

# Lattice-Based Cryptography, $\text{LWE/LWR}$

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# Introduction

- ▶ What exactly is lattice cryptography?
- ▶ Why should we care about it?

## Peikert

The use of *apparently* hard problems on point lattices in  $\mathbb{R}^n$  as the foundation for secure cryptographic constructions.

# What makes Lattice-Crypto Special?

- ▶ Conjectured security against *quantum* attacks.

Number-Theoretic cryptography (Diffie-Hellman, RSA) rely on hardness of integer factorization/ discrete-log in groups.


But Shor's Quantum Algorithm finds integer factorization in time  $O(n)!$

- ▶ Ajtai'96 proved that the worst-case hardness of lattice problems implies average-case hardness of certain problems.

# What makes Lattice-Crypto Special?

*Gentry*[*Gen09b*, *Gen09a*] proposed the first candidate for FHE(Fully Homomorphic Encryption) based on lattices! All further constructions were based on lattices as well.

# Lattice: Definition



An  $n$ -dimensional lattice  $L$  is a subset of  $\mathbb{R}^n$  which has the structure of:

- (1). An additive subgroup  $\implies \mathbf{0} \in L, -x, x + y \in L \ \forall x, y \in L$ .
- (2). A discrete set  $\implies \forall x \in L, \exists$  a neighborhood of  $x$  in  $\mathbb{R}^n$  such that  $x$  is the only point in  $L$  contained in the neighborhood.

## GapSVP, SVP

We define the minimum distance of a lattice  $L$  as the length of the shortest non-zero lattice vector:  $\lambda_1(L) = \min_{v \in L - \{0\}} \|v\|$ .

$\|v\|$  denotes the Euclidean norm. The notion can be generalized by defining  $\lambda_i(L)$  as the smallest  $r$  such that  $L$  has  $i$  linearly independent vectors of norm at most  $r$ .

# GapSVP,SVP

## **SVP Problem:**

Given an arbitrary basis  $B$  of an  $n$ -dimensional lattice  $L = L(B)$ , find a non-zero vector  $v \in L$  for which  $\|v\| = \lambda_1(L)$ .

## **SVP $_{\gamma}$ Problem:**

Given a lattice basis  $B$ , find a nonzero  $v \in L(B)$  such that  $0 < \|v\| \leq \gamma \lambda_1(L(B))$ . Here  $\gamma = \gamma(n) \geq 1$  is a function of dimension  $n$ .

# GapSVP, SVP

## GapSVP <sub>$\gamma$</sub> Problem:

Given a lattice basis  $B$  and a positive integer  $d$ , output whether  $\lambda_1(L(B)) \leq d$  is true or  $\lambda_1(L(B)) > d$ .

We have the intuitive result:  $\text{GapSVP}_\lambda \leq \text{SVP}_\lambda$  in general.



## LPN: Definition

We are provided with samples  $(x, f(x))$  where  $f(x) \in \{0, 1\}$ . However, with some small probability, we are provided with  $1 - f(x)$ . The idea is to recover the secret if the output is sometimes flipped, or perturbed. Since  $f(x)$  has only two possibilities, it represents the parity of a number, since 0 represents  $0 \pmod{2}$  and 1 represents  $1 \pmod{2}$ .

# LPN - Algorithm

For an integer  $n \geq 1$  and some real number  $\epsilon \geq 0$ , we need to find an unknown  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_2^n$  if we have a list of equations:

$$\langle s, a_1 \rangle \approx_{\epsilon} b_1 \pmod{2}$$

# LPN-Algorithm

We can find a set  $S$  of  $O(n)$  equations such that  $\sum_S a_i = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$  using Gaussian Elimination. Summing the corresponding values for  $b_i$ , gives us a good guess for the first bit of  $s$ .

Each  $b_i$  is correct with a probability  $1 - \epsilon$ . We note that this is  $\frac{1}{2} + 2^{-\Theta(n)}$ . This implies that to get the first bit of  $s$  with high probability  $(1 - \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)})$ , we need to repeat the algorithm  $2^{\Theta(n)}$  times.

# LPN-Algorithm

Blum et al. provide a subexponential algorithm for the problem. They only use  $2^{O(n/\log n)}$  equations/time. Best algorithm known today!

## LWE: Definition

Let  $q = p(n) \leq \text{poly}(n)$  be some prime integer (note that in later discussions, we do not have this restriction) and we have a list of equations with error:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle s, a_1 \rangle &\approx_{\chi} b_1(\text{mod } q) \\ \langle s, a_2 \rangle &\approx_{\chi} b_2(\text{mod } q) \\ &\vdots \end{aligned}$$

$s \in \mathbb{Z}_n^q$  and  $a_i$  are chosen independently and uniformly from  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,  $b_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ . Note that the error now has a distribution specified by  $\chi : \mathbb{Z}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$  on  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .

Thus we have:

$$b_i = \langle s, a_i \rangle + e_i \tag{1}$$

where each  $e_i$  is chosen independently according to  $\chi$ . Now we simply have the problem of learning the secret  $s$  given all the equations above with the error added. We denote this problem by  $\text{LWE}_{q,\chi}$  as in the paper.

## Regev's Result

Let  $n, p$  be integers and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  be such that  $\alpha p > 2\sqrt{(n)}$ . If there is an efficient algorithm that solves  $\text{LWE}_{p, \psi_\alpha}$  then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decision version of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to within  $\tilde{O}(n/\alpha)$  in the worst case.

# Learning With Rounding (LWR)

Proposed by Banerjee, Peikert, Rosen.

**LWR<sub>n,q,p</sub> Definition:** We draw independent samples  $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  and then round  $\langle a_i, s \rangle \bmod p$ . We then have to distinguish these rounded inner products from uniform random samples in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . Here  $q, p \in \mathbb{N}$ .

# Discrete Gaussian

The Discrete Gaussian Distribution  $\chi_\sigma$  on  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  with standard deviation  $\sigma : \chi_\sigma(x)$ .

**Definition:**

For any center  $c \in R$ , and Gaussian parameter  $s \in \mathbb{R}_+$ , define the discrete Gaussian distribution as:

$$D_{s,c}(x) = \frac{\rho_{s,c}(x)}{\sum_{y=-\infty}^{\infty} \rho_{s,c}(y)} \forall x \in \mathbb{Z}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\rho$  denotes the Gaussian function  $\rho_{s,c}(x) = e^{-\pi|x-c|^2/s^2}$