

Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations: A Multilevel Analysis

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ABSTRACT This article investigates the relationship between culture, personality, and deception in a simulated international management negotiation at multiple levels of analysis. 'Deception' was operationalized here as the propensity to lie and bribe. As predicted, at the cultural level the results from a scenario study with 1583 participants from eight cultures suggested that cultural collectivism was positively related to reported use of deception in negotiations, and to greater emotional reactions (i.e. guilt, shame, and disgust) after the use of deception. At the individual level, however, the personality variable of allocentrism (consisting of behaviors found in collectivist cultures) was negatively related to the use of deception. Theoretical implications are discussed.

KEY WORDS • collectivism • deception • individualism • negotiations

Deception is a common behavior (Ford, 1996; Lewis and Saarni, 1993), and occurs, according to Ford, not only among humans but also among birds, elephants, primates and even fireflies. Ford argues that it is a 'remarkably adaptive feature of survival' (p. 273). Indeed DePaulo et al. (1996) reported,

on the basis of diary studies conducted in the USA, that different samples average between one and two lies per day. Others, such as Ford et al. (1988) and DePaulo and Bell (1996), have documented some of the individual differences and situational conditions that predict lying. For instance, it is more

likely to be used by those who are less powerful to control the environment, to increase status (by attributing a desirable quality or event to themselves), or as wish fulfillment (when aspiration exceeds abilities). It is also used more frequently when 'reality is unkind' (i.e. when people are forced by circumstances to present themselves untruthfully).

An example of a situation that is conducive to deception is a negotiation context. Deception may be more probable when two individuals negotiate than it is in other kinds of situations, because success in negotiations often requires that people do not show 'their hand'. If a supervisor and a subordinate negotiate about the subordinate's salary level, a salesperson and a buyer about a price, a middle manager and a top manager about the level of funding of a department, there is always the possibility that negotiators might threaten an action that they do not intend to take, or give an impression that is inaccurate. The issue becomes even more complicated when the negotiators come from different cultures, since they bring into the negotiation aspects of their diverse cultures.

The purpose of this article is to examine cultural and personality influences on deception in a negotiation context. Deception in this study is operationalized as the propensity to lie and to bribe. To preface the discussion, based on culture theory (i.e. Triandis, 1995), we will argue that some kinds of cultural collectivism are likely to be associated with lying in negotiation. However, we also expect that at the individual level of analysis, the relationship may be reversed. That is, we expect that the personality pattern of idiocentrism (consisting of behaviors found in individualist cultures) would be related to lying at that level of analysis. In what follows we will briefly review recent theory concerning individualism and collectivism and then discuss its implications for deception in negotiation.

Individualism and Collectivism

Culture is a shared pattern of categorizations, attitudes, beliefs, definitions, norms, values, and other elements of subjective culture. In individualist cultures these elements are centered on the individual; in collectivist cultures they are centered on the ingroup. The general tendency is that in collectivist cultures the self is defined as interdependent with an ingroup (family, tribe, nation, etc.) (Markus and Kitayama, 1991); the ingroup's goals are given priority over personal goals (Triandis, 1990; Yamaguchi, 1994); norms are more powerful predictors of social behavior than attitudes (Davidson et al., 1976; Bontempo and Rivero, 1992; Abrams et al., 1998; Suh et al., 1998); and social relationships are more communal (Mills and Clark, 1982), than defined in exchange theory terms (Kim et al., 1994). Conversely, in individualist cultures the self is autonomous of ingroups; personal goals are given priority over ingroup goals; attitudes are more powerful predictors of social behavior than norms, and social behavior can be described by exchange theory (Triandis, 1995).

A crucial factor in understanding how this cultural pattern affects social behavior is the relationship between one individual and other individuals. In collectivist cultures Friend and Self are very close, and Enemy is very far from Self; in individualist cultures, both Friend and Enemy are far from Self (Iyengar et al., 1999). In short, the major gap for collectivists occurs between ingroup and outgroup; the major gap for individualists occurs between self and others.

Thus, in order to understand a behavior we need to know if the other person is in the intimate ingroup (e.g. family), the outer ingroup (e.g. acquaintances), a neutral group (e.g. people one has not yet met), or an outgroup (e.g. a competitor).

Triandis (1995) argued that there are many kinds of collectivist cultures. For

example, Korea and the Israeli kibbutz might be collectivist cultures, but they are not identical in their collectivism. Similarly, Sweden and the USA might be individualist cultures but they are not identical in their individualism. One important distinction is between vertical and horizontal collectivist and vertical and horizontal individualist cultures. The vertical cultures emphasize hierarchy; the horizontal stress equality.

The vertical collectivist (VC) cultures see some members of the ingroup as more important than most members of the ingroup. Thus, authorities must be obeyed without argument. Sacrifice of the individual for the ingroup is valued. This aspect of collectivism is stressed in South Asia. Horizontal collectivist (HC) cultures see most members of the ingroup as equal. This aspect of collectivism is stressed in the Israeli kibbutz. Vertical individualist (VI) cultures emphasize that the individual is different (superior, the best) from others. In US academic and business subcultures this aspect is important. In horizontal individualist (HI) cultures the individual is unique, but not superior. Australia and Sweden tend to emphasize this aspect of individualism.

Cultures are not monolithic in their individualism or collectivism. People sample horizontal or vertical, individualist or collectivist elements in their cognitive systems, *depending on the situation*. Thus the best way to describe a culture is by measuring how frequently, across situations, people sample the HI, HC, VI, and VC elements. Also, there is much within-culture variation (e.g. see Vandello and Cohen, 1999). Specifically, the upper classes in all cultures are likely to sample the individualist elements, while the lower classes are likely to sample the collectivist elements (Kohn, 1969). Marshall (1997) found that social class accounted for more of the variance of individualism and collectivism than the difference between the cultures of New Zealand and Singapore. Rural or old samples are more collectivist than urban or

young samples. People who have migrated are more idiocentric than people who have had a steady residence. Many other factors increase and decrease the levels of idiocentrism and allocentrism (a review can be found in Triandis and Trafimow, in press). For example, a major correlate of individualism is affluence (Hofstede, 1980).

Culture and Deception

The topic of deception seems important for management around the world. Yet there is very little evidence concerning cultural differences in the tendency to deceive. Thus this study is a preliminary investigation of this topic. We note several lines of thinking that suggest deception will be higher in collectivist cultures, especially in vertical collectivist cultures, as compared with individualist cultures – particularly horizontal individualist cultures.

Previous research has determined that people are likely to lie to help save face in important, close relationships (DePaulo and Bell, 1996). Given that maintaining ingroup harmony and face are central concepts in collectivist cultures (especially vertical cultures; Hu, 1944; Ho, 1976), we may expect that the propensity to lie may be greater and more adaptive in collectivist cultures. In addition, people in collectivist cultures do what is expected of them, by the norms of their ingroups, and their roles. If we observe a person's behavior in a role that requires deception (e.g. a negotiator who is not supposed to 'show his hand'), we may be more likely to see this behavior in collectivist than in individualist cultures. In vertical collectivist cultures, also, there might be more deception when a subordinate disagrees with a supervisor, and also more nepotism and favoritism.

An additional factor is ambiguity in communication, where a person might not tell an actual lie, but might deceive by remaining silent. Lin (1997) points out that ambiguity in communication can be very helpful in a

vertical collectivist culture such as China, where clarity may result in sanctions. One cannot point out to an official that he is not correct. The Chinese, he indicates, admire people who are frank, such as Judge Bao (p. 369), but do not emulate them.

Given the correlation between collectivism and power distance in Hofstede (1980), we might expect VC to be more prototypical of the collectivist cultures, and HI to be more prototypical of the individualist cultures. Thus the tendency toward deception might be greatest in VC cultures, moderate in HC and VI cultures, and least in HI cultures. Cultures high in HI may be low in deception also because people in such cultures emphasize authenticity (Trilling, 1972). Trilling (1972) has argued that authenticity is higher in cultures where people largely decide for themselves who they are than in cultures where people are mostly shaped by social processes, as is typical of collectivist cultures. Thus in cultures where people largely decide who they are, a lie is truly reprehensible, while in collectivist cultures lying to the out-group is a perfectly acceptable behavior, and other kinds of lying may also be tolerated.

Some Indirect Evidence

Indirect evidence consistent with the hypothesis that people in collectivist cultures engage in deception more frequently than people in individualist cultures can be found in published data provided by the Berlin Transparency International (see the *New York Times*, 20 August 1995, Section E, p. 3). This is an organization that monitors corruption around the globe, based on reports provided by academic, business, and government officials.

The index is generated by ratings provided by seven agencies, such as the World Bank and the World Economic Forum and Harvard Institute for International Development. The ratings are made by those who have worked in the various countries on a

zero to 10 (no corruption) scale. The 1998 index ranges from 10 for Denmark to 1.4 for Cameroon. The latest press releases, which include a description of the methodology for generating the index and other matters, can be found in www.transparency.de/documents/press-releases/1998/1998.09.22.cpi.de.html.

Of course, 'corruption' refers to a cultural level and deception to an individual level of the phenomenon. However, when individuals use deception frequently, that may result in more corruption, since most corrupt behaviors require deception.

There were 36 countries in the Berlin Index that overlapped with Hofstede's (1980) data. The correlation between the Berlin Index (where large numbers indicate low corruption) and collectivism was -0.63 $p < .0001$. The countries that are most corrupt, according to the Berlin Index, tend to have vertical collectivist cultures. The countries that are least corrupt tend to have horizontal individualist cultures. The importance of the vertical–horizontal dimension is also reflected in the correlation of the Berlin Index with Hofstede's power distance, which was -0.70 $p < .0001$. This indicates that horizontal cultures are less corrupt.

Main Hypotheses

We propose the following hypotheses based on the preceding discussion of the theoretical relationship between culture and deception.

Hypothesis 1: The more vertical collectivist the culture the greater the propensity to lie in negotiation situations. The more horizontal individualist the culture the less will be the propensity to lie.

Many have argued that lying is associated with increased feelings of guilt and/or shame. As such if deception is more common in vertical collectivist cultures, we may see greater negative emotional reactions following lying. On the other hand, it is also plausible that this

is a Western assumption. That is, if lying is a role-linked behavior in some collectivist cultures, then we may not see a relationship between lying and emotional reactions. Thus, in this study we can test two alternative hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: If hypothesis 1 is supported, we can expect that after having lied, the research participants from vertical collectivist cultures will feel more guilty and ashamed than the participants from horizontal individualist cultures. Hypothesis 2b: If hypothesis 1 is supported, we will not see the expression of more guilt or shame in the vertical collectivist than in the horizontal individualist cultures.

Importance of Level of Analysis

There is now considerable evidence that relationships found at the cultural level of analysis (where the responses of the individuals have been aggregated within culture) may be different from relationships obtained at the individual level of analysis (e.g. Van De Vijver, 2000). Triandis et al. (1985) proposed two personality terms that correspond to individualism and collectivism: *idiocentrism* (behaviors frequently found in individualist cultures) and *allocentrism* (behaviors usually found in collectivist cultures). Smith and Bond (1999) have adopted the terms in their treatment of social psychology across cultures. This terminology makes it easy to talk about allocentrics in an individualist culture and idiocentrics in a collectivist culture.

We expect that there will be idiocentrics and allocentrics in all cultures. The idiocentrics will behave the way most people do in individualist cultures, so that an idiocentric in a collectivist culture will find the requirement to behave according to norms, to accept without questioning the dictates of authority figures and the like, aversive, and will seek to leave that culture. Idiocentrics will feel most satisfied when living in an individualist culture. Similarly, allocentrics living in individualist cultures join a variety of groups,

such as unions, community groups and the like.

This raises the question: if hypothesis 1 is supported, will it hold also for the individual level of analysis? There is some reasoning that suggests that it might not. Idiocentrics, especially if they are vertical, are competitive. Competition means that if idiocentrics are placed in a situation where accomplishing the task requires lying they will lie. There is already some evidence (Hagan et al., 1998) that links hierarchical forms of self-interest and delinquency, so the next hypothesis is likely to be supported. Thus,

Hypothesis 3: Idiocentrics, especially vertical idiocentrics, are more likely to lie than allocentrics, if placed in situations where getting what they want in a negotiation requires them to lie.

Method

Overview

We selected eight cultures, four (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Greece) that were relatively collectivist, according to Hofstede (1980) and four (USA, Australia, Germany, and the Netherlands) that were relatively individualist according to that study. We explored the vertical and horizontal kinds of collectivism and individualism of the eight cultures by measuring those aspects.

Respondents

A total of 1583 students enrolled in social science courses around the world responded to a questionnaire. *When studying culture*, differences between students and other samples, such as managers, tend to be unimportant.¹ Furthermore, anthropologists depend on a few informants and assume that all members of a culture will give about the same kind of information. However, we had an interest in personality, and to study that topic we had to have substantial samples. Students were the most practical samples that we could obtain.

There were 288 participants in the USA

(men 118; women 159; not reported 11), 144 in Australia (men 80; women 64), 121 in the Netherlands (men 83; women 38), 160 in Germany (men 81; women 79); 145 in Japan I (men 70; women 75) from Keio University and 48 in Japan II from Tohoku University, Kawauchi, Sendai (men 23; women 21; not reporting 4), 160 in Greece (men 80; women 80); 191 in Hong Kong (men 95; women 96), and 326 in Korea (men 160; women 162, not reported 4). A random half of these samples responded to the scenario mentioned below; the other half responded to a mediation scenario; that study will be presented in another article. Thus the N of the analyses of the cultural measurements is 1583; the N s for the analyses of the scenario data are half as large.

Scenario

The scenario used in this study was constructed, after many iterations and input from our research collaborators, by the US research team (see Appendix for wording). It was then double translated (Brislin, 1980) and adjusted in each culture to reflect local conditions. Of course it would have been desirable to use more than one deception scenario, but that was not practical, given the need to obtain a scenario that had more or less the same meaning across cultures, and required extensive discussions among the co-authors.

Procedure

In each culture the subject was asked to pretend that he or she was the 'chief negotiator' of a team of 10 negotiators from Company X. The name of X was changed depending on the country of the sample (i.e. it was a common name in that country; such as in the US: Smith). The negotiation was with another company, Y.

The contract under negotiation concerned supplying materials to Y. The negotiator was told that a third company, Z, was competing with X for the contract. The production capacity of Z was 10% higher than the capacity of X. Since Y was eager to

get the materials on time, they would be attracted to Z's larger capacity. However, no one outside of company X knows precisely what X's capacity is, and it is common in the industry for delays to occur. Thus X's 10 percent lower capacity than Z may not be detected for a long time, if ever. The subject was told that 'once you have secured the contract, your company can find many plausible excuses to explain delays. If you were to exaggerate your company's production capacity, you would have an excellent chance of winning the contract'.

After reading the scenario the participants read that

Your company has allowed 15% of the value of the contract for expenses toward getting the contract. The availability of such an expense account is common practice in most contract-based dealings. You have been told that you may use this money at your discretion, to give it to the Y chief negotiator as a gift so as to increase your chances of getting the contract.

Measures

Participants were then asked to respond to a number of questions on 9-point scales, as if they were the chief negotiator, and then to predict the responses of others placed in a similar situation, such as 'How likely would it be for *most chief negotiators* in a similar situation to use this money as a gift for the Y chief negotiator?' Responses to these questions represented different approaches to assessing the degree of deception in the responses of the participants. The questions will be described in the results section.

Analyses

The data were analyzed both at the cultural level, where the $N = 8$, and at the individual differences or personality level, where the N s were as shown below.

The data were analyzed also by ANOVAs. When this was done the two Japanese samples were combined. To control for possible response sets we computed these ANOVAs with two kinds of scores: either the

raw scores or the scores that were obtained after within-subject standardization. For this latter step, we used all the 9-point scales that the subject had responded to. The standardization sets all the subjects' scores to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.00. In most cases we will present the unstandardized as well as the standardized results.

Results

As Campbell (1964) has pointed out, the first fact that needs to be established in cross cultural investigations is that the participants from the various cultures perceived the task in more or less the same way. Thus we must first look at similarities across cultures. To do that we correlated the dependent variables from each culture among themselves, and examined what similarities were observed.

Telling the truth in this case is admitting that one's company has less capacity than the competitor company. Thus lying is indicating that one's company has equal or more capacity than the rival company. Also, indicating that one will make gifts to the person one is negotiating with is an indication of tendencies to bribe, which is related to corruption. We mentioned earlier our expectation that tendencies to lie and corruption are likely to be correlated.

We found that in all cultures the degree of lying was significantly correlated with the judgment that 'Most chief negotiators would give a gift'. In all cultures there was a significant correlation between the degree of lying and the perceived probability of getting the contract. The correlations ranged from 0.36 (Germany) to 0.66 (the Netherlands). There were also significant correlations between lying and the perceived importance 'to you personally of getting the contact'. In short, there are enough similarities to suggest that we have comparable data across the eight countries.

Position of the Cultures on the Collectivism-Individualism Continuum

The position of the cultures on the collectivism-individualism continuum was assumed to be reflected in Hofstede's (1980) measurements. Hofstede's individualism scores of our cultures were as follows: US 91, Australia 90, the Netherlands 80, Germany 67, Japan 46, Greece 35,² Hong Kong 35. Korea was not included in Hofstede's sample but there is evidence (see Kim et al. 1994; Triandis, 1995) that it is collectivist.

However, since these measurements are 30 years old, we also measured the collectivism of our own samples, using two methods: (a) the attitude items of Singelis et al. (1995), and (b) the scenarios of Triandis et al. (1998). Triandis and Gelfand (1998) found convergence between these two sets of measurements of horizontal and vertical idiocentrism and allocentrism.

Specifically, the Ss responded to 32 randomly ordered attitude items, developed by Singelis et al. (1995), that measure the horizontal and vertical aspects of idiocentrism and allocentrism. This scale was generated with input from both western and eastern countries. The 32 by 32 matrix of correlations among the 32 items was submitted to several principal components factor analyses. We did factor analyses with varimax rotations separately within each country. In addition, a pancultural ($N = 1517$) factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted. In all factor analyses the scree plots showed that there were five factors. We identified HI, HC, and VC factors plus two factors that reflected competition. One was broad, and was interpreted as vertical individualism (VI). The other was narrow and included only items that used the word 'competition' (e.g. 'I enjoy working in situations involving competition'). Since factor analysis can produce artificial factors, based on the mischance that several items used the same word, we decided to

Table 1 Mean factor scores (based on pancultural analysis) for horizontal individualism (HI) attitude items, percentage endorsing the HI option for the scenario items, and country scores on the Berlin corruption index (CI)

Country	HI attitude item scores	% HI scenario responses	CI
USA	0.63	36	7.8
Australia	0.62	39	8.8
The Netherlands	0.52	43	8.7
Germany	0.55	39	8.1
Japan I	0.11	35	6.7
Japan II	0.11	N.A.	6.7
Greece	0.44	32	4.0
Hong Kong	0.32	25	7.1
Korea	0.43	31	4.3

Notes: Countries are ordered on the basis of Hofstede's (1980) rankings from high to low individualism. Attitude items scores are standardized on the basis of individual responses from all items in the experiment on a 9-point scale, and positive scores in all countries reflect a general tendency to endorse HI items. Scores on the CI scale range from 0 to 10, with 10 representing no corruption and 0 representing extreme corruption. Scenario responses were not obtained in the Japan II sample.

ignore the fifth factor, which in any case accounted for the least variance.

Summing the scores of the items that loaded strongly on a given factor created scores on the four culture variables. Means for each culture were then computed.

Inspection of these means indicated that there were no relationships between Hofstede's rank-order and the means on the VI and VC factors. In fact the student samples generally disagreed with most vertical items, so the VI and VC scores suffered from restriction of range. On the other hand, the country means on the horizontal individualist factor were quite consistent with Hofstede's rank-order (rank-order correlation of 0.81, $p < .03$). The horizontal collectivist measures tended to be consistent also. Since hypothesis 1 specifically mentions horizontal individualist countries, we present in Table 1 only the HI scores.

Note that the standardized scores of Table 1 are computed on the basis of each individual's scores on all questions with 9-point scales. The scores in Table 1 are mostly

positive because the research participants accepted most of the horizontal and rejected most of the vertical attitude items.

In addition, to measure vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism with another method (Triandis et al., 1998), 16 scenarios were presented with a four-answer multiple choice response format. Each response had been pretested to reflect VI, HI, VC or HC.

The percentages of the participants in each sample who endorsed each response were used as a basis for the computation of the relative preferences for individualist or collectivist answers. Consistent with the responses to the attitude items, in all countries the horizontal answers were endorsed more often (average 32.25% of the time; range 30 to 35) than the vertical answers (average 16.1%; range 14 to 20).

Table 1 shows the placement of the countries according to Hofstede's scores (column 1), according to our measurements based on the attitude items (column 2), the scenarios (column 3) and according to the Berlin

Table 2 Reported likelihood that 'most chief negotiators' would use a discretionary fund as a gift (MOST), and likelihood that 'YOU' (YOU, the subject) would use the money as a gift

Country	MOST (raw)	MOST (std)	YOU (raw)	YOU (std)
USA	5.7	-0.14	4.6	-0.71
Australia	4.7	-0.69	4.0	-1.02
The Netherlands	3.5	-1.26	2.9	-1.57
Germany	6.0	0.02	4.4	-0.64
Japan I	7.0	0.48	6.1	-0.00
Japan II	7.1	0.53	5.7	-0.07
Greece	7.1	0.19	5.4	-0.54
Hong Kong	5.6	-0.29	4.8	-0.66
Korea	6.5	0.13	5.3	-0.54

Notes: Raw scores range from 1 (not at all likely) to 9 (very likely). Standardized scores (std) were calculated on the basis of individual responses from all items in the experiment on a 9-point scale. Omnibus ANOVAs by column are all significant ($p < .0001$): column 1 $F(7, 745) = 28.5$; column 2 $F(7, 745) = 25.4$; column 3 $F(7, 745) = 12.7$; column 4 $F(7, 745) = 12.2$.

Corruption Index (column 4). It is clear that according to our HI measurements the four countries on the top of Table 1 are high and the four countries on the bottom of Table 1 are low on horizontal individualism. Australia and the Netherlands are especially high on horizontal individualism and Japan is especially low. Also the Berlin Index shows less corruption for the four countries at the top and more corruption for the countries at the bottom of the Table.

The rank order correlation between the HI column based on the attitude items and the HI column based on the scenarios is 0.64, $p < .05$ (one tailed). This suggests convergent validity.

According to the attitude items, Greece and Korea deviated from Hofstede's ranking, because they turned out to be more individualist than expected. This may reflect recent large increases in gross national product per capita. Also, the US was not individualist enough according to the scenario measurements, but there are differences in collectivism among the US states (Vandello and Cohen, 1999), and while Hofstede's data were collected mostly on the coasts our data

came from the midwest of the USA. In any case our measurements are more or less consistent with Hofstede's ranking. We thus decided to preserve Hofstede's ranking, but bear in mind, when interpreting the lying data, that some changes may have occurred in the intervening years.

Test of Hypothesis 1

According to this hypothesis deception and corruption should be highest in vertical collectivist cultures such as Japan and Korea and lowest in horizontal individualist cultures such as Australia and the Netherlands. Table 2 presents the relevant data. When asked 'How likely would it be for most chief negotiators in a similar situation to use the money as a gift to the Y negotiator?' Japan and Korea had the highest scores, though Greece was also very high. The Netherlands and Australia had the lowest scores. The HI scores can also be rank-order correlated with the Berlin Index. The rank-order correlation is .64, which is $p < .05$ (one tail). Thus, it would appear that cultures high in HI tend to have low levels of corruption.

When asked 'How likely is it that you

Table 3 Mean responses by country to the question: 'what would most chief negotiators do in a similar situation? Claim that your company's production is . . .?'

Country	Production capacity
USA	4.9
Australia	4.0
The Netherlands	3.5
Germany	5.0
Japan I	5.3
Japan II	4.7
Greece	7.1
Hong Kong	6.1
Korea	6.5

Notes: The possible range for responses is -10% (the truthful response) to +10% (an exaggeration of actual capacity). The country effect is significant $F(7, 703) = 2.9, p < .005$.

would use the money as a gift to the Y negotiator?' the ratings were less extreme, but the pattern was the same. Again, Japan, Greece and Korea had the highest scores and the Netherlands and Australia the lowest scores.

The Hong Kong level of corruption is low; Hofstede's data would have suggested a score similar to the score of the other collectivists. However, Hofstede's data were collected in the 1960s. Hong Kong's standard of living is now among the highest in the world (*The Economist*, 21 September 1996). Thus the Hong Kong data are not surprising. Japan, on the other hand, in spite of its tremendous gross national product per capita, remains collectivist, even though some recent work suggests that change toward individualism might be occurring (Takano and Osaka, 1999).

We also asked, 'What would most chief negotiators do in a similar situation? Claim that your company's production is . . . ' to which the subjects responded on a scale that ranged from 10% higher than Z's to 10% lower than Z's. Of course, the latter point was the accurate (no lie) position.

Table 3 shows these results. Clearly, in all cultures the chief negotiators were perceived as likely to lie and to claim that they had more

capacity than their competitor, but the collectivists were generally more likely to see the chief negotiators as deceptive than were the individualists. Interestingly, the Berlin Corruption Index (CI) was correlated .90 with the participants' mean responses to this question, using the Spearman rank-order correlation which was significant ($p < .01$). This suggests again that lying and corruption are related, and speaks to the validity of the measurements obtained from the responses to the scenario.

When asked, 'As a chief negotiator you are going to claim that your production capacity is . . . ' on a scale from -10 to +10 % in relation to the capacity of your competitor (where -10% is the accurate statement) the samples provided the results shown in Table 4. Again, in all cultures the chief negotiators lied. On this scale, the Hong Kong participants were more extreme in lying followed by Greece, Korea, and Japan. The US mean indicated that the participants lied only to the extent of claiming that they had the same capacity as their competitor. The samples from the USA, Australia, the Netherlands and Germany did not lie as much as the samples from the other cultures. The rank-order correlation between our HI score

Table 4 Mean responses by country to the question: 'As a chief negotiator you are going to claim that your production capacity is . . .', and the percentage of people in each sample who gave a completely truthful answer (–10%)

Country	Production capacity (%)	Truthful responses (%)
USA	–0.1	20.0
Australia	0.7	18.6
The Netherlands	2.3	12.2
Germany	1.9	6.2
Japan I	3.2	1.1
Japan II	2.5	0.0
Greece	3.6	3.3
Hong Kong	6.1	5.3
Korea	3.3	9.8

Note: The possible range for responses in the 'production capacity' column is –10% (the truthful response) to +10% (an exaggeration of actual capacity). The country effect is significant $F(7, 714) = 8.9, p < .0001$.

and the claimed production capacity is .83 ($p < .01$, one tail).

Table 4 also shows the percentages of each sample that told the truth, i.e. that they had 10% less capacity than their competitor. These results are the most dramatic. In the individualist cultures 6.2% to 20% of the samples actually told the truth; in the collectivist cultures there were cases where not a single participant told the truth, as well as a case where 9.8% of the sample told the truth. The distributions overlap, but the mean of the individualists is 14.25%, and the mean of the collectivists is 3.9% telling the truth. The rank-order correlation between our HI measure and the percentage of respondents telling the truth is .83 ($p < .01$, one tail). The results of Table 4 are stronger than the results of the other Tables in support of hypothesis 1.

Given that cultures are not monolithic, as mentioned earlier, and our measurements are imperfect and the data in any one of the columns of Tables 2–4 are not totally convincing by themselves, we need to examine the total pattern of results. This pattern is consistent with hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2a

According to this hypothesis, if people in vertical collectivist cultures lie more than those in horizontal individualist cultures, they should feel especially guilty and ashamed. If HI is the best measure available, that measure should be related to the extent people report feeling guilty or ashamed. The rank-order correlation between our HI score and the degree of expressed guilt was $-.71$ ($p < .05$); the rank-order correlation of our HI score and the degree of expressed shame was $-.93$ ($p < .005$, one tail).

More specifically, after the subjects lied, they were asked to report their emotional reactions. The emotional reactions of those from collectivist cultures were somewhat stronger than the reactions of those from individualist cultures. For instance: 'After making this decision, rate the extent to which you feel: *guilt*'. A 5-point scale was used. Table 5 shows the data. A MANOVA indicated that there was a highly significant ($p < .0001$) difference between the samples in their emotional reactions. ANOVAS on *guilt*, *shame*, and *disgust* indicated that the Japanese, Hong Kong, and Korean samples were significantly ($p < .0001$) higher than the USA,

Table 5 Mean emotional reactions after reporting production capacity

Country	Guilt	Shame	Elation	Disgust	Happy
USA	2.3	2.0	2.3	1.9	2.7
Australia	2.3	2.0	2.5	2.1	2.9
The Netherlands	2.2	2.2	2.9	1.7	2.6
Germany	2.2	2.0	3.0	2.7	2.2
Japan I	2.9	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.6
Japan II	3.3	2.9	2.5	3.3	2.2
Greece	2.3	2.1	2.9	2.1	3.0
Hong Kong	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.5
Korea	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.5

Note: Responses on a 5-point scale where 1 indicates no experience of the emotion, and 5 indicates experience of the emotion. Omnibus ANOVAs are all significant ($p < .0002$): Guilt $F(7, 745) = 5.4$; Shame $F(7, 745) = 8.3$; Elation $F(7, 745) = 6.3$; Disgust $F(7, 745) = 13.6$; Happy $F(7, 745) = 4.2$.

Australia, Germany, and the Netherlands samples. Since we did not know whether Greece should be grouped with the former or the latter we did analyses in both ways, and found that the Greeks were not different from the individualist samples on these three emotions, but they were different from the collectivist samples. On *elation* we found no cultural differences. On *happy* we did not obtain a significant difference between the samples, but when the Greeks were grouped with the individualist samples there was a significant ($p < .007$) difference between the Greek and the collectivist samples. In sum, hypothesis 2a received support, and thus hypothesis 2b was rejected.

Hypothesis 3

According to this hypothesis, idiocentric individuals with their concern for winning in competitions will be more likely to lie in a scenario situation such as the one we used. Conversely, allocentrics not being too concerned with winning will be less likely to lie.

To test this hypothesis we correlated, within each country, the *average* standardized idiocentrism and allocentrism scores obtained from the attitude items with the respondents' claimed production levels

(where higher production capacity indicates more deception).

In all countries, except in Japan, there was a positive, though not always statistically significant, correlation between idiocentrism and deception. Korea had the highest correlation ($.22, p < .005$); Australia also had a significant correlation of $.20, p < .05$. Japan had a correlation of $-.10$ (NS). When all participants ($N = 827$) were used, the correlation was $.16, p < .0001$. Thus, within culture, idiocentrism is positively correlated with deception. This seems to be a cultural universal, because it was observed in seven of the eight cultures. The binomial test is significant ($p < .035$, one tailed), suggesting that in most cultures we might find idiocentrism to be related to deception.

In all countries allocentrism was negatively correlated with deception. This correlation reached significance only in Greece, where $r = -.27, p < .03$. However, when all the participants were used, the correlation was $r = -.08, N = 827, p < .03$. Thus, allocentrism is negatively related to deception. This may be a cultural universal since it was observed in all eight cultures, which by the binomial test is significant ($p < .004$, one tail). A combination of the two binomial tests gives $p < .004$.

.001, one tailed. In short, hypothesis 3 was supported.

Discussion

Reasonable support was obtained for three hypotheses: (1) vertical collectivist samples were more likely to lie in a negotiation situation than horizontal individualist samples; (2) in the samples where more lying was observed there were higher levels of guilt and shame than in the samples that did not show as much lying; (3) idiocentrics were more likely to lie than allocentrics. Personality did not account for much variance. However, in some cases results that accounted for little variance, but were significant, give clues for further research.³

Apparently, the greater competitiveness of idiocentrics resulted in their tendency to deceive in order to win the contract presented in the scenario. As societies adopt the market place as the ideal form of economic organization, do they also increase the chances that deception will become more common?

In this study the cultural differences effects are more powerful (rank-order correlations in the range of .64 to .90) than the within culture results (correlations with absolute values in the .10 to .27 range). This may simply reflect the stability of the data. When data from individuals are aggregated they are quite stable.

The data suggest that in all cultures people feel bad when they lie, especially when they lie a lot (e.g. the Korean and Japanese felt considerable shame, guilt, and disgust) suggesting that all recognized that lying is wrong, so this may be a moral universal. However, in some cultures a lie is a more significant transgression than in other cultures.

In short, it is likely that people in different cultures give different meaning to deception. For example, ethnographies suggest that traditional Greeks see lying as a game (Friedl, 1982; Handmann, 1983). Cultures may differ in the conditions under which people will lie.

For example the work of Aune and Waters (1994) suggests that Samoans lie to benefit their family; Americans lie to protect their privacy.

A universal generalization may be that individuals will lie when an important aspect of their self-concept is threatened. In this study we demonstrated that people in some collectivist cultures were more likely to lie than people in some individualist cultures, in a situation wherein their interdependent self could be threatened. Future research should examine whether individualists are more likely than collectivists to lie when their independent self is threatened (e.g. their privacy), and whether this is enhanced by situational factors such as accountability (Gelfand and Realo, 1999) or the nature of negotiation issues (Carnevale, 1995).

Furthermore, future research should examine cognitive and affective aspects of deception in negotiations. For instance, do people in individualist and collectivist cultures label an act as 'deceptive' differentially? Our results suggest that the answer is 'Yes'⁴ but more research is needed.

Within all cultures, idiocentrism with its emphasis on competitiveness can lead to more deception. On the other hand, allocentrism, with its emphasis on benevolence, can lead to less deception.

We conclude by noting several caveats about our use of negotiation scenarios. First, the data reported here were based on responses to only one scenario, which suggests that this particular scenario may be unrepresentative of negotiation situations, or may have had idiosyncratic characteristics that had important effects. It is of course difficult to collect multi-nation samples with many scenarios, but future research might benefit by comparing multiple scenarios to assess the generality of the effects reported here. Second, the data were obtained from students. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that these results will generalize to managers for a variety of reasons: (1) theory which is well

grounded and supported in laboratory contexts is likely to translate to real world contexts (Locke, 1986); (2) recent comparisons (Anderson et al., 1999) of field and laboratory studies have found comparable effect sizes across a broad range of psychological domains. Nevertheless, future research might examine responses to our scenario obtained from managers, negotiators, and other interesting samples.

Third, scenarios are by definition not 'real life' in that participants are required to simulate their own behavior in a hypothetical situation. This raises the question about involvement, and whether or not the participants would engage the same behavior in 'real life' or in a behavioral simulation. Although the data that we reported on the Berlin Corruption Index does suggest a measure of correspondence between our scenario results and the real world, cross cultural behavioral simulations may provide even better tests of culture effects.

It is important to note that lying in the scenario was observed at a high level in all cultures that were sampled. Indeed, in the sample where lying occurred least, it occurred in the case of 80% of the individuals (see Table 4). Thus one might conclude that, for negotiators everywhere, lying is the rule. However, there are at least three reasons that the scenario used in the present study may have produced exaggerated lying. First, in the scenario, telling the truth would have made the participant and their company appear inferior relative to a competitor, and certain to lose a contract. Second, the scenario encouraged participants to lie, and even implied that lying would be successful: 'Once you have secured the contract, your company can find many plausible excuses to explain delays. If you were to exaggerate your company's production capacity, you would have an excellent chance at winning the contract'. Third, the scenario encouraged participants to use corruption at the behest of their superiors. It stated: 'You have been

told that you may use this money at your discretion, to give it to the Y chief negotiator as a gift so as to increase your chances of getting the contract'. In other words, the scenario contained elements of a strong personal motivation to lie (e.g. to look better, to win), as well as social elements (e.g. to please superiors). We suspect that negotiations that do not contain these motivations are less likely to evoke lying behavior. It is interesting to note in this context that laboratory studies of negotiation behavior, carried out in the USA, typically report low levels of overt lying (see O'Connor and Carnevale, 1997).

Nevertheless, we believe that the data reported here that indicate that a culture-level effect may be the opposite of an individual level effect, are especially intriguing and deserving of further inquiry.

Appendix: A Version of the Scenario, Used in the USA

You are the chief negotiator of a team of 10 negotiators from your company, FAP. You are negotiating an important contract with a team from another company, IWA, located in America. The contract is regarding supplying materials to IWA. You have had a very cooperative relationship with IWA for years.

You are aware that one of your competitors in the supplying industry, another American company called MOTO, is also trying to get the contract from IWA. You know for sure that MOTO's capacity is 10% higher than FAP's. Since IWA is eager to get the materials as soon as possible, they would be attracted by MOTO's large production capacity. However, no one outside of your company (i.e. FAP) knows precisely what FAP's production capacity is, and it is common in the industry for delays to occur. Thus, FAP's 10% lower capacity than MOTO's may not be detected for a long time, if ever. And once you have secured the contract, FAP can find many plausible excuses to explain delays. If you were to exaggerate FAP's pro-

duction capacity, you would have an excellent chance at winning the contract.

Five out of 10 members of your team instruct you to inform the IWA negotiator that the capacity of FAP is 10% higher than MOTO's. Your negotiation team consists of negotiation specialists whose evaluations are important to you. Therefore, whether or not you get the contract will have important implications for your career.⁵

Notes

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- 1 For example, Robert House and his associates (personal communication, March 2000) have examined the meaning of leadership in some 60 plus cultures. In some investigations they used both student samples and managers. They found no important differences in the meaning of leadership between students and managers.
- 2 Greece was difficult to place on the collectivism-individualism continuum, because Georgas (1989) has reported considerable individualism in Greek student samples, but in traditional Greek villages and the islands there is still considerable collectivism (Dragonas, 1984). In any case, we will present the data using Hofstede's rank-order, and confirm the rank-order with our own measurements of the collectivism of our samples. Since all cultures are in transition, especially the cultures that have changed dramatically in terms of their gross national product per capita in the last 25 years (such as Greece, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea) we may not have today the full range on the cultural syndrome that Hofstede had 30 years ago.
- 3 For example, when a correlation between the presence of cholinesterase in the urine and IQ was detected, the correlation was .008, but it was based on an extremely large sample so it was significant. That suggested that it would be worthwhile to study the presence of various chemicals in the brain, and now there is a strong prospect that within a few years we will be able to elevate

the IQ of individuals by using pills. The ethics of this development are complex and were explored, in Sweden, at the International Congress of Psychology in July 2000.

- 4 A Chinese woman who heard an oral presentation of this study argued that she did not think that the scenario involved deception, 'because it was in the negotiator's role to get the contract, and getting the contract benefits the company, not the individual'. One can not hope for a better example of cultural differences in the meaning of deception!
- 5 For exploratory purposes we also manipulated the other company's country (Japanese company), the competitor company's country (Japanese), the accountability of the chief negotiator ('the negotiation team consists of other managers whose duties are such that their evaluations will have little, if any, consequences for your career'), and the consensus within the negotiating team ('all the members of the team instructed you to . . .').

However, perhaps because there was too much information for the participants to pay attention to, or because the number of respondents per cell was too low, these manipulations did not result in significant findings, and thus the results were not reported in the article.

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Résumé

La culture et la tromperie au cours de la négociation commerciale: une analyse à différents niveaux (Harry C. Triandis et al.)

Les auteurs étudient à différents niveaux d'analyse les relations entre culture, personnalité et tromperie dans une simulation de négociation commerciale internationale fondée sur l'utilisation de la méthode des scénarios. Dans cette étude, la tromperie est opérationnalisée comme la propension à mentir et à corrompre au cours de la négociation. Conformément aux prédictions, les résultats des analyses conduites au niveau des cultures à partir d'un échantillon de 1583 participants dans huit cultures suggèrent que le collectivisme culturel est positivement associé à l'usage de la tromperie dans les négociations ainsi qu'à des réactions émotionnelles plus importantes (la culpabilité, la honte et le dégoût) en cas d'usage de la tromperie. Au niveau individuel cependant, la variable de personnalité d'allocentrisme (qui consiste en les comportements habituellement observés dans les cultures collectivistes) est négativement liée à l'usage de la tromperie. Les principales implications théoriques de la recherche sont discutées par les auteurs.

摘要

商务谈判中的 文化与欺瞒

Harry C. Triandis, Peter Carnevale, Michele Gelfand, Christopher Robert, S. Arzu Wasti, Tahari Probst, Emiko S. Kashima, Thalia Dragonas, Daius Chan, Xiao Ping Cheng, Unichol Kim, Carsten de Dreu, Evert van de Vliert, Sumiko Iwao, Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi, and Paul Schmitz

文章对国际商务谈判中出现的文化差异、个人性格及欺瞒等现象及它们之间的联系进行了多角度的研究。文章作者通过对来自八个不同文化背景的1583人的调查发现来自‘集体主义’占主导文化的受调查者在谈判中有较多的欺瞒行为。同时, 这些受调查者对这种欺瞒行为表现出了较强烈的情感反映(如负罪感、羞耻感及厌恶感等)。文章对这种现象的实质进行了理论上的分析。