Validating Solidity Code
Defects using Symbolic and
Concrete Execution powered
by Large Language Models

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


Overview

- Key Terminology
- Slither and other relevant tools
- An example highlighting the limitations of Analysis Tools and LLMs
- Our detection pipeline
- An example of processing a contract using our pipeline
- Conclusion

Smart Contracts

Smart Contracts are pieces of code that run on a blockchain network. They are implemented using a programming language like Solidity, Viper, Bamboo and more.



Yifei Huang. Decoding Ethereum smart contract data (2021)

Solidity

According to the official documentation, Solidity is a statically typed, compiled programming language for implementing smart contracts. It was designed to target the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).

```
SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
     pragma solidity 0.8.29;
     contract Bank {
         mapping(address => uint) private balance;
          function deposit() external payable {
              balance[msg.sender] = msg.value;
11
          function withdraw() external {
12
              uint addrBal = balance[msg.sender];
              payable(msg.sender).transfer(addrBal);
13
              balance[msg.sender] = 0;
15
16
```

Defects in Smart Contracts are Critical



Immutable

Once a smart contract is deployed, we are unable to replace it with a newer version



Public

Even though not explicitly public, the source code of the deployed Smart Contract can still be retrieved



Financial

Most Smart Contracts directly handle a form of currency or other classes of assets

Slither Static Analyzer for Smart Contracts

```
(env) PS E:\Contracts> slither .\GameContract.sol
                                                                                               Running Slither from the CLI
solc --version' running
solc .\GameContract.sol --combined-json abi,ast,bin,bin-runtime,srcmap,srcmap-runtime,userdo
INFO:Detectors:
   eContract.play() (GameContract.sol#31-41) sends eth to arbitrary user
       Dangerous calls:
         address(msg.sender).transfer(10 * fee) (GameContract.sol#36)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#functions-that send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
INFO: Detectors:
GameContract.play() (GameContract.sol#31-41) uses timestamp for comparisons
       Dangerous comparisons:
                                                                                                      Defects found by Slither
       - block.timestamp >= gameStartTime && block.timestamp <= gameEndTime (GameContract.sol
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timest
INFO:Detectors:
GameContract. owner (GameContract.sol#5) should be immutable
GameContract.fee (GameContract.sol#8) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
INFO:Slither:.\GameContract.sol analyzed (1 contracts with 100 detectors), 4 result(s) found
```

slither = Slither(contract_path)

from slither.slither import Slither

Importing the Slither module and initializing the object which gives us access to contract data

Other Development & Testing Tools for Smart Contracts

Forge Part of the Foundry suite along with Anvil and Cast. Facilitates the development and testing of Smart Contracts using only Solidity Allows developers perform fuzz testing on smart contracts

Kontrol A formal verification tool integrated within the Foundry ecosystem Fully compatible with existing Forge tests. It analyses all possible execution paths through symbolic execution

Example - Reentrancy False Alarm

A Reentrancy attack is a smart contract vulnerability that occurs when an external contract call is able to call back into ("re-enter") the original function before it has finished executing. However, the transfer function does not allow such exploits due to the limited gas that is forwards.

```
SPDX-License-Identifier
                                  The balance of the
     pragma solidity 0.8.29;
                                 caller is reduced to
                                 O after sending the
     contract Bank {
                                      currency.
          mapping(address => uint) private balance;
         function deposit() external payable {
             balance[msg.sender] = msg.value;
          function withdraw() external {
11
12
             uint addrBal = balance[msg.sender];
             payable(msg.sender).transfer(addrBal);
13
             balance[msg.sender] = 0;
15
16
```


Slither can be tricked!

```
Reentrancy in Bank.withdraw() (Bank.sol#11-<u>15):</u>
        External calls:
                                             Wrongfully reporting a Reentrancy

    address(msg.sender).transfer(add

                                             vulnerability for the contract on
        State variables written after the
                                                  the previous Slide
        Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Document
ation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-4
INFO:Slither:Bank.sol analyzed (1 contracts with 100 detectors), 1
result(s) found
```

Do LLMs fare any better?



Even with additional help?

The transfer function only attaches 2300 gas to the transaction, is it enough to call a function?

No, 2,300 gas is generally not enough to call a function that modifies state (like another withdraw call), which is why the transfer function was historically used as a method to mitigate reentrancy attacks.

So is this contract vulnerable to Reentrancy?




Yes, the withdraw function in the contract you provided is vulnerable to a reentrancy attack.


Analysis Tools vs LLMs

	Analysis Tools	LLMs
Detection Rate	Narrower detection range compared to LLMs	Able to correctly flag scenarios which Analysis Tools miss
False Alarms	No false alarms for most defect categories	Notable number of false alarms, over-generalization of training data
Resource Consumption	Most tools run on common hardware	Only small models run on common hardware
Consistency	Deterministic	Debatable

Contribution: Empower Static Analysis Tools with LLMs Inference



Example: Reentrancy prerequisites



```
ontract Test is Test
//Replace the type "ContractUnderTest" of _contractUnderTest with the type of the contract that is currently being analyzed"
     ContractUnderTest public _contractUnderTest;
     Attacker public attacker;
                                                                                                                                                  Initialize the contract under
 // If the constructor of the contract under test has parameters, the "setUp" function should have the same parameters
  function setUp() public {
                                                                                                                                                test and additional elements
     //Initialize the contract being tested with the correct constructor, use the correct parameters
     //If the constructor is payable, use "vm.deal" to add balance to the current contract before intializing the contract under test
     contractUnderTest = new ContractUnderTest();
     attacker=new Attacker(address( contractUnderTest)):
  //IMPORTANT: Do not use hardcoded parameters. Add the paramters to the "test proofReentrancyExploit" method and forward them o the method being tested. I want to perform symbolic execution or fuzz testing using
 //We use this function to perform that Reentrancy attacks fail against the contract
   function test_proofReentrancyExploit(uint initialDeposit) public {
     vm.deal(address( attacker), initialDeposit);
     vm.deal(address(_contractUnderTest), initialDeposit);
                                                                                                                                                  Check if the call is successful
     vm.prank(address( attacker));
     //Call the function from the attacker contract that prepares the attack. Attach any paramters that are needed. Make sure to not is hardcoded value
                                                                                                                                                              for Malicious users
     attacker.setupAttack();
     //Call the function from the attacker contract that attempts a Reentrancy attack. Attach any paramters that are needed.
     contractUnderTest.attack();
     assert(address(_attacker).balance > initialDeposit);
         test prooflithdrawlsuallylocks(wint initialDeposit) public /
     //Make sure that both contracts have enough Ether to simulate this scenario, adjust the following "vm.deal" lines if needed
     vm.deal(address(this), initialDeposit);
     vm.deal(address(_contractUnderTest), initialDeposit);
                                                                                                                                                  Check if the call is successful
     //Perform any setup steps that are necessary to receive Ether from the contract being tested
                                                                                                                                                         for non Malicious users
     //Call the method that sends Ether to this contract
```

```
Replace this import with one correcponding to the contract type being tested,
  the file has the same name as the contract and is located in the same folder path as t
import {ContractUnderTest} from "../../src/ContractUnderTest.sol";
                                                                                          Dummy import
//Append the type of the contract being tested to the name of the Test contract
contract Test is Test {
//Replace the type "ContractUnderTest" of contractUnderTest with the type
// of the contract that is currently being analyzed"
       ContractUnderTest public contractUnderTest
                                                                                Dummy declaration
       Attacker public _attacker;
    // If the constructor of the contract under test has parameters,
   //the "setUp" function should have the same parameters
    function setUp() public {
       //Initialize the contract being tested with the correct constructor,
       // use the correct parameters
       //If the constructor is payable, use "vm.deal" to add balance to the current
       //contract before intializing the contract under test
        _contractUnderTest = new ContractUnderTest();
                                                                              Dummy initialization
        attacker=new Attacker(address( contractUnderTest));
```

```
^\prime/IMPORTANT: Do not use hardcoded parameters. Add the paramters to the "test proofReentrancyExploit"
   want to perform symbolic execution or fuzz testing using this test
//We use this function to perform that Reentrancy attacks fail against the contract
 function test proofReentrancyExploit(uint initialDeposit) public {
   //Make sure that both contracts have enough Ether to simulate this scenario, adjust the following
   vm.deal(address( attacker), initialDeposit);
   vm.deal(address( contractUnderTest), initialDeposit);
   // --- ARRANGE ---
   //Use "vm.prank" to make sure that all subsequent calls will be made using the attacker's address
   vm.prank(address( attacker));
   //Call the function from the attacker contract that prepares the attack. Attach any paramters that
   //Add narameters from "test proofReentrancyExploit" if needed and forward them.
   attacker.setupAttack();
   // --- ACT ---
   //Call the function from the attacker contract that attempts
                                                                 Perform the attack and check
   //Make sure to not use hardcoded values. Add parameters to
                                                                  the balance of the attacker
   attacker.attack();
   // --- ACT ---
   assert(address(_attacker).balance > initialDeposit);
```

```
function test proofWithdrawUsuallyWorks(uint initialDeposit) public {
    //Make sure that both contracts have enough Ether to simulate this scenario, adjust the following "vm.de
    vm.deal(address(this), initialDeposit);
    vm.deal(address( contractUnderTest), initialDeposit);
    // --- ARRANGE ---
    //Perform any setup steps that are necessary to receive Ether from the contract being tested
    // --- ACT ---
    //Call the method that sends Ether to this contract
//Keep this so the test contract can receive Ether from the contract being tested on the "positive" scenario
receive() external payable {
```

Example: Reentrancy Generated Test

```
import {Bank} from "../../src/Bank.sol";
contract BankTest is Test {
       Bank public contractUnderTest;
       Attacker public _attacker;
    function setUp() public {
        contractUnderTest = new Bank();
        _attacker = new Attacker(address(_contractUnderTest));
    function test_proofReentrancyExploit(uint initialDeposit) public {
       vm.deal(address( attacker), initialDeposit);
       vm.deal(address( contractUnderTest), initialDeposit);
        vm.prank(address(_attacker));
        attacker.setupAttack(initialDeposit);
        attacker.attack();
        assert(address( attacker).balance > initialDeposit);
    function test proofWithdrawUsuallyWorks(uint initialDeposit) public {
       vm.deal(address(this), initialDeposit);
       vm.deal(address( contractUnderTest), initialDeposit);
        contractUnderTest.deposit{value: initialDeposit}();
        contractUnderTest.withdraw();
```

Concrete test contract setup generated by the model

Method usage scenario generated by the model

Example: Reentrancy Attacker Template

```
//Add the preparation steps necessary to perform the attack in this method,
//add_any_narameters_that_are_needed__do_not_use_hardcoded_values.
function setupAttack() public payable{
                                                                Attack setup step, model
    attackCallCount=0;
                                                                must fill additional setup
                                                                           steps
//Call the reentrant method, add any parameters that are needed,
//do not use hardcoded values.
function attack() public{
                                                            Empty attack scenario, must
                                                                be filled by the model
//We only want to call the function once more.
//This is enough to prove Reentrancy exploits without risking running out of gas
receive() external payable {
    if (attackCallCount < 1) {
        attackCallCount++;
                                                              receive() implementation
        //Add a call to the ree<mark>ntrant method here to perfo</mark>
                                                            must facilitate reentrant calls
        //If paramters are needed, set them using state variables before performing the attack.
```

Example: Reentrancy Attacker Generated

```
function setupAttack(uint initialDeposit) public payable {
    attackCallCount = 0;
    _victim.deposit{value: initialDeposit}();
                                                            Attack setup step generated
                                                                   by the model
function attack() public {
    victim.withdraw();-
                                                          Method under test call
                                                          generated by the model
receive() external payable {
    if (attackCallCount < 1) {
        attackCallCount++;
                                                          Method under test reentrant
         victim.withdraw()
                                                          call generated by the model
```

Challenges & Limitations Documented during our Experiments

Challenges	Limitations		
The cost of using LLMs via API	Forge & Kontrol integration		
Receiving a structured output from LLMs	The detection of some defect categories is limited by the scope of our test templates		
Receiving consistent outputs from LLMs			

Conclusion

Key Takeaways

- Novel detection pipeline: static analysis + LLMs + symbolic/concrete execution.
- Our approach effectively validates true positives.
- Eliminates false alarms that plague existing tools.

Future Work

- Extend the set of defect templates for additional defect categories to expand detection range
- Optimize and improve the test generation process
- Experiment with advanced prompting techniques and locally deployed models.

THANK YOU!

QSA