




ANG CUI | ANG@CS.COLUMBIA.EDU




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp

Firmware Fat Camp!



Untenna!



With Zach Newman
zjn2101@columbia.edu



Last year...

WIN!

RAM Flash (ROM)



SOC

BCM 1100

Network

MIC



OFFHOOK
✓ Switch

-- VCC

GPIO

~~(Input)~~

Output

RAM Flash (ROM)



SOC

MIC

(Always On!)



Funtenna!

BCM 1100

Network



12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp


FUNTEENNA

Noun:

- 1: Software payload that intentionally causes its host hardware to act as an improvised RF transmitter using existing hardware, which are typically not designed for electromagnetic emanation.
- 2: Software which intentionally causes compromising emanation.

PRIOR ART

- **SigInt Awesomesauce, et. al**
 - TEMPEST Timeline: <http://cryptome.org/tempest-time.htm>




Peter Wright

MI5 Counter Intelligence
Author: Spycatcher




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp




12/27/13


Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp






"Greetings, dear sir!"



super
secret
crypto Telex




"#/#/1183XT"
G...r...e...e...t..."

Cable to mothership

PRIOR ART

- SigInt Awesomesauce, et. al
- Van Eck Phreaking, etc

PRIOR ART



Enabling sym flood protection
Disabling IP Forwarding
Boot Logging started on <dev>/ttyp1
Master Resource Control: previous runlevel: 5, switching to runlevel: 3
Starting personal-firewall (initial) (not active)
Initializing random number generator
done
Starting hotplugging services (usb)
done



Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks of Flat-Panel Displays

Fig. 1. Eavesdropped Linux boot screen visible on the LCD of a Toshiba 440CDX laptop (log-periodic antenna, vertical polarization).

Markus G. Kuhn

University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory,
15 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FD, United Kingdom
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/>

PRIOR ART




Fig. 4. Original and intercepted data signal at 7 m and 98 MHz (FM band).

The Threat of Information Theft by Reception of Electromagnetic Radiation from RS-232 Cables

Peter Smulders

PRIOR ART




Figure 7: Acoustic measurement frequency spectrogram of a recording of different CPU operations using the Brüel&Kjær 4939 microphone capsule. The horizontal axis is frequency (0–310 kHz), the vertical axis is time (3.7 sec), and intensity is proportional to the instantaneous energy in that frequency band.

RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis*

Daniel Genkin

Technion and Tel Aviv University
danielg3@cs.technion.ac.il

Adi Shamir

Weizmann Institute of Science
adi.shamir@weizmann.ac.il

Eran Tromer

Tel Aviv University
tromer@cs.tau.ac.il

Funtenna p0c

- Reference implementation to demonstrate feasibility

Funtenna p0c

- Reference implementation to demonstrate feasibility
- Open hardware & software
- Use hardware found on nearly all embedded devices

Funtenna p0c

- Reference implementation to demonstrate feasibility
- Open hardware & software
- Use hardware found on nearly all embedded devices



BEAGLEBONE - GPIO











VIA 9GAG.COM







DSP



DAC


DSP





DAC




LPF










DAC?




DAC?




WIRE...

LPF?



LPF?




WIRE...

OSCILLATOR?



OSCILLATOR?




SORTA...

POWER AMP?



POWER AMP?




WIRE...

BPF?



BPF?



WIRE...

ANTENNA?




WIRE!


Funtenna p0c

SoC


Funtenna p0c





Funtenna p0c



Funtenna p0c




Funtenna p0c




W_{in}

Reference Implementation



www.funteenna.org

Reference Implementation




12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp


DEMO

On-Off Keying



On-Off Keying


100,000 cycles / bit




Message Format

- „Prologue: 11001100
- „Message length
- „Hamming[7,4] code with extra parity bit

Results: Irregular Symbol Duration



Results: Sample Drift




Results: Bandwidth

12.5 MHz at 100,000 cycles / bit

= 125 bits / sec

≈ 16 bytes / sec

Theoretical Bandwidth



1,500 cycles / bit

\approx 8.3 kbit / sec

Other Improvements

- Frequency Shift Keying


- Protocol improvements:

- Packets of fixed size (fix sample drift; a little more efficient)

- Regulate duration better

Funtenna p0c meets reality

Would be so nice if GPIO worked this way...




But GPIO input usually MUX'd




But GPIO input usually MUX'd





12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp




ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE



UART-TXD

ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE


BCM RING




UART-TXD

AMBA: Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture


ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE



ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE




ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE



PL011 Datasheet <http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0183f/DDI0183.pdf>

ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE




```
259 /*  
260 ****  
261 chipcHw_freq chipcHw_setClockFrequency(chipcHw_CLOCK_e clock, /* [ IN ] Configurable clock */  
262                                     uint32_t freq /* [ IN ] Clock frequency in Hz */  
263 ) {
```


```
31 typedef uint32_t chipcHw_freq;  
32  
33 /* Configurable miscellaneous clocks */  
34 typedef enum {  
35     chipcHw_CLOCK_DDR,          /* DDR PHY Clock */  
36     chipcHw_CLOCK_ARM,         /* ARM Clock */  
37     chipcHw_CLOCK_ESW,         /* Ethernet Switch Clock */  
38     chipcHw_CLOCK_VPM,         /* VPM Clock */  
39     chipcHw_CLOCK_ESW125,      /* Ethernet MII Clock */  
40     chipcHw_CLOCK_UART,        /* UART Clock */  
41     chipcHw_CLOCK_SDIO0,       /* SDIO 0 Clock */  
42     chipcHw_CLOCK_SDIO1,       /* SDIO 1 Clock */  
43     chipcHw_CLOCK_SPI,         /* SPI Clock */  
44     chipcHw_CLOCK_ETM,         /* ARM ETM Clock */  
45  
46     chipcHw_CLOCK_BUS,         /* BUS Clock */  
47     chipcHw_CLOCK OTP,         /* OTP Clock */  
48     chipcHw_CLOCK_I2C,         /* I2C Host Clock */  
49     chipcHw_CLOCK_I2S0,        /* I2S 0 Host Clock */  
50     chipcHw_CLOCK_RTBUS,       /* DDR PHY Configuration Clock */  
51     chipcHw_CLOCK_APM100,      /* APM100 Clock */  
52     chipcHw_CLOCK_TSC,         /* Touch screen Clock */  
53     chipcHw_CLOCK_LED,         /* LED Clock */  
54  
55     chipcHw_CLOCK_USB,         /* USB Clock */  
56     chipcHw_CLOCK_LCD,         /* LCD Clock */  
57     chipcHw_CLOCK_APM,         /* APM Clock */  
58  
59     chipcHw_CLOCK_I2S1,        /* I2S 1 Host Clock */  
60 } chipcHw_CLOCK_e;
```

CLOCK_UART = 0x5


ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE




ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE




ARM / Linux / PL011 UART EXAMPLE





UART FUNTENNA 9600 BAUD




UART FUNTENNA 9600 BAUD





“UUUUUUUUUUUUUUU”




UART FUNTEENNA 460800 BAUD




UART FUNTEENNA 460800 BAUD




“UUUUUUUUUUUUUUU”




UART FUNTENNA “1843200” BAUD




UART FUNTENNA “1843200” BAUD



“UUUUUUUUUUUUUUU”




`0x00 > /dev/uart`



$\sim 1.8\text{MHz}$ CARRIER



OTHER POTENTIAL FUNTENNAS



UART on HDD

“Implementation and Implications of a Stealth Hard-Drive Backdoor”

OTHER POTENTIAL FUNTENNAS





UART on HDD
“Implementation and Implications of a Stealth Hard-Drive Backdoor”

12/27/13

Ang Cui - 30c3 - Firmware Fat Camp

Ethernet Interface

OTHER POTENTIAL FUNTENNAS



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UART on HDD
“Implementation and Implications of a Stealth Hard-Drive Backdoor”

Ethernet Interface

Firmware Fat Camp!

AUTOTOMIC BINARY STRUCTURE RANDOMIZATION

A U T O T O M Y

B I N A R Y

S T R U C T U R E

R A N D O M I Z A T I O N

A U T O T O M I C

B I N A R Y

S T R U C T U R E

R A N D O M I Z A T I O N

Idea 1: Remove code that should **never execute**



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MGCP
VRRP
HSRP
EIGRP
HTTP/S
SIP
SCCP
DHCPServer
Etc, etc...

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Lawful Intercept

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MGCP
VRRP
HSRP
EIGRP
HTTP/S
SIP
SCCP
DHCPServer
Etc, etc...

Lawful Intercept

Feature not configured? Remove it from the firmware.

Idea 2: Use “empty space” in firmware for
binary **randomization**

Basic Block A	Basic Block B	Basic Block C	Basic Block D
Basic Block E	Basic Block F	Basic Block G	Basic Block H
Basic Block I	Basic Block J	Basic Block K	Basic Block L



ORIGINAL DEVICE
FIRMWARE BINARY

Basic Block A	Basic Block B	Basic Block C	Basic Block D
Basic Block E	Basic Block F	Basic Block G	Basic Block H
Basic Block I	Basic Block J	Basic Block K	Basic Block L



ORIGINAL DEVICE
FIRMWARE BINARY



DEVICE SPECIFIC
CONFIGURATION

Basic Block A	Basic Block B	Basic Block C	Basic Block D
Basic Block E	Basic Block F	Basic Block G	Basic Block H
Basic Block I	Basic Block J	Basic Block K	Basic Block L



ORIGINAL DEVICE
FIRMWARE BINARY




DEVICE SPECIFIC
CONFIGURATION



Basic Block A	Basic Block B	Basic Block C	Basic Block D
Basic Block E	Basic Block F	Basic Block G	Basic Block H
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
AUTOTOXIC BINARY
REDUCTION




AUTOTOMIC BINARY
REDUCTION



ABSR INSTANCE A



ABSR INSTANCE Z



BINARY STRUCTURE
RANDOMIZATION


Code Execution Detector Pads


A U T O T O M Y


B I N A R Y


S T R U C T U R E


R A N D O M I Z A T I O N











Autotomy: Intractable for the general case, but feasible for most specific cases.

```
[0x41] ] -> FTP Server Timer-Process
[0x41] ] -> TCP/FTP Server
[0x41] ] -> Generic Call Filter Module
[0x41] ] -> GLBP
[0x41] ] -> dspdum process
[0x41] ] -> dspdum2 process
[0x41] ] -> HSRP (Standby)
[0x41] ] -> http client process
[0x41] ] -> htppc test process
[0x41] ] -> HTTP CORE
[0x41] ] -> HTTP CP
[0x41] ] -> DNS Snoop
[0x41] ] -> RCP Read Process
[0x41] ] -> RCP Write Process
[0x41] ] -> IP SNMP
[0x41] ] -> IP SYSLOGD
[0x41] ] -> TFTP Server
[0x41] ] -> TFTP Read Process
```


A U T O T O M I C

B I N A R Y

S T R U C T U R E

R A N D O M I Z A T I O N

```
STR R8, [SP, #0x60+var_40]  
STR R9, [SP, #0x60+var_3C]  
LDR R8, =stderr  
LDR R9, [SP, #0x60+var_48]  
MOV R6, #0  
MOV R5, #1
```




```
STR R8, [SP, #0x60+var_40]  
STR R9, [SP, #0x60+var_3C]  
LDR R8, =stderr  
LDR R9, [SP, #0x60+var_48]  
B loc_B09EC
```

loc_B09EC

```
MOV R6, #0  
MOV R5, #1
```

Transform: Basic Block Split





```
000B0A3C  
000B0A3C  
000B0A3C  
000B0A3C sub_B0A3C  
000B0A3C CMP R0, #0  
000B0A40 MOV R3, R1  
000B0A44 BEQ loc_B0A80
```

```
000B0A48 MOVLT PC, LR
```

```
000B0A80  
000B0A80 loc_B0A80  
000B0A80 LDR R2, [R2]  
000B0A84 LDR R2, [R2]  
000B0A88 TST R2, #0x100  
000B0A8C MOVEQ PC, LR
```

```
000B0A4C CMP R0, #2  
000B0A50 MOVGTE PC, LR
```

```
000B0A7C loc_B0A7C  
000B0A7C B loc_B0A98
```

```
000B0A90 LDR R1, =aFileSAndSAreI ; "Files ts and ts are identical\n"  
000B0A94 MOV R0, #1
```

```
000B0A54 LDR R12, =sub_3BD7C  
000B0A58 BX R12 ; sub_3BD7C
```

```
000B0A98 loc_B0A98  
000B0A98 LDMIA R3, {R2,R3}  
000B0A9C B __printf_chk  
000B0A9C ; End of function sub_B0A3C  
000B0A9C
```

```
0003BD7C  
0003BD7C  
0003BD7C  
0003BD7C sub_3BD7C  
0003BD7C LDR R1, =dword_FCBC8  
0003BD80 LDR R1, [R1]  
0003BD84 MOVNE R2, #0  
0003BD88 MOVEQ R2, #1  
0003BD8C TST R1, #0x40  
0003BD90 ORRNE R2, R2, #1  
0003BD94 CMP R2, #0  
0003BD98 MOVNE R0, #1  
0003BD9C LDRNE R1, =aFileSAndSDiff ; "Files ts and ts differ\n"  
0003BDA0 MOVEQ PC, LR
```

```
0003BDA4 LDR R12, =loc_B0A7C  
0003BDA8 BX R12 ; loc_B0A7C  
0003BDA8 ; End of function sub_3BD7C  
0003BDA8
```

DEMO

- REMOVING HTTP & SSH SERVERS FROM CISCO IOS
- CISCO 1841, IOS 12.4

DEMO

- REMOVING HTTP & SSH SERVERS FROM CISCO IOS

```
Cisco 2821 (revision 49.46) with 251904K/10240K bytes of memory.  
Processor board ID FTX1143A0KU  
2 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces  
DRAM configuration is 64 bits wide with parity enabled.  
239K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory.  
250880K bytes of ATA CompactFlash (Read/Write)
```

```
Feature disabled by ABSR
```

```
Feature disabled by ABSR  
Failed to set server status.  
Failed to set secure server status.
```

```
Press RETURN to get started!
```

```
p3wni3>  
p3wni3#
```

```
p3wni3#show run | include ssh  
boot system flash flash:ssh-14-uncompressed-123.BIN  
ip ssh time-out 60  
ip ssh authentication-retries 2  
ip ssh version 2  
transport input ssh  
p3wni3#
```

```
p3wni3#show ssh  
%No SSHv2 server connections running.  
%No SSHv1 server connections running.  
p3wni3#
```


DEMO

```
p3wni3#sh ip http server status
HTTP server status: Disabled
HTTP server port: 80
HTTP server authentication method: enable
HTTP server access class: 0
HTTP server base path:
Maximum number of concurrent server connections allowed: 5
Server idle time-out: 180 seconds
Server life time-out: 180 seconds
Maximum number of requests allowed on a connection: 1
HTTP secure server capability: Present
HTTP secure server status: Disabled
HTTP secure server port: 443
HTTP secure server ciphersuite: 3des-edc-cbc-sha des-cbc-sha rc4-128-md5 rc4-128-sha
HTTP secure server client authentication: Disabled
HTTP secure server trustpoint:


p3wni3#conf t
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
p3wni3(config)#ip http server
Failed to set server status.

p3wni3(config)#end
p3wni3#sh ip http server status
HTTP server status: Disabled
HTTP server port: 80
HTTP server authentication method: enable
HTTP server access class: 0
HTTP server base path:
Maximum number of concurrent server connections allowed: 5
Server idle time-out: 180 seconds
Server life time-out: 180 seconds
Maximum number of requests allowed on a connection: 1
HTTP secure server capability: Present
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HTTP secure server trustpoint:
```


Binary Autotomy: Cisco IOS Features




HTTP




HTTP | SSH



HTTP|SSH|X.25|ATM



HTTP|SSH|X.25|ATM|SCP



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