Chapter 2

Who is the Opponent?

Going all the way back to early time-sharing systems we systems people regarded the users, and any code they wrote, as the mortal

enemies of us and each other. We were like the police force in a violent slum.

– ROGER NEEDHAM

False face must hide what the false heart doth know

– MACBETH

# Introduction

Ideologues may deal with the world as they would wish it to be, but engineers deal with the world as it is. If you’re going to defend systems against attack, you ﬁrst need to know who your enemies are.

In the early days of computing, we mostly didn’t have real enemies; while banks and the military had to protect their systems, most other people didn’t really bother. The ﬁrst computer systems were isolated, serving a single com- pany or university. Students might try to hack the system to get more resources and sysadmins would try to stop them, but it was mostly a game. When dial-up connections started to appear, pranksters occasionally guessed passwords and left joke messages, as they’d done at university. The early Internet was a friendly place, inhabited by academics, engineers at tech companies, and a few hobby- ists. We knew that malware was possible but almost nobody took it seriously until the late 1980s when PC viruses appeared, followed by the Internet worm in 1988. (Even that was a student experiment that escaped from the lab; I tell the story in section 21.3.2.)

Things changed once everyone started to get online. The mid-1990s saw the ﬁrst spam, the late 1990s brought the ﬁrst distributed denial-of-service attack, and the explosion of mail-order business in the dotcom boom introduced credit card fraud. To begin with, online fraud was a cottage industry; the same person

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would steal credit card numbers and use them to buy goods which he’d then sell, or make up forged cards to use in a store. Things changed in the mid-2000s with the emergence of underground markets. These let the bad guys specialise

– one gang could write malware, another could harvest bank credentials, and yet others could devise ways of cashing out. This enabled them to get good at their jobs, to scale up and to globalise, just as manufacturing did in the late eighteenth century. The 2000s also saw the world’s governments putting in the e↵ort to ‘Master the Internet’ (as the NSA put it) – working out how to collect data at scale and index it, just as Google does, to make it available to analysts. It also saw the emergence of social networks, so that everyone could have a home online – not just geeks with the skills to create their own handcrafted web pages. And of course, once everyone is online, that includes not just the spooks and the crooks but also the jerks, creeps, racists and bullies.

Over the past decade, this threat landscape has stabilised. We also know quite a lot about it. Thanks to Ed Snowden and other whistleblowers, we know a lot about the capabilities and methods of Western intelligence services; we’ve also learned a lot about China, Russia and other nation-state threat actors. We know a lot about cybercrime; online crime now makes up about half of all crime, by volume and by value. There’s a substantial criminal infrastructure based on malware and botnets with which we are constantly struggling; there’s also a large ecosystem of scams. Many traditional crimes have gone online, and a typical ﬁrm has to worry not just about external fraudsters but also about dishonest insiders. Some ﬁrms have to worry about hostile governments, some about other ﬁrms, and some about activists. Many people have to deal with online hostility, from kids su↵ering cyber-bullying at school through harassment of elected politicians to people who are stalked by former partners. And our politics may become more polarised because of the dynamics of online extremism.

One of the ﬁrst things the security engineer needs to do when tackling a new problem is to identify the likely opponents. Although you can design some speciﬁc system components (such as cryptography) to resist all reasonable ad- versaries, the same is much less true for a complex real-world system. You can’t protect it against all possible threats and still expect it to do useful work at a reasonable cost. So what sort of capabilities will the adversaries have, and what motivation? How certain are you of this assessment, and how might it change over the system’s lifetime? In this chapter I will classify online and electronic threats depending on motive. First, I’ll discuss surveillance, intrusion and manipulation done by governments for reasons of state, ranging from cyber- intelligence to cyber-conﬂict operations. Second, I’ll deal with criminals whose motive is mainly money. Third will be researchers who ﬁnd vulnerabilities for fun or for money, or who report them out of social conscience – compelling ﬁrms to patch their software and clean up their operations. Finally, I’ll discuss bad actors whose reasons are personal and who mainly commit crimes against the person, from cyber-bullies to stalkers.

The big service ﬁrms, such as Microsoft, Google and Facebook, have to worry about all four classes of threat. Most ﬁrms and most private individuals will only be concerned with some of them. But it’s important for a security engineer to understand the big picture so you can help clients work out what their own threat model should be, and what sort of attacks they should plan to forestall.

# The spooks

Governments have a range of tools for both passive surveillance of networks and active attacks on computer systems. Hundreds of ﬁrms sell equipment for wire- tapping, for radio intercept, and for using various vulnerabilities to take over computers, phones and other digital devices. However, there are signiﬁcant dif- ferences among governments in scale, objectives and capabilities. We’ll discuss four representative categories – the USA and its allies, China, Russia and the Arab world – from the viewpoint of potential opponents. Even if the spooks aren’t in your threat model today, the tools they use will quite often end up in the hands of the crooks too, sooner or later.

## The Five Eyes

Just as everyone in a certain age range remembers where they were when John Lennon was shot, everyone who’s been in our trade since 2013 remembers where they were when they learned of the Snowden revelations on Friday 7th June of that year.

* + - 1. Prism

I was in a hotel in Palo Alto, California, reading the Guardian online before a scheduled visit to Google where I’d been as a scientiﬁc visitor in 2011, helping develop contactless payments for Android phones. The headline was ‘NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others’; the article, written by Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, describes a system called Prism that collects the gmail and other data of users who are not US citizens or permanent residents, and is carried out under an order from the FISA court [817]. After breakfast I drove to the Googleplex, and found that my former colleagues were just as perplexed as I was. They knew nothing about Prism. Neither did the gmail team. How could such a wiretap have been built? Had an order been served on Eric Schmidt, and if so how could he have implemented it without the mail and security teams knowing? As the day went on, people stopped talking.

It turned out that Prism was an internal NSA codename for an access channel that had been provided to the FBI to conduct warranted wiretaps. US law permits US citizens to be wiretapped provided an agency convinces a court to issue a warrant, based on ‘probable cause’ that they were up to no good; but foreigners could be wiretapped freely. So for a foreign target like me, all an NSA intelligence analyst had to do was click on a tab saying he believed I was a non-US person. The inquiry would be routed automatically via the FBI infrastructure and pipe my Gmail to their workstation. According to the article, this program had started at Microsoft in 2007; Yahoo had fought it in court, but lost, joining in late 2008; Google and Facebook had been added in 2009 and Apple ﬁnally in 2012. A system that people thought was providing targeted, warranted wiretaps to law enforcement was providing access at scale for foreign intelligence purposes, and according to a slide deck leaked to the Guardian it

was ‘the SIGAD1 most used in NSA reporting’.

The following day we learned that the source of the story was Edward Snow- den, an NSA system administrator who’d decided to blow the whistle. The story was that he’d smuggled over 50,000 classiﬁed documents out of a facility in Hawaii on a memory stick and met Guardian journalists in Hong Kong [818]. He tried to ﬂy to Latin America on June 21st to claim asylum, but after the US government cancelled his passport he got stuck in Moscow and eventually got asylum in Russia instead. A consortium of newspapers coordinated a series of stories describing the signals intelligence capabilities of the ‘Five Eyes’ countries

* the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – as well as how these capabilities were not just used but also abused.

The ﬁrst story based on the leaked documents had actually appeared two days before the Prism story; it was about how the FISA court had ordered Verizon to hand over all call data records (CDRs) to the NSA in February that year [814]. This hadn’t got much attention from security professionals as we knew the agencies did that anyway. But it certainly got the attention of lawyers and politicians, as it broke during the Privacy Law Scholars’ Conference and showed that US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper had lied to Congress when he’d testiﬁed that the NSA collects Americans’ domestic com- munications ‘only inadvertently’. And what was to follow changed everything.

* + - 1. Tempora

On June 21st, the press ran stories about Tempora, a program to collect in- telligence from international ﬁbre optic cables [1199]. This wasn’t a complete surprise; the journalist Duncan Campbell had described a system called Eche- lon in 1988 which tapped the Intelsat satellite network, keeping voice calls on tape while making metadata available for searching so that analysts could select traﬃc to or from phone numbers of interest [373, 374] (I’ll give more historical background in section 26.2.6). Snowden gave us an update on the technology. In Cornwall alone, 200 transatlantic ﬁbres were tapped and 46 could be collected at any one time. As each of these carried 10Gb/s, the total data volume could be as high as 21Pb a day, so the incoming data feeds undergo *massive volume reduction*, discarding video, news and the like. Material was then selected using *selectors* – not just phone numbers but more general search terms such as IP addresses – and stored for 30 days in case it turns out to be of interest.

The Tempora program, like Echelon before it, has heavy UK involvement. Britain has physical access to about a quarter of the Internet’s backbone, as modern cables tend to go where phone cables used to, and they were often laid between the same end stations as nineteenth-century telegraph cables. So one of the UK’s major intelligence assets turns out to be the legacy of the communications infrastructure it built to control its nineteenth-century empire. And the asset is indeed signiﬁcant: by 2012, 300 analysts from GCHQ, and 250 from the NSA, were sifting through the data, using 40,000 and 31,000 selectors respectively to sift 600m ‘telephone events’ each day.

1SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) Activity Designator

* + - 1. Muscular

One of the applications running on top of Tempora was Muscular. Revealed on October 30th, this collected data as it ﬂowed between the data centres of large service ﬁrms such as Yahoo and Google [2016]. Your mail may have been encrypted using SSL en route to the service’s front end, but it then ﬂowed in the clear between each company’s data centres. After an NSA PowerPoint slide on ‘Google Cloud Exploitation’ was published in the Washington Post – see ﬁgure

2.1 – the companies scrambled to encrypt everything on their networks. Execu- tives and engineers at cloud service ﬁrms took the smiley as a personal a↵ront. It reminded people in the industry that even if you comply with warrants, the spooks will also hack you if they can. It made people outside the industry stop and think: Google had accreted so much access to all our lives via search, mail, maps, calendars and other services that unrestricted intelligence-service access to its records (and to Facebook’s and Microsoft’s too) was a major privacy breach.




Figure 2.1: Muscular – the slide

Two years later, at a meeting at Princeton which Snowden attended in the form of a telepresence robot, he pointed out that a lot of Internet communica- tions that appear to be encrypted aren’t really, as modern websites use content delivery networks (CDNs) such as Akamai and Cloudﬂare; while the web traﬃc is encrypted from the user’s laptop or phone to the CDN’s point of presence at their ISP, it isn’t encrypted on the backhaul unless they pay extra – which most of them don’t [86]. So the customer thinks the link is encrypted, and it’s protected from casual snooping – but not from nation states or ﬁrms who can read backbone traﬃc.

* + - 1. Special collection

The NSA and CIA jointly operate the Special Collection Service (SCS) whose most visible activity may be the plastic panels near the roofs of US and allied

embassies worldwide; these hide antennas for hoovering up cellular communica- tion (a program known as ‘Stateroom’). Beyond this, SCS implants collection equipment in foreign telcos, Internet exchanges and government facilities. This can involve classical spy tradecraft, from placing bugs that monitor speech or electronic communications, through recruiting moles in target organisations, to the covert deployment of antennas in target countries to tap internal microwave links. Such techniques are not restricted to state targets: Mexican drug car- tel leader ‘El Chapo’ Guzman was caught after US agents suborned his system administrator.

Close-access operations include Tempest monitoring: the collection of infor- mation leaked by the electromagnetic emissions from computer monitors and other equipment, described in 19.3.2. The Snowden leaks disclose the collection of computer screen data and other electromagnetic emanations from a number of countries’ embassies and UN missions including those of India, Japan, Slovakia and the EU.2.

* + - 1. Bullrun and Edgehill

Special collection increasingly involves supply-chain tampering. SCS routinely intercepts equipment such as routers being exported from the USA, adds surveil- lance implants, repackages them with factory seals and sends them onward to customers. And an extreme form of supply-chain tampering was when the NSA covertly bought Crypto AG, a Swiss ﬁrm that was the main supplier of cryp- tographic equipment to non-aligned countries during the Cold War; I tell the story in more detail later in section 26.2.7.1.

Bullrun is the NSA codename, and Edgehill the GCHQ one, for ‘crypto enabling’, a $100m-a-year program of tampering with supplies and suppliers at all levels of the stack. This starts o↵ with attempts to direct, or misdi- rect, academic research3; it continued with placing trusted people on standards committees, and using NIST’s inﬂuence to get weak standards adopted. One spectacular incident was the Dual EC\_DRBG debacle, where NIST standardised a random number generator based on elliptic curves that turned out to contain an NSA backdoor. Most of the actual damage, though, was done by restrictions on cryptographic key length, dovetailed with diplomatic pressure on allies to en- force export controls, so that ﬁrms needing export licenses could have their arms twisted to use an ‘appropriate’ standard, and was entangled with the Crypto Wars (which I discuss in section 26.2.7). The result was that many of the systems in use today were compelled to use weak cryptography, leading to vulnerabili- ties in everything from hotel and car door locks to VPNs. In addition to that, supply-chain attacks introduce covert vulnerabilities into widely-used software; many nation states play this game, along with some private actors [890]. We’ll see vulnerabilities that result from surveillance and cryptography policies in one

2If the NSA needs to use high-tech collection against you as they can’t get a software implant into your computer, that may be a compliment!

3In the 1990s, when I bid to run a research program in coding theory, cryptography and computer security at the Isaac Newton Institute at Cambridge University, a senior oﬃcial from GCHQ o↵ered the institute a £50,000 donation not to go ahead, saying “There’s nothing interesting happening in cryptography, and Her Majesty’s Government would like this state of a↵airs to continue”. He was shown the door.

chapter after another, and return in Part 3 of the book to discuss the policy history in more detail.

* + - 1. Xkeyscore

With such a vast collection of data, you need good tools to search it. The Five Eyes search computer data using Xkeyscore, a distributed database that enables an analyst to search collected data remotely and assemble the results. Exposed on July 31 2013, NSA documents describe it as its “widest-reaching” system for developing intelligence; it enables an analyst to search emails, SMSes, chats, address book entries and browsing histories [815]. Examples in a 2008 training deck include “my target speaks German but is in Pakistan. How can I ﬁnd him?” “Show me all the encrypted Word documents from Iran” and “Show me all PGP usage in Iran”. By searching for anomalous behaviour, the analyst can ﬁnd suspects and identify strong selectors (such as email addresses, phone numbers or IP addresses) for more conventional collection.

Xkeyscore is a federated system, where one query scans all sites. Its compo- nents bu↵er information at collection points – in 2008, 700 servers at 150 sites. Some appear to be hacked systems overseas from which the NSA malware can exﬁltrate data matching a submitted query. The only judicial approval required is a prompt for the analyst to enter a reason why they believe that one of the parties to the conversation is not resident in the USA. The volumes are such that traﬃc data are kept for 30 days but content for only 3–5 days. Tasked items are extracted and sent on to whoever requested them, and there’s a notiﬁcation system (Traﬃcthief) for tipping o↵ analysts when their targets do anything of interest. Extraction is based either on ﬁngerprints or plugins – the latter allow analysts to respond quickly with detectors for new challenges like steganography and homebrew encryption.

Xkeyscore can also be used for target discovery: one of the training queries is “Show me all the exploitable machines in country X” (machine ﬁngerprints are compiled by a crawler called Mugshot). For example, it came out in 2015 that GCHQ and the NSA hacked the world’s leading provider of SIM cards, the Franco-Dutch company Gemalto, to compromise the keys needed to in- tercept (and if need be spoof) the traﬃc from hundreds of millions of mobile phones [1658]. The hack used Xkeyscore to identify the ﬁrm’s sysadmins, who were then phished; agents were also able to compromise billing servers to sup- press SMS billing and authentication servers to steal keys; another technique was to harvest keys in transit from Gemalto to mobile service providers. Ac- cording to an interview with Snowden in 2014, Xkeyscore also lets an analyst build a ﬁngerprint of any target’s online activity so that they can be followed automatically round the world. The successes of this system are claimed to include the capture of over 300 terrorists; in one case, Al-Qaida’s Sheikh Atiy- atallah blew his cover by googling himself, his various aliases, an associate and the name of his book [1658].

There’s a collection of decks on Xkeyscore with a survey by Morgan Marquis- Boire, Glenn Greenwald and Micah Lee [1230]; a careful reading of the decks

can be a good starting point for exploring the Snowden hoard4.

* + - 1. Longhaul

Bulk key theft and supply-chain tampering are not the only ways to defeat cryptography. The Xkeyscore training deck gives an example: “Show me all the VPN startups in country X, and give me the data so I can decrypt and discover the users”. VPNs appear to be easily defeated; a decryption service called Longhaul ingests ciphertext and returns plaintext. The detailed description of cryptanalytic techniques is held as *Extremely Compartmented Information* (ECI) and is not found in the Snowden papers, but some of them talk of recent breakthroughs in cryptanalysis. What might these be?

The leaks do show diligent collection of the protocol messages used to set up VPN encryption, so some cryptographers suggested in 2015 that some variant of the “Logjam attack” is feasible for a nation-state attacker against the 1024-bit prime used by most VPNs and many TLS connections with Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange [26]. Others pointed to the involvement of NSA cryptographers in the relevant standard, and a protocol ﬂaw discovered later; yet others pointed out that even with advances in number theory or protocol exploits, the NSA has enough money to simply break 1024-bit Diﬃe-Hellman by brute force, and this would be easily justiﬁed if many people used the same small number of prime moduli – which they do [853]. I’ll discuss cryptanalysis in more detail in Chapter 5.

* + - 1. Quantum

There is a long history of attacks on protocols, which can be spoofed, replayed and manipulated in various ways. (We’ll discuss this topic in detail in Chap- ter 4.) The best-documented NSA attack on Internet traﬃc goes under the codename of Quantum and involves the dynamic exploitation of one of the communication end-points. Thus, to tap an encrypted SSL/TLS session to a webmail provider, the Quantum system ﬁres a ‘shot’ that exploits the browser. There are various ﬂavours; in ‘Quantuminsert’, an injected packet redirects the browser to a ‘Foxacid’ attack server. Other variants attack software updates and the advertising networks whose code runs in mobile phone apps [1995].

* + - 1. CNE

Computer and Network Exploitation (CNE) is the generic NSA term for hack- ing, and it can be used for more than just key theft or TLS session hijacking; it can be used to acquire access to traﬃc too. Operation Socialist was the GCHQ codename for a hack of Belgium’s main telco Belgacom5, in 2010–11. GCHQ attackers used Xkeyscore to identify three key Belgacom technical sta↵, then used Quantuminsert to take over their PCs when they visited sites like LinkedIn. The attackers then used their sysadmin privileges to install malware

4There’s also a search engine for the collection at [https://www.edwardsnowden.com](http://www.edwardsnowden.com/).

5It is now called Proximus.

on dozens of servers, including authentication servers to leverage further access, billing servers so they could cover their tracks, and the company’s core Cisco routers [734]. This gave them access to large quantities of mobile roaming traﬃc, as Belgacom provides service to many foreign providers when their subscribers roam in Europe. The idea that one NATO and EU member state would conduct a cyber-attack on the critical infrastructure of another took many by surprise. The attack also gave GCHQ access to the phone system in the European Com- mission and other European institutions. Given that these institutions make many of the laws for the UK and other member states, this was almost as if a US state governor had got his state troopers to hack AT&T so he could wiretap Congress and the White House.

Belgacom engineers started to suspect something was wrong in 2012, and realised they’d been hacked in the spring of 2013; an anti-virus company found sophisticated malware masquerading as Windows ﬁles. The story went pub- lic in September 2013, and the German news magazine Der Spiegel published Snowden documents showing that GCHQ was responsible. After the Belgian prosecutor reported in February 2018, we learned that the attack must have been authorised by then UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, but there was not enough evidence to prosecute anyone; the investigation had been hampered in all sorts of ways both technical and political; the software started deleting itself within minutes of discovery, and institutions such as Europol (whose head was British) refused to help. The Belgian minister responsible for telecomms, Alexander de Croo, even suggested that Belgium’s own intelligence service might have informally given the operation a green light [735]. Europol later adopted a policy that it will help investigate hacks of ‘suspected criminal origin’; it has nothing to say about hacks by governments.

A GCHQ slide deck on CNE explains that it’s used to support conventional sigint both by redirecting traﬃc and by “enabling” (breaking) cryptography; that it must always be “UK deniable”; and that it can also be used for “ef- fects”, such as degrading communications or “changing users’ passwords on ex- tremist website” [735]. Other papers show that the agencies frequently target admins of phone companies and ISPs in the Middle East, Africa and indeed worldwide – compromising a key technician is “generally the entry ticket to the network” [1139]. As one phone company executive explained, “The MNOs were clueless at the time about network security. Most networks were open to their suppliers for remote maintenance with an ID and password and the techie in China or India had no clue that their PC had been hacked”.

The hacking tools and methods used by the NSA and its allies are now fairly well understood; some are shared with law enforcement. The Snowden papers reveal an internal store where analysts can get a variety of tools; a series of leaks in 2016–7 by the Shadow Brokers (thought to be Russian military intelli- gence, the GRU) disclosed a number of actual NSA malware samples, used by hackers at the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations team to launch attacks [238]. (Some of these tools were repurposed by the Russians to launch the NotPetya worm and by the North Koreans in Wannacry, as I’ll discuss later.) The best documentation of all is probably about a separate store of goodies used by the CIA, disclosed in some detail to Wikileaks in the ‘Vault 7’ leaks in 2017. These include manuals for tools that can be used to install a remote access Trojan

on your machine, with components to geolocate it and to exﬁltrate ﬁles (in- cluding SSH credentials), audio and video; a tool to jump air gaps by infecting thumb drives; a tool for infecting wiﬁ routers so they’ll do man-in-the-middle attacks; and even a tool for watermarking documents so a whistleblower who leaks them could be tracked. Many of the tools are available not just for Win- dows but also for OSX and Android; some infect ﬁrmware, making them hard to remove. There are tools for hacking TVs and IoT devices too, and tools to hamper forensic investigations. The Vault 7 documents are useful reading if you’re curious about the speciﬁcations and manuals for modern government malware [2019]. As an example of the law-enforcement use of such tools, in June 2020 it emerged that the French police in Lille had since 2018 installed malware on thousands of Android phones running EncroChat, an encrypted messaging system favoured by criminals, leading to the arrest of 800 criminal suspects in France, the Netherlands, the UK and elsewhere, as well as the arrest of several police oﬃcers for corruption and the seizure of several tons of drugs [1332].

* + - 1. The analyst’s viewpoint

The intelligence analyst thus has a big bag of tools. If they’re trying to ﬁnd the key people in an organisation – whether the policymakers advising on a critical decision, or the lawyers involved in laundering an oligarch’s proﬁts – they can use the traﬃc data in Xkeyscore to map contact networks. There are various neat tools to help, such as ‘Cotraveler’ which ﬂags up mobile phones that have traveled together. We have some insight into this process from our own research into cybercrime, where we scrape tens of millions of messages from underground forums and analyse them to understand crime types new and old. One might describe the process as ‘adaptive message mining’. Just as you use adaptive text mining when you do a web search, and constantly reﬁne your search terms based on samples of what you ﬁnd, with message mining you also have metadata

* so you can follow threads, trace actors across forums, do clustering analysis and use various other tricks to ‘ﬁnd more messages like this one’. The ability to switch back and forth between the detailed view you get from reading individual messages, and the statistical view you get from analysing bulk collections, is extremely powerful.

Once the analyst moves from the hunting phase to the gathering phase, they can use Prism to look at the targets’ accounts at Facebook, Google and Mi- crosoft, while Xkeyscore will let them see what websites they visit. Traﬃc data analysis gives still more: despite the growing use of encryption, the communi- cations to and from a home reveal what app or device is used when and for how long6. The agencies are pushing for access to end-to-end messaging systems such as WhatsApp; in countries like the UK, Australia and China, legislators have already authorised this, though it’s not at all clear which US companies might comply (I’ll discuss policy in Chapter 26).

Given a high-value target, there’s a big bag of tools the analyst can install on their laptop or cellphone directly. They can locate it physically, turn it into a room bug and even use it as a remote camera. They can download

6See for example Hill and Mattu who wiretapped a modern smart home to measure this [900].

the target’s address book and contact history and feed that into Xkeyscore to search recursively for their direct and indirect contacts. Meanwhile the analyst can bug messaging apps, beating the end-to-end encryption by collecting the call contents once they’ve been decrypted. They can set up an alarm to notify them whenever the target sends or receives messages of interest, or changes location. The coverage is pretty complete. And when it’s time for the kill, the target’s phone can be used to guide a bomb or a missile. Little wonder Ed Snowden insisted that journalists interviewing him put their phones in the fridge!

Finally, the analyst has also a proxy through which they can access the Internet surreptitiously – typically a machine on a botnet. It might even be the PC in your home oﬃce.

* + - 1. O↵ensive operations

The Director NSA also heads the US Cyber Command, which since 2009 has been one of ten uniﬁed commands of the United States Department of Defense. It is responsible for o↵ensive cyber operations, of which the one that made a real di↵erence was Stuxnet. This was a worm designed to damage Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges by speeding them up and slowing them down in patterns designed to cause mechanical damage, and was developed jointly by the USA and Israel [325, 826]. It was technically sophisticated, using four zero- day exploits and two stolen code-signing certiﬁcates to spread promiscuously through Windows PCs, until it found Siemens programmable logic controllers of the type used at Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant – where it would then install a rootkit that would issue the destructive commands, while the PC assured the operators that everything was ﬁne. It was apparently introduced using USB drives to bridge the air gap to the Iranian systems, and came to light in 2010 after copies had somehow spread to central Asia and Indonesia. Two other varieties of malware (Flame and Duqu) were then discovered using similar tricks and common code, performing surveillance at a number of companies in the Middle East and South Asia; more recent code-analysis tools have traced a lineage of malware that goes back to 2002 (Flowershop) and continued to operate until 2016 (with the Equation Group tools) [2068].

Stuxnet acted as a wake-up call for other governments, which rushed to ac- quire ‘cyber-weapons’ and develop o↵ensive cyber *doctrine* – a set of principles for what cyber warriors might do, developed with some thought given to ratio- nale, strategy, tactics and legality. Oh, and the price of zero-day vulnerabilities rose sharply.

* + - 1. Attack scaling

Computer scientists know the importance of how algorithms scale, and exactly the same holds for attacks. Tapping a single mobile phone is hard. You have to drive around behind the suspect with radio and cryptanalysis gear in your car, risk being spotted, and hope that you manage to catch the suspect’s signal as they roam from one cell to another. Or you can drive behind them with a false

base station7 and hope his phone will roam to it as the signal is louder than the genuine one; but then you risk electronic detection too. Both are highly skilled work and low-yield: you lose the signal maybe a quarter of the time. So if you want to wiretap someone in central Paris often enough, why not just wiretap everyone? Put antennas on your embassy roof, collect it all, write the decrypted calls and text messages into a database, and reconstruct the sessions electronically. If you want to hack everyone in France, hack the telco, perhaps by subverting the equipment it uses. At each stage the capital cost goes up but the marginal cost of each tap goes down. The Five Eyes strategy is essentially to collect everything in the world; it might cost billions to establish and maintain the infrastructure, but once it’s there you have everything.

The same applies to o↵ensive cyber operations, which are rather like sabo- tage. In wartime, you can send commandos to blow up an enemy radar station; but if you do it more than once or twice, your lads will start to run into a lot of sentries. So we scale kinetic attacks di↵erently: by building hundreds of bomber aircraft, or artillery pieces, or (nowadays) thousands of drones. So how do you scale a cyber attack to take down not just one power station, but the opponent’s whole power grid? The Five Eyes approach is this. Just as Google keeps a copy of the Internet on a few thousand servers, with all the content and links indexed, US Cyber Command keeps a copy of the Internet that indexes what version of software all the machines in the world are using – the Mugshot system mentioned above – so a Five Eyes cyber warrior can instantly see which targets can be taken over by which exploits.

A key question for competitor states, therefore, is not just to what extent they can create some electronic spaces that are generally o↵-limits to the Five Eyes. It’s the extent to which they can scale up their own intelligence and o↵ensive capabilities rather than having to rely on America. The number of scans and probes that we see online indicates that the NSA are not alone in trying to build cyber weapons that scale. Not all of them might be nation states; some might simply be arms vendors or mercenaries. This raises a host of policy problems to which we’ll return in Part 3. For now we’ll continue to look at capabilities.

## China

China is now the leading competitor to the USA, being second not just in terms of GDP but as a technology powerhouse. The Chinese lack the NSA’s network of alliances and access to global infrastructure (although they’re working hard at that). Within China itself, however, they demand unrestricted access to local data. Some US service ﬁrms used to operate there, but trouble followed. After Yahoo’s systems were used to trap the dissident Wang Xiaoning in 2002, Alibaba took over Yahoo’s China operation in 2005; but there was still a row when Wang’s wife sued Yahoo in US courts in 2007, and showed that Yahoo had misled Congress over the matter [1760]. In 2008, it emerged that the version of Skype available in China had been modiﬁed so that messages were scanned for sensitive keywords and, if they were found, the user’s texts were uploaded to a

7These devices are known in the USA as a Stingray and in Europe as an IMSI-catcher; they conduct a man-in-the-middle attack of the kind we’ll discuss in detail in section 22.2.1.

server in China [1959]. In December 2009, Google discovered a Chinese attack on its corporate infrastructure, which became known as Operation Aurora; Chinese agents had hacked into the Google systems used to do wiretaps for the FBI (see Prism above) in order to discover which of their own agents in the USA were under surveillance. Google had already su↵ered criticism for operating a censored version of their search engine for Chinese users, and a few months later, they pulled out of China. By this time, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube had already been blocked. A Chinese strategy was emerging of total domestic control, augmented by ever-more aggressive collection overseas.

From about 2002, there had been a series of hacking attacks on US and UK defence agencies and contractors, codenamed ‘Titan Rain’ and ascribed to the Chinese armed forces. According to a 2004 study by the US Foreign Military Studies Oﬃce (FMSO), Chinese military doctrine sees the country in a state of war with the West; we are continuing the Cold War by attacking China, trying to overthrow its communist regime by exporting subversive ideas to it over the Internet [1881]. Chinese leaders see US service ﬁrms, news websites and anonymity tools such as Tor (which the State Department funds so that Chinese and other people can defeat censorship) as being of one fabric with the US surveillance satellites and aircraft that observe their military defences. Yahoo and Google were thus seen as fair game, just like Lockheed Martin and BAe.

Our own group’s ﬁrst contact with the Chinese came in 2008. We were asked for help by the Dalai Lama, who had realised that the Chinese had hacked his oﬃce systems in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics that year. One of my research students, Shishir Nagaraja, happened to be in Delhi waiting for his UK visa to be renewed, so he volunteered to go up to the Tibetan HQ in Dharamsala and run some forensics. He found that about 35 of the 50 PCs in the oﬃce of the Tibetan government in exile had been hacked; information was being siphoned o↵ to China, to IP addresses located near the three organs of Chinese state security charged with di↵erent aspects of Tibetan a↵airs. The attackers appear to have got in by sending one of the monks an email that seemed to come from a colleague; when he clicked on the attached PDF, it had a JavaScript bu↵er overﬂow that used a vulnerability in Adobe Reader to take over his machine. This technique is called *phishing*, as it works by o↵ering a lure that someone bites on; when it’s aimed at a speciﬁc individual (as in this case) it’s called *spear phishing*. They then compromised the Tibetans’ mail server, so that whenever one person in the oﬃce sent a .pdf ﬁle to another, it would arrive with an embedded attack. The mail server itself was in California.

This is pretty sobering, when you stop to think about it. You get an email from a colleague sitting ten feet away, you ask him if he just sent it – and when he says yes, you click on the attachment. And your machine is suddenly infected by a server that you rent ten thousand miles away in a friendly country. We wrote this up in a tech report on the ‘Snooping Dragon’ [1374]. After it came out, we had to deal for a while with attacks on our equipment, and heckling at conference talks by Chinese people who claimed we had no evidence to attribute the attacks to their government. Colleagues at the Open Net Initiative in Toronto followed through, and eventually found from analysis of the hacking tools’ dashboard that the same espionage network had targeted 1,295 computers in 103 countries [1223]

* ranging from the Indian embassy in Washington through Associated Press in New York to the ministries of foreign a↵airs in Thailand, Iran and Laos.

There followed a series of further reports of Chinese state hacking, from a complex dispute with Rio Tinto in 2009 over the price of iron ore and a hack of the Melbourne International Film festival in the same year when it showed a ﬁlm about a Uighur leader [1898]. In 2011, the Chinese hacked the CIA’s covert communications system, after the Iranians had traced it, and executed about 30 agents – though that did not become publicly known till later [578]. The ﬁrst ﬂashbulb moment was a leaked Pentagon report in 2013 that Chinese hackers had stolen some of the secrets of the F35 joint strike ﬁghter, as well as a series of other weapon systems [1379]. Meanwhile China and Hong Kong were amounting for over 80% of all counterfeit goods seized at US ports. The Obama administration vowed to make investigations and prosecutions in the theft of trade secrets a top priority, and the following year ﬁve members of the People’s Liberation Army were indicted in absentia.

The White House felt compelled to act once more after the June 2015 news that the Chinese had hacked the Oﬃce of Personnel Management (OPM), get- ting access to highly personal data on 22 million current and former federal employees, ranging from ﬁngerprints to sensitive information from security clear- ance interviews. Sta↵ applying for Top Secret clearances are ordered to divulge all information that could be used to blackmail them, from teenage drug use to closeted gay relationships. All sexual partners in the past ﬁve years have to be declared for a normal Top Secret clearance; for a Strap clearance (to deal with signals intelligence material) the candidate even has to report any foreigners they meet regularly at their church. So this leak a↵ected more than just 22 million people. Oﬃcially, this invasive data collection is to mitigate the risk that intelligence agency sta↵ can be blackmailed. (Cynics supposed it was also so that whistleblowers could be discredited.) Whatever the motives, putting all such information in one place was beyond stupid; it was a real ‘database of ruin’. For the Chinese to get all the compromising information on every American with a sensitive government job was jaw-dropping. (Britain screwed up too; in 2008, a navy oﬃcer lost a laptop containing the personal data of 600,000 people who had joined the Royal Navy, or tried to [1072].) At a summit in September that year, Presidents Obama and Xi agreed to refrain from computer-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain8. Nothing was said in public though about military secrets – or the sex lives of federal agents.

The Chinese attacks of the 2000s used smart people plus simple tools; the attacks on the Tibetans used Russian crimeware as the remote access Trojans. The state also co-opted groups of ‘patriotic hackers’, or perhaps used them for deniability; some analysts noted waves of na¨ıve attacks on western ﬁrms that were correlated with Chinese university terms, and wondered whether students had been tasked to hack as coursework. The UK police and security service warned UK ﬁrms in 2007. By 2009, multiple Chinese probes had been reported on US electricity ﬁrms, and by 2010, Chinese spear-phishing attacks had been

8The Chinese have kept their promise; according to US ﬁrms doing business in China, IP is now sixth on the list of concerns, down from second in 2014 [704]. In any case, the phrase ‘IP theft’ was always a simpliﬁcation, used to conﬂate the theft of classiﬁed information defence contractors with the larger issue of compelled technology transfer by other ﬁrms who wanted access to Chinese markets and the side-issue of counterfeiting.

reported on government targets in the USA, Poland and Belgium [1304]. As with the Tibetan attacks, these typically used crude tools and had such poor operational security that it was fairly clear where they came from.

By 2020 the attacks had become more sophisticated, with a series of ad- vanced persistent threats (APTs) tracked by threat intelligence ﬁrms. A cam- paign to hack the phones of Uighurs involved multiple zero-day attacks, even on iPhones, that were delivered via compromised Uighur websites [393]; this targeted not only Uighurs in China but the diaspora too. China also conducts industrial and commercial espionage, and Western agencies claim they exploit managed service providers9. Another approach was attacking software supply chains; a Chinese group variously called Wicked Panda or Barium compromised software updates from computer maker Asus, a PC cleanup tool and a Korean remote management tool, as well as three popular computer games, getting its malware installed on millions of machines; rather than launching banking trojans or ransomware, it was then used for spying [810]. Just as in GCHQ’s Operation Socialist, such indirect strategies give a way to scale attacks in territory where you’re not the sovereign. And China was also playing the Socialist game: it came out in 2019 that someone had hacked at least ten western mobile phone companies over the previous seven years and exﬁltrated call data records – and that the perpetrators appeared to be the APT10 gang, linked to the Chinese military [2017].

Since 2018 there has been a political row over whether Chinese ﬁrms should be permitted to sell routers and 5g network hardware in NATO countries, with the Trump administration blacklisting Huawei in May 2019. There had been a previous spat over another Chinese ﬁrm, ZTE; in 2018 GCHQ warned that ZTE equipment “would present risk to UK national security that could not be mitigated e↵ectively or practicably” [1475]10. President Trump banned ZTE for breaking sanctions on North Korea and Iran, but relented and allowed its equipment back in the USA subject to security controls11.

The security controls route had been tried with Huawei, which set up a cen- tre in Oxfordshire in 2010 where GCHQ could study its software as a condition of the company’s being allowed to sell in the UK. While the analysts did not ﬁnd any backdoors, their 2019 report surfaced some scathing criticisms of Huawei’s software engineering practices [931]. Huawei had copied a lot of code, couldn’t patch what they didn’t understand, and no progress was being made in tackling many problems despite years of promises. There was an unmanageable num- ber of versions of OpenSSL, including versions that had known vulnerabilities and that were not supported: 70 full copies of 4 di↵erent OpenSSL versions, and 304 partial copies of 14 versions. Not only could the Chinese hack the Huawei systems; so could anybody. Their equipment had been excluded for

9This became public in 2019 with the claim that they had hacked Wipro and used this to compromise their customers [1093]; but it later emerged that Wipro had been hacked by a crime gang operating for proﬁt.

10The only router vendor to have actually been caught with a malicious backdoor in its code is the US company Juniper, which not only used the NSA’s Dual-EC backdoor to make VPN traﬃc exploitable, but did it in such a clumsy way that others could exploit it too – and at least one other party did so [413].

11This was done as a favour to President Xi, according to former National Security Adviser John Bolton, who declared himself ‘appalled’ that the president would interfere in a criminal prosecution [156].

some years from UK backbone routers and from systems used for wiretapping. The UK demanded “sustained evidence of improvement across multiple versions and multiple product ranges” before it will put any more trust in it. A num- ber of countries, including Australia and New Zealand, then banned Huawei equipment outright, and in 2019 Canada arrested Huawei’s CFO (who is also its founder’s daughter) following a US request to extradite her for conspiring to defraud global banks about Huawei’s relationship with a company operating in Iran. China retaliated by arresting two Canadians, one a diplomat on leave, on spurious espionage charges, and by sentencing two others to death on drugs charges. The USA hit back with a ban on US suppliers selling chips, software or support to Huawei. The UK banned the purchase of their telecomms equip- ment from the end of 2020 and said it would remove it from UK networks by 2027. Meanwhile, China is helping many less developed countries modernise their networks, and this access may help them rival the Five Eyes’ scope in due course. Trade policy, industrial policy and cyber-defence strategy have become intertwined in a new Cold War.

Strategically, the question may not be just whether China could use Huawei routers to wiretap other countries at scale, so much as whether they could use it in time of tension to launch DDoS attacks that would break the Internet by subverting BGP routing. I discuss this in more detail in the section 21.2.1. For years, China’s doctrine of ‘Peaceful Rise’ meant avoiding conﬂict with other ma- jor powers until they’re strong enough. The overall posture is one of largely de- fensive information warfare, combining pervasive surveillance at home, a walled- garden domestic Internet that is better defended against cyber-attack than any- one else’s, plus considerable and growing capabilities, which are mainly used for diligent intelligence-gathering in support of national strategic interests. They are starting to bully other countries in various ways that sometimes involve on- line operations. In 2016, during a dispute with Vietnam over some islands in the South China Sea, they hacked the airport systems in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, displaying insulting messages and forcing manual check-in for pas- sengers [1195]. In 2020, the EU has denounced China for spreading disruptive fake news about the coronavirus pandemic [1577], and Australia has denounced cyber-attacks that have happened since it called for an international inquiry into the pandemic’s origins [935]. These information operations displayed a ﬁrst-class overt and covert disinformation capability and followed previous more limited campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan [564]. Diplomatic commentators note that China’s trade policy, although aggressive, is no di↵erent from Japan’s in the 1970s and not as aggressive as America’s; that the new Cold War is just as misguided and just as likely to be wasteful and dangerous as the last one; that China still upholds the international order more than it disrupts it; and that it upholds it more consistently than the USA has done since WWII [704]. China’s external propaganda aim is to present itself as a positive socio-economic role model for the world, as it competes for access and inﬂuence and emerges as a peer competitor to the USA and Europe.

## Russia

Russia, like China, lacks America’s platform advantage and compensates with hacking teams that use spear-phishing and malware. Unlike China, it takes the low road, acting frequently as a spoiler, trying to disrupt the international order, and sometimes beneﬁting directly via a rise in the price of oil, its main export. The historian Timothy Snyder describes Putin’s rise to power and his embrace of oligarchs, orthodox Christianity, homophobia and the fascist ideologue Ivan Ilyin, especially since rigged elections in 2012. This leaves the Russian state in need of perpetual struggle against external enemies who threaten the purity of the Russian people [1798]. Its strategic posture online is di↵erent from China’s in four ways. First, it’s a major centre for cybercrime; underground markets ﬁrst emerged in Russia and the Ukraine in 2003–5, as we’ll discuss in the follow- ing section on cybercrime. Second, although Russia is trying to become more closed like China, its domestic Internet is relatively open and intertwined with the West’s, including major service ﬁrms such as VK and Yandex [605]. Third, Russia’s strategy of re-establishing itself as a regional power has been pursued much more aggressively than China’s, with direct military interference in neigh- bours such as Georgia and the Ukraine. These interventions have involved a mixed strategy of cyber-attacks plus ‘little green men’ – troops without Russian insignia on their uniforms – with a political strategy of denial. Fourth, Russia was humiliated by the USA and Europe when the USSR collapsed in 1989, and still feels encircled. Since about 2005 its goal has been to undermine the USA and the EU, and to promote authoritarianism and nationalism as an alternative to the rules-based international order. This has been pursued more forcefully since 2013; Snyder tells the history [1798]. With Brexit, with the emergence of authoritarian governments in Hungary, Turkey and Poland, and with author- itarians in coalition governments in Italy, Slovakia and Austria, this strategy appears to be winning.

Russian cyber-attacks came to prominence in 2007, after Estonia moved a much-hated Soviet-era statue in Tallinn to a less prominent site, and the Russians felt insulted. DDoS attacks on government oﬃces, banks and media companies forced Estonia to rate-limit its external Internet access for a few weeks [692]. Russia refused to extradite the perpetrators, most of whom were Russian, though one ethnic-Russian Estonian teenager was ﬁned. Sceptics said that the attacks seemed the work of amateurs and worked because the Estoni- ans hadn’t hardened their systems the way US service providers do. Estonia nonetheless appealed to NATO for help, and one outcome was the Tallinn Man- ual, which sets out the law of cyber conﬂict [1664]. I’ll discuss this in more detail in the chapter on electronic and information warfare, in section 23.8. The following year, after the outbreak of a brief war between Russia and Georgia, Russian hackers set up a website with a list of targets in Georgia for Russian patriots to attack [1990].

Estonia and Georgia were little more than warm-ups for the Ukraine. Fol- lowing demonstrations in Maidan Square in Kiev against pro-Russian President Yanukovich, and an intervention in February 2014 by Russian mercenaries who shot about a hundred demonstrators, Yanukovich ﬂed. The Russians invaded Ukraine on February 24th, annexing Crimea and setting up two puppet states in the Donbass area of eastern Ukraine. Their tactics combined Russian spe-

cial forces in plain uniforms, a welter of propaganda claims of an insurgency by Russian-speaking Ukrainians or of Russia helping defend the population against Ukrainian fascists or of defending Russian purity against homosexuals and Jews; all of this coordinated with a variety of cyber-attacks. For example, in May the Russians hacked the website of the Ukrainian election commission and rigged it to display a message that a nationalist who’d received less than 1% of the vote had won; this was spotted and blocked, but Russian media announced the bogus result anyway [1798].

The following year, as the conﬂict dragged on, Russia took down 30 elec- tricity substations on three di↵erent distribution systems within half an hour of each other, leaving 230,000 people without electricity for several hours. They involved multiple di↵erent attack vectors that had been implanted over a period of months, and since they followed a Ukrainian attack on power distribution in Crimea – and switched equipment o↵ when they could have destroyed it instead

* seemed to have been intended as a warning [2067]. This attack was still tiny compared with the other e↵ects of the conﬂict, which included the shooting down of a Malaysian Airlines airliner with the loss of all on board; but it was the ﬁrst cyber-attack to disrupt mains electricity. Finally on June 27 2017 came the NotPetya attack – by far the most damaging cyber-attack to date [813].

The NotPetya worm was initially distributed using the update service for MeDoc, the accounting software used by the great majority of Ukrainian busi- nesses. It then spread laterally in organisations across Windows ﬁle-shares using the EternalBlue vulnerability, an NSA exploit with an interesting history. From March 2016, a Chinese gang started using it against targets in Vietnam, Hong Kong and the Philippines, perhaps as a result of ﬁnding and reverse engineering it (it’s said that you don’t launch a cyberweapon; you share it). It was leaked by a gang called the ‘Shadow Brokers’ in April 2017, along with other NSA software that the Chinese didn’t deploy, and then used by the Russians in June. The NotPetya worm used EternalBlue together with the Mimikatz tool that recovers passwords from Windows memory. The worm’s payload pretended to be ransomware; it encrypted the infected computer’s hard disk and demanded a ransom of $300 in bitcoin. But there was no mechanism to decrypt the ﬁles of computer owners who paid the ransom, so it was really a destructive service- denial worm. The only way to deal with it was to re-install the operating system and restore ﬁles from backup.

The NotPetya attack took down banks, telcos and even the radiation moni- toring systems at the former Chernobyl nuclear plant. What’s more, it spread from the Ukraine to international ﬁrms who had oﬃces there. The world’s largest container shipping company, Maersk, had to replace most of its comput- ers and compensate customers for late shipments, at a cost of $300m; FedEx also lost $300m, and Mondelez $100m. Mondelez’ insurers refused to pay out on the ground that it was an ‘Act of War’, as the governments of the Ukraine, the USA and the UK all attributed NotPetya to Russian military intelligence, the GRU [1232].

2016 was marked by the Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of President Trump in the USA, in both of which there was substantial Russian interference. In the former, the main intervention was ﬁnancial support for the leave campaigns, which were later found to have broken the law by spending too

much [1265]; this was backed by intensive campaigning on social media [363]. In the latter, Russian interference was denounced by President Obama during the campaign, leading to renewed economic sanctions, and by the US intelligence community afterwards. An inquiry by former FBI director Robert Mueller found that Russia interfered very widely via the disinformation and social media cam- paigns run by its Internet Research Agency ‘troll farm’, and by the GRU which hacked the emails of the Democratic national and campaign committees, most notably those of the Clinton campaign chair John Podesta. Some Trump asso- ciates went to jail for various o↵ences.

As I’ll discuss in section 26.4.2, it’s hard to assess the e↵ects of such inter- ventions. On the one hand, a report to the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations sets out a story of a persistent Russian policy, since Putin came to power, to undermine the inﬂuence of democratic states and the rules-based in- ternational order, promoting authoritarian governments of both left and right, and causing trouble where it can. It notes that European countries use broad defensive measures including bipartisan agreements on electoral conduct and raising media literacy among voters; it recommends that these be adopted in the USA as well [385]. On the other hand, Yochai Benkler cautions Democrats against believing that Trump’s election was all Russia’s fault; the roots of popu- lar disa↵ection with the political elite are much older and deeper [227]. Russia’s information war with the West predates Putin; it continues the old USSR’s strategy of weakening the West by fomenting conﬂict via a variety of national liberation movements and terrorist groups (I discuss the information-warfare as- pects in section 23.8.3). Timothy Snyder places this all in the context of modern Russian history and politics [1798]; his analysis also outlines the playbook for disruptive information warfare against a democracy. It’s not just about hack- ing substations, but about hacking voters’ minds; about undermining trust in institutions and even in facts, exploiting social media and recasting politics as showbusiness. Putin is a judo player; judo’s about using an opponent’s strength and momentum to trip them up.

## The rest

The rest of the world’s governments have quite a range of cyber capabilities, but common themes, including the nature and source of their tools. Middle Eastern governments were badly shaken by the Arab Spring uprisings, and some even turned o↵ the Internet for a while, such as Libya in April–July 2010, when rebels were using Google maps to generate target ﬁles for US, UK and French warplanes. Since then, Arab states have developed strategies that combine spyware and hacking against high-proﬁle targets, through troll farms pumping out abusive comments in public fora, with physical coercion.

The operations of the United Arab Emirates were described in 2019 by a whistleblower, Lori Stroud [247]. An NSA analyst – and Ed Snowden’s former boss – she was headhunted by a Maryland contractor in 2014 to work in Dubai as a mercenary, but left after the UAE’s operations started to target Americans. The UAE’s main technique was spear-phishing with Windows malware, but their most e↵ective tool, called Karma, enabled them to hack the iPhones of foreign statesmen and local dissidents. They also targeted foreigners critical of

the regime. In one case they social-engineered a UK grad student into installing spyware on his PC on the pretext that it would make his communications hard to trace. The intelligence team consisted of several dozen people, both mercenaries and Emiratis, in a large villa in Dubai. The use of iPhone malware by the UAE government was documented by independent observers [1219].

In 2018, the government of Saudi Arabia murdered the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in its consulate in Istanbul. The Post campaigned to expose Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman as the man who gave the order, and in January 2019 the National Enquirer published a special edition containing texts showing that the Post’s owner Je↵ Bezos was having an a↵air. Bezos pre-empted the Enquirer by announcing that he and his wife were di- vorcing, and hired an investigator to ﬁnd the source of the leak. The Enquirer had attempted to blackmail Bezos over some photos it had also obtained; it wanted both him and the investigator to declare that the paper hadn’t relied upon ‘any form of electronic eavesdropping or hacking in their news-gathering process’. Bezos went public instead. According to the investigator, his iPhone had been hacked by the Saudi Arabian government [199]; the malicious What- sApp message that did the damage was sent from the phone of the Crown Prince himself [1053]. The US Justice Department later charged two former Twitter employees with spying, by disclosing to the Saudis personal account information of people who criticised their government [1500].

An even more unpleasant example is Syria, where the industrialisation of brutality is a third approach to scaling information collection. Malware attacks on dissidents were reported from 2012, and initially used a variety of spear- phishing lures. As the civil war got underway, police who were arresting suspects would threaten female family members with rape on the spot unless the suspect disclosed his passwords for mail and social media. They would then spear-phish all his contacts while he was being taken away in the van to the torture chamber. This victim-based approach to attack scaling resulted in the compromise of many machines not just in Syria but in America and Europe. The campaigns became steadily more sophisticated as the war evolved, with false-ﬂag attacks, yet retained a brutal edge with some tools displaying beheading videos [737].

Thanks to John Scott-Railton and colleagues at Toronto, we have many fur- ther documented examples of online surveillance, computer malware and phone exploits being used to target dissidents; many in Middle Eastern and African countries but also in Mexico and indeed in Hungary [1219]. The real issue here is the ecosystem of companies, mostly in the USA, Europe and Israel, that sup- ply hacking tools to unsavoury states. These tools range from phone malware, though mass-surveillance tools you use on your own network against your own dissidents, to tools that enable you to track and eavesdrop on phones overseas by abusing the signaling system [488]. These tools are used by dictators to track and monitor their enemies in the USA and Europe.

NGOs have made attempts to push back on this cyber arms trade. In one case NGOs argued that the Syrian government’s ability to purchase mass- surveillance equipment from the German subsidiary of a UK company should be subject to export control, but the UK authorities were unwilling to block it. GCHQ was determined that if there were going to be bulk surveillance de- vices on President Assad’s network, they should be British devices rather than

Ukrainian ones. (I describe this in more detail later in section 26.2.9.) So the ethical issues around conventional arms sales persist in the age of cyber; indeed they can be worse because these tools are used against Americans, Brits and others who are sitting at home but who are unlucky enough to be on the contact list of someone an unpleasant government doesn’t like. In the old days, selling weapons to a far-o↵ dictator didn’t put your own residents in harm’s way; but cyber weapons can have global e↵ects.

Having been isolated for years by sanctions, Iran has developed an indige- nous cyber capability, drawing on local hacker forums. Like Syria, its main focus is on intelligence operations, particularly against dissident Iranians, both at home and overseas. It has also been the target of US and other attacks of which the best known was Stuxnet, after which it traced the CIA’s covert com- munications network and rounded up a number of agents [578]. It has launched both espionage operations and attacks of its own overseas. An example of the former was its hack of the Diginotar CA in the Netherlands which enabled it to monitor dissidents’ Gmail; while its Shamoon malware damaged thousands of PCs at Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company. The history of Ira- nian cyber capabilities is told by Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour [49]. Most recently, it attacked Israeli water treatment plants in April 2020; Israel responded the following month with an attack on the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas [229].

Finally, it’s worth mentioning North Korea. In 2014, after Sony Pictures started working on a comedy about a plot to assassinate the North Korean leader, a hacker group trashed much of Sony’s infrastructure, released embar- rassing emails that caused its top ﬁlm executive Amy Pascal to resign, and leaked some unreleased ﬁlms. This was followed by threats of terrorist attacks on movie theatres if the comedy were put on general release. The company put the ﬁlm on limited release, but when President Obama criticised them for giving in to North Korean blackmail, they put it on full release instead.

In 2017, North Korea again came to attention after their Wannacry worm infected over 200,000 computers worldwide, encrypting data and demanding a bitcoin ransom – though like NotPetya it didn’t have a means of selective decryption, so was really just a destructive worm. It used the NSA Eternal- Blue vulnerability, like NotPetya, but was stopped when a malware researcher discovered a kill switch. In the meantime it had disrupted production at car- makers Nissan and Renault and at the Taiwanese chip foundry TSMC, and also caused several hospitals in Britain’s National Health Service to close their ac- cident and emergency units. In 2018, the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment of a North Korean government hacker for both incidents, and also for a series of electronic bank robberies, including of $81m from the Bank of Bangladesh [1653]. In 2019, North Korean agents were further blamed, in a leaked United Nations report, for the theft of over $1bn from cryptocurrency exchanges [346].

## Attribution

It’s often said that cyber is di↵erent, because attribution is hard. As a general proposition this is untrue; anonymity online is much harder than you think.

Even smart people make mistakes in operational security that give them away, and threat intelligence companies have compiled a lot of data that enable them to attribute even false ﬂag operations with reasonable probability in many cases [180]. Yet sometimes it may be true, and people still point to the Cli- mategate a↵air. Several weeks before the 2009 Copenhagen summit on climate change, someone published over a thousand emails, mostly sent to or from four climate scientists at the University of East Anglia, England. Climate sceptics seized on some of them, which discussed how to best present evidence of global warming, as evidence of a global conspiracy. Oﬃcial inquiries later established that the emails had been quoted out of context, but the damage had been done. People wonder whether the perpetrator could have been the Russians or the Saudis or even an energy company. However one of the more convincing analy- ses suggests that it was an internal leak, or even an accident; only one archive ﬁle was leaked, and its ﬁlename (FOIA2009.zip) suggests it may have been pre- pared for a freedom-of-information disclosure in any case. The really interesting thing here may be how the emails were talked up into a conspiracy theory.

Another possible state action was the Equifax hack. The initial story was that on 8th March 2017, Apache warned of a vulnerability in Apache Struts and issued a patch; two days later, a gang started looking for vulnerable systems; on May 13th, they found that Equifax’s dispute portal had not been patched, and got in. The later story, in litigation, was that Equifax had used the default username and password ‘admin’ for the portal [358]. Either way, the breach had been preventable; the intruders found a plaintext password ﬁle giving access to 51 internal database systems, and spent 76 days helping themselves to the personal information of at least 145.5 million Americans before the intrusion was reported on July 29th and access blocked the following day. Executives sold stock before they notiﬁed the public on September 7th; Congress was outraged, and the CEO Rick Smith was ﬁred. So far, so ordinary. But no criminal use has been made of any of the stolen information, which led analysts at the time to suspect that the perpetrator was a nation-state actor seeking personal data on Americans at scale [1444]; in due course, four members of the Chinese military were indicted for it [552].

In any case, the worlds of intelligence and crime have long been entangled, and in the cyber age they seem to be getting more so. We turn to cybercrime next.

# Crooks

Cybercrime is now about half of all crime, both by volume and by value, at least in developed countries. Whether it is slightly more or less than half depends on deﬁnitions (do you include tax fraud now that tax returns are ﬁled online?) and on the questions you ask (do you count harassment and cyber-bullying?)

* but even with narrow deﬁnitions, it’s still almost half. Yet the world’s law- enforcement agencies typically spend less than one percent of their budgets on ﬁghting it. Until recently, police forces in most jurisdictions did their best to ignore it; in the USA, it was dismissed as ‘identity theft’ and counted separately, while in the UK victims were told to complain to their bank instead of the police

from 2005–15. The result was that as crime went online, like everything else, the online component wasn’t counted and crime appeared to fall. Eventually, though, the truth emerged in those countries that have started to ask about fraud in regular victimisation surveys12.

Colleagues and I run the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre where we collect and curate data for other researchers to use, ranging from spam and phish through malware and botnet command-and-control traﬃc to collections of posts to underground crime forums. This section draws on a survey we did in 2019 of the costs of cybercrime and how they’ve been changing over time [91].

Computer fraud has been around since the 1960s, a notable early case being the Equity Funding insurance company which from 1964-72 created more than 60,000 bogus policies which it sold to reinsurers, creating a special computer sys- tem to keep track of them all. Electronic frauds against payment systems have been around since the 1980s, and spam arrived when the Internet was opened to all in the 1990s. Yet early scams were mostly a cottage industry, where individ- uals or small groups collected credit card numbers, then forged cards to use in shops, or used card numbers to get mail-order goods. Modern cybercrime can probably be dated to 2003–5 when underground markets emerged that enabled crooks to specialise and get good at their jobs, just as happened in the real economy with the Industrial Revolution.

To make sense of cybercrime, it’s convenient to consider the shared infras- tructure ﬁrst, and then the main types of cybercrime that are conducted for proﬁt. There is a signiﬁcant overlap with the crimes committed by states that we considered in the last section, and those committed by individuals against other individuals that we’ll consider in the next one; but the actors’ motives are a useful primary ﬁlter.

## Criminal infrastructure

Since about 2005, the emergence of underground markets has led to people spe- cialising as providers of criminal infrastructure, most notably botnet herders, malware writers, spam senders and cashout operators. I will discuss the tech- nology in much greater detail in section 21.3; in this section my focus is on the actors and the ecosystem in which they operate. Although this ecosystem con- sists of perhaps a few thousand people with revenues in the tens to low hundreds of millions, they impose costs of many billions on the industry and on society. Now that cybercrime has been industrialised, the majority of ‘jobs’ are now in boring roles such as customer support and system administration, including all the tedious setup work involved in evading law enforcement takedowns [453]. The ‘ﬁrms’ they work for specialise; the entrepreneurs and technical specialists can make real money. (What’s more, the cybercrime industry has been booming during the coronavirus pandemic.)

12The USA, the UK, Australia, Belgium and France

* + - 1. Botnet herders

The ﬁrst botnets – networks of compromised computers – may have been seen in 1996 with an attack on the ISP Panix in New York, using compromised Unix machines in hospitals to conduct a SYN ﬂood attack [368]. The next use was spam, and by 2000 the Earthlink spammer sent over a million phishing emails; its author was sued by Earthlink. Once cyber-criminals started to get organised, there was a signiﬁcant scale-up. We started to see professionally built and maintained botnets that could be rented out by bad guys, whether spammers, phishermen or others; by 2007 the Cutwail botnet was sending over 50 million spams a minute from over a million infected machines [1832]. Bots would initially contact a command-and-control server for instructions; these would be taken down, or taken over by threat intelligence companies for use as sinkholes to monitor infected machines, and to feed lists of them to ISPs and corporates.

The spammers’ ﬁrst response was peer-to-peer botnets. In 2007 Storm sud- denly grew to account for 8% of all Windows malware; it infected machines mostly by malware in email attachments and had them use the eDonkey peer- to-peer network to ﬁnd other infected machines. It was used not just for spam but for DDoS, for pump-and-dump stock scams and for harvesting bank cre- dentials. Defenders got lots of peers to join this network to harvest lists of bot addresses, so the bots could be cleaned up, and by late 2008 Storm had been cut to a tenth of the size. It was followed by Kelihos, a similar botnet that also stole bitcoins; its creator, a Russian national, was arrested while on holiday in Spain in 2017 and extradited to the USA where he pled guilty in 2018 [661].

The next criminal innovation arrived with the Conﬁcker botnet: the domain generation algorithm (DGA). Conﬁcker was a worm that spread by exploiting a Windows network service vulnerability; it generated 250 domain names every day, and infected machines would try them all out in the hope that the botmaster had managed to rent one of them. Defenders started out by simply buying up the domains, but a later variant generated 50,000 domains a day and an industry working group made agreements with registrars that these domains would simply be put beyond use. By 2009 Conﬁcker had grown so large, with maybe ten million machines, that it was felt to pose a threat to the largest websites and perhaps even to nation states. As with Storm, its use of randomisation proved to be a two-edged sword; defenders could sit on a subset of the domains and harvest feeds of infected machines. By 2015 the number of infected machines had fallen to under a million.

Regardless of whether something can be done to take out the command- and-control system, whether by arresting the botmaster or by technical tricks, the universal ﬁx for botnet infections is to clean up infected machines. But this raises many issues of scale and incentives. While AV companies make tools available, and Microsoft supplies patches, many people don’t use them. So long as your infected PC is merely sending occasional spam but works well enough otherwise, why should you go to the trouble of doing anything? But bandwidth costs ISPs money, so the next step was that some ISPs, particularly the cable companies like Comcast, would identify infected machines and conﬁne their users to a ‘walled garden’ until they promised to clean up. By 2019 that has

become less common as people now have all sorts of devices on their wiﬁ, many of which have no user interface; communicating with human users has become harder.

In 2020, we ﬁnd many botnets with a few tens of thousands of machines that are too small for most defenders to care about, plus some large ones that tend to be multilayer – typically with peer-to-peer mechanisms at the bottom that enable the footsoldier bots to communicate with a few control nodes, which in turn use a domain generation algorithm to ﬁnd the botmaster. Fragmenting the footsoldiers into a number of small botnets makes it hard for defenders to inﬁltrate all of them, while the control nodes may be located in places that are hard for defenders to get at. The big money for such botnets in 2020 appears to be in clickfraud.

The latest innovation – since October 2016 – is Mirai, a family of botnets that exploit IoT devices. The ﬁrst Mirai worm infected CCTV cameras that had been manufactured by Xiaomi and that had a known factory default password that couldn’t be changed. Mirai botnets scan the Internet’s IPv4 address space for other vulnerable devices which typically get infected within minutes of being powered up. The ﬁrst attack was on DynDNS and took down Twitter for six hours on the US eastern seaboard. Since then there have been over a thousand variants, which researchers study to determine what’s changed and to work out what countermeasures might be used.

At any one time, there may be half a dozen large botnet herders. The Mirai operators, for example, seem to be two or three groups that might have involved a few dozen people.

* + - 1. Malware devs

In addition to the several hundred software engineers who write malware for the world’s intelligence agencies and their contractors, there may be hundreds of people writing malware for the criminal market; nobody really knows (though we can monitor traﬃc on hacker forums to guess the order of magnitude).

Within this community there are specialists. Some concentrate on turning vulnerabilities into exploits, a nontrivial task for modern operating systems that use stack canaries, ASLR and other techniques we’ll discuss later in section 6.4.1. Others specialise in the remote access Trojans that the exploits install; others build the peer-to-peer and DGA software for resilient command-and-control communications; yet others design specialised payloads for bank fraud. The highest-value operations seem to be platforms that are maintained with constant upgrades to cope with the latest countermeasures from the anti-virus companies. Within each specialist market segment there are typically a handful of operators, so that when we arrest one of them it makes a di↵erence for a while. Some of the providers are based in jurisdictions that don’t extradite their nationals, like Russia, and Russian crimeware is used not just by Russian state actors but by others too.

As Android has taken over from Windows as the most frequently used oper- ating system we’ve seen a rise in Android malware. In China and in countries with a lot of second-hand and older phones, this may be software that uses an

unpatched vulnerability to root an Android phone; the USA and Europe have lots of unpatched phones (as many OEMs stop o↵ering patches once a phone is no longer on sale) but it’s often just apps that do bad things, such as stealing SMSes used to authenticate banking transactions.

* + - 1. Spam senders

Spamming arrived on a small scale when the Internet opened to the public in the mid-1990s, and by 2000 we saw the Earthlink spammer making millions from sending phishing lures. By 2010 spam was costing the world’s ISPs and tech companies about $1bn a year in countermeasures, but it earned its operators perhaps one percent of that. The main beneﬁciaries may have been webmail services such as Yahoo, Hotmail and Gmail, which can operate better spam ﬁlters because of scale; during the 2010s, hundreds of millions of people switched to using their services.

Spam is now a highly specialised business, as getting past modern spam ﬁlters requires a whole toolbox of constantly-changing tricks. If you want to use spam to install ransomware, you’re better o↵ paying an existing service than trying to learn it all from scratch. Some spam involves industrial-scale email compromise, which can be expensive for the victim; some $350m was knocked o↵ the $4.8bn price at which Yahoo was sold to Verizon after a bulk compromise [771].

* + - 1. Bulk account compromise

Some botnets are constantly trying to break into email and other online accounts by trying to guess passwords and password recovery questions. A large email service provider might be recovering several tens of thousands of accounts every day. There are peaks, typically when hackers compromise millions of email addresses and passwords at one website and then try them out at all the others. In 2019, this *credential stu*ﬃ*ng* still accounts for the largest number of attempted account compromises by volume [1882]. Compromised accounts are sold on to people who exploit them in various ways. Primary email accounts often have recovery information for other accounts, including bank accounts if the attacker is lucky. They can also be used for scams such as the stranded traveler, where the victim emails all their friends saying they’ve been robbed in some foreign city and asking for urgent ﬁnancial help to pay the hotel bill. If all else fails, compromised email accounts can be used to send spam.

A variant on the theme is the pay-per-install service, which implants malware on phones or PCs to order and at scale. This can involve a range of phishing lures in a variety of contexts, from free porn sites that ask you to install a special viewer, to sports paraphernalia o↵ers and news about topical events. It can also use more technical means such as drive-by downloads. Such services are often o↵ered by botnets which need them to maintain their own numbers; they might charge third party customers $10-15 per thousand machines infected in the USA and Europe, and perhaps $3 for Asia.

* + - 1. Targeted attackers

We’ve seen the emergence of hack-for-hire operators who will try to compromise a speciﬁc target account for a fee, of typically $750 [1882]. They will investi- gate the target, make multiple spear-phishing attempts, try password recovery procedures, and see if they can break in through related accounts. This contin- ues a tradition of private eyes who traditionally helped in divorce cases and also stalked celebrities on behalf of red-top newspapers – though with even fewer eth- ical constraints now that services can be purchased anonymously online. John Scott-Railton and colleagues exposed the workings of Dark Basin, a hack-for- hire company that had targeted critics of ExxonMobil, and also net neutrality advocates, and traced it to a company in India [1692].

In recent years, targeted attacks have also been used at scale against small business owners and the ﬁnance sta↵ of larger ﬁrms in order to carry out various kinds of payment fraud, as I’ll discuss below in 2.3.2.

* + - 1. Cashout gangs

Back in the twentieth century, people who stole credit card numbers would have to go to the trouble of shopping for goods and then selling them to get money out. Nowadays there are specialists who buy compromised bank credentials on underground markets and exploit them. The prices reveal where the real value lies in the criminal chain; a combination of credit card number and expiry date sells for under a dollar, and to get into the single dollars you need a CVV, the cardholder’s name and address, and more.

Cashout techniques change every few years, as paths are discovered through the world’s money-laundering controls, and the regulations get tweaked to block them. Some cashout ﬁrms organise armies of *mules* to whom they transfer some of the risk. Back in the mid-2000s, mules could be drug users who would go to stores and buy goods with stolen credit cards; then there was a period when unwitting mules were recruited by ads promising large earnings to ‘agents’ to represent foreign companies but who were used to remit stolen funds through their personal bank accounts. The laundrymen next used Russian banks in Latvia, to which Russian mules would turn up to withdraw cash. Then Liberty Reserve, an unlicensed digital currency based in Costa Rica, was all the rage until it was closed down and its founder arrested in 2013. Bitcoin took over for a while but its popularity with the cybercrime community tailed o↵ as its price became more volatile, as the US Department of the Treasury started arm- twisting bitcoin exchanges into identifying their customers.

As with spam, cashout is a constantly evolving attack-defence game. We monitor it and analyse the trends using CrimeBB, a database we’ve assembled of tens of millions of posts in underground hacker forums where cybercriminals buy and sell services including cashout [1499]. It also appears to favour gangs who can scale up, until they get big enough to attract serious law-enforcement attention: in 2020, one Sergey Medvedev pleaded guilty to inﬂicting more than

$568 million in actual losses over the period 2010–15 [1928].

* + - 1. Ransomware

One reason for the decline in cryptocurrency may have been the growth of ransomware, and as the gangs involved in this switched to payment methods that are easier for victims to use. By 2016–17, 42% of ransomware encountered by US victims demanded prepaid vouchers such as Amazon gift cards; 14% demanded wire transfers and only 12% demanded cryptocurrency; a lot of the low-end ransomware aimed at consumers is now really scareware as it doesn’t actually encrypt ﬁles at all [1742]. Since 2017, we’ve seen ransomware-as-a- service platforms; the operators who use these platforms are often amateurs and can’t decrypt even if you’re willing to pay.

Meanwhile a number of more professional gangs penetrate systems, install ransomware, wait until several days or weeks of backup data have been encrypted and demand substantial sums of bitcoin. This has grown rapidly over 2019–20, with the most high-proﬁle ransomware victims in the USA being public-sector bodies; several hundred local government bodies and a handful of hospitals have su↵ered service failures [358]. During the pandemic, more hospitals have been targeted; the medical school at UCSF paid over $1m [1480]. It’s an in- ternational phenomenon, though, and many private-sector ﬁrms fall victim too. Ransomware operators have also been threatening large-scale leaks of personal data to bully victims into paying.

## Attacks on banking and payment systems

Attacks on card payment systems started with lost and stolen cards, with forgery at scale arriving in the 1980s; the dotcom boom ramped things up further in the 1990s as many businesses started selling online with little idea of how to detect fraud; and it was card fraud that spawned underground markets in the mid-2000s as criminals sought ways to buy and sell stolen card numbers as well as related equipment and services.

Another signiﬁcant component is pre-issue fraud, known in the USA as *‘iden- tity theft’* [670], where criminals obtain credit cards, loans and other assets in your name and leave you to sort out the mess. I write ‘identity theft’ in paren- theses as it’s really just the old-fashioned o↵ence of impersonation. Back in the twentieth century, if someone went to a bank, pretended to be me, borrowed money from them and vanished, then that was the bank’s problem, not mine. In the early twenty-ﬁrst, banks took to claiming that it’s your identity that’s been stolen rather than their money [1727]. There is less of that liability dumping now, but the FBI still records much cybercrime as ‘identity theft’ which helps keep it out of the mainstream US crime statistics.

The card fraud ecosystem is now fairly stable. Surveys in 2011 and 2019 show that while card fraud doubled over the decade, the loss fell slightly as a percentage of transaction value [90, 91]; the system has been getting more eﬃcient as it grows. Many card numbers are harvested in hacking attacks on retailers, which can be very expensive for them once they’ve paid to notify a↵ected customers and reimburse banks for reissued cards. As with the criminal infrastructure, the total costs may be easily two orders of magnitude greater than anything the criminals actually get away with.

Attacks on online banking ramped up in 2005 with the arrival of large-scale phishing attacks; emails that seemed to come from banks drove customers to imitation bank websites that stole their passwords. The banks responded with techniques such as two-factor authentication, or the low-cost substitute of asking for only a few letters of the password at a time; the crooks’ response, from about 2009, has been credential-stealing malware. Zeus and later Trojans lurk on a PC until the user logs on to a bank whose website they recognise; they then make payments to mule accounts and hide their activity from the user – the so-called ‘man-in-the-browser attack’. (Some Trojans even connect in real time to a human operator.) The crooks behind the Zeus and later the Dridex banking malware were named and indicted by US investigators in December 2019, and accused of stealing some $100m, but they remain at liberty in Russia [795]. Other gangs have been broken up and people arrested for such scams, which continue to net in the hundreds of millions to low billions a year worldwide.

Firms also have to pay attention to business email compromise, where a crook compromises a business email account and tells a customer that their bank account number has changed; or where the crook impersonates the CEO and orders a ﬁnancial controller to make a payment; and social engineering attacks by people pretending to be from your bank who talk you into releasing a code to authorise a payment. Most targeted attacks on company payment systems can in theory be prevented by the control procedures that most large ﬁrms already have, and so the typical target is a badly-run large ﬁrm, or a medium-sized ﬁrm with enough money to be worth stealing but not enough control to lock everything down.

I’ll discuss the technicalities of such frauds in Chapter 12, along with a grow- ing number of crimes that directly a↵ect only banks, their regulators and their retail customers. I’ll also discuss cryptocurrencies, which facilitate cybercrimes from ransomware to stock frauds, in Chapter 20.

## Sectoral cybercrime ecosystems

A number of sectors other than banking have their own established cybercrime scenes. One example is travel fraud. There’s a whole ecosystem of people who sell fraudulently obtained air tickets, which are sometimes simply bought with stolen credit card numbers, sometimes obtained directly by manipulating or hacking the systems of travel agents or airlines, sometimes booked by corrupt sta↵ at these ﬁrms, and sometimes scammed from the public directly by stealing their air miles. The resulting cut-price tickets are sold directly using spam or through various aﬃliate marketing scams. Some of the passengers who use them to ﬂy know they’re dubious, while others are dupes – which makes it hard to deal with the problem just by arresting people at the boarding gate. (The scammers also supply tickets at the last minute, so that the alarms are usually too late.) For an account and analysis of travel fraud, see Hutchings [936]. An increasing number of other business sectors are acquiring their own dark side, and I will touch on some of them in later chapters.

## Internal attacks

Fraud by insiders has been an issue since businesses started hiring people. Em- ployees cheat the ﬁrm, partners cheat each other, and ﬁrms cheat their share- holders. The main defence is bookkeeping. The invention of double-entry book- keeping, of which our earliest records are from the Cairo of a thousand years ago, enabled businesses to scale up beyond the family that owned them. This whole ecosystem is evolving as technology does, and its design is driven by the Big Four accounting ﬁrms who make demands on their audit clients that in turn drive the development of accounting software and the supporting security mechanisms. I discuss all this at length in Chapter 12. There are also inside attacks involving whistleblowing, which I discuss below.

## CEO crimes

Companies attack each other, and their customers too. From the 1990s, printer vendors have used cryptography to lock their customers in to using proprietary ink cartridges, as I describe in section 24.6, while companies selling reﬁlls have been breaking the crypto. Games console makers have been playing exactly the same game with aftermarket vendors. The use of cryptography for acces- sory control is now pervasive, being found even on water ﬁlter cartridges in fridges [1071]. Many customers ﬁnd this annoying and try to circumvent the controls. The US courts decided in the Lexmark v SCC case that this was ﬁne: the printer vendor Lexmark sued SCC, a company that sold clones of its security chips to independent ink vendors, but lost. So the incumbent can now hire the best cryptographers they can ﬁnd to lock their products, while the challenger can hire the best cryptanalysts they can ﬁnd to unlock them – and customers can hack them any way they can. Here, the conﬂict is legal and open. As with state actors, corporates sometimes assemble teams with multiple PhDs, millions of dollars in funding, and capital assets such as electron microscopes13. We discuss this in greater detail later in section 24.6.

Not all corporate attacks are conducted as openly. Perhaps the best-known covert hack was by Volkswagen on the EU and US emissions testing schemes; diesel engines sold in cars were programmed to run cleanly if they detected the standard emission test conditions, and eﬃciently otherwise. For this, the CEO of VW was ﬁred and indicted in the USA (to which Germany won’t extradite him), while the CEO of Audi was ﬁred and jailed in Germany [1084]. VW has set aside e25bn to cover criminal and civil ﬁnes and compensation. Other carmakers were cheating too; Daimler was ﬁned e860m in Europe in 2019 [1466], and in 2020 reached a US settlement consisting of a ﬁne of $1.5bn from four government agencies plus a class action of $700m [1856]. Settlements for other manufacturers and other countries are in the pipeline.

Sometimes products are designed to break whole classes of protection system, an example being the overlay SIM cards described later in Chapter 12. These are SIM cards with two sides and only 160 microns thick, which you stick on top of the SIM card in your phone to provide a second root of trust; they were

13Full disclosure: both our hardware lab and our NGO activities have on occasion received funding from such actors.

designed to enable people in China to defeat the high roaming charges of the early 2010s. The overlay SIM essentially does a man-in-the-middle attack on the real SIM, and can be programmed in Javacard. A side-e↵ect is that such SIMs make it really easy to do some types of bank fraud.

So when putting together the threat model for your system, stop and think what capable motivated opponents you might have among your competitors, or among ﬁrms competing with suppliers on which products you depend. The obvi- ous attacks include industrial espionage, but nowadays it’s much more complex than that.

## Whistleblowers

Intelligence agencies, and secretive ﬁrms, can get obsessive about ‘the insider threat’. But in 2018, Barclays Bank’s CEO was ﬁned £642,000 and ordered to repay £500,000 of his bonus for attempting to trace a whistleblower in the bank [698]. So let’s turn it round and look at it from the other perspective – that of the whistleblower. Many are trying to do the right thing, often at a fairly mundane level such as reporting a manager who’s getting bribes from suppliers or who is sexually harassing sta↵. In regulated industries such as banking they may have a legal duty to report wrongdoing and legal immunity against claims of breach of conﬁdence by their employer. Even then, they often lose because of the power imbalance; they get ﬁred and the problem goes on. Many security engineers think the right countermeasure to leakers is technical, such as data loss prevention systems, but robust mechanisms for sta↵ to report wrongdoing are usually more important. Some organisations, such as banks, police forces and online services, have mechanisms for reporting crimes by sta↵ but no e↵ective process for raising ethical concerns about management decisions14.

But even basic whistleblowing mechanisms are often an afterthought; they typically lead the complainant to HR rather than to the board’s audit com- mittee. External mechanisms may be little better. One big service ﬁrm ran a “Whistle-blowing hotline” for its clients in 2019; but the web page code has trackers from LinkedIn, Facebook and Google, who could thus identify unhappy sta↵ members, and also JavaScript from CDNs, littered with cookies and refer- rers from yet more IT companies. No technically savvy leaker would use such a service. At the top end of the ecosystem, some newspapers o↵er ways for whistleblowers to make contact using encrypted email. But the mechanisms tend to be clunky and the web pages that promote them do not always educate potential leakers about either the surveillance risks, or the operational security measures that might counter them. I discuss the usability and support issues around whistleblowing in more detail in Chapter 25.

This is mostly a policy problem rather than a technical one. It’s diﬃcult to design a technical mechanism whereby honest sta↵ can blow the whistle on abuses that have become ingrained in an organisation’s culture, such as pervasive sexual harassment or ﬁnancial misconduct. In most cases, it’s immediately clear who the whistleblower is, so the critical factor is whether the whistleblower will

14Google sta↵ ended up going on strike in 2018 about the handling of sexual harassment scandals.

get external support. For example, will they ever get another job? This isn’t just a matter of formal legal protection but also of culture. For example, the rape conviction of Harvey Weinstein empowered many women to protest about sexual harassment and discrimination; hopefully the Black Lives Matter protests will similarly empower people of colour [31].

An example where anonymity did help, though, was the UK parliamentary expenses scandal of 2008–9. During a long court case about whether the public could get access to the expense claims of members of parliament, someone went to the PC where the records were kept, copied them to a DVD and sold the lot to the Daily Telegraph. The paper published the juicy bits in instalments all through May and June, when MPs gave up and published the lot on Parliament’s website. Half-a-dozen ministers resigned; seven MPs and peers went to prison; dozens of MPs stood down or lost their seats at the following election; and there was both mirth and outrage at some of the things charged to the taxpayer. The whistleblower may have technically committed a crime, but their action was clearly in the public interest; now all parliamentary expenses are public, as they should have been all along. If a nation’s lawmakers have their hands in the till, what else will clean up the system?

Even in the case of Ed Snowden, there should have been a robust way for him to report unlawful conduct by the NSA to the appropriate arm of gov- ernment, probably a Congressional committee. But he knew that a previous whistleblower, Bill Binney, had been arrested and harassed after trying to do that. In hindsight, that aggressive approach was unwise, as President Obama’s NSA review group eventually conceded. At the less exalted level of a commer- cial ﬁrm, if one of your sta↵ is stealing your money, and another wants to tell you about it, you’d better make that work.

# Geeks

Our third category of attacker are the people like me – researchers who inves- tigate vulnerabilities and report them so they can be ﬁxed. Academics look for new attacks out of curiosity, and get rewarded with professional acclaim – which can lead to promotion for professors and jobs for the students who help us. Researchers working for security companies also look for newsworthy exploits; publicity at conferences such as Black Hat can win new customers. Hobby hack- ers break into stu↵ as a challenge, just as people climb mountains or play chess; hacktivists do it to annoy companies they consider to be wicked. Whether on the right side of the law or not, we tend to be curious introverts who need to feel in control, but accept challenges and look for the ‘rush’. Our reward is often fame – whether via academic publications, by winning customers for a security consulting business, by winning medals from academic societies or government agencies, or even on social media. Sometimes we break stu↵ out of irritation, so we can circumvent something that stops us ﬁxing something we own; and sometimes there’s an element of altruism. For example, people have come to us in the past complaining that their bank cards had been stolen and used to buy stu↵, and the banks wouldn’t give them a refund, saying their PIN must have been used, when it hadn’t. We looked into some of these cases and discovered

the No-PIN and preplay attacks on chip and PIN systems, which I’ll describe in the chapter on banking (the bad guys had actually discovered these attacks, but we replicated them and got justice for some of the victims).

Security researchers who discovered and reported vulnerabilities to a software vendor or system operator used to risk legal threats, as companies sometimes thought this would be cheaper than ﬁxing things. So some researchers took to disclosing bugs anonymously on mailing lists; but this meant that the bad guys could use them at once. By the early 2000s, the IT industry had evolved practices of responsible disclosure whereby researchers disclose the bug to the maintainer some months in advance of disclosure. Many ﬁrms operate bug- bounty programs that o↵er rewards for vulnerabilities; as a result, independent researchers can now make serious money selling vulnerabilities, and more than one assiduous researcher has now earned over $1m doing this. Since the Stuxnet worm, governments have raced to stockpile vulnerabilities, and we now see some ﬁrms that buy vulnerabilities from researchers in order to weaponise them, and sell them to cyber-arms suppliers. Once they’re used, they spread, are eventually reverse-engineered and patched. I’ll discuss this ecosystem in more detail in the chapters on economics and assurance.

Some more traditional sectors still haven’t adopted responsible disclosure. Volkswagen sued researchers in the universities of Birmingham and Nijmegen who reverse-engineered some online car theft tools and documented how poor their remote key entry system was. The company lost, making fools of them- selves and publicising the insecurity of their vehicles (I’ll discuss the technical details in section 4.3.1 and the policy in section 27.5.7.2). Eventually, as soft- ware permeates everything, software industry ways of working will become more widespread too. In the meantime, we can expect turbulence. Firms that cover up problems that harm their customers will have to reckon with the possibility that either an internal whistleblower, or an external security researcher, will ﬁgure out what’s going on, and when that happens there will often be an estab- lished responsible disclosure process to invoke. This will impose costs on ﬁrms that fail to align their business models with it.

# The Swamp

Our fourth category is abuse, by which we usually mean o↵ences against the person rather than against property. These range from cyber-bullying at schools all the way to state-sponsored Facebook advertising campaigns that get people to swamp legislators with death threats. I’ll deal ﬁrst with o↵ences that scale, including political harassment and child sex abuse material, and then with of- fences that don’t, ranging from school bullying to intimate partner abuse.

## Hacktivism and hate campaigns

Propaganda and protest evolved as technology did. Ancient societies had to make do with epic poetry; cities enabled people to communicate with hundreds of others directly, by making speeches in the forum; and the invention of writing enabled a further scale-up. The spread of printing in the sixteenth century led

to wars of religion in the seventeenth, daily newspapers in the eighteenth and mass-market newspapers in the nineteenth. Activists learned to compete for attention in the mass media, and honed their skills as radio and then TV came along.

Activism in the Internet age started o↵ with using online media to mobilise people to do conventional lobbying, such as writing to legislators; organisations such as Indymedia and Avaaz developed expertise at this during the 2000s. In 2011, activists such as Wael Ghonim used social media to trigger the Arab Spring, which we discuss in more detail in section 26.4.1. Since then, govern- ments have started to crack down, and activism has spread into online hate campaigns and radicalisation. Many hate campaigns are covertly funded by governments or opposition parties, but by no means all: single-issue campaign groups are also players. If you can motivate hundreds of people to send angry emails or tweets, then a company or individual on the receiving end can have a real problem. Denial-of-service attacks can interrupt operations while doxxing can do real brand damage as well as causing distress to executives and sta↵.

Activists vary in their goals, in their organisational coherence and in the extent to which they’ll break the law. There’s a whole spectrum, from the completely law-abiding NGOs who get their supporters to email legislators to the slightly edgy, who may manipulate news by getting bots to click on news stories, to game the media analytics and make editors pay more attention to their issue. Then there are whistleblowers who go to respectable newspapers, political partisans who harass people behind the mild anonymity of Twitter accounts, hackers who break into target ﬁrms and vandalise their websites or even doxx them. The Climategate scandal, described in 2.2.5 above, may be an example of doxing by a hacktivist. At the top end, there are the hard-core types who end up in jail for terrorist o↵ences.

During the 1990s, I happily used email and usenet to mobilise people against surveillance bills going through the UK parliament, as I’ll describe later in sec- tion 26.2.7. I found myself on the receiving end of hacktivism in 2003 when the Animal Liberation Front targeted my university because of plans to build a monkey house, for primates to be used in research. The online component consisted of thousands of emails sent to sta↵ members with distressing images of monkeys with wires in their brains; this was an early example of ‘brigading’, where hundreds of people gang up on one target online. We dealt with that online attack easily enough by getting their email accounts closed down. But they persisted with physical demonstrations and media harassment; our Vice- Chancellor decided to cut her losses, and the monkey house went to Oxford instead. Some of the leaders were later jailed for terrorism o↵ences after they assaulted sta↵ at a local pharmaceutical testing company and placed bombs under the cars of medical researchers [21].

Online shaming has become popular as a means of protest. It can be quite spontaneous, with a ﬂash mob of vigilantes forming when an incident goes viral. An early example happened in 2005 when a young lady in Seoul failed to clean up after her dog defecated in a subway carriage. Another passenger photographed the incident and put it online; within days the ‘dog poo girl’ had been hounded into hiding, abandoning her university course [418]. There have been many other cases since.

The power of platforms such as Twitter became evident in Gamergate, a storm sparked by abusive comments about a female game developer made pub- licly by a former boyfriend in August 2014, and cascading into a torrent of misogynistic criticism of women in the gaming industry and of feminists who had criticised the industry’s male-dominated culture. A number of people were doxxed, SWATted, or hounded from their homes [1932]. The harassment was coordinated on anonymous message boards such as 4Chan and the attackers would gang up on a particular target – who then also got criticised by main- stream conservative journalists [1130]. The movement appeared leaderless and evolved constantly, with one continuing theme being a rant against ‘social jus- tice warriors’. It appears to have contributed to the development of the alt-right movement which inﬂuenced the 2016 election two years later.

A growing appreciation of the power of angry online mobs is leading politi- cians to stir them up, at all levels from local politicians trying to undermine their rivals to nation states trying to swing rival states’ elections. Angry mobs are an unpleasant enough feature of modern politics in developed countries; in less de- veloped countries things get even worse, with real lynchings in countries such as India (where the ruling BJP party has been building a troll army since at least 2011 to harrass political opponents and civil-society critics [1637]). Companies are targeted less frequently, but it does happen. Meanwhile the social-media companies are under pressure to censor online content, and as it’s hard for an AI program to tell the di↵erence between a joke, abuse, a conspiracy theory and information warfare by a foreign government, they end up having to hire more and more moderators. I will return to the law and policy aspects of this in 26.4 below.

## Child sex abuse material

When the Internet came to governments’ attention in the 1990s and they won- dered how to get a handle on it, the ﬁrst thing to be regulated was images of child sex abuse (CSA), in the Budapest Convention in 2001. We have little data on the real prevalence of CSA material as the legal restrictions make it hard for anyone outside law enforcement to do any research. In many countries, the approach to CSA material has less focus on actual harm reduction than it de- serves. Indeed, many laws around online sexual o↵ences are badly designed, and seem to be driven more by exploiting outrage than by minimising the number of victims and the harm they su↵er. CSA may be a case study on how not to do online regulation because of forensic failures, takedown failures, weaponisation and the law-norm gap.

The most notorious forensic failure was Britain’s Operation Ore, which I describe in more detail in 26.5.3. Brieﬂy, several thousand men were arrested on suspicion of CSA o↵ences after their credit card numbers were found on an abuse website, and perhaps half of them turned out to be victims of credit card fraud. Hundreds of innocent men had their lives ruined. Yet nothing was done for the child victims in Brazil and Indonesia, and the authorities are still nowhere near eﬃcient at taking down websites that host CSA material. In most countries, CSA takedown is a monopoly of either the police, or a regulated body that operates under public-sector rules (NCMEC in the USA and the IWF in

the UK), and takes from days to weeks; things would go much more quickly if governments were to use the private-sector contractors that banks use to deal with phishing sites [938]. The public-sector monopoly stems from laws in many countries that make the possession of CSA material a strict-liability o↵ence. This not only makes it hard to deal with such material using the usual abuse channels, but also allows it to be weaponised: protesters can send it to targets and then report them to the police. It also makes it diﬃcult for parents and teachers to deal sensibly with incidents that arise with teens using dating apps or having remote relationships. The whole thing is a mess, caused by legislators wanting to talk tough without understanding the technology. (CSA material is now a signiﬁcant annoyance for some legislators’ sta↵, and also makes journalists at some newspapers reluctant to make their email addresses public.)

There is an emerging law-norm gap with the growth in popularity of sexting among teenagers. Like it or not, sending intimate photographs to partners (real and intended) became normal behaviour for teens in many countries when smartphones arrived in 2008. This was a mere seven years after the Budapest convention, whose signatories may have failed to imagine that sexual images of under-18s could be anything other than abuse. Thanks to the convention, possessing an intimate photo of anyone under 18 can now result in a prison sentence in any of the 63 countries that have ratiﬁed it. Teens laugh at lectures from schoolteachers to not take or share such photos, but the end result is real harm. Kids may be tricked or pressured into sharing photos of themselves, and even if the initial sharing is consensual, the recipient can later use it for blackmail or just pass it round for a laugh. Recipients – even if innocent – are also committing criminal o↵ences by simply having the photos on their phones, so kids can set up other kids and denounce them. This leads to general issues of bullying and more speciﬁc issues of intimate partner abuse.

## School and workplace bullying

Online harassment and bullying are a fact of life in modern societies, not just in schools but in workplaces too, as people jostle for rank, mates and resources. From the media stories of teens who kill themselves following online abuse, you might think that cyber-bullying now accounts for most of the problem – at least at school – but the ﬁgures show that it’s less than half. An annual UK survey discloses that about a quarter of children and young people are constantly bullied (13% verbal, 5% cyber and 3% physical) while about half are bullied sometimes (24%, 8% and 9% respectively) [565]. The only national survey of all ages of which I’m aware is the French national victimisation survey, which since 2007 has collected data not just on physical crimes such as burglary and online crimes such as fraud, but on harassment too [1458]. This is based on face-to-face interviews with 16,000 households and the 2017 survey reported two million cases of threatening behaviour, 7% were made on social networks and a further 9% by phone. But have social media made this worse? Research suggests that the e↵ects of social media use on adolescent well-being are nuanced, small at best, and contingent on analytic methods [1473].

Yet there is talk in the media of a rise in teen suicide which some commen- tators link to social media use. Thankfully, the OECD mortality statistics show

that this is also untrue: suicides among 15–19 year olds have declined slightly from about 8 to about 7 cases per 100,000 over the period 1990–2015 [1477].

## Intimate relationship abuse

Just as I ended the last section by discussing whistleblowers – the insider threat to companies – I’ll end this section with intimate relationship abuse, the insider threat to families and individuals. Gamergate may have been a ﬂashbulb exam- ple, but protection from former intimate partners and other family members is a real problem that exists at scale – with about half of all marriages ending in divorce, and not all breakups being amicable. Intimate partner abuse has been su↵ered by 27% of women and 11% of men. Stalking is not of course limited to former partners. Celebrities in particular can be stalked by people they’ve never met – with occasional tragic outcomes, as in the case of John Lennon. But for- mer partners account for most of it, and law enforcement in most countries have historically been reluctant to do anything e↵ective about them. Technology has made the victims’ plight worse.

One subproblem is the publication of non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII), once called ‘revenge porn’ – until California Attorney General Kamala Harris objected that this is cyber-exploitation and a crime. Her message got through to the big service ﬁrms who since 2015 have been taking down such material on demand from the victims [1690]. This followed an earlier report in 2012 where Harris documented the increasing use of smartphones, online marketplaces and social media in forcing vulnerable people into unregulated work including prosti- tution – raising broader questions about how technology can be used to connect with, and assist, crime victims [866].

The problems faced by a woman leaving an abusive and controlling husband are among the hardest in the universe of information security. All the usual advice is the wrong way round: your opponent knows not just your passwords but has such deep contextual knowledge that he can answer all your password recovery questions. There are typically three phases: a physical control phase where the abuser has access to your device and may install malware, or even destroy devices; a high-risk escape phase as you try to ﬁnd a new home, a job and so on; and a life-apart phase when you might want to shield location, email address and phone numbers to escape harassment, and may have lifelong concerns. It takes seven escape attempts on average to get to life apart, and disconnecting from online services can cause other abuse to escalate. After escape, you may have to restrict childrens’ online activities and sever mutual relationships; letting your child post anything can leak the school location and lead to the abuser turning up. You may have to change career as it can be impossible to work as a self-employed professional if you can no longer advertise.

To support such users, responsible designers should think hard about usabil- ity during times of high stress and high risk; they should allow users to have multiple accounts; they should design things so that someone reviewing your history should not be able to tell you deleted anything; they should push two- factor authentication, unusual activity notiﬁcations, and incognito mode. They should also think about how a survivor can capture evidence for use in divorce and custody cases and possibly in criminal prosecution, while minimising the

trauma [1248]. But that’s not what we ﬁnd in real life. Many banks don’t really want to know about disputes or ﬁnancial exploitation within families. A big problem in some countries is stalkerware – apps designed to monitor partners, ex-partners, children or employees. A report from Citizen Lab spells out the poor information security practices of these apps, how they are marketed ex- plicitly to abusive men, and how they break the law in Europe and Canada; as for the USA and Australia, over half of abusers tracked women using stalk- erware [1495]. And then there’s the Absher app, which enables men in Saudi Arabia to control their women in ways unacceptable in developed countries; its availability in app stores has led to protests against Apple and Google elsewhere in the world, but as of 2020 it’s still there.

Intimate abuse is hard for designers and others to deal with as it’s entan- gled with normal human caregiving between partners, between friends and col- leagues, between parents and young children, and later between children and elderly parents. Many relationships are largely beneﬁcent but with some abu- sive aspects, and participants often don’t agree on which aspects. The best analysis I know, by Karen Levy and Bruce Schneier, discusses the combination of multiple motivations, copresence which leads to technical vulnerabilities, and power dynamics leading to relational vulnerabilities [1154]. Technology facil- itates multiple privacy invasions in relationships, ranging from the casual to serious abuse; designers need to be aware that households are not units, devices are not personal, and the purchaser of a device is not the only user. I expect that concerns about intimate abuse will expand in the next few years to con- cerns about victims of abuse by friends, teachers and parents, and will be made ever more complex by new forms of home and school automation.

# Summary

The systems you build or operate can be attacked by a wide range of oppo- nents. It’s important to work out who might attack you and how, and it’s also important to be able to ﬁgure out how you were attacked and by whom. Your systems can also be used to attack others, and if you don’t think about this in advance you may ﬁnd yourself in serious legal or political trouble.

In this chapter I’ve grouped adversaries under four themes: the spooks, the crooks, the hackers and the swamp. Not all threat actors are bad: many hack- ers report bugs responsibly and many whistleblowers are public-spirited. (‘Our’ spooks are of course considered good while ‘theirs’ are bad; moral valence de- pends on the public and private interests in play.) Intelligence and law enforce- ment agencies may use a mix of traﬃc data analysis and content sampling when hunting, and targeted collection for gathering; collection methods range from legal coercion via malware to deception. Both spooks and crooks use malware to establish botnets as infrastructure. Crooks typically use opportunistic col- lection for mass attacks, while for targeted work, spear-phishing is the weapon of choice; intelligence agencies may have fancier tools but use the same basic methods. There are also cybercrime ecosystems attached to speciﬁc business sectors; basically, crime will evolve where it can scale. As for the swamp, the weapon of choice is the angry mob, wielded nowadays by states, activist groups

and even individual orators. There are many ways in which abuse can scale, and when designing a system you need to work out how crimes against it, or abuse using it, might scale. It’s not enough to think about usability; you need to think about abusability too.

Personal abuse matters too. Every police oﬃcer knows that the person who assaults you or murders you isn’t usually a stranger, but someone you know

* maybe another boy in your school class, or your stepfather. This has been ignored by the security research community, perhaps because we’re mostly clever white or Asian boys from stable families in good neighbourhoods.

If you’re defending a company of any size, you’ll see enough machines on your network getting infected, and you need to know whether they’re just zombies on a botnet or part of a targeted attack. So it’s not enough to rely on patching and antivirus. You need to watch your network and keep good enough logs that when an infected machine is spotted you can tell whether it’s a kid building a botnet or a targeted attacker who responds to loss of a viewpoint with a scramble to develop another one. You need to make plans to respond to incidents, so you know who to call for forensics – and so your CEO isn’t left gasping like a landed ﬁsh in front of the TV cameras. You need to think systematically about your essential controls: backup to recover from ransomware, payment procedures to block business email compromise, and so on. If you’re advising a large company they should have much of this already, and if it’s a small company you need to help them ﬁgure out how to do enough of it.

The rest of this book will ﬁll in the details.

# Research problems

Until recently, research on cybercrime wasn’t really scientiﬁc. Someone would get some data – often under NDA from an anti-virus company – work out some statistics, write up their thesis, and then go get a job. The data were never available to anyone else who wanted to check their results or try a new type of analysis. Since 2015 we’ve been trying to ﬁx that by setting up the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre, where we collect masses of data on spam, phish, botnets and malware as a shared resource for researchers. We’re delighted for other academics to use it. If you want to do research on cybercrime, call us.

We also need something similar for espionage and cyber warfare. People trying to implant malware into control systems and other operational technology are quite likely to be either state actors, or cyber-arms vendors who sell to states. The criticisms made by President Eisenhower of the ‘military-industrial complex’ apply here in spades. Yet not one of the legacy think-tanks seems interested in tracking what’s going on. As a result, nations are more likely to make strategic miscalculations, which could lead not just to cyber-conﬂict but the real kinetic variety, too.

As for research into cyber abuse, there is now some research, but the tech- nologists, the psychologists, the criminologists and the political scientists aren’t talking to each other enough. There are many issues, from the welfare and rights of children and young people to our ability to hold fair and free elections. We

need to engage more technologists with public-policy issues and educate more policy people about the realities of technology. We also need to get more women involved, and people from poor communities in both developed and less devel- oped countries, so we have a less narrow perspective on what the real problems are.

# Further Reading

There’s an enormous literature on the topics discussed in this chapter but it’s rather fragmented. A starting point for the Snowden revelations might be Glen Greenwald’s book *‘No Place to Hide’* [816]; for an account of Russian strat- egy and tactics, see the 2018 report to the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations [385]; and for a great introduction to the history of propaganda see Tim Wu’s *‘The Attention Merchants’* [2050]. For surveys of cybercrime, see our 2012 paper “Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime” [90] and our 2019 follow-up “Measuring the Changing Cost of Cybercrime” [91]. Criminologists such as Bill Chambliss have studied state-organised crime, from piracy and slavery in pre- vious centuries through the more recent smuggling of drugs and weapons by intelligence agencies to torture and assassination; this gives the broader context within which to assess unlawful surveillance. The story of Gamergate is told in Zo¨e Quinn’s *‘Crash Override’* [1567]. Finally, the tale of Marcus Hutchings, the malware expert who stopped Wannacry, is at [811].