Economic Inequality and Campaign Participation Online Appendices

Michael Ritter Frederick Solt michael-ritter@uiowa.edu frederick-solt@uiowa.edu

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A Measures and Data Sources

Individual Characteristics

| Make Donation | Dummy variable coded one if respondent made a political dona- |
|----------------------|--|
| | tion in the past year. Source: 2012 Cooperative Congressional |
| | Election Study (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2015). |
| Attend Meetings | Dummy variable coded one if respondent attended a political |
| | meeting in the past year. Source: 2012 CCES. |
| Work for Campaign | Dummy variable coded one if respondent did volunteer work for a political campaign in the past year. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Income Quintile | Quintile within state of respondent's household income. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Age | Respondent's age in years. Source: 2012 CCES. |
| Education | Respondent's education on six-point scale: 1. less than high school diploma, 2. high school graduate, 3. some college, 4. 2-year college degree, 5. 4-year college degree, 6. post-graduate degree. Source: 2012 CCES. |
| Homeowner | Dummy variable coded one if respondent owned home, zero otherwise. $Source: 2012 \text{ CCES}.$ |
| Republican | Dummy variable coded one if respondent was Republican, zero otherwise. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Democrat | Dummy variable coded one if respondent was Democrat, zero otherwise. $Source$: 2012 CCES. |
| African American | Dummy variable coded one if respondent was African American, zero otherwise. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Latino | Dummy variable coded one if respondent was latino, zero otherwise. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Male | Dummy variable coded one if respondent was male, zero otherwise. $Source:\ 2012\ CCES.$ |
| Married | Dummy variable coded one if respondent was married, zero otherwise. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Length of Residence | Respondent's length of residence at current home on a four-point scale: 0. less than one year, 1. one to two years, 2. three to four years, 3. five or more years. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Religious Attendance | Respondent's attendance at religious services on six-point scale: 1. never, 2. seldom, 3. few times a year, 4. once or twice a month, 5. once a week, 6. more than once a week. <i>Source</i> : 2012 CCES. |
| Union Member | Dummy coded one if respondent was a union member, zero otherwise. $Source: 2012$ CCES. |

Contextual Characteristics

| Income Inequality | Gini coefficient of household income as measured in |
|-------------------------|--|
| | the 2011 American Community Survey. Source: Noss |
| | (2012). |
| GDP/Capita | 2011 state gross domestic product per capita, thousands |
| | of 2009 dollars. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, |
| | Bureau of Economic Analysis. |
| Ethnic Diversity | Probability that two randomly selected state residents |
| | belong to different racial or ethnic groups, calculated |
| | from standardized data from the U.S. Census. <i>Source</i> : |
| | U.S. Census Bureau. |
| Ballot Initiatives | Number of initiatives appearing on the state |
| | ballot. Source: Initiative & Referendum In- |
| | stitute, University of Southern California, |
| | http://www.iandrinstitute.org. |
| Gubernatorial Race | Dummy variable coded one if there was a simultaneous |
| | gubernatorial election, zero otherwise. |
| Senatorial Race | Dummy variable coded one if there was a simultaneous |
| | U.S. Senate election, zero otherwise. |
| Margin, Statewide Races | Percentage of votes cast for winner minus percentage for |
| | second-place candidate in state's closest statewide race |
| | (governatorial, senatorial, or presidential). |


B Aggregate Residential Mobility as a Contextual Control

Our analysis incorporates an individual-level control for length of residence to account for the observation that those who have only recently moved in are likely to be less well-rooted to their communities and therefore less likely to participate in politics. But, as Putnam (2000, 204) wrote, just as recent movers "have weaker community ties, so too are communities with higher rates of residential turnover less well integrated." Then everyone living in states that have higher proportions of new arrivals could be expected to be less likely to participate in campaigns. If this is true, and the proportion of new arrivals is positively related to income inequality, this variable could be a source of omitted variable bias that would lead to the overestimation of the negative coefficients for income inequality on campaign participation in our analyses.

Data on residential mobility from the 2012 American Community Survey, however, indicate that states' income inequality and the percentage of residents who moved in within the past year are highly negatively correlated (R = -.60): states with lower levels of inequality had a larger proportion of new arrivals. (Data from the 2011 ACS, or on the percentage of residents who had moved either into or within the state, yield the same conclusions in this regard and in the analyses presented below.) The lower propensity to participate in campaigns of those living in states with higher inequality found in the main text is unlikely to be an artifact caused by those states' larger proportion of newcomers simply because those states actually have smaller proportions of newcomers.


Despite its unexpected sign, the high magnitude of the correlation between states' level of income inequality and their proportion of recent arrivals raises the potential for problems with multicollinearity. Figure A1 reproduces Figure 1 of the main text. For all three forms of campaign participation, the estimated coefficient for the proportion of newcomers to a state is, contrary to theory, positive. The estimated coefficients for income inequality are smaller than in Figure 1, and those for working for a campaign are no longer statistically significant at any income quintile. This suggests that, in these models, the estimates for the proportion of new arrivals is not tapping any ways in which residential turnover weakens communities but rather, due to multicollinearity, simply a portion of the differences in campaign participation explained by income inequality. For these reasons, we exclude agregate residential mobility from the analyses presented in the main text.

Figure A1: Effects of Income Inequality on Campaign Participation, Controlling for Residential Mobility



Note: The dots represent estimated change in the logged odds of the dependent variable occurring for a change of two standard deviations in the independent variable; the whiskers represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates.

Figure A2: Estimated Coefficients of Income Inequality by Income Quintile, Controlling for Residential Mobility



Source: Analyses presented in Figure A1. The dots represent estimated change in the logged odds of the dependent variable occurring for a change of two standard deviations in the income inequality; the whiskers represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates.

References

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Brian Schaffner. 2015. "CCES Common Content, 2012." Version 8.0, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/21447.
- Noss, Amanda. 2012. Household Income for States: 2010 and 2011. Washington: U.S. Census Bureau.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.