

High Performance Fuzzing



Introduction

Whoami


- → Richard Johnson / @richinseattle
- → Research Manager, Vulnerability Development
- → Cisco Talos Security Intelligence and Research Group

Agenda

- → Why Performance Matters
- → Targeting & Input Selection
- → Engine Design
- → Host Configuration







Why Performance Matters

Why Performance Matters

- Mutational fuzzing almost seems too easy
 - → Just throw some hardware at the problem
- Majority of CPU cycles are wasted
 - → Program load time vs file parsing time
 - → Fuzzing requires high I/O, blocking CPU
 - → Mutations on large files are inefficient

- Quantitatively analyze fuzzer designs
- Qualitatively analyze fuzzer strategies





Microsoft SDL Verification Guidance

Fuzzing is a requirement of SDLC Verification:

"Where input to file parsing code could have crossed a trust boundary, file fuzzing must be performed on that code. All issues must be fixed as described in the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Bug Bar. Each file parser is required to be fuzzed using a recommended tool."

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/cc307418.asp



Microsoft SDL Verification Guidance

Fuzzing is a requirement of SDL Verification:

"Win32/64/Mac: An Optimized set of templates must be used. Template optimization is based on the maximum amount of code coverage of the parser with the minimum number of templates. Optimized templates have been shown to double fuzzing effectiveness in studies. A minimum of 500,000 iterations, and have fuzzed at least **250,000 iterations since the last bug found/fixed that meets** the SDL Bug Bar"

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/cc307418.asp





Microsoft SDL Verification Guidance

- Required fuzzing is a good thing
- How did they calibrate?
 - → Iterations limited by practical resources
 - → Parsers with greater complexity require more resources
 - → Iterations is a poor choice for defining guidance
- What properties define the theoretical limit of available resources
- What are the best practices for fuzzing to optimize our effectiveness





Historical Performance Stats

- Microsoft Windows Vista 2006
 - → 15 months, 350mil iterations, 250+ file parsers
 - → ~1.4mil iterations per parser (on average)
 - \rightarrow 300+ issues fixed
- Microsoft Office 2010
 - → 800 million iterations, 400 file formats
 - \rightarrow 1800 bugs fixed
 - http://blogs.technet.com/b/office2010/archive/2010/05/11/how-the-sdl-helped-improve-security-in-office-2010.aspx
- Charlie Miller 2010
 - → 3 months, 7mil iterations, 4 parsers
 - → ~1.8m iterations per parser (on average)





Historical Performance Stats (cmiller)

- Charlie Miller intentionally went with a poor design
 - → Microsoft minifuzz is equally stupid
- Input Selection
 - → 80,000 PDFs reduced to 1515 via code coverage minset
- Targeting
 - → PDF Adobe Reader 9.2.0
 - → PDF Apple Preview (OS X 10.6.1)
 - → PPT OpenOffice Impress 3.1.1
 - → PPT Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2008 Mac





Historical Performance Stats (cmiller)

Engine Design

- → 5-lines of python to mutate input
- → AppleScript to iterate files with system handler

Performance

- → About 3 weeks each target
- → Reader: 3M tests, 2.2 8.5 sec / test
- → Preview: 2.8M tests, 0.37 15 sec / test
- \rightarrow Impress: 610K tests, 4 60+ sec / test
- → PowerPoint: 595K tests, 2 60 sec / test







Targeting and Input Selection

Target Selection

- 64-bit vs 32-bit applications (x86 architecture)
 - → 64-bit binaries are fatter than 32-bit
 - → 64-bit runtime memory usage is greater than 32-bit
 - → 64-bit OSs take more memory and disk for your VMs
 - → Some software only comes compiled as 32-bit binaries
 - → Some fuzzers and debuggers only support 32-bit
 - → 64-bit CPUs have more registers to increase performance
 - Optimization depends on compiler





Target Selection

- So are 64-bit programs faster?
 - → On x64? It varies either way to a small degree
 - Chrome Negligible
 - http://www.7tutorials.com/google-chrome-64-bit-it-better-32-bit-version
 - Photoshop YES?
 - 8-12% (but talks about unrelated disk i/o optimizations)
 - https://helpx.adobe.com/photoshop/kb/64-bit-os-benefits-limitations.html
 - \rightarrow On SPARC? NO
 - True story, but who cares
 - http://www.osnews.com/story/5768/Are_64-bit_Binaries_Really_Slower_than_32-bit_Binaries_/page3/





Target Selection

- Much more important: Minimize lines of code
 - → What is the ratio of time spent initializing program and executing actual parser code
- Optimization strategy
 - → Target libraries directly
 - → Write thin wrappers for each API
 - This allows feature targeting
 - → Patch target to eliminate costly checksums / compression
 - This is what flayer is all about (Drewery & Ormandy WOOT'07)





Input Selection

- Input is a numerical set
- Input parsers are (should be) state machines
 - → Specifications described using FSM
 - → Actual parser code typically not implemented using FSM
 - → LangSec Paper on high performance FSM Parsers
 - http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pete/pubs/LangSec-2014-fsm-parsers.pdf
- Goal: search space and discover new transitions
- Each search is computationally expensive
 - → We need to optimize for time





Input Selection

- Optimize input selection
 - → File size is very important
 - Mutations are more meaningful with smaller input size
 - Smaller inputs are read and parsed quicker
 - Some test generation approaches utilize large amounts of memory per-input-byte
 - → Specific feature set per input allows for focused targeting
 - Handcrafted or minimized samples
 - Feedback fuzzing or concolic testing automates creation of unique small inputs with different features






Input Selection

- Minset is good when it's not broken
 - → Peach minset tool is not minimal set algorithm
 - → Peach minset performs equivalent to random selection
- CMU Coverset
 - → Optimizing Seed Selection for Fuzzing USENIX 2014
 - https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-rebert.pdf
 - → Minset helps less than expected
 - → Unweighted Minset is the winner
- Charlie is redeemed, his minset tool actually works







Engine Design

Engine Design

- Generate new inputs
- Execute target with new input
- Detect failure conditions



Engine Design

- Generate new inputs
- Execute target with new input
- Trace target execution
- Monitor trace output
- Detect failure conditions
- **Detect non-failure conditions**





- Most important is the selection of mutators
 - \rightarrow AFL

Deterministic bitflip

1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 bits

Deterministic addition/subtraction

Values $\{1-35\}$ for each byte, short, word, dword

Little endian and big endian

Deterministic 'interesting' constant values

27 boundary values

Dictionary keywords

Havoc

Random bitflips, arithmetic, block move/copy, truncate

Splice

Merge two previously generated inputs





Most important is the selection of mutators

→ Radamsa

ab: enhance silly issues in ASCII string data handling

bd: drop a byte

bf: flip one bit

bi: insert a random byte

br: repeat a byte

bp: permute some bytes

bei: increment a byte by one

bed: decrement a byte by one

ber: swap a byte with a random one

sr: repeat a sequence of bytes

sd: delete a sequence of bytes

ld: delete a line





- Most important is the selection of mutators
 - → Radamsa

lds: delete many lines

Ir2: duplicate a line

li: copy a line closeby

Ir: repeat a line

ls: swap two lines

lp: swap order of lines

lis: insert a line from elsewhere

Irs: replace a line with one from elsewhere

td: delete a node

tr2: duplicate a node

ts1: swap one node with another one

ts2: swap two nodes pairwise





- Most important is the selection of mutators
 - → Radamsa

tr: repeat a path of the parse tree

uw: try to make a code point too wide

ui: insert funny unicode

num: try to modify a textual number

xp: try to parse XML and mutate it

ft: jump to a similar position in block

fn: likely clone data between similar positions

fo: fuse previously seen data elsewhere

Mutation patterns (-p)

od: Mutate once

nd: Mutate possibly many times

bu: Make several mutations closeby once





- Deterministic mutators first
- Permutations and infinite random mode
- Stack permutations to a reasonable level

Need feedback loop to assess effectiveness of new mutators





Execute Target

- Using an execution loop is slow
 - → process creation, linking, initialization
- Use a fork() server
 - → Skip initialization
 - → Copy-on-write process cloning is very fast on Linux
 - → Windows and OSX manually copy process memory
 - 30x+ performance hit over COW pages





Execute Target

- Windows black magic SUA posix fork() tangent
 - → ZwCreateProcess (NULL, ...) Windows 2000
 - No sections, threads, CSRSS, User32, etc.
 - → RtlCloneUserProcess Windows Vista
 - Works to limited extent
 - Applications cannot use Win32 API
 - → RtlCreateProcessReflection Windows 7
 - Designed for quick full memory dump creation
 - Does not restore threads
- Windows only does COW on mapped files by default
 - → Full minidump loader an option





Execute Target

Are you forking kidding me??

cygwin	linux
0 ,0	11110171


10000 - 0m46.972s 10000 - 0m2.263s

213 exec/sec 4419 exec/sec

msys native

135 exec/sec 574 exec/sec





A Forking Demo

Trace Target Execution

- Feedback loop fuzzing finally realized with AFL
 - → Allows qualitative assessment of fuzzing strategy
 - → Optimized instrumentation strategy
 - → Optimized feedback signal
 - \rightarrow Source code only
- Previous attempts at binary feedback were too slow
 - → EFS was overly complicated and used PaiMei
 - → BCCF uses COSINC code coverage Pintool
 - → Honggfuzz uses BTS





Trace Target Execution


- Hooking engine selection is critical
 - → Pin / DynamoRIO are slow
 - ~5-10x slowdown on block coverage
 - Can benefit from fork server

TurboTrace:

- 1. Fork self in LD_PRELOADed library.
- 2. Ptrace the forked child.
- 3. Break on _start
- 4. Inject a call to the actual function that will be doing repeated fork()ing.
- 5. Step over a call.
- 6. Repair the _start and resume execution.







TurboTracer Demo

Trace Target Execution

- Hooking engine selection is critical
 - → TurboTrace performance, 100 iterations
 - 20 50% speed increase

```
First test (without pintool, just instrumentation):

Pin without pintool on test_png: 55.03 seconds

Turbotrace without pintool on test_png: 37.24 seconds

Second test (bblocks pintool):

Pin bblocks pintool on test_png: 72.62 seconds

Turbotrace bblocks pintool on test_png: 51.07 seconds

Second test (calltrace pintool):

Pin calltrace pintool on test_png: 106.19 seconds

Turbotrace calltrace pintool on test_png: 85.24 seconds
```






Trace Target Execution

- Hooking engine selection is critical
 - → QEMU
 - Uses QEMU userland block tracing
 - Statically compiled binaries
 - Linux only
 - Readpng: ~860 ex/s vs ~3800 afl-gcc 4.5x slower
 - → DynInst
 - Static binary rewriting
 - Dynamically compiled binaries
 - Linux only for now (windows port in progress)
 - Readpng: ~2400 ex/s vs ~3300 afl-gcc 1.3x slower







AFL-DYNINST DEMO

Monitor Trace Output

- Logging is critical, tracers perform way too much I/O
 - → Only store enough for feedback signal
- Block coverage is weak, edge transitions are better
- Use shared memory

```
cur_location = (block_address >> 4) ^ (block_address << 8);
shared_mem[cur_location ^ prev_location]++;
prev_location = cur_location >> 1;
```






Detect Failure / Non-Failure

Failure

- \rightarrow Linux
 - #define WTERMSIG(status) ((status) & 0x7f)
- → Windows
 - Debugger is the only option
- Non-Failure
 - → Timeout
 - Self calibrate
 - Lowest possible timeout,
 - → CPU Usage
 - If CPU utilization drops to near zero for X millisec







Host Configuration

System Cache

Windows

- → Pre-Windows 7 used only 8 MB memory for filesystem cache
 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management
 - Set value LargeSystemCache = 1
- → Enable disk write caching in disk properties





System Cache

Linux

- → Enables large system cache by default
- → /sbin/hdparm -W 1 /dev/hda 1 Enable write caching
- \rightarrow \$ sysctl -a | grep dirty
 - vm.dirty_background_ratio = 10
 - vm.dirty background bytes = 0
 - vm.dirty_ratio = 20
 - vm.dirty_bytes = 0
 - vm.dirty_writeback_centisecs = 500
 - vm.dirty_expire_centisecs = 3000





Storage: HDD

- ~100 MB/s
- Cache commonly used programs proactively
 - → Windows Superfetch (default)
 - → Linux Preload
 - http://techthrob.com/tech/preload_files/graph.png
- Features are most useful in low memory availability scenarios
 - → Typical for fuzzing w/ 1-2gb memory per VM






Storage: HDD

- Use a solid state USB drive for cache
 - → Benefit is low latency, not high bandwidth
 - → Windows ReadyBoost (available by default)
 - Random access is 10x faster on flash than hdd
 - http://www.7tutorials.com/files/img/readyboost_performance/readyboost_performance14.png
 - If you aren't already using a device for caching, and the new device is between 256MB and 32GB in size, has a transfer rate of 2.5MB/s or higher for random 4KB reads, and has a transfer rate of 1.75MB/s or higher for random 512KB write
 - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2007.03.vistakernel.aspx
 - \rightarrow Linux >3.10 bache / zfs l2arc
 - 12.2K random io/sec -> 18.5K/sec with bcache, 50% increase
 - http://bcache.evilpiepirate.org/






Host Configuration











Storage: SSD

Major performance gains over HDD






Raid 0 SSD




Storage: Ram Disk


- Much faster than SSD, eliminates fragmentation
 - http://superuser.com/questions/686378/can-ssd-raidbe-faster-than-ramdisk (10GB/s - 17GB/s)
- Linux built in
 - \rightarrow ramfs or tmpfs
- Windows 3rd party
 - High amount of variance
 - https://www.raymond.cc/blog/12-ram-disksoftware-benchmarked-for-fastest-read-and-writespeed/
 - → SoftPerfect RamDisk is winner for free software
 - https://www.softperfect.com/products/ramdisk/





Host Configuration






SSD Ramdisk

Memory

- 32-bit memory limits
 - → Linux built in to PAE kernels
 - → Windows
 - Limited based on SKU of your OS
 - Driver compatibility is the claimed reasoning
 - http://blogs.technet.com/b/markrussinovich/archive/2008/07/21/3092070.aspx
 - kernel patching required
 - http://www.geoffchappell.com/notes/windows/license/memory.htm
 - http://news.saferbytes.it/analisi/2012/08/x86-4gb-memory-limit-from-a-technical-perspective/
 - http://news.saferbytes.it/analisi/2013/02/saferbytes-x86-memory-bootkit-new-updated-build-is-out/







Conclusions

Thank You!

- Cisco Talos VulnDev Team
 - → Richard Johnson
 - rjohnson@sourcefire.com
 - @richinseattle
 - → Marcin Noga
 - → Yves Younan
 - → Piotr Bania
 - → Aleksandar Nikolic
 - → Ali Rizvi-Santiago





[Concolic Testing]

- taint analysis
 - → instruction level tracing
- constraint solving
 - → translation to SMT

 \longrightarrow





Benchmark set

- AFL thoughts found X bugs, all found within 48h
- NIST bug set samate.nist.gov/SARD/testcases/000/001/297/crack addr-bad.c
- set of sliced vulns i sent before



