

Thesis Draft: Integration of Hardware and Software in Secure Embedded Systems

Abstract

This thesis explores the integration of hardware and software systems with a focus on secure command execution, verification, and logging in embedded environments. It builds upon the concept of `igniteAuth` — a Python-based secure execution framework — and proposes architectural bridges to interface with embedded C systems. The thesis guides future expansion into real-world IoT security, microcontroller interactions, and battlefield-level digital trust models.

1. Introduction

1.1 Motivation

Security in embedded systems is no longer optional. As microcontrollers become the core of critical infrastructure, there's an urgent need for authenticated, intent-driven control layers that operate above firmware.

1.2 The `igniteAuth` Foundation

The `igniteAuth` system establishes a Python-based gateway that validates admin users, maps commands to intents, and audits each action to a log file. It aims to simulate a command-authorization pipeline that will eventually be mirrored in real embedded environments.

2. Software Control Layer (`igniteAuth`)

2.1 Functional Modules

- **Admin Token System:** Bcrypt-hashed tokens stored in `.env`
- **Intent-Purpose-Command Mapping:** Enforces task specificity
- **Target Node Abstraction:** Simulated with Python function pointers
- **Audit Trail Logging:** Every command with timestamp + result status

2.2 Innovations

- Stateless but secure verification logic
 - Modular architecture for embedding future expansions
 - CLI simulation + potential web-based UI for monitoring
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3. Embedded Layer (C / Microcontroller Logic)

3.1 Role of Embedded Devices

- Execute the validated commands
- Respond to controller (Python) with execution results or status
- Protect integrity of execution pipeline

3.2 Firmware Limitations

- Cannot self-verify integrity without cryptographic attestation
- Must rely on trusted bootloaders or signed firmware

3.3 Node Response Design

- Each node replies to command packets with ACK/NACK
- Responses can include health telemetry or sensor status
- Future enhancement: Remote attestation hashes at boot

4. Bridging Python and C

4.1 Levels of Integration

Level	Bridge Mechanism	Description
1	Serial (UART) / I2C / SPI	Python sends encoded commands to C firmware
2	API or Protocol	Custom command protocol with session token, checksum
3	Shared Libraries (<code>ctypes</code>)	C functions compiled into shared libs and imported in Python
4	MicroPython / CircuitPython	Python runs directly on the MCU with limited C integration

4.2 Sample Packet Structure (for command stream)

```
<COMMAND>: <INTENT>: <SESSION_TOKEN>: <HASH>
```

- Command: `reboot_firmware`
- Intent: `emergency`
- Token: from verified user
- Hash: SHA-256 of all above parts

4.3 Recommended Tools

- `pyserial` (UART)
- `RPi.GPIO` / `gpiozero`

- `protobuf` or `MessagePack` for efficient binary communication
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5. Zones of Innovation (Freedom Points)

To future-proof the system, reserve **hooks** in both software and firmware:

Software Hooks (Python)

```
# === Future Hook: Streamlit dashboard log viewer
def render_log_dashboard():
    pass
```

Firmware Hooks (C)

```
// Hook for telemetry or watchdog ping
void send_node_acknowledgment() {
    // Respond to igniteAuth with OK/ERR
}
```

These zones allow controlled evolution over time without breaking architecture.

6. Trust Models & Verification

6.1 Problem Statement

"How can we trust that the node executed the command even after software verification?"

6.2 Solutions

- Firmware checksums at boot (remote attestation)
 - Token replay protection (nonces / time-based)
 - Hardware watchdog acknowledgment
 - Event telemetry sent back from firmware
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7. Conclusion

This thesis outlines a complete vision for secure, future-ready embedded system control. Starting from a Python CLI system (`igniteAuth`), it lays the roadmap for real-world deployment across embedded C environments. By enforcing layered security, intent-based execution, and traceable logs, the system sets the foundation for battlefield-grade command integrity.

Next stages (v0.3+) will enable live web interfaces, multiple admin management, and hardware-level command confirmations.

References

- OWASP Embedded Security Guide
- NIST Secure Boot Guidelines
- MicroPython Docs
- pyserial Docs
- RFC 4086 (Randomness Requirements for Security)