Chapter 23

Electronic and Information Warfare

All warfare is based on deception ... hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

– Sun Tzu

Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinal Virtues.

– Thomas Hobbes

# Introduction

For decades, electronic warfare was a separate subject from computer security, even though they use some common technologies. This started to change in the last years of the twentieth century as the Pentagon started to fuse elements of the two disciplines into the new subject of *information warfare*, followed by Russia and China. The Russian denial-of-service attacks on Estonia in 2007 put it ﬁrmly on many policy agendas; Stuxnet moved it into prime time; and the Russian interference in two big political events of 2016, the UK Brexit referendum and the US election, taught legislators that it could cost them their jobs.

There are other reasons why some knowledge of electronic warfare is im- portant to the security engineer. Many technologies originally developed for the warrior have been adapted for commercial use, and instructive parallels abound. The struggle for control of the electromagnetic spectrum was the ﬁrst area of electronic security to have experienced a lengthy period of coevolution of attack and defense involving capable motivated opponents, giving rise to deception strategies and tactics of a unique depth and subtlety. Although the subject lan- guished after the end of the Cold War in 1989, it has revived recently as China works to become a peer competitor to the USA, as Russia modernises its armed forces, and as AI ﬁnds its way into radar, sonar and related systems. Warfare is about to get hi-tech again, unlike in 2000-2020 with its emphasis on spooks hacking people’s phones and special forces then kicking down their doors.

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Electronic warfare was also our ﬁrst teacher about service-denial attacks, a topic that computer security people ignored for years, and about hybrid attacks that involve both direct and psychological factors. Finally, many of the tech- niques evolved to defeat enemy radars, including various kinds of decoys and jamming, have interesting parallels in the new ‘information warfare’ world of fake news, troll farms and postmodern propaganda.

# Basics

While old-fashioned computer security was about conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability, electronic warfare has this the other way round. The priorities are:

* + 1. denial of service, which includes jamming, mimicry and physical attack;
    2. deception, which may be targeted at automated systems or at people; and
    3. exploitation, which includes not just eavesdropping but obtaining any op- erationally valuable information from the enemy’s use of his electronic systems.

At the level of doctrine, electromagnetic warfare is generally considered to consist of

* *electronic attack*, such as jamming enemy communications or radar, and disrupting enemy equipment using high-power microwaves;
* *electronic protection*, which is about retaining some radar and communica- tions capability in the face of attack. It ranges from designing systems re- sistant to jamming, through hardening equipment to resist high-power mi- crowave attack, to the destruction of enemy jammers using anti-radiation missiles; and
* *electronic support*, which supplies the necessary intelligence and threat recognition to allow e↵ective attack and protection. It allows commanders to search for, identify and locate sources of intentional and unintentional electromagnetic energy.

These deﬁnitions are taken from Schleher [1662]. The traditional topic of cryptography, namely *communications security* (Comsec), is only a small part of electronic protection, just as it is only a small part of information protec- tion in modern civilian systems. Electronic support includes *signals intelli- gence*, or Sigint, which consists of *communications intelligence* (Comint) and *electronic intelligence* (Elint). The former collects enemy communications, in- cluding both message content and traﬃc data about which units are communi- cating, while the latter concerns itself with recognizing hostile radars and other non-communicating sources of electromagnetic energy.

Deception is central to electronic attack. The goal is to mislead the enemy by manipulating their perceptions in order to degrade the accuracy of their intelligence and target acquisition. Its e↵ective use depends on clarity about who

(or what) is to be deceived, about what and how long, and – where the targets of deception are human – the exploitation of pride, greed, laziness and other vices. Deception can be extremely cost e↵ective and is increasingly relevant to commercial systems.

Physical destruction is an important part of the mix; while some enemy sensors and communications links may be neutralized by jamming (so-called *soft kill*), others will be destroyed (*hard kill*). Successful electronic warfare depends on using the available tools in a coordinated way.

Electronic weapon systems are like other weapons in that there are *sensors*, such as radar, infrared and sonar; *communications* links which take sensor data to the command and control center; and output devices such as jammers, lasers, missiles, bombs and so on. I’ll discuss the communications system issues ﬁrst, as they are the most self-contained, then the sensors and associated jammers, and ﬁnally other devices such as electromagnetic pulse generators. Once we’re done with electronic warfare, we’ll look at the lessons we might take over to information warfare.

# Communications Systems

Military communications were dominated by physical dispatch until about 1860, then by the telegraph until 1915, and then by the telephone and radio until after the end of the Cold War [1380]. Nowadays, a typical command and control structure is made up of various tactical and strategic radio networks supporting data, voice and images, operating over point-to-point links and broadcast. There are also ﬁxed links including the Internet and classiﬁed IP networks. Without situational awareness and the means to direct forces, the commander is likely to be ine↵ective. But the need to secure communications is pervasive, and the threats are very diverse.

* One obvious type of traﬃc is the communications between ﬁxed sites such as army headquarters and the political leadership. A signiﬁcant histor- ical threat here was that the cipher security might be penetrated and the orders, situation reports and so on compromised, whether as a re- sult of cryptanalysis or – more likely – equipment sabotage, subversion of personnel or theft of key material. The insertion of deceptive messages may also be a threat in some circumstances. Cipher security may include protection against traﬃc analysis (such as by constant bitrate encryption of some links) as well as of the transmitted message conﬁdentiality and authenticity. The secondary threat is that the link might be disrupted, whether by destruction of cables or relay stations, or by traﬃc ﬂooding where resources are shared.
* There are more stringent requirements for communications with covert assets such as agents in the ﬁeld. Here, in addition to cipher security, location security is important. Agents have to take steps to minimize the risk of being caught as a result of communications monitoring. If they send messages using a medium the enemy can monitor, such as the Internet or

radio, then some e↵ort may go into frustrating traﬃc analysis and radio direction ﬁnding.

* Tactical communications, such as between HQ and a platoon in the ﬁeld, also have more stringent (but slightly di↵erent) needs. Radio direction ﬁnding is still an issue, but jamming may be at least as important, and de- liberately deceptive messages may also be a problem. By the 1980s, there was equipment that enabled an enemy air controller’s voice commands to be captured, cut into phonemes and spliced back together into deceptive commands, in order to gain a tactical advantage in air combat [730]. As voice morphing techniques are developed using deepfake techniques from machine learning, the risk of spooﬁng attacks on communications will in- crease. So cipher security may increasingly include authenticity as well as conﬁdentiality and covertness.
* Control and telemetry communications, such as signals sent from an air- craft to a missile it has just launched, should be protected against jamming and modiﬁcation. It would also be nice if they could be covert (so as not to trigger a target’s warning receiver) but that is in tension with the power levels needed to defeat defensive jamming systems. A common solution is to make the communications adaptive – to start o↵ in a low-probability-of- intercept mode, but ramp up the power as needed in response to jamming.

So the protection of communications will require some mix, depending on the circumstances, of content secrecy, authenticity, resistance to traﬃc analysis and radio direction ﬁnding, and resistance to various kinds of jamming. These interact in some subtle ways. For example, one radio designed for use by dissi- dent organizations in Eastern Europe in the early 1980s operated in the radio bands normally occupied by the Voice of America and the BBC World Service

– which were routinely jammed by the Russians. The idea was that unless the Russians were prepared to turn o↵ their jammers, they would have to work harder at direction ﬁnding.

Attack also generally requires a combination of techniques – even where the objective is not analysis or direction ﬁnding but simply denial of service. According to Soviet doctrine, a comprehensive and successful attack on a mil- itary communications infrastructure would involve destroying one third of it physically, denying e↵ective use of a second third through techniques such as jamming, trojans or deception, and then allowing the adversary to disable the remaining third by attempting to pass all their traﬃc over a third of their in- stalled capacity [1156]. This applies even in guerilla wars; in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus the rebels managed to degrade the telephone system enough to force the police to set up radio nets [1380].

NATO developed a comparable doctrine, called *Counter-Command, Control and Communications* operations (C-C3, pronounced C C cubed), in the 80s. It achieved its ﬁrst ﬂowering in Gulf War 1. Of course, attacking an army’s command structures is much older; it’s basic common sense to shoot at an oﬃcer before shooting at his men.

## Signals intelligence techniques

Before communications can be attacked, the enemy’s network must be mapped. The most expensive and critical task in signals intelligence is identifying and extracting the interesting material from the cacophony of radio signals and the huge mass of traﬃc on systems such as phone networks and the Internet.

In the case of radio signals, communications intelligence agencies collect a huge variety of signal types and build extensive databases of which stations or services use which frequencies and how. It is often possible to identify individual equipment by signal analysis. The giveaways can include any unintentional frequency modulation, the shape of the transmitter turn-on transient, the precise center frequency and the ﬁnal-stage ampliﬁer harmonics. This *RF* ﬁ*ngerprinting* (RFID) technology was declassiﬁed in the mid-1990s for use in identifying cloned cellphones [776, 1662]. It is the direct descendant of the World War 2 technique of recognizing a wireless operator by his ﬁ*st* – the way he used Morse Code [1224].

*Radio Direction Finding* (RDF) is also critical. In the old days, this involved triangulating the signal of interest using directional antennas at two monitoring stations. So spies might have several minutes to send a message home be- fore having to move. Modern monitoring stations use *time di*↵*erence of arrival* (TDOA) to locate a suspect signal accurately and automatically by comparing the phase of the signals received at two sites; nowadays, anything more than a second or so of transmission can be a giveaway.

*Tra*ﬃ*c analysis* – looking at the number of messages by source and destina- tion – can also give very valuable information. Imminent attacks were signalled in World War 1 by a greatly increased volume of radio messages, and more re- cently by increased pizza deliveries to the Pentagon. However, traﬃc analysis really comes into its own when sifting through traﬃc on public networks, where its importance (both for national intelligence and police purposes) is diﬃcult to overstate. Until the late 1990s, traﬃc analysis was the domain of intelligence agencies – when NSA ops people referred to themselves as ‘hunter-gatherers’, traﬃc analysis was much of the ‘hunting’. In this century, however, traﬃc analysis has come out of the shadows and become a major subject of study; I discuss this in the context of law-enforcement and intelligence surveillance in section 26.2.2.

One of the basic techniques is the *snowball search*. If you suspect Alice of espionage (or drug dealing, or whatever), you note everyone she calls, and ev- eryone who calls her. This gives you a list of dozens of suspects. You eliminate the likes of banks and doctors, who receive calls from too many people to an- alyze, and repeat the procedure on each remaining number. Having done this procedure recursively two or three times, you amass thousands of contacts – they accumulate like a snowball rolling downhill. You now sift the snowball you’ve collected – for example, for people already on one of your blacklists, and for telephone numbers that appear more than once. So if Bob, Camilla and Donald are Alice’s contacts, with Bob and Camilla in contact with Eve and Donald and Eve in touch with Farquhar, then all of these people may be considered suspects. You now draw a *friendship tree* which gives a ﬁrst approx- imation to Alice’s network, and reﬁne it by collating it with other intelligence sources. *Covert community detection* became a very hot topic after 9/11, and

researchers have tried all sorts of hierarchical clustering and graph partitioning methods to the problem. One leading algorithm is by Mark Newman [1434]; it uses spectral methods to partition a network into its natural communities so as to maximise modularity. The standard reference on such techniques is Easley and Kleinberg [599].

But even given good mathematical tools for analysing abstract networks, reality is messier. People can have several numbers, and they also share numbers. When conspirators take active countermeasures, it gets harder still; Bob might get a call from Alice at his work number and then call Eve from a phone box. (If you’re running a terrorist cell, your signals oﬃcer should get a job at a dentist’s or a doctor’s or some other place that has too many active contacts to analyse e↵ectively). Also, you’ll need some means of correlating telephone numbers to people. Even if you have access to the phone company’s database of unlisted numbers, prepaid mobile phones can be a serious headache, as can hacked PBXs and encrypted messaging services such as Signal. Tying IP addresses to people is even harder; ISPs don’t always keep the Radius logs for long. I discuss all these issues in more detail elsewhere, including Ed Snowden’s revelations about what the NSA did in section 2.2.1 and the history of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement in section 26.2.6. For now, I’ll just remark that anonymous communications aren’t new. There have been letter boxes and public phone booths for generations. But they’re not a universal answer for the crook as the discipline needed to use anonymous communications properly is beyond most criminals. It was reported, for example, that one of the alleged 9/11 masterminds was caught after he used in his mobile phone in Pakistan a prepaid SIM card that had been bought in Switzerland in the same batch as a SIM that had been used in another Al-Qaida operation.

*Signals collection* is not restricted to getting phone companies to give access to the content of phone calls and the itemised billing records. It also involves a wide range of specialized facilities, as revealed by Ed Snowden in 2013 and described in section 2.2.1. Even before then, we knew the broad picture, thanks to a long series of leaks and work by investigative journalists. A 1996 book by Nicky Hager [849] described a Five Eyes collection network. Known as *Echelon*, this consisted of a number of ﬁxed collection stations that monitored phone, fax and data traﬃc with computers called *dictionaries* that searched passing traﬃc for interesting phone numbers, network addresses and machine-readable content; this traﬃc selection was driven by search strings entered by intelligence analysts. Two years before Google was founded, Echelon was already a kind of Google for the world’s phone system; the 2013 system described by Snowden extends this to IP networks and to the greater traﬃc volumes of today. It has become a massive distributed search engine with over a hundred nodes worldwide. Ingested traﬃc is ﬁrst subject to massive data reduction – the video and the broadcast stu↵ gets thrown away – and then content is kept for a period of a few days in case anyone wants it. Traﬃc data is also kept, but for longer.

This ﬁxed network is supplemented by tactical collection facilities as needed. Hager described, for example, the dispatch of Australian and New Zealand navy frigates to monitor domestic communications in Fiji during military coups in the 1980s. Koch and Sperber discuss US and German installations in Germany in the 1990s in [1062]; Fulghum describes airborne signals collection in [730];

satellites are also used to collect signals, and there are covert collection facilities too that are not known to the host country. For example, in section 2.2.1.9 I describe Operation Socialist, where GCHQ hacked the Belgian phone company to get access to third-party mobile-phone traﬃc routed through Belgium and also to the communications of EU institutions in Brussels.

Since the Snowden revelations, over half of IP traﬃc has been encrypted, which has shifted the focus of intelligence and law enforcement somewhat to collection from endpoints. This brings us to the topic of attacks.

## Attacks on communications

Once you have mapped the enemy network, you may wish to attack it. People often talk in terms of ‘codebreaking’ but this is a gross oversimpliﬁcation.

First, although some systems have been broken by pure cryptanalysis, this is fairly rare. Most production attacks have been on the supply or custody of equipment or key material. Examples include the theft of the State Department code book during World War 2 by the valet of the American ambassador to Rome [1001]; errors in the manufacture and distribution of one-time pads lead- ing to the ‘Venona’ attacks on Soviet diplomatic traﬃc [1001]; and the covert ownership of the Swiss company Crypto AG by the CIA and Germany’s Bun- desnachrichtendienst, which I discuss in section 26.2.7.1. Ed Snowden disclosed the theft by GCHQ of the card personalisation ﬁles from Gemplus, which com- promised the keys in millions of SIM cards, giving the intelligence community access to the traﬃc of millions of mobile phones. Even where attacks based on cryptanalysis have happened, they have often been made much easier by operational errors, as with the attacks on the German Enigma traﬃc during World War 2 [1002], or by political interference with cryptography. This can be overt, as with export controls (see sections 4.3.1 and 26.2.9), or subtle, as with standards for random number generators (see section 2.2.1.5) and VPNs (section 2.2.1.7). Such activities are known by the agencies as ‘crypto enabling’ and their budgets are in nine ﬁgures. Other states play similar games: the history of Soviet intelligence during the Cold War reveals that the USA’s tech- nological advantage was largely nulliﬁed by Soviet skills in ‘using Humint in Sigint support’ – recruiting traitors who sold key material, such as the Walker family [118]. More recently, Chinese attacks on cloud service providers and on key assets such as the Oﬃce of Personnel Management – which got them the clearance data ﬁles on essentially all US government employees – were described in section 2.2.2.

Second, access to content is often not the desired result. In tactical sit- uations, the goal is often to detect and destroy nodes, or to jam the traﬃc. Jamming can involve not just noise insertion but active deception. In World War 2, the Allies used German speakers as bogus controllers to send German nightﬁghters confusing instructions, and there was a battle of wits as authenti- cation techniques were invented and defeated. I mentioned in an earlier chapter the tension between intelligence and operational units: the former want to listen to the other side’s traﬃc, and the latter to deny them its use [150]. Compro- mises between these goals can be hard to ﬁnd. It’s not enough to jam the traﬃc you can’t read as that tells the enemy what you can read!

Matters can be simpliﬁed if the opponent uses cryptography – especially if they’re competent and you can’t read their traﬃc. This removes the ops/intel tension, so you switch to RDF or the destruction of protected links as appro- priate. This can involve the hard-kill approach of digging up cables or bombing telephone exchanges (both of which the Allies did during Gulf War 1), the soft- kill approach of jamming, or whatever combination is e↵ective. Jamming is useful where a link is to be disrupted for a short period, but is often expensive; not only does it tie up facilities, but the jammer itself becomes a target. Cases where it is more e↵ective than physical attack include satellite links, where the uplink can often be jammed using a tight beam from a hidden location using only a modest amount of power.

The increasing use of civilian infrastructure, and in particular the Internet, raises the question of whether systematic denial-of-service attacks might be used to jam traﬃc. (There were anecdotes during the Bosnian war of Serbian infor- mation warfare cells attempting to DDoS NATO web sites.) This threat is still considered real enough that many Western countries have separate intranets for government and military use.

## Protection techniques

So communications security techniques involve not just protecting authenticity and conﬁdentiality, but also preventing traﬃc analysis, direction ﬁnding, jam- ming and physical destruction. Encryption can stretch to the ﬁrst of these if applied at the link layer, so that all links have a constant-rate pseudorandom bitstream on them at all times. But link-layer encryption is tricky over radio, because of the trade-o↵ between synchronisation and jamming; and on its own it is not always enough, as enemy capture of a single node might put the whole network at risk.

Encryption alone cannot protect against RDF, jamming, and the destruction of links or nodes. For this, di↵erent technologies are needed. The obvious solutions are:

* + - * redundant dedicated lines or optical ﬁbers;
      * highly directional transmission links, such as optical links using infrared lasers or microwave links using highly directional antennas and extremely high frequencies;
      * *low-probability-of-intercept* (LPI), *low-probability-of-position-*ﬁ*x* (LPPF) and anti-jam radio techniques.

The ﬁrst two of these options are fairly straightforward, and where they’re feasible they are usually the best. Cabled networks are very hard to destroy completely, unless the enemy knows where the cables are and has physical access to cut them. Even with massive artillery bombardment, the telephone network in Stalingrad remained in use (by both sides) all through the siege.

The third option is a substantial subject in itself, which I will now describe (brieﬂy).

A number of LPI/LPPF/antijam techniques go under the generic name of *spread spectrum* communications. They include *frequency hoppers*, *direct se- quence spread spectrum* (DSSS) and *burst transmission*. From beginnings around World War 2, spread spectrum has spawned a substantial industry and the tech- nology (especially DSSS) has been applied to numerous other problems, ranging from high resolution ranging (in the GPS system) through radio protocols such as Bluetooth. I’ll look at each of these three approaches in turn.

* + - 1. Frequency hopping

Frequency hoppers are the simplest spread spectrum systems to understand and to implement. They do exactly as their name suggests – they hop rapidly from one frequency to another, with the sequence of frequencies determined by a pseudorandom sequence known to the authorized principals. They were invented, famously, over dinner in 1940 by actress Hedy Lamarr and screenwriter George Antheil, who devised the technique as a means of controlling torpedos without the enemy detecting them or jamming their transmissions [1702]. A frequency-hopping radar was independently developed at about the same time by the Germans [1682].

Hoppers are resistant to jamming by an opponent who doesn’t know the hop sequence. If the hopping is slow and a nearby opponent has capable equipment, then an option might be *follower jamming* – observing the signal and following it around the band, typically jamming each successive frequency with a single tone. However if the hopping is fast enough, or propagation delays are excessive, the opponent may have to jam much of the band, which requires much more power. The ratio of the input signal’s bandwidth to that of the transmitted

signal is called the *process gain* of the system; thus a 100 bit/sec signal spread over 10MHz has a process gain of 107/102 = 105 = 50dB. The *jamming margin*, which is deﬁned as the maximum tolerable ratio of jamming power to signal power, is essentially the process gain modulo implementation and other losses (strictly speaking, process gain divided by the minimum bit energy-to-noise density ratio). The optimal jamming strategy, for an opponent who can’t predict

or e↵ectively follow the hop sequence, is *partial band jamming* – to jam enough of the band to introduce an unacceptable error rate in the signal.

Frequency hopping is used in some civilian applications, such as Bluetooth, where it gives a decent level of interference robustness at low cost. On the military side of things, although hoppers can give a large jamming margin, they give little protection against direction ﬁnding. A signal analysis receiver that sweeps across the frequency band of interest will usually intercept them (and depending on the relevant bandwidths, sweep rate and dwell time, it might intercept a hopping signal several times).

Since frequency hoppers are simple to implement and give a useful level of jam-resistance, they are often used in combat networks, such as man-pack radios, with hop rates of 50–500 per second. To disrupt these communications, the enemy will need a fast or powerful jammer, which is inconvenient for the battleﬁeld. Fast hoppers (deﬁned in theory as having hop rates exceeding the bit rate; in practice, with hop rates of 10,000 per second or more) can pass the limit of even large jammers. Hoppers are less ‘LPI’ than the techniques I’ll

Narrow band original signal



*N* bits

Over sampled original signal



*R*

*N\*R* bits

Wide band pseudonoise

XOR



Spread signal

Figure 23.1: – spreading in DSSS (courtesy of Roche and Dugelay)

Spread signal

Wide band pseudonoise Demodulated signal Restored signal

XOR

Figure 23.2: – unspreading in DSSS (courtesy of Roche and Dugelay)

describe next, as an opponent with a sweep receiver can detect the presence of a signal; and slow hoppers have some vulnerability to eavesdropping and direction ﬁnding, as an opponent with suitable wideband receiving equipment can often follow the signal.

* + - 1. DSSS

In direct-sequence spread spectrum, we multiply the information-bearing se- quence by a much higher rate pseudorandom sequence, usually generated by some kind of stream cipher (see Figures 23.1 and 23.2). This spreads the spec- trum by increasing the bandwidth. The technique was ﬁrst described by a Swiss engineer, Gustav Guanella, in a 1938 patent application [1682], and developed extensively in the USA in the 1950s. Its ﬁrst deployment in anger was in Berlin in 1959.

Like hopping, DSSS can give substantial jamming margin (the two systems have the same theoretical performance). But it can also make the signal sig- niﬁcantly harder to intercept. The trick is to arrange things so that at the intercept location, the signal strength is so low that it is lost in the noise ﬂoor unless the opponent knows the spreading sequence with which to recover it. Of course, it’s harder to do both at the same time, since an antijam signal should be high power and an LPI/LPPF signal low power; the usual tactic is to work in LPI mode until detected by the enemy (for example, when coming within radar range) and then boost transmitter power into antijam mode.

There is a large literature on DSSS, and the techniques have now been taken up by the commercial world as *code division multiple access* (CDMA) in various mobile radio and phone systems.

DSSS is sometimes referred to as “encrypting the RF” and it comes in a number of variants. For example, when the underlying modulation scheme is FM rather than AM it’s called *chirp*. The classic introduction to the underly- ing mathematics and technology is [1525]; the engineering complexity is higher than with frequency hop for various reasons. For example, synchronization is particularly critical. One strategy is to have your users take turns at providing a reference signal. If your users have access to a reference time signal (such as GPS, or an atomic clock) you might rely on this; but if you don’t control GPS, you may be open to synchronization attacks, and even if you do the GPS signal might be jammed. It was reported in 2000 that the French jammed GPS in Greece in an attempt to sabotage a British bid to sell 250 tanks to the Greek government, a deal for which France was a competitor. This caused the British tanks to get lost during trials. When the ruse was discovered, the Greeks found it all rather amusing [1918]. Now GPS jammers are commodity items and I’ll discuss them in more detail a little later in this chapter.

* + - 1. Burst communications

*Burst communications*, as their name suggests, involve compressing the data and transmitting it in short bursts at times unpredictable by the enemy. They are also known as *time-hop*. They are usually not so jam-resistant (except insofar as the higher data rate spreads the spectrum) but can be even more diﬃcult to detect than DSSS; if the duty cycle is low, a sweep receiver can easily miss them. They are often used in radios for special forces and intelligence agents. Really high-grade room bugs often use burst.

An interesting variant is *meteor burst* transmission (also known as *meteor scatter*). This relies on the billions of micrometeorites that strike the Earth’s atmosphere each day, each leaving a long ionization trail that persists for typi- cally a third of a second and provides a temporary transmission path between a mother station and an area of maybe a hundred miles long and a few miles wide. The mother station transmits continuously; whenever one of the daugh- ters is within such an area, it hears mother and starts to send packets of data at high speed, to which mother replies. With the low power levels used in covert operations one can achieve an average data rate of about 50 bps, with an av- erage latency of about 5 minutes and a range of 500–1500 miles. Meteor burst communications are used by special forces, and in civilian applications such as monitoring rainfall in remote parts of the third world. With higher power levels, and in higher latitudes, average data rates can rise into the tens of kilobits per second, and the USAF in Alaska uses such systems as backup communications for early warning radars. In niche markets where low bit rates and high latency can be tolerated, but where equipment size and cost are important, meteor scatter can be hard to beat. The technology is described in [1661].

* + - 1. Combining covertness and jam resistance

There are some rather complex tradeo↵s between di↵erent LPI, LPPF and jam resistance features, and other aspects of performance such as resistance to fading and multipath, and the number of users that can be accommodated simultane- ously. They also behave di↵erently in the face of specialized jamming techniques such as *swept-frequency jamming* (where the jammer sweeps repeatedly through the target frequency band) and follower. Some types of jamming translate be- tween di↵erent modes: for example, an opponent with insuﬃcient power to block a signal completely can do *partial time jamming* on DSSS by emitting pulses that cover a part of the spectrum it uses, just like partial band jamming of frequency hop.

There are also engineering tradeo↵s. For example, DSSS tends to be about twice as eﬃcient as frequency hop in power terms, but frequency hop gives much more jamming margin for a given complexity of equipment. On the other hand, DSSS signals are much harder to locate using direction-ﬁnding techniques [673].

System survivability requirements can impose further constraints. It may be essential to prevent an opponent who has captured one radio and extracted its current key material from using this to jam a whole network. So a typical military system will use some combination of tight beams, DSSS, hopping and burst.

* + - * + Both DSSS and hopping are used with TDMA in *Link 16*, as it’s known in NATO; it’s also known to US forces as the *Tactical Digital Information Link* (TADIL), and was previously known as the *Joint Tactical Informa- tion Distribution System* (JTIDS) [1662]. TDMA separates transmission from reception and lets users know when to expect their slot. It has a DSSS signal with a 57.6KHz data rate and a 10MHz chip rate (and so a jamming margin of 36.5dB), which hops around in a 255MHz band with minimum jump of 30 MHz. The hopping code is available to all users, while the spreading code is limited to individual circuits. The rationale is that if an equipment capture leads to the compromise of the spreading code, this would allow jamming of only a single 10MHz band, not the full 255MHz. Development started in 1967 with Gordon Welchman, who also broke German ciphers at Bletchley during World War 2; after pilot projects in the 1970s, serious development started in the 1980s and the system was fully deployed from about 2000, seeing use in Afghanistan and Iraq [1956].
        + The US armed forces have been supported by a series of satellite com- munications systems (MILSTAR and DSCS) with 1 degree beams from a geostationary orbit. The e↵ect of the narrow beam is that users can operate within three miles of the enemy without being detected. Jam pro- tection is from hopping: its channels hop several thousand times a second in bands of 2GHz.
        + French tactical radios have remote controls. The soldier can use the hand- set a hundred yards from the radio. This means that attacks on the high-power emitter don’t have to endanger the troops so much [514].

There are also some system-level tricks, such as *interference cancellation* – where you communicate in a band which you’re jamming with a waveform known to your own radios, so they can cancel it out or hop around it. This can make jamming harder for the enemy by forcing them to spread their available power over a larger bandwidth, and can make signals intelligence harder too [1601].

## Interaction between civil and military uses

Civil and military communications are increasingly intertwined. Operation Desert Storm (Gulf War 1 against Iraq) made extensive use of the Gulf States’ civilian infrastructure: a huge tactical communications network was created in a short space of time using satellites, radio links and leased lines, and experts from various US armed services claim that the e↵ect of communications capability on the war was decisive [942].

Another example of growing interdependency is the Global Positioning Sys- tem, GPS. This started o↵ as a US military navigation system and had a *selective availability* feature that limited the accuracy to about a hundred yards unless the user had the relevant cryptographic key. This had to be turned o↵ during Gulf War 1 as there weren’t enough military GPS sets to go round and civilian equipment had to be used instead. As time went on, GPS turned out to be so useful in civil aviation that the FAA helped ﬁnd ways to defeat selective avail- ability and give an accuracy of about 3 yards compared with a claimed 8 yards for the standard military receiver [630]. Finally, in May 2000, President Clinton announced the end of selective availability.

The US government still reserves the right to switch o↵ GPS, or to intro- duce errors, for example if terrorists are thought to be using it. But so many diverse systems now depend on GPS, from Google Maps to Uber, that respon- sible governments are unlikely to. However there are many applications with motivated opponents. Some countries use GPS to do road pricing, or to enforce parole terms on released prisoners via electronic ankle tags, as I discussed in section 14.4 As a result, GPS jammers appeared in car magazines in 2007 for

$700, and now cost under $100; they’re used by truck drivers to cheat road toll systems, company car drivers who want to stop their boss knowing where they’re going, and car thieves. Cheap devices have short ranges, of typically 5–10m.

GPS spooﬁng takes slightly more work. An example is *meaconing*, where you sample the signals at location A and retransmit them at location B (this is also known as a *wormhole attack*). The result is that anyone near B thinks they’re near A instead. This is used as a defensive mechanism in the limousines of some heads of government (a sophisticated assassin could use this to target a missile). Some countries engage in systematic GPS jamming, an example being Russia along its border with Norway. Spooﬁng can be largely detected using di↵erential GPS, where you use another receiver at a known location as a reference point (the FAA’s trick), and with interferometric GPS, also known as S-GPS, where you use the signals captured by successive readings by the same receiver to produce a synthetic aperture. This also increases sensitivity and deals with multipath in urban canyons, the main source of large errors in

current equipment1.

In addition to the US GPS system, Russia, China and Europe have separate navigation satellite systems using the same principles; collectively, such systems are known as GNSS.

# Surveillance and Target Acquisition

Those aspects of electronic warfare that have to do with target acquisition and weapon guidance are where the arts of jamming and deception have been most highly developed. (In fact, although there is much more in the open literature on the application of electronic attack and defense to radar than to communi- cations, much of the same science applies to both.)

The main methods used to detect hostile targets and guide weapons to them are sonar, radar and infrared. The ﬁrst to be developed was sonar, which was invented and deployed in World War 1 (under the name of ‘Asdic’), and still dominates submarine warfare [846]. Elsewhere the key sensor is radar. Although it was invented in 1904 as a maritime anti-collision device, its serious development only occurred in the 1930s and it was used by all major participants in World War 2 [855, 990]. The electronic attack and protection techniques developed for it tend to be better developed than, and often go over to, systems using other sensors.

## Types of radar

The wide range of deployed systems includes search radars, ﬁre-control radars, terrain-following radars, counter-bombardment radars and weather radars. They have a wide variety of signal characteristics. For example, radars with a low RF and a low *pulse repetition frequency* (PRF) are better for search while high- frequency, high-PRF devices are better for tracking. A classic textbook on the technology is by Schleher [1662].

Early radar designs for search applications may have a rotating antenna that emits a sequence of pulses and detects echos. In the days before digital electronics, the sweep in the display tube could be mechanically rotated in sync with the antenna. Fire control radars often used *conical scan*: the beam would be tracked in a circle around the target’s position, and the amplitude of the returns could drive positioning servos (and weapon controls) directly. Now the beams are generated electronically using multiple antenna elements, but tracking loops remain central. Many radars have a *range gate*, circuitry which focuses on targets within a certain range of distances from the antenna; if the radar had to track all objects between (say) zero and 100 miles, then its pulse repetition frequency would be limited by the time it takes radio waves to travel 200 miles. This would have consequences for angular resolution and tracking performance generally.

1Full disclosure: the company that developed S-GPS, Focal Point Positioning, was started by one of my postdocs and I’m an investor in it.

*Doppler* radar measures the velocity of the target by the change in frequency in the return signal. It is very important in distinguishing moving targets from *clutter*, the returns reﬂected from the ground. Doppler radars may have *velocity gates* that restrict attention to targets whose radial speed with respect to the antenna is within certain limits.

An example of gating in a non-military application is adaptive cruise control in cars. This uses radar, gated to ignore vehicles whose relative speed is too great (so it doesn’t panic at oncoming vehicles) as well as vehicles that are too near or too far. You may notice that if another car pushes in close in front of you, less than 20m away, your cruise control won’t notice it and won’t slow down.

## Jamming techniques

Electronic attack can be passive or active.

The earliest countermeasure to be widely used was *cha*↵ – thin strips of conducting foil that are cut to half the wavelength of the target signal and then dispersed to provide a false return. Toward the end of World War 2, allied aircraft were dropping 2000 tons of cha↵ a day to degrade German air defenses. Cha↵ can be dropped directly by the aircraft attempting to penetrate the defenses (which isn’t ideal as they will then be at the apex of an elongated signal), or by support aircraft, or ﬁred forward into a suitable pattern using rockets or shells. The main counter-countermeasure against cha↵ is Doppler: as cha↵ is very light it comes to rest almost at once and can be distinguished fairly easily from moving targets.

Other techniques include small decoys with active repeaters that retransmit radar signals and larger decoys that simply reﬂect them; sometimes one vehicle (such as a helicopter) acts as a decoy for another more valuable one (such as an aircraft carrier). These principles are quite general. Weapons that home in on their targets using *radio direction* ﬁ*nding* (RDF) are decoyed by special drones that emit seduction RF signals, while infrared guided missiles are diverted using ﬂares.

The passive countermeasure in which the most money has been invested is *stealth* – reducing the *radar cross-section* (RCS) of a vehicle so that it can be detected only at very much shorter range. This forces the enemy to place their air defense radars closer together, so they have to buy a lot more of them. Stealth includes a wide range of techniques and a proper discussion is well beyond the scope of this book. Some people think of it as ‘extremely expensive black paint’ but there’s more to it than that. As an aircraft’s RCS is typically a function of its aspect, it may have a ﬂy-by-wire system that continually exhibits a low-RCS aspect to identiﬁed hostile emitters (the F117 became known to its pilots as the ‘wobbly goblin’).

Active countermeasures are much more diverse. Early jammers simply gen- erated a lot of noise in the range of frequencies used by the target radar; this is known as *noise jamming* or *barrage jamming*. Some systems used systematic frequency patterns, such as pulse jammers, or swept jammers that traversed the frequency range of interest (also known as *squidging oscillators*). But such

a signal is fairly easy to block – one trick is to use a *guard band* receiver, a receiver on a frequency adjacent to the one in use, and to blank the signal when this receiver picks up a jamming signal. And jamming isn’t restricted to one side; as well as being used by the target, the radar itself can also send spurious signals from an auxiliary antenna to mask the real signal or to simply overload the defenses.

At the other end of the scale lie hard-kill techniques such as *anti-radiation missiles* (ARMs), often ﬁred by support aircraft, which home in on hostile sig- nals. Defenses against such weapons include the use of decoy transmitters, blinking transmitters on and o↵, and *passive radar* – which exploits the signals from existing transmitters such as TV and radio stations when they bounce o↵ targets.

In the middle lies a large toolkit of *deception jamming* techniques. Most jammers used for self-protection are deception jammers of one kind or another; barrage and ARM techniques tend to be more suited to use by support vehicles.

The usual goal with a self-protection jammer is to deny range and bearing information to attackers. The basic trick is *inverse gain jamming* or *inverse gain amplitude modulation*. This is based on the observation that the directionality of the attacker’s antenna is usually not perfect; as well as the main beam it has *sidelobes* through which energy is also transmitted and received, albeit much less eﬃciently. The sidelobe response can be mapped by observing the transmitted signal, and a jamming signal can be generated so that the net emission is the inverse of the antenna’s directional response. The e↵ect, as far as the attacker’s radar is concerned, is that the signal seems to come from everywhere; instead of a ‘blip’ on the radar screen you see a circle centered on your own antenna. Inverse gain jamming is very e↵ective against the older conical-scan ﬁre-control systems.

More generally, the technique is to retransmit the radar signal with a sys- tematic change in delay and/or frequency. This can be non-coherent, in which case the jammer’s called a *transponder*, or coherent – that is, with the right waveform – when it’s a *repeater*. Modern equipment stores received waveforms in *digital radio frequency memory* (DRFM) and manipulates them using signal processing.

An elementary countermeasure is *burn-through*. By lowering the pulse repe- tition frequency, the dwell time is increased and so the return signal is stronger – at the cost of less precision. A more sophisticated countermeasure is *range gate pull-o*↵ (RGPO). Here, the jammer transmits a number of fake pulses that are stronger than the real ones, thus capturing the receiver, and then moving them out of phase so that the target is no longer in the receiver’s range gate. Similarly, with Doppler radars the basic trick is *velocity gate pull-o*↵ (VGPO). With older radars, successful RGPO would cause the radar to break lock and the target to disappear from the screen. Modern radars can reacquire lock very quickly, and so RGPO must either be performed repeatedly or combined with another technique – commonly, with inverse gain jamming to break angle tracking at the same time.

An elementary counter-countermeasure is to jitter the pulse repetition fre- quency. Each outgoing pulse is either delayed or not depending on a *lag se-*

*quence* generated by a random number generator, so the jammer cannot an- ticipate when the next pulse will arrive and has to follow it. Such *follower jamming* can only make false targets that appear to be further away. So the counter-counter-countermeasure, or (counter)3-measure, is for the radar to have a *leading edge tracker*, which responds only to the ﬁrst return pulse; and the (counter)4-measures can include jamming at such a high power that the re- ceiver’s automatic gain control circuit is captured. An alternative is *cover jam- ming* in which the jamming pulse is long enough to cover the maximum jitter period.

The next twist of the screw may involve tactics. Cha↵ is often used to force a radar into Doppler mode, which makes PRF jitter diﬃcult (as continuous wave- forms are better than pulsed for Doppler), while leading edge trackers may be combined with frequency agility and smart signal processing. For example, true target returns ﬂuctuate, and have realistic accelerations, while simple transpon- ders and repeaters give out a more or less steady signal. Of course, it’s always possible for designers to be too clever; the Mig-29 could decelerate more rapidly in level ﬂight by a rapid pull-up than some radar designers had anticipated, so pilots could use this manoeuvre to break radar lock. And now CPUs are powerful enough to manufacture realistic false returns.

## Advanced radars and countermeasures

A number of advanced techniques are used to defend against jamming.

*Pulse compression* was ﬁrst developed in Germany in World War 2, and uses a kind of direct sequence spread spectrum pulse, ﬁltered on return by a matched ﬁlter to compress it again. This can give processing gains of 10– 1000. Pulse compression radars are resistant to transponder jammers, but are vulnerable to repeater jammers, especially those with digital radio frequency memory. However, the use of LPI waveforms is important if you don’t wish the target to detect you long before you detect it.

*Pulsed Doppler* is much the same as Doppler, and sends a series of phase sta- ble pulses. It has come to dominate many high-end markets, and is widely used, for example, in *look-down shoot-down* systems for air defense against low-ﬂying intruders. As with elementary pulsed tracking radars, di↵erent RF and pulse repetition frequencies give di↵erent characteristics: we want low frequency/PRF for unambiguous range/velocity and also to reduce clutter – but this can leave many blind spots. Airborne radars that have to deal with many threats use high PRF and look only for velocities above some threshold, say 100 knots – but are weak in tail chases. The usual compromise is medium PRF – but this su↵ers from severe range ambiguities in airborne operations. Also, search radar requires long, diverse bursts but tracking needs only short, tuned ones. An ad- vantage is that pulsed Doppler can discriminate some very speciﬁc signals, such as modulation provided by turbine blades in jet engines. The main deception strategy used against pulsed Doppler is velocity gate pull-o↵, although a modern variant is to excite multiple velocity gates with deceptive returns.

*Monopulse* became one of the most popular techniques. It was used, for example, in the Exocet missiles that proved so diﬃcult to jam in the Falklands

war. The idea is to have four linked antennas so that azimuth and elevation data can be computed from each return pulse using interferometric techniques. Monopulse radars are diﬃcult and expensive to jam, unless a design defect can be exploited; the usual techniques involve tricks such as formation jamming and terrain bounce. Often the preferred defensive strategy is just to use towed decoys.

One powerful trick is *passive coherent location*. Lockheed’s ‘Silent Sentry’ system has no emitters at all, but rather uses reﬂections of commercial radio and television broadcast signals to detect and track airborne objects [164].The receivers, being passive, are hard to locate and attack; knocking out the sys- tem entails destroying major civilian infrastructure, which opponents will often prefer not to do for legal and propaganda reasons. Passive coherent location is e↵ective against some kinds of stealth technology, particularly those that en- tail steering the aircraft so that it presents the nulls in its radar cross-section to visible emitters. Passive location actually goes back to the radar pioneer Robert Watson-Watt in the 1930s and appears to have been ﬁrst used by the Germans from 1942 when their Klein Heidelberg station exploited British Chain Home radar signals to track RAF aircraft (in EW parlance, it was a ‘hitchhiker’). When Britain realised this was happening in 1944, the Chain Home signals were jittered [824].

One research frontier in 2020 is *cognitive radar*. Attack and defence have be- come more complex since the arrival of digital radio frequency memory and other software radio techniques. Both radar and jammer waveforms may be adapted to the tactical situation with much greater ﬂexibility than before. Simon Haykin and colleagues studied the strategies and tactics used by bats, who adapt their sonar intelligently while hunting insects, and applied this ﬁrst to radio for the eﬃcient use of spectrum, then to radar in a seminal 2006 paper [872]. From the moment a radar (or sonar) is switched on, it builds up knowledge of its environ- ment, the interesting aspects of which are mostly dynamic. The basic idea is that a cognitive radar does a recursive update of a model of its environment and uses this to illuminate it intelligently, using learning mechanisms. This becomes adversarial with non-cooperative targets. There is now vigorous research into the fusion of ideas from the human visual system and neural networks more generally, Bayesian target tracking and signal processing.

## Other sensors and multisensor issues

Much of what I’ve said about radar applies to sonar as well, and a fair amount to infrared. Passive decoys – ﬂares – worked very well against early heat-seeking missiles which used a mechanically spun detector, but are less e↵ective against modern detectors that incorporate signal processing. Flares are like cha↵ in that they decelerate rapidly with respect to the target, so the attacker can ﬁlter on velocity or acceleration. They are also like repeater jammers in that their signals are relatively strong and stable compared with real targets.

Active infrared jamming is less widespread than radar jamming because it’s harder; it tends to exploit features of the hostile sensor by pulsing at a rate or in a pattern that causes confusion. Some infrared defense systems are starting to employ lasers to disable the sensors of incoming weapons; and it’s emerged

that a number of ‘UFO’ sightings have actually been due to various kinds of jamming (both radar and infrared) [175].

One growth area is *multisensor data fusion* whereby inputs from radars, infrared sensors, video cameras and even humans are combined to give better target identiﬁcation and tracking than any could individually. The Rapier air defense missile, for example, used radar to acquire azimuth while tracking is carried out optically in visual conditions. Data fusion can be harder than it seems. As I discussed in section 17.8, combining two alarm systems will generally result in improving either the false alarm or the missed alarm rate, while making the other worse. If you scramble your ﬁghters when you see a blip on either the radar or the infrared, you’ll have more false alarms; but if you scramble only when you see both then it will be easier for the enemy to jam you or sneak through.

Things become more complex where the attacker’s on a platform that’s vul- nerable to counter-attack, such as a ship or aircraft. It will have systems for threat recognition, direction ﬁnding and missile approach warning, whose re- ceivers will be deafened by its jammer. The usual trick is to turn the jammer o↵ for a short ‘look-through’ period at random times.

With multiple friendly and hostile platforms, things get more complex still. During the Cold War, you expected each side to have specialist support vehicles with high-power dedicated equipment, which makes it to some extent an energy battle – “he with the most watts wins”. A SAM belt would have multiple radars at di↵erent frequencies to make jamming harder. The overall e↵ect of jamming (as of stealth) is to reduce the e↵ective range of radar. But jamming margin also matters, and who has the most vehicles, and the tactics employed; and the move to cognitive systems has changed doctrine to “subtly disrupt the enemy’s communications and radar networks without their realizing they’re being deceived” [721].

# IFF Systems

With multiple vehicles engaged, it’s also necessary to have a reliable way of distinguishing friend from foe. *Identify-Friend-or-Foe* (IFF) systems are both critical and controversial, with a signiﬁcant number of ‘blue-on-blue’ incidents in Iraq being due to equipment incompatibility between US and allied forces. Incidents in which US aircraft bombed British soldiers have contributed signiﬁ- cantly to loss of UK public support for the war, especially after the authorities in both countries tried and failed to cover up such incidents out of a wish to both preserve technical security and also to minimise political embarrassment.

IFF goes back in its non-technical forms to antiquity. See for example Judges 12:5–6 (which I quote at the head of the chapter on biometrics): the Israelites identiﬁed enemy soldiers by their inability to pronounce ‘Shibboleth’. World War 2 saw the French resistance asking people to pronounce ‘grenouille’, and anyone who couldn’t was presumed German. In the early years of that conﬂict, air identiﬁcation was procedural: allied bombers would be expected to cross the coast at particular times and places, while stragglers would announce their

lack of hostile intent by a pre-arranged manoeuvre such as ﬂying an equilateral triangle before crossing the coast. German planes would roll over when the radio operator challenged them, so as to create a ‘blip’ in their radar cross-section. There were then some early attempts at automation: when allied aircraft started to carry IFF beacons, the German air defence found they could detect the planes by triggering them [824].

The Korean war saw the arrival on both sides of jet aircraft and missiles, which made it impractical to identify targets visually. Early IFF systems simply used a serial number or ‘code of the day’, but this was wide open to spooﬁng, and the world’s air forces started work on cryptographic authentication.

The legacy NATO system is the Mark XII, introduced in the 1960s and designed to solve the protocol problems discussed in section 4.3.3. The Mark XII secure mode uses a 32-bit challenge and a 4-bit response. If challenges or responses are too long, then the radar’s pulse repetition frequency (and thus its accuracy) would be degraded. It sends 12–20 challenges in a series, and in the original implementation the responses were displayed on a screen at a position o↵set by the arithmetic di↵erence between the actual response and the expected one. The e↵ect was that while a foe had a null or random response, a ‘friend’ would have responses clustered near the center screen, which would light up. Reﬂection attacks are prevented, and MIG-in-the-middle attacks made much harder, because the challenge uses a focused antenna, while the receiver is omnidirectional. (The antenna used for the challenge is typically the ﬁre control radar, which in older systems was conically scanned.)

This has been largely replaced by the Mark XIIA which has a backwards- compatible mode, but uses spread-spectrum waveforms in the new Mode 5, which has been the focus of development e↵orts by the US services and NATO armed forces during the 2010s. Such systems also have compatibility modes with the systems used by civil aircraft to ‘squawk’ their ID to secondary surveillance radar. However, the real problems are now air-to-ground. NATO’s IFF systems evolved for a Cold War scenario of thousands of tactical aircraft on each side of the Iron Curtain; how do they fare in a modern conﬂict like Iraq or Afghanistan?

Historically, about 10–15% of casualties were due to ‘friendly ﬁre’ but in Gulf War 1 this rose to 25%. Such casualties are more likely at the interfaces between air and land battle, and between sea and land, because of the di↵er- ent services’ way of doing things; joint operations are thus particularly risky. Coalition operations also increase the risk because of di↵erent national systems. Following this experience, several experimental systems were developed to ex- tend IFF to ground troops. But when Gulf War 2 came along, nothing decent had been deployed. A report from Britain’s National Audit Oﬃce describes what went wrong [1389]. In a world where defence is purchased not just by nation states, and not just by services, but by factions within these services, and where legislators try to signal their ‘patriotism’ to less-educated voters by blocking technical collaboration with allies (‘to stop them stealing our jobs and our secrets’), the institutional and political structures just aren’t conducive to providing defense ‘public goods’ such as a decent IFF system that would work across NATO. And NATO is a broad alliance; as one insider told me, “Trying to evolve a solution that met the aspirations of both the US at one extreme and Greece (for example) at the other was a near hopeless task.”

Project complexity is one issue: it’s not too hard to stop your air force planes shooting each other, it’s a lot more complex to stop them shooting at your ships or tanks, and it’s much harder still when a dozen nations are involved. There are some sexy systems used by a small number of units in Iraq that let all soldiers see each other’s positions superimposed in real time on a map display on a helmet-mounted monocle. They greatly increase force capability in mobile warfare, allowing units to execute perilous maneuvers like driving through each other’s kill zones, but are not a panacea in complex warfare such as Iraq in the late 2000s and early 2010s: there, the key networks are social, not electronic, and it’s hard to automate networks with nodes of unknown trustworthiness [1659]. The big-bang approach was tried, but failed; the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS, pronounced ‘jitters’) set out to equip all the US services with radios that interoperate and do at least two IFF modes. However, it’s one of the Pentagon’s biggest procurement failures, as they spent $6bn over 15 years without delivering a single usable radio [1983].

Experience has taught us that even with ‘hard-core’ IFF, where ships and planes identify each other, the hardest issues weren’t technical but to do with economics, politics and doctrine. Over two decades of wrangling within NATO, America wanted an expensive high-tech system, for which its defense industry was lobbying hard, while European countries wanted something simpler and cheaper that they could also build themselves, for example by tracking units through the normal command-and-control system and having decent interfaces between nations. But the USA refused to release the location of its units to anyone else for ‘security’ reasons. America spends more on defense than its allies combined and believed it should lead; the allies didn’t want their own capability further marginalised by yet more dependence on US suppliers.

Underlying doctrinal tensions added to this. US doctrine, the ‘Revolution in Military A↵airs’ (RMA) promoted by Donald Rumsfeld and based on an electronic system-of-systems, was not only beyond the allies’ budget but was distrusted, based as it is on minimising one’s own casualties through vast ma- terial and technological supremacy. The Europeans argued that one shouldn’t automatically react to sniper ﬁre from a village by bombing the village; as well as killing ten insurgents, you kill a hundred civilians and recruit several hundred of their relatives to the other side. The American retort to this was that Europe was too weak and divided to even deal with genocide in Bosnia. The result was deadlock; countries decided to pursue national solutions, and no real progress has been made on interoperability since the Cold War. Allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were reduced to painting large color patches on the roofs of their vehicles and hoping the air strikes would pass them by. US aircraft duly bombed and killed a number of allied servicemen, which weakened the alliance. What will happen now, given deglobalisation and President Trump’s impatience with foreign allies, is anyone’s guess.

# Improvised Explosive Devices

A signiﬁcant e↵ort was made in electronic-warfare measures to counter the im- provised explosive devices (IEDs) that were the weapon of choice of insurgents in

Iraq and Afghanistan. The ﬁrst IED attack on U.S. forces took place in March 2003, and they rose to a peak of 25,000 in 2007 with over 100,000 in total. These bombs became the ‘signature weapon’ of the Iraq war, as the machine- gun was of World War 1 and the laser-guided bomb of Gulf War I. And now that unmanned aerial vehicles can be built by hobbyists for under $1000, we are starting to see improvised cruise missiles used in Syria and elsewhere, including an attempt to assassinate Venezuela’s President Maduro.

Anyway, over 33,000 jammers were made and shipped to coalition forces. The Department of Defense spent over $1bn on them in 2006, in an operation that, according to insiders, “proved the largest technological challenge for DOD in the war, on a scale last experienced in World War 2” [140]. The e↵ect was that the proportion of radio-controlled IEDs dropped from 70% to 10%, while the proportion triggered by command wires increased to 40%.

Rebels have been building IEDs since at least Guy Fawkes, who tried to blow up England’s Houses of Parliament in 1605. Many other nationalist and insurgent groups have used IEDs, from anarchists through the Russian resistance in World War 2, the Irgun, ETA and the Viet Cong to Irish nationalists. The IRA got so expert at hiding IEDs in drains and culverts that the British Army had to use helicopters instead of road vehicles in the ‘bandit country’ near the Irish border in the 1980s and early 1990s. They also ran bombing campaigns against the UK on a number of occasions in the twentieth century. In the last of these, from 1970–94, they blew up the Grand Hotel in Brighton when Margaret Thatcher was staying there for a party conference, killing several of her colleagues; later, London su↵ered two incidents in which the IRA set o↵ truckloads of home-made explosive causing widespread devastation. The ﬁght against the IRA involved a total of about 7,000 IEDs, and gave UK defense scientists much experience in jamming: barrage jammers were ﬁtted in VIP cars that would cause IEDs to go o↵ either too early or too late. These were made available to allies; such a jammer saved the life of President Musharraf of Pakistan when Al-Qaida tried to blow up his convoy in 2005.

The electronic environment in Iraq turned out to be much more diﬃcult than either Belfast or Pakistan. Bombers can use any device that will ﬂip a switch at a distance, and used everything from key fobs to cellphones. Meanwhile the RF environment in Iraq had become complex and chaotic. Millions of Iraqis used unregulated cellphones, walkie-talkies and satellite phones, as most of the optical-ﬁbre and copper infrastructure had been destroyed in the 2003 war or looted afterwards. 150,000 coalition troops also sent out a huge variety of ra- dio emissions, which changed all the time as units rotated. Over 80,000 radio frequencies were in use, and monitored using 300 databases – many of them not interoperable. Allied forces only started to get on top of the problem when hundreds of Navy electronic warfare specialists were deployed in Baghdad; after that, coalition jamming e↵orts were better coordinated and started to cut the proportion of IEDs detonated by radio.

But the ‘success’ in electronic warfare did not translate into a reduction in allied casualties. The IED makers simply switched from radio-controlled bombs to devices detonated by pressure plates, command wires, passive infrared or volunteers. The defence focus shifted to a mix of tactics: ‘right of boom’ measures such as better vehicle armor and autonomous vehicles, and ‘left of

boom’ measures such as disrupting the bomb-making networks. Better armor had some e↵ect: while in 2003 almost every IED caused a coalition casualty, by 2007 it took four devices on average [140]. Armored vehicles were also a key tactic in other insurgencies, while the DARPA investment in self-driving vehicles paid o↵ a decade later in the form of a surge of work on driver assistance and even autonomous road vehicles by commercial ﬁrms such as Waymo and Tesla. Network disruption, though, is a longer-term play as it depends on building good sources of human intelligence; Britain and Israel spent years targeting bombmakers in Ireland and Lebanon respectively.

# Directed Energy Weapons

In the late 1930s, there was panic in Britain and America on rumors that the Nazis had developed a high-power radio beam that would burn out vehicle ignition systems. British scientists studied the problem and concluded that this was infeasible [990]. They were correct – given the relatively low-powered radio transmitters, and the simple but robust vehicle electronics, of the 1930s.

Things started to change with the arrival of the atomic bomb. The deto- nation of a nuclear device creates a large pulse of gamma-ray photons, which in turn displace electrons from air molecules by Compton scattering. The large induced currents give rise to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), which may be thought of as a very high amplitude pulse of radio waves with a very short rise time.

Where a nuclear explosion occurs within the earth’s atmosphere, the EMP energy is predominantly in the VHF and UHF bands, though there is enough energy at lower frequencies for a radio ﬂash to be observable thousands of miles away. Within a few tens of miles of the explosion, the radio frequency energy may induce currents large enough to damage most electronic equipment that has not been hardened. The e↵ects of a blast outside the earth’s atmosphere are believed to be much worse (although there has never been a test). The gamma photons can travel thousands of miles before they strike the earth’s atmosphere, which could ionize to form an antenna on a continental scale. It is reckoned that most electronic equipment in Northern Europe could be burned out by a one megaton blast at a height of 250 miles above the North Sea. For that matter, most electronic equipment on the US west coast, from Seattle to San Diego, could be wiped out by a blast 250 miles above Salt Lake City. Such an attack would kill no-one directly but could cause economic damage on the scale of the coronavirus pandemic [122]. A Carrington event – a massive solar ﬂare, as observed by the astronomer Richard Carrington in 1859 – would cause similar disruption; that caused auroras as far south as the Caribbean. Telegraph systems failed all over Europe and North America, sometimes giving their operators electric shocks. Lloyd’s of London later estimated that the cost of such an event to the USA alone could be in the low trillions of dollars, and that such an event is inevitable every generation or two [917]. Smaller geomagnetic storms happen regularly, for example in 1989 and 2003. For this reason, critical military systems are carefully shielded, big IT service ﬁrms disperse their data centres round the globe, we have warning satellites, and well-run utilities spend

money to protect critical assets such as large transformers.

Western concern about EMP grew after the Soviet Union started a research program on non-nuclear EMP weapons in the mid-80s. At the time, the United States was deploying “neutron bombs” in Europe – enhanced radiation weapons that could kill people without demolishing buildings. The Soviets portrayed this as a “capitalist bomb” which would destroy people while leaving property intact, and responded by threatening a “socialist bomb” to destroy property (in the form of electronics) while leaving the surrounding people intact.

By the end of World War 2, the invention of the cavity magnetron had made it possible to build radars powerful enough to damage unprotected electronic circuitry at a range of several hundred yards. The move from valves to transis- tors and integrated circuits has increased the vulnerability of most commercial electronic equipment. A terrorist group could in theory mount a radar in a truck and drive around a city’s ﬁnancial sector wiping out the banks. In fact, the banks’ underground server farms would likely be una↵ected; the real dam- age would be to everyday electronic devices. Replacing the millions of gadgets on which a city’s life depends would be extremely tiresome.

For battleﬁeld use, it’s desirable for EMP weapons to ﬁt into a standard bomb or shell casing rather than having to be truck-mounted. Their military use is however limited. The US tried a device called Blow Torch in Iraq as a means of frying the electronics in IEDs, but it didn’t work well [140]. There’s a survey of usable technologies at [1082] that describes how power pulses in the terawatt range can be generated using explosively-pumped ﬂux compres- sion generators and magnetohydrodynamic devices, as well as by high-power microwave transmitters. But EMP bombs dropped from aircraft need to de- ploy antennas before detonation in order to get decent coupling, and even so are lethal to ordinary electronic equipment for a radius of only a few hundred meters. Military command and control systems that are already hardened for nuclear EMP should be una↵ected.

The real signiﬁcance of EMP may be to give a blackmail weapon to countries such as Iran and North Korea with primitive nuclear technology. When North Korea ﬁres a missile into the sea near Japan, it sends a signal: “We can switch o↵ your economy any time we like, and without directly killing a single Japanese civilian either.” Japan is now developing anti-missile defences. A massive attack on electronic communications is more of a threat to countries such as the USA and Japan that depend on them, than on countries such as North Korea (or Iran) that don’t.

This observation goes across to attacks on the Internet as well, so let’s now turn to ‘Information Warfare’.

# Information warfare

The phrase *Information warfare* came into use from about 1995. Its popularity was boosted by operational experience in Gulf War 1. There, air power was used to degrade the Iraqi defenses before the land attack was launched, and one goal of NSA personnel supporting the allies was to enable the initial attack

to be made without casualties – even though the Iraqi air defenses were at that time intact and alert. The attack involved a mixture of standard e-war techniques such as jammers and anti-radiation missiles; cruise missile attacks on command centers; attacks by special forces who sneaked into Iraq and dug up lengths of communications cabling from the desert; and, allegedly, the use of hacking tricks to disable computers and telephone exchanges. (By 1990, the US Army was already calling for bids for virus production [1206].) The operation achieved its goal of ensuring zero allied casualties on the ﬁrst night of the aerial bombardment. Military planners and think tanks started to consider how to build on the success.

In April 2007, information warfare was thrust back on the agenda by events in Estonia. There, the government had angered Russia by moving an old Soviet war memorial, and shortly afterwards the country was subjected to a number of dis- tributed denial-of-service attacks that appeared to originate from Russia [525]. Estonia’s computer emergency response team tackled the problem with cool professionalism, but their national leadership invoked the NATO treaty, call- ing for US military help against Russia. Russia had deniability: the packet storms were launched by Russian botnet herders, reacting to the news from Estonia and egging each other on via chat rooms; the one man convicted of the attacks was an ethnic Russian teenager in Estonia itself. There had been similar tussles between Israeli and Palestinian hackers, and between Indians and Pakistanis. Estonia also had some minor street disturbances caused by rowdy ethnic Russians objecting to the statue’s removal. Nonetheless NATO did respond by setting up an information warfare centre in Tallinn, and as I described in section 2.2.3, one outcome was the Tallinn Manual, which sets out the military and international law applicable to online operations designed to have real-world e↵ects in conﬂicts between states [1664].

States must act in self-defense or with some other lawful justiﬁcation and in accordance with the law of armed conﬂict. Attacks are operations reasonably expected to cause injury to people or damage to property; they may only be directed at combatants and their logistics, not at civilians; attacks must be geographically limited, not indiscriminate; and some targets are o↵-limits, from hospitals and places of worship to nuclear power stations. Interpretation could keep the lawyers busy though. Infrastructure used by both military and civilian organisations is fair game, and although ‘treachery’ is prohibited, ‘ruses of war’ are not.

In section 2.2.3, I described how Estonia was just a warm-up for later Russian operations in Ukraine, where the Russians took down electricity infrastructure and did signiﬁcant damage to companies operating there by the NotPetya worm, which inﬂicted signiﬁcant collateral damage on some international companies with oﬃces in that country.

But what’s information warfare anyway? The conventional view from the mid-2000s, arising out of Gulf War 1, was expressed by Whitehead [1977]:

The strategist ... should employ (the information weapon) as a pre- cursor weapon to blind the enemy prior to conventional attacks and operations.

Cynics took the view that it was just a remarketing of the things the agencies have been doing for decades anyway, in an attempt to maintain their budgets post-Cold-War.

However the most far-sighted analyst at the time was Dorothy Denning of the Naval Postgraduate School whose 1999 book on the topic deﬁned information warfare as “operations that target or exploit information media in order to win some advantage over an adversary” [539]. This was so broad that it includes not just hacking but all of electronic warfare and all existing intelligence gathering techniques (from Sigint through satellite imagery to spies), but propaganda too. In a later article she discussed the role of the net in the propaganda and activism surrounding the Kosovo war [540].

A similar view of information warfare, from a writer whose background was defense planning rather than computer security, was given by Edward Waltz [1977]. He deﬁned *information superiority* as “the capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted ﬂow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same”. The aim of such superiority is to conduct operations without e↵ective opposition. The book has less technical detail on computer security matters than Denning but set forth a ﬁrst attempt to formulate a military doctrine of information operations.

## Attacks on control systems

If you want to use computer exploitation to do real damage to a rival nation, perhaps the ﬁrst thing to look at is electricity generation and distribution. Tak- ing down the grid is the cyber equivalent of a nuclear strike; once the electricity supply fails, then pretty well everything else in a modern economy shuts down too. For example, a ﬁve-week failure of the power supply to the central business district of Auckland, New Zealand, in 1996 led to 60,000 of the 74,000 employees having to work from home or from relocated oﬃces, while most of the area’s 6,000 apartment dwellers moved out for the duration [839]. And perhaps the worst terrorist ‘near miss’ in recent history was an IRA attempt in 1996 to blow up transformers at the big substations that supply London [231]. This failed because a senior IRA commander was a British agent; had it been successful it would have wrecked electricity supplies to much of London for many months, blacking out millions of people and businesses responsible for maybe a third of Britain’s GDP. Finally, attacks on electricity transmission and distribution have been a standard US tactic in wars from Serbia to Iraq. (In fact, the Iraq insurgency after 2003 was fuelled by delays in restoring the power supply, which left millions of Iraqis sweltering in the summer heat with no air conditioning.)

Security researchers started paying attention to control systems in the mid 2000s once it was noticed that the protocols used to manage assets such as electricity grids and petrochemical plants, namely Modbus and DNP3, did not support authentication, as these systems had evolved in a world of private net- works – with ﬁxed LANs inside installations and leased lines linking them to control centres. Firms started moving to IP networks from the late 1990s be- cause it was cheaper, but this meant that, without authentication, anyone who knew the IP address of a sensor could read it, and anyone who knew the address of an actuator could operate it. After one or two accidents caused by pranks,

and an incident in 2000 where a disgruntled employee of a water company’s IT contractor caused a spill of 800 tons of sewage in Maroochy, Australia [7], there started to emerge a control-systems security research community.

Governments tried to help with regulation. The US Departments of En- ergy and Homeland Security launched an initiative in 2006, and North Ameri- can Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which sets standards for the bulk power system, ruled in its Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard that any generator with a black-start capability would need to have basic informa- tion security compliance. Black start is the ability to start up even if the grid is down; hydro power stations can do this, nuclear stations can’t, and coal-ﬁred stations can generally only do a black start if they have an auxiliary diesel gen- erator. The industry’s response was that some coal-ﬁred plants scrapped their diesel plant, as information security could not be added to their regulated cost base and therefore came o↵ the bottom line [104].

Attempts were also made to extend control-system protocols to support en- cryption and authentication, but this is seriously diﬃcult. There are three main vendors of electricity substations, and if one becomes the prime contractor on a project it will typically buy components from the other two, so compatibility is essential. Substations have a design life of typically 40 years and come with maintenance contracts, so the rate of change is glacial. The threat model is also interesting. Anyone who can get physical access can switch o↵ the power by pressing the red button; they can even destroy the transformer by causing an internal short-circuit, which takes only one bullet. It therefore makes lit- tle sense to encrypt or even just authenticate traﬃc on the substation LAN, and doing that is hard anyway as some of the control traﬃc has a 4ms latency requirement [731]. The only practical outcome was to secure the logical perime- ter – the communications from the substation to the network control centre – just as one secures the asset physically by using a cage or a building. So one practical outcome of this research programme was startups whose focus was to enable energy companies and other utilities to protect their networks by re- perimeterising them. The specialist ﬁrewalls and gateways they designed have now become mainstream products and are widely used by energy companies.

A second outcome was increased awareness of indirect threats to national electricity supply. I described in section 14.2.4 how most European governments decided to install smart meters, following lobbying from the meter industry, and how we found that the proposed UK installation was insecure; it amounted to putting a remotely commandable o↵ switch in every home in Britain, and not even protecting it with appropriate cryptographic authentication. GCHQ got involved in the design, but even seven years later only a minority of UK smart meters follow the ‘improved’ speciﬁcation. As we discussed in section 14.2.4, the project has been a conspicuous failure in both ﬁnancial and energy-saving terms.

A third outcome was a set of research tools. The Shodan search engine, launched in 2009, crawls the Internet to locate and index connected devices, en- abling researchers to see which devices are vulnerable from their software update status; in 2011, E´ireann Leverett used this to locate thousands of vulnerable con-

trol systems [1147]. A 2016 scan by Ariana Mirian and colleagues found some 60,000 vulnerable devices round the world, ranging from electricity substations

to HVAC in government buildings; they also used honeypots to track the actors scanning for such devices, and although over half were from known security com- panies, a signiﬁcant minority were in China or from shielded hosts [1321]. More recently our group has been involved in developing better honeypots to detect people doing scans and launching attacks on network-attached devices [1955]; by deploying realistic honeypots in realistic network locations, it’s possible to pro- voke hostile action [573]. Our monitoring of underground crime forums, which goes back to the early days of control system security research, has detected no sustained competent interest in control system hacking by criminal groups, so it is reasonable to assume that the great majority of such activity is by state actors or their proxies.

The burst of research into control systems security ran in parallel with state actors’ growing awareness of the potential. It’s been reported that Idaho Na- tional Labs, which was involved in the US regulatory push and hosted some of the Scada security conferences at the time, helped the NSA and their Israeli counterparts develop the Stuxnet worm, which damaged Iran’s uranium enrich- ment capacity over the period 2008–2010; I described this in section 2.2.1.11.

Finally, as I described in section 2.2.3, 2015 saw Russia responding to a con- ventional Ukrainian attack on power distribution in Crimea (a Ukrainian terri- tory that Russia had annexed) by a cyber attack that took down 30 Ukrainian substations, leaving 230,000 people in the dark for several hours [2067]. However, that seems to have been a warning rather than attempt to do serious economic damage, and since then there seem to have been no serious cyber attacks on electricity distribution. There have been attacks on other control systems; no- tably, Iran tried to hack Israeli water distribution systems in April 2020 with a view to introducing toxic levels of chlorine into the rural water supply, but the Israelis detected and stopped this. They retaliated the following month by closing down one of the harbours at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, causing tailbacks of trucks that stretched for miles [229].

But the main action has moved elsewhere.

## Attacks on other infrastructure

After the Stuxnet story broke there was a surge of interest among governments worldwide in cyber-conﬂict. The prices paid in underground markets for ex- ploitable vulnerabilities skyrocketed, and in addition to the overt markets in vulnerabilites, there developed grey markets to which security researchers could take their ideas for resale to cyber-arms manufacturers. In addition to vulner- abilities that governments could use to exploit the PCs or phones of their foes, both foreign and domestic, there emerged concern about attacks on information infrastructure such as the Internet itself. The Russian attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 focused minds somewhat, as did an attack by Pak- istan on YouTube in 2008 (Pakistan had planned to block the service only at home, but the BGP attack it mounted caused a global outage), and an incident in 2010 when China Telecom hijacked 15% of Internet addresses for 18 minutes, which some observers interpreted as a test of a ‘cyber-nuke’.

The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) commis-

sioned us to write a report on the Internet’s interconnect, which appeared in 2011 [1906]. I discussed the main ﬁndings in section 21.2.1 on BGP security. It is certainly possible to tear up the Internet’s routing infrastructure by ad- vertising lots of bogus routes; a number of incidents (including the Pakistani and Chinese ones) have taught us that. It is also true that if an opponent could take down the Internet for a few days in a developed country, the result would be be chaos (and especially so since the coronavirus pandemic as even more human activities have been forced online). One of the main technical re- straints on such action is that most capable opponents would themselves su↵er tremendous harm, given that the online services used in most countries are glob- alised. However, China is largely immune, because of its policy of separating its infrastructure from the rest of the Internet using the Great Firewall, and excluding US service providers such as Google, Facebook and Twitter in favour of local champions. North Korea is even more isolated. Russia has been trying to follow China, and as its service providers such as Vkontakte are much more entangled with European and American infrastructure, President Putin passed a law in May 2019 requiring Russian ISPs to be able to operate independently of foreign Internet infrastructure by November. In December, a successful test was announced, though nobody noticed anything happening; a second test, due in March 2020, was apparently postponed because of the coronavirus [159]. If that were to be made to work, then Russia, like China, would be in a position to mount large-scale disruption attacks against the Internet in the rest of the world.

## Attacks on elections and political stability

The period 2011–16 saw the emphasis in information operations shift from at- tacks on infrastructure to political conﬂict. The period started with the Arab Spring, which I will discuss in more detail in section 26.4.1. There, social media were used to fuel an uprising against autocratic regimes across the Arab world; although the Tunisians overthrew their dictator and achieved democracy, the results elsewhere ranged from civil war in Syria and the Yemen to state failure in Libya and crackdowns by rulers elsewhere. I described in section 2.2.4 how Arab governments splashed out on surveillance technology from the west and from Israel, and hired ex-NSA mercenaries, to track and harass their opponents both at home and abroad.

By 2016, we’d seen substantial Russian interference in both the Brexit refer- endum and the US presidential election. Russia has a long history of managed elections. I wrote sarcastically in the ﬁrst edition in 2001: “I sincerely hope that the election of Vladimir Putin as the president of Russia had nothing to do with the fact that the national electoral reporting system is run by FAPSI, a Russian signals intelligence agency formed in 1991 as the successor to the KGB’s 8th and 16th directorates. Its head, General Starovoitov, was reported to be an old KGB type; his agency reported directly to President Yeltsin, who chose Putin as his successor.” [733, 1003] By the time Putin’s party was re-elected in 2007, the cheating had become so blatant – with gross media bias and state employees ordered to vote for the ruling party – that the international community would not accept the result as free and fair.

By the 2012 election, as I noted in section 2.2.3, the Russian population was suﬃciently restive that Putin felt the need for external enemies to rally public support. He invaded the Ukraine in 2014, claiming simultaneously to be defend- ing it against fascists, and against gays and Jews, and annexed the Crimea – bringing down international sanctions. This campaign involved ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics that combined ‘little green men’ – Russian soldiers in uniforms with- out insignia, claimed to be Ukrainian anti-fascists – with various cyber-attacks, propaganda and even an attack on Ukrainian media, reporting falsely that a pro-Russian candidate had won an election. After Europe imposed sanctions on Russia as a punishment for invading the Ukraine, the Kremlin became a major funder of far-right groups throughout Europe, supporting the Brexit campaigns in the UK and the rise of parties such as AfD in Germany. At the same time as openly promoting fascist ideas – including the ideology of Ivan Ilyin at home

– Putin has managed to retain the sympathy of swathes of the anti-fascist left in Europe too. The overall strategy since sanctions has been to disrupt and weaken the USA and the EU by all available means.

The tactics used in such information warfare have a lot in common with electronic warfare. Putin, and other authoritarian leaders, often swamp target audiences, both at home and abroad, with fake news; this jamming undermines trust in more reliable media – who are in turn accused of being ‘fake news’. If you can’t stop your population from reading the New York Times, you just make sure they don’t believe it [474]. There are bulk decoys, like cha↵; after the Russians shot down Malaysia Airlines’ ﬂight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, they pushed many di↵erent conspiracy theories in parallel [1593]. Many politicians use other decoys to distract the press from news that could damage them; Trump has used everything from the WHO to hydroxychloroquine [1710]. The equivalent of deceiving IFF may be triangulation – the art of stealing a key aspect of the opponent’s brand (as when Boris Johnson made the NHS central to his pitch in the Brexit referendum). The equivalent of an anti-radiation missile might be blocking an opponent’s website or choking o↵ their funding. Corrupt leaders accuse their opponents of corruption, while authoritarians who blame gays and Jews for their country’s plight will happily accuse their opponents of fascism.

So it is a mistake to think that the security of an election is limited to the anonymous but veriﬁable tallying of the vote itself. Just as an IED can be defeated before the boom (by intelligence or jamming) or afterwards (by armour), so also an election can be subverted before or after the vote. Even in mature democracies, politicians are forever trying to manipulate the franchise and the campaigning rules, such as campaign ﬁnance limits. For example, the Russians contributed money to both the ‘Leave’ campaigns in Britain’s Brexit referendum, which was illegal, and both campaigns separately broke overall ﬁnance limits, for which they got ﬁned [1265]. The disclosure of these o↵ences did not lead to a rerun of the vote; it merely helped paralyse UK politics for three years. The UK Prime Minister David Cameron had earlier changed franchise rules to require all voters to register separately, rather than by households, to cut the number of young people on the electoral roll (this should have helped his Conservative party, but backﬁred in the referendum). The outcome was much more due to discontent among voters and to blunders by complacent pro- remain politicians than to enemy action, but the existence of an enemy actively promoting harmful outcomes did not help. To this day, many remain supporters

do not accept the referendum result as valid – a truly wonderful outcome from the Russians’ point of view.

Similar comments can be made on the US presidential election later that year; I discuss the political scientist Yochai Benkler’s analysis of the e↵ect on that election of fake news in section 26.4.2. Again, the role played by the Rus- sians was to exploit existing polarisation, throw petrol on the ﬁre where possible (for example by leaking hacked emails from the Clinton camp, as discussed in section 2.2.3) and to buy inﬂuence where they could [385]. Had Clinton won the election, I expect evidence of hacked election systems would have emerged to enable Trump to refuse to accept defeat. The fact that there are 6,000 di↵erent voting systems across the USA makes the presidential ballot hard to steal out- right by technical means, but exposes its credibility to challenge. An election system is like an alarm; as we discussed in section 13.3, you can defeat an alarm by destroying conﬁdence in it, so that alarms are ignored. The real customer for an election is the losing party, and if one of the parties isn’t really prepared to accept defeat, then a pretext may be all they need. Whether Trump wins or loses in November 2020, we can expect an increase in polarisation among the US electorate and a decline in America’s standing in the world – again, a win for Russia.

China has largely refrained from interfering in other countries’ internal af- fairs; as I described in section 2.2.2, they have long taken the view that an uncensored Internet amounted to US subversion of communist party rule but their posture on that front has been defensive. Their focus has been on building their economic, technological and intelligence capacity while not conducting at- tacks, whether disruptive or political, on other countries. This capacity building has had political consequences, most notably in the US e↵ort to prevent Huawei dominating 5G infrastructure, as I discuss in sections 2.2.2 and 22.2.4. This looks set to become a frontier in the new cold war that’s emerging as China seeks to become the USA’s peer competitor. There are signs in 2020 though of more aggressive diplomacy as China seeks to entrench its narrative around coronavirus and exploit the USA’s chaotic response to the pandemic.

## Doctrine

The inclusion by Denning and Waltz of propaganda and other psychological operations in information warfare back in 1999 was a minority view at the time, but has been borne out by events since. It does have historical precedent. From Roman and Mongol e↵orts to promote a myth of invincibility, through the use of propaganda radio stations by both sides in World War 2 and the Cold War, to the bombing of Serbian TV during the Kosovo campaign and denial-of-service attacks on Chechen web sites by Russian agencies – the tools may change but the game remains the same.

In the intervening twenty years, the names have changed: the Pentagon adopted ‘information warfare’ in 1998, changed it to ‘information operations’ in 2006 and ‘cyberspace operations’ in 2013 [1164]. There have been some big blind spots: it wasn’t anybody’s job at the Pentagon in 2016 to worry about people in St Petersburg pretending to be from Black Lives Matter [1221]. Meanwhile a lot of wrong ideas have been gradually discarded. It used to be

said that attribution would be too hard; that’s not been borne out. Others used to suggest that information warfare provided a casualty-free way to win: ‘just hack the Iranian power grid and watch them sue for peace’. Yet more developed countries are more exposed, and if a cyber attack targets civilians to an even greater extent than the alternatives, then the attackers are likely to be portrayed as war criminals. What’s more, if a NATO country is the aggressor, the Tallinn manual will bolster the prosecution.

In the second edition of this book, I wondered whether cyber attacks would ﬁnd their place in open conﬂict or in guerilla warfare. So far we’ve seen their development by Russia into a component of a hybrid warfare strategy honed in Georgia and the Ukraine. We’ve seen attacks on democratic mechanisms not just in the UK and the USA but in Germany, France and elsewhere. Will this be the future for the next ten years too, as the USA, Russia and China continue to smile sweetly at the United Nations while kicking each other under the table? Or are there other possibilities? We’ve seen cyber tactics being used by peaceful demonstrators in the Arab spring, and by violent extremists in the Middle East, mostly without success. What else is there? Or will states continue to be the main actors?

# Summary

Electronic warfare ﬂourished during the Cold War, and developed a lot of inter- esting techniques, some of which have found their way into mainstream informa- tion security. After being starved of attention and money for years, it’s starting to move back up the agenda as China aims to compete with the USA and the Russians also modernise their armed forces. The AI revolution may change how the game is played as cognitive radar and sonar, coupled with better techniques for multisensor data fusion, move the advantage from the platform with the most megawatts to the player with the smartest software. It is likely, though, that victory will require e↵ective coordination of physical force and subtle deception.

A decade ago, people already talked of electronic warfare becoming infor- mation warfare. We have seen occasional use of cyber-weapons, from the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities to the Russian NotPetya attack on the Ukraine. And it is easily observable that nation state actors are making preparations to attack other nations’ critical national infrastructure. However, the great majority of the information operations that have actually been carried out in 2010–20 have been psychological operations and propaganda, aimed at sowing discord, disrupting political institutions such as elections, and deepening political polarisation. There are some interesting similarities between the decoys, jamming and other techniques used to manipulate enemy radar, and the techniques used to manipulate public opinion.

# Research Problems

My own research group has two relevant interests. First, we’ve been looking at adversarial machine learning. For example, if a missile uses a neural network

to seek its target, then can we approximate that model well enough from ob- servations to determine whether there’s an evasion strategy better than random maneuvering [2071]? Can we design camouﬂage that takes a lot of computa- tional e↵ort to understand? Can we add keys to neural networks so that di↵erent instances of them are vulnerable to di↵erent adversarial samples, thus limiting an opponent’s ability to learn [1732]?

Second, via the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre, we collect large amounts of data on spam, phish, malware, botnet command-and-control traﬃc, and other online wickedness. We develop better honeypots for capturing attack traﬃc, including attacks aimed at embedded systems. We license our collections of data to over a hundred researchers worldwide. They are now starting to include scrapes of underground fora for political extremism as well as for cybercrime.

# Further Reading

The best all-round reference for the technical aspects of electronic warfare, from radar through stealth to EMP weapons, is by Curtis Schleher [1662]; a good sum- mary was written by Doug Richardson [1601]. The classic introduction to the anti-jam properties of spread spectrum sequences is by Andrew Viterbi [1964]; the history of spread spectrum is ably told by Robert Scholtz [1682]; the classic introduction to the mathematics of spread spectrum is by Raymond Pickholtz, Donald Schilling and Lawrence Milstein [1525]; while the standard textbook is by Robert Dixon [567]. The most thorough reference on communications jam- ming is by Richard Poisel [1530]. Hugh Griﬃths and Nicholas Willis describe the electronic war between the RAF and the Luftwa↵e in World War 2 [824], while R. V. Jones’ overall history of British electronic warfare and scientiﬁc in- telligence gives a lot of insight not just into how the technology developed but also into strategic and tactical deception [990, 992]. The various protocols used in industrial control systems and surveyed, and their vulnerabilities discussed, by Santiago Figueroa-Lorenzo, Javier An˜orga, and Saioa Arrizabalaga in [684]. The inadequacy of US power grid hardening against Carrington events and EMP are discussed by Matthew and Martin Weiss [2005]. For readings on informa- tion operations, I’d recommend the readings I list at the end of the chapters on psychology and on surveillance; for the Russian assault on democracy in the

U.S. and Europe, one starting point is a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate [385].