Chapter 22

Phones

I rarely had to resort to a technical attack. Companies can spend millions of dollars toward technological protections and that’s wasted if somebody can basically call someone on the telephone and either convince them to do something on the computer that lowers the computer’s defenses or reveals

the information they were seeking.

– KEVIN MITNICK

Privacy is not about hiding – privacy is about

human growth and agency.

– CHRISTOPHER WYLIE

The protection of phones, the app ecosystem they support and the telecom- munications networks on which they rely, is central to the modern world. First, in the decade after the launch of the iPhone, the world moved from accessing the Internet via PCs or laptops to using smartphones instead, and added bil- lions of new users too. Whole business sectors are being revolutionised as they move to apps; of the 5.5bn adults on earth, 5bn have phones, and 4bn of them have smartphones. Second, the new generation of connected devices, from smart speakers to cars, are very much like phones, often using the same platforms and sharing the same vulnerabilities. Third, phones now provide the bedrock for authentication: if you forget your password, you get an SMS to recover it – so someone who can steal an SMS from you may be able to spend your money. Fourth, mobile networks are critical to other infrastructure: electricity compa- nies rely on mobile phones to direct their engineers when repairing faults, so if the phone system goes down a few hours after the power does, there’s a real problem. Finally, there’s public policy. While smartphones have revolutionised the lives of the third-world poor by giving access to services such as banking, they also facilitate surveillance and control.

The phone ecosystem is mind-numbingly complex, and to master it the se- curity engineer needs not just general security knowledge such as crypto and access controls, and knowledge of speciﬁc platforms such as Android and iOS, but of mobile and ﬁxed-line networks too. The history of telecomms security

668

is instructive. Early attacks were carried out on phone companies by enthusi- asts (‘phone phreaks’) to get free calls; then the phone system’s vulnerabilities were exploited by crooks to evade police wiretapping; then premium rate calls were introduced, which brought in large-scale fraud; then when telecomms mar- kets were liberalized, some phone companies started conducting attacks on each other’s customers; and some phone companies have even attacked each other. At each stage the defensive measures undertaken tended to be inadequate for various reasons. The same cycle of exploitation then repeated with the Internet

– amateur hackers followed by debates about wiretaps followed by fraud and tussles between companies and users; and as the two came together we’ve seen lots of complex interactions. Now we see rapidly growing phone-based fraud against banking systems, bad apps stealing people’s personal information and high policy debates on the national security implications of 5G infrastructure. How is the security engineer to navigate this?

The security of the phone as a platform depends on a number of things, which I’ll deal with under two main headings.

1. First, there’s whether the network to which it’s attached has somehow been compromised, whether by some kind of wiretap or by a SIM swap attack which undermines the phone’s network identity.
2. Second, there’s the question of whether the device itself has been com- promised, whether by malware rooting the operating system, or by the installation of a potentially hostile application or library.

Phone security used to be all about the ﬁrst of these, but by now it’s mostly about the second.

# Attacks on phone networks

The abuse of communications goes back centuries. Before Sir Rowland Hill invented the postage stamp, postage was paid by the recipient. Unsolicited mail became a huge problem – especially for famous people – so recipients were allowed to inspect a letter and reject it rather than paying for it. People soon worked out schemes to send short messages on the covers of letters which their correspondents rejected. Regulations were brought in to stop this, but were never really e↵ective [1460].

A second set of abuses developed with the telegraph. Early optical tele- graphs worked using semaphores or heliographs; people would bribe operators, or ‘hack the local loop’ by observing the last heliograph station through a tele- scope, to learn which horse had won before the local bookmaker did. Here too, attempts to legislate the problem away were a failure [1818]. The problems got worse when the electric telegraph brought costs down; the greater volumes of communication, and the greater ﬂexibility that got built into and on top of the service, led to more complexity and more abuse.

The telephone was to be no di↵erent.

## Attacks on phone-call metering

Early phone-call metering systems were open to creative abuse.

* + - * In the 1950’s, the operator in some systems had to listen for the sound of coins dropping on a metal plate to tell that a callbox customer had paid, so people practised hitting the coinbox with a piece of metal that struck the right note.
      * Initially, the operator had no way of knowing which phone a call had come from, so she had to ask the caller his number. He could give the number of someone else – who would then be charged. Operators started calling back to verify the number for international calls, so people worked out social engineering attacks (‘This is IBM here, we’d like to book a call to San Francisco and because of the time di↵erence can our Managing Director take it at home tonight? His number’s xxx-yyyy’). So payphone lines had a warning to alert the operator. But the UK implementation had a bug: a customer who had called the operator from a payphone could depress the rest brieﬂy, whereupon he’d be reconnected (often to di↵erent operator), with no warning this time that the call was from a payphone. He could then call anywhere and bill it to any local number.
      * Early systems also signalled the entry of a coin by one or more pulses, each of which consisted of the insertion of a resistance in the line followed by a brief open circuit. At a number of colleges, enterprising students installed ‘magic buttons’ which could simulate this in a callbox in the student union so people could phone for free. (The bill in this case went to the student union, for which the magic button was not quite so amusing.)

Attacks on toll metering have continued for over a century now. Most coun- tries moved their payphones from coins to chip cards in the 1990s to cut the costs of coin collection and vandalism, but as I remarked in section 18.5, the design was often poor at ﬁrst and villains sold lots of bogus phone cards until it got ﬁxed.

Other attacks involve what’s called *clip-on*: physically attaching a phone to someone else’s line to steal their service. In the 1970s through the 1990s, when international phone calls were very expensive, some foreign students would clip a phone on to a residential line in order to call home, and the unsuspecting home owner could get a huge bill. The Norwegian phone company had customer premises equipment authenticate itself to the exchange before a dial tone was given [994].

The UK phone company was not as enlightened as its Norwegian counter- part, and had a policy of denying that wiretaps were possible, so it could just collect the call charges from victim households. This occasionally caused col- lateral damage, as a family in Cramlington was to ﬁnd out. The ﬁrst sign they had of trouble was hearing a conversation on their line. The next was a visit from the police who said there’d been complaints of nuisance phone calls. The complainants were three ladies, all of whom had a number one digit di↵erent from a number to which this family had supposedly made a huge number of

calls. When the family’s bill was examined, there were also calls to clusters of numbers that turned out to be payphones; these had started quite suddenly at the same time as the nuisance calls. When the family had complained later to the phone company about a fault, their connection was rerouted and this had solved the problem.

A report from the phone company’s maintenance engineer noted that the family’s line had been tampered with at the distribution cabinet, but this was against doctrine and the company later claimed the report was in error. It turned out that a drug dealer had lived close by, and it seemed a reasonable inference that he’d tapped their line in order to call his couriers at the payphones. By using an innocent family’s phone line instead of his own, he not only saved on the phone bill, but also had a better chance of evading police surveillance. But both the police and the local phone company refused to go into the house where the dealer had lived, claiming it was too dangerous – even though the dealer had by now got six years in jail. The Norwegian phone company declined an invitation to testify about clip-on for the defence. The upshot was that the subscriber was convicted of making harassing phone calls, in a case widely believed to have been a miscarriage of justice.

Stealing dial tone from cordless phones was another variant on the theme. In the 1990s, this became so widespread in Paris that France Telecom broke with phone company tradition and announced that it was happening, claim- ing that the victims were using illegally imported cordless phones which were easy to spoof [1097]. That was a bit cheeky, as most equipment seems to sim- ply send a handset serial number to the base station rather than using the DECT security mechanisms, which use cryptography patented by the French company Alcatel. These mechanisms were proprietary but turned out to have multiple weaknesses, as Erik Tews documented in 2012 after reverse engineering them [1871]. DECT authentication is based on a weak block cipher; conﬁden-

tiality uses a weak stream cipher (a slightly more complicated version of A5/1 which I describe below in section 22.2.1) which can be broken with typically 234 e↵ort; there are weak random number generators; while protocol failures include a man-in-the middle attack, and a replay attack where you make a silent call to collect keystream to decrypt a call you recorded earlier. It’s said that the German intelligence services used DECT to train recruits in signal collection

and cryptanalysis. Since Tews’ work was published, the DECT standards body suggests using AES instead but it’s not clear how many vendors can be both- ered. The takeaway is that a cordless phone gives you no security against a capable opponent nearby, and as the standard emerged during the Crypto Wars of the 1990s you should have expected nothing else. As for clip-on fraud, it has largely disappeared since services like Skype and WhatsApp made long-distance calls cheap.

Social engineering gives another way in. A crook calls you pretending to be from AT&T and asks whether you made a large number of calls to Peru on your calling card. When you deny this, they say that, in order to reverse out the charges, can you conﬁrm that your card number is 123-456-7890-6543? No, you say (if you’re not really alert), it’s 123-456-7890-5678. Now 123-456-7890 is your phone number and 5678 your password, so that crook can now bill calls to you.

Premium-rate phone services grew rapidly during the 1990s, leading scam- sters to develop all sorts of tricks to get people to call them: pager messages, job ads, fake emergency messages about relatives, ‘low cost’ calling cards with 0900 access numbers, you name it. Indeed the business of tricking people into calling premium numbers enabled crooks to hone the techniques they now use in phish- ing attacks. The 809 area code for the Caribbean used to be a favourite cover for crooks targeting US subscribers; many people weren’t aware that ‘domestic’ numbers (numbers within the USA’s +1 international direct dialling code) in- clude countries other than the relatively cheap USA and Canada. Even though many people have now learned that +1 809 is ‘foreign’ and more expensive, the introduction of still more Caribbean area codes, such as +1 345 for the Cayman Islands, has made it even harder to spot such scams.

Phone companies advised their customers ‘Do not return calls to unfamiliar telephone numbers’ – but how practical is that? Just as banks now train their customers to click on links in marketing emails and thus make them vulnerable to phishing attacks, so I’ve had junk marketing calls from my phone company

– even though I’m on the do-not-call list. Governments typically set up weak regulators who avoid trying to regulate premium-rate operators, claiming it’s too hard; and from time to time it all blows up. In the late 2000s, all the major UK TV companies (including the state-owned BBC) ended up getting ﬁned for getting viewers to phone in and vote, in all sorts of shows. Many of these are recorded, so the calls were futile [1323]. Phone scams by broadcast stations have been a recurring problem worldwide since radio broadcasting took o↵ in the 1920s, and got worse when TV went mainstream in the 1950s [2050]. It’s also a recurring pattern that the biggest scams are often run by ‘respectable’ companies rather than by Russian gangsters.

## Attacks on signaling

The term ‘phone phreaking’ refers to attacks on signaling as well as pure toll fraud. Until the 1980s, phone companies used signalling systems that worked *in-band* by sending tone pulses in the same circuit that carried the speech. The ﬁrst attack I’ve heard of dates back to 1952, and by the mid-to-late 1960s many enthusiasts in both America and Britain had worked out ways of rerouting calls. One of the pioneers, Joe Engresia, had perfect pitch and discovered as a child that he could make free phone calls by whistling a tone he’d heard in the background of a long-distance call. His less gifted colleagues used home- made tone generators, of which the most common were called *blue boxes*. The trick was to call an 0800 number and then send a 2600Hz tone that would *clear down* the line at the far end – that is, disconnect the called party while leaving the caller with a trunk line connected to the exchange. The caller could now enter the number he really wanted and be connected without paying. Phone phreaking was one of the roots of the computer hacker culture that took root in the Bay Area and was formative in the development and evolution of personal computers [1222]. Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak ﬁrst built blue boxes before they diversiﬁed into computers [722].

Phone phreaking started out with a strong ideological element. In those days most phone companies were monopolies – large, faceless and unresponsive. In

America, AT&T was such an abusive monopoly that the courts eventually broke it up; most phone companies in Europe were government departments. People whose domestic phone lines had been involved in a service theft found they were stuck with the charges. If the young man who had courted your daughter was (unknown to you) a phone phreak who hadn’t paid for the calls he made to her, you would suddenly ﬁnd the company trying to extort either the young man’s name or a payment. Phone companies were also aligned with state security. Phone phreaks in many countries discovered signalling codes or switch features that would enable the police or the spooks to tap your phone from the comfort of their desks, without having to send out a lineman to clip on a wiretap. Back in the days of the Vietnam war and student protests, this was inﬂammatory stu↵. Phone phreaks were counterculture heroes, while phone companies were hand-in-hand with the forces of darkness.

As there was no way to stop blue-box attacks so long as telephone signalling was carried in-band, the phone companies spent years and many billions of dollars moving to a signaling system called SS7 which is out-of-band, in e↵ect on a private Internet to which normal subscribers had no easy access. Gradually, region by region, the world was closed o↵ to blue-box attacks. This forced attackers to become insiders.

## Attacks on switching and conﬁguration

Once telephone exchange switches became programmable, a second wave of attacks targeted the computers. Typically these were Unix machines on a LAN in the exchange, which also had machines with administrative functions such as scheduling maintenance. By hacking one of these less well guarded machines, a phreak could go across the LAN and break into the switching equipment – or into other secondary systems such as subscriber databases. For a survey of PacBell’s experience of this, see [388]; for Bellcore’s, see [1059].

Using these techniques, unlisted phone numbers could be found, calls could be forwarded without a subscriber’s knowledge, and all sorts of mischief became possible. A Californian phone phreak called Kevin Poulsen got root access to many of PacBel’s switches and other systems in 1985–88: this apparently involved burglary as much as hacking (he was eventually convicted of conspiring to possess ﬁfteen or more counterfeit, unauthorized and stolen access devices). He did petty things like obtaining unlisted phone numbers for celebrities and winning a Porsche from Los Angeles radio station KIIS-FM. Each week KIIS would give a Porsche to the 102nd caller, so Poulsen and his accomplices blocked out all calls to the radio station’s 25 phone lines save their own, made the 102nd call and collected the Porsche. He was also accused of unlawful wiretapping and espionage; these charges were dismissed. In fact, the FBI came down on him so heavily that there were allegations of an improper relationship between the agency and the phone companies, along the lines of ‘you scratch our backs with wiretaps when needed, and we’ll investigate your hacker problems’ [690].

The FBI’s sensitivity does highlight the fact that attacks on phone company computers are used by foreign intelligence agencies to conduct remote wiretaps. Some of the attacks mentioned in [388] were from overseas, and the possibility that such tricks might be used to crash the whole phone system in the context

of an information warfare attack worried the NSA [727, 1106]. Countries that import their telephone exchanges rather than building their own just have to assume that their telephone switchgear has vulnerabilities known to the sup- plier’s government. (During the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Kabul had two exchanges: an old electromechanical one and a new electronic one. The USAF bombed only the ﬁrst.)

Many real attacks involved insiders, who misconﬁgured systems to provide free calls through special numbers. This didn’t matter much when the phone company’s marginal cost of servicing an extra phone call was zero, but with the proliferation of value-added services in the 1990s, and with deregulation giving rise to cash payments between phone companies, it got serious [460]. In a hack reminiscent of Poulsen, two sta↵ at British Telecom were dismissed after they each won ten tickets for Concorde from a phone-in o↵er at which only one randomly selected call in a thousand was supposed to get through [1914].

As for outsiders, the other ‘arch-hacker’ apart from Poulsen was Kevin Mit- nick, who got arrested and convicted following a series of break-ins which made him too the target of an FBI manhunt. They initially thought he was a foreign agent who was abusing the US phone system to wiretap sensitive US targets. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, he testiﬁed after his release from prison that almost all of his exploits had involved social engineering. He wrote a book on deception that became a classic [1325]. In congressional testimony, he came up with the quote at the head of this chapter: “Companies can spend millions of dollars toward technological protections and that’s wasted if somebody can basically call someone on the telephone and either convince them to do something on the computer that lowers the computer’s defenses or reveals the information they were seeking”. Phone companies, like other ﬁrms, are vulnerable to careless insiders as well as malicious insiders.

Fast forward to 2020, and one worrying development is the growth of switch- ing exploits. A number of telcos now give SS7 access to corporate customers, for example if they want to send bulk SMS messages to authenticate customers. Access to the switch fabric lets them play the kind of games that Poulsen and Mitnick got up to in the 1980s. For example, if I want to hack your Gmail account, I send a message to your mobile service provider saying that you’ve roamed into my network. I then start an account recovery at Google, which sends an SMS to reset your password. As I noted in sections 3.4.1 and 12.7.4, this is now in active use for bank fraud; the ﬁrst instance of its use to steal money from bank customers was in Germany in 2016, when they were moved without their knowledge to another network; there was a similar fraud in Lon- don in 2019 [489]. SS7 has also been abused by Saudi Arabian MNOs to track Saudi dissidents in the USA [1054]. Most major telcos in developed countries now use some SS7 ﬁrewalling, and allow or deny remote access depending on their roaming agreements. If there is such an agreement, a ﬁrm given SS7 access by the remote telco can either steal a phone to get its SMS messages, or get it to do premium fraud. Forensics can be hard if there’s a complaint from a single user; the best you can do may be to look for roaming charges. If there are a thousand cases the bank might be motivated to go to the operator. But banks and their bulk SMS contractors are paying operators for SS7 access, opening up the formerly closed system. In short, we used to think that attacks involving

SS7 were the preserve of nation states, but that is no longer the case.

## Insecure end systems

The next major vulnerabilities of modern phone networks were insecure terminal equipment and feature interaction.

There have been many exploits of voicemail, whether implemented as an answering machine on customer premises or, as common now, a cloud service. Exploits start with tricking someone into calling a premium-rate number, and escalate to journalists and others hacking voicemail via the default PINs that many people don’t bother to change. The most notorious case was the murder, on the 21st of March 2002, of the English schoolgirl Millie Dowler. In 2011 it transpired that an investigator working for the News of the World, then the UK ﬂagship of the Murdoch empire, had hacked Millie’s voicemail, interfered with the police investigation in the process, and may have caused some of her messages to be deleted, giving Millie’s family a false hope that she might still be alive. The resulting outrage led to the closure of the newspaper, several criminal convictions – including the imprisonment in 2014 of David Cameron’s publicist Andy Coulson, a former News of the World editor – and a public inquiry into press standards.

But the really big frauds that exploit insecure end systems tend to target companies and government departments, as they have the ability to pay big phone bills. Attacks on corporate *private branch exchange* systems (PBXes) had become big business by the mid-1990’s and cost business billions of dollars a year [467]. PBXes are usually supplied with facilities for *re*ﬁ*ling* calls, also known as *direct inward system access* (DISA). The company’s sales force could call in to an 0800 number, enter a PIN or password, and then call out again taking advantage of the low rates a large company can get for long-distance calls. As you’d expect, these PINs become known and get traded by villains [1352]. The result is known as *dial-through* fraud.

In many cases, the PINs are set to a default by the manufacturer, and never changed by the customer. Many PBX designs also have ﬁxed engineering pass- words that allow remote maintenance access, and prudent people reckon that any PBX will have at least one back door to give easy access to law enforcement and intelligence agencies (it’s said, as a condition of export licensing). Such features get discovered and abused. In one case, the PBX at Scotland Yard was compromised and used by criminals to reﬁle calls, costing the Yard a million pounds, for which they sued their telephone installer. The crooks were never caught [1868]. One of the criminals’ motivations is to get access to communi- cations that will not be tapped. Businesses who’re the victims of such crimes ﬁnd the police reluctant to investigate, and the phone companies aren’t helpful

– they don’t like having their bills disputed [1624].

In a notorious case, Chinese gangsters involved in labour market racketeer- ing – smuggling illegal immigrants from Fujian, China, into Britain – hacked the PBX of an English district council and used it to reﬁle over a million pounds’ worth of calls to China. The gang was tackled by the police after a number of its labourers died; they were picking shellﬁsh in Morecambe Bay when the tide

came in and drowned them. The council had by now discovered the discrep- ancy in its phone bills and sued the phone company for its money back. The phone company argued that it wasn’t to blame, even though it had supplied the insecure PBX. Here, too, the gangsters were interested not just in saving money but in evading surveillance. (Indeed, they routed their calls to China via a compromised PBX in Albania, so the cross-border segment of the call, which is most likely to be monitored by the agencies, was between numbers their col- lection systems wouldn’t touch; the same trick seems to have been used in the Scotland Yard case, where the crooks made their calls via the USA.)

Such cases apart, dial-through fraud is mostly driven by premium rate ser- vices and the crooks are in cahoots with premium line operators. Most compa- nies don’t understand the need to guard their ‘dial tone’ and don’t know how to even if they wanted to. PBXes are typically run by company telecomms man- agers who know little about security, while the security manager often knows little about phones. This is changing as company phone networks adopt VOIP technologies and merge with the data network. Estimates of the losses from PBX fraud sustained by business worldwide fell from $4.96bn in 2011 to $3.88bn in 2017, with about half the latter ﬁgure now VOIP rather than classical PBX [91].

Exploits of insecure end-systems a↵ect domestic subscribers too. Premium- rate mobile malware arrived in 2006, when the Red Browser worm cashed out by sending $5 SMSs to Russia [941]; this scaled up after Android came along, and we’ll discuss mobile malware in section 22.3.1.4. And now that phones are used more and more for tasks such as voting, securing entry into apartment buildings, checking that o↵enders are observing their parole terms, and authenticating ﬁnancial transactions, more motives are created for ever more creative kinds of mischief, and especially for hacks that defeat caller-line ID. Since the early 2000s, there have been warnings that caller-line ID hacks, SMS spooﬁng and attacks on the SS7 signaling could be used for fraud. This is now reality, and we’ll discuss it in more detail later in this chapter.

## Feature interaction

Phone manipulation often involves feature interaction.

* + - * Inmates at the Clallam Bay Correctional Center in Washington state, who were only allowed to make collect calls, found an interesting exploit of a system which the phone company (‘Fone America’) introduced to handle collect calls automatically. The system would call the dialled number and a synthesised voice would say: “If you will accept a collect call from...(name of caller)...please press the number 3 on your telephone twice.” Prisoners were supposed to state their name for the machine to record and insert. The system had, as an additional feature, the ability to have the greeting delivered in Spanish. Inmates did so, and when asked to identify them- selves, said “If you want to hear this message in English, press 33.” This worked often enough that they could get through to corporate PBXes and talk the operator into giving them an outside line. The University of Washington was hit several times by this scam [696].
      * Many directory-enquiry services will connect you to the number they’ve

just given you, as a premium service for motorists who can’t dial while driving. It can also be used to defeat mechanisms that rely on endpoint identiﬁcation. Naughty children use it to call sex lines despite call barring, while naughty grown-ups use it to prevent their spouses seeing lovers’ numbers on the family phone bill [1456].

* + - * Call forwarding is a source of many scams. In the old days, it was used for pranks, such as kids social-engineering a phone company operator to forward their teacher’s calls to a sex line. Nowadays, it can be both professional and nasty. For example, a fraudster may tell a victim to conﬁrm their phone number with the bank by dialing a sequence of digits

– which forwards incoming calls to a number controlled by the attacker. So the bank’s callback mechanisms are defeated.

* + - * Conference calls can be exploited in all sorts of ways. For example, foot- ball hooligans in some countries are placed under a curfew that requires them to be at home during a match, and to prove this by calling the pro- bation service, which veriﬁes their caller ID. So you get your partner to set up a conference call with the probation service and your mobile. If the probation oﬃcer asks about the crowd noise, you tell him it’s the TV and you can’t turn it down or your mates will kill you. (And if he wants to call you back, you get your partner to forward the call.)

## VOIP

In *voice over IP* (VOIP), voice traﬃc is digitised, compressed and routed over the Internet. This had experimental beginnings in the 1970s; products started ap- pearing in the 1990s, and it became big business from the mid-2000s. Nowadays, most traditional phone calls are digitized and sent over IP networks belonging to the phone companies, so in a technical sense almost all phone calls are now ‘VOIP’. But though my home phone pretends to be a plain old telephone, my lab phone is now a born-VOIP device that o↵ers conference calling and all sorts of other complicated features that I don’t understand.

The most popular VOIP protocol, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), has had its share of vulnerabilities [2069] but is mostly attacked through poor con- ﬁgurations, for which many actors are constantly scanning; a PBX can get over a million messages a day trying to register as an extension, and then attempt- ing to call high-cost numbers in less developed countries [1271]. As I noted in section 22.1.4, the VOIP segment of frauds against corporate PBX systems was about $2bn a year by 2017 [91]. The broader interaction with security is compli- cated. Corporate security policies can result in ﬁrewalls refusing to pass VOIP traﬃc. The current political tussle is over robocalls, which can hide caller ID more easily if they go over VOIP. The FCC voted in 2020 to insist that telcos implement by the end of June 2021 a suite of protocols, STIR/SHAKEN, which authenticate callers over SIP [326]. Another regulatory issue is that govern- ments want emergency calls made through VOIP services to work reliably, and provide information about the location of the caller. But an IP packet stream can come from anywhere, and no-one owns enough of the Internet to guarantee quality of service. And although a VOIP handset looks like a phone and works

like a phone, if the power goes o↵, so does your service. Then you’re forced to fall back on the mobile network. So now it’s the mobile network rather than the traditional one that is the default emergency system.

## Frauds by phone companies

Phone fraud is not just a story of crooked customers committing toll fraud against telcos, and defrauding other customers by exploiting mechanisms that the telcos have no real incentive to harden, There are many scams by unscrupu- lous telcos. The classic scam is *cramming*, where a rogue phone company bills lots of small sums to unwitting users. Billing was designed in the days when phone companies were monopolies, usually state-owned, and assumes that phone companies trust each other: if company A creates a *call data record* (CDR) say- ing that a customer of telco B called their subscriber, they just pass it on to telco B, which pays up. (It has no incentive to quibble, as it gets a cut.)

I was myself the victim of an attempt at cramming. On holiday in Barcelona, my wife’s bag was snatched, so we called up and cancelled the phone that she’d had in it. Several months later, we got a demand to pay a few tens of dollars roaming charges recently incurred by that SIM card in Spain. In all probability, the Spanish phone company was simply cramming a few charges to a number that they’d seen previously, in the knowledge that they’d usually get away with it. My wife’s former MNO insisted that even though she’d cancelled the number, she was still liable for calls billed to it months afterwards and had to pay up. We got out of the charges only because I’d met the company’s CEO at an academic seminar and was able to get his private oﬃce to ﬁx the problem. Customers without such access usually get the short end of the stick. Indeed, UK phone companies’ response to complaints has been to o↵er customers ‘insurance’ against fraudulent charges. That they can get away with this is a clear regulatory failure. There are many variants: if you call an 800 number in the USA, the company may say “Can we call you right back?” and if you agree then you’re deemed to have accepted the charges, which can be at a high premium rate. The same can happen if you respond to voice prompts as the call progresses.

Another problem is *slamming* – the unauthorized change of a subscriber’s service provider without their consent. It would be a mistake to assume that cramming and slamming are just done by small ﬂy-by-night operators. AT&T was one of the worst o↵enders, having been ﬁned not only for slamming, but for forging signatures of subscribers to make it look as if they had agreed to switch to their service. They got caught when they forged a signature of the deceased spouse of a subscriber in Texas.

Yet another is the exploitation of international calls for premium-rate scams. The abuse of domestic premium-rate numbers led regulators in many countries to force phone companies to o↵er premium-rate number blocking to subscribers. The telcos got round this by disguising premium rate numbers as international ones. I mentioned scams with Caribbean numbers in section 22.1.1, and many other phone companies from small countries got into the act. Such scams bene- ﬁt from an international agreement (the Nairobi Convention) that stops phone companies selectively blocking international destinations. Advisories from gov-

ernments still warn of ‘wangiri’ scams where you get a call that rings once, in the hope you’ll call back – to an international premium number. However these seem to have stopped; an extensive study of robocalls in 2020 found no evidence of them any more [1543]. There are many reasons why scams may be moving away from the telco platform to the app ecosystem; the interaction between scams and regulation is complex.

By the time smartphones came along, the phone companies had got used to taking a cut of high-value service delivery, ranging from parking meters in London to ferry tickets in Finland. As malware became widespread on mobile phones, the botnet herders who control subverted phones could pay for goods and services by SMS. Many new services were made possible by the smartphone revolution and payment moved from SMS to payments via apps. SMS abuses have got to the point that neither Google nor Apple allows normal apps to send or receive text messages. We might pause to think of the industry’s economics. Why have telcos never felt a duty of care towards their customers?

## Security economics of telecomms

Phone and cable companies have extremely high ﬁxed costs and very low marginal costs. Building a nationwide network costs billions and yet the cost of handling an additional phone call or movie download is essentially zero. As I discussed in the chapter on Economics, this has a couple of implications.

First, there’s a tendency towards dominant-ﬁrm markets. For many years telephone service was considered in most countries to be a ‘natural monopoly’ and operated by the government; the main exception was the USA where the old AT&T system was heavily regulated. After the breakup of AT&T following an antitrust case, and Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation of BT in the UK, the world moved to a di↵erent model, of regulated competition. The details vary from one country to another but, in general, some sectors (such as mobile phones) had a ﬁxed number of allowed competitors; others (such as long-distance provision) were free for companies to compete in; and others (such as local loop provision) remained monopolies but were regulated.

Second, the competitive sectors (such as long-distance calling) saw prices drop quickly to near zero. Some sectors were made competitive by apps: Skype and WhatsApp made international calls essentially free.

In many telecomms markets, the outcome is *confusion pricing* – products are continually churned, with new o↵erings giving generous introductory dis- counts to compete with the low-cost providers, but with rates sneakily raised afterwards. There is constant bundling of broadband access with mobile service and TV o↵erings. If you can be bothered to continually check prices, you can get good deals, but often at the cost of indi↵erent service. If you don’t have the time to keep scrutinising your broadband and mobile phone bills, you can get some unpleasant surprises.

# Going mobile

Since their beginnings as an expensive luxury in 1981, mobile phones have be- come one of the big technological success stories. By 2020, we now have over ﬁve billion subscribers; it’s said that over a billion phones were sold in 2019 alone. In developed countries, most people have at least one mobile, and many new electronic services are being built on top of them. Growth has been rapid in developing countries too, where the wireline network is often dilapidated and people used to wait years for phone service. In many places it’s the arrival of mobile networks that connected villages to the world. This has brought many beneﬁts, and new crimes too. Both developed steadily as the technology was evolved and deployed.

Mobile phone security has developed as the abuse has. The ﬁrst generation of mobile phones (1G) used analog signals and the handset simply sent its serial numbers in clear over the air link1. So villains built devices to capture these numbers from calls in the neighborhood, or reprogrammed phones to steal ID from other phones nearby. One of the main customers was the *call-sell opera- tion* that would steal phone service and resell it cheaply, often to immigrants or students who wanted to call home. The call-sell operators would hang out at known pitches with cloned mobiles, and their customers would queue up to phone home for a few dollars. The call-sell market was complemented by the

criminal market for anonymous communications: people hacked mobile phones to use a di↵erent identity for each call. Known as *tumblers*, these were particu- larly hard for the police to track [944]. 1G phones did not encrypt voice traﬃc, so anyone could casually eavesdrop on calls with a radio receiver, yet despite this the possibility of caller anonymity led to their use in crime. The demand for serial numbers grew rapidly and satisfying it was increasingly diﬃcult, even by snooping at places like airports where lots of mobiles get turned on. So prices rose, and as well as passive listening, active methods started to get used.

Mobile phones are cellular: the operator divides the service area up into cells, each covered by a base station. The mobile uses the base station with the strongest signal, and there are protocols for handing o↵ calls from one cell to another as the customer moves about. Early active attacks consisted of a fake base station, typically at a place with a lot of passing traﬃc such as a freeway bridge. As phones passed by, they heard a stronger signal and attempted to register by sending their serial numbers and passwords.

Various mechanisms were tried to cut the volume of fraud. Most oper- ators ran intrusion-detection systems to watch out for suspicious patterns of activity, such as too-rapid movement or a rapid increase in call volume or du- ration. Vodafone also used RF ﬁngerprinting, a military technology in which signal characteristics arising from manufacturing variability in the handset’s radio transmitter are used to identify individual devices and tie them to the claimed serial numbers [776].

1In the US system, there were two of them: one for the equipment, and one for the subscriber.

## GSM

The second generation of mobile phones (2G) adopted digital technology. The *Global System for Mobile Communications* (GSM) was founded when 15 com- panies signed up to the GSM Association in 1987 and secured political support from the EU; service was launched in 1992. The designers of GSM set out to secure the system against cloning and other attacks: their goal was that GSM should be at least as secure as the wireline system. What they did, how they succeeded and where they failed, make an interesting case history.

The industry initially tried to keep secret the cryptographic and other pro- tection mechanisms which form the core of the GSM protocols. This didn’t work: some eventually leaked and the rest were discovered by reverse engineer- ing. I’ll describe them brieﬂy here. Mobile networks consist of a *radio access network* (RAN) and a *core network* (CN), and each mobile network has two databases, a *home location register* (HLR) that contains the location of its own mobiles, and a *visitor location register* (VLR) for the location of mobiles which have roamed in from other networks. These databases enable incoming calls to be forwarded to the correct cell.

The handsets are commodity items, personalised using a *subscriber identity module* (SIM) – a smartcard you get when you sign up for a network service, and which you load into your handset. The SIM can be thought of as containing three numbers:


1. there may be a personal identiﬁcation number that you use to unlock the card;
2. there’s an *international mobile subscriber identi*ﬁ*cation* (IMSI), a unique number that maps on to your mobile phone number;
3. ﬁnally there is a *subscriber authentication key K*i, a 128-bit number that serves to authenticate that IMSI and is known to your home network.

There is also a handset serial number, the *international mobile equipment identi*ﬁ*cation* (IMEI). The protocol used to authenticate the handset to the network runs as follows (see Figure 22.1). On power-up, the SIM emits the IMSI, which the handset sends to the nearest base station along with the IMEI. The IMSI is relayed to the subscriber’s HLR, which generates ﬁve *triplets*. Each triplet consists of:

* + - * RAND, a random challenge;
      * SRES, a response; and
      * *K*c, a ciphering key.

The algorithm is that RAND is encrypted under the SIM’s authentication key *K*i, giving SRES concatenated with *K*c:

{*RAND*}Ki = (*SRES*|*K*c)



SIM

Mobile

BSC

VLR

HLR

Figure 22.1: – GSM authentication system components

The encryption method is up to the issuer; an early standard called Comp128 turned out to be insecure [1971, 1972], so issuers nowadays use hash functions or constructions using AES.

Anyway, the triplets are sent to the *base station controller* (BSC), which now presents the ﬁrst RAND to the mobile. It passes this to the SIM, which computes SRES. The mobile returns this to the base station and if it’s correct the mobile and the base station can now communicate using the ciphering key *K*c. So the whole authentication protocol runs as in Figure 22.2.

SIM ! HLR IMSI

HLR ! BSC (RAND, SRES, *K*c), ... BSC ! SIM RAND

SIM ! BSC SRES

BSC ! mobile {traﬃc}Kc

Figure 22.2 – GSM authentication protocol

There are several vulnerabilities in this protocol. First, the base station isn’t authenticated, so it’s easy for a wiretapper to use a false base station to intercept calls. Such devices, known as *IMSI catchers* in Europe and *StingRays* in the USA, are now standard law-enforcement equipment2. Second, in most countries the communications between base stations and the VLR pass unencrypted on microwave links3. This allows bulk interception by intelligence agencies, and in many cases access to the triples needed to spoof or decrypt traﬃc.

The introduction of GSM caused signiﬁcant shifts in patterns of crime. The authentication mechanisms made phone cloning diﬃcult, so the villains switched to buying phones using stolen credit cards, using stolen identities or bribing in- siders [2034]. Robbery was the next issue, with a spate of media stories about kids being mugged for their phones. Mobile phone crime did indeed increase 190% between 1995 and 2002, but to keep this in context, the number of sub- scribers went up 600% in the same period [865]. Some of the theft is bullying – kids taking smaller kids’ phones; some is insurance fraud by subscribers who’ve dropped their phones in the toilet and report them as stolen as their insurance doesn’t cover accidental damage; but there is a hard core of theft where muggers take phones and sell them to fences. Many of the fences either work at mobile phone shops that have authorised access to tools for reprogramming the IMEI,

2When 2G was designed, a base station ﬁlled a whole room and cost $100k, so it might have seemed reasonable to ignore man-in-the-middle attacks. Nowadays all it takes is a low-cost software radio.

3The equipment can encrypt traﬃc, but the average phone company has no incentive to

switch the cryptography on.

the serial number in the handset, or else have links to organised criminals who ship the handsets abroad4.

Prepaid mobile phones appeared from about 1997, enabling the industry to expand rapidly to people without credit ratings, including both poor people in rich countries and everyone in poor countries. By 2008, prepaids made up 90% of the market in Mexico but 15% in the USA. During the 2010s, billions of people got access not just to calls and texts but to online information and payment services.

Prepaid phones also made anonymous communication practical. The issues include not just evading police wiretapping but fraud, stalking, extortion, bul- lying and other kinds of harassment. However, prepaid phones only protect you from the police if they don’t try very hard. Most criminals don’t have any clue of the level of operational discipline needed to stop traﬃc analysis. As I already remarked, one alleged 9/11 mastermind was caught when he used a prepaid SIM from the same batch as one that had been used by another Al-Qaida mem- ber; and after the failed 21/7 London bombings, one would-be bomber ﬂed to Rome, where he was promptly caught. He had changed the SIM in his mobile phone en route; but call records show not just the IMSI from the SIM, but also the IMEI from the handset. If you’ve got all the world’s police after you, just changing the SIM isn’t anything like enough. Operational security requires some understanding of how networks operate.

In addition to authentication, 2G was supposed to provide two further kinds of protection – location security and call content conﬁdentiality.

The location security mechanism is that when a mobile is registered to a network, it is issued with a *temporary mobile subscriber identi*ﬁ*cation* (TMSI), which acts as its address in that network. This is a lightweight mechanism; it is defeated trivially by IMSI catchers, which pretend to be a base station in a di↵erent network.

2G GSM also provides some call content conﬁdentiality by encrypting the traﬃc between the handset and the base station once authentication and reg- istration are completed. The speech is digitized, compressed and chopped into packets; each packet is encrypted by xor-ing it with a pseudorandom sequence generated from the ciphering key *K*c and the packet number. The algorithm commonly used in Europe is A5/1. This is a stream cipher that, like Comp128, was originally secret; like Comp128, it was leaked and attacks were quickly found on it [248]. By the mid-2000s, law enforcement suppliers were selling devices that would break the key in under a second, enabling a surveillance team to hoover up all the GSM traﬃc and decrypt it, so they could then pick out conversations of interest. Phones also supported an even weaker algorithm

called A5/2, which was licensed for export to non-EU countries5 and which can

be broken almost instantly. As I mentioned above in section 22.1.1, the DECT standard for cordless phones is somewhat similar, and also weak. The embassies of major powers round the world have roof structures that indicate antennas for capturing local telephone traﬃc, and the Snowden papers conﬁrm that the NSA

4In recent smartphone designs, the IMEI is supposed to be unalterable; some Android phones keep it in TrustZone.

5There was a row when it emerged that Australia was using A5/2.

collects local phone traﬃc at US diplomatic missions.

In addition to passive bulk collection, targeted active collection can exploit protocol tricks.

GSM vendors introduced a third cipher, A5/3, which is based on a strong block cipher known as Kasumi and became standard in third-generation mobile phones. But there’s the *bidding-down attack* which exploits the fact that the initial algorithm negotiation is in plaintext. The IMSI catcher simply tells the handset to use a weaker cipher. Elad Barkan, Eli Biham and Nathan Keller realised that this can be done retrospectively [171]. If you’re following a suspect who uses his mobile, you record the call, including the initial protocol exchange of challenge and response. Once he’s ﬁnished, you switch on your IMSI-catcher and cause him to register with your bogus base station. The IMSI-catcher tells his phone to use A5/2 rather than A5/1, and a key is duly set up – with the IMSI-catcher sending the challenge that was used before. So the mobile phone generates the same key *K*c as before. As this is now being used in a weak cipher, it can be cracked quickly, giving access to the conversation already recorded. A5/2 has now been retired; handsets that cannot use A5/1 or A5/3 communicate in plaintext. However A5/1 is easy to break with modern equipment.

Phone companies, equipment vendors and ISPs are now compelled to pro- vide for local law-enforcement access, but other countries often want access too and the wiretap facilities are often so poorly engineered that they can be abused [1707]. In 2004-5, persons unknown (but presumed to be from the NSA or CIA) tapped the mobile phones of the Greek Prime Minister and about a hundred of that country’s political, law enforcement and military elite during the Athens Olympics, by subverting the wiretapping facilities built into Voda- fone’s Greek network. Both Vodafone, and their equipment supplier Ericsson, were heavily ﬁned [1550]. Colleagues and I warned about this problem years ago [4] and the Snowden disclosures suggest that it has got steadily worse. I’ll discuss it at greater length in Part III.

Anyway, the net e↵ect is while the 2G GSM security mechanisms were de- signed to provide slightly better protection than the wireline network in coun- tries allowed to use A5/1, and somewhat worse protection elsewhere, they now provide slightly worse protection everywhere because of the range of exploits that can be industrialised by third parties.

## 3G

The third generation of digital mobile phones was initially known as the *Uni- versal Mobile Telecommunications System* (UMTS) and now as the *Third Gen- eration Partnership Project* (3gpp, or just 3G). The acronym 3gpp is still used for the standards body working on 4G, 5G and beyond. 3G entered service in 2003–2004 and is due to be retired in 2022, after which mobile devices that cannot use 4G or 5G are supposed to fall back to 2G. This may happen mostly in sparsely-populated rural areas where it is uneconomic to install the newer 4G and 5G technologies and the far greater backhaul transmission they need. 3G uses spread-spectrum technology on the radio access network, and instead of the 9.6kb/s of standard 2G and the tens of kilobits per second of the 2.5G

variant (GPRS), 3G data rates are in the hundreds of thousands of bits per sec- ond. 3G’s vision was to enable all sorts of mobile services, from mobile TV to laptops that just go online anywhere. It laid the foundation for the smartphone revolution.

The overall security strategy is described in [1976], and the security archi- tecture is at [1961]. The crypto algorithms A5/1 and A5/2 are replaced by A3, based on a block cipher called Kasumi [1021], which in turn is based on a design by Mitsuru Matsui called Misty, which has now withstood public scrutiny for two decades [1245]. All keys are now 128 bits. Cryptography is used to protect the integrity and conﬁdentiality of both message content and signalling data, rather than just content conﬁdentiality, and the protection runs from the hand- set to the core network, rather than simply to the local base station. So picking up the keys, or the plaintext, from the base station or microwave backhaul is no longer an attack. The authentication is now two-way rather than one-way. The theory was that this would end the vulnerability to rogue base stations, and IMSI catchers wouldn’t work any more. In practice, they work ﬁne as they just tell the target handset to fall back to 2G operation. 3G also has also a proper interface for local interception [1962].

In the basic 3G *authentication and key agreement* (AKA) protocol, the au- thentication runs from the handset to the visitor location register. The home location register is now known as the *home environment* (HE) and the SIM as the *UMTS SIM* (USIM). The home environment chooses a random challenge RAND as before and enciphers it with the USIM authentication key *K*i to gen- erate a response RES, a conﬁdentiality key *CK*, and integrity key *IK*, and an anonymity key *AK*.

{*RAND*}K = (*RES*|*CK*|*IK*|*AK*)

There is also a sequence number SEQ known to the HE and the USIM. A MAC is computed on RAND and SEQ, and then the sequence number is masked by exclusive-or’ing it with the anonymity key. The challenge, the expected response, the conﬁdentiality key, the integrity key, and the masked sequence number made up into an *authentication vector AV* which is sent from the HE to the VLR. The VLR then sends the USIM the challenge, the masked sequence number and the MAC; the USIM computes the response and the keys, unmasks the sequence number, veriﬁes the MAC, and if it’s correct returns the response to the VLR.

USIM ! HE IMSI (this can optionally be encrypted)

HE ! VLR RAND, XRES, *CK*, *IK*, *SEQ* ⊕ *AK*, *MAC*

VLR ! USIM RAND, *SEQ* ⊕ *AK*, *MAC*

USIM ! VLR RES

Fig 20.4 – 3gpp authentication protocol

The 3G standards set out many other features, including identity and lo- cation privacy mechanisms, backwards compatibility with 2G, mechanisms for encrypting authentication vectors in transit from HEs to VLRs, and negotiation of various optional cryptographic mechanisms.

As with 2G, its design goal was that security should be comparable with that of the wired network [922] and the net e↵ect was a modest improvement: bulk eavesdropping on the air link is prevented by higher-quality mechanisms, although targeted attacks by IMSI catchers still work by exploiting fallback. In a number of countries, third-generation mobiles were hard for the police to tap in the ﬁrst few years, as they had to integrate their systems with those of the network operators to operate at any scale greater than tactically.

## 4G

Fourth-generation mobile networks were ﬁrst rolled out in 2009, and accounted for most mobile subscriptions (4.2bn of the 8bn) by 2019 [981]. They use IP throughout, unlike 2G and 3G which had circuit-switched core networks. The radio access network changed from 3G’s spread spectrum to *frequency-domain equalization* (FDE) schemes, making very high bit rates possible despite multi- path radio propagation (echoes). The higher data rates made apps such as Google Maps and Snapchat work much better, and made video streaming apps possible. There is actually a family of standards that has evolved during the 2010s, supporting bandwidths in the megabits up to tens of megabits per second. The 4G security standards rowed back from 3G by limiting encryption to the link between the handset and the base station, though to be fair most apps now encrypt data at the application layer. The authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol is very similar to 3G, although the nomenclature has changed. The handset is now the UE or user equipment while the HE/HLR is now the *home subscriber server* (HSS). The base station functionality is split into an Evolved NodeB (eNodeB) base station and a smaller number of Mobility Man- agement Entities (MMEs), which handle the AKA exchange, make admission decisions, supply session keys to the base stations and handle law enforcement access. The idea was that the MMEs can be housed in protected spaces or at least made tamper-resistant (people talked about TPMs but no operator seems to have implemented them).

The three main weaknesses in 4G are that local traﬃc at a base station (or MME) can still be monitored by anyone who can take it over; that the user equipment’s identity is sent to the network in the clear, or masked using a *Globally Unique Temporary Identity* (GUTI) which is fairly weak, like its predecessor the TMSI [918]; and that the home network delegates authentication to the serving network [362]. SS7 is replaced by a control protocol suite called Diameter, where messages can be optionally encrypted, but as the operators trust each other it’s vulnerable to many of the same types of attack [426]. It started o↵ with fewer abusable functions, but they got put back in following business pressure.

*Rich Communications Services* (RCS) became widely available during 2019 thanks to support from Google in its Messages app. It is intended to replace SMS with richer chat features including geolocation exchange, social presence information and voice-over-IP. Also known as SMS+, +Message or joyn, it pro- vides many of the same services as WhatsApp, but without the end-to-end encryption, as it’s a telco hosted product. Many of the initial implementations are insecure as the telcos haven’t conﬁgured them correctly [1696].

For decades, phone security has been kept weak at the behest of the secu- rity and intelligence community. Yet this strategy blew back when it turned out that Russian agents in the USA compromised the communications of FBI counterintelligence agents who used push-to-talk cellphones [579]. We haven’t been told whether they were 3G or 4G, or what the speciﬁc exploits were, but it was so bad that in December 2016 the Obama administration kicked out three dozen Russian diplomats. They had also been obsessed with getting premises with line of sight to the CIA HQ at Langley, Virginia.

## 5G and beyond

Fifth-generation networks entered service in 2019, promising a further signiﬁcant improvement over 4G in terms of bandwidth and latency. The main driver at present is bandwidth; mobile traﬃc grew by 68% between Q3 2018 and Q3 2019, mostly from video, and growth at over 25% is anticipated up till 2025, by which time almost half the traﬃc worldwide will be 5G [981]. Again, there’s an evolving family of standards, with complexity increasing still further. Initial deployments use *non-standalone mode* (NSA) which reuse the 4G control plane (and even the 4G towers) but boost the data rate. The real excitement is about *standalone mode* (SA) which will follow. 5G makes it cheaper and easier for mobile network operators to build new capacity, not just at existing frequencies, but at millimeter-wave frequencies over 20GHz, which will mean much larger numbers of small base stations on lamp posts, bus stops and so on (this will also limit the time available to do authentication handshakes). Network energy eﬃciency and area traﬃc capacity could be up two orders of magnitude, while connection density, mobility and data rates could go up one order. Availability is a high priority; after the 2016 Brussels bombings, the police couldn’t get network service on their phones because of congestion, and had to ﬁnd wiﬁ hotspots to talk to each other.

The terminology changes yet again. Each tiny base station is now a *dis- tributed unit* (DU) and is controlled by a *centralised unit* (CU), which is also in the ﬁeld but counted as part of the core network. The encryption goes from your device to the CU, and from there it’s protected using IPSec to the *access man- agement function* (AMF), which replaces the MME boxes. The authentication and key agreement protocols are much the same (XRES is renamed HXRES). One material improvement is that your device identity is sent to your home net- work encrypted under its public key, so location privacy will be harder to break; and we’re told that IMSI catchers won’t work any more6. Passive and active attacks by fake base stations seem still possible, including man-in-the-middle

attacks that downgrade a device to a previous generation of technology, and could be used to deplete the batteries of energy-critical devices [1712].

However the whole core network moves to the cloud, including all the law- enforcement access mechanisms. Instead of defending familiar technologies, mo- bile network operators will depend on new ones that they don’t understand and which most will just buy from the cheapest vendor. One mistake in conﬁg- uration, and things could be world readable; and unless something like SGX

6We heard that before with 3G: the wiretappers just forced fallback to 2G. We hear that the intelligence agencies are lobbying to break this, in alliance with the big data carriers.

can be made to work, the cloud providers’ governments may well be able to get access by serving warrants on them rather than on the operators. The use of SDN in the core cloud network opens up still more questions, of which the most troublesome long-term may be whether 5G becomes an end-run round net neutrality, enabling network operators to customise o↵erings to each application by performance (and price). Meanwhile the speciﬁcations are complex and the implementations are still ﬂaky. As the standards evolve, one ﬁght is between the big data carriers who want to manipulate traﬃc to break net neutrality and claw their way up the value chain, versus the big mobile network operators who want end-to-end trust. In theory traﬃc edits will be signed by the ﬁrm that does the editing, but nobody seems to know how that will work. Another is that the US government is trying to prevent Huawei getting a critical mass of installations outside China; the 2019 annual report of the UK National Cyber Security Centre (part of GCHQ) noted that signiﬁcant supply-chain risks have developed over 2010–19, for which market drivers were insuﬃcient to ensure an adequate response [1393]. In 2020, with anti-Chinese sentiment rising with the coronavirus pandemic and the end of ‘one country two systems’ in Hong Kong, the UK government decided to ban Huawei from selling 5G network equipment from the end of 2020 and remove its existing equipment by 2027. A longer- term resolution may depend on a third tussle, between the ‘bellheads’ and the ‘netheads’: between ﬁrms like Nokia and Huawei who take a phone-industry ap- proach and culture, and insurgents such as Rakuten whose culture is from the computer industry and which will happily virtualise everything in sight once it’s in the cloud [609].

What about 6G and 7G? Telecomms researchers talk about the former see- ing evolution in the radio access network to support a diversity of apps with di↵erent requirements for peak bandwidth, latency, service quality and power consumption [1454]; and the latter having thousands of micro-satellites to de- ploy 200Mbps broadband over all the earth’s surface. The arrival of stream- ing games, augmented reality and (perhaps) autonomous vehicles will create demand for ultra-low-latency cloud services, so rather than having our data shipped o↵ to a few dozen data centres run by Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Amazon, we may see edge clouds with clusters of servers in each town, perhaps even in the buildings that used to house the old telephone exchanges. Then, just as the dotcom boom in the late 1990s forced us to partition web services into the active processes at the core and the rest that could be served more or less statically and thus cached locally in CDNs, we’ll have to host some of the active stu↵ locally too.

## General MNO failings

Regardless of the generation of radio link technology in use, there are some common failings of MNOs whose root causes lie in the economics and regu- lation of the industry. One is the rapidly growing attacks on authentication functions supported by mobile phones. In addition to the SS7 security issues we discussed in section 22.1.3, which apply also to wireline telcos, the mobile world has brought us SIM swapping, channel jacking and the theft of cookies from authenticator apps. Many of these have security economics at their root:

there is some misalignment of incentives between the various principals in the system.

In section 3.4.1 we introduced SIM swap attacks, where the attacker per- suades the victim’s telco to issue a new SIM card on the victim’s account. This can open the door to all sorts of mayhem; individuals can have their lives trashed by attackers who take over their online accounts. Celebrities are targets: in Au- gust 2019, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey had his account taken over for an hour and used to send racist and antisemitic tweets, causing commentators to wonder whether someone who took over President Trump’s twitter account might start World War 3 [1340]. As I mentioned in section 12.7.4, SIM-swap attacks are mostly used in 2020 against the customers of banks and bitcoin exchanges, and often involve phone company insiders. Yet the response of phone companies has been at best patchy. The only major US MNO making SIM swapping harder is Verizon [712]. But not all countermeasures help all users: if they are optional, then the company can more easily disclaim losses by the customers who don’t opt to use them. The ﬁrst MNO to take action was MTN in South Africa in 2003, which enabled users to designate a second SIM to authorise SIM replace- ment; curiously, this was the phone company involved in the ﬁrst SIM-swap fraud case in 2007, which I described in section 12.7.4. Phone companies can also help relying parties detect SIM swaps by sending a hash of the IMSI as a response to the second-factor SMS; but few do so. We discussed the often ad- versarial attitude of phone companies toward their customers in section 22.1.8; MNOs are no di↵erent in this respect from legacy wireline phone companies. Indeed, they may be worse because most of their customers in most countries are prepayment customers.

Another example of MNOs and their suppliers feeling unable to do customer security properly is SIMjacking. In 2013, Karsten Nohl warned that many SIMs in use were easy to hijack, because of features built in to facilitate over-the air software update. The industry retorted that it wasn’t a problem as SIM cards could run only signed software [1582]. In 2019, it emerged that governments had been using this for surveillance [1107]. MNOs’ relationship with their customers has always been somewhat adversarial, and they are compelled in many coun- tries to run middleperson attacks on demand. When a suspect’s mobile phone browser visits an unencrypted URL, the MNO serves police malware instead. Such network injection attacks can be done tactically, with IMSI-catchers, but doing them at the MNO is more convenient. This practice started in less devel- oped countries but has now spread as far as Germany [1443]. We will discuss government surveillance, and the tensions it has generated with security since the crypto wars, in section 26.2.7.3.

The real underlying problem for the MNOs is that they lost control of ser- vices. For various reasons, they were unable to engage with developers and promote an app ecosystem from which they could extract value. They ended up being commoditised – bit shifters who have to maintain the infrastructure, but who see the monopoly proﬁts they used to enjoy being creamed o↵ by others.

# Platform security

The second part of the phone story is the app ecosystems. These ﬁx some problems, and create others: the most acute security problem is whether the platform itself is trustworthy, or whether your phone might act against your interests. This has been a growing concern since programmable phones came along in the early 2000s. For the back story see the second edition of my book which describes the state of play in 2007. Brieﬂy, before the iPhone came along, security was fragmented along the supply chain, with chip designers, chip makers, OS vendors, handset OEMs and MNOs passing the buck while they tussled over DRM and over control. MNOs refused to allow OEMs to have any relationship with the customer. As I remarked in the chapter on Access Control, Arm launched TrustZone in 2004; by 2007, several hundred viruses and worms were being detected in Symbian phones each year, and vendors responded with access controls, code signing, and so on.

Apple changed the world in several ways at once. First, it broke the taboo on OEMs having a relationship with the customer. Second, it made it much easier for third party vendors to write apps. Third, it made the App Store central to a platform strategy, which it monetised by taking a share of both music downloads and software. This entailed a semi-closed platform. Devices could go online either through an MNO or via wiﬁ, and could switch easily between the two as needed. The e↵ect was to shift power from the MNO to Apple. Google launched

Android the following year, with a strategy of making a similar platform as open as possible7, allowing anyone to write apps for Android phones. They aimed to provide a minimum level of trust, to enable the ecosystem to grow. They remembered that Microsoft had grabbed most of the PC software market from Apple in the early 1980s by o↵ering a more open platform that got the network

e↵ects going in their favour and hoped to do the same with phones, leaving the iPhone as a niche product for the rich. This did not in the end happen, and we now have two large ecosystems that have converged in a number of ways. But Apple’s monetisation strategy does give it a better incentive to maintain its platforms, and iPhones are typically patched for at least ﬁve years while Android products are patched for three, and often less.

Both the iPhone and Android launched with security architectures I describe in the chapter on Access Control; both approaches aim to separate apps from each other and to prevent them from subverting the platform itself. The main processor is not the whole story, as phones contain dozens of other CPUs, and there have been vulnerabilities discovered in DSPs too which can a↵ect handsets from multiple OEMs [1212]. I also discussed in the chapter on Side Channels how a bad app could, for example, use the phone’s accelerometer and gyro to work out a password or PIN being entered into another app, even if denied direct access to the screen. The combination of rich sensors and a huge range of applications makes security and privacy services at the platform level rather complex. Both the Android and iPhone security mechanisms have been reﬁned over time, with more controls added to block or mitigate the more ﬂagrant abuses. However they can best be understood as an ecosystem, rather than as

7subject to the regulators’ insistence that the baseband software which controls the device’s RF behaviour had to be locked down

a list of protection options.

This ecosystem is truly immense. By 2019, 56% of all Internet access globally was from mobile devices, but 63% in the USA and 80% in India [1252]. It consists at the very least of the apps that run on the two families of mobile devices themselves, and the back-end services they rely on. The boundaries are hard to deﬁne. We probably have to include the ad ecosystems that app developers bundle with their products. Do we include the web services that mobile devices access from browser apps? Do we include voice telephony, now that this is migrating to apps like WhatsApp, Skype and Signal? What about other devices, from watches to cars, that run mobile operating systems and apps? It may be simplest to start with the app families.

## The Android app ecosystem

Android is the most widely deployed end-user operating system, found not just in phones but in tablets, watches, TVs, cars and other devices – a total of over 2bn monthly active devices. Its platform security model is described by Ren´e Mayrhofer and colleagues from Google in [1252], and in section 6.2.8 I discussed the technical architecture. Actions are based on three-party consent: the user, the developer and Google should all agree. The implementation is that rather than giving a userid to the end user, as in a conventional \*nix system, Android runs each app with a separate userid; data in private app directories is controlled by the app, while data in shared storage is controlled by the end user, and there are mandatory access control mechanisms to ensure that critical system data remain under the control by the platform, unless it’s rooted. So long as this does not happen, the user cannot be tricked into letting a bad app access or overwrite the data of other apps. The threat model includes everything from physical attacks and wiretapping through the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the operating system, libraries and other apps; it’s assumed that users will be tricked into installing malicious apps [1252]. Apps sold via Google’s Play store are scanned for malware (though the scanning isn’t perfect).

However, Google takes 30% of revenues from sales of apps, and refuses to host adult apps. This has driven many vendors of paid and adult apps to use less secure distribution channels such as OEM deals, third-party stores and their own websites [1823]. Since 2014 Google has o↵ered to upload non-Play-store apps for scanning when they’re ﬁrst run, but the risk of evil apps is ever present. Many more apps are somewhat predatory, even if they’re distributed by apparently respectable businesses such as hardware vendors, MNOs and security ﬁrms. The sad fact is that user data has become a major commodity; little else might have been expected given that most apps are free and the ecosystem is driven as much by ad revenue as anything else. One major consequence is that Android does not support the most critical permission for privacy – allowing the user to control Internet access for an app. (Blackberry allowed users to deny Internet access.) This pleases ad companies as otherwise many users would turn o↵ internet access for the ﬂashlight/game/compass app the moment they installed it. If this displeases you, you can get ﬁrewall apps that pretend to be VPNs and can block other apps’ access to the Internet. But of course most users go with the default, of letting the ad ecosystems harvest just about everything.

* + - 1. App markets and developers

App markets mitigate some security problems while amplifying others. As the Android ecosystem is open, anyone can be a developer and distribute the soft- ware they write through the Play Store. This makes a huge market available to novice developers, who can get simple apps running with little e↵ort. The fact you have to use the framework with the Android SDK constrains developers in potentially useful ways. Although fragmentation greatly impedes the update process for operating systems, app updates are easy if you use an app store that pushes updates.

However the developer rapidly encounters both technical and business com- plexity. Some simple apps are little more than a customised browser for an online back end; others exercise a single feature of the phone in new ways, as ﬂashlight apps do. But how uniform is that feature? How many versions of Android do you need to support? Do you need to test on hundreds of di↵erent handsets? There are now test frameworks to help, but fragmentation is a real issue if your app uses the rich hardware features on many modern phones. For example, people developing contact-tracing apps for coronavirus have struggled with the variation in bluetooth performance between di↵erent handsets. An- other example is where developers want to protect really sensitive information, such as key material in banking apps. Arm hoped that developers would use TrustZone but this turned out to be so hard given the variation between OEMs, handsets and software versions, that most turned to obfuscation instead. An- droid then provided KeyStore, which lets an app store its keys in TrustZone or a Secure Element or other cryptoprocessor if available, and block other apps from using them. Some developers prefer obfuscation in the hope of blocking mal- ware that roots the phone and can thus pretend to be the app; as I mentioned in section 12.7.4, some banking regulators insist on this.

Business complexity can come from the application itself, or from the ecosys- tem’s underlying economics: platform companies, device vendors, app develop- ers, app publishers (who add all sorts of ads), ad networks, toolsmiths and end users all have di↵erent incentives. There are di↵erent rules for paid apps, apps allowing in-app purchases and free apps. The rules for identifying users are com- plex: the user’s consent is needed to use some UIDs (IMEI, IMSI, phone number and ad ID) but not others such as MAC address and hardware ﬁngerprint.

* + - 1. Bad Android implementations

The ﬁrst bundle of systemic security problems to become obvious as Android became widespread around 2010 was the poor quality of the engineering work by many of the OEMs who licensed it. One example was factory reset. There’s a thriving trade in second-hand phones, as rich users buy the latest models and their old phones end up being sold. You might think that when you do a factory reset on your phone, that clears all your personal information, not just from shared storage but from app storage as well. But it’s hard to get this right because of all the interactions with how Flash memory is organised on a typical phone; there may be an embedded multimedia card (eMMC) and virtual SD card, with their own wear-levelling mechanisms. If the OEM’s engineers don’t

take the trouble to implement secure deletion, then the all-too-common outcome is that someone who buys your phone second-hand can retrieve the Google master cookie and access the Gmail account associated with the phone [1757]. For several years I bought Google’s own-brand Nexus and Pixel phones and never sold them after use, but many people get phones subsidised by a contract and locked to the MNO, which sells them in second-hand markets afterwards – often in less developed countries. (It is prudent to assume that Android phones in LDCs have been rooted and had remote access Trojans installed by local distributors.)

These quality problems extend to TrustZone and its Trusted Execution En- vironment (TEE), as implemented by various chipset vendors. For example, Qualcomm’s TEE system lets a *trusted app* (TA) map in memory regions of the host OS, and as a result any insecure TA can let an adversary root the device. Other problems allow attacks on the TEEs of the other four vendors: the soft- ware security mechanisms used in trusted environments lag the state of the art by several years, with absent or weak ASLR, excessively large TCBs, informa- tion leaks through debugging channels, no execution prevention, multiple side channels and no good ways to revoke wicked or vulnerable TAs – of which there are plenty. See David Cerdeira and colleagues for a survey of these issues [403].

However the biggest security problem with Android implementations is poor after-sales support. Many OEMs only support the version that’s currently being actively marketed; they are reluctant to spend engineer time backporting ﬁxes to old versions. A 2015 survey revealed that 87% of active devices were insecure, averaged over 2011–15, because they were running versions of the operating system that contained known vulnerabilities. In many cases, the OEM simply did not make ﬁxes available [1880]. This had already been identiﬁed as a problem by Google by 2011; the company o↵ered OEMs access to cut-price components if they undertook to patch their systems, but this got little traction. Google now o↵ers certiﬁcation programs for both vendors and apps, but the problems go deeper than just OEM engineering e↵ort. If a vulnerability is found in, say, the OpenSSL or Bouncy Castle cryptographic library, this ﬁx has to propagate to Linux, then to Android, them to each OEM, and then in many cases to each mobile network operator – as the MNOs control updates for phones that are locked to the network. Each of these steps can take several months, and each can be neglected for commercial reasons [1880]. This raises thorny issues around coordinated disclosure, which we’ll discuss in section 27.5.7.2, and regulation, which we’ll discuss in the last chapter of this book.

* + - 1. Permissions

Consent has been a wicked problem from the beginning, as we noted in the chapter on Access Control. In early versions of Android, an app’s manifest speciﬁed the access rights it demanded and the user would have to approve them all on installation in order to run it. This led to widespread abuse, as most users would just click approval to get the installation done, and a lot of utility apps became machines for harvesting and reselling your address book, browser history and other personal data. Already in 2012, research showed that only 17% of users paid attention during installation, and only 3% could answer

basic questions about what was going on [676]. In 2015, Android 6 moved to the Apple model of approving access to such resources on ﬁrst use. Indeed, progressive restrictions of the more dangerous permissions have driven platform evolution more than anything else. Android 6 also made ﬁne-grained location access a separate permission; Android 7 limited apps’ access to the metadata of other apps; Android 8 randomised MAC addresses and mandated the use of a single Advertising ID for monetisation; Android 9 limited access to sensors when an app is in background mode and restricted access to the phone and call logs; and Android 10 restricted location access in background mode.

Google now provides several dozen permissions, and developers have always been able to deﬁne custom permissions when making services available to other apps; thousands of these are deﬁned by hardware vendors, MNOs, security ﬁrms and Internet browsers [741]. These further balkanise the ecosystem and make it even harder for users (and developers) to understand.

An analysis of the consent problem by Yasemin Acar and colleagues breaks it up into comprehension of permissions, and attention to permissions, by both users and developers [10]. There are both usability and incentive failures on both sides. It’s clear enough why a predatory ﬂashlight app wants access to my address book; many failures are more subtle. Developers are just trying to make stu↵ work so they can ship it, while users are just trying to access some service or other. Developer usability is a signiﬁcant source of bugs; we’ve noted this elsewhere (e.g. in section 5.5) but it looms larger in appiﬁed ecosystems as the developers have to drive the application framework APIs to get useful work done. A substantial minority of developers request more permission than they need out of ignorance or confusion, and this holds even for system apps whose developers should know better. Google failed to implement fail-safe defaults; the APIs are confusing and poorly documented. This drove developers to copy each others’ code via fora such as stackexchange, to an even greater extent than

with conventional development8.

* + - 1. Android malware

As Android is an open platform, for which anyone can write apps, it has at- tracted a lot of harmful software. As we mentioned in section 22.1.4, premium- rate phone malware arrived in 2006 with the Red Browser worm; Android’s arrival turned mobile malware from a niche activity into a mainstream prob- lem. Deﬁnitions here are hard, as many apps are harmful in di↵erent ways to at least some people; here I focus on apps that act secretly against the interests of the user that installed them. I’ll discuss bad programs installed by OEMs and MNOs later in section 22.3.1.6.

Malware can be bulk or targeted, and it can come from private-sector crim- inals or state actors. Most of it by volume is of the bulk private-sector variety, and most of that comes through regular distribution channels. As well as the millions of apps in the Play Store, alternative markets are widely used, espe- cially in countries like China and Iran where the Play Store is censored. The

8It also drove Acar and her colleagues to look at usability from the developers’ view- point [11], creating an important new area of security research which I mentioned in the research problems section at the end of the chapter on Access Control.

largest single source of malware has been the Play Store, with a signiﬁcant mi- nority of apps being harmful at some times, while some alternative markets have on occasion removed most of their apps for being harmful. Apps may be born harmful, or libraries on which they rely may become bad, or the bad guys may buy failing app companies, just as they snap up domains of former banks. One of the biggest crime rings exposed recently did hundreds of millions of dollars of ad fraud by buying Android apps and using their user data to train bots that then clicked on ads [1738]; such scams exploit other kinds of malware too. The measurement problems are non-trivial, as over 60 anti-virus ﬁrms label apps us- ing di↵erent criteria and classify them into di↵erent families. There are several hundred families active at any one time.

A 2018 survey by Guillermo Suarez-Tanguil and Gianluca Stringhini anal- ysed 1.2m samples collected over 2010–17, and classiﬁed them into over a thou- sand families [1842]. Since 2012, most of them have involved repackaging, where the malware dev takes a legitimate app (the *carrier*) and adds harmful code (the *rider*). This is industrialised by repackaging many benign carriers with variants of the same malicious rider. The riders may try to root the phone for persis- tent access, and drop a remote access Trojan (RAT) that can earn money at the direction of a command-and-control server, just as with regular PC mal- ware. Monetisation strategies have evolved; in 2010 the focus was on making premium-rate calls, but by 2018 it had shifted to ad fraud and the exﬁltration of personal information. The great majority of riders use obfuscation tricks such as encryption, while only a quarter of benign apps do this (Facebook’s app uses obfuscation as a defence against user data and keys being stolen by malware, particularly RATs in less developed countries). Riders are mostly native code rather than Java (or Kotlin, which replaced it as the oﬃcial Android language of choice in 2019).

Banking Trojans stand out among the more targeted varieties of private- sector malware. A common approach is the *overlay attack* where the malware tricks the user into allowing it to use Android Accessibility Services, which enables it to build an overlay over (for example) your banking app so it can capture the screen and input data, under the control of a remote command server [396]. Android malware has been stealing bank SMSes for some time, and Google has pushed back by allowing only approved apps the permission to read SMSes; the latest development in 2020 is that the Cerberus banking malware can now steal Google authenticator cookies too [431].

States already used targeted malware in intelligence and law-enforcement missions, and by 2012 vendors such as Gamma had produced mobile-phone versions of their products that were found in multiple jurisdictions [1231]. Such malware also seeks root access but implants spyware. Recent examples of bulk malware deployment come from Turkey, which in 2018 was using man-in-the- middle devices on the Tu¨rk Telekom network to deploy spyware [1218], and China, which sets website traps for Uighurs’ phones [393]. Bulk state-actor malware can include mandating doctored versions of apps in some jurisdictions; Skype was available in China from 2005 only through a local distributor, Tom Online, which repackaged it to scan for words forbidden by Chinese censors. After Microsoft bought Skype, they took back control from 2013, but the app was banned from app stores accessible in China from 2017 [1347].

There are technical abuses where apps defeat the permission framework while stopping short of rooting your phone. Joel Reardon and colleagues ran 88,000 Android apps in an instrumented virtual environment to look for apps abus- ing side channels [1588]. They found two large Chinese companies, Baidu and Salmonads, using the SD card as a covert channel, so that ads which could read the phone’s IMEI could store it for those which could not. They also found 42 apps getting the IMEI when they shouldn’t, using ioctl system calls, and over 12,000 with the code to do so.

* + - 1. Ads and third-party services

Mobile phone apps typically incorporate third-party services to support ads, social network integration and analytics for a range of purposes from crash re- porting to A/B testing. Such services can track users across multiple apps, even without their consent. An example of what can go wrong comes from Cam- Scanner, an app downloaded by over 100m people for scanning and managing documents. At some point, the app was updated to add a new advertising network that contained a malicious module. Negative reviews led antivirus re- searchers to take a look, and it turned out that the module was dropping Trojans on to people’s phones [796].

Third-party services are a fairly opaque part of the ecosystem, as they are not directly visible to the user. Some light has been shed by a survey carried out by Abbas Razaghpanah and colleagues, using a VPN app used by 11,000 volunteers to monitor traﬃc to and from their phones [1586]. They mapped over 2,000 *advertising and tracking services* (ATS), including hundreds that had not previously been reported, and found that a substantial minority (39%) did cross-device tracking; 17 of the top 20 had a presence on the web as well as in the app ecosystem. Eight of the top ten reserved the right, in their privacy poli- cies, to share data with other organisations. The largest of all were Alphabet and Facebook, but ﬁrms whose whole business consists of ATS, such as Chart- boost, Vungle and Adjust, have a signiﬁcant share and are relatively unknown to users. App developers often use several such services simultaneously. Paid apps have the fewest trackers, free apps have more, and free apps that allow in-app purchases, often of premium services, tend to have the most.

Mutual trust issues are discussed by Yasemin Acar and colleagues [10]. App developers have to trust ad networks, as they execute in the app sandbox and inherit its permissions. Ad libraries exploit apps in various ways, such as loading insecure code from web services and stealing users’ private information; app developers return the compliment by stealing money from the networks with fake click events, just like malware developers. (The boundaries are a bit fuzzy, as they were before in the world of the PC; there’s predatory behaviour at just about every layer of the stack.)

There are many examples of children’s apps collecting personal data with- out parental consent, contrary to the US Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA): Irwin Reyes and colleagues scanned 5,855 of the most popular free children’s apps and found that most of them potentially violated COPPA because of the way they used third-party SDKs; these typically enable devel- opers to disable third-party tracking and advertising but most developers don’t

bother. Worse, 19% of the apps were collecting personally identiﬁable informa- tion using SDKs that banned this in children’s apps [1599]. This study led to legal action by state attorneys general, which might encourage app developers to take the law more seriously. There are other practices contrary to the EU GDPR and its ePrivacy Directive, but EU regulators seem reluctant to get en- gaged, as the ATS industry is overwhelmingly based in the USA, and amounts to a substantial invisible export. Even from the viewpoint of the US authorities, most of the ATS specialists don’t even have a COPPA policy, leaving regulatory compliance to their customers.

Most people expect that if they pay for an app, they get more privacy. But given that developers rely on third-party services for analytics as well as ads, this costs e↵ort, which many developers can’t be bothered to make. Catherine Han and colleagues compared free and paid versions of the same app and found that a third of the paid versions were just as predatory in terms of data collection; another sixth collected at least some of the same data; three-quarters used the same permissions; and almost all had the same security policy. Looking at paid/free app pairs designed for families, she found that the majority of paid apps violated COPPA in the same way as the free versions [859].

* + - 1. Pre-installed apps

Julien Gamba and colleagues studied the ﬁrmware distributed by over 200 ven- dors worldwide [741]. Distributions typically reﬂect a partnership between a handset OEM and an MNO, with various aﬃliated developers, ad networks and distributors. They can be poorly controlled; there have been multiple cases of malware ﬁnding its way in, as well as software to do mass-scale data collection for commercial or regulatory reasons. Some phones also have diagnostic or sup- port modes that could be exploited by wicked apps. Most of the pre-installed apps are not available in the Play Store and thus appear to fall outside the conventional framework. Some are from ﬁrms like Facebook and AccuWeather which are known to collect personal data aggressively; many of these are not the public versions of these ﬁrms’ apps; and many pre-installed apps use mobile an- alytics or targeted advertisement libraries. What’s more, 74% of the non-public apps do not seem to get updated, and 41% remained unpatched for 5 years or more [741]. Many have sensitive custom permissions in order to perform such tasks as mobile device management for enterprise customers, call block- ing, and VPN services. Behavioral analysis showed that a signiﬁcant proportion of pre-installed apps could access and disseminate user and device identiﬁers, conﬁguration and current location. The domains most contacted by such apps were Alphabet, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and Adobe. Some pre-installed apps, particularly in cheaper phones, have components in the system partition that the user cannot easily remove, and which serve annoying ads or even act as loaders for Trojans [1109].

## Apple’s app ecosystem

Apple has led from the start on security usability, providing ﬁne-grained access controls long before Android, but its ecosystem has always been more closed.

When the Mac was competing with the PC it was one hardware platform against many OEMs; the same pattern followed with the iPod, where Apple demanded 30% of music sales, and it continued when Apple launched the iPhone. The business model was much the same as a gaming console. Apple is the only hardware vendor and demands 30% of software revenues, as well as 30% of in- app purchases of online goods and services. Now that Apple has half the market in developed countries (and three-quarters of teens) this is becoming a antitrust issue. Every developer has horror stories, and although Amazon was allowed in April 2020 to sell movies on Apple devices without giving Apple a cut [836], this just highlights the arbitrary nature of Apple’s rules. Why should dating sites like match.com have to hand it 30% of their sales, while Uber does not? Apple treats dating as a digital good, but Uber tries to avoid taxi regulation by claiming it’s the same, a mere matchmaking service between drivers and riders. The rules appear to hit smaller ﬁrms particularly hard, and imposed an ‘Apple tax’ on people like musicians, ﬁtness instructors and yoga teachers who went online because of the pandemic, if people booked them via an iPhone app. All this has led to an antitrust lawsuit in the USA from Epic Games, and a competition policy investigation by the EU [888].

Apple also used its control of the hardware and the operating system to implement rights-management mechanisms to protect its aftermarket revenue; competing app stores are not allowed. The company does due diligence on developers, requiring them to pay $99 a year for a license. Its app vetting process is a lot tougher than Google’s: there’s extensive automated security testing, followed by manual review to ensure that apps follow Apple policy on matters such as payment, content and abuse. To support this, iOS apps submitted to the App Store are only allowed to use the publicly-documented APIs [1812]. Academic researchers have therefore dug into the iOS ecosystem a lot less, but nevertheless a few things can be said.

The overall protection against malware is the best of any mass-market sys- tem, with zero-day remote exploits of iOS trading for multiple millions of dollars and being patched as soon as they’re used at scale. Indeed, when our own uni- versity’s ﬁnance division has asked for advice on how to protect really high-value transactions against phishing, my advice has been simple: buy an iPad on which you run the bank’s authenticator app to release payments, use it only for pay- ments, and keep it in a safe the rest of the time.

However, the protection isn’t entirely bulletproof, and various actors have found workarounds.

First, there’s a long history of of hobbyists and others ‘jailbreaking’ Apple devices, starting with people who objected to DRM or who wanted to sideload their own apps without paying Apple $99 tax, as they can with Android. As jailbreaks come out, Apple patches them; so at least the company has an in- centive to patch its devices up to date, rather than abandon them after sale as the typical Android OEM does. Sometimes patching isn’t possible, as when the exploit is of the device’s boot ROM; for example, the 2019 Checkra1n jailbreak will liberate most devices sold before 2017 [798], and the forensics industry uses the Checkm8 jailbreak, which exploits the boot ROM of all iPhones from the 4S to the X [798]; this is used widely in the forensic ‘kiosks’ sold to the world’s police forces, as I describe in section 26.5.1. Although ROM exploits cannot

defeat the user PIN on devices later than the 5s, thanks to the secure element, they can access those user data that are made accessible after ﬁrst unlock, as described in section 6.2.7. There’s also a market for carrier unlocking, where you can also assume that the phone is in the physical custody of the attacker.

Attacks that can exploit iOS remotely are more valuable, as state actors are willing to pay millions of dollars for them. We described in section 2.2.4 how the UAE used such a tool to target dissidents, and how Saudi Arabia used one against Je↵ Bezos, whose newspaper the Washington Post they detested; the Saudis also hacked their regional rival, the King of Qatar. Cybercriminals also do it: in 2019, Google’s Project Zero revealed iOS exploits that were being used in the wild to infect iPhones [204]. Apple always patches such exploits quickly, so your millions only give you access to a handful of targets. If someone’s likely to spend a million dollars to compromise your phone, you’d better have several

and not tell your enemies the number of your private phone that contains the data you really care about9

Second, Apple sells large ﬁrms ‘enterprise certiﬁcates’ which let iOS develop- ers bypass the app review process. This led to abuse and spats, with Facebook’s enterprise cert being suspended until their app stopped infringing App store pol- icy; Google’s app on the iPhone had a similar experience, and suddenly lots of abuse by porn, gambling and spyware apps came to light. They had been abus- ing enterprise certiﬁcates and hiding in plain sight in the app store [1697]. Many of the bad actors had got their enterprise certs by pretending to be helpline apps from MNOs in less developed countries [1170].

Third, Apple is like Android in that it doesn’t allow the user to block an app’s access to the Internet. So we ﬁnd ﬁrewall apps for iOS too, but this is one way in which the iOS privacy mechanisms get in the way of privacy. One app can’t even see another let alone block it, so all the iOS ﬁrewalls can do on the iPhone is block access to ad servers.

Although the malware issues are less serious than with Android, the same market forces apply, and so ad abuse still happens. Many popular apps (in- cluding dating apps such as Grindr and OkCupid) share a lot of data with advertisers, and are still allowed in the Apple ecosystem [1762]. The same holds for apps you might expect to be more privacy conscious, such as VPNs and ad blockers – where the privacy exploits come in through embedded ad networks, as in the Android ecosystem [1739]. In one case, an advertising SDK let its authors steal clicks from the 1,200 apps that used it and were installed on 300m iPhones; its code had stealth features that may have helped it past the app review pro- cess [1314]. And although more apps are paid for in the Apple App Store than in the Google Play Store (6% rather than 4.4%) and people assume that paid apps that don’t show apps don’t track you, such an expectation may be optimistic – in both ecosystems. In section 22.3.1.5 I mentioned research showing how the paid versions of Android apps often still track you. One might expect similar results for Apple, but the iPhone is a harder platform to do research on.

9I know of one tycoon who would borrow the mobile phone of a di↵erent employee each day and get the switchboard to forward his calls. If that’s your strategy you’d better assume it may occasionally double as a listening device and have your PA carry it for you. And against a state adversary, maintaining separation between a hot phone and a cold one is not straightforward: see the cotraveler system described in section 2.2.1.10.

Apple, like Google, has been progressively tightening up the permissions apps need. For example, iOS13 reﬁnes geodata from ‘allow’ on installation to ‘allow once’ and ‘allow while using app’, and also curtails the use of wiﬁ and Bluetooth to determine location – causing the same kind of complaints from developers [434]. From September 2020, iOS14 will turn *identi*ﬁ*cation for ad- vertisers* (IDFA) from opt-out to opt-in, essentially killing it, and undermining advertisers’ ability to track the e↵ectiveness of campaigns – supposedly for pri- vacy, but it also looks set to promote Apple’s ad business at the expense of Google, Facebook and third-party ad service ﬁrms [1073].

The two stores share some political problems, such as the fact that they both allowed an app used by men in Saudi Arabia to control the movements of their wives, daughters and servants, as I discussed in section 2.5.4. Occasionally, they do diverge. Apple is more aggressive than Google at removing ‘bad’ apps, though this can sometimes get them a bad press. During the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, Apple banned a crowdsourced protest safety app that demonstrators were using to avoid the police, claiming “Your app contains content – or facilitates, enables, and encourages an activity – that is not legal ... speciﬁcally, the app allowed users to evade law enforcement”, while Google left the Android version up [1253].

Another political controversy arose with coronavirus contact tracing. In February 2020 the government of Singapore announced an app that would use Bluetooth to record which phones had been near each other, so that when someone tested positive for the virus, public health oﬃcials could trace possible contacts automatically rather than just asking the patient who they’d met over the past week. This turned out to not work very well, as Bluetooth isn’t a good ranging technology. If you set the volume to be sure to see people 2m away, you see a fair number 10m away – which greatly increases the number of false alarms that contact tracers have to deal with. What’s more, if the proportion of the population running the app is *p* then the probability that both a patient

and their contact were both running it is *p*2 and the missed alarm rate is 1 − *p*2;

for Singapore, *p* was 12% so over 98% of contacts were missed. By the time this was reported in April, a number of other countries, including the UK, France, Germany, Latvia and Australia, had started to develop contact tracing apps too. They discovered that the restrictions on Bluetooth use made such apps tricky to write for Android phones and essentially impossible for iPhones [437]. When they asked for better access Google and Apple refused, citing the privacy risk to their customers if all apps could do Bluetooth contact tracing. Google and Apple made available an API for anonymous contact tracing, but from the epidemiologists’ point of view this is even less useful [1799]. This led to criticism of Google and especially Apple for taking policy decisions that are the job of elected politicians [955]. Germany switched to the Google/Apple API but started requiring pubs and restaurants to keep lists of customers’ contact details, so that if one customer gets sick, people who sat nearby can be traced using traditional methods.

## Cross-cutting issues

The convergence of the two ecosystems is leading to a growing number of cross- cutting issues. These apply not just to phones but to other IoT devices, many of which are either in the iOS ecosystem – such as Apple watches – or the Android one – including thermostats, doorbell cameras, building sensors and Google Home smart speakers. The other notable ecosystem is probably that of the Amazon Alexa, which kickstarted the smart speaker product category (this category has grown extremely quickly, taking 4 years to be adopted by half the US population rather than 8 for the smartphone). Many of these devices are also designed to support an ecosystem of apps, although the number and usage varies by product.

In addition to the issues that stem from the MNOs, which we discussed in section 22.2.5, and the rapacious ad ecosystems, which we discussed in the above section, a major problem is poorly engineered apps.

Quite simply, when billions of people entrust their ﬁnancial lives, their social lives and even their sex lives to apps, then poorly-written apps can cause real harm. Speciﬁc application issues have been discussed in many other chapters of this book. Here, one example may suﬃce to put things in context. It illus- trates a problem that many app developers just don’t think through – that of revocation. In fact, when assisting in the design of a payment app, we spent about half of the security-engineering time working out in detail how we’d cope with stolen phones: how payments could be blocked quickly when alerts came in from di↵erent stakeholders, what would happen when the crime victim walked into a shop the following day and bought a new phone, whether you’d rely on the phone shop to authenticate them or make them call a bank contractor, how you’d deal with phone OEMs who had their own backup and recovery ser- vices – an absolute mass of mind-numbing detail. That’s what real engineering comes down to: working with your supply chain and thinking through both the customer experience and the possible abuse cases.

My example of what can happen when you don’t pay enough attention is FordPass, an app that enables you to control a rental car so you can track it, lock and unlock it, and start the engine – even several months after you’ve returned it to the rental lot [794]. There are many more cases, but this is enough to illustrate that poorly designed apps can expose other systems, including safety- critical ones.

The threats from poorly written apps cover the whole spectrum of conﬁden- tiality, integrity and availability. The consequences of goods relying on apps that are no longer maintained are such that the EU passed the Sales of Goods Directive in 2019 requiring vendors of goods with digital components to main- tain these components for at least two years and for longer if that is a reasonable expectation of the customer. From January 2022, phone apps supplied along with a durable good such as a car or washing machine will have to be maintained for ten years after the last of these products leaves the showroom. We’ll discuss sustainability further in the last chapter of this book.

# Summary

Phone security is a fascinating case study. People have been cheating phone companies for a century, and since deregulation the phone companies have been vigorously returning the compliment. To start o↵ with, systems were not really protected at all, and it was easy to evade charges and redirect calls. The mech- anism adopted to prevent this – out-of-band signalling – proved inadequate as the rapidly growing complexity of the system opened up many more vulnerabil- ities. These range from social engineering attacks on users through poor design and management of terminal equipment such as PBXes to the exploitation of various hard-to-predict feature interactions. The main disruptive force was the development of premium-rate services that enabled people to steal real money.

On the mobile front, the attempts to secure GSM and its third, fourth and ﬁfth generation successors make an interesting case study. Their engineers con- centrated on communications security threats rather than computer security threats, and on the phone companies’ interests at the expense of the customers’. Their e↵orts were not entirely in vain but have led to an immensely complex global ecosystem that has become the subject of signiﬁcant political tussles, particularly over the control of 5G infrastructure.

The dominating factor in 2020 is the mobile app ecosystems. The Android ecosystem has attracted hundreds of thousands of developers, ranging from ﬁrms like Uber that have built apps into major international businesses, through apps o↵ered by many established businesses and a host of specialist tools, to a sub- stantial criminal fringe. The Apple ecosystem is more regulated but similar in a number of respects. Many apparently innocuous apps in both ecosystems can be abused in interesting ways, and the ad networks they use are a pervasive threat to privacy. The ecosystems of mobile apps, apps on more traditional platforms such as laptops, and apps on devices such as watches and cars converge and overlap in various ways, but insofar as they are still distinct, mobile platforms protect apps from each other more robustly than laptops do and the platform operators make signiﬁcant security e↵orts at the ecosystem level. Indeed, as most Android phones are not patched up to date and are therefore insecure, the heavy lifting isn’t done at the level of technical platform security but at the level of the ecosystem.

# Research Problems

The interaction between communications, mobility, platforms, and apps contin- ues to be fertile ground for both interesting research and expensive engineering errors. We have explored a lot of the issues over the past ten years in the mobile phone app ecosystem, mostly in the Android part of it where most of the prob- lems occur. Mobility is now extending to all sorts of other devices, from your watch to your car, and many of the issues around app ecosystems are arising with smart speakers and other domestic devices. Given the sheer scale of these new emerging ecosystems, we will need innovative ways to automate the hunt for both threats and vulnerabilities. One approach is to build honeypots and look for attack traﬃc; a somewhat more forward defence may be to analyse

the companion apps used to control IoT devices and infer vulnerabilities from them [1978].

# Further Reading

Information about the world’s phone systems is scattered across a large number of standards documents that can be rather heavy going, while app platforms at least have oﬃcial guides, white papers and developer communities. Keeping up with the latest exploits is a matter of following the security blogs and tech press. There are some good surveys of speciﬁc subproblems, which I’ve cited in the relevant sections, but I’m not aware of any good books or survey papers of the overall phone security scene. Perhaps that’s inevitable; now that more people go online via mobile devices then from laptops or desktops, mobile security touches one way or another on much of the subject matter of this book.