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	IV	Execu	tion:						
A) <u>General Scheme</u> .	1 .			al Schen	ne.				

- 7) The boat must be equipped with special care with regard to the heavy long term strain to be imposed upon it. Spare parts, machine equipment are to be carried in adequate supply, a cabin on the upper deck is to be set aside as store room.

 Maximum supply of provisions must be provided.
- The boats are to sail in the period from 25th June to 4th July. They are to make for FD 20 at economical cruising speed. The first fuel replenishment will take place here. Supply boat U 462. Enemy air reconnaissance must be expected in this area within a 300 sea mile circumference of Ascension Island.

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
- 9) Progress is to be made on the shortest routes but with adequate distance)about 300 to 400 sea miles from the South African coast outside the enemy short range aircraft area, to KS 50. Here, the second replenishment of supplies is to take place from German merchant ships sailing from Japan. For details of supply and procedure at the supply point see paragraph 16 and 20.
- 10) After replenishment of supplies, boats will proceed to the operational areas allocated to them. Central points MP 60, MF 30, MH 70 and LC 30.
 - Boats must expect to be in their respective operations areas for about one month. Course for operations, change of operations area will be sent by W/T.
- 11) After exhaustion of supplies etc., and on instructions to return, via new supply point in KS or KT. Replenishment from German ship, then return passage to Lorient.
- 12) Measures to be adopted in the event of nonappearance by German Supply Ships.
 - On nonappearance of ship for second replenishment (according to paragraph 9) according to situation:
 - a) Occupation of Cape area as operations area, subsequent return passage with further supply by U-boat tanker or
 - b) Passage to Penang, refuel and short rest, operations in Arabian Sea, refuel on the return passage.
 - (Directions for approach to Penang, see Appendix 3)
- 13) On the nonappearance of the supply ship for 3rd replenishment (see paragraph 11) passage to Penang. Mutual assistance with fuel. There refuel for return passage. Small number of torpedoes available.

Further Plans.

14) Some boats will be allowed to undergo short overhaul and supply (also with torpedoes)

	according to the need of boat and personnel. Further operations in India area subsequent return passage.
B)	Permission to attack and general procedure.
15)	On the outward passage up to 200 sea miles off the supply point in KS 50: Wireless discipline according to Signals Directive Operations Order No. 54. Permissions to attack according to general directive of Operations Order Atlantic No. 54 and Standing War Orders No. 101 and 105. Exploit every chance to the utmost also convoys. In the case of north bound convoys in the Atlantic orders for the breaking off of operations will be given by the Command.
16)	Within a 200 sea miles circumference of the supply area in KS and KT. Wireless and attack ban. Remember that surface craft are considerably more vulnerable than U-boat tankers. Boats are free to attack if the supply ship is in danger or if the latter has been sighted by an enemy merchant ship.
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17) The 100% success of this undertaking can only be assured if the boats attacks are carried out swiftly and unexpectedly at the focal points, in a time limit determined by keyword order.							
In addition, on passage to Operations area in Arabian Sea:							
	(Af	ter replenishment of supplies in KS 50)					
	a)	Until arrival in operations area definitely remain unseen and unlocated.					
	b)	Strict wireless silence.					
		Only transmit if it is confirmed with certainty that the boat is observed and recognized as German by the enemy. Even in this case, the Commander must question whether according to circumstance (the course on which the sighting took place, the certainty of recognition etc) the enemy's reaction can be anticipated in which case the breaking of wireless silence is justified and correct.					
	c)	General ban on attacks on merchant ships and war-ships until keyword is given. Attack is only allowed on:					
		Battleships					
		A/c carriers					
Troop transport ships of more than 15,000 GRT.							
	if a hit is certain						
18)	a)	In operations area: Permission to attack on the <u>key-word order</u> " <u>Hinein</u> " with appropriate number which gives the date of the attack when divided by 7. Start of attack 1800 German					



	a	vailab	ole in adequate supply there, so that if necessary provisioning will have to take place from tankers on the return passage.
V.	Com	<u>munic</u>	rations Instructions:
	See	appen	ndix 2. (T.N. page 541)
VI.	Misc	<u>ellane</u>	<u>ous</u> :
	The	re will	be a doctor on every boat.

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C-in-C German Navy								
bt.Sk1./FL B.Nr. 2078/43gKds								
	Berlin 4.June 1943.							
Enemy Situation in the Indian Ocean								
1.6. 1943.								
I. Distribution of Naval Forces.								
II. Naval and Air Bases.								
III. Surface and Air Patrol.								
IV. Merchant shipping Traffic and shipping routes with chart (Appendix 5).								
V Harbor approaches with charts (Appendix 1 - 4)								

<u>Appendices</u>: 5 charts <u>Special distribution list.</u>

I. Distribution of Naval Forces:

On the grounds of wireless search intelligence since 1942, Japanese reports and unconfirmed agents reports, the following are in the Indian Ocean including the Cape area:

a) English Naval Forces.

O	
6 battleships:	Warspite, Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge, Royal Sovereign, Valiant (one or two of which are presumed to be undergoing repairs (USA?))
1 aircraft carrier:	Illustrious
9 light cruisers (Indian Ocean):	Birmingham, Caradoc, Colombo, Danae, Dauntless, Frobisher, Cambia, Hawkins, Martitius.
5 light cruisers (Cape Area):	Cape Town, Ceres, Durban, Emerald, Newcastle
2nd and 7th Destroyer Flotilla:	about 25 - 30 destroyers
U-boats:	No information
Auxiliary vessels:	2 auxiliary aircraft carriers
	about 10 auxiliary cruisers
	1 aircraft transport ship
	1 aircraft and U-boat depot ship (each)
	at least 24 corvettes, mine sweepers and small units.

b) American Naval Forces:

1 heavy cruiser: Portland

2 light cruisers: Cincinnati, Detroit

Destroyers: At least 7.

c) <u>Indian Navy</u>:

9 gun boats

16 corvettes and minesweepers.

There is no reliable information of the present distribution and activity of the Naval forces.

It is presumed that the heavy units are for the most part based in Ceylon (Trincomali) and that their field of action lies mainly in the areas E. and S. of Ceylon. In the past,

battleships have appeared in the western Indian Ocean among the long range escort of WS convoys. This is still possible today with important transport ships, especially in the transfer of troops, also in India - Red Sea traffic.

Cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels are presumably distributed in the various main bases and operate in patrols and convoy service.

With regard to the proportion of orders issued, it is evident from wireless traffic that the English are in command of the Indian Ocean and that this is not shared by the Americans. Three Command stations are known:

- a) Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet (Vice Admiral Sir J.F. Someryille), under him the S.O. Destroyers Eastern Fleet.
- b) Royal Indian Navy (Vice Admiral J.H. Godfrey)
- c) F.O.I.C. Ceylon (Vice Admiral Sir G. Layton)

II. Naval and Air bases:

a) Naval bases 1st Class.

Durban

Diego Suarez

Trincomali

Naval bases 2nd Class.

Mombassa

Aden

Karachi

Bombay

b) Air bases:

No information of air bases outside the area of naval bases which are also air bases.

III. Surface and air patrol:

a) Surface patrol.

Apart from the presumed activity of naval forces mentioned in paragraph I medium escort activity is to be expected off the main harbors. In the case of harbors with especially swept approach channels (see paragraph V) it must be assumed that there is daily routine minesweeping activity to the extreme end of the entrance channels.

b) Air patrol.

Routine air patrol must be expected up to about 100 sea miles from the coast, in the entire coastal approached to Aden, Persian Gulf to Ceylon.

Formation and strength of air escort in Indian Ocean are not known in detail.

The great USA-India Air Transport line runs from Khartoum via Aden to Salata (Arabia) then to Karachi.

IV. Merchant shipping traffic and shipping routes:

- A) General Traffic situation.
 - 1) Apparent in shipping traffic in the Indian Ocean:
 - a) Troop transport vessels and freighter tonnage engaged in ocean going service in passage between England and U.S.A. at present still Cape area and Indian area. (Stopping in Indian area only in the case of through traffic):

Troop transport vessel tonnage - no information possible.

Freighter tonnage about 700,000 GRT monthly.

b) Freighter and tanker tonnage in Empire service sailing between East African, Near and Middle Eastern ports, likewise India (operating permanently in India area).

Freighter tonnage about 750,000 GRT monthly.

Tanker tonnage about 470,000 GRT monthly.

Troop transport ships appear mainly in convoys from and to the Pacific and Atlantic. They also probably take over troop transport duties within the Indian area and are encountered on the routes Karachi - Bombay - Colombo to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture of the freighter and tanker tonnage set up except in the case of ocean-going service and tanker tonnage in Empire service.

Except for the general statement that the greater part of the freighter tonnage engaged in Empire service operates as Indian coastal traffic, and would, therefore, be most likely encountered off the ports of Karachi, Bombay and Calcutta - lack of confirmation prevents a more detailed survey.

2) Monthly traffic strength in the main passage areas.

(estimate)

To be met with in both directions per month.

(from a favorite point on the former routes)

	Davitas		Englishman		Tauliana	Damarla
	Routes		Freighters		Tankers	Remarks
1)	Cape - Red Sea		Approx.	50	-	
2)	Cape - Persian Gulf		11	30	Approx. 5	Tankers not W. of
3)	Cape - Indian (Karachi, Bombay,		"	15	-	Port Elizabeth
	Colombo, Calcutta)					
4)	Cape - Australia		"	10	-	
5)	Persian Gulf - Red Sea)			Approx. 25	At present via Durban
6)	Persian Gulf - India/Australia)			" 55	
7)	Persian Gulf - Karachi, Bombay,)	about 150		-	
	Ceylon inclusive)	ships on			
8)	Bombay - Red Sea)	Empire		-	
9)	Colombo - Red Sea)	service		-	
10)	Bombay - East Africa)			-	
11)	Colombo - East Africa)			-	

3 Estimated monthly traffic on the main junctions.

The following amount of traffic at the main junctions per month is conjectured according to the traffic strength on individual routes (both ways).

	Area		Freighters		Tankers		Total	Remarks	
4								D 1 11	
1)	Area Cape Guardafui		Approx. 80		Approx. 25		Approx 105	Plus smaller	
	Socotra-S. Coast of Arabia			l				part of Empire	е

2)	Gulf of Aden		" [50	"	25	" 75) service.
3)	Gulf of Oman		" (30	11	80	" 110)
4)	Karachi)			11	10	
5)	Bombay)	larger part of		11	10	
6)	Colombo)	Empire service		11	20	
7)	Calcutta)			11	15	

With the introduction of direct England/USA-Indian area traffic these facts alter in favor of the Red Sea and to the detriment of the Cape traffic. The proportion of the alteration depends on the extent of shipping traffic withdrawn from the Cape route and directed through the Mediterranean. (Maximum about half the amount of Cape traffic).

Direct traffic through the Mediterranean not yet started but must be expected shortly. The process of deflecting traffic into the Mediterranean route will take about 2 to 3 months to complete.

B) Convoy Traffic:

The main part of shipping traffic including that in the Atlantic and Pacific, consists of isolated vessels. Generally speaking only particularly valuable troop and war material convoys sail with convoy protection.

Between Cape Town and Durban (presumably as far as Lourenco Marques) escorted coastal traffic has recently appeared.

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It is impossible to say at present to what extent the tonnage permanently in the Indian area is formed in to convoys in their passage areas.

There is also no useful intelligence of the convoy escorts. In contrast to the escort craft operating in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the small amount of available convoy escort units, which have only lately begun to increase, makes a generally weak escort likely. Radar (although inexperienced) is to be expected. The convoys intercepted and presumably still sailing in the Indian Ocean are set out below according to their passage areas:

Passage area	Identification	Cycle	Average Strength	Remarks
From Atlantic	WS	monthly	at present 15-20 ships (estimated)	From England via Cape Town to Suez - Basrah - India, Passage time England - Cape Town 1 month. Cape Town - Suez/Basrah about 22 days; to Bombay about 19 days.
	I	I	1	WS 30 is expected in Cape Town in about the middle of June.
	AS	monthly	20-25 ships (estimated)	From USA via Cape Town Indian area
				AS 9 last confirmed 1.11.42 New York
S. & E. coast of Africa	CM	approx. monthly	(estimated)	From Cape Town via Durban to Suez also E. India. Passage time about 28 days. Last confirmed
				<u>CM 34</u> 6.11.42. Durban.
				No confirmation of reverse convoy
	CA	confirmation	no confirmation	Cape Town presumably to Aden. <u>CA 1</u> intercepted for first time 5.12.42. Cape Town. No further confirmation
	CD	"	6 ships (estimated)	From Cape Town to Durban. Last time intercepted 23.2.43 Cape Town.
Arabian Sea	BM	about 22 days	no confirmation	From Bombay - Colombo (Madras). Last interception <u>BM 29</u> 6.10.42 Bombay.
	MB	"	"	Colombo (Madras) to Bombay. Last interception MB 19 12.10.42 Madras.
	1	(Prob. as BM)	1	I
				(continued)

Passage	Identification	Cycle	Average	Remarks
area			Strength	
	BP	8-10 days	6-8 ships	From Bombay to Persian Gulf. Last intercepted <u>BP 62</u> 7.12.42. Passage time about 7 days.
	PB	8 days	Probably 6-8 ships	Persian Gulf - Bombay. Last interception <u>PB 9</u> 30.10.42. Bender Abbas.
	BA	11-12 days	no confirmation	Bombay - Aden. Last intercepted 28.7.42. <u>BA</u> 29 Bombay. No confirmation of convoys.
	AP	about 18 days	11	Aden - Persian Gulf. LAst interception 11.11.42 <u>AP 6</u> Aden.
	PA	6-7 days	"	Persian Gulf - Aden. Last intercepted 39.1.43 PA 22 (Bender Abbas).
From Australia	US	Spasmodic	"	Carrying from Sydney and Freemantle to India (Colombo-Bombay Persian Gulf, also Red Sea). Last interception 22.9.42. <u>US 19</u> at sea.
	SU	"	"	India - Australia. Latest confirmation 13.4.42 <u>SU 4</u> in passage.

C) Convoy and isolated traffic shipping routes:

1) Convoy routes.

Convoys to and from Cape Town (WS -, AS -, CM -, CA -, CD - convoys) were formerly directed along the south and southeast coast of Africa and (with the exception of CD convoys) further through Mozambique Channel to the N. and the other way. It seems probable from the interception of an east bound convoy in KP 89 on 23.5.43, that convoys from Durban are also directed on an alternate course E. of Madagascar to the N., and vice versa.

Convoys plying in the Arabian Sea and outward bound from Australia presumably, sail mostly on a direct course between the various ports as long as the monsoon conditions do not cause a diversion of the shipping routes.

After the October/November monsoon change there are no more diversions of shipping routes owing to weather conditions until May/June.

2) <u>Isolated traffic</u>.

The routes for isolated traffic in the southwestern Indian Ocean are mainly dependent on the coaling facilities. Coaling stations are Cape Town, Durban and Lourenco Marques. The isolated traffic to and from the Atlantic runs partly between Cape Town and Lourenco Marques close to the coast, partly to the south, diverting to the S.E. and E. through open sea to the vicinity of the port of call, which is then approached on a westerly or northwesterly course.

Isolated traffic not needing to coal in the ports mentioned (about 25% of the total traffic), withdraw to the S. of the coast of South Africa and for the most part, presumably, now sail S. of about 30° S. as far as E. of Madagascar and from there spread out to the north.

3) Miscellaneous.

According to an unconfirmed agents report of 3.5.43, a regular sailing ship traffic for the supply of wheat to Iraq, to relieve the tonnage now operating, is to be inaugurated between Indian and Basrah.

Isolated traffic from Australia and sailing between ports on the Arabian Sea is presumably at the moment proceeding on the normal merchant shipping routes in as far as weather conditions (see above) or enemy activity makes a diversion unnecessary.

V. <u>Harbor approaches</u>:

The following information on minefree channels in harbor entrances of harbor approaches in the India area has been obtained from captured material (Mostly in the year 1942).

1) Aden: (Appendix 4)

Centerline: from 12^0 44' N 44° 59' E 10 sea miles in the direction of 146^0 to 12^0 35' 45" N 45° 04' 35" E.

Width: 3 sea miles

Buoyage: Unknown.

2) **Bombay**: (Appendix 3)

Centerline: From 18^0 54' 55" N 72^0 51' 56" E 4.5 sea miles in the direction of 209^0 , then 34 sea miles in the direction 258^0 to 18^0 43' 50" N 72^0 14' 48" E.

Width: The outer 24 sea miles of the route is 2 sea miles wide, the inner is 1 sea mile wide.

Buoyage: Unknown.

3) Colombo: (Appendix 4)

Center line: from 6° 53' 30" N 79° 37' E 10.7 sea miles in the direction of 74° to buoy No. S6, then 3.4 sea miles in the direction 52° to buoy No. S8.

Width: 0.8 sea miles.

Buoyage: Buoy S1 13 sea miles in the direction of 254^o from S.W. breakwater head. Further buoys from outside to inside:

Buoy S2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 1.7, 3.5, 5.0, 6.8, 9.5 sea miles from buoy S1.

Buoy S7 and S8 are 1.8 and 3.4 sea miles from buoy S6. (Contraband) control steamer at buoy S8.

Miscellaneous:

Addition I:

Ships may only proceed as far as buoy S7 without pilots or signaled instructions; S7 lies 274^o 1.95 sea miles from red light on the S.W. breakwater.

Addition II:

Presumed approach points:

"N" in 070 05' N 790 36' 00" E

"W" in 060 52' N 790 30' 40" E

"S" in 06° 45' N 79° 38' 00" E

Addition III:

Anchorage forbidden outside Colombo harbor in the area: from Clocktown as far as Drunken Sailor buoy, further 350° distance 15 cables, 10° distance 7 cables, 60° as far as the coast.

Addition IV:

Presumed Control ship anchorage:

Northern limit: 07º 03' 00" N Southern limit: 06º 55' 00" N

Eastern limit: 79° 39' 00" E

Western limit: 79° 29′ 45″ E

4) <u>Kamaran Bay</u> (Southern part of the Red Sea): (Appendix I)

Center line: from $15^0\ 15'\ 00"\ N\ 42^0\ 35'\ 37"\ E\ 3.05$ sea miles in the direction $225^0\ 17$ sea miles in the direction $243\ 1/2^0$ to $15^0\ 05'\ 20"\ N\ 42^0\ 18'\ 00"\ E$.

Width: 2 sea miles.

Buoyage: Unknown.

5)	Karachi: (Appendix 2)
	Center line: From 24 $^{\rm o}$ 46 $^{\rm '}$ 45" N 66 $^{\rm o}$ 59' 00" E 24 sea miles in direction 213 $^{\rm o}$ to 24 $^{\rm o}$ 26 1/4' N 66 $^{\rm o}$ 44. 5' E
	Width: 2 sea miles
	Buoyage: unknown.
6)	Kilindini: (Mombassa, East Africa): (Appendix 3)
	Center line: from 4^0 07' 15" S 39^0 46' 01" E 5.4 sea miles in direction 301^0 to 4^0 04' 24" S 39^0 41' 30" E 2 routes from here:
	1) to Mombasa 0.75 sea miles in direction 346° to 4° 03′ 36″ S 39° 41′ 20″ E
	2) to Kilindini 0.7 sea miles in direction 237° to 4° 04′ 50″ S 39° 40′ 53″ E.
	Width: Outer 3 sea miles, 1 sea mile
	Inner Section 0.3 sea mile
	Buoyage: unknown.
7)	Port Louis, Mauritius: (Appendix 3)
	Center line: from 20 $^{\circ}$ 08' 25" S 57 $^{\circ}$ 28' 30" E 1 1/4 sea miles in direction 303 1/2 $^{\circ}$ to 20 $^{\circ}$ 06' 53" S 57 $^{\circ}$ 27' 25" E
	Width: 0.4 sea miles
	Buoyage: unknown.
8)	Port Victoria (Seychellen (Appendix 2)
	Center line: from 4° 35′ 30″ S 55° 29′ 00″ E then 2 sea miles in direction 37°, from there:
	1) 6 sea miles in direction 37 ⁰
	5 miles in direction 349 ⁰
	41 sea miles in direction 60
	to 3 ^o 43 3/4' S 55 ^o 37' 00" E
	2) 6 sea miles in direction 126 ^o
	8 sea miles in direction 170 ^o
	30 sea miles in direction 217 ⁰
	to 5º 09' 00" S 55º 18' 00" E.
	Width: 1 sea mile


Buoyage: unknown.
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9)	Shatt el Arab: (Appendix 4)
	Center line: from 29° 51' 30" N 48° 46' E 3 sea miles in direction 157° then 5 1/2 sea miles in direction 180°, then 19 1/2 sea miles in direction 148° to 29° 26' N 48° 59' E
	Width: unknown
	Buoyage: unknown.
10)	Trinicomali: (Appendix 4)
	Center line: from center between Little Sober Island and Ostenburg Point 1.5 sea miles in the direction 157°.
	Width: 0.3 seamiles
	Buoyage: unknown.

			Appendix 2 to Operations Order "Monsoon"	
			_	
V.		<u>Communications Instructions</u> :		
			reless traffic to be cleared in accordance with Standing War Orders - Communications (yulations (N.B. U-boats).	
		Wireless discipline see paragraph 15 - 17 of this operational order.		
	22)	22) A special U-boat (wave-length) system "India", is to be inaugurated for communication between home (stations) and units operating in the Indian Ocean.		
	The order for this, included in the appendix is drafted as a Standing Operational Order B.d.U. (Comm. Regs.). When this system is put into force, the draft is to be inserted in the Communications Regulations for U-boats as a Standing War Order. The number will be given. If alterations are necessary boats will be informed by W/T.			
	23) There is as yet little experience of wireless traffic for the operations area. The cooperation of the boats, therefore, is expected.			
		a)	Exploitation of every chance of reliable interception.	
			The use of a special very long wave high-power transmitter is probable.	
			The operating of special short wave program times is proposed.	
		b)	Most extensive use of Wireless system "B" (Standing War Order 206 App. 2) and alternative frequencies for the sending of news.	
			As far as can be seen, wireless system "B" is particularly suitable for the operational area, especially if home reception is bad on the ordered system.	
		c)	Wireless relay service and the exploitation of possibilities of U-boats group system (Standing War Order 207), is to be particularly observed especially in combined operations. Always attempt to contact the Command on the home wave lengths.	
		d)	Experience of reception conditions in the operations area are of special importance to the control station for the clearing of wireless services. Observations on this point are therefore to be added to other messages. Improvement is only possible in this way.	
			The keeping of a S/S list for all short and very long waves observed (also on outward and	

	return passage) is very important especially in the operations area as the later evaluation be scientific departments is of great value in the improvement of all U-boat wave bands.	y
24	Cypher and recognition signal tables and line indicators for the frequency tables for maximum period, also excepts from the frequency tables A - D January 1942 issue are to be taken.	
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25)	Direct	nange of recognition signals outside Europe, area according to Recognition Signal ive paragraph 110, also except from Recognition Signal Directions Overseas edition ling Operational Order 222) suitable for call sign exchange with the tanker "Brake".
	(See a	llso paragraph 20 of this Operational Order)
		arrying out of call sign exchange with Japanese Naval Forces or aircraft likewise on aching Penang will be ordered by W/T.
26)		operating in shallow water, preparations must be made for the destruction of cypher ial, place red printed matter so that the water can reach it. (See Standing War Order 231 n B)



		Appendix to Communications Instructions			
			Operations Order "Monsoon"		
	<u>Draft</u>				
	Standing War Order B. d. U. No				
	- Communications Directions -				
	<u>U-boat Wireless system India</u> .				
I.		<u>eneral</u> :			
	1.	<u>Pur</u>	<u>pose</u> :		
			Indian wireless system is intended for wireless traffic between the Command and U-boat rating in the Indian Ocean.		
	2.	Beginning and termination of the system:			
		This will be ordered by the Command in a wireless message. (In exceptional circumstances by a sailing or operational order.)			
	3.	Set-up of the system:			
		a)	The Indian system consists of 2 short waves and one very long wave. The same messages with the same serial number will be sent on both short and very long wave.		
		b)	The two parallel short waves will ensure favorable reception and transmission conditions for boats in all areas covered by this system.		
		c)	According to Order 200 paragraph 15, a special short wave transmission can be operated at program times as supplement to the very long wave program times. Boats operating on the		

			Indian system may only use this short wave for the transmission of reports by special permission.
			The Indian system short waves occasionally available may be used as a transmission frequency by all boats at sea.
II.	Way	ves a	and Traffic times.
	4.	Sho	<u>rtwaves</u> :
		a)	<u>India A</u>
			Control
			Checking reception
			from to wave = K/cs
			from to wave = K/cs
			from to wave = K/cs
			from to wave = K/cs
			from to wave = K/cs
			from to wave = K/cs
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