention to the possibility that p and q both hold.
- This is what makes $\diamond p \wedge \diamond q$ a useful recommendation in Szabolcsi's scenario

Might meets negation

Basic observation

Standard sentential negation never takes scope over *might*

- (17) John might not be in London. $\Diamond \neg p$

Crucially

Might \neq ‘it is consistent with my information that’


- (18) It is not consistent with my information
that John is in London. $\neg \text{CONSISTENT } p$

Explanation


$\neg \Diamond \varphi$ is always a contradiction

See the paper for similar, but more complex effects in conditionals

Projection operators




Projections onto the axes



- $[!]A$ purely informative projection
- $[?]A$ purely inquisitive projection
- $[◊]A$ purely attentive projection

Projections onto the planes

Issues



- $[?◇]A$ non-informative projection
- $[!◇]A$ non-inquisitive projection
- $[?!]A$ non-attentive projection


Example: purely informative projection

Requirements

- $[!]A$ should preserve the informative content of A
- $[!]A$ should be non-inquisitive
- $[!]A$ should be non-attentive

Implementation

- $[!]A = \{\cup A\}$




Another example: non-inquisitive projection

Requirements

- $[\Diamond]A$ should preserve the informative content of A
- $[\Diamond]A$ should be non-inquisitive
- $[\Diamond]A$ should preserve the attentive content of A

Implementation

- $[\Diamond]A = A \cup \{\cup A\}$




Relevance for natural language semantics

- It makes sense to think of **declarative complementizers** as non-inquisitive closure operators

Example:

(19) C_D John speaks Russian or French.



- Informative and attentive, but not inquisitive
- Alternatives introduced by **disjunction**, but closed off by C_D

Pragmatics

- Gricean pragmatics generally assumes a truth-conditional semantics, which captures only informative content
- Gricean pragmatics is a pragmatics of providing information
- Inquisitive semantics enriches the notion of semantic meaning
- This requires an enrichment of the pragmatics as well
- We need not just a pragmatics of providing information, but rather a pragmatics of exchanging information

Inquisitive pragmatics (sketch)

Quality

Maintain the common ground and your own information state.

- Be sincere (speaker oriented)
 - Only assert what you take yourself to know
 - Only ask what you don't know
 - Only draw attention to 'live' possibilities
- Be transparent: signal inconsistency (hearer oriented)

Reject a proposed possibility if it is inconsistent with your information state

Inquisitive pragmatics (sketch)

Relatedness/compliance

- The semantics allows us to formulate several formal notions of relatedness/compliance

Quantity

- Among all the compliant and sincere responses to a given (possibly implicit) question under discussion, there is a general preference for more informative responses

Back to *might*: three basic observations

(11) John might be in London.

Possibility

- (11) signals that the speaker considers it **possible** that John is in London
⇒ point of departure for a **modal** analysis of *might*

Back to *might*: three basic observations

(11) John might be in London.

Consistency test

- (11) imposes a **consistency test** on the hearer: if her information state is inconsistent with John being in London, she must report this
⇒ point of departure for Veltman's **update semantics** of *might*

Back to *might*: three basic observations

(11) John might be in London.

Ignorance

- (11) typically signals that the speaker is **ignorant** as to whether John is in London or not
⇒ typically analyzed as a **Gricean implicature**

The inquisitive account

(11) John might be in London.

Possibility

- (11) signals that the speaker considers it **possible** that John is in London
- Follows directly from **sincerity**
- Unlike the modal analysis, this account directly extends to:

(1) John might be in London or in Paris.

The inquisitive account

(11) John might be in London.

Consistency test

- (11) imposes a **consistency test** on the hearer: if her information state is inconsistent with John being in London, she must report this
- Follows directly from **transparency**
- Unlike update semantics, this account directly extends to:

(1) John might be in London or in Paris.

The inquisitive account

(11) John might be in London.

Ignorance

- (11) typically signals that the speaker is **ignorant** as to whether John is in London or not
- Follows from the **quantitative preference** for more informative compliant moves

Division of labor

Semantics

- Specifies which proposals are expressed by which sentences

Pragmatics

- Specifies what a context—in particular, the common ground and the speaker's information state—must be like in order for a certain proposal to be made
- ... and how a hearer is supposed to react to a given proposal, depending on the common ground and her own information state.

Final remarks

- The idea that the core semantic contribution of *might*- φ lies in its potential to draw attention to certain possibilities has been entertained before
- For instance, Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996) write:

"in many cases, a sentence of the form might- φ will have the effect that one becomes aware of the possibility of φ ."
- Similar ideas can be found in more recent work:
e.g. Swanson (2006), Franke and de Jager (2008),
Brumwell (2009), Dekker (2009)
- Related ideas exist also in the literature on evidentials
(Murray, 2010; Faller, 2002)

Final remarks

- However, Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman continue to point out that their framework

"is one in which possible worlds are total objects, and in which growth of information about the world is explicated in terms of elimination of worlds.

Becoming aware of a possibility cannot be accounted for in a natural fashion in such an eliminative approach. It would amount to extending partial worlds, rather than eliminating total ones. To account for that aspect of the meaning of might a constructive approach seems to be called for."

Final remarks

- We have taken a different route
- Possible worlds are still total objects
- Growth of information still amounts to eliminating worlds
- **What has changed is the very notion of meaning**
- No truth-conditions, no information change potential,
but rather **information exchange potential**
- This shift in perspective immediately facilitates a perspicuous
account of *might*, and of attentive content more generally

Appendix: some open issues

- Conjunction
- Implication
- Entailment

Conjunction

Conjunction as pointwise intersection

- $[\varphi \wedge \psi] = \{\alpha \cap \beta \mid \alpha \in [\varphi] \text{ and } \beta \in [\psi]\}$

Is not idempotent

- $(p \vee q) \wedge (p \vee q) \not\equiv p \vee q$
- $(p \vee q) \wedge (p \vee q) \equiv p \vee q \vee (p \wedge q)$

Entailment

- Note that we did not specify a notion of entailment in the paper
- Entailment should not only take informative and inquisitive content into account in this setting, but also attentive content
- When we wrote the paper we had no clear idea about attentive entailment
- Now we do have some ideas, but none of them is really conclusive

Implication

- In terms of support, there is a reasonable clause for implication
- We also have an algebraic characterization of implication in the support-based system, as **relative pseudo-complementation**
- With attentive content on board, it is less clear how we should think about implication
- As long as we do not have a notion of entailment, the algebraic approach does not get off the ground
- And even if it does, it is likely that we cannot treat implication as relative pseudo-complementation in this setting