




Dimlington Terminal Low Temperature Study





Background Information



- Design of Dimlington Terminal (DT) in 1989 made use of ASTM A333 Gr 6 Post Weld Heat Treated Killed Carbon Steel piping specifications for temperatures down to -119°C
- Original design temperature was based upon piping section of BS5500, an approach which not used today.
- Before gas is supplied to National Grid, it passes through one of four Hydrocarbon Dew-point Reduction (HCDP) skids which ensure no drop-out across the grid from heavy ends/condensate/water. These skids are predominantly made up of ASTM A333 Gr 6 piping specifications
- DT has Emergency Shut Down (ESD) and Emergency Depressurisation (EDP) system installed to protect the Terminal from over pressure, minimise gas inventory and minimise uncontrolled release of flammable fluids

Scope of Investigation



- An 'Emergency Depressurisation study' was completed to model fluid characteristics during depressurisation following an emergency event.
- The study highlighted the HCDP skid tailpipes and vent header downstream of Emergency Depressurisation Valve (EDV) as experiencing low temperatures due to Joules-Thompson effect.
- A review of line list and process conditions was completed to investigate any other potential sections of DT pipework likely to experience low temperatures. Pipework highlighted in initial study were found to be only locations.


PSE Investigation (Simulation)



- The initial study looked purely at gas temperatures, not focussing on temperature within the metal itself.
- Process System Enterprise (PSE) were consulted to perform dynamic simulations of DT pipework metal temperatures.
- HCDP skid F was modelled first as this was the one which had the most information readily available.
- Simulation was carried out using PSE's proprietary Advanced Modelling technology gFLARE.
- 1 Base Case and 9 Sensitivity calculations were performed initially on Skid F (varying input temperatures/pressures etc)


PSE investigation Skid F - system schematic





PSE investigation System representation in gFLARE





PSE Investigation Key findings




- Process side
 - Metal temperatures of LT separator remain above design limit (-55°C)
- Vapour vent tailpipes
 - Metal temperatures are below modern design limit (-101°C)
 - Prolonged choked flow
- Further analysis was then completed to investigate low temperature risks in the flare header
 - Assessment of flare header temperatures when only one skid (Skid F) is depressurised and vapour vent tailpipe material remains low temperature carbon steel

EDV021F

p 3 in VA 2011 C262



Case 1: venting from Skid F only




PSE Investigation Key findings



- Process side
 - Metal temperatures of LT separator remain above design limit (-55°C)
- Vapour vent tailpipes
 - Metal temperatures are below modern design limit (-101°C)
 - Prolonged choked flow
- Further analysis was then completed to investigate low temperature risks in the flare header
 - 1. Assessment of flare header temperatures when only one skid (Skid F) is depressurised and vapour vent tailpipe material remains low temperature carbon steel: header metal temperature remains above -101°C
 - 2. Assessment of flare header temperatures when three identical skids (to Skid F) are depressurised simultaneously and vapour vent tailpipes are changed of stainless steel



Case 2: simultaneous venting from 3 identical skids; vapour vent tailpipes changed to stainless steel











PSE Investigation System analysis



- Factors that are expected to increase metal temperatures in tailpipes and 12" header
 - Upstream conditions
 - Starting temperature and pressure
 - Blowdown point location (temperature and pressure vary across the system)
 - Lower velocities
 - Smaller kinetic energy contribution d/s of blowdown points -> higher fluid temperatures
 - Lower heat transfer coefficient between fluid and wall
 - Metal mass
 - The thicker the pipe wall is the longer it takes to cool it down
 - The longer the pipe is the higher are the temperatures at its exit -> prevent low temperatures propagate to d/s lines (headers)
 - Wall material
 - Material with a lower LDT


PSE Investigation Key findings




- Process side
 - Metal temperatures of LT separator remain above design limit (-55°C)
- Vapour vent tailpipes
 - Metal temperatures are below modern design limit (-101°C)
 - Prolonged choked flow
- Further analysis was then completed to investigate low temperature risks in the flare header
 - 1. Assessment of flare header temperatures when only one skid (Skid F) is depressurised and vapour vent tailpipe material remains low temperature carbon steel: header metal temperature remains above -101°C
 - 2. Assessment of flare header temperatures when three identical skids (to Skid F) are depressurised simultaneously and vapour vent tailpipes are changed of stainless steel: header metal temperature can be lower than -101°C
 - 3. Investigation of the impact of stainless steel tailpipe design specifications on flare header metal temperatures



Case 3a: Investigation of the impact of stainless steel tailpipe design specifications on flare header metal temperatures






10", SCH 80s, 25m

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
Case 3b: Investigation of the impact of stainless steel tailpipe design specifications on flare header metal temperatures



p 12 in vent header



Case 3c: Investigation of the impact of stainless steel tailpipe design specifications on flare header metal temperatures




Metal temperature at pipe inlet (at pipe interior)

Metal temperature at pipe outlet (at pipe interior)

Fluid temperature at pipe inlet

Metal temperature at pipe inlet (at pipe exterior)
Metal temperature at pipe outlet (at pipe exterior)
Fluid temperature at pipe outlet



PSE Investigation Results summary



Case	Number of skids	Line	Length [m]	Material	SCH	Minimum metal temperature [°C]
1	1	3"-VA-2011	0.242	Carbon steel (insulated)	80	-120.2
		6"-VA-2011	0.818	Carbon steel	40	-114.9
		12"- Vent header	350	Carbon steel (A333 Grade 6)	40	-100.7
2	3	3"-VA-2011	0.242	Stainless steel	80	-122.6
		6"-VA-2011	0.818	Stainless steel	40	-109.3
		12"- Vent header	350	Carbon steel (A333 Grade 6)	40	-107.5
3a	3	3"-VA-2011	10	Stainless steel	80S	-122.1
		10"-VA-2011	15	Stainless steel	80S	-102.2
		12"- Vent header	350	Carbon steel (A333 Grade 6)	40	-104.3
3b	3	3"-VA-2011	10	Stainless steel	80S	-121.7
		10"-VA-2011	25	Stainless steel	80S	-102
		12"- Vent header	350	Carbon steel (A333 Grade 6)	40	-102.8
3c	3	3"-VA-2011	10	Stainless steel	80S	-121
		6"-VA-2011	50	Stainless steel	80S	-101.6
		12"- Vent header	350	Carbon steel (A333 Grade 6)	40	-99.5

Mechanical Investigation (Charpy Impact test)



- Several sections of pipework were removed from the redundant HCDP skid D for impact testing downstream of EDV.
- Material specification ASTM A333 Gr 6 requires charpy impact testing to result in at least 9J average and 7J from and individual test (based on 55mm x 5mm x 10mm sample)
- Samples were taken from Weld Centre Line (WCL), Fusion Line (FL) on Weld Neck Flange (WNF) and FL on tee.
- Samples passed ASTM A333 impact test at -121°C

Docition	Energy Absorbed (J)								
Position	Test 1		Test 2		Test 3		Average		
WCL		9		31		35	25		
FL WNF	1	.8		9		41	23		
FL Tee	3	6		51		35	41		

Further Investigation by Mechanical Department



- Full Stress Analysis of Tailpipes and Vent Header (On-going)
- As part of Stress analysis, confirm stresses are in line with original design at low temperature.

Membrane Pressure Stress Criteria

The Design Minimum Temperature shall correspond to the lowest metal temperature of the part under consideration coincident with being subjected to calculated tensile membrane pressure hoop stress exceeding $50N/mm^2$ (7250lbf/in²). (This being the stress level below which, historically, brittle fracture has not occurred).

- Further Charpy Impact tests to take place.
- Scope of remedial work to be confirmed following completion of the above.
- HCDP skids have never been depressurised in an emergency, but this
 will not form the basis of any decision going forward, as timing of an
 emergency depressurisation event can not be predicted.

Conclusion



- Original static model predicted low fluid temperature directly downstream of EDV whereas PSE's study also considered metal temperatures.
- This study allowed Perenco to assess how the low fluid temperatures affected the adjacent pipework and extent of low temperature propagation away from EDVs throughout the vent system.
- The work performed by PSE has provided Perenco with a detailed understanding of the transient behaviour of the Dimlington Terminal with respect to low temperatures.