

# FRAUKE STEHR

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RESEARCH INTERESTS      Primary:      Experimental Economics, Applied Microeconomic Theory  
Secondary:      Behavioral Economics, (Behavioral) Industrial Organization

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REFERENCES

<a href="#">Christian Seel</a> Maastricht University <a href="mailto:c.seel@maastrichtuniversity.nl">c.seel@maastrichtuniversity.nl</a>	<a href="#">Peter Werner</a> Maastricht University <a href="mailto:p.werner@maastrichtuniversity.nl">p.werner@maastrichtuniversity.nl</a>
<a href="#">Roberto Weber</a> University of Zürich <a href="mailto:roberto.weber@econ.uzh.ch">roberto.weber@econ.uzh.ch</a>	

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EDUCATION	Maastricht University, Ph.D. in Economics	2018 - 2023 ( <i>expected</i> )
	University of Copenhagen, M.Sc. in Economics	2015 - 2017
	University of Mannheim, B.Sc. in Economics	2012 - 2015

ACADEMIC VISITS	University of Zürich; Host: Roberto Weber	09 - 10/2022
	WZB Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin	04 - 08/2022
	briq Institute Bonn; Host: Florian Zimmermann (virtual)	04 - 06/2021

WORKING PAPERS      **["Dodging High Impact Behaviors with Motivated Beliefs?"](#)**  
***Job Market Paper***

Although other-regarding behavior is widespread, high-impact behaviors are rarely adopted. This leaves a large potential for social benefit untapped. Using an online experiment, I test the explanatory role of impact beliefs focusing on two potential cognitive mechanisms. First, I propose that motivated impact beliefs may serve as a justification to only adopt low impact behaviors. In particular, I hypothesize that people overestimate impact of low cost behaviors, while they underestimate the impact of high cost behaviors. Second, I hypothesize that people only vaguely think about impact, and rather rationalize their choices ex post. I find that subjects on average slightly overestimate low impacts and underestimate high impacts, in line with a self-serving interpretation. Still, beliefs are robust to changes in incentives. Neither higher incentives for accuracy, nor changes in prices of impactful behavior affect beliefs. Reducing scope for ex post rationalization does not affect beliefs either. It does, however, make it more likely that subjects maximize impact. Taken together this suggests that besides motivated beliefs, complexity of integrating impact and cost information may play a role in the low adoption levels of high impact behaviors.

## "Making Up for Harming Others – An Experiment on Voluntary Compensation Behavior" *with Peter Werner*

We investigate in a controlled laboratory setting if and to what extent buyers are willing to offset negative real-world externalities that their purchasing decisions create. In one set of treatments, the externality associated with a purchase is irreversible, whereas in another set of treatments, buyers are offered the possibility to voluntarily compensate for the externality. The other set of treatment variations refers to the matching of buyers and third parties, inducing diffusion of harm among third parties or diffusion of responsibility among buyers. We find that subjects are on average willing to compensate for the externalities they create, and that compensation decisions are sensitive to the surplus from buying. Yet, experimental buyers are highly heterogeneous, and some of them never compensate. Overall, while the introduction of voluntary compensation significantly reduces the harm created by consumption, the net externality still remains high across all treatments. In particular, diffused responsibility among buyers reduces the amounts paid for compensation and leads to larger overall net externalities compared to the case without diffusion. At the same time, diffusion of the harm among third parties does not significantly change compensation choices and externalities.

### WORK IN PROGRESS

"Hotelling Revisited – The Price-then-location Model"  
*with Markus Reisinger and Christian Seel*

This paper analyzes a two-stage game in which two firms first choose prices and then locations on the Hotelling line. Each consumer picks their supplier depending on the price difference and distance to their location. We derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium for moderate differences in production cost. At equilibrium, firms choose pure strategies at the price stage and mix in terms of location, with the more efficient firm locating closer to the middle of the Hotelling line. For identical production cost, any subgame perfect equilibrium involves mixing on the price stage.

### RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Lab assistant, University of Copenhagen  
*for Steffen Altmann, Marco Piovesan, Alexander Sebal* 2015 - 2017

Lab and research assistant, University of Mannheim  
*for Andrej Svorencik* 2014 - 2015

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

International Competition Policy, Maastricht University	2020-2021
Economic Psychology, Maastricht University	2018-2021
Microeconomics II, Maastricht University	2018-2021
Microeconomics III, University of Copenhagen	2016

### PRESENTATIONS

2022	Berlin BBE Colloquium; ESA Bologna; Zürich
2021	1st Lyon-Maastricht Behavioural Workshop; Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Bologna; ESA Global Online Around-the-Clock Meetings; Jahrestagung Verein für Socialpolitik
2020	Münster

*(Not listed: multiple presentations in Maastricht every year.)*

SUMMER SCHOOLS	briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics (online) Organizer: Armin Falk	2021
	Platform Economics, University of East Anglia (online) Organizer/Lecturer: Kai-Uwe Kühn	2020
	Experiments, University of East Anglia (online) Organizer/Lecturer: Peter Moffatt	2020
	Belief-Dependent Preferences, University of Copenhagen Organizer: Alexander Sebold	2019
	Field Experiments, University of Copenhagen Organizer: Toke Fosgaard	2018
WORKSHOPS (no presentation)	Recent Advances in the Economics of Philanthropy (online, 2022) briq Workshop Beliefs (Bonn, 2021) ECONtribute Workshop Social Image and Moral Behavior (online, 2021) Behavioral Game Theory (East Anglia, 2020) Behavioral Economics and Environmental Decision Making (Groningen, 2020) Belief-Dependent Preferences (Copenhagen, 2019) Passive Choices (Copenhagen, 2016)	
GRANTS	Primary Data Collection Grant (\$4000), GSBE, Maastricht University	
ACADEMIC SERVICE	Member of Selection Committee for Head of Economics Department, Maastricht Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Reading Group, Organizer	
REFEREEING	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance	
INTERNSHIPS	ConPolicy, Institute for Consumer Policy, Berlin Bundeskartellamt (Federal Competition Authority), Bonn Copenhagen Economics, Market Division, Copenhagen	04 - 07/2018 01 - 04/2018 09 - 12/2017
PROGRAMMING	oTree (Python, javascript, html, CSS), R, STATA, Mathematica, L <sup>A</sup> T <sub>E</sub> X, Markdown	
LANGUAGES	German (native), English (fluent), Danish (fluent), Dutch (fluent), French (intermediate)	
CITIZENSHIP	German	

September 2022