

reasonable explanation.

Variable	"Healthy" Value	"Corrupt" Value
Pop Des Eco Welfare	65	55
Pop Des Freedom	65	55
Freedom	50	40
Economic Welfare	50	40
Executive Power	.4	.6
Exec Leg Infl	.33	.66
Arist Leg Infl	.33	0.0
Pop Leg Infl	.33	.33
Religious Des Free	50	40
Religious Des Eco Wel	50	40

Figure 4.6: Comparison of Parameter Values for "Healthy" and "Corrupt" Systems

The relevant variable here is not an absolute, such as Opposition to Government, but a relative--Climate of Opposition. The climate of opposition is determined by comparing the current amount of opposition present to some traditional level (see Figure 3.11). In a like manner, current opposition is greatly affected by Turmoil, the difference between the average ("normal") level of unrest and current levels. The justification for this formulation is presenting in Section 3.4. Between these two formulations, we can now begin to fathom the process by which a bizarre shock of opposition takes place. In short, the destabilizing process here is *lack of conflict*. As conditions improve, the levels of Average Unrest and Traditional Opposition




Figure 4.7: Shocks of Opposition in Response to Attempted Reform

begin to decline. Because these variables serve as a reference point for the determination of Turmoil and Climate of Opposition, respectively, as their magnitude decreases, the revolutionary process becomes increasingly unstable. When they finally reach their minimum levels, a very small economic downturn is sufficient to develop a disproportionate amount of unrest, turmoil, and government opposition.

While there are some likely criticisms concerning the mathematical characteristics of the formulations which result in this behavior, this is probably a reasonable representation of this process. There do not appear to be any previous errors, i.e. divide by zero, etc. Thus, this surprise behavior must be considered for empirical validity. In fact, there does seem to be a body of literature to support such an opposition shock. James Davies (Graham and Gurr 1969) illustrates this idea with the famous J-curve (Figure 4.8). He speculates that revolution takes place due to an intolerable gap between what people want and what they receive. From here, he goes on to show, with the J-curve, that revolutions are most likely when societal conditions are improving. This causes an increase in expectations, making any failure of the government to meet these newly raised expectations much more volatile.




Figure 4.8: The J-Curve Illustrating Revolutionary Tendencies During Reform

In Graphs 56-60, we see that more conservative reform measures are better, but still very destabilizing. Graphs 61-65 demonstrate the behavior of the system on the edge of stability. In

this scenario, the executive attempts slightly more ambitious reforms ($\Delta=20$ instead of $\Delta=15$). Here we once again note the presence of an initial shock of opposition which appears to be damped. However, the problem of instability gets gradually worse until month 350 when there is another explosion of unrest and opposition, leading to instability.

The solution to the problem of opposition shocks is, ironically, to encourage opposition. In the scenarios reflected in Graphs 51-65, there is no substantial increase in desires in response to executive action. This is probably not entirely correct, however, it is not unreasonable to assume that in the absence of institutional influence, popular desires are likely to increase slowly. The run presented in Graphs 66-70 represents a coordinated attempt by the executive to utilize both government policy and institutional influence (Religion) to effect social reform. As the executive increases levels of freedom and economic distribution, the church relaxes its hold upon the values of the populace. In addition, propaganda plays a major role (likely in the spread and patronage of new ideas and innovation). These things cause the level of popular desired norms to appreciate. Thus, opposition to the government is prevented from sinking to extremely low levels. Although there is still a noticeable shock of opposition, it is much more moderate than any of those due to previous policies. Thus, we have success of sorts.

Unfortunately, we also have failure. In spite of all of these measures, if we observe Graph 67 we note that there is no redistribution of political power. Having obtained control over the entire government apparatus, it is difficult for the executive to dismantle all of those structures which tend to prevent public participation in the policy process. The task of enticing the aristocracy and populace into political participation is a difficult one indeed. Because they have no power, any move to force them to seize power may well subjugate them even further. This is probably what Machiavelli was referring to when he said that once corrupted, it is impossible for a city to free itself.