Chapter 11

Inference Control

Privacy is a transient notion. It started when people stopped believing that God could see everything and stopped when governments realised there was a vacancy to be ﬁlled.

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“Anonymized data” is one of those holy grails, like “healthy ice-cream” or “selectively breakable crypto”

* CORY DOCTOROW

# Introduction

Just as Big Tobacco spent decades denying that smoking causes lung cancer, and Big Oil spent decades denying climate change, so also Big Data has spent decades pretending that sensitive personal data can easily be ‘anonymised’ so it can be used as an industrial raw material without infringing on the privacy rights of the data subjects.

Anonymisation is an aspirational term that means stripping identifying in- formation from data in such a way that useful statistical research can be done without leaking information about identiﬁable data subjects. Its limitations have been explored in four waves of research, each responding to the technology of the day. The ﬁrst wave came in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the context of the US census, which contained statistics that were sensitive of themselves but where aggregate totals were required for legitimate reasons such as allocating money to states; and in the context of other structured databases from college marks through sta↵ salaries to bank transactions. Statisticians started to study how information could leak, and to develop measures for inference control.

The second wave came in the 1990s as medical records were computerised. Both health service administrators and medical researchers saw this as a treasure trove, and hoped that removing patients’ names and addresses would be enough to make the data non-personal. This turned out to be insuﬃcient because of the richness of the data, which led to tussles in several countries including the

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US, the UK, Germany and Iceland. There have since been multiple scandals when inadequately anonymised data were leaked or even sold.

The third wave, in the mid-2000s, came when people realised they could use search engines to identify people in large datasets of consumer preferences such as movie ratings and search engine logs. An advance in theory came in 2006, when Cynthia Dwork and colleagues developed the theory of *di*↵*erential privacy*, which quantiﬁes the extent to which inferences can be prevented by limiting queries and adding noise, enabling us to add noise where it’s needed. This is now being used in the US census, whose experience teaches a lot about its practical limits.

The fourth wave came upon us in the late 2010s with social media, pervasive genomics and large databases of personal location histories collected by phone apps and widely sold to marketers. Ever more companies who sell personal information at scale pretend that it isn’t personal because names are somehow tokenised. Ever more press articles show how bogus such claims usually are. For example, in December 2019 the New York Times reported analysing the mobile-phone location history of 12 million Americans over a few months, lo- cating celebrities, rioters, police, Secret Service oﬃcers and even sex-industry customers without diﬃculty [1885].

We face a yawning gap between what can be done using anonymisation and related privacy technologies, and what stakeholders from medical researchers through marketers to politicians would like to believe is possible. This gap has been the subject of much discussion and, as with tobacco and carbon emissions, political argument. As our knowledge of the re-identiﬁcation risks becomes ever more detailed and certain, so the hopes of both governments and industry be- come ever more unrealistic. Governments repeatedly call for proposals, and data users call for contractors, to create services that cannot be created; all too of- ten, contracts for privacy services are won by the more ignorant or unscrupulous operators.

It must be said that not all governments have simply been ignorant. Both the UK and Ireland, for example, annoyed other EU member states for years by allowing ﬁrms to pretend that data were anonymous when they clearly weren’t, and this was one of the factors that led the EU to pass the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as I will discuss later in section 26.6.1. Since it came into force, the wriggle room for wishful thinking has become less – though even the European institutions have sometimes had a rosy view of what can be achieved by de-identiﬁcation.

# The early history of inference control

Inference control goes back to the 1920s when economic data were compiled in ways that masked the contribution of individual ﬁrms, but it was ﬁrst studied systematically in the context of census data. A census collects a lot of sensitive information about individuals, including names, addresses, family relationships, race, employment, educational attainment and income, and then makes statisti- cal summaries available by geographical and governmental units such as states,

counties, districts and wards. This information is used to determine electoral districts, to set levels of government funding for public services, and as inputs to all sorts of other policy decisions. Census data are a good simple case with which to start as the data are in a standard format, and the allowable queries are generally known in advance.

There are two broad approaches, depending on whether the data are sanitised once and for all before publication, or whether the privacy mechanisms operate one query at a time and work out whether it’s allowable. Mathematically, the two types of processing are the same. For data of a particular type subject to given privacy constraints, only a certain number of queries will be allowable; the question is whether you determine these in advance, or dynamically in response to user demand.

An example of the ﬁrst type comes from the US census data up till the 1960s. One record in a thousand was made available on tape – minus names, exact addresses and other sensitive data. There was also noise added to the data in order to prevent people with some extra knowledge (such as of the salaries paid by the employer in a company town) from tracing individuals. In addition to the sample records, local averages were also given for various attributes. But records with extreme values – such as very high incomes – were suppressed. Without such suppression, a wealthy family living in a small village might increase the average village income by enough for their own family income to be deduced.

In the second type of processing, identiﬁable data are stored in a database, and privacy protection comes from restricting the queries that may be made. For example, a simple rule might be that you answer no question unless the result is computed using the data of three or more data subjects – the so-called *rule of three*. Early attempts at this were not very successful, as people kept on coming up with new attacks based on inference. A typical attack would construct a number of queries about samples containing a target individual, and work back to infer some conﬁdential fact. You might for example ask ‘tell me the number of two-person households earning between $50,000 and $55,000’, ‘tell me the proportion of households headed by a man aged 40–45 years earning between

$50,000 and $55,000’, ‘tell me the proportion of households headed by a man earning between $50,000 and $55,000 whose children have grown up and left home’, and so on, until you home in on the target individual. Queries to which we successively add context to defeat query controls are known as *trackers*.

Related problems arise in many contexts. For example, a New Zealand journalist deduced the identities of many oﬃcers in that country’s signals intel- ligence service, GCSB, by scrutinising lists of military and diplomatic personnel for patterns of postings over time [849]. Combining low-level sources to draw a high-level conclusion is known as an *aggregation attack* in the national security context.

## The basic theory of inference control

The basic theory of inference control was developed by Dorothy Denning and others in late 1970s and early 1980s, largely in response to problems of the US census [538]. This wave of research is summarised in a 1989 survey paper by

Adam and Wortman [17]. The developers of many modern privacy systems are often unaware of this work, and repeat many of the mistakes of the 1960s. The following is an overview of the basic ideas.

A *characteristic formula* is the expression (in some database query language) that selects a *query set* of records. An example might be ‘all female employees of the Computer Laboratory at the grade of professor’. The smallest query sets, obtained by the logical AND of all the attributes (or their negations) are known as *elementary sets* or *cells*. The statistics corresponding to query sets may be *sensitive statistics* if the set size is too small. The objective of inference control is to prevent the disclosure of sensitive statistics.

If we let *D* be the set of statistics that are disclosed and *P* the set that are sensitive and must be protected, then we need *D* ✓ *P* 0 for privacy, where *P* 0 is the complement of *P* . If *D* = *P* 0, then the protection is said to be *precise*. Protection that is not precise will usually carry some cost in terms of the range of queries that the database can answer and may therefore degrade its usefulness.

* + - 1. Query set size control

The simplest protection mechanism is to specify a minimum query set size, so that no question is answered if the number of records from which the answer is calculated is less than some threshold *t*. But this is not enough. Say *t* = 6; then an obvious tracker attack is to make an enquiry on six patients’ records, and then on those records plus the target’s. And you must also prevent the attacker from querying all but one of the records: if there are *N* records and a query set size threshold of *t*, then between *t* and *N* − *t* records must be the subject of a query for it to be allowed. This also applies to subsets. For example, when I wrote the ﬁrst edition of this book, only one of the full professors in our lab was female. So we could have found out her salary with just two queries: ‘Average salary professors?’ and ‘Average salary male professors?’. So you have to avoid successive queries of record sets *K* and *L* if *K* ⇢ *L* and |*L*| − |*K*| *< t*.

* + - 1. Trackers

That is an example of an *individual tracker*, a custom formula that allows us to calculate the answer to a forbidden query indirectly. There are also *general trackers* – sets of formulae that will enable any sensitive statistic to be revealed. A somewhat depressing discovery made in the late 1970s, due to Dorothy Den- ning, Peter Denning and Mayer Schwartz, was that general trackers are usually easy to ﬁnd. Provided the minimum query set size *n* is less than a quarter of the total number of statistics *N* , and there are no further restrictions on the type of queries that are allowed, then we can ﬁnd formulae that provide general trackers [541]. So tracker attacks are easy, unless we restrict the query set size or control the allowed queries in some other way. Such *query auditing* turns out to be an NP-complete problem.

* + - 1. Cell suppression

The next question is how to deal with the side-e↵ects of suppressing sensitive statistics. The UK rules for the 2010 census, for example, required that it be ‘unlikely that any statistical unit, having identiﬁed themselves, could use that knowledge, by deduction, to identify other statistical units in National Statistics outputs’ [1416]. To take a simple concrete example, suppose that a university wants to release average marks for various combinations of courses, so that people can check that the marking is fair across courses. Suppose now that the table in Figure 11.1 contains the number of students studying two science subjects, one as their major subject and one as their minor subject.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Major: | Biology | Physics | Chemistry | Geology |
| Minor: |  |  |  |  |
| Biology | - | 16 | 17 | 11 |
| Physics | 7 | - | 32 | 18 |
| Chemistry | 33 | 41 | - | 2 |
| Geology | 9 | 13 | 6 | - |

Figure 11.1: Table containing data before cell suppression

The UK census rules imply a minimum query set size of 3, which makes sense here too: if we set it at 2, then either of the two students who studied ‘geology-with-chemistry’ could work out the other’s mark. So we cannot release the average for ‘geology-with-chemistry’. But if the average mark for chemistry is known, then it could be reconstructed from the averages for ‘biology-with- chemistry’ and ‘physics-with-chemistry’. So we have to suppress at least one other mark in the chemistry row, and for similar reasons we need to suppress one in the geology column. But if we suppress ‘geology-with-biology’ and ‘physics- with-chemistry’, then we’d also better suppress ‘physics-with-biology’ to prevent these values being worked out in turn. Our table will now look like Figure 11.2, where ‘D’ means ‘value suppressed for disclosure purposes’.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Major: | Biology | Physics | Chemistry | Geology |
| Minor: |  |  |  |  |
| Biology | - | D | 17 | D |
| Physics | 7 | - | 32 | 18 |
| Chemistry | 33 | D | - | D |
| Geology | 9 | 13 | 6 | - |

Figure 11.2: Table after cell suppression

This process, due to Tore Dalenius, is called *complementary cell suppression*. If there are further attributes in the database schema – for example, if ﬁgures are also broken down by race and sex, to show compliance with anti-discrimination laws – then even more information may be lost. Where a database scheme contains *m*-tuples, blanking a single cell generally means suppressing 2*m* − 1 other cells, arranged in a hypercube with the sensitive statistic at one vertex. So even precise protection can rapidly make the database unusable. Sometimes complementary cell suppression can be avoided, as when large incomes (or rare

diseases) are tabulated nationally and excluded from local ﬁgures. But it is often necessary when we are publishing microstatistics, as in the above tables of exam marks. It may still not be suﬃcient, unless we can add noise to the totals – as the possible values of the conﬁdential data are limited still further by the information we disclose, and there may also be side information such as the fact that no totals are negative.

* + - 1. Other statistical disclosure control mechanisms

Another approach is *k-anonymity*, due to Pierangela Samarati and Latanya Sweeney, which means that each individual whose data is used in calculating a release of data cannot be distinguished from *k* − 1 others [1795]. Its limita- tion is that it’s an operational deﬁnition of a privacy mechanism rather than a mathematical deﬁnition of a privacy property; it’s not much help if *k* individuals all possess the same sensitive attribute. Where the database is open for online queries, we can use *implied queries control*: we allow a query on *m* attribute values only if every one of the 2*m* implied query sets given by setting the *m* attributes to true or false, has at least *k* records. An alternative is to limit the type of inquiries. *Maximum order control* limits the number of attributes any query can have. However, to be e↵ective, the limit may have to be severe. It takes only 33 bits of information to identify a human, and most datasets are of much smaller populations. A more thorough approach (where it is feasible) is to reject queries that would partition the sample population into too many sets.

We saw in the previous chapter how lattices can be used in compartmented security to deﬁne a partial order of permitted information ﬂows between com- partments with combinations of codewords. They can also be used in a slightly di↵erent way to systematize query controls in some databases. If we have, for example, three attributes *A*, *B* and *C* (say area of residence, birth year and medical condition), we may ﬁnd that while enquiries on any one of these at- tributes are non-sensitive, as are enquiries on *A* and *B* and on *B* and *C*, the combination of *A* and *C* might be sensitive. It follows that an enquiry on all three would not be permissible either. So the lattice divides naturally into a ‘top half’ of prohibited queries and a ‘bottom half’ of allowable queries, as shown in Figure 11.3.

* + - 1. More sophisticated query controls

There are a number of alternatives to simple query control. During the late 20th century, the US census used the ‘*n*-respondent, *k*%-dominance rule’: it would not release a statistic of which *k*% or more was contributed by *n* values or less. Other techniques included suppressing data with extreme values. A census may include high-net-worth individuals in national statistics but not in the local ﬁgures, while some medical databases do the same for less common diseases. For example, a UK prescribing statistics system from that period suppressed sales of AIDS drugs from local statistics [1249]; even during the AIDS crisis in the early 1990s, there were counties with only one single patient receiving such treatment.

Some systems try to get round the limits imposed by static query control

(A, B, C)

Prohibited

(A, B)

(B, C)

(C, A)

A

B

C

Allowable

U

Figure 11.3: – table lattice for a database with three attributes

by keeping track of who accessed what. Known as *query overlap control*, this involves rejecting any query from a user that, combined with what the user knows already, would disclose a sensitive statistic. This may sound like a good idea, but in practice it su↵ers from two usually insurmountable drawbacks. First, the complexity of the processing involved increases over time, and often exponentially. Second, it’s extremely hard to be sure that your users don’t collude, or that one user has registered under two di↵erent names. Even if your users are all honest and distinct persons today, it’s always possible that one of them will get taken over tomorrow.

* + - 1. Randomization

By now it should be clear that if various kinds of query control are the only protection mechanisms used in a statistical database, they will often impose an unacceptable statistical performance penalty. So query control is often used in conjunction with various kinds of randomization, designed to degrade the signal-to-noise ratio from the attacker’s point of view while impairing that of the legitimate user as little as possible.

Until 2006, all the methods used were rather ad hoc. They started with *perturbation*, or adding noise with zero mean and a known variance to the data; but this tends to damage the legitimate user’s results precisely when the sam- ple set sizes are small, and leave them intact when the sample sets are large enough to use simple query controls anyway. A later variant was *controlled tab- ular adjustment* where you identify the sensitive cells and replace their values with di↵erent ones, then adjust other values in the table to restore additive relationships [490]. Then there are *random sample queries* where we make all the query sets the same size, selecting them at random from the available rel- evant statistics. Thus, all the released data are computed from small samples rather than from the whole database, and we can use a pseudorandom number

generator keyed to the input query to make the results repeatable. Random sample queries are a natural protection mechanism where the correlations being investigated are strong enough that a small sample is suﬃcient. Finally, there’s *swapping*, another of Tore Dalenius’ innovations; many census bureaux swap a proportion of records so that a family with two young teenage kids and an income in the second quartile might be swapped for a similar family in a town in the next county.

Since 2006, we have a solid theory of exactly how much protection we can get from adding randomness: *di*↵*erential privacy*. This is now being used for the 2020 US census, and we’ll discuss it in more detail later in this chapter.

## Limits of classical statistical security

As with any protection technology, statistical security can only be evaluated in a particular environment and against a particular threat model. Whether it is adequate or not depends on the details of the application.

One example is a system developed in the mid-1990s by a company then called Source Informatics for analysing trends in drug prescribing, which ﬁgured in the key UK lawsuit about the privacy of anonymised data1. The system’s goal is to tell drug companies how e↵ective their sales sta↵ are, by tracking sales of di↵erent medicines by district. The privacy goal was to not leak any information about identiﬁable patients or about the prescribing habits of indi- vidual physicians2. So prescriptions were collected (minus patient names) from pharmacies, and then a further stage of de-identiﬁcation removed the doctors’ identities too.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Week: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Doctor A | 17 | 26 | 19 | 22 |
| Doctor B | 25 | 31 | 9 | 29 |
| Doctor C | 32 | 30 | 39 | 27 |
| Doctor D | 16 | 19 | 18 | 13 |

Figure 11.4: Sample of de-identiﬁed drug prescribing data

The ﬁrst version of this system merely replaced the names of doctors in a cell of four or ﬁve practices with ‘doctor A’, ‘doctor B’ and so on, as in Figure 11.4. When evaluating it, we realised that an alert drug rep could identify doctors from prescribing patterns: “Well, doctor B must be Susan Jones because she went skiing in the third week in January and look at the fall-o↵ in prescriptions here. And doctor C is probably Mervyn Smith who was covering for her”. The ﬁx was to replace absolute numbers of prescriptions with the percentage of each doctor’s prescribing which went on each particular drug, to drop some doctors at random, and to randomly perturb the timing by shifting the ﬁgures backwards or forwards a few weeks [1249].

1Full disclosure: I was the evaluator, acting on behalf of the British Medical Association.

2Doctors are hounded all the time by drug sales reps and often say they’ll use some product or other just to get them out of the surgery. It’s curious that such an important privacy case had as its privacy objective a doctor’s ability to continue telling white lies.

This is a good example of the sort of system where classical statistical secu- rity techniques can give a robust solution. The application is well-deﬁned, the database is not too rich, the allowable queries are fairly simple, and they remain stable over time. Even so, the UK Department of Health sued the database oper- ator, alleging that the database might compromise privacy. The Department’s motive was to maintain a monopoly on the supply of such data to industry. They lost, and this established the precedent that (in Britain at least) inference security controls may, if they are robust, exempt statistical data from being considered as ‘personal information’ for the purpose of privacy laws [1804].

In general, though, it’s not so easy. For a start, privacy mechanisms don’t compose: it’s easy to have two separate applications, each of which provides the same results via perturbed versions of the same data, but where an attacker with access to both of them can easily identify individuals. This actually happened in the Source Informatics case; by 2015, another competing system was avail- able that used di↵erent mechanisms, and people realised that a drug company with access to both systems could occasionally deduce some doctors’ prescribing behaviour. If we were re-implementing such a system today, we’d prevent this by using di↵erential privacy, which I’ll describe later in this chapter.

* + - 1. Active attacks

The Source Informatics system added a new tranche of records every week, but it can sometimes happen that users have the ability to insert single identiﬁable records into the database. In that case, *active attacks* can be particularly pow- erful. A prominent case in the late 1990s was a medical research database in Iceland. A Swiss drug company funded a local startup to o↵er the Reykjavik government a deal: we’ll build you a modern health cards system if you’ll let us mine it for research. The government signed up, but Iceland’s doctors mostly opposed the deal, seeing it as a threat both to patient privacy and professional autonomy.

Under their proposed design, every time a medical record was generated, it would be sent to the Iceland privacy commissioner whose system would strip out the patient’s name and address, replacing it with an encrypted version of their Social Security number, and pass it to a research database. The privacy commissioner controlled the encryption key. However, anyone in the system who wanted to ﬁnd (say) the Prime Minister’s medical records would merely have to enter some record or other – say a prescription for aspirin – and then watch it pop up on the research system a second or two later. The Icelandic government pressed ahead anyway, with a patient opt-out. Many doctors advised patients to opt out, and 11% of the population did so. Eventually, the Icelandic Supreme Court found that European privacy law required the database to be opt-in rather than opt-out, which put paid to the project.

Iceland was particularly attractive to researchers as the population is very homogeneous, being descended from a small number of settlers a thousand years ago, and there are good genealogical records. This also made privacy problems in the Icelandic database more acute. By linking medical records to genealogies, which are public, patients can be identiﬁed by such factors as the number of their uncles, aunts, great-uncles, great-aunts and so on – in e↵ect by the shape

of their family trees. There was much debate about whether the design could even theoretically meet legal privacy requirements [66], and European privacy oﬃcials expressed grave concern about the possible consequences for Europe’s system of privacy laws [515]. This brings us to the broader question of rich contextual data, which drove the second wave of work on inference control.

## Inference control in rich medical data

The second half of the 1990s saw the ‘dotcom boom’. The worldwide web was new, and a torrent of money ﬂowed into tech as businesses (and governments) tried to ﬁgure out how to move their operations online. Healthcare IT people struggled with many questions around safety and privacy; records had already been moving from paper to computers, but now all the computers started talking to each other [63]. Could you use email to send test results from a hospital to a doctor’s surgery, or would it be a web form? How would you encrypt it, and who’d manage the keys? And could you make complete medical records safe enough for use in research by removing names and addresses, as opposed to just episode data such as individual prescriptions? Researchers had previously done epidemiology by sitting in hospital libraries reading paper records, and it would ‘obviously’ be better if you could do this at your desk. However, an epidemiologist will usually want to be able to link up episodes over a patient’s lifetime, so they can see long-term e↵ects of treatments and lifestyle choices. That is much harder to anonymise.

Health IT people faced this problem in many countries at once. New Zealand set up a database with encrypted patient names plus a rule that no query may answered with respect to fewer than six records, but realised that that was not enough and restricted access to a small number of specially cleared med- ical statisticians [1422]. The fall of the Berlin Wall caused an acute problem for Germany, as the former East Germany had cancer registries with ﬁrst-class data that were really useful for research but had patient names and rich con- textual data, and these now fell under West Germany’s strict privacy laws. The registry had to install protection mechanisms rapidly, which involve both de- identiﬁcation and strict usage controls [266]. In Switzerland too, some research systems were replaced at the insistence of privacy regulators [1681]. The British Medical Association objected to a proposal for a centralised research database in 1995–6 and a committee was set up under an eminent psychiatrist, Dame Fiona Caldicott, to suggest a way forward.

The fact that the rich context of medical records had changed the statis- tical security game was then brought into focus in 1997 by Latanya Sweeney who tried, in her PhD thesis, to build a system that would anonymise medical records properly, and discovered how hard it is. She showed that even the Health Care Finance Administration’s ‘public-use’ ﬁles could often be re-identiﬁed by cross-correlating them with commercial databases [1849]. She showed that 69% of U.S. residents can be identiﬁed by date of birth and zip code, and discussed the extreme diﬃculty of scrubbing medical records that contain all sorts of contextual data, including free-form text [1849]. At the time, the Medicare system considered *bene*ﬁ*ciary-encrypted* records – with patients’ names and So- cial Security numbers encrypted – to be personal data and thus only usable by

trusted researchers. There were also *public-access* records, stripped of identiﬁers down to the level where patients are only identiﬁed in general terms such as ‘a white female aged 70–74 living in Vermont’. Nonetheless, researchers have found that many patients can still be identiﬁed by cross-correlating the public access records with commercial databases. Sweeney brought this to public attention by identifying the records of Massachusetts governor William Weld. This got the anonymity of medical research data on to the US political agenda.

As I describe in section 10.4, the Clinton administration issued a privacy rule in 2000 under HIPAA that deﬁned a ‘Safe Harbor’ standard for the public sharing of data, and then in 2002 the Bush administration adopted a more relaxed rule. In 2017 Sweeney and colleagues examined a 2006 public-health study of 50 homes in California, which had been cited hundreds of times in the research literature, and showed they could identify 25% of the participants by name and 28% by address [1850]. Even after redacting participants’ birth years to 10-year ranges, they could still pinpoint 3% by name and 18% by address – because of side information such as the type of housing.

The UK followed a similar trajectory. Dame Fiona Caldicott’s report identi- ﬁed over sixty illegal information ﬂows within the health service [367]. Some re- search datasets were de-identiﬁed very carelessly; others (including data on peo- ple with HIV/AIDS) were re-identiﬁed deliberately afterwards, so that people and HIV charities whose data had been collected under a promise of anonymity were deceived. Parliament then passed a law giving ministers the power to regulate secondary uses of medical data, but the broad direction was trusted researchers; a committee vetted applications for data access. Patient consent was obtained in some cases, but not for research involving the Hospital Episode Statistics database, which contains records of over a billion hospital treatments in England and Wales from 1998 to the present day. HES data are made avail- able to researchers with the patient’s name and address removed and replaced with an encrypted identiﬁer. (The encryption key is di↵erent for each research organisation that licenses the data.)

But encrypting patient names isn’t enough. Suppose I want to look up the record of former Prime Minister Tony Blair. A quick web search reveals that he was treated in Hammersmith Hospital in London for an irregular heartbeat on 19th October 2003 and 1st October 2004. That’s more than enough to pick out his encrypted ID and look up everything else he’s had done. Such a leak can be intrusive for anybody; for a celebrity, it can be newsworthy. What’s more, in many systems there’s a cleartext postcode and date of birth; again,

this combination is enough to identify about 98% of UK residents3. Even if

the date of birth is replaced by a year of birth, I am still likely to be able to compromise patient privacy if the records are detailed, or if records of di↵erent individuals can be linked. For example, a query such as ‘show me the records of all women aged 36 with daughters aged 14 and 16 such that the mother and exactly one daughter have psoriasis’ can ﬁnd one individual out of millions. Query set size control might stop this kind of tracker, but researchers do want to make complex queries with lots of conditions to ﬁnd disease clusters with a

3UK postcodes have more resolution than US zip codes, with typically 30 buildings in each postcode. The 1% or so of people for whom postcode plus date of birth is not unique are mostly identical twins, or young people living in college halls of residence or military barracks.

few hundreds or even a few dozens of patients. Such queries could be composed, whether deliberately or by accident, in such a way as to identify individuals.

In 2006, UK privacy groups organised a campaign to alert people to the risks and invite them to exercise their right to opt out of secondary data use. In 2007, Parliament’s Health Select Committee conducted an inquiry into the Electronic Patient Record, heard evidence from a wide range of viewpoints4 and made many recommendations, including that patients should be permitted to prevent the use of their data in research [925]. Privacy concerns are not the only

reason that a patient might reasonably request that their data not be used; for example, a devout Catholic woman might demand that her data not be used to develop pills for abortion or birth control. The Government rejected this.

David Cameron’s government, elected in 2010, weakened privacy protection, just as George Bush had done ten years earlier. Amidst talk of abolishing red tape and making the UK the best place in the world for medical research, as I discussed at greater length in section 10.4.4.3, he launched ‘care.data’, a central research database that would add test results, prescriptions and GP data to the existing HES database. In November 2013 it emerged that HES data were avail- able via BT for sale online [948], and in February 2014, it emerged that copies of the HES database had been sold to 1,200 organisations worldwide, including not just academic researchers but commercial ﬁrms, from drug companies to consultancies [774]. One of the big US consultancies had uploaded all 23GB of data to the Google cloud ‘as it was too big for Excel’ and was making it available to clients, despite laws that required the data to remain in the UK. The data had been used for non-health purposes, speciﬁcally by actuaries to reﬁne insur- ance premiums. A law was quickly passed stating that health and social data could be shared and analyzed only when there was a ‘beneﬁt to healthcare’, and never for other purposes. Another consultancy was hired to produce another report, and people who’d opted out were told to opt out all over again. An aca- demic case study tells the story, analyses the tensions between healthcare law and data-protection law, and remarks that ‘this debate centers on the ability to protect and maintain the anonymity of patient data, and there are no easy answers’ [1548].

## The third wave: preferences and search

The next wave broke in 2006, by which time a signiﬁcant number of transac- tions had moved online, recommender systems had emerged thanks to eBay and Amazon, and search engines made it easy to ﬁnd needles in haystacks. Two incidents that year brought this home to the public.

First, AOL released the supposedly anonymous records of 20 million search queries made over three months by 657,000 people. Searchers’ names and IP addresses were replaced with numbers, but that didn’t help. Investigative jour- nalists looked through the searches and rapidly identiﬁed some of the searchers, who were shocked at the privacy breach [167]. The data were released ‘for re- search purposes’: the leak led to complaints being ﬁled with the FTC, following which the company’s CTO resigned, and the ﬁrm ﬁred both the employee who

4Declaration of interest: I was a Special Adviser to the Committee.

released the data and their supervisor. Search history, or equivalently your clickstream, is highly sensitive as it reﬂects your thoughts and intentions.

Second, Netﬂix o↵ered a $1m prize for a better recommender algorithm and published the viewer ratings of 500,000 subscribers with their names removed. At the time, it had only 6 million US customers and shipped them physical DVDs, so this was a signiﬁcant minority of its customers. Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov showed that many subscribers could be reidentiﬁed by comparing the anonymous records with preferences publicly expressed in the Internet Movie Database [1384]. This is partly due to the ‘long tail’ e↵ect: once you disregard the 100 or so movies everyone watches, people’s viewing preferences are pretty unique. As US law protects movie rental privacy, the attack was a serious embarrassment for Netﬂix.

The response of privacy regulators in Europe and Canada was to promote *Privacy Enhancing Technologies* (PETs) – they hoped that if security researchers were to work harder, we could come up with more e↵ective ways of anonymising rich data [649]. Researchers at Microsoft took them at their word, and developed the theory of di↵erential privacy, which I explain in 11.3. This does not get the privacy regulators o↵ the hook, as it clariﬁes the limitations of anonymisation. Yet for years policy people talked about it as a solution without understand- ing that it explains in more detail why we cannot resolve the tension between researchers’ demand for detailed data, and the right of data subjects to privacy.

## The fourth wave: location and social

During the 2010s, the world was changed by smartphones and social networks. Chapter 23 in the second edition of this book in 2008 describes the early social network scene, as Facebook was just taking over from Myspace. I noted that Robert Putman’s book ‘Bowling Alone’ had documented the decline of social engagement through voluntary associations such as churches, clubs and societies with the arrival of TV in the 1960s [1563], and the fact that the Internet’s early Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists had managed to put some of that back. The sweet spot the social networks hit was rolling this out to everybody. However recondite your interests, you can connect with people who share them, wherever in the world they are. We predicted that social networks would bring all sorts of privacy problems directly, as social context makes it hard to hide. (Is there anyone other than me who hangs out with cryptographers, with digital- rights activists, and with people interested in the dance music of 200 years ago?) Persistence adds further hazards, as when teens’ boasts about sex and drugs come back to haunt them later in job interviews. Two things we missed were the fact that masses of data have migrated to the cloud, and the sheer amount of sensitive personal information that can be deduced from contextual data about people. By 2011 Google was describing its core competence as ‘the statistical data mining of crowdsourced data’; as the datasets got larger, and basic statistical techniques were augmented with machine learning, the amount we can learn has grown.

An example of ‘more data’ is location history. By 2012, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and his colleagues had shown that four mobile-phone locations are in general enough to identify someone, even when you only get their cell-tower

location [1333]. Nowadays much more high-resolution data are widely available, as many smartphone apps ask for access to your location – which can involve not just GPS (with an average accuracy of perhaps 8m outdoors) but also which wiﬁ hotspots are in range (which can tell where you are in a building). Most people click to agree without a second thought, and there’s now a whole ecoystem of companies buying and selling location trace data – which is now accurate to a few metres rather than a few hundred. The data were sold not just to marketing ﬁrms, but to private detectives, including bounty hunters who use it to track down people who’ve jumped bail [489].

In December 2019 the New York Times got hold of the location traces of 12 million Americans over a few months and demonstrated graphically how closely people can now be tracked. Your daily trace shows your home, when you left, how you traveled to work, where you stopped for a co↵ee en route, where your oﬃce is, where you went for lunch – everything. The journalists found in their database a celebrity who had sung at a church service for President Trump; hundreds of people working at the Pentagon and the CIA, as well as the President’s Secret Service bodyguards, all of whom they could follow home; and people visiting the sex industry. They found one man who’d worked at Microsoft, then visited Amazon, then started working at Amazon the following month. They looked at a riot, and found they could follow both rioters and police oﬃcers home [1885]. There’s a stark contrast between the ease of buying this data on the open market, and the hoops that law enforcement have to jump through to get it by means of warrants. The location data companies all claim that their data are anonymous; yet even though they might not actually use the phone book or the voters’ roll to look up your name from your street address, several sell your location data tied to an advertising identiﬁer based on one or more cookies in your browser. With low-resolution location data, when you go to Black Hat in Las Vegas, online gambling companies can put ads in front of you. With high-resolution data, a foreign intelligence agency could locate people who work at the Pentagon and also visit gay clubs or brothels. It can also follow them home.

An example of ‘better inference’ comes from the behavioural analysis of social-network data. The headline case here started when Michal Kosinski and colleagues wrote a Facebook app that o↵ered free psychometric testing and persuaded tens of thousands of people to use it. They ﬁgured out that they could tell whether someone was straight or gay from four Facebook likes; given sixty likes, they could assess the user’s ‘Big Five’ personality traits: whether you are open to experience or cautious, conscientious or easygoing, extravert or introvert, agreeable or detached, and neurotic or conﬁdent [1086]. They can also tell whether you’re white or black, conservative or liberal, Christian or Muslim, whether you smoke, whether you drink, whether you’re in a relationship, and whether you use drugs – with varying degrees of accuracy. This led some of his colleagues to collect Facebook data on an industrial scale for marketing and political campaigning, leading to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which I’ll discuss in Part 3. Later research showed that having behavioural data gives publishers only an extra 4% of ad income compared with what they get over contextual ads, so conceivably this practice might simply be banned [1239]. However, industry observers note that the platforms earn more than this, as they get the lion’s share of ad income – so they can be expected to resist any

such privacy law [1181].

In many cases, you can get both location data and social data, and get them at scale. For example, the government of Victoria, Australia, made public a database of transport ticket use covering a billion journeys by 15m tickets from 2015–8. Although the card IDs had been anonymised, it usually took only one or two journeys for a resident to identify their own card from the touch on and touch o↵ times; researchers found they could then identify their co-travelers [502]. Next they identiﬁed people using Australian federal parlia- mentary passes, who routinely get the train to their constituencies; hypotheses could be conﬁrmed from the parliamentarians’ tweets. This dataset enabled the researchers to analyse the sensitivity of travel time. They found that even if travel times were truncated to the day, with hours and minutes thrown away, four locations would identify over a third of travelers.

We now have many social side channels as well as location data. Location history leaks so much data as it reveals who we live with, work with and party with. Social networks are even richer with our contacts, preferences and selﬁes, and can make these measurements more accurate. And social analysis can reach right down into the lowest layers of the stack. For example, it turns out to be fairly easy to match up two social graphs, even if they are not exact copies of each other; so given a country’s anonymised mobile phone call data records, you can re-identify them by comparing them with (say) the friend graph of a social network [1719]. Mobile phone data already leak lots of information about our personalities: extraverts make more calls, agreeable people get more calls, and the variance of time between phone calls predicts conscientiousness [1334].

The combination of more data and better inference led to fresh controversy in medical research too. Google’s AI subsidiary DeepMind announced a collab- oration in 2016 with a London hospital to develop an app to diagnose kidney injury. The following year, it turned out that the hospital had given DeepMind not just the records of kidney injury su↵erers, but all 1.6m fully-identiﬁable records of all its patients, without getting their consent [1542]. The privacy regulator reprimanded the hospital, as such access should be given only to ﬁrms involved in direct patient care rather than for product research; however it did not attempt to force DeepMind to delete the data. The company used VA data from the US instead to develop diagnostic apps. It did set up an Ethics Board that it claimed would control the technology, and did undertake not to give the hospital data to its parent Google, but in 2017 an eminent member of the ethics board resigned claiming it was window-dressing, and in 2018 it was announced that Google was absorbing DeepMind’s health operation [909]. This slow train wreck was followed by the news that Google was already under ﬁre for acquiring the records of 50 million US patients [121].

So is it possible to do anonymisation properly? The answer is yes; in certain circumstances, it is. Although it is not possible to create anonymous datasets that can be used to answer any question, we can sometimes provide a dependable measure of privacy when we set out to answer a speciﬁc set of research questions. This brings us to the theory of di↵erential privacy.

# Di↵erential privacy

In 2006, Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim and Adam Smith published a seminal paper showing how you could systematically analyse pri- vacy systems that added noise to prevent disclosure of sensitive statistics in a database [595]. Their theory, *di*↵*erential privacy*, enables the security engineer to limit the probability of disclosure, even in the presence of an adversary with unbounded computational power and copious side information, and can thus be seen as the equivalent of the one-time pad and unconditionally secure authen- tication codes in cryptography. Although it started as a paper on theoretical cryptography, it has come to be seen as the gold standard for both statistical database security and for anonymisation in general. The starting point was an earlier paper by Kobbi Nissim and Irit Dinur, who had shown in 2003 that if queries on a database each returned an approximation to a linear function of private bits of information, then so long as the error was small enough the num- ber of queries required to reconstruct the database would not grow too quickly; such reconstruction attacks are, after all, based on linear algebra, so rather than making carefully targeted tracker attacks, an attacker can just make a whole lot of random queries, then do the algebra and get everything out [562]. So the defender has to add noise if there will be more than a limited number of queries, and the question is how much.

The key insight of di↵erential privacy is that, to avoid inadvertent disclosure, no individual’s contribution to the results of queries should make too much of a di↵erence, so you calibrate the standard deviation of the noise according to the sensitivity of the data. A privacy mechanism is called ✏-indistinguishable if for all databases *X* and *X*0 di↵ering in a single row, the probability of getting any answer from *X* is within a multiplicative factor of (1 + ✏) of getting it from *X*0; in other words, you bound the logarithm of the ratios. It follows that you can use noise with a Laplace distribution to get indistinguishability with noisy sums, and things compose, so it all becomes mathematically tractable. The value of ✏, which sets the trade-o↵ between accuracy and privacy, has to be set by policy. Small values give strong privacy; but setting ✏ = 1000 is basically publishing your raw data.

There is now a growing research literature exploring how such mechanisms can be extended for static to dynamic databases, to data streams, to mecha- nism design and to machine learning. But can the promise of learning nothing useful about individuals while learning useful information about a population, be realised in practical applications?

## Applying di↵erential privacy to a census

Di↵erential privacy is now getting a full-scale test in the 2020 U.S. census. The census is not allowed to publish anything that identiﬁes the data of any individual or establishment; collected data must by law be kept conﬁdential for 72 years and used only for statistical purposes until then. First, the Census Bureau reviewed the security of the 2010 census in the light of modern analysis tools [752]. In 2010, the aggregated *census edited* ﬁ*le* (CEF) of data collected from US residents and then edited to get rid of duplicates and ﬁll in missing

entries from data such as tax returns, had 44 bits of conﬁdential data on each resident (a total of 1.7Gb). The problem is that the microdata summaries simply contained a lot more data than this; writing everything out, you get several billion simultaneous equations and can in theory solve for the conﬁdential data.

What about in practice? Census sta↵ implemented ideas based on Kobbi Nissim and Irit Dinur’s work, and found that they got all the variables right about 38% of the time, covering a bit under 20% of the population. It took one month on four servers, so it’s not entirely trivial. However, the lesson is that the traditional approaches to statistical database security don’t really work. They did provide some privacy, because the 2010 census swapped very identiﬁable households with other blocks, so not everyone was compromised. If they’d swapped all the households, it would have been OK, but the users wouldn’t have put up with that; the fact that they gave exact population counts for a block was a real vulnerability. Dealing with database reconstruction piecemeal is hard; that’s the value of di↵erential privacy.

The big policy question is where you set ✏. This is also an empirical question. In 2018, census sta↵ did an end-to-end test reporting four tables. In 2020 the full system will process the CEF into a *microdata details* ﬁ*le* (MDF) from which the tabulations will be derived. Foreseeable issues include that numbers won’t add up; so the number of members of the separate Native American tribes won’t add up to the total of Native Americans, and that will have to be explained to the public. The di↵erential-privacy approach will protect everyone, while the old system only protected people who were swapped, and it has to be done all at once. Every record may be modiﬁed subject to an overall privacy budget, so there’s no exact mapping between the CEF and the MDF.

The new top-down algorithm generates a national histogram without ge- ographic identiﬁers, then sets out to build a geographic histogram top-down, such that the state ﬁgures add up to the national ﬁgures (which is needed for Congressional redistricting). The construction is then done recursively down through state, county, tract, block group and block, after which they generate the microdata. This can be done in parallel and enables sparsity discovery (e.g. there are very few people over 100 belonging to 5 or more races). The top-down approach turns out to be much more accurate than applying noise block-by- block, in that county data have less error than blocks, and national data have essentially no error. There are several edge cases needing special handling: a prison won’t be turned into a college dorm, but if there are ﬁve dorms, you might report four or six. Person-household joins are also hard; you can do the number of men on a block, or the number of households, but the number of children in households headed by a single man is more sensitive. But many things that used to be suppressed no longer have to be; you no longer have to enumerate all the sources of side information that might be used; and there will at last be published error statistics.

Now that the outline design has been done, there’s a simulator you can use to explore possible values of ✏. You can plug this into an economic analysis of the tradeo↵ between the marginal social beneﬁt of better stats with the marginal social costs of identity theft [928]; the outcome suggests a value of ✏ between 4 and 6.

# Mind the gap?

On the political side, the use of lightly-deidentiﬁed data in research, whether medical research or market research, has involved sporadic guerilla warfare be- tween privacy advocates and data users for years, with regulators usually siding with the data users except in the aftermath of a scandal. The regulators are both overwhelmed and conﬂicted, as I’ll describe in section 26.6.1, and mostly do not have the political support to take on big Internet service ﬁrms or govern- ment departments. These ‘Big Data’ interests are generally adept at capturing regulators anyway. For example, in 2008 Prime Minister Gordon Brown asked the UK Information Commissioner and the head of Britain’s largest medical- research charity to come up with guidelines on using data in research; they ignored privacy rights, took an instrumental view of costs and beneﬁts, and spun the secondary use of data as ‘data sharing’. As you might expect, neither privacy lawyers nor security academics were pleased with the result [96].

In 2009 a highly inﬂuential paper, ‘Broken promises of privacy’, was written by Paul Ohm, a distinguished US law professor [1465]. He noted that “scientists have demonstrated they can often ‘reidentify’ or ‘deanonymize’ individuals hid- den in anonymized data with astonishing ease” and confessed “we have made a mistake, labored beneath a fundamental misunderstanding, which has assured us much less privacy than we have assumed. This mistake pervades nearly ev- ery information privacy law, regulation, and debate, yet regulators and legal scholars have paid it scant attention.” For the previous thirty years, computer scientists had known that anonymisation doesn’t really work, but law and pol- icy people had stopped their ears. Here at last was an eminent lawyer spelling out the facts, telling the story of AOL and Netﬂix, in a law journal and us- ing lawyer-accessible language. Among other things he ridiculed Google’s claim that IP addresses were not personal information (it argued that its search logs should therefore fall outside the scope of data protection), denounced the binary mindset of data as either personal or not, and called for a more realistic debate on privacy and data protection. Might this change things?

In 2012, a report from the Royal Society called for scientists to publish their data openly where possible but acknowledged the reality of re-identiﬁcation risks: ‘However, a substantial body of work in computer science has now demon- strated that the security of personal records in databases cannot be guaranteed through anonymisation procedures where identities are actively sought’ [1627]. In that year, the UK Information Commissioner also developed a code of prac- tice on anonymisation [80]; as the ICO is the privacy regulator, such a code can shield ﬁrms from liability, and it was the target of vigorous lobbying. The eventual code required data users to only describe their mechanisms in general terms, and shifted the burden of proof on to anyone who objected [81]. This was a less stringent burden than the ICO applies in freedom-of-information cases, where a request for public data can be refused on the presumption that the data subjects’ ‘friends, former colleagues, or acquaintances’ may know relevant context. This tiptoes round a concept of some relevance to tactical anonymity – the *privacy set*, or the set of people whom I might want to not know some fact about me. For most people, this is your family, friends and work colleagues – perhaps 100–200 people. For celebrities, it can be everybody; and problems can

arise when someone suddenly becomes famous. Most of us can be anonymous in a big city, but a celebrity can’t.

Another useful but quite di↵erent concept is the *anonymity set*, which is the set of people with whom you might be confused. We’re all familiar with detective ﬁlms or novels, where Poirot steadily reduces the number of people who might have committed the murder from a dozen to one. Strategic mechanisms like di↵erential privacy focus on keeping the anonymity set large enough, while many tactical mechanisms assess the risk that people with access to some application will overlap your privacy set.

But you always have to think carefully about the threat model. While it may be enough to worry about your privacy set when the concern is embarrassment, when it’s scam artists you need to worry about the anonymity set. As we noted in Chapter 3, phishing attacks often involve information leaks about the victim that enable an attacker to impersonate the victim to some service, or impersonate the service to the victim. In short, when it comes to phishing, anyone who can tie your identity to some relevant context may be able to attack you.

## Tactical anonymity and its problems

The ICO also set up the UK Anonymisation Network (UKAN), which is coor- dinated by academics and by the Oﬃce of National Statistics. In 2016 UKAN produced a book of guidance on how ﬁrms should make decisions on anonymi- sation, duly signed o↵ by the ICO [626]. Its authors see conﬁdentiality as being about risk rather than duty; decisions have to be taken not just according to the technical possibility of identifying data subjects but the institutional and social context that determines whether this might be attempted. The threat model should be based on plausible intruder scenarios. They talk of governance pro- cesses rather than side channels; they dismiss di↵erential privacy as ‘extreme’; they see anonymisation as a process and advise against using ‘success terms’ like ‘anonymised’; and they deﬁne ‘de-identiﬁed’ as ‘can’t be re-identiﬁed from the data directly’. Measures to manage re-identiﬁcation risk should be pro- portional to risk and its likely impact; and anonymisation measures may have a limited lifetime because of eventual triangulation from other datasets. Such mechanisms therefore have to be seen as tactical anonymity, as opposed to the strategic anonymity that is being carefully engineered into the US census. The UKAN authors do not seem to have considered di↵erential privacy seriously.

Despite its ﬂaws, the UKAN framework requires attention if you’re going to rely on anonymisation, whether tactical or strategic, in the UK, as it’s the yardstick by which the regulator will decide whether or not to take enforcement action against you. It is likely to provide a shock absorber and liability shield for both data users and regulators as anonymisation becomes steadily less e↵ective. It would have provided some protection for ﬁrms that based their EU operations in the UK, but with Britain having left the EU this will no longer hold. It does however contain a reasonable amount of practical advice on assessing the risks of tactical anonymisation in applications where both the data and the environment are reasonably well understood. As a result, there are now several ﬁrms whose products and services aim at helping data users comply with it.

An example of a ﬁrm operating openly under this framework is the mobile network operator Vodafone, which sells ‘location insight’ products. The com- pany aggregates the mobile phone locations of its customers into journeys with implied origin, destination and mode of transport. The origin-destination ma- trices are sold to local government and transport ﬁrms along with ﬂows along main roads and railways. The privacy mechanisms consist of ﬁrst, allowing all subscribers an opt-out and second, encrypting phone IMSIs to give a di↵erent pseudonym per device, with a slowly changing key; the cell towers are easily re- identiﬁable. One can indeed make an argument that the risk here is low; maybe the analysts at the local council or bus company can identify you, especially if you live in a small hamlet (as I do; four houses 200m from the nearest village). So the anonymity set can be too small. Then you have to look at the privacy set size. But suppose you work at a ﬁrm that becomes a target for activists. If they recruit someone at the council, they could target company sta↵ who live

in isolated houses in order to intimidate them or their families5.

The practical problems that have become evident have to do ﬁrst with scale and second with the inherent conﬂicts of self-regulation. The scale is evident not just in the number of data sources that might be matched externally to identify people, but in the growing size and complexity of organisations’ internal data warehouses too. A decisive factor has been Hadoop6: a ﬁrm can now store everything, so it’s hard to keep track of what’s stored. As there are no

database schemas but the data are just piled up, you have no idea of linkage risks, especially if your ﬁrm has a multitenant cluster with all sorts of stu↵ from di↵erent subsidiaries. Such data warehouses are now used for fraud prevention, customer analytics and targeted marketing. Firms want to be responsible, but how do you give live data to your development and test teams? How can you collaborate with academics and startups? How can you sell data products? Anonymisation technology is all pretty rudimentary at this scale, and as you just don’t know what’s going on, it’s beyond the scope of di↵erential privacy or anything else you can analyse cleanly. You can tokenise the data on ingest to get rid of the obvious names, then control access and use special tricks for time series and location streams, but noise addition doesn’t work on trajectories and there are lots of creative ways to re-identify location data (e.g. photos of celebs getting in and out of taxis). Things get even harder where people are partially authorised and have partial access.

Future problems may come from AI and machine learning; that’s the fash- ion now, following the ‘Big Data’ fashion of the mid-2010s that led ﬁrms to set up large data warehouses. You’re now training up systems that generally can’t explain what they do, on data you don’t really understand. We already know of lots of things that can go wrong. Insurance systems jack up premiums in minority neighbourhoods, breaking anti-discrimination laws. And machine learning systems inhale existing social prejudices along with their training data; as machine-translation systems read gigabytes of online text, they become much

5In 2003 I was an elected member of our university’s governing body, and we were targeted by animal rights activists after the university proposed a new building for animals to be used in medical research. Some colleagues had activists turning up at their homes to shout at them,

and a couple of activists were later convicted of terrorism o↵ences after a similar campaign at Oxford. Just about anyone can suddenly become a target.

6Open-source software originally developed by Yahoo to store data at petabyte scale on clusters of servers and access it using NoSQL.

better at translation but they also become racist, sexist and homophobic (we’ll discuss this in more detail in section 25.3. Another problem is that if a neu- ral network is trained on personal data, then it will often be able to identify those persons if it comes across them again – so you can’t just train it and then release it in the hope that its knowledge is somehow anonymous, as we might hope for averages derived from large aggregates of data. Again, you just don’t understand what the ML system is doing, so any claim you make to anonymity should be treated with scepticism. And it’s not enough to say ‘We don’t sell your data, we just target ads’: if you let the Iranian secret police target ads at gay people who speak Farsi, they can simply pop up ads o↵ering free pizza.

As the Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce doesn’t appear to have the capa- bility or motivation to police anonymity services and applications, the industry self-regulates; in e↵ect, ﬁrms mark their own homework. This means adverse selection, as the least conscientious provider will promise the most functional- ity. As I already noted, there are many ﬁrms selling ﬁne-grained location data, social data and the like who claim it’s anonymous even when it clearly isn’t. Even where organisations are well-meaning, it’s rare for them to really under- stand the issues until they hit trouble, and on more than one occasion we’ve had providers approaching us for advice after they’d bitten o↵ more than they could chew. The data users often don’t want to talk to real experts once they hit a problem as they realise that the more they know, the more expensive things will be to ﬁx. As for beeﬁng up the regulator, the more a government did that, the less competitive its information industries would become. One of the reasons anonymisation is such a wicked problem is that its security economics are truly dreadful.

## Incentives

Even imperfect de-identiﬁcation may protect data against casual browsing and against some uses that are unsafe or even predatory. However, it may make rascals feel empowered to do rascally things (especially since UKAN). So in statistical security, the question of whether one should let the best be the enemy of the good can require a ﬁner judgment call than elsewhere. As I discussed in the chapter on economics, the most common cause of security failure in large systems with many stakeholders is when the incentives are wrong – when Alice guards a system and Bob pays the cost of failure. So what are the incentives here?

The overall picture is not good. For example, medical privacy is conditioned by how people pay for healthcare. If you see a psychoanalyst privately and pay cash, then the incentives are aligned; the analyst will lock up your notes. But in the US, healthcare is generally paid for by your employer; and in Britain, the government pays for most of it. In both cases, attempts to centralise control for management purposes have driven conﬂict with doctors and patients. While such conﬂicts can be masked for a while by claims about anonymity, it is unlikely that they can be resolved by any feasible privacy technology. Once people accept this, a more realistic political conversation can begin.

## Alternatives

One approach is to combine weak anonymity with access control, whether re- quiring the researcher to visit a secure site (as in New Zealand, and also for research on tax data in the UK) or requiring licensing incorporating a non- disclosure agreement plus access and use controls that forbid any attempt at identifying subjects (as in Germany). This can be robust provided it is done:

1. competently, with decent security engineering;
2. honestly, without false claims that the data are no longer personal; and
3. within the law, which in the EU will involve giving data subjects a right to opt out that is respected.

In medicine, the gold standard is doing research with explicit patient con- sent. This not only allows full access to data, but provides motivated subjects and much higher-quality clinical information than can be harvested simply as a byproduct of normal clinical activities. For example, a network of researchers into ALS (the motor-neurone disease from which Cambridge astronomer Stephen Hawking su↵ered) shares fully-identiﬁable information between doctors and other researchers in over a dozen countries with the full consent of the pa- tients and their families. This network allows data sharing between Germany, with very strong privacy laws, and Japan, with almost none; and data continued to be shared between researchers in the USA and Serbia even when the USAF was bombing Serbia. The consent model is spreading. A second example is Biobank, a UK research project in which several hundred thousand volunteers gave researchers not just full access to their records for the rest of their lives, but answered an extensive questionnaire and gave blood samples so that those who develop interesting diseases in later life can have their genetic and proteomic makeup analysed. Needless to say, access with full consent also requires robust security engineering as consent will be contingent on access being restricted to researchers.

Whether you go the trusted-researcher route or the full-consent route, access for research will also depend on ethical approval. In section 10.4.5.1 we discussed the origins of medical ethics, in the Tuskegee experiments in the US and the experiments performed by Nazi doctors in Germany, and the safeguards that have now arisen: Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in America and ethics committees in Europe. If you’re a medical researcher with no realistic alternative to using records collected from medical practice on a shaky legal basis and protected using leaky de-identiﬁcation mechanisms, then you have no real choice but to rely on your IRB or ethics committee. Although the exact processes di↵er between (and within) institutions the key principle is that such research has to be approved by someone independent of the researcher – typically one or more anonymous colleagues, who assess both the aims of the investigation and the proposed methods. There are, however, some serious moral hazards.

## The dark side

Ethics review processes provide researchers with a liability shield at two levels. First, if something goes wrong and the researcher is sued for negligence, this is assessed using ‘the standards of the industry’ as a yardstick. If you follow the same processes as everybody else, and have each project approved by an ethics committee that contains ‘independent’ members (which in practice means professors from other universities, rather than representatives of the real data subjects) then you can make a strong case that you followed those standards. Second, if the worst happens and you face the possibility of criminal prosecution, in common-law countries that involves a dual test: of ‘mens rea’ or wrongful intent, as well as ‘actus reus’ or a prohibited act. Ethical approval processes are designed to provide evidence that there was no mens rea. If you did what you said you’d do, and for reasons that independent people approved, how can that be wrongful intent? In short, ethics review processes are optimised to protect the researcher and the institution, not the data subject.

This has not escaped the attention of Big Data. In section 11.2.5 I men- tioned Google DeepMind’s ethics board and its failure to prevent the scandal; Google managed to escape censure from the Information Commissioner (unlike the hospital that handed over all its medical records). Unsurprisingly, ethics boards are proliferating, especially as ﬁrms start throwing artiﬁcial intelligence and machine learning techniques at large data warehouses with little clear idea of what the outcome might be. AI ethics is a hot topic in academia and a rapidly-growing source of jobs. The cynical operator will go through the mo- tions of complying with some of the UKAN recommendations and then hire some unemployed philosophers to talk about moral philosophy and the nature of intelligence, while getting on with the business of selling your most intimate personal information to the spammers. Ethics washing and data abuse now go hand in hand.

What’s more, the existence of publicly-advertised privacy mechanisms may deﬂect attention from abuse of the underlying personal data. In March 2007, historians Margo Anderson and William Seltzer found that census conﬁden- tiality was suspended in 1942, and microdata on Japanese Americans living in Washington DC was given to the Secret Service in 1943 [1699]. Block-level data were given to oﬃcials in California, where they rounded up Japanese-Americans for internment. The single point of failure there appears to have been Census Bureau director JC Capt, who released the data to the Secret Service following a request from Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. The Bureau has since publicly apologised [1319]. But this was nothing new. The British government used the 1911 census to target aliens for expulsion when WWI broke out in 1914; the 1941 census was brought forward to 1939 to serve as a basis for conscription, rationing and internment; and the security services continued to have a back door into the census until the 1980s. Elsewhere, the Germans used census data to round up Jews not only in Germany but in the Netherlands and other oc- cupied territories. More recently, Cambridge Analytica and its parent company SCL were granted covert access to full national census data by a number of countries where they helped the incumbent government win re-election [2052].

There are many examples of publicly-advertised privacy mechanisms that are

less e↵ective than they seem. The UK is building a system of ‘smart meters’ that report everyone’s gas and electricity consumption via a central clearinghouse, from which it gets sent to your utility so they can bill you; other ﬁrms need an approved privacy plan to get access to the data. However, when we look at a typical privacy plan, we see a distribution network operator getting access to half-hourly meter data for its distribution area, the Midlands, the South West and Wales [2011]. The purpose is to predict when substation transformers will have to be replaced. The distributor promises to aggregate this feed into half- hourly totals for each feeder – these are the cables that leave the transformers and supply a number of houses. But looking at the data, we see that 0.96% of feeders serve only one house and 2.67% serve 3 or fewer. A more robust privacy regulator would have told them to just install their own meters at their own transformers. In fact, more sensible public policy would have been to not do the smart meter project at all; I discuss this in Chapter 14.

As for medicine, the U.S. HIPAA system empowers the DHHS to regulate health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers, but leaves many other organisations that process medical data such as lawyers, employers and universities, outside its scope. Big tech companies may escape the regula- tions depending on who they say they’re processing data for. In the UK, as we already noted, neither the patient opt-outs nor the advertised de-identiﬁcation mechanisms are e↵ective. In many countries, more organisations than you might think have access to fully-identiﬁable data.

# Summary

Lots of people want to believe that you can turn sensitive personal data into an industrial raw material by stripping o↵ overt identiﬁers such as names. This only works in some well-deﬁned special cases, such as a national census – where we have a solid theory in the form of di↵erential privacy. In most cases, the data are just too rich and re-identiﬁcation of data subjects is easy.

However policymakers, marketers, medical researchers and others want so hard to believe that anonymity provides a magic solution to using personal data that it’s diﬃcult to disabuse them. The constant hype around big data and machine learning makes the education task harder, just as these technologies are making anonymity much harder still. We may expect serious trouble as the scale and the scope of the privacy lawbreaking become ever more clear to the public. It will probably take a scandal to bring real change, and when this eventually happens, the disruption is likely to be non-trivial.

# Research problems

At present there are several lively threads of research around anonymity and privacy. First, there are practical researchers who look for new ways of de- riving sensitive data from existing public data, or try to understand exploits being carried out by marketers and cyber-criminals. Second, there are math- ematicians looking at ways of doing di↵erentially-private machine learning in

various contexts, such as learning from data held by mutually mistrustful ﬁrms. Third, there are privacy law scholars trying to work out how the gap between law and practice could be closed. Fourth, there are practical campaigners (such as EPIC, Privacy International and Max Schrems) who bring lawsuits to try to stop practices that are becoming common yet which appear to violate the laws we already have. This ecosystem of theory, practice, scholarship and campaign- ing will no doubt continue to evolve as yet more of the stu↵ around us becomes ‘smart’. Will ‘smart cities’ simply mean even more pervasive surveillance? In the limit, will there be so much contextual information available that nothing short of di↵erential privacy will do? Or will society eventually say that enough is enough, and impose radical limits on the collection, analysis and use of data

– and what limits might have some chance of working? Finally, the latest magic potion is privacy-preserving federated machine learning. I’ve no doubt one can ﬁnd edge cases in which something like that can be made to work, as with dif- ferential privacy. But I suspect it will turn out to be just a variant of the snake oil we’ve been fed about anonymisation over the past forty years. (Hey, if you boil snake oil with sodium hydroxide, you should get snake soap.) What’s the best way to debunk that?

# Further reading

If you want to dive into the details of di↵erential privacy, a good starting point might be a long survey paper by Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth [594]. The classic reference on inference control is Dorothy Denning’s 1982 book [538]; the 1989 survey paper by Adam and Wortman is a good summary of the state of the art then [17]. An important reference for statisticians involved in U.S. government work is the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology’s *‘Report on Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology’* which introduces the tools and methods used in various US departments and agencies [667]; this dates back to 2005, so it’s somewhat out of date and is currently being rewritten. The UKAN book is a must-read if you’re doing anonymisation for a client operating within the UK’s jurisdiction [626]. As an example of a quite di↵erent application, Mark Allman and Vern Paxson discuss the problems of anonymizing IP packet traces for network systems research in [42]. Finally, Margo Anderson and William Seltzer’s papers on the abuses of census data in the US, particularly during World War 2, can be found at [52].