Chapter 26

Surveillance or Privacy?

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneﬁcient... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning

but without understanding.

– Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis

Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice;

nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity.

– Lord Acton

The arguments of lawyers and engineers pass through one

another like angry ghosts.

– Nick Bohm, Ian Brown and Brian Gladman

# Introduction

Governments have ever more interests online, ranging from surveillance to cen- sorship, from privacy to safety, and from market competition to fair elections. Their goals are often in tension with the reality of a globalised online world, and with each other too. They crystallise around a number of speciﬁc pol- icy concerns, from terrorism and counterinsurgency, through national strategic and economic advantage, to the suppression of harmful or unpopular content and the maintenance of human rights. In this chapter we explore the nexus of surveillance, censorship, forensics and privacy.

The Internet has transformed the world in lots of complicated ways, like other big technologies before it – electricity, the steam engine, writing, agriculture and ﬁre. The relationship between the citizen and the state has changed everywhere, with the state usually acquiring more power and control. In the early years, as the PC replaced the mainframe and the Internet opened up to all, many pioneers

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were utopians: we believed that free access to information would be liberating at the personal level, and would destabilise authoritarian governments too. Yet governments and large companies learned in time to use the new tools. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York and Washington had a real impact, by creating the incentive for mass surveillance and weakening political opposition to it. The move of business online created the tools, and a commercial market for personal information to pay for them. While the pendulum swung back during the 2010s towards surveillance capitalism, the COVID-19 pandemic

looks set to increase state surveillance once more, with the trade-o↵ being not privacy versus security but privacy versus health.

It’s been a boom time for surveillance. It’s not just the NSA capabilities revealed in 2013 by Ed Snowden; nation-state competitors like Russia and China also have serious capabilities; while there are more primitive but still e↵ective systems in less developed countries like Syria.

The 2010s also saw growing cyber conﬂict and disruption with states inter- fering covertly in other states’ a↵airs. The USA and Israel used the Stuxnet malware to damage and delay Iran’s push to acquire nuclear weapons, and this caused a rush by other states to acquire cyber-weapons of various kinds. Since

the Russian interference in the 2016 US election, legislators in a number of coun- tries want to regulate social media: a lot of politicians have stopped ignoring technology once they realised their jobs were on the line.

There are many thorny issues. First, are open societies with democracy and a free press more vulnerable, because we’re easier to exploit? And if so what can we do about it? We face real challenges to our core values – expressed in the USA as the Constitution, and in Europe as the Convention on Human Rights. Since 9/11 we’ve seen one authoritarian measure after another, ranging from large-scale surveillance of communications to detention without trial and even torture. Many of these measures were not just illegal and immoral but ine↵ective or even counterproductive: torturing Iraqi secret policemen alongside al-Qaida terrorists in the Abu Ghraib prison was what forged them into the core of Islamic State. Can’t we ﬁnd better ways to defend freedom? And how can we reassert and defend our core values?

Second, there’s the political economy of security. President Eisenhower warned in his valedictory speech that ‘we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted inﬂuence, whether sought or unsought, by the military indus- trial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist’. Since 9/11, we’ve seen a security-industrial complex capturing policy in the same ways that the defence industry did at the start of the Cold War. Politicians of left and right have stoked a culture of fear, abetted by se- curity agencies and the press. This has been deepened since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 by the rise of nationalism.

Security technology arguments are often used to bamboozle or intimidate legislators. For example, all through the Irish republican terrorist campaign from the 1970s through 1990s, the British police had to charge arrested terrorist suspects within four days. But after 9/11, this was quickly raised to 28 days; then the government said it needed 90 days, claiming they might have diﬃculty decrypting data on PCs seized from suspects. The real problem was police

ineﬃciency at managing forensics. Now if the police had just said ‘we need to hold suspects for 90 days because we don’t have enough Somali interpreters’ then common sense could have kicked in; Parliament might well have told them to use sta↵ from commercial translation agencies. But talk of decryption seems a good way to turn legislators’ brains to mush. People who understand cryptography have a duty to speak out.

The focus on terrorism starved the rest of law enforcement. About half of all crime is now online, and yet the resources devoted to ﬁghting it are tiny. Many scammers operate with impunity.

There are further problems around censorship. Concerns about online abuse are real, but this is a diﬃcult area. Abuses range in seriousness from videos of murder and child rape at the top end, down through hate speech, rape threats and cyber-bullying to news manipulation which, at scale, can be toxic. Countries are starting to pass laws requiring ﬁrms like Facebook to do the censorship for them, which causes many tensions. The companies don’t like the extra costs, and thoughtful citizens don’t like the idea of censorship being in the hands of private monopolies – or the idea that everything we upload, from pictures and videos to private messages, is ﬁltered. So the ﬁrms have an incentive to redesign their systems so that they’re harder to abuse; Facebook, for example, claims to be rebuilding its systems to focus more on groups, which are harder for extremists to game, and to make more use of end-to-end encryption, so it can claim ignorance. Such arguments cut no ice in major incidents, such as when a shooter killed people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019 and used Facebook to share live video of the crime. This forced the company to start censoring white supremacist groups, a politically sensitive task it had previously avoided [1913]. The COVID-19 pandemic led the company to rapidly do many things that the industry had previously denounced as impossible, undesirable or impractical: removing misinformation, banning exploitative ads and pushing oﬃcial advice [984]. The tensions between privacy and censorship may continue to work out in unpredictable ways.

Privacy regulation is already complex. U.S. laws are fragmented, with federal laws on speciﬁc topics such as health data and video rentals and the FTC pun- ishing ﬁrms that violate their published privacy policies, while state laws drive security-breach disclosure. Europe is very di↵erent: the General Data Protec- tion Regulation provides a comprehensive framework, backed up by human- rights law that has been used to strike down laws on surveillance. The over- all e↵ect, from the viewpoint of the IT industry, is that Europe is becoming the world’s privacy regulator; Washington doesn’t care, and nobody else is big enough to matter. (There are strong signs that this regulatory power will be extended steadily to safety as well, although we’ll leave that to the chapter on

assurance.)

In this chapter, I’m going to discuss the evolution of surveillance, then look at terrorism before discussing censorship and privacy regulation, and ﬁnally trying to put the whole thing in context.

# Surveillance

The 2010s saw a huge increase in technical surveillance, not just by governments but also by commercial ﬁrms monitoring our clickstream and location history in order to target ads better – described by Shoshana Zubo↵ as ‘Surveillance Capitalism’ [2075]. The two interact in various ways. In some countries, like the USA, law enforcement and intelligence agencies don’t just get information from their own collection systems but use warrants to get it from ﬁrms like Google and Facebook too. In others, like China, these ﬁrms are banned because they refused to give complete access to the authorities; in others, like Iran and Syria, the police agencies just beat people’s passwords out of them, or phish their friends, or hack their phones.

This is a huge subject, and all I can reasonably provide is a helicopter tour: to place surveillance in its historical context, sketch what’s going on, and provide pointers to primary sources.

## The history of government wiretapping

Rulers have always tried to control communications. In classical times, couriers were checked at customs posts, and from the Middle Ages, many kings either operated a postal monopoly or granted it to a crony. The letter-opening and codebreaking facilities of early modern states, the so-called *Black Chambers*, are described in David Kahn’s history, ‘The Codebreakers’ [1001].

When electronic communications came along, governments tried to keep con- trol. In most of Europe, the telegraph service was set up as part of the post oﬃce and owned by the government; in Britain, the telegraph industry was national- ized by Gladstone in 1869. A profusion of national rules caused so much trouble that the *International Telegraph Union* (ITU) was set up in 1865 to standardise things [1818]. In the USA, Western Union was the ﬁrst nationwide industrial monopoly and dominated the market through the nineteenth century. Union and Confederate soldiers tapped each others’ telegraph lines, and the New York Police Department started wiretapping operations in 1895.

The invention of the telephone led to tussles over privacy. In the USA, the Supreme Court ruled in 1928 in *Olmstead vs United States* that wiretapping didn’t violate the fourth amendment provisions on search and seizure as there was no physical breach of a dwelling; Justice Brandeis famously dissented. In 1967, the Court reversed itself in *Katz vs United States*, ruling that the amend- ment protects people, not places. The following year, Congress legalized Federal wiretapping (in ‘title III’ of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act) following testimony on the scale of organized crime. In 1978, following an in- vestigation into the Nixon administration’s abuses, Congress passed the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which controls wiretapping for national se- curity. In 1986, the Electronic Communications Protection Act (ECPA) relaxed the Title III warrant provisions. By the early 1990s, the spread of deregulated services from mobile phones to call forwarding had started to undermine the authorities’ ability to wiretap, as did technical developments such as adaptive echo cancellation in modems.

So the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) required all communications companies to make their networks tappable in ways approved by the FBI. By 1999, over 2,450,000 telephone conversations were legally tapped following 1,350 court orders [634, 1257]; by 2017 the number of wiretap orders had almost tripled to 3,813, but 94% were against portable devices such as cellphones [1927]1. A further 1,598 orders were granted in whole

or in part by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) while 26 were denied.

Even before 9/11, some analysts believed that there were at least as many unauthorized wiretaps as authorized ones [558]. First was phone company col- lusion: while a phone company must give the police access if they present a warrant, in many countries they are also allowed to help – and there have been many reports over the years of phone companies being cosy with the government. Second, there’s intelligence-agency arbitrage: if the NSA wants to wiretap an American citizen without a warrant they can get an ally to do it, and return the favour later. It was said, for example, that Margaret Thatcher used the Cana- dian intelligence services to wiretap ministers suspected of disloyalty [728]. Such practices were denied by the agencies for years but the Snowden leaks showed them to be reality; for example, the NSA got GCHQ to tap the links between Google data centres, as I described in 2.1. Third, in some countries, wiretapping is uncontrolled if one of the subscribers consents – so calls from phone boxes are free to tap (the owner of the phone box is the legal subscriber). Companies may

wiretap their sta↵ to detect fraud and voluntarily pass the product to the police or security agencies; there was a scandal in the UK when it emerged that the security services were involved in an unlawful, clandestine scheme to blacklist construction industry sta↵ who had tried to organise unions [658]. Finally, in many countries, the police get hold of email and other stored communications by subpoena rather than warrant. They did this in America too before a court stopped the practice in 2007 [1161] – but the judgment didn’t stop private ac- tors such as bounty hunters and bail agents buying phone location histories from

data aggregators [489].

But even if the oﬃcial ﬁgures have to be doubled or tripled, democratic regimes use wiretapping very much less than authoritarian ones. The surveil- lance leader now is China, which uses pervasive technical monitoring in regions with minority populations such as Xinjiang and Tibet, with surveillance cameras mounted over street corners, mosques and schools hooked up via face-recognition software to databases recording who was seen where and when. There are also intrusive physical measures ranging from frequent street checkpoints, through billeting party members in the homes of minority families, to mass incarceration in labour camps [1110].

The incidence of wiretapping has also been highly variable within and be- tween democracies. In the USA, for example, only about half the states use it, and for much of the 20th century most taps were in the ‘Maﬁa’ states of New York, New Jersey and Florida (though Nevada and California have now caught up) [1927]. There is similar variation in Europe. Wiretaps are very common in the Netherlands: they have up to 1,000 taps on the go at once with a tenth of

1The relevant law is 18 USC (US Code) 2510–2521, while FISA’s regulation of foreign intelligence gathering is now codiﬁed in US law as 50 USC 1801–1811.

America’s population [356]. In a Dutch homicide investigation, it’s routine to tap everyone in the victim’s address book for a week to monitor how they react to the death. The developed country with the most wiretaps is Italy, thanks to its history of organised crime [1160]. In the UK, domestic wiretaps are supposed to need a ministerial warrant, and cannot be used in evidence; so the police use room bugs and computer exploits instead. If you can root a gangster’s phone or laptop you can record, and mail home, everything said nearby, whether it’s said to someone in the same room, or on a call. International calls have been routinely recorded for decades and stored for some days to weeks in case they turn out to be of interest, a model followed by many other countries; for exam- ple, after the Mumbai massacre in 2008, India could dig out recordings of phone calls the terrorists made to their controllers in Pakistan.

Automation is shifting the costs of wiretapping from per-call labour costs to one-o↵ capital costs. Before CALEA was introduced, in 1993, US police agencies spent only $51.7 million on wiretaps – perhaps a good estimate of their value before the issue became politicised [862]. The implementation of CALEA cost over $500m, and that was before it was extended to VOIP in 2007. VOIP was harder: “The paradigm of VoIP intercept diﬃculty is a call between two road warriors who constantly change locations and who, for example, may call from a cafe in Boston to a hotel room in Paris and an hour later from an oﬃce in Cambridge to a giftshop at the Louvre” [220]. During the 2010s things became harder still as people moved from physical platforms, such as their cellphone, to virtual platforms such as Facebook, Skype and Signal. So the trend for policymakers has been to make capital investments that cut the marginal costs of access. For example, ten years ago, if the UK police were investigating three similar rapes, they might have had to pay the phone companies thousands of pounds to assemble cellsite dumps so they could look for any mobile phones that were present at all three locations. Now, after spending hundreds of millions and getting several laws passed, they have access to databases of mobile phone locations, and all it takes is a database query. This changes the nature of both police and intelligence work.

The USA also changed its laws to facilitate bulk surveillance. 43 days after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Patriot Act, which allowed increased access by law enforcement to stored records (including ﬁnancial, medical and government records), ‘sneak-and-peek’ searches of homes and businesses without the owner’s knowledge, and the use by the FBI of National Security Letters to get access to ﬁnancial, email and telephone records.

But this was not enough for the agencies. In December 2005, the New York Times revealed that President Bush had signed a secret 2002 order mandat- ing warrantless wiretapping of US residents suspected of terrorism, contrary to law [1606]. In 2006, USA Today revealed that the NSA had covertly obtained full call-data records (CDRs) for the 200m customers of AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth, the nation’s three biggest phone companies. The CDR program had been started by the DEA in 1992 under the older President Bush, and tar- geted calls by Americans to and from certain countries; it was ramped up after 9/11, when his son authorised the collection of CDRs for all internal US calls too [877]. Qwest did not cooperate, because its CEO at the time, Joe Nac- chio, maintained that the NSA needed a court order. The NSA put pressure on

Qwest by threatening to withhold classiﬁed contracts, so Qwest’s lawyers asked the NSA to take its proposal to the FISA court. They refused, saying the court might not agree with them. It’s since emerged that they had put pressure on Qwest to hand over data even before 9/11 [768]. In October 2007, Verizon ad- mitted to senators that it had given the FBI second-generation call data on its customers against national security letters on 720 occasions since 2005 [1376]. In November 2007, the Washington Post revealed that the NSA had tapped a lot of purely domestic phone calls and traﬃc data, and had also tapped AT&T’s

peering centre in San Francisco to get access to Internet traﬃc [1377]. After

two years of debate, Congress amended FISA to grant retroactive immunity to phone companies who cooperated with unlawful wiretapping, and to change the law so that the NSA no longer needs even a FISA warrant to tap a call if one party’s believed to be outside the USA or a non-US person. (This split both parties, with Senators Obama and Feinstein supporting the amendment while Senators McCain, Biden, Reid, Leahy and Clinton opposed it.)

## Call data records (CDRs)

Historically, more police communications intelligence has come from the analysis of telephone call data records and other metadata rather than wiretaps. We discussed in the chapter on telecoms security how the police use such data to trace networks of criminal contacts, and how criminals respond by burying their signals in innocuous traﬃc using techniques such as pre-paid mobile phones and PBX hacking.

Again, this is nothing new. Rulers have long used their control over postal services to track the correspondents of suspects, even when the letters weren’t opened. The introduction of postage stamps in 1840 was an advance for privacy as it made it much easier to send a letter anonymously. Some countries got so worried about the threat of sedition that they passed laws requiring a return address to be written on the back of the envelope. The development of the telegraph, on the other hand, was an advance for surveillance; as messages were logged by sender, receiver and word count, traﬃc totals could be compiled and

were found to be an e↵ective indicator of economic activity [1818]. The First

World War taught the combatants how much intelligence could be gleaned from measuring the volume of enemy radio traﬃc, even when it couldn’t conveniently be deciphered [1001, 1380]. Later twentieth-century conﬂicts reinforced this.

When I wrote the ﬁrst edition of this book, I noted that the USA had 1,329 wiretap applications approved in 1998, while there were 4886 subpoenas (plus 4621 extensions) for *pen registers* (devices which record all the numbers dialed from a target phone line) and 2437 subpoenas (plus 2770 extensions) for *trap-and-trace* devices (which record the calling line ID of incoming calls, even if the caller tries to block it). Law-enforcement agencies were also starting to switch in the 1990s to using subpoenas for the call-detail records in the phone companies’ databases. Bell Atlantic, for example, responded to 25,453 subpoenas or court orders for toll billing records of 213,821 of its customers in 1989–92, while NYNEX processed 25,510 subpoenas covering an unrecorded number of customers in 1992 alone [402]. Scaled up across the seven Baby Bells, this suggests that perhaps half a million customers were having their records

seized every year in the 1990s, and that traﬃc data were collected on perhaps a hundred times as many people as were subjected to wiretapping.

Statistics went dark after 9/11, during the period of unlawful collection, although the NSA did reveal in 2006 that it wanted “to create a database of every call ever made within the nation’s borders” so it could map the entire US social network for the War on Terror [395]. After Snowden revealed in 2013 that it had built databases of pretty well all traﬃc data for all communications worldwide, Congress passed the Freedom Act in 2015 and we started to get an annual Statistical Transparency Report from the Director of National Intelli- gence. The April 2018 report gives some ﬁgures for 2017; these relate only to national-security matters, but give some feel for the balance between content and traﬃc data. Wiretap warrants are stable at about 1,500 per year in the USA (targeting about 300 US persons and 1000 others), as well as a rising number of targets overseas – 106,469 in 2016 and 129,080 in 2017. In addition, there were 7,512 US residents whose communications content was retrieved (e.g. sub- poenas for email) while 16,924 residents had non-content (such as traﬃc data) retrieved, along with 56,064 non-residents. There were also 87,834 collected business records, which might include records of which subscriber was using which IP address [1464].

Now the US intelligence community only considers a communication to be ‘intercepted’ when a human analyst looks at it; analysis by software doesn’t count (UK law counts both). As I described in Section 23.3.1, the usual proce- dure when hunting for suspects is contact chaining, also known as a ‘snowball search’. If someone blows themselves up in a terror attack, analysts will use soft- ware that looks at all the people they communicated with, and then everyone these direct contacts communicated with, and exceptionally even out to a third degree of separation. The standard depth-two search typically gives some tens of thousands of indirect contacts. These contacts are then compared against millions of names on various suspect lists – religious extremists, right-wing hate groups, organised crime – and the analysts then home in on the links with any known suspects. (The analogy is rolling a snowball downhill, then melting it

and seeing what dirt you ﬁnd in the bottom of the bucket.) So the analyst may

look at only half a dozen people who were in contact with the dead terrorist and also with members of some religious group, but tens of thousands of innocent people had their call data records looked at by the software. The DNI report estimates that in 2017, 534,396,285 call data records (CDRs) were examined automatically in this way – a large increase from 151,230,968 in 2016.

Yet there was a long debate in Congress about allowing Section 215 of the Patriot Act (as amended by FISA) to lapse. This was the section that allows the bulk collection of CDRs [416]; the NSA has said that it doesn’t want it. The bulk collection of communications data was one of the matters highlighted by Ed Snowden that sparked the most controversy. On June 8th 2013, the press disclosed Boundless Informant, an NSA visualisation tool that shows a heat map of where metadata are collected for both voice and computer communications; in a 30-day period ending in March 2013, 3 billion records were collected from 504 sources (or SIGADs). Although the most intensive collection was in the Middle East, Snowden said that more records were collected on Americans in America than on Russians in Russia [756]. On another reading of the material,

Boundless Informant collected 3 billion phone records via US telecommunica- tions providers, plus a further 97 billion emails and 124 billion phone calls round the world [816, p. 92]; overall, 20 billion events a day are collected [816, p. 98]. However, a declassiﬁed report revealed that while the NSA call-data record pro-

gram in the USA cost over $100m, it produced only two leads and one signiﬁcant

investigation [1656]. In 2020, the clause was allowed to lapse in March but rein- stated in May; the politics was messy. Susan Landau and Asaf Lubin explained that with 4g mobile networks, traditional CDRs don’t identify both the caller and the called party reliably any more [1126]. In any case, the action is shifting from the plain old telephone system to messaging systems.

As for targeted collection in speciﬁc criminal investigations, under 18 USC 3123 [1925], the investigative oﬃcer merely has to certify to a magistrate ‘that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation’. This can be any crime – felony or misde-

meanour – and under either Federal or State law. Since CALEA, warrants are still required for such communications data as the addresses to which a sub- scriber has sent e-mail messages, but basic toll records can be obtained under subpoena – the subscriber need not be notiﬁed, and there is no court supervision once the order has been made. The US Department of Justice is required by law to publish statistics for its non-national-security law-enforcement activities but appears reluctant to do so; the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) extracted ﬁgures for 2011–12 only after freedom-of-information (FOI) litigation, which revealed that the combined number of original orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices used to spy on phones increased by 60%, from 23,535 in 2009 to 37,616 in 2011 [765]. I’ve been unable to ﬁnd anything more recent.

Bulk access to traﬃc data has been also led to serious political tussles in Europe. The UK pushed through a Data Retention Directive in the European Union in 2006, under which member states had to store telecommunications data – including IP address and timing of every email, phone call and text message sent or received – for between 6 months and 24 months, and make all this available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Directive was struck down in 2014 by the European Court of Justice after Digital Rights Ireland brought a lawsuit arguing that blanket data collection violated the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In Britain, targeted access to communications data requires only a notice from a senior police oﬃcer to the phone company or ISP, not a warrant; and data can be provided to a wide range of public-sector bodies, just as in the USA. Following the Data Retention Directive, the Blair government wanted to centralise things; it argued that the police needed a ‘communications database’ and pushed a law to establish it. Fate intervened when some wicked person stole a copy of all the expenses claims ﬁled by members of parliament and sold it to the Daily Telegraph. It turned out that numerous ministers and others had been making embarrassing claims; several honourable members went to jail, and most of the well-known politicians in Britain had to make repayments. (I told the tragic tale of the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith – who had been promoting the communications database – in section 8.6.5 above.) We heard nothing more of the communications database until Ed Snowden told us in 2013 that they’d just built it anyway, even without parliamentary approval.

After the European Court struck down data retention, and Snowden revealed some highly objectionable activities by GCHQ, the UK passed the 2014 DRIP Act to assert that what GCHQ had been doing was legal after all. It was clear that the European Court would object eventually, but some breathing space was needed and the Act gave this (it had a two-year sunset clause; Prime Minister Cameron’s liberal coalition partners wouldn’t give him any more). Eventually, in the wake of the Brexit vote, Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act, which pretty well enables GCHQ to do as it pleases and compel any company

in the jurisdiction to assist it. The interesting action in the future will be, ﬁrst, the extent to which the large US ﬁrms will help, and second, the line to be taken by the European Court of Human Rights2. I’ll return to these issues later.

## Search terms and location data

It has become ever clearer over the past 20 years that the regulation of surveil- lance that evolved in the phone-company era is not really ﬁt for purpose in the era of the Internet. Back then, you got either a full wiretap and recorded the content, or made do with traﬃc data from call data records. But as things moved online, communications data and content got all mixed up, as what’s con- tent at one level of abstraction is often communications data at the next. Some people might think of a URL as just the address of a page to be fetched, but a URL such as [http://www.google.com/search?q=marijuana+cultivation+UK](http://www.google.com/search?q=marijuana%2Bcultivation%2BUK) contains the terms entered into a search engine as well as the search engine’s name. Clearly, some policemen would like a list of everyone who submitted such an enquiry. This became a live issue in 1999, when the UK government modernised its surveillance law; academics, NGOs and industry managed to get a ‘Big Browser Amendment’ into the resulting Regulation of Investigatory Pow-

ers Act of 2000 deﬁning traﬃc data as the information necessary to identify the communicating machine; for URLs, this means everything up to the ﬁrst slash.

In the USA, the Department of Justice issued a subpoena to a number of search engines to hand over two full months’ worth of search queries, as well as all the URLs in their index, claiming it needed the data to bolster its claims that the Child Online Protection Act did not violate the constitution and that ﬁltering could be e↵ective against child pornography. (Recall we discussed in section 11.2.3 how when AOL released some search histories, a number of them

were easily identiﬁable to individuals.) AOL, Microsoft and Yahoo quietly com- plied, but Google resisted. A judge ﬁnally ruled in 2006 that the Department would get no search queries, and only a random sample of 50,000 of the URLs it had originally sought [2035].

The next issue was mobile-phone location data, which ended up being treated di↵erently in di↵erent jurisdictions. In Britain, all information about the loca- tion of mobile phones counts as traﬃc data, and oﬃcials get it easily; but in the USA, the Court of Appeals ruled in 2000 that when the police get a warrant for the location of a mobile, the cell in which it is active is suﬃcient, and that to require triangulation on the device (an interpretation the police had wanted)

2Britain’s departure from the EU will let it escape the European Court of Justice, which is an EU institution, but not the Court of Human Rights, as this is an institution of the Council of Europe

would invade privacy [1926]. Also, even cell-granularity location information would not be available under the lower standards applied to pen-register sub- poenas. Yet despite these rules, there were massive leaks of information. It emerged in 2019 that AT&T and Sprint had both been selling their customers’ location information to data brokers for years, including not just cellsite data but GPS; and this had routinely been bought by bounty hunters and bail agents to track defaulters [489]. Location data is now being collected by many govern- ments with a view to tracing contacts of COVID-19 su↵erers and epidemiology more generally. It’s also collected by lots of apps: the Untappd beer-rating app is run by millions of beer drinkers who record hundreds of time-stamped loca- tions, which enabled journalists to track US military and intelligence personnel around the world [1538].

## Algorithmic processing

The analysis of call data is only one aspect of a much wider issue: law-enforcement matching of bulk datasets. The earliest serious use of multiple-source data ap- pears to have been in Germany in the late 1970s to track down safe houses used by the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group. Investigators looked for rented apartments with irregular peaks in utility usage, and for which the rent and electricity bills were paid by remote credit transfer from a series of di↵erent locations. This worked: it yielded a list of several hundred apartments among which were several safe houses. The tools to do this kind of analysis are now shipped with a number of the products used for traﬃc analysis and for managing major police investigations. The extent to which they’re used depends on the local regulatory climate; there have been rows in the UK over police access to databases of the prescriptions ﬁlled by pharmacists, while in the USA doctors are alarmed at the frequency with which personal health information is subpoe- naed from insurance companies by investigators. There are also practical limits imposed by the cost of understanding the many proprietary data formats used by commercial and government data processors. But it’s common for police to have access at least to utility data, such as electricity bills which get trawled to ﬁnd marijuana growers, and there’s little to stop them using commercially available data such as feeds from credit reference agencies.

Since AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol in 2016, there’s been a host of machine- learning startups, and quite a few aim to make law enforcement easier one way or another. But it’s not as easy as it looks. Terrorists are so rare as a per- centage of the population that any tests you use to ‘detect’ them would require extraordinary speciﬁcity if you’re not to drown in false positives. Combining multiple sensors is hard, and if you’re looking for a needle in a haystack, it’s not always smart to build a bigger haystack. As Je↵ Jonas, once the chief sci- entist at IBM’s data-mining operation, put it, “techniques that look at people’s behavior to predict terrorist intent are so far from reaching the level of accu- racy that’s necessary that I see them as nothing but civil liberty infringement engines” [757].

## ISPs and CSPs

The 2000s saw rapid growth of intrusive surveillance at both Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Communications Service Providers (CSPs – ﬁrms like Google and Yahoo). Tapping data traﬃc at an ISP is harder than voice used to be; there are many obstacles, such as transient IP addresses given to most customers and the increasingly distributed nature of traﬃc. In the old days (say 2002), an ISP might have had modem racks, and a LAN where a wiretap device could be located; nowadays many customers come in via DSL, and providers use

switched networks that often don’t have any obvious place to put a tap. The ISP simply became the natural control point.

Many countries now have laws requiring ISPs to help, and the usual way to do it at a large ISP is to have equipment already installed that will send copies of packets of interest (or NetFlow records) to a separate classiﬁed network. The FBI’s system, DCSNet, is very slick – allowing agents point-and-click access to traﬃc and content from participating phone companies [1761]. (Information about which companies have been brought onboard is closely held, but smart bad guys use small ISPs.) And things often go wrong because the police don’t understand ISPs; they subpoena the wrong things, or provide inaccurate times- tamps so that the wrong user is associated with an IP address. For an analysis of failure modes, see Clayton [442].

The smartphone revolution has changed the natural control point from the ISP to the CSP. A modern criminal might get up, check his messages on Gmail or WhatsApp using his home wiﬁ, then get on a bus into town and do the same using his 3G or 4G data connection, then perhaps use wiﬁ at a Starbucks or a public library ... and in none of these cases does a wiretap at the ISP tell

anything much beyond the fact that a particular service has been used. As the traﬃc to that communications service is encrypted, the police have to serve paperwork on the service to get anywhere. This is what led the FBI to set up the Prism system, whereby intelligence agencies can get customer data from Google, Yahoo, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook and others at the press of a button. It is also what led the UK, in its 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, to grant itself the power to order any company to do anything it physically can in order to assist law-enforcement of intelligence investigations. More and more countries are passing such laws, which put the service providers in conﬂict with other countries’ laws.

One big ﬂashpoint is the tension between EU privacy and data-protection law, which requires due process for privacy infringement, and US surveillance law which demands that US ﬁrms hand over foreigners’ data on demand. But there are many more. Google left China rather than give the police unfettered access to all user data. And as a senior Google executive told me, ‘If a family court in India orders you to hand over the Gmail of someone who lives in Canada and imposes a lifelong secrecy order, how do you simultaneously employ people in India, and give believable assurances of privacy to people in Canada?’

Finally, there are lots of issues around the much richer data available from CSPs like Facebook, which not only collect highly sensitive data at scale but enable sensitive facts to be deduced from traﬃc data in ways that were not pre- viously possible. As I discussed in section 11.2.5, Michal Kosinski and colleagues

ﬁgured out that he could tell whether someone was straight or gay from four Facebook likes [1086], after which some of his colleagues collected Facebook data at industrial scale and weaponised it for political campaigning, leading to the Cambridge Analytica scandal when it was discovered that social-network data had been used in 2016 to intervene unlawfully and at scale in both the Brexit referendum in the UK and the presidential election in the USA. What sort of controls should there be on the use of social analysis methods by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies, or for that matter by public-health agencies? (We’ll return to the broader issues raised by these techniques later.)

## The Five Eyes’ system of systems

We discussed the technical meat of the Snowden revelations in 2.2.1. These did not come entirely from the blue; there had been many previous disclosures about signals intelligence collection. David Kahn’s inﬂuential history of cryptography sets the scene by describing what happened up till the start of World War 2 [1001]. An anonymous former NSA analyst, later identiﬁed as Perry Fellwock, then revealed the scale of NSA operations in 1972 [674]. “Information gathering by NSA is complete,” he wrote. “It covers what foreign governments are doing, planning to do, have done in the past: what armies are moving where and against whom; what air forces are moving where, and what their capabilities are. There really aren’t any limits on NSA. Its mission goes all the way from calling in the B-52s in Vietnam to monitoring every aspect of the Soviet space program.”

While Fellwock’s motive was opposition to Vietnam, the next major whistle- blower was a British wartime codebreaker, Frederick Winterbotham, who wanted to write a memoir of his wartime achievements and, as he was dying, was not bothered about prosecution. In 1974, he revealed the Allies’ success in breaking German and Japanese cipher systems during that war [2031], which led to many further books on World War 2 signals intelligence (Sigint) [438, 1002, 2007]. Thereafter there was a slow drip of revelations by investigative journalists, quite a few of whose sources were concerned about corruption or abuse of the fa-

cilities by oﬃcials monitoring targets they should not have, such as domestic political groups. Whistleblower Peg Newsham revealed that the NSA had ille-

gally tapped a phone call made by Senator Strom Thurmond [373, 374]. James Bamford pieced together a lot of information on the NSA from open sources and by talking to former employees [160], while New Zealand journalist Nicky Hager [849] dug up a lot of information following the New Zealand intelligence community’s failure to obey an order from their Prime Minister to downgrade intelligence cooperation with the USA.

The ﬁrst high-proﬁle expos´e of US economic espionage was made in a 1999 report to the European parliament [644], which was concerned that after the col- lapse of the USSR, European Union member nations were becoming the NSA’s main targets [377]. By then, people who paid attention were aware that data, faxes and phone calls get collected at a large number of nodes ranging from where international communications cables land in friendly countries (or are tapped clandestinely underwater), through observation of traﬃc to and from commercial communications satellites and special Sigint satellites that collect

traﬃc over hostile countries, to listening posts in member states’ embassies [644]. During the Cold War, much of the e↵ort was military, aimed at understand- ing Soviet radar and communications, and at gaining a decisive advantage in

location, jamming and deception. Without an ability to conduct electronic war- fare, a modern state is not competitive in air or naval warfare or even in tank battles. Most of the personnel at NSA were military, and its director has always been a serving general or admiral. A lot of e↵ort still goes into understanding the signals of potential adversaries.

One might question whether this huge worldwide system of systems still gives value for money. Politicians have justiﬁed its budgets since 9/11 in terms of terrorism, and there have indeed been some successes against terrorists – notably the arrest of an alleged 9/11 terrorism planner after he used a mobile phone SIM from a batch bought by a known terrorist in Switzerland. But elec- tronic warfare against insurgents in Iraq proved less productive, as I discussed in Chapter 19. And it’s clear that more e↵ort should have been put into human intelligence. In an article published just before 9/11, an analyst wrote “The CIA probably doesn’t have a single truly qualiﬁed Arabic-speaking oﬃcer of Middle Eastern background who can play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would volunteer to spend years of his life with shitty food and no women in the mountains of Afghanistan. For Christ’s sake, most case oﬃcers live in the suburbs of Virginia. We don’t do that kind of thing.” Another put it even more bluntly: “Operations that include diarrhea as a way of life don’t happen” [758]. Nearly two decades after the start of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and North Africa, we haven’t trained enough soldiers to carry a basic conversation in Arabic, Dari or Pushtu.

Although other countries may complain about US Sigint collection, for them to moralise about it is hypocritical. Other countries also run intelligence oper- ations, and are often much more aggressive in conducting economic and other non-military espionage. The real di↵erence between the Five Eyes countries and the others is that no-one else has built the ‘system-of-systems’. Indeed, there are network e↵ects in Sigint as elsewhere: while non-aligned countries like India were happy to buy their warplanes from the old Soviet Union, they nowa- days tend to share intelligence with the USA, as it has a much bigger network than the Russians or the Chinese [84]. The Snowden documents reveal NSA information sharing with over 60 other countries.

My own view is that, like the armed forces of which they are often a part, signals intelligence agencies are both necessary but potentially dangerous. An army can be a good servant but is likely to be an intolerable master. The issue is not whether such resources should exist, but how they are held accountable. In the USA, hearings by Senator Church in 1975 detailed a number of abuses such as the illegal monitoring of US citizens [423]; this led to FISA. The Snowden

revelations in turn led to action by all three arms of the US government, albeit of limited e↵ect3.

The structural problems remain, though. The NSA is responsible for both

3President Obama set up the NSA review group and accepted most of its recommendations, but his positive work was undone by President Trump. Congress passed the USA Freedom Act which imposed some limits on the bulk collection of communications data on US residents by US agencies. Chief Justice Roberts made some changes to the FISA court.

attack and defence, and defence tends to play second ﬁddle. Imagine that you’re the Director of the NSA, and one of your engineers comes to you with a cool new zero-day exploit of Windows. Do you tell Microsoft, thereby protecting 300m Americans, or do you keep it secret, so you can attack 1.2bn Chinese? Stated in those terms, the answer is obvious. This *equities issue* is the one issue on which President Obama declined to follow the advice of the NSA review group. The group recommended that in almost all cases, vulnerabilities that come to the attention of the NSA should be reported to vendors for ﬁxing; the NSA prefers to stockpile them instead. Indeed it has a $100m a year budget for Bullrun, a program to insert them into commercial products by means fair and foul, as discussed in section 2.2.1.5. And when bugs occur naturally, the NSA uses them where it can; it was reported in 2014, for example, that the hugely disruptive Heartbleed bug in SSL had been exploited by the NSA for two years before it was discovered independently and ﬁxed [2065].

In some countries things are cleaner: in both France and Germany, there are separate agencies for attack and defence. But in most countries, the oversight of intelligence isn’t even discussed. In the UK, it’s only the European courts that forced the government to admit to the scale of surveillance, and to legislate some controls on it. New cases continually highlight excessive collection, by both electronic and human methods. In 2019, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the UK police to delete from its ‘extremism’ database the records of some 60 demonstrations attended by John Catt, a 94-year-old protester with no criminal record – a verdict applauded even in the conservative press [2024].

That is the high-level picture of how surveillance has evolved over the past few decades. Another aspect is scale. Cross-border bandwidth increased from 11Tbit/sec in 2007, when the systems described by Ed Snowden were being built, to 704Tbit/sec in 2017; this ﬁrehose creates yet more pressure for the agencies

to collect traﬃc from CSPs or other edge systems rather than from ISPs or

the backbone, as they can target the collection much better. The resulting pressure for government access to data is remarkably similar to the pressure for government access to cryptographic keys in the 1990s, which was a formative experience for many governments (as well as for industry and civil society) on issues of surveillance and technology policy.

## The crypto wars

Technology policy during the 1990s was dominated by acrimonious debates about *key escrow* – the Clinton administration doctrine that anyone who en- crypted data should give the government a copy of the key, so that the civilian use of cryptography would not interfere with intelligence gathering.

I was involved as one of the academics whose research and teaching was under threat from the proposed controls, and in 1998 I was one of the people who set up the Foundation for Information Policy Research, a UK Internet- policy think-tank, which wrestled with crypto policy, export policy, copyright and related issues. In 2003 we set up European Digital Rights (EDRi) along with other European NGOs to campaign on these issues in Brussels. In the next few sections I’ll lay out a brief background to the crypto wars, and then discuss how governments have failed to get to grips with the Internet.

* + - 1. The back story to crypto policy

Many countries made laws in the mid-19th century banning the use of cryp- tography in telegraph messages, and some even forbade the use of languages other than those on an approved list. Prussia went as far as to require telegraph operators to keep copies of the plaintext of all messages [1818]. Sometimes the excuse was law enforcement – preventing people obtaining horse race results or stock prices in advance of the ‘oﬃcial’ transmissions – but the real concern was national security. This pattern was to repeat itself again in the twentieth century.

After the immense success that the Allies had during World War 2 with signals intelligence, the UK and US governments agreed in 1946 to continue in- telligence cooperation. This ‘BRUSA agreement’ was joined by Canada in 1948 and by Australia and New Zealand in 1956, giving the ‘Five Eyes’ partnership in signals intelligence. They decided to prevent the proliferation of cryptographic equipment and know-how. Until the 1980s, about the only vendors were com- panies selling into government markets, who could mostly be trusted not to do anything overseas which would upset their major customers at home. This was reinforced by export controls that were operated “in as covert a way as possible, with the minimum of open guidance to anyone wanting, for example, an export licence. Most things were done in behind-the-scenes negotiation between the

oﬃcials and a trusted representative of the would-be exporter.” [206]

In these negotiations, the authorities would try to steer applicants towards using weak cryptography where possible, and where confronted with a more sophisticated user would try to see to it that systems had a ‘back door’ (known in the trade as a *red thread*) which would give access to traﬃc. Anyone who tried to sell decent crypto domestically could be dissuaded by various means. If they were a large company, they would be threatened with loss of government contracts; if a small one, they could be strangled with red tape as they tried to get licenses and product approvals. The upshot was that most governments used weak crypto, and the NSA could break it with ease. But this wasn’t the whole story, as we learned in the Bu¨hler case.

Hans Bu¨hler worked as a salesman for the Swiss ﬁrm Crypto AG, a leading supplier of cryptographic equipment to governments without the technical ca- pability to build their own. He was arrested in 1992 in Iran when the authorities ﬁgured out that the Iraqis had been reading their traﬃc during the Iran-Iraq war; they accused him of selling them cipher machines which had been tampered with so that the NSA could get at the plaintext. Crypto AG paid 1.44 billion Rials – then about a million US dollars – to bail him, but ﬁred him once he got back to Switzerland. Bu¨hler then alleged on Swiss radio and TV that the ﬁrm was secretly controlled by the German intelligence services and that it had been involved in intelligence work for years [335]. One story was that when the founder of Crypto AG, Boris Hagelin, decided to retire, he contacted William Friedman, the NSA’s chief scientist; Friedman was a friend, and the US govern- ment had been a big customer, buying Hagelin machines during World War 2. Hagelin sold his company secretly to the NSA, which had it secretly controlled by German nominees. The equipment it sold was routinely red threaded [1205]. Crypto AG’s line was that these allegations were concocted by the NSA to

undermine the company, as it was one of the third world’s few sources of cryp- tographic equipment. Bu¨hler’s story was told in a book by Res Strehle [1837]. It is now known that Crypto AG was run by the German Bundesnachrichten- dienst in collaboration with the agencies of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and France, and with the CIA. The backdoors in their equipment were used, for example, by the UK to decipher Argentinian communications during the Falklands war in 1982 – the outcome of which was “materially inﬂuenced, if not decided” by this operation [970].

* + - 1. DES and crypto research

Despite the poor quality of early banking cryptosystems, the NSA still worried in the seventies that the banking sector might evolve good algorithms that would escape into the wild. Many countries were still using rotor machines or other equipment that could be broken using the techniques developed in World War

2. How could the banking industry’s thirst for a respectable cipher be slaked, not just in the US but overseas, without this cipher being adopted by foreign governments and driving up the costs of intelligence collection?

The solution was the Data Encryption Standard (DES). At the time, as I mentioned in section 5.4.3.2, there was controversy about whether 56 bits were enough. We now know that this was deliberate. The NSA did not at the time have the machinery to do DES keysearch; that came later. But by giving the impression that they did, they managed to stop most foreign gov- ernments adopting it. The rotor machines continued in service, in many cases reimplemented using microcontrollers; Crypto AG and other biddable vendors continued to thrive; and the traﬃc continued to be harvested. Foreigners who

encrypted their important data with such ciphers merely marked that traﬃc as

worth collecting.

A second initiative was to undermine academic research in cryptology. In the 1970s this was done directly by harassing the people involved; by the 1980s it had evolved into a subtler strategy. While the Pentagon funded research into computer security, it tried to divert crypto research into theoretical channels and claimed that more practical published research work was all old hat: ‘we did all that stu↵ thirty years ago; why should the taxpayer pay for it twice?’ The

insinuation that DES may have had a ‘trapdoor’ inserted into it ﬁtted well with

this playbook. A side e↵ect we still live with is that the crypto and computer security communities got separated from each other in the early 1980s as the NSA worked to sideline one and build up the other.

By the mid 1990s this line had become exhausted. Agency blunders in the design of key escrow systems debunked their story that they were way ahead of the rest of us in cryptology, and in any case the ﬁght moved to a di↵erent battleﬁeld.

* + - 1. Crypto War 1 – the Clipper chip

Crypto policy went mainstream in 1993 with the launch of the Clipper chip. Af- ter AT&T proposed the introduction to the US domestic market of an encrypting

telephone that would have used Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange and triple-DES to protect traﬃc, the NSA persuaded the Clinton administration to promote a dif- ferent standard. This would use a classiﬁed block cipher, Skipjack, implemented in a tamper-resistant chip and with a protocol that made a spare (‘escrowed’) key available to the agencies to decrypt traﬃc. This ‘Escrowed Encryption Stan- dard’ led to a public outcry; an AT&T computer scientist, Matt Blaze, found a protocol vulnerability in Clipper that defeated the escrow mechanism [258] and the proposal was withdrawn.

Several more attempts were made through the 1990s to promote the use of cryptography with government access to keys. Key escrow acquired various new names, such as *key recovery*; certiﬁcation authorities which kept copies of their clients’ private decryption keys became known as *Trusted Third Parties* (TTPs) – somewhat emphasising the NSA deﬁnition of a trusted component as one which can break security. In the UK, a key escrow protocol was introduced for the public sector [980], and this was used to try to get the private sector to adopt it as well; but we found a number of vulnerabilities in it too [115].

The pro-escrow people said that as crypto provided conﬁdentiality, and con- ﬁdentiality could help criminals, there needed to be some way to defeat it. The anti-escrow lobby started out by arguing that since crypto was necessary for pri- vacy, there must not be a way to defeat it. Reality was more complex [56]. Most crypto applications are about authentication rather than conﬁdentiality, so help the police rather than hindering them. As for criminals, they mainly require

unobtrusive communications – and back in the 1990s, encrypting a phone call was a good way to bring attention to yourself. If you wanted to be unobtrusive, it was better to just buy a prepaid phone. As for privacy, most violations result from abuse of authorized access by insiders. Finally, a much more severe prob- lem for policemen is to ﬁnd acceptable evidence, for which decent authentication can also be helpful.

The debate got rapidly tangled up with export controls on weapons, the means by which cryptography was traditionally controlled. US software ﬁrms were not allowed to export products containing cryptography that was too hard to break, and this was also used as a means of controlling cryptography at home; Americans who put cryptography software on their websites were liable to prosecution for making it available to foreigners. A US software author, Phil Zimmermann, was hauled up before a grand jury for arms traﬃcking after a program he wrote – PGP – ‘escaped’ on to the Internet. He became a folk hero and made a fortune as his product grabbed market leadership. Others, such as Bruce Schneier, printed cryptographic algorithms in books as a way of exercising their constitutional right to free speech [1667]. The conﬂict became international: the US State Department tried hard to persuade other countries to control cryptography too (I’ll go into more detail in Section 26.2.9 on export control below). Imposing American policy worldwide became one of the missions of Vice-President Gore (a reason why many tech people contributed to the Bush campaign in 2000).

The apparent resolution of Crypto War 1 came in two phases. In 1999, the European Union’s Commissioner for the Single Market, Martin Bangemann, pushed through the Electronic Signature Directive, a law that banned the com- pulsory licensing of certiﬁcation authorities. This undermined the demand from

the NSA and GCHQ that all private signing keys should be escrowed – not just decryption keys, but also signature veriﬁcation keys. The Germans objected that escrowing signature keys would let the agencies not just read messages, but forge them too, undermining trust in electronic commerce and authentica- tion generally. When the EU followed the German line rather than the British one, it followed that individuals could either use their signature keypairs for encryption, or to authenticate Diﬃe-Hellman keys and use those for encryption.

European oﬃcials molliﬁed the US administration by passing an export control

regulation that extended EU export controls from physical goods to intangibles such as software, so that European ﬁrms faced the same export controls on cryptographic software as US ﬁrms [651].

Second, in 2000 when Al Gore was running for president and wanted to get Silicon Valley onside, the administration decided to call a halt. Meetings were held at the FBI oﬃces in Quantico between the agencies and the tech majors, leading to an agreement that the agencies would no longer push for vulnerabilites to be inserted into products and systems. Instead, the agencies would exploit the many naturally-occurring vulnerabilities, and the NSA inveigled itself into the patching cycle. When a software vulnerability is reported to the CERT ecosystem, it ﬁnds its way to the CERT at the Software Engineering Institute in Pittsburgh, which is sponsored by the DoD. This shares it with the NSA and also reports it to the vendor for ﬁxing. The patch cycle typically takes a month or two – sometimes more, if coordinating vulnerability disclosure and product testing is hard – giving the NSA a window to exploit the bug.

Those of us who were active in digital rights in Europe were generally pleased at the e-signature directive but appalled at intangible export controls; we set up European Digital Rights (EDRi) in 2003 to create a lobbying presence in Brussels, backed by dozens of individual NGOs in European countries. We thought that the surveillance issue had been largely settled and that future ﬁght would be over issues like software copyright and data protection. In 2013, Ed Snowden showed us how wrong we’d been. The NSA and the other agencies had simply gone underground, and had been running a covert program called Bullrun with a budget of $100m a year to undermine commercial cryptography, interfering with standards, implementations, supply chains and much else. But that came later.

One of the engineering lessons from Crypto War 1 is that doing key escrow properly is hard. Making two-party security protocols into three-party protocols increases the complexity and the risk of serious design errors, and centralizing the escrow databases creates huge targets; I discussed this in a paper ‘The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption’ that I wrote with ten other cryptographers and that became the most highly-cited reference on the subject [4]. Where escrow is required it’s usually better done with simple local mechanisms. In one army, every oﬃcer must write down his passphrase on a piece of paper, put it in an envelope, stamp it ‘Secret’ and hand it to his commanding oﬃcer, who puts it in his oﬃce safe. That way the keys are kept in the same place as the documents whose electronic versions they protect, and there’s no central database for an airplane to bomb or a spy to steal. But trying to automate this and scale it up leads to trouble. The UK government idea was that everyone’s private key would be generated from their email address using a

super-secret master key generated by GCHQ and kept in equipment controlled by their departmental security oﬃcer, so that both the department and GCHQ could decrypt traﬃc if they had to. The result was a clunky system that couldn’t easily deal with the frequent changes of name as government departments were reorganised and renamed. The demand for customised central control leads to

vast IT projects that run years late and millions over budget, or just never work at all. Problems providing oﬃcials with working email systems led to them using private accounts instead, and eventually the Cameron government more or less gave up; routine email in the Cabinet Oﬃce (the stu↵ below Top Secret) started to use a branded version of G Suite, the paid-for version of Gmail. By the coronavirus pandemic, the cabinet was using Zoom for meetings, despite known insecurities; there did in fact exist a secure videoconferencing system, but as it was classiﬁed, ministers weren’t allowed to take it home.

Crypto War 1 left a signiﬁcant legacy, with both technical and political as- pects. On the technical front, the mandated use of weak cryptography made DVDs easy to rip, made cars easier to steal, made Bluetooth easy to hack, and made millions of building locks easy to defeat – including the building where I work4. The business models of ﬁrms selling hotel door locks have been under- mined as they can no longer lock in their customers to buying their proprietary card stock. As for policy, authoritarian governments such as Russia’s passed harsh crypto control laws; Britain went from a laissez-faire policy under John Major in the mid 1990s to Tony Blair’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act of 2000 which enables the police to demand that I hand over a key or password in my possession, and the Export Control Act of 2002 instructs me to get an export licence if I send any cryptographic software outside Europe that uses keys longer than 56 bits5. I’ll return to export control later.

## Crypto War 2 – Going spotty

The 2013 disclosures by Edward Snowden have led to a resumption, after a fashion, of the crypto wars. In fact, the NSA and its partners never stopped, but just took their ‘crypto enabling’ activities underground. They were not only harvesting everyone’s SMSes and email from the backbone, and getting content from major service providers using warrants at much larger scale than we imag- ined. They were hacking allies, as when GCHQ hacked Belgacom [734] – an amazing story about how one EU member state attacked the critical infrastruc- ture of another, and went on to wiretap the European Commission. Another example was New Zealand’s contribution to the Five Eyes which includes spy- ing on small neighbours such as Samoa, Tonga and French Polynesia [850]. The NSA had lied to Congress, for example about collecting call data records on US citizens. They were bypassing legal controls: GCHQ could get my gmail from Google using Prism, as I’m not a US resident, and we’d always suspected this, but it had always been denied. They were also getting it from major services by covert means – by tapping the communications between Google’s data centres.

4See section 4.3.1 for car theft, section 5.7.2.2 for attacks on Bluetooth and section [?] for attacks on door locks.

5Thankfully, the person who does the exporting is the person who clicks on the link – so if you’re in Iran, you would be a very bad person if you clicked on the link on my website to download the Serpent block cipher. You have been warned!

In 2015, a UK court ruled that for the UK to obtain mass surveillance data on UK residents via the USA had been unlawful, as it contravened the European Convention on Human Rights [304].

All this had a real e↵ect on behaviour. First, the service providers cleaned up their act; Google had been starting to encrypt its internal network but ac- celerated the program to ensure that the only way to get their users’ data was through the front door, by a warrant. Microsoft and Yahoo followed. Second, most messaging systems o↵ered end-to-end encryption to reassure users (and also to save system operators the cost of complying with warrants). Third, the policy conversation started tackling more realistic problems, such as jurisdic- tion; given that most of the material of interest to the world’s police forces is kept on servers belonging to US companies, who can get access to it, and on what terms? While countries like the UK worked at getting faster access to US data, others went for localisation. India had already insisted that all pri- vate Blackberry users keep their messages on servers in India; China banned Facebook and Google to ensure its residents used Chinese systems instead; and many countries have passed data-localisation laws to ensure that some kinds of personal data are kept within the jurisdiction. Most countries in Africa, for example, require ﬁnancial data to be kept locally; I’ll discuss the European

Union’s data-protection regulation and its interaction with US ﬁrms later.

Although the agencies no longer ask for access to all keys, the escrow ar- guments came back in new forms post-Snowden. GCHQ, along with the FBI, started to argue that providers of messaging services such as WhatsApp and FaceTime should be compelled to build in a facility whereby law enforcement can be added as a silent conference-call party (so-called ‘ghost users’) when they get a warrant. FBI Director James Comey led the charge along with GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan, who accused Facebook in 2014 of helping terrorism [1566] by requiring him to go through the procedures of the UK/USA Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty to get information. Facebook’s response was that they were just obeying US and EU privacy laws; the relevant service centre was in Ireland, not the UK, so Hannigan couldn’t simply use UK law to force them to help him. He and Comey were supported by UK Prime Minister David Cameron.

My cryptographer colleagues and I reconvened to write an update of our analysis, ‘Keys Under Doormats’, which explains how many of the problems with 1990s key escrow proposals simply come back in a new form if you man- date government access to data instead of to keys [5]. The e↵ects if anything are likely to be worse, as we are now much more dependent on the Internet than in the 1990s. It would be a bad thing if governments were to force designers to abandon security mechanisms such as forward secrecy, authenticated encryp- tion and strict transport security that have become widespread in the meantime; and because of the many interactions between systems that have been secured in di↵erent ways, the risk of mandated vulnerabilities having serious and unan-

ticipated side-e↵ects is now much greater. Building in exceptional access also

creates huge targets in the wiretapping systems themselves, and extra complex- ity that can lead to further security failures. Indeed, the 2010 Chinese hack of Google’s wiretapping system suggests that even the best-run companies cannot keep out state actors all the time – and that hack was aimed at the systems

Google built to service wiretaps. The Chinese obviously wanted to know which of their agents in the USA was under suspicion. There are huge problems around jurisdiction. If Facebook carries a WhatsApp message from a user in France to a user in Argentina, do only these two governments get access, or does the NSA demand it too? Since Snowden, everyone knows they will, and nobody believes they could keep such a capability under control. Any demand for such systems raises a lot of questions of both law and engineering, some of which we spelled out in our analysis [5].

The next move came in 2016 when the FBI tried to force Apple to produce an operating system ‘upgrade’ for the iPhone that would unlock it, using as their test case a locked iPhone that had been used in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino. Apple’s Tim Cook had resisted pressure to install back doors before, and saw the case as a serious threat to Apple users’ privacy and to the Apple brand; he fought the FBI in court [1006]. Comey testiﬁed that the agency would not be able to get at such vital information without assistance from Apple. The case divided American opinion, with Republicans supporting the FBI (and candidate Trump, as he then was, calling for a boycott of Apple) while most Democrats, and the tech industry, supported Tim Cook. My colleague Sergei Skorobogatov worked out how to defeat the iPhone PIN retry counter [1777], as I discussed in 3.4.8.3. As for the FBI, they bought a commercial iPhone exploit from an Israeli ﬁrm, Cellebrite, and dropped the case.

In the chaos following the Brexit referendum, the new UK Prime Minister Theresa May (who as home secretary had been a surveillance hawk) pushed the Investigatory Powers Act through UK parliament. This law grants ministers the power to order any company to do anything physically possible to facilitate signals intelligence collection, and to keep quiet about it forever. In 2018, two senior GCHQ mathematicians, Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson, suggested how government access to messaging services might work [1153]; their idea was that when GCHQ presented Facebook with a warrant, they would add a GCHQ pub- lic key quietly to the target’s keyring, so that they’d become a silent conference party to all his calls. My colleague Bruce Schneier responded in detail [1678]:

the fact that such an approach would work with some systems (it would work with WhatsApp but not with Signal) is actually a bug that’s being ﬁxed by better transparency mechanisms, and mandating it would prevent the bugﬁx. In any case, such an access power is excessive; intelligence agencies should not have it because of their history of abusing such access, or simply losing it. In

section 2.2.3 I described how the NSA tool EternalBlue was stolen and used by the Russians against Ukraine in the NotPetya worm, causing billions of dollars of collateral damage to US ﬁrms in 2016; by 2019 it was being used in ran- somware that shut down email and other services in the city of Baltimore, just up the road from the NSA [1529].

In 2019, Mark Zuckerberg announced that Facebook will shift its emphasis from public posts to emphemeral, end-to-end encrypted messaging by unifying WhatsApp with Instagram and Messenger [1439]. Some cynics suggested that this would make it easier to hide fake news and hate speech from both the media and the law, and cut the costs of moderation as well as the PR damage from scandals; others that it was to prevent either the EU or the US government from ordering the breakup of the company [1911, 1931]. In October, the US

Attorney General joined the UK Home Secretary and the Australian Minister for Home A↵airs in asking Zuck to think again, highlighting the risk of ‘a single platform that would combine inaccessible messaging services with open proﬁles, providing unique routes for prospective o↵enders to identify and groom our children’. Time will tell whether Zuck can do abuse detection using metadata alone; we’ll consider moderation and other forms of censorship below.

## Export control

One spillover from the crypto wars was the imposition of more uniform export controls than before, particularly in Europe; here’s a quick summary. Interna- tional arms control agreements (COCOM and Wassenaar) bind most govern- ments to implement export controls on cryptographic equipment, and the latter is implemented in the European Union by an EU regulation compelling Member States to control and license the export of *dual-use goods* – goods which have both civilian and military uses. Cryptanalytic products fall under the military regime, whereas software that just uses cryptography for protection falls under dual-use.

National policy used to vary more, and during the 1990s European re- searchers like me could write crypto software and publish it on our web pages, while our US colleagues were prevented from doing that by the US Interna- tional Traﬃcking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). US ﬁrms complained and in 1997, Vice-President Al Gore persuaded the incoming British Prime Minister Tony Blair to extend export control to intangibles. He initially tried to sell this to the UK parliament, but the relevant committees weren’t keen, so Blair had it pushed through as an EU regulation and his ministers then happily told us “Our hands are tied – we have to do this as it’s EU law”. (Such policy laundering, as it’s called, has been endemic in Europe and is one of the factors that fuelled the movement to get Britain to leave the EU.)

Tens of thousands of academics and small software companies are now break- ing the law without knowing it by exporting products (or even by giving away software) containing crypto with keys longer than 56 bits. There are open gen- eral export licenses (OGELs) that you can use, but you have to understand the mechanisms and ﬁle the paperwork. And it’s not just cryptography. For example, in our hardware tamper-resistance research we use an ion beam work- station, which is like an electron microscope only it ﬁres metal ions at the target rather than electrons, so you can modify a chip by cutting tracks and adding new ones. Like cryptography, this is on the dual-use list. In the old days, we had to get an export licence when we bought one, and another seven years later when we threw it in a skip. Now, we’re in theory supposed to get a licence whenever we share a script we’ve written for the machine with someone who isn’t an EU citizen or resident. The practical outcome is that tens of thousands of scientists happily break the law – which can make them vulnerable to pres- sure from the agencies. The number has surely shot up now that the pandemic has led to many people working from home, often from overseas, and that the UK has left the EU. How I deal with such issues personally is to be very careful that all such software and scripts are on my website, which enables me to use a public-domain exemption, and rely on the fact that it’s the person who clicks

on the link who performs the export.

The civil war in Syria exposed the dark side of export control in 2012. People from several digital rights NGOs lobbied the UK government, asking it to use export control law to prevent a UK company selling bulk surveillance equipment to the Assad government. UK NGOs argued that mass surveillance equipment should not just be on the dual-use list but the military list, that the intelligence community includes bulk collection in ‘cryptanalysis’ which is military; and its sale to a government involved in wholesale abuses was against human-rights law. The lady from GCHQ fought this tooth and nail; the sales were going through an arms dealer in Dubai so how could the vendor be sure of the desti- nation; they came from a German subsidiary so it was the Germans’ problem; Wassennaar was a forum for military issues rather than human rights ones; and even that mass surveillance is also used for marketing. The real issue was that GCHQ feared that UK troops would end up in Syria and they were determined that if President Assad was going to have black boxes on his network, they should be British black boxes rather than Ukrainian ones. Eventually the Ger- man chancellor Angela Merkel admitted in public that she had decided to allow surveillance equipment to be sold to Syria, and that it was one of the hardest decisions she’d taken. In August 2013, the UK Parliament voted against autho- rising military action in Syria, and President Obama decided not to go it alone. In due course, the export control issue was referred to European agencies and quietly forgotten.

One unpleasant side-e↵ect of this ﬁght lingers: a system of vetting foreign students at UK universities. GCHQ was opposed to Chinese students studying cryptography, and the security service briefed that an Iraqi woman who’d got a PhD in Britain had gone on to direct part of Saddam Hussein’s alleged research programme into weapons of mass destruction. Briefers raised a scare about people from countries on the terrorist list, such as Sudan, being allowed to study medicine. Tony Minson, a professor of virology and Cambridge colleague, argued that nature can do much nastier things than people can, and if there were no competent public-health people in Khartoum when something like Ebola came down the Nile, we’d regret it. He was of course ignored. We got an ‘Academic Technology Approval Scheme’, and graduate students coming to the UK have to get an ‘ATAS clearance’ to get a visa.

# Terrorism

Talk about terrorism has driven a lot of policy around surveillance and privacy, especially since 9/11. The tide is starting to recede, but it’s still a card that politicians play when they want to scare us, and the media often play along. There has been talk of cyber-terrorism; that basically hasn’t happened, but there are real concerns about encrypted chat services and social media being used to groom and recruit young people to criminal organisations ranging from right-wing hate groups to Islamic State. So what can we say about terrorism?

Political violence is nothing new; anthropologists have found that tribal war- fare was endemic among early humans, as indeed it is among chimpanzees [1132]. Terror has long been used to cow subject populations – by the Maya, by the

Inca, by William the Conqueror. Terrorism of the ‘modern’ sort also goes back centuries. Guy Fawkes tried to blow up Britain’s Houses of Parliament in 1605; his successors, the Irish Republican Army, ran a number of campaigns against the UK. In the latest, from 1969–97, some three thousand people died, and the IRA even blew up a hotel where the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was staying for a party conference, killing several of her colleagues. During the Cold War, the Russians supported not just the IRA but the Baader Meinhof Gang in Germany and many others; the West armed and supported jihadists ﬁghting the Russians in Afghanistan. Some terrorists, like Baader and Meinhof, ended up in jail, while others – such as the IRA leaders Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, the Irgun leader Menachim Begin, the French resistance leader Charles de Gaulle and the African anti-colonial leaders Jomo Kenyatta, Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela – ended up in oﬃce.

What general lessons can be drawn from this history? Well, there’s good news and bad news.

## Causes of political violence

The biggest piece of good news is that the trend in terrorist violence has been steadily downward [1350]. There were many insurgencies in the 1960s and 70s, some ethnic, some anti-colonial, and some ideological. Many were ﬁnanced by the Soviet Union or its allies as proxy conﬂicts in the Cold War, although a handful (notably the Nicaraguan Contras and the resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan) were ﬁnanced by the West. The end of the Cold War removed the motive and the money.

The second (and related) point is that the causes of civil conﬂict are partly economic. An inﬂuential study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoe✏er for the World Bank looked at wars from 1960-1999 to see whether they were caused largely by grievances (such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and

religious divisions), or by greed (some rebellions are more economically viable than others) [459]. The world has plenty of grievances, but the data show that the incidence of rebellion was more determined by whether it could be sustained. (Indeed, Cicero said two thousand years ago that “Endless money forms the sinews of war.”) Thus the IRA campaign got signiﬁcant support from the Soviet bloc and Libya; the Tamil revolt in Sri Lanka was sustained by funds

from ethnic Tamils in the USA and India; and Al-Qaida was ﬁnanced by rich donors in the Gulf states. So we know one way to tackle an insurgency: cut o↵ their money supply. It’s not entirely that simple, of course; the loss of Soviet support for the ANC (and Angola and Mozambique) reduced the pressure on

the last white government of South Africa but gave them the space to do a historic peace deal with Nelson Mandela.

## The psychology of political violence

Less encouraging ﬁndings come from scholars of psychology, politics and the media. Psychology gives a lot of insight into the underlying mechanisms. I mentioned the a↵ect heuristic in Section 3.2.5: where people rely on a↵ect, or

emotion, calculations of probability tend to be disregarded. The prospect of a happy event, such as winning the lottery, will blind most people to the long odds and the low expected return; similarly, a dreadful event, such as a terrorist attack, will make most people disregard the fact that such events are exceedingly rare [1787]. Most of the Americans who died as a result of 9/11 probably did

so since then in car crashes, after deciding to drive rather than ﬂy: the shift from ﬂying to driving led to about 1,000 extra fatalities in the following three months, and about 500 a year since then [1677].

There are other e↵ects at the border between psychology and culture. A study of the psychology of terror by Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon and Je↵ Greenberg looked at how people cope with the fear of death [1564]. They got 22 municipal court judges in Tucson, Arizona, to participate in an experiment in which they were asked to set bail for a drug-addicted prostitute. They were all given a personality questionnaire ﬁrst, in which half were asked questions such as ‘Please brieﬂy describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” to remind them that we all die one day. The judges for whom mortality had been made salient set an average bail of $455 while the control group set an average bond of $50 – a huge e↵ect for such an experiment. Further experiments showed that the mortality-salience group had not just become mean: they were

also prepared to give larger rewards to citizens who performed some public act. It turns out that when you remind people of death, it makes them adhere more strongly to their cultural norms and defend their worldview more vigorously. This helps explain why cyber-terrorism just hasn’t happened. Hacking a couple of substations and turning o↵ a town’s electricity can be mighty inconvenient,

but it just doesn’t have the same emotional e↵ect as a bleeding child. The media analysis conﬁrms this; coverage is strongly correlated with fatalities, and

increases by 46% for each extra dead body [1026].

The 9/11 attacks brought mortality to the forefront of people’s minds, and were also an assault on symbols of national and cultural pride. It was natu- ral that the response included religion (the highest level of church attendance since the 1950s), patriotism (in the form of a high approval rating for the Pres- ident), and for some people bigotry too. It was natural that, as the memory of the attacks receded, society would repolarise because of divergent core values. Curiously, when they’re reminded that they’re mortal, both conservatives and

liberals take a more polarised view of an anti-American essay written by a foreign student – except in experiments where they are ﬁrst reminded of the Constitu- tion, in which case conservatives defend the student’s right to free speech even more vigorously than liberals do [1564].

So a national leader trying to keep a country together following an attack should constantly remind people what they’re ﬁghting for. This is what the best leaders do, from Churchill’s radio broadcasts to Roosevelt’s ﬁreside chats. In more recent years, some countries have taken a bipartisan approach to terrorism

– as when Germany faced the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and Britain the IRA. In others, politicians have given in to the temptation to use fearmongering to get re-elected.

A study by the University of Alabama of over 200,000 articles on the 136 di↵erent attacks in the USA between 2005 and 2016 showed that attacks by Mus- lims get 357% more news coverage than other terrorist attacks [1026]. Islamic

extremists were labelled terrorists 78.4% of the time, whereas far-right extrem- ists were identiﬁed as terrorists only 23.6% of the time. Political leadership does matter. Perhaps the best recent response was that of New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to the Christchurch shooting; she not only described it immediately as terrorism but refused to name the shooter. On the other hand, the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting was simply described as a ‘wicked act of mass murder’ by the US President. In each case, the media followed [1335].

What are the dynamics here, and which approaches work best?

## The role of institutions

There’s a whole academic subject – *public-choice economics* – devoted to ex- plaining why governments act the way they do, and for which one of its founders James Buchanan won the Nobel prize in 1986. As he put it in his prize lecture, “Economists should cease pro↵ering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure within which political decisions are made.” Much government behaviour is explained by the incentives facing individual public-sector decision makers. It’s natural for oﬃcials to build

empires as they’re ranked by their span of control rather than by the proﬁts

they generate. Similarly, politicians maximise their chances of reelection rather than the abstract welfare of the public. Understanding their decisions requires methodological individualism – analysis of the incentives facing individual pres- idents, congressmen, generals, police chiefs and newspaper editors, rather than the potential gains or losses of a nation. We know it’s prudent to design in- stitutions so that their leaders’ incentives are aligned with its goals – we give company managers stock options to make them act like shareholders. But this is harder in a polity. What’s the equivalent for presidents and prime ministers?

How is the national interest even to be deﬁned?

Public-choice scholars argue that both markets and politics are instruments of exchange. In the former we seek to optimise our utility individually, while in the latter we do the same but using collective actions to achieve goals that we cannot attain in markets because of externalities or other failures. The politi- cal process in turn is thus prone to speciﬁc types of failure. Intergenerational bargaining is hard: it’s easy for politicians to borrow money to buy votes now, and leave the bill with the next generation, who can’t vote yet. But then why do some countries have much worse public debt than others? The short answer is that institutions matter. Political results depend critically on the rules that constrain political action.

Although public-choice economics emerged in response to problems in public ﬁnance in the 1960s, it has some clear lessons. Constitutions matter, as they set the ground rules of the political game. So do administrative structures, as oﬃcials are self-interested agents too. In the UK, for example, the initial response to 9/11 was to increase the budget for the security service; but this hundred million dollars or so didn’t o↵er real pork to the security-industrial complex. So all the pet projects got dusted o↵, and the political beauty contest was won by a national ID card, a grandiose project that in its original form would have cost £20 billion [1182]. Washington insiders remarked that a similar dynamic was involved in the decision to invade Iraq: although the 2001 invasion

of Afghanistan had been successful, it had not given much of a role to the Pentagon barons who’d spent careers assembling ﬂeets of tanks, capital ships and ﬁghter-bombers, or much of a payo↵ to the defense industry either. Indeed, USAF Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski retired at the start of the Iraq war, described how intelligence assessments were politically manipulated, and later ran for

Congress [1113]. Similar things were said in the aftermath of World War 1, which was blamed on the ‘merchants of death’.

An institution of particular concern must be the media, whether the old- fashioned press or the social media that are taking over some of their functions. ‘If it bleeds, it leads’, as the saying goes; bad news sells more papers than good. The self-interest of media owners combines with that of politicians who want to get re-elected, oﬃcials who want to build empires, and vendors who want to sell

security stu↵. They pick up on, and amplify, the temporary blip in patriotism

and the need for heroes that terrorist attacks naturally instil. Fearmongering gets politicians on the front page and helps them control the agenda. And the recommender algorithms of many social media platforms learn to promote fear and outrage, as they increase the time people spend on the platform and the number of ads they click on.

## The democratic response

Yet people also learn over time. The worldwide reaction to 9/11 was sharp; it was more muted four years later, in July 2005, when four suicide bombers killed 52 people on London’s public transport and injured about 700. The initial response of the public was gritty resignation: ‘Oh, well, we knew something like this was going to happen – bad luck if you were there, but life goes on.’6

And as populations learn, so might political elites. John Mueller has written a history of the attitudes to terrorism of successive US administrations [1350]. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford ignored terrorism. President Carter made a big deal of the Iran hostage crisis, and like 9/11 it gave him a huge boost in the polls at the beginning, but later it ended his presidency. His Secretary of State Cyrus Vance later admitted they should have played down the crisis rather than giving undeserved credibility to the Iranian ‘students’ who’d kidnapped US diplomats. President Reagan mostly ignored provocations, but succumbed to temptation over the Lebanese hostages and shipped arms to Iran to secure their release. However, once he’d distanced himself from this error, his ratings recovered quickly. In America, people got fed up with President Bush’s fear-based policies and elected President Obama whose line was “9/11 is not a way to scare up votes but a challenge that should unite America and the world against the common threats of the 21st century”. Much the same happened in the UK, where Margaret Thatcher was re-elected twice after treating terrorists

as common criminals. Later, Tony Blair played the fear game, and his departure from oﬃce was met with a sigh of relief; his successor Gordon Brown forbade ministers from using the phrase ‘war on terror’, and David Cameron’s govern- ment continued that. Mature voters prefer politicians who stand up to terrorists

6The press went along with this for a couple of days: then there was an explosion of fearmongering. It seems that ministers needed a day or two of meetings to sort out their shopping lists and decide what they would try to shake out of Parliament.

rather than using them as props in their re-election campaigns.

The harshest teacher may be the coronavirus. For years, a pandemic has been at the top of Britain’s risk register, yet far less was spent preparing for one than on anti-terrorist measures, many of which were ostentatious rather than

e↵ective. This misallocation of resources looks set to cost far more of us our lives than any terrorist could have dreamed of. The US and UK governments justiﬁed torture in the 2000s by talking of an al-Qaida cell stealing a nuclear bomb and detonating it in New York or London. Yet a 10 kT atomic demolition munition set o↵ in a major city might cost 50–100,000 lives, compared with the 50–100 million who died in the 1918–19 pandemic. The rhetoric of terror pu↵ed up the security agencies at the expense of public health, predisposing governments in America, Europe, India and Africa to disregard the lesson of SARS in 2003 – unlike the governments of China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.

# Censorship

I wrote in the ﬁrst edition that “the 1990s debate on crypto policy is likely to be a test run for an even bigger battle, which will be over anonymity, censorship and copyright.” By the second edition, I noted that “copyright law has largely stabilised”, and it was during 2008 that power over content distribution shifted from the music majors and Hollywood to tech ﬁrms like Apple and Amazon. I also noted that “censorship has become a much bigger issue over the past few years”. Now, a decade later, censorship is front and centre. It has two faces: state censorship, and content ﬁltering by service companies.

Rulers have long censored books, although the invention of the printing press made their job a whole lot harder. When John Wycli↵e translated the Bible into English in 1380–1, the Lollard movement he started was suppressed along with the Peasants’ Revolt. But when William Tyndale had another go in 1524–5, printing let him spread the word so widely that the princes and bishops could not suppress it. They had him burned at the stake, but by then over 50,000 copies of the New Testament had been printed, and the Reformation was under way. After that upset, printers were closely licensed and controlled; things only eased up in the eighteenth century.

Censorship nowadays is done for a variety of motives. Most countries block images of child sex abuse; during the 1990s, as the dotcom boom got underway, governments started looking for some handle on the Internet, and a view arose that images of child sex abuse were about the one thing that all states could agree should be banned. In due course the 2004 Cybercrime Convention obliged signatory states to ban sexual images of under-18s. Most governments go further and block some kinds of hate speech. Britain bans websites that ‘radicalise’ young people by glorifying terrorism. Finally, censorship is sometimes imposed by the courts.

The invention of the Internet has made the censors’ job easier in some ways and harder in others. It’s easier for the authorities to order changes in material that not many people care about: for example, courts that ﬁnd a newspaper guilty of libel order the o↵ending material to be removed. Changing the histor-

ical record wasn’t possible when it consisted of physical copies in libraries, and the centralisation of human knowledge in the servers of a small number of ﬁrms

– from Amazon’s e-book system to the servers of the major news organisations –

takes us, in some sense, back to the 15th century. It’s also easier for the author- ities to observe the transmission of disapproved material, as they can monitor electronic communications more easily than physical packages. On the other hand, nowadays everyone can be a publisher; much of the really unpleasant material online comes from millions of individuals posting sort-of anonymously to social media, to the comment pages of newspapers, and to individuals whom they wish to harass and intimidate. Censors have learned to harness this. While a decade ago China had tens of thousands of people who took down dissident speech, now they have millions of citizen volunteers who drown it out. Once,

speech was scarce, and the censors tried to silence the speaker; now it’s the listener’s attention that’s scarce, and so di↵erent tactics work.

To tease out the issues, let’s look at some contexts.

## Censorship by authoritarian regimes

When I wrote the second edition of this book, I was cautiously optimistic that the government of China would fail in its attempts to censor all online content. However the authorities there have become steadily more e↵ective at suppressing any forms of organisation and human solidarity outside of party control.

By 2006, observers noted that online discussion of local news events had led to the emergence of ‘public opinion’ that for the ﬁrst time was not in thrall to media managers [1470]. China had 137 million Internet users then, including a quarter of the population in the big cities, and ‘the Great Firewall of China’ was already a complex system of controls giving defence in depth against a range of material, from pornography to religious material to political dissent [1469]. The defences work at three levels.

First, there are the perimeter defences. China’s border routers ﬁlter on IP addresses to block access to known ‘bad’ sites like the Voice of America and the BBC; they also use DNS cache poisoning. Deep packet inspection at the TCP level is used to identify emails and web pages containing forbidden words such as ‘Falun Gong’; such connections are torn down. Ten years ago, much

of the work was done at this level. Nowadays, since most traﬃc is encrypted, that’s not so easy. In 2020, the ﬁrewall started dropping TLS 1.3 traﬃc using *Encrypted Server Name Indication* (ESNI) as this stops the censor telling which subdomain the traﬃc’s going to; this amounted to over 30% of traﬃc by the beginning of July [433].

Second, there are application-level defences, which now do much of the work. Nowadays some services are blocked and some aren’t, depending on whether the service provider is prepared to help the regime with both surveillance and censorship. Google and Facebook are largely blocked; China has promoted Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu instead. Now that the borders that matter most are those of ﬁrms rather than of nations, the Chinese government has aligned its industrial policy with its politics. This is the big change; we never believed ten years ago that China would build an entire ecosystem of Chinese-owned

online service providers to keep western inﬂuence at bay. Language provides one barrier, but there are strong technical barriers too: the perimeter defences now focus on blocking Tor and VPNs that could be used by Chinese residents to use non-approved services.

Third, there are social defences. There were already 30,000 online police a decade ago; now many more citizens have been engaged in the process, and rather than trying to block all dissident speech the strategy is to swamp it. Loyal citizens are expected to post lots of pro-regime comments and to ﬂame anybody who criticises authority, whether local or national. A social credit system gives people positive points for such pro-social behaviour, while they can lose points for anything considered antisocial. Online monitoring is being integrated with the monitoring of physical space, such as by CCTV cameras with face recog- nition and emotion recognition – which is particularly aggressive in areas with rebellious minority populations, such as the Tibetans and Uighurs. Since 2014, a system in Sinkiang for ‘re-education’ has pioneered a fusion of techniques from the western ‘war on terror’ and Maoist social control, leading to the internment

of hundreds of thousands of Muslims on the basis of a scoring system whose inputs include whether a suspect prays regularly or has a VPN on their phone. The U.S. Congress has denounced this regime for ‘crimes against humanity’: dozens of the contractor companies have been placed on the sanctions list [359].

So China appears to be winning the censorship battle, using populist but authoritarian techniques. Russia’s Internet is fairly open, and although the government had an ally take over the main social network, and has organised armies of trolls to shout down its opponents, the opposition politician Alexei Navalny has his own YouTube channel with millions of viewers, and attempts to censor Telegram have been met with street protests. Putin has fought back with a ‘digital sovereignty’ law enabling him to order ISPs to install surveillance and censorship equipment.

The Arab Spring has also been signiﬁcant. This series of uprisings started in Tunisia in December 2010 after a street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on ﬁre after an oﬃcial conﬁscated his wares and humiliated him. Protests were organised using Facebook and other social media, leading to the downfall of the government, and spreading to neighbouring countries too. The government of Egypt also fell, along with those of Libya and the Yemen; in Egypt’s case a Google employee, Wael Ghonim, turned Internet activist after the police beat a man to death in Alexandria on suspicion that he had video evidence of their involvement in a drug deal. The government of Syria almost fell, but fought back in a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions. A number of other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, su↵ered signiﬁcant unrest and cracked down. As I write in 2020, only Tunisia has managed the transition to democracy. In Egypt, one military dictator has been replaced by another; Libya is in chaos, and Yemen, like Syria, is racked by war. The lesson drawn by the world’s autocrats is that, to stay in power, they’d better study the methods used by China. Arab countries do censor the Internet (as do most of the less- developed countries) but their infrastructure is still fairly easily defeated using VPNs or Tor. They also buy in kit for both bulk surveillance and targeted work; for a description of how the UAE hired US mercenaries to set up an equivalent of the NSA, see Bing and Schectman [247].

To what extent was the Arab Spring a function of technology, and to what extent was this just marketing hype put out in 2011 by companies like Facebook and Google while things seemed to be going well? It’s unclear. Some of the populations that rose up made little use of the Internet, particularly those of Libya and the Yemen; on the other hand, a revolt in Burma in 2007 was catalysed by the Internet, even though only 1% of the population had access [1471]. In the Arab world, the Qatari TV station Al-Jazeera may have done more work than the Internet, by showing news videos of uprisings elsewhere in the region.

## Filtering, hate speech and radicalisation

Democracies’ laws on hate speech vary widely. At one end, the USA has con- stitutional protection for free speech; so do France and Germany. But inter- pretations di↵er. France and Germany both prohibit the sale of Nazi memo- rabilia, and hate speech (‘Volksverhetzung’) has been a crime in Germany for decades. In January 2018 the authorities started enforcing it against online ser- vice providers, with the threat of a ﬁne of e50m if any service provider with more than 2m customers doesn’t take down any such material within 24 hours. Whatever the service companies say about the cost of taking down bad stu↵, the German example shows they can do it when they have to. Many countries now ban terrorist material and extreme violence, the deﬁnition of which is never straightforward. It might seem a good thing to ban not just beheading videos but all videos of murder, such as drug gangs shooting a customer who didn’t pay his debts. But it gets complex quickly. Platforms that enforce such a policy end up deleting evidence, both of local killings and of human-rights violations overseas.

Already much of the material you put online gets ﬁltered automatically to look for material that’s forbidden by local laws, or by a platform’s terms of service. Facebook’s former CISO Alex Stamos described the tension between privacy and censorship as a spectrum: people expect end-to-end encrypted chat such as WhatsApp to be private rather than censored, and broadcast media to be censored rather than private, with the diﬃcult stu↵ in the middle, like Facebook groups. By now, most social media are censored. The platforms vary widely; Facebook is perhaps the tightest, and bans even nudity7; though it is much more forgiving of hate speech from President Trump than from others, and in return appears to receive much less attention on the antitrust front [1790]. Au- thoritarian countries are becoming more aggressive about forcing service ﬁrms to block content they deem to be illegal; for example, Facebook’s service was slowed to a crawl in Vietnam in early 2020 until the company agreed to suppress dissent [1506].

Behind the AI systems that try to spot forbidden content are thousands of content moderators. Filtering is expensive, and the costs are not just ﬁnan- cial, but human; we’ve seen an increasing number of news articles about the psychological toll on sta↵ who have to spend all day looking at videos of gang murders and terrorist beheadings, animal cruelty, child abuse, and other un-

7Facebook bans photos of female nipples but not male ones, so dozens of naked women demonstrated in 2019 in New York holding pictures of men’s nipples over their own; men and women demonstrated with pictures of female nipples [616].

pleasantness [1438]. Many moderators are in less developed countries; just as we dump a lot of unpleasant refuse there, we also dump a lot of the Internet’s nastiest trash [414]. It’s also problematic to outsource censorship to large ser- vice monopolies. They act in a quasi-judicial manner, regulating the speech of billions of people but without the transparency and due process we expect of government decisions. The world sees them allowing abuse by the rich and powerful while ignoring the weak. Perhaps it was inevitable that ﬁrms would snuggle up to power and then try to direct political speech; this has become a factor in the backlash against the whole tech sector.

One focus of debate is section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) which states that ‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’ so platforms cannot be held liable

for bad stu↵ provided by users; it also left platforms free to remove anything ‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, ﬁlthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.’ When it passed the CDA, Congress was concerned that ﬁrms that moderated content could be treated as publishers and held liable for all of it (including copyright infringement and libel) while ﬁrms that didn’t would be treated as distributors and escape liability. How could we get a civil internet without killing innovation? Section 230 made ﬁrms like YouTube and Facebook possible, but protected sites whose business model is based on revenge porn, defamation, or getting a cut of illegal gun sales [1419]. It also enabled service ﬁrms to acquire some of the powers of states. Back then, the Internet had 10-20m users, mostly geeks; now most human activity is online, and it’s not sustainable for a handful of American ﬁrms to act as censor, prosecutor and judge for 200-odd countries. As a result the CDA, and similar laws elsewhere, are starting to be trimmed: in the USA in 2018 with laws on sex traﬃcking and in Europe with a 2019 law on copyright [1598]. The tensions can only get worse.

When making laws to restrict speech, it’s a good idea to stop and look at the historical context. Tim Wu’s ‘The attention merchants’ [2050] is a history of propaganda since the 1830s when the ﬁrst mass-market newspapers appeared, stu↵ed with grisly crime reports and adverts for patent medicines; this gave

politicians their ﬁrst industrial mass-market channel. Radio followed, and was

used skilfully by Hitler. TV was next, and its nature was shaped by advertising; people invented quiz shows, soaps and much else to grab eyeballs. A second useful perspective is Yochai Benkler’s ‘Network propaganda’ which analyses the 2016 US election campaign. He traces the history of political polarisation and argues that the root cause of the outcome wasn’t technology or Russian inter- ference so much as the asymmetric media systems of right and left that have developed over the past 20 years; the left and centre-right are fact-based while the right is a propaganda feedback loop [227]. A third perspective is the cri- tique of recommender systems by former Googler Tristan Harris: the platforms’ algorithms learn that to maximise the time people spend on site, they should be fed articles that stoke fear, anxiety and outrage.

The reactions of governments to fake news are mostly ine↵ective. The most capable may be Finland, which has been a target of Russian propaganda since Tsarist times. Its government has been promoting critical thinking and me- dia literacy in schools and elsewhere since 2014, making it every citizen’s job

to spot and counter information that’s designed to sow division. In Britain we have laws designed to please tabloid newspapers rather than to push back against them. Schoolteachers and university professors are supposed to report students who seem at risk of being radicalised, and have procedures to ﬁgure out whether seminars or other talks could radicalise them; there are also laws against online material that might lead them astray. If such an approach were applied consistently it might lead to banning much of the literature produced or funded by religious institutions from Saudi Arabia [1263], but action against our largest arms export customer isn’t going to happen anytime soon. White supremacists are at least as much of a threat, having murdered a member of the UK parliament during the Brexit campaign; but our government is much less keen on cracking down on them, and the people who broke the law by spend-

ing too much money on that campaign (including Russian money) did not end up in jail, but at the heart of government. In general, Internet censorship lets the government claim it’s doing something, but doesn’t really work well, and undermines whatever our diplomats might say about freedom of speech to the world’s despots. I’d prefer to enforce existing laws on incitement to murder (and campaign ﬁnance, leave other political material in the open, let the police mon-

itor the traﬃc to the worst of the sites, and train them to use the existing laws

better [642]. In the longer term, the key is education, as Finland has shown.

As for targeting Muslim students, this runs directly against the criminologi- cal evidence. The few UK students who’ve signed up to extremist organisations have been those who experienced lack of respect socially, perhaps being rejected by their peers, were searching for identity but couldn’t ﬁnd it in the religion of

their parents – then fell in with small groups of other disa↵ected youngsters. They came under the inﬂuence of radical preachers, who o↵ered ideals, com-

munity, kinship, caring and brotherhood. The radicalisation of white boys into white supremacist groups is not hugely di↵erent. Research by Max Abrahms also shows that terrorists mostly joined their movement in a search for social sol- idarity; that’s why they recruit from lonely young men rather than from among political activists. Their groups become institutions to which members cleave, rather than agents of change; that’s why they can respond to sensible peace o↵ers with increased violence, and indulge in fratricidal conﬂict with similar groups [6]. In fact, as Lydia Wilson pointed out after interviewing large num- bers of young people who’d gone to Syria to join Daesh and ended up in Kurdish

jails, the process whereby young men (and occasionally women) ﬁnd their iden- tity by joining terror groups or crime gangs is no di↵erent from ﬁnding identity by joining religions, sports clubs or dance bands [2022]. Zo¨e Quinn’s more re- cent experience of angry online mobs during the Gamergate drama, which we

discussed in section 2.5.1, draws much the same conclusion [1567]. The people who join extreme organisations in search of social solidarity need to think of themselves as the good guys; you need to undermine that, and you can’t do it by excluding them.

For all these reasons, it is unwise to model terrorist groups as rational eco- nomic actors, and just as unwise to try to prevent radicalisation on similar as- sumptions. The best approach is to have an environment that doesn’t exclude people – one in which students get to know others from di↵erent backgrounds on the staircase in their residence, in small teaching groups, and in project groups

– and with hundreds of sports and student societies to choose from, so everyone

can ﬁnd a gang to belong to. That’s how great universities have always worked anyway.

# Forensics and Rules of Evidence

Our last main policing topic is how information can be recovered from comput- ers, mobile phones and other electronic devices for use in evidence. This has been getting more problematic over the past twenty years because of ﬁrst, the sheer volumes of data; and second, the fact that while much of it is seized from platforms such as mobile phones and laptops, more and more of it is held on cloud services that require paperwork and often quite substantial delays. The rising costs and operational diﬃculties lead to more selective law enforcement, with whole categories of online harms where states rarely intervene. As a result, many bad people, from cybercriminals to creeps, bullies and extremists, operate online with near-total impunity.

## Forensics

Computer forensics has been a growing problem for the police since at least the 1980s; by the early 2000s both the facilities and the sta↵ training were hopelessly behind. The move of everything online during the 2010s has made matters still worse. When the police raid even a small-time drug dealer nowadays, they can get half-a-dozen mobile phones, several laptops, and gadgets such as a navigator or a Fitbit that hold his location history. The suspect may also have dozens of accounts for webmail, social-networking sites and other services. We have all sorts of clever ways of extracting information from the data – for example, you can identify which camera took a picture from the pattern noise of the CCD array [1192], and even use this to ﬁgure out which parts of a photo might have been tampered with.

The use of digital material in evidence depends, however, on both law and economics. Material has to be lawfully collected, whether with a search warrant or equivalent powers; and the forensic oﬃcer has to maintain a *chain of custody*, which means being able to satisfy a court that evidence wasn’t tampered with afterwards. That means using trustworthy tools to make evidential copies of data; to document everything that’s done; and to have means of dealing appro- priately with any private material that’s found (such as privileged lawyer-client emails, or the trade secrets of a suspect’s employer). The traditional approach to computer forensics is described in standard textbooks such as Sammes and Jenkinson [1644].

Since the world moved to smartphones and cloud services, the centre of gravity has shifted to a handful of companies that sell mobile forensics tools to police and intelligence agencies. They supply kiosks to police forces that enable unskilled oﬃcers to download mobile-phone contents, and to use the tokens on them to download data from suspects’ accounts in the cloud. Some police forces are working hard to get the legal issues sorted out (such as Police Scotland, who don’t use ‘cloud forensics’ without a warrant) but many just grab and keep all the data.

At the more sophisticated end of the trade, there’s an arms race between forensics and countermeasures. Police forces used to always turn PCs o↵, so that hard disks could be copied for prosecution and defence lawyers. Phishing gangs exploited this by making their phishing software memory-resident, so that the evidence would self-destruct. And since laptops started to ship with decent encryption, the risk is multiplied. By 2013, when the FBI arrested Ross Ulbricht

– the creator of the Silk Road underground drugs market – one agent’s mission was to put his hand in the laptop to stop Ulbricht closing it, and he already had the right kind of power cord to plug it in [482].

In the old days, people – and small businesses – who got caught up in a police investigation and had their computers seized could wait years to get them back, even if they were just a bystander, or if they were charged but eventually acquitted. Nowadays, people have seizure-proof o↵site backup thanks to cloud services. These services also make life harder for the police where suspects’ material sits on servers overseas. The ﬁght between Facebook and GCHQ I referred to in Section 26.2.8 arose when two terrorists murdered a British soldier, Lee Rigby, near Woolwich barracks in March 2013 by running him over with a car and then stabbing him. While they were at the crime scene, facing o↵ against the police, Facebook fed the police and security services data instantly, but once the two had been shot and were in custody in hospital, requests had to go through the UK/US mutual legal assistance treaty. This involves the police ﬁling forms at the US Embassy in London that are then considered at length in the Department of Justice in Washington. The forms are often sent back as UK police sta↵ don’t understand US law and complete them incorrectly. Even where everything goes right, it can take six weeks for the FBI to serve the paperwork on Facebook in Menlo Park, California, and collect the data. So we found we’d gone from a world in which, after a raid, the police would have your data and you wouldn’t, to one in which you still have your data but the police don’t – unless you cooperate, or unless you’re a serious enough bad guy to be worth the time and attention of diplomats.

Since about 2017, there’s been a third option: cloud forensics. What this means in practice is that your phone is hacked by the police’s forensic kiosk and gives up access tokens to your email, your photos, your Facebook and your other cloud services. Some UK police forces think this is wonderful; they treat the downloaded data as ‘data at rest’ as if it had been found on the phone itself and keep it forever. Others consider that it can only be obtained by consent or with a further warrant. The incentives to grab cloud data are strong, but the mechanisms involved (phone hacking followed by impersonation of the user) are likely to strike most citizens as unfair. And ever more devices are now acquiring

an attached cloud service and an app. Will the police investigate traﬃc o↵ences

in future by seizing the driver’s phone and using it to download the car’s logs from the manufacturer’s server? This is a current policy topic in 2020: for example, the UK privacy regulator called for a statutory code of practice to be developed [958]. As it happens, courts already have some rules about what evidence can be used.

## Admissibility of evidence

When courts were ﬁrst confronted with computer evidence in the 1960s there were many concerns about its reliability. There was not just the engineering issue of whether the data were accurate, but the legal issue of whether computer- generated data were inadmissible as hearsay. Di↵erent legislatures tackled this di↵erently. In the US, most of the law is found in the Federal Rules of Evidence where 803(6) allows computer data to be introduced as records ‘made at or

near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity... unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.’ The UK is similar, and the rules of electronic evidence in the common-law countries (including Canada, Australia, South Africa and Singapore) are analysed by Stephen Mason [1236].

The deﬁnition of ‘writing’ and ‘signature’ is of interest, and varies by juris- diction. In Britain, courts took the view that an email is writing just as a letter is: the essence of a signature is the signer’s intent [2042, 2043]. The US approach was similarly pragmatic. In 2000, Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (‘ESIGN’) Act, which gives legal force to any ‘sound, symbol, or process’ by which a consumer assents to something. So press- ing a telephone keypad (‘press 0 to agree or 9 to terminate this transaction’), clicking a hyper-link to enter a web site, or clicking ‘continue’ on a software installer, the consumer consents to be bound to a contract [669]. This makes click-wrap licenses perfectly valid in America. Nonetheless, Docusign has built a business o↵ering digital signatures as a service for ﬁrms who want something a bit more showy.

In Europe the Electronic Signature Directive, which came into force in 2000, gave special force to an *advanced electronic signature*, which basically means a digital signature generated with a smartcard or hardware security module. Europe’s smartcard industry thought this would earn them lots of money, but it languished for years. In many countries, the risk that a paper check will be forged is borne by the relying party: if someone forges a check on my account, then it’s not my signature, and I have not given the bank my mandate to debit my account; so if they negligently rely on a forged signature and do so, that’s their lookout. However, if I ever accept an advanced electronic signature device, then I become liable to anyone in the world for any signature that appears to have been made by this device, regardless of whether or not I actually made it! This, coupled with the facts that smartcards don’t have a trusted user inter- face and that the PCs which most people would use as an interface are easily subverted, made such electronic signatures unattractive. Following further lob- bying, Europe updated the law with the eIDAS Regulation (910/2014) which tries to improve the incentives for adoption, by requiring all organisations deliv- ering public services to accept electronic signatures since 2018. A number of EU

countries now insist that you use such a signature to ﬁle your taxes, rather than permitting it. There’s a hierarchy whereby a signature can be ‘advanced’ or ‘qualiﬁed’ depending on the certiﬁcation of the technology used, and a qualiﬁed electronic signature must be accepted for any purpose for which a handwrit-

ten signature was previously required. Dozens of signature creation products were duly certiﬁed and brought to market. The assurance mechanisms used

to certify such products are defective in many ways, as I will discuss later in section 28.2.7.2. The European Commission duly made a reference implementa- tion available to help governments get started with verifying all the signatures; in 2019 bugs were discovered in it that would let any citizen impersonate any other [429].

## What goes wrong

Many things can go wrong with police investigations, and the computerised kind are no di↵erent. An old pitfall is relying on evidence extracted from the sys- tems of one party to a dispute, without applying enough scepticism about its dependability. Recall the Munden case described in Section 12.4.3. A man was falsely accused and wrongly convicted of attempted fraud after he complained of unauthorized withdrawals from his bank account. On appeal, his defence team got an order from the court that the bank open its systems to the defence expert as it had done to the prosecution. The bank refused, the bank state- ments were ruled inadmissible and the case collapsed. The same has happened multiple times since then, including two terror cases involving curfew tags which I discussed in section 14.4.

The worst failure of computer evidence of which I’m aware was Operation Ore. After the US Postal Service raided a porn site in Texas, they discovered hundreds of thousands of credit card numbers that they thought had been used to buy child sex abuse images, and some eight thousand of these were from UK cardholders. Some 3,000 homes got raided in the early 2000s, until the police ﬁnally realised that most of the cardholders were probably victims of

card fraud. The vice squad used unskilled sta↵ in their initial analysis of the

seized material, and were slow to learn – because they were ﬁxated on getting porn convictions, because they didn’t have the forensic capacity to process all the seized computers quickly, because they didn’t understand card fraud (they

preferred to leave that to the banks) and because of politics (Prime Minister Tony Blair himself had ordered the raids). So several thousand men had their lives disrupted for months or even years, and the sad story of police bungling and cover-up is told by Duncan Campbell in [375, 376]. For some, the revelation that the police had screwed up came too late; over thirty men, faced with prosecution, killed themselves. At least one of them, Commodore David White, commander of British forces in Gibraltar, appears to have been innocent [886]. The gangsters in Indonesia and Brazil who organised and photographed the child abuse do not seem to have been seriously pursued. America handled this case much better. Some 300,000 US credit card numbers were found on the same servers, but US police forces used the data for intelligence rather than evidence, identifying suspects of concern – such as people working with children

– and quietly investigating them. Over a hundred convictions for actual child abuse followed.

Sometimes systems are deliberately designed to not provide evidence; an example is the policy adopted by Microsoft after embarrassing emails came out during their antitrust battles with the US government in the 1990s. The ﬁrm reacted with a policy that all emails are discarded after a ﬁxed period of time

unless someone takes positive action to save them, and many other ﬁrms followed

suit. Another example is the move by service ﬁrms in the mid-2010s to adopt end-to-end encryption, so they don’t have access to customer message traﬃc and don’t have to employ hundreds of lawyers to deal with requests for it.

The biggest problem with computer forensics, though, has always been sheer lack of money. Despite all the cool tricks that intelligence agencies can use to extract information from computer systems, a county drugs squad often won’t have the budget to do even basic computer forensics except for occasional big cases. They can’t even a↵ord to send every wrap of white powder o↵ to the lab to see if it’s illegal or not. In normal cases, they were only able to use digital material that was easily available, such as copies of messages on the phones of cooperative witnesses, until mobile-phone forensic kiosks came along around 2016–8 and made masses of data available from seized handsets at low marginal costs. Hence the huge pressure to use the kiosks, even before robust legal procedures could be developed. And, of course, the use of forensic tools by regular police oﬃcers with no specialist training raises the risk of future miscarriages of justice. Judicial education is also an issue; few judges understand probability theory, and indeed the UK Court of Appeal has refused to accept analysis of evidence based on Bayes’ theorem. Quite apart from the injustice of a court system that denies mathematics, there’s the practical issue that defendants faced with computer evidence that’s the result of bugs, or simply misrepresented, may have no practical way to prove their innocence.

# Privacy and Data Protection

Privacy and data protection are one subject on which the USA and Europe have taken separate paths. A concentrated interest (such as business wanting to use our personal information to exploit us) usually prevails over a di↵use interest (such as the desire of individuals to keep control of our personal information), and the usual remedy is law. The remedy is imperfect because the concentrated interest lobbies the lawmakers and will attempt to capture any regulator they set up. And Europe, for historical reasons regulates more than America does. The resulting gulf was highlighted powerfully in May 2014 when, in the USA, the Presidential Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (PCAST) published “Big Data: A Technological Perspective” [1546]. This report, whose authors included Google’s Eric Schmidt and Microsoft’s Craig Mundie, painted a picture of a world full of smart objects connected to cloud servers, with an ecology in which sensors reported to cloud analytics which in turn provided information to

users, such as advertisers. PCAST warned that the spread of voice and gesture interfaces meant that pretty soon, every inhabited space on the planet would have microphones and cameras in it, whose output would be processed centrally for energy eﬃciency. They argued that privacy controls could not be imposed on the sensors, as they’ll be too numerous; that they should not be imposed on the central service aggregators; and that the controls would therefore have to fall on how the information was used.

Less than two weeks later, the European Court of Justice disagreed. A Spanish lawyer, Mario Costeja Gonz`alez, had complained that searches for his name brought up two ancient press reports of an auction sale of his repossessed

house. He asked the Spanish data protection authorities to order Google to stop serving these results as they were out of date and no longer relevant. Google argued that it was just reporting the contents of a newspaper. The case went to the ECJ, which found in Gonz`alez’ favour, creating what the media colour- fully if inaccurately called a ‘right to be forgotten’, later codiﬁed into Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation from 2018. Google and other online ser- vice providers had to set up mechanisms whereby people could complain about search results that are ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were processed’ and have them re- moved. The mechanisms are contentious: Gonz`alez’ results are removed from Google searches in Spain, but European regulators want them removed globally. Google’s supporters claim that this would interfere with its right to free speech in the USA.

How did this rift come about?

## European data protection

Fear of technology undermining privacy isn’t a recent development. As early as 1890, Justices Warren and Brandeis warned of the threat to privacy posed by ‘recent inventions and business methods’ – speciﬁcally photography and in- vestigative journalism [1988]. After banks, tax collectors and welfare agencies started using computers in the early 1960s, people started to worry about the privacy implications if all our transactions could be collated and analyzed. In Europe, business argued that only government could a↵ord enough computers to be a serious privacy threat. This became a human-rights issue, given living memory of the Gestapo in most European countries and of communist secret police forces in the East8.

A patchwork of data protection laws started to appear starting with the Ger- man state of Hesse in 1969. Because of the rate at which technology changes, the successful laws have been technology neutral. Their common theme was a regulator (whether at national or state level) to whom users of personal data had to report and who could instruct them to cease and desist from inappro- priate processing. The practical e↵ect was usually that the general law became

expressed through a plethora of domain-speciﬁc codes of practice.

Over time, processing by multinational businesses became an issue too, and people realised that purely local or national initiatives were likely to be ine↵ec- tive against them. Following a voluntary code of conduct promulgated by the OECD in 1980 [1476], data protection was entrenched by a Council of Europe convention in January 1981, which entered into force in October 1985 [475]. Although strictly speaking this convention was voluntary, many states signed up to it for fear of losing access to data-processing markets. It required cer- tain minimum safeguards for *personal information*, which generally means any data kept on an identiﬁable human being, or *data subject*, such as bank account

8In Germany, privacy is now entrenched in the constitution, and trumps even the ‘war on terror’. The highest court found unconstitutional a 2001 police action to create a ﬁle on over 30,000 male students or former students from Muslim-majority countries – even though no-one was arrested as a result. It ruled that such exercises could be performed only in response to concrete threats, not as a precautionary measure [344].

details and credit card purchasing patterns. Data subjects have the right to inspect personal data held on them, have records changed if inaccurate, un- derstand how they’re processed, and in many cases prevent them being passed on to other organizations without their consent. Almost all commercial data are covered. There are exemptions for national security, but they are not as complete as the spooks would like: there was a big row when it turned out that data from SWIFT, which processes interbank payment instructions, were being copied to the Department of Homeland Security without the knowledge of data subjects; SWIFT eventually agreed to stop processing European data in the USA [1485, 1486].

The quality of implementation varied widely. In the UK, for example, Mar- garet Thatcher unashamedly did as little as possible to comply; a data protection body was established but starved of funds and technical expertise, and many ex- emptions were provided for both government and industry9. In Germany, which had written a right to privacy into its post-war constitution, the data protection bodies became proper law-enforcement agencies. Many other countries, such as

Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland passed comparable privacy laws in the 1980s and early 1990s: some, like Switzerland, went for the German model while others, like Iceland and Ireland, followed the British one.

By the early 1990s the di↵erence between national laws was creating barriers to trade. Some businesses avoided controls altogether by moving their data processing to the USA. So data protection was ﬁnally elevated to the status of European Union law in 1995 with a Data Protection Directive [647]. This set higher minimum standards than before, with particularly stringent controls on highly sensitive data such as health, religion, race and political aﬃliation. It also set out to prevent personal information being shipped to ‘data havens’ such as the USA in the absence of comparable controls enforced by contract or treaty.

The British implementation was again minimal, falling far short of European requirements [597]. For example, data controllers could pretend that lightly- anonymised information was no longer personal information, just so long as they themselves did not possess the auxiliary data needed to re-identify it. The Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce was overwhelmed, and severely conﬂicted as a result of being simultaneously the public sector’s adviser on privacy and the privacy enforcer; the enforcement arm was reluctant to take action against systems blessed by their colleagues in the advisory arm. Ireland’s enforcement was even weaker – its industrial strategy for the past 50 years has been to attract US ﬁrms’ European headquarters. So in addition to having low corporate taxes,

the Dublin government located its data protection oﬃce in Portarlington, a town

of less than 10,000 people, gave it only 30 sta↵, and did not allow it to publicise the results of investigations.

This so annoyed countries with tighter privacy laws such as France and Ger- many that they pushed for the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which passed in 2016 and came into force in May 2018. This was the most heav- ily lobbied piece of European legislation ever, with over 3,000 amendments dis- cussed in committee in the European Parliament [82]; it was helped over the line

9In one case where you’d expect there to be an exemption, there wasn’t; journalists who kept notes on their laptops or PCs which identiﬁed people were formally liable to give copies of this information to the data subjects on demand.

by the Snowden disclosures, although it had been cooking for some time before that10. GDPR took direct e↵ect in all EU member states, removing the wriggle room for Britain or Ireland to introduce loopholes; but lobbyists got quite a few of those in the Regulation already (particularly for ‘research’, whether of the scientiﬁc or marketing kind). The main e↵ect on normal businesses is to force them to document all their uses of personal information and write down, in advance, what the legal basis is for each of them; it’s not enough to try and ﬁgure things out once challenged. For information-intensive businesses, the im- plications could be more signiﬁcant, and there have been fascinating disclosures of how Facebook executives lobbied to amend the regulation – e↵ectively using the Irish prime minister, Enda Kenny, as their advocate in Brussels [1418].

Despite the many carve-outs inserted by the lobbyists, GDPR is still pro- viding regulators with tools to push back. France ﬁned Google e50m for failing to tell users enough about its data consent policies or give them enough control over how their information is used [1534]. The fact that consent can no longer be coerced or presumed may become a big deal, and there are many further cases in the pipeline.

## Privacy regulation in the USA

In the USA, business has mostly managed to persuade government to leave privacy largely to ‘self-regulation’. Although there’s a patchwork of state and federal laws, they are application-speciﬁc and fragmented. In general, privacy in federal government records and in communications is regulated, while business data are largely uncontrolled. The few islands of regulation include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, which governs disclosure of credit information and is broadly similar to European rules; the Video Privacy Protection Act or “Bork Bill”, enacted after a Washington newspaper published Judge Robert Bork’s video rental history following his nomination to the US Supreme Court; the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act, enacted to protect privacy of DMV records

after the actress Rebecca Schae↵er was murdered by an obsessed fan who hired a private eye to ﬁnd her address; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act which protects medical records and which I discussed in Chapter 9. Most states also have a breach disclosure law, which requires ﬁrms su↵ering any security failure that compromises residents’ personal information to inform them about it. Several torts also provide a basis for civil action in a surprising number of circumstances; for a survey, see Daniel Solove [1801].

The ﬁrst case that started to put privacy on CEOs’ radar came in 2006, when Choicepoint paid $10m to settle a lawsuit brought by the FTC after it failed to vet subscribers properly and let crooks buy the personal information of over 160,000 Americans, leading to at least 800 cases of ‘identity theft’ [671]. In 2007, it came out that the store chain TJ Maxx had had 45.7 million customers’ credit card details stolen [1159]; Albert Gonzales got 20 years in prison for this in 2010, and it’s reckoned that the breach cost the company $800m. The FTC sued Facebook over deceptive changes to privacy settings and settled in 2011, just before its IPO, requiring it to get user consent for certain changes and

10Snowden revealed some egregious abuses such as the large-scale collection of by GCHQ of Yahoo video chats in Operation Optic Nerve, including intimate video chats [14].

subjecting it to 20 years of audits [181]. The real shock to CEO-land came when Target’s CEO, Gregg Steinhafel, was ﬁred in May 2014 following a hack of more than 100m credit card numbers the previous December; the CIO was also replaced [702]. The C-suite carnage has continued, both in the USA11 and elsewhere12 moving cybersecurity steadily up the corporate agenda.

In 2018, California passed a consumer privacy law, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). This followed a privacy ballot initiative which, if it had gone to a ballot and passed, would have entrenched an even tougher privacy law. The ballot in turn followed the Cambridge Analytica scandal where the Facebook data of 87 million users was harvested without their knowledge or consent and used to target behavioural advertising during the 2016 election campaign. The big tech companies’ defence was to negotiate the new law instead of the ballot initiative, so they could have it amended later, or even trumped by a Federal law. CCPA is somewhat similar to European data-protection law: it empowers consumers to request the deletion of personal information, opt out of its sale, and access it in a format that enables its transfer to third parties. The European right to be forgotten is a non-starter thanks to the US First Amendment. CCPA can be enforced by the state attorney general but also by private action. A really important policy question now is whether this law is progressively copied by other states, or whether Big Tech manages to emasculate

it13. But the USA is not the only serious player here.

## Fragmentation?

Since 1998, European law has forbidden companies from sending personal data to organizations in countries where the law does not provide comparable pro- tection or other safeguards – in practice, that means America and India. The ﬁrst attempt to resolve this was the *Safe Harbour Agreement* whereby a data processor in America or India would promise their European customer to abide by European law. In 2000, the European Commission adopted an executive decision to the e↵ect that this would give ‘adequate protection’. However, it left no practical recourse for EU citizens who felt their rights had been violated.

The case that killed Safe Harbour was brought by Max Schrems, an Austrian lawyer, against Facebook. Following the Snowden revelations, he argued that for Facebook in Ireland (its EU headquarters) to pass his data to the USA for

processing was unlawful, as the law and practice of the United States o↵er no protection against surveillance by the public authorities, speciﬁcally the NSA, which can collect it all via Prism. The European Court of Justice agreed and

in 2015 it struck down the Safe Harbour principles. The USA and the EU then agreed to replace them with a fresh arrangement, called Privacy Shield, which

11Amy Pascal of Sony in 2014, Walter Stephan of FACC in 2016, Richard Smith of Equifax in 2017; and maybe we can note Marissa Meyer of Yahoo who forfeited her bonus and stock in 2017, and perhaps even Travis Kavalnick of Uber whose successor publicised a hack that had been covered up.

12Dido Harding of TalkTalk, UK, in 2017; Bruce Liang of Integrated Health Information Systems, Singapore, in 2019; and maybe we can count Martin Winterkorn of VW and Rupert Stadler of Audi too, who presided over the company hacking its car emissions.

13Their lobbyists are already attacking it, but as I write in 2020, there’s a ballot initiative that would entrench it in California law and put it beyond the grasp of state legislators.

adds and ombudsperson to whom an EU citizen can complain if they think the NSA might have spied on them [1474]; Max too this to the European Court of Justice, which duly struck it down in July 2020[1683]. The defendant was the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, who spent almost e3M defending the position that she had the right to look the other way as US tech ﬁrms with their EU headquarters in Ireland ride roughshod over privacy law. The court also ruled that privacy authorities have a duty to take action when they receive a complaint. It also made clear that the NSA’s right under US law to get free access to the data of people who are not US persons is not consistent with US ﬁrms keeping data on EU citizens under US custody and control14.

Many companies that process data in the USA had in the meantime fallen back on contract, forcing customers to agree to their personal data being shared before they do business with them. This has a long and sordid history (it’s how medical insurers get away with selling your data to drug companies), and the ECJ allowed the continued use of *standard contractual clauses* (SCCs) to protect data. But this isn’t straightforward. First, the data controller has to establish that there’s an adequate level of protection in the country where the data will be held, and second, you can’t simply impose such terms on consumers in the world of the GDPR as coercive consent is speciﬁcally disallowed. It is hard

to see how US ﬁrms can establish adequacy when US law provides unfettered

access to foreigners’ data on US soil and the Snowden disclosures document the systematic use (and, from the EU law viewpoint, abuse) of this access.

So this is developing into a real ﬁght, with real consequences for how and where the world’s server farms are located and controlled. Some of the better- informed ﬁrms assume that they will eventually have to process European data in Europe and under European law; Microsoft put a data centre in Germany under the control of a German trustee for a couple of years, but then changed its mind, while Google has done its privacy research and development for some years in Munich. And public opinion in the USA isn’t that di↵erent from Europe: most Americans think their personal data is less secure now, that the risks of surveillance capitalism outweigh the beneﬁts, that they don’t understand what’s going on, that they have no control and neither companies nor government are accountable for abuse, but that they just don’t have any alternative. Oh, and 20% su↵ered some kind of online fraud in the last twelve months [144].

Meanwhile, data-protection law is pushing into new areas where it gives a way of responding to abuses. For example, after the Brexit referendum, the UK Information Commissioner ﬁned Facebook £500,00015 after they let Cambridge Analytica harvest personal data on 87 million people worldwide, and used this to target election ads in both the Brexit referendum and the US 2016 presidential election [957]. As many modern practices in marketing and in political propa- ganda involve o↵ences under data-protection law, this gives scope for regulatory

14There is also a case pending at the European Court of Human Rights, brought by Big Brother Watch against US mass surveillance [420], which has been granted an appeal to the Grand Chamber. If this goes the same way, the ECJ judgment will be extended to those countries that are members of the Council of Europe but not of the EU, such as the UK and Russia.

15The UK ﬁne was the maximum allowed under pre-GDPR data-protection law; since then the maximum is 4% of the defendant’s turnover, which should bring European penalties into line with American ones.

innovation. The US equivalent is the FTC’s use of truth-in-advertising law to punish ﬁrms that break their privacy policies or previous agreements about user privacy; and Facebook was in due course ﬁned $5bn by the FTC. The Elec- tronic Privacy Information Center16 had been arguing arguing ever since the

Cambridge Analytica scandal broke that Facebook had violated the terms of its 2011 settlement with the FTC.

# Freedom of Information

Information tends to ﬂow from the weak to the powerful, increasing their power and making it harder for others to hold them to account. As James Madison wrote:

A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.

In the aftermath of Watergate, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act, and other countries followed; Britain got one in 199717. More radical versions have been tried: tax returns are published in Iceland and in some Swiss cantons, and the practice cuts evasion, as rich men fear the loss of social status that a low declared income would bring. The most radical version is proposed by David Brin, in ‘The Transparent Society’ [322]. He reasons that the falling costs

of data acquisition, transmission and storage will make pervasive surveillance technologies available to the authorities, so the only real question is whether they are available to the rest of us too. He paints a choice between two futures

– one in which the citizens live in fear of a Chinese–style policing system and one in which oﬃcials are held to account by public scrutiny. He argues that essentially all information should be open – including, for example, all our bank accounts. The cameras will exist: will they be surveillance cams or webcams? Social media often seem to be pushing us in that direction. In any case, Freedom of Information Acts typically let the citizen demand copies of information held by the state unless there’s a good reason to withhold it, and help ensure that the ﬂow of information between the citizen and the state isn’t entirely one-way.

However, transparency leads to interesting tussles. Many European coun- tries have clean-slate laws whereby most criminal convictions are expunged after a period of time that depends on the severity of the o↵ence, and in 2019 Penn- sylvania, Utah and California followed suit [607]. But how can such laws be enforced now that web search engines exist? Do you tag the names of o↵enders in newspaper accounts of trials with an expiration date, and pass laws com- pelling search and archive services to respect them? The Google Spain case gives us the answer: someone whose conviction has expired has a right to have it suppressed in searches, although it may remain in the newspaper archive for those who know where to look.

16Full disclosure: I’m a member of their advisory board.

17Tony Blair later described it as his biggest mistake.

That’s one example of the shifting boundary between data protection and freedom of information. Another has been the monitoring of former child sex of- fenders, with laws in some states requiring that registers of o↵enders be publicly available, and riots in the UK following the naming of some former o↵enders by a Sunday newspaper and at least one innocent person being lynched. A third

is the release of crime statistics: home owners object to their neighbourhood being stigmatised, and if the data are too granular there may be some risk of individual victims being identiﬁed. For further examples, see Section 11.1 on inference security.

# Summary

Public policy is increasingly entangled with the work of the security engineer. The largest single concern of governments, if we measure it in dollar terms, is intelligence; a typical government spends a hundred times more money collecting

information on its enemies, real and potential, than it does on ﬁghting cyber- crime. Intelligence collection is also in conﬂict with both defensive security and with privacy, both of which have historically come second. However, since the Snowden revelations made clear the scale of US data collection worldwide,

and of Five Eyes operations against allied countries, the balance has started to shift, and the e↵ects have propagated through privacy and data protection law, albeit slowly and with so far little e↵ect on the agencies themselves. Perhaps when the analysis is done, Snowden’s e↵ect on the agencies’ capabilities will be largely technical (through getting people to use cryptography more, and more intelligently) while the policy e↵ect may be to curb some of the excesses of ‘surveillance capitalism’ by making privacy more salient to more people. The strains between the US and European ways of dealing with privacy are becoming more signiﬁcant and in the medium term we may see more localisation – where US companies have to keep data on EU citizens on servers in Europe and perhaps even under the control of European trustees. Other countries are starting to follow suit.

Censorship is a real issue; some countries, like China, ban many of the large US service ﬁrms outright, while more and more are demanding that they take down not just abusive material but also material that o↵ends local political sensitivities. The Internet still makes it harder for countries that won’t go as far as China to censor subversive content, but much of the optimism we had ten

years ago has dissipated with the failure of the Arab Spring. Even the developed countries push the large service ﬁrms to moderate and ﬁlter user-generated content at scale, and despite the cost and complexity, it’s becoming universal except on end-to-end encrypted services. It’s now 25 years since AOL barred users from living in Scunthorpe, and large-scale ﬁltering still raises a host of policy issues whether we’re talking about copyright, radicalisation, harassment or fake news.

The security-industrial complex, whose growth was fuelled by the climate of fear whipped up after the 9/11 attacks, has got a second wind from China and the Arab Spring, as the world’s authoritarians buy surveillance systems to keep track of their populations. This has led to the proliferation of computer and

network exploitation tools that erode our security, our liberty, and our quality of life. This proliferation is aided and abetted by Western governments who should know better, and is bound to be extended as social media ﬁrms and others are co-opted into ever more content screening as a condition of doing business. Understanding and pushing back on the surveillance ecosystem while mitigating online harms is the highest priority for security engineers who have the ability to get involved in public life – whether directly, or via our writing and teaching. And research also helps. Individual academics can’t hope to compete with national leaders in the mass media, but the careful accumulation of data and knowledge over the years can and will undermine their excuses. I don’t mean just knowledge about why extreme airport screening measures are a waste of money; we also must disseminate knowledge about the economics and

psychology that underlie maladaptive government behaviour, and its terrible consequences in terms of spending money on security theatre that should have been spent on pandemic preparedness.

# Research Problems

Technology policy involves a complex interplay between science, engineering, psychology, law and economics. There is still too little serious cross-disciplinary research, and initiatives which speed up this process are almost certainly a good thing. Since 2002 I’ve worked to build up the security-economics research community; and since 2008 we’ve run an annual workshop on security and hu- man behaviour to engage psychologists, anthropologists and philosophers too. But we need much, much more. Where are the historians, the sociologists and the political scientists? (And perhaps if there’s a fourth edition, we’ll add the philosophers.)

# Further Reading

It’s extraordinarily easy for technology policy arguments to get detached from reality, and many of the scares conjured up to get attention and money (such as ‘cyberterrorism’) are the modern equivalent of the monsters that appeared on medieval maps to cover up the cartographer’s ignorance. An engineer should look for primary sources – from material written by experienced insiders such as R.V. Jones [992] to the thousands of documents leaked by Ed Snowden. As for the use of information warfare techniques in the Brexit referendum and the 2016 US election, Carole Cadwalladr’s movie ‘The Great Hack’ is unmissable.

There’s a good book on the history of wiretapping and crypto policy by Whit Diﬃe and Susan Landau, who had a long involvement in the policy pro- cess [558], and an NRC study on cryptography policy was also inﬂuential [1411]. There’s a video on my website of the history of the crypto wars from a European perspective.

The history of export control is tied up with Soviet attempts to buy US computer, semiconductor and energy technology during the 1970s and 80s, and the US and French intelligence community’s work to block them and feed them

misleading information: see the memoir on Gus Weiss, a CIA maverick involved in this work [723].

Resources on online censorship include Reporters without Borders, who pub- lish a ‘Handbook for bloggers and cyber-dissidents’ on how to circumvent cen- sorship, with a number of case histories of how blogging has helped open up the media in less liberal countries [1594].

The standard work on computer forensics is by Tony Sammes and Brian Jenkinson [1644], while Privacy International has a survey of mobile phone forensics [1555] and the Department of Justice’s “Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers” also bear some attention [550]. For early computer crime case histories, see Peter Neumann [1429] and Dorothy Denning [539]. The stan- dard work on computer evidence in the common law countries is by Stephen Mason [1236].

On the topic of privacy versus data protection, there is a huge literature but no concise recent guide that I know of. Recent material can be found on the web sites of organizations such as EPIC [631], EFF [618], FIPR [708] and EDRi [643], and of Max Schrems [1683].

As for the policy problems around the ﬁltering of inﬂammatory content and propaganda, the two most thought-provoking books for me are those by Tim Wu [2050] and Yochai Benkler [227], while Facebook’s former CISO Alex Stamos now discusses the tech companies’ view of ﬁltering political ads [999].

Finally, the deﬁnitive story of the Cambridge Analytica scandal is told in the book by the whistleblower Chris Wylie [2052], and in the journalism by Carole Cadwalladr based on information that he and others supplied [363].