4.3 Analysis of Executive Policy Effects for an Extremely Competent Executive

The previous analysis assumed an executive unable to aggrandize power under "normal" conditions. However, there are many examples of leaders who have been quite successful in obtaining and holding power when there are no strong external or internal deterrents. The following analysis is for the case of a very competent executive (Executive Competence=1.5). If we assume a "strong" executive and run the model with no policy changes or exogenous inputs (identical to those conditions which produced the original equilibrium run), we find that the distribution of power does not stay constant over the course of 400 months (see Figure 4.3) (Graphs 76-80). With these figures in mind for comparison purposes, we can now consider the effects of executive policies similar to the ones mentioned previously.

Variable	Initial Value	Final Value
Executive Leg. Influence	.33	.74
Aristocratic Leg. Influence	.33	.18
Popular Leg. Influence	.33	.08
Executive Power	.51	.4

Figure 4.3: Base Run Values for Executive Competence=1.5

Figure 4.4 summarizes the effects of three progressively more effective policies. These include an economic step change, an economic ramp change, and a combined economic and political ramp change in executive desires. As expected, the step change in executive policy is the least effective of the three. The quick change causes a great deal of turmoil, lessening the effectiveness of executive policy (Graphs 36-40). The ramp policy turns out to be very effective, undermining the position of the populace without any ill effects on the executive (Graphs 41-45). The most effective policy by far, however, is a combined one of first economic and then political deprivation (Graphs 46-50). Figure 4.5 demonstrates the collapse of popular resistance brought about by these measures. Between months 200 and 300 it is evident that there is a struggle progressing between the populace and the executive for control of the government apparatus. However, because the economic base of the populace has been eroded, they do not have the strength to prevail. After M=300, popular resistance fails, and executive domination of events accelerates greatly. We note from Figure 4.4 that the executive is actually able to aggrandize power much more effectively by decimating the economic and political institutions guaranteeing the freedom and welfare of the populace. Consider what Machiavelli says about power:

"For anyone becoming a prince . . . the best means he can use to hold that principality . . . is to begin everything in that state anew . . . he should build new cities, destroy existing ones, move the inhabitants from one place to another; in short, leave nothing intact in that province, nor

permit either rank, institution, form of government, or wealth in your city which is not
recognized as coming from you." (*Discourses*, 232)

This idea is significant because it suggests, at least superficially, that under those systems where
it is possible to aggrandize power, the freedom and welfare of the people are in jeopardy--not
because of the build up of power, but because the one most likely to attain and hold power is the
executive who systematically deprives the populace of material wealth and civil liberties.

Finally, if we view Figure 4.5 (and Graph 46) closely, we will note something which has
not appeared in any of the other model runs until now. There is a substantial decay in Popular
Desired Freedom and Economic Welfare. This plot illustrates a society's gradual lapse into
corruption. Machiavelli speaks strongly about the difficulty of any population extracting itself
from this state once it had been corrupted. Here we begin to see the implications. Once Popular
Desires fall, there is no longer any force maintaining the level of popular economic and civil

		Final Values for Various Executive Policies		
Variable	Initial Values	Economic Step	Economic Ramp	Combined Eco./Poly
Exec. Leg. Infl.	.33	0.6	.75	.80
Arist. Leg. Infl.	.33	0.0	0.0	0.0
Pop. Leg. Infl.	.33	0.4	.25	.20
Exec Power	.4	.44	.51	.58
Economic Welfare	50	38	30	26
Economic Law	50	50	38	30
Political Freedom	50	54	52	26
Political Law	50	56	54	29

Figure 4.4: Comparison of Results for Various Executive Policies with Executive
Competence=1.5

welfare. Strictly on the basis of what we have seen so far, one would postulate that it will be a
much more difficult task for the society to exit this state than it was for it to arrive at it.

4.4 Corruption and Reform

Until now, all of the runs presented have assumed an initial "healthy" equilibrium level.
However, there are still a myriad of questions to be answered concerning the treatment of "social
pathologies." The difficulties encountered in the Third World and the failure of American foreign
policy to establish liberal governments in many of its political satellites are indicative of

1 Exe_Des_Eco_Wel   2 Economic_Law   3 Eco_Welfare   4 Pop_Des_Eco_Wel

Figure 4.5: Combined Economic and Political Deprivation Leading to Corruption

complexity of the issues involved. In an attempt to obtain a better understanding of the behavior entailed by this model's assumptions, it has been initialized in a state of corruption (similar to the state at the end of the scenario shown in Figure 4.5)(Figure 4.6). We have seen some of the repercussions of executive policy meant to subjugate the populace of its economic and political welfare, now it is interesting to note the results of an executive attempt at reform.

Graphs 51-55 demonstrate the effects of an executive attempt at radical economic and political reform. The policy is rather straightforward. At M=50 the values of Executive Desired Freedom and Executive Desired Economic Welfare are increased by a +15 step. Because the executive dominates the government, this policy has the desired primary effect; both Freedom and Economic Welfare increase to "healthy" levels. However, this policy also has one very interesting unintended side effect which is illustrated in Figure 4.6.

In Figure 4.7 we see a very curious phenomena. Starting during the 50th month, things begin to improve for the populace. By month 100 it is evident that all of their desires are being satisfied. Yet, beginning at M=120 there appears a massive uprising. If we examine Graphs 51 and 53, we note that Freedom and Economic Welfare respond to the executive policy in a relatively stable fashion. Thus, there seems no obvious explanation for this behavior. However, this opposition shock persists even after much scrutiny of the structure involved, and there is a

47