FRAUKE STEHR

04 - 06/2021

RESEARCH INTERESTS	·	Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, (E		v
References	Christian Seel Maastricht Uni c.seel@maastric Roberto Weber University of Z roberto.weber@	chtuniversity.nl r Zürich	Peter Werner Maastricht Universi p.werner@maastrich	·
Education	Ph.D. Economics, Maastricht University Member of the Behavioral Insights Center M.Sc. Economics, University of Copenhagen B.Sc. Economics, University of Mannheim			2018 - 2023 2015 - 2017 2012 - 2015
Academic Visits	University of Zürich; Host: Roberto Weber WZB Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin		09 - 10/2022 04 - 08/2022	

Working Papers

"Dodging High Impact Behaviors with Motivated Beliefs?" Job Market Paper

briq Institute Bonn; Host: Florian Zimmermann (virtual)

Although other-regarding behavior is widespread, high-impact behaviors are rarely adopted. This leaves a large potential for social benefit untapped. Using an online experiment, I test the explanatory role of impact beliefs focusing on two potential cognitive mechanisms. First, I propose that motivated impact beliefs may serve as a justification to only adopt low impact behaviors. In particular, I hypothesize that people overestimate impact of low cost behaviors, while they underestimate the impact of high cost behaviors. Second, I hypothesize that people only vaguely think about impact, and rather rationalize their choices ex post. I find that subjects on average slightly overestimate low impacts and underestimate high impacts, in line with a self-serving interpretation. Still, beliefs are robust to changes in incentives. Neither higher incentives for accuracy, nor changes in prices of impactful behavior affect beliefs. Reducing scope for ex post rationalization does not affect beliefs either. It does, however, make it more likely that subjects maximize impact. Taken together this suggests that besides motivated beliefs, complexity of integrating impact and cost information may play a role in the low adoption levels of high impact behaviors.

"Making Up for Harming Others – An Experiment on Voluntary Compensation Behavior" with Peter Werner

We investigate in a controlled laboratory setting if and to what extent buyers are willing to offset negative real-world externalities that their purchasing decisions create. In one set of treatments, the externality associated with a purchase is irreversible, whereas in another set of treatments, buyers are offered the possibility to voluntarily compensate for the externality. other set of treatment variations refers to the matching of buyers and third parties, inducing diffusion of harm among third parties or diffusion of responsibility among buyers. We find that subjects are on average willing to compensate for the externalities they create, and that compensation decisions are sensitive to the surplus from buying. Yet, experimental buyers are highly heterogeneous, and some of them never compensate. Overall, while the introduction of voluntary compensation significantly reduces the harm created by consumption, the net externality still remains high across all treatments. In particular, diffused responsibility among buyers reduces the amounts paid for compensation and leads to larger overall net externalities compared to the case without diffusion. At the same time, diffusion of the harm among third parties does not significantly change compensation choices and externalities.

Work in Progress

"Hotelling Revisited – The Price-then-location Model" with Markus Reisinger and Christian Seel

This paper analyzes a two-stage game in which two firms first choose prices and then locations on the Hotelling line. Each consumer picks their supplier depending on the price difference and distance to their location. We derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium for moderate differences in production cost. At equilibrium, firms choose pure strategies at the price stage and mix in terms of location, with the more efficient firm locating closer to the middle of the Hotelling line. For identical production cost, any subgame perfect equilibrium involves mixing on the price stage.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE	Lab assistant, University of Copenhagen for Steffen Altmann, Marco Piovesan, Alexander Sebald	2015 - 2017
	Lab and research assistant, University of Mannheim $for\ Andrej\ Svorencik$	2014 - 2015
TEACHING	International Competition Policy, Maastricht University	2020-2021
Experience	Economic Psychology, Maastricht University	2018-2021
	Microeconomics II, Maastricht University	2018-2021
	Microeconomics III, University of Copenhagen	2016

Presentations	2022	Berlin BBE Colloquium; ESA Bologna; Zürich
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2021 1st Lyon-Maastricht Behavioural Workshop; Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Bologna; ESA Global Online Around-the-Clock Meetings; Jahrestagung Verein für Socialpolitik

2020 Münster

(Not listed: multiple presentations in Maastricht every year.)

SUMMER SCHOOLS	briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics (online) Organizer: Armin Falk	2021		
	Platform Economics, University of East Anglia (online) Organizer/Lecturer: Kai-Uwe Kühn	2020		
	Experimetrics, University of East Anglia (online) Organizer/Lecturer: Peter Moffatt	2020		
	Belief-Dependent Preferences, University of Copenhagen Organizer: Alexander Sebald	2019		
	Field Experiments, University of Copenhagen Organizer: Toke Fosgaard	2018		
Workshops (no presentation)	Recent Advances in the Economics of Philanthropy (online, 2022) briq Workshop Beliefs (Bonn, 2021) ECONtribute Workshop Social Image and Moral Behavior (online, 2021) Behavioral Game Theory (East Anglia, 2020) Behavioral Economics and Environmental Decision Making (Groningen, 2020) Belief-Dependent Preferences (Copenhagen, 2019) Passive Choices (Copenhagen, 2016)			
Grants	Primary data collection grant (\$4000), GSBE, Maastricht University			
ACADEMIC SERVICE	Member of selection committee for head of economics department, Maastricht Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Reading Group, Organizer			
Refereeing	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance			
Internships	ConPolicy, Institute for Consumer Policy, Berlin Bundeskartellamt (Federal Competition Authority), Bonn Copenhagen Economics, Market Division, Copenhagen 04 - 07/20 01 - 04/20 09 - 12/20	018		
Programming	o Tree (Python, javascript, html, CSS), R, STATA, Mathematica, L ATEX, Markdown			
Languages	German (native), English (fluent), Danish (fluent), Dutch (fluent), French (intermediate)			
CITIZENSHIP	German			

September 2022