lab 1

个人信息

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实验环境

虚拟机: Windows 7专业版

虚拟程序: VMware Workstation 16

lab 1-1

实验要求


This lab uses the files *Lab01-01.exe* and *Lab01-01.dll*. Use the tools and techniques described in the chapter to gain information about the files and answer the questions below.

Questions


- 1. Upload the files to *http://www.VirusTotal.com/* and view the reports. Does either file match any existing antivirus signatures?
- 2. When were these files compiled?
- 3. Are there any indications that either of these files is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators?
- 4. Do any imports hint at what this malware does? If so, which imports are they?
- 5. Are there any other files or host-based indicators that you could look for on infected systems?
- 6. What network-based indicators could be used to find this malware on infected machines?
- 7. What would you guess is the purpose of these files?

实验过程

1. 首先将下载好的样本进行解压,得到如下图所示目录




2. 将 Tab01-01.exe 提交到 VirusTotal.com , 得到report




可以看到此时有46家杀毒公司都检测出来了这个文件是病毒

3. 将 Tab01-01.dll 提交到 VirusTotal.com, 得到report




可以看到此时有40家杀毒公司都检测出来了这个文件是病毒

- 4. 利用工具判断是否存在加壳
 - 1. 使用工具PEiD



2. 使用工具Exeinfo



可以看出没有进行加壳

5. 使用strings工具

1. 对 Lab01-01. exe 进行分析,得到如下结果(已忽略无效字符串)

```
CloseHandle
UnmapViewOfFile
IsBadReadPtr
MapViewOfFile
CreateFileMappingA
CreateFileA
FindClose
FindNextFileA
FindFirstFileA
CopyFileA
KERNEL32. d11
malloc
exit
MSVCRT. dll
exit
____XcptFilter
 _p__initenv
_getmainargs
initterm
 setusermatherr
_adjust_fdiv
 _p__commode
_p_fmode
__set_app_type
_except_handler3
_controlfp
_stricmp
kerne132.d11
kerne132. d11
C:\*
C:\windows\system32\kerne132.dll
Kerne132.
Lab01-01. d11
C:\Windows\System32\Kerne132.d11
WARNING THIS WILL DESTROY YOUR MACHINE
```

2. 对 Lab01-01.d11 进行分析,得到如下结果(已忽略无效字符串)

```
CloseHandle
Sleep
CreateProcessA
CreateMutexA
OpenMutexA
KERNEL32. d11
WS2 32.d11
strncmp
MSVCRT. dll
free
initterm
malloc
_adjust_fdiv
exec
sleep
hello
127. 26. 152. 13
SADFHUHF
/010[0h0p0
141G1[111
1Y2a2g2r2
3!3{3}
```

问题回答

Q1

通过实验过程2、3可以清晰的看见 lab01-01.exe 有46家杀毒公司检测出, lab01-01.dll 有40家杀毒公司检测出

Q2

根据VirusTotal中的反馈,可以看出时间应该是在2020-12-19

History ①

Creation Time	2010-12-19 16:16:19
First Seen In The Wild	2021-03-15 23:54:49
First Submission	2012-02-16 07:31:54
Last Submission	2021-09-13 02:43:00
Last Analysis	2021-09-13 05:57:48

Q3

根据实验过程3、4可以看出本次实验的样本并没有进行加壳

根据VirusTotal的报告,可以看出

1. exe文件有 Kernel32.dll 和 MSVCRT.dll

Imports

KERNEL32.dll

MapViewOfFile

UnmapViewOfFile

FindFirstFileA

FindNextFileA

FindClose

CopyFileA


CloseHandle

CreateFileMappingA

CreateFileA

IsBadReadPtr

MSVCRT.dll



2. dll文件有 Kernel 32. dll 、 MSVCRT. dll 和 WS2_32. dll

KERNEL32.dll

OpenMutexA

CreateMutexA

Sleep

CloseHandle

CreateProcessA

MSVCRT.dll

strncmp

initterm

_adjust_fdiv

malloc

free

WS2_32.dll

socket

closesocket

inet_addr

send

WSACleanup

WSAStartup

connect

shutdown

htons

recv

Q5

VirutTotal反馈的相关检测报告如下:

- 1 | File System Actions
- 2 Files Opened
- 3 C:\Windows\TEMP\CR_DB106.tmp
- 4 C:\Windows\TEMP\CR_DB106.tmp\CHROME_PATCH.PACKED.7Z
- 5 C:\Windows\TEMP\CR_DB106.tmp\SETUP_PATCH.PACKED.7Z
- 6 \??\MountPointManager

```
\SystemRoot\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb
   8
              C:\
   9
10 | Files Written
11 C:\Windows\Temp\CR_DB106.tmp\CHROME_PATCH.PACKED.7Z
12
             C:\Windows\Temp\CR_DB106.tmp\SETUP_PATCH.PACKED.7Z
13
             C:\Windows\TEMP\CR_DB106.tmp
14
              C:\Windows\TEMP\CR_DB106.tmp\CHROME_PATCH.PACKED.7Z
              C:\Windows\TEMP\CR_DB106.tmp\SETUP_PATCH.PACKED.7Z
15
16
              Files Deleted
17
18
              C:\Windows\Temp\CR_6BD02.tmp
19
              C:\Windows\Temp\CR_6BD02.tmp\setup.exe
20
21
              Registry Actions
22
              Registry Keys Set
              HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Google\Update\ClientState\{8A69D345-D564-463C-
              AFF1-A69D9E530F96}\ap
24
25
              Process And Service Actions
26
              Shell Commands
              "C:\Program Files\Google\Update\Install\\{652D9351-3518-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9526-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9500-4014-950-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-4014-9550-
              7C49A0F0D9B0}\69.0.3497.100_68.0.3440.106_chrome_updater.exe" --verbose-
              logging --do-not-launch-chrome --system-level
```

可以看出涉及到比较多的文件读写以及修改注册表和谷歌浏览器的更新操作

Q6

在对 Lab01-01.d11 使用strings工具进行检查时,发现了一个IP地址: 127.26.152.13。猜测此exe在运行以后会对这个IP进行访问

Q7

根据反馈中其在命令行中的操作可以得出,此程序和dll的功能应该是更新Chorme,并且删除和修改一 些默认的文件

lab 1-2


实验要求

Questions


- 1. Upload the *Lab01-02.exe* file to *http://www.VirusTotal.com/*. Does it match any existing antivirus definitions?
- 2. Are there any indications that this file is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it if possible.
- 3. Do any imports hint at this program's functionality? If so, which imports are they and what do they tell you?
- 4. What host- or network-based indicators could be used to identify this malware on infected machines?

实验过程


1. 将 lab01-02.exe 提交到 virusTotal.com, 得到report




- 2. 使用工具分析是否加壳
 - 1. 使用Exeinfo检测



2. 使用PEiD检测




3. 使用strings工具进行分析,得到如下截图



```
0P
PΤj
XPTPSW
KERNEL32. DLL
ADVAPI32. d11
MSVCRT. dll
WININET. dll
LoadLibrarvA
GetProcAddress
VirtualProtect
VirtualAlloc
VirtualFree
ExitProcess
CreateServiceA
exit
InternetOpenA
```

4. 使用OllyDbg进行反汇编



问题回答

Q1

可以看出有51家杀毒公司检测出此病毒

Q2

通过Exeinfo可以看出,此样本应该是进行了加壳操作,使用的壳应该是UPX 0.89。利用OD的插件OllyDump可以进行脱壳


备份 复制 二进制 汇编(A) Spac 标签 注释 断点(P) HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签 去除花指令	• • •
二进制 汇编(A) Space 标签 注释 断点(P) HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	
 汇编(A) Space 标签 注释 断点(P) HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签 	
标签 注释 断点(P) HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	
注释 断点(P) HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	:
断点(P) HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	
HIT 跟踪 RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	;
RUN 跟踪 转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
转到 数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
数据窗口中跟随 查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
查找(S) 查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
查找参考(R) 查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
查看 复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
复制到可执行文件 分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
分析 AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
AJunk Asm2Clipboard 书签	•
Asm2Clipboard 书签	٠
书签	•
· -	•
去除花指令	•
2010-100-1	•
超级拷贝	+
创建标签	
载入脚本(S)	•
用OllyDump脱壳调试进程	
OllyFlow 图表	•
用PEdumper脱壳调试进程	
超级字串参考 + (U)	+
界面选项	•



得到脱壳后的程序:



并可以使用OD进行反汇编



程序的开始就是Push EBP等对栈的操作,脱壳应该是成功了

Q3

关于imports, VirusTotal的报告如下:

Imports

ADVAPI32.dll

CreateServiceA

KERNEL32.DLL

VirtualFree

ExitProcess

VirtualProtect

LoadLibraryA

VirtualAlloc

GetProcAddress

MSVCRT.dll

exit

WININET.dll

InternetOpenA

从这些dll文件中函数的名字可以猜测,该程序有创建虚拟内存、保护、创建服务和联网的操作

Q4

在使用strings工具进行分析时,发现在 Lab01-02.exe 中出现有http://字样,由此将其后面的字符串进行拼接,猜测会进行问网络访问,访问网址大概为: http://www.wareanysisbook.com

lab 1-3

实验要求


Analyze the file Lab01-03.exe.


Questions

- 1. Upload the *Lab01-03.exe* file to *http://www.VirusTotal.com/*. Does it match any existing antivirus definitions?
- 2. Are there any indications that this file is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it if possible.
- 3. Do any imports hint at this program's functionality? If so, which imports are they and what do they tell you?
- 4. What host- or network-based indicators could be used to identify this malware on infected machines?

实验过程


1. 将 lab01-03.exe 提交到 virusTotal.com, 得到report





2. 使用工具判断是否加壳

1. Exeinfo



2. PEiD



3. 使用LordPE查看程序的节的信息

[PE Editor] - c:\users\nirvana\desktop\samples\上机实验样本\chapter_1l\lab01-03.exe								
1	Basic PE Header In	nformation —					ОК	$\neg 1$
	EntryPoint:	00005000	Subsystem:		0003		Save	
	ImageBase:	00400000	NumberOfS	ections:	0003			
	SizeOfImage:	00006000	TimeDateSt	tamp:	00000000	_	Section	ns
	BaseOfCode:	00001000	SizeOfHead	ders:	00001000 ?	+	Director	ies
	BaseOfData:	00002000	Characteris	ties:	010F		FLC	
	SectionAlignment:	00001000	Checksum:		00000000 ?		TDSC	:
	FileAlignment:	00001000	SizeOfOptio	nalHeader:	00E0	_ l	Compa	re
	Magic:	010B	NumOfRva	AndSizes:	00000010 +			
L								
	[Section Table							×
	Name	VOffset	VSize	ROffset	RSize	Flag		_
		00001000	00003000	00000000	00000000		000E0	
		00004000 00005000	00001000 00001000	00001000 00000E00	0000028C 00000200		000E0 000E0	1
		00000000	00001000	00000200	00000200		00020	3/1/

可以发现有三个区段, 并且区段名都抹去了

问题回答

Q1

可以看出有58家杀毒公司检测出此病毒

Q2

在VirusTotal得到的报告中,其检测出来的Imports中只有对 Kernel 32.d 11 中的 LoadLibrary 和 GetProcAddress, 由此猜测应当是存在有加壳或者混淆操作

通过工具对文件的检查,可以看出明显样本进行了加壳操作,并且判断出加壳版本是 FSG 1.0,不会手 动脱壳

Q3

VirusTotal反馈报告如下

Imports

KERNEL32.dll

LoadLibraryA GetProcAddress

可以看见这个程序只调用了 Kernel 32.dll,并且使用的函数是 LoadLibrary 和 GetProcAddress,猜 测这个程序应当做了加壳处理

VirusTotal中关于病毒行为表现的报告如下:

Network Communication ①

HTTP Requests

+ http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com/ad.html

IP Traffic

184.168.221.22:80

184.168.131.241:80

192.0.78.24:443

192.0.78.24:80 192.0.78.25:443

192.0.78.25:80

File System Actions ①

Files Opened

 $C: \label{local-Microsoft-Feeds Cache-73N0YS4B} C: \label{local-Microsoft-Fe$

 $C: \label{localMicrosoft} C: \label{localM$

 $C: \label{local-Microsoft-Feeds Cache-QZT35V7O-desktop.ini} C: \$

 $C: \label{localMicrosoft} C: \label{localM$

C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Feeds Cache\desktop.ini

Files Written

 $C: \verb|\Windows| System 32 \verb|\Config| system profile \verb|\AppData| Local \verb|\Microsoft| Feeds Cache and the support of the state of the state of the support of$

C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Feeds Cache\73NOYS4B

 $C: Windows \ System 32 \ Config \ system profile \ App Data \ Local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ 73NOYS \ 4B \ desktop. in in the local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ 13NOYS \ 4B \ desktop. In in the local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ 13NOYS \ 4B \ desktop. In in the local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ 13NOYS \ 4B \ desktop. In in the local \ Microsoft \ Micros$

 $C: Windows \ System 32 \ Config \ system profile \ App Data \ Local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ OI5ZC7Q8$

 $C: \label{local-Microsoft-Feeds Cache-OI5ZC7Q8-desktop.init} C: \label{local-Microsoft-Feeds$

 $C: Windows \ System 32 \ Config \ system profile \ App Data \ Local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ QZT 35 V7O \ App Data \ App Data$

 $C: Windows \ System 32 \ Config \ system profile \ App Data \ Local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ QZT 35 V 70 \ desktop. In initial \ Configuration \ App Data \ Ap$

 $C: Windows \ System 32 \ config \ system profile \ App Data \ Local \ Microsoft \ Feeds \ Cache \ WBF2QWVY \ and \ System \ Sys$

 $C: \label{local-Microsoft-Feeds Cache-desktop.ini} C: \$

~

Files Deleted

 ${\tt HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\setminus CLSID\setminus \{8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93\}}$

 $HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES \land CLSID \land \{8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F490-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F490-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F490-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805\} \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-045$ \land \{18AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-044E-11D1-B3E9-045 \land \{18AD9

 ${\tt HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\setminus CLSID\setminus \{CAFEEFAC-FFFF-FFFF-ABCDEFFEDCBA\}}$

HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\CLSID\{CAFEEFAC-FFFF-FFFF-FFFF-ABCDEFFEDCBA}\InprocServer32

Registry Actions ①

Registry Keys Opened

 $HKEY_CURRENT_USER (Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ Current \ Version \ (Ext) \ Stats \ (18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3)$

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Ext\Stats\(180F081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3\)\iexplore
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Ext\Stats\(76149788-D6F0-462C-B6EB-D4DAF1D92D43\)

 $HKEY_CURRENT_USERS of tware IMicrosoft Windows \ Current Version \ Ext\Stats \ (761497BB-D6F0-462C-B6EB-D4DAF1D92D43) \ Version \ Ext\Stats \ (DBC80044-A445-435B-BC74-9C25C1C588A9) \ Version \ Ext\Stats \ (DBC80044-A445-435B-BC74-9C25C1C588A9) \ Version \ Ext\Stats \ (DBC80044-A445-435B-BC74-9C25C1C588A9) \ Version \ Ext\Stats \ (DBC80044-A445-435B-BC74-9C25C1C58A9) \ Version \ Ext\Stats \ (DBC80044-A45-435B-BC74-9C25C1C58A9) \ Version \ Ext$

HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\CLSID

HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\CLSID\{8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93}

HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\CLSID\(8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93)\InprocServer32

 ${\tt HKEY_CURRENT_USER_CLASSES\CLSID\backslash\{CAFEEFAC-0018-0000-0151-ABCDEFFEDCBA\}}$

_

Registry Keys Set

- $+ \quad \text{HKEY_CURRENT_USER(Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Ext\Stats\{18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3\}\lives\plots\end{200}} \\ \text{HEY_CURRENT_USER(Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\NExt\Stats\{18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3\}\lives\plots\prot$

- + HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings
- + HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyEnable
- $+ \quad \text{HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Ext\Stats\{18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3\}\ iexplore\Version\New York (Note that the property of th$
- $+ \quad \text{HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Lext\Stats\{18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3\}\livexplore\Version\Lext\New Properties and Propertie$
- $+ \quad \text{HKEY_CURRENT_USER} \\ \text{Software} \\ \text{Microsoft} \\ \text{Windows} \\ \text{CurrentVersion} \\ \text{ExtStates} \\ \text{(18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3)} \\ \text{viexplore} \\ \text{Type} \\ \text$
- + HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Ext\Stats\(761497BB-D6F0-462C-B6EB-D4DAF1D92D43\)\iexplore\Time

~

Process And Service Actions ①

Processes Created

C:\PROGRA~1\Java\JRE18~1.0 1\bin\ssvagent.exe

C:\Windows\System32\ie4uinit.exe

C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.ex

C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe

Shell Commands

- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" SCODEF:1444 CREDAT:79874
- $"C:\PROGRA~1\Java\JRE18~1.0_1\bin\ssvagent.exe"-new$
- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" SCODEF:1444 CREDAT:79873
- "C:\Windows\Svstem32\ie4uinit.exe" -ShowQLlcon
- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" -Embedding
- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" SCODEF:1556 CREDAT:79873
- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" SCODEF:1556 CREDAT:79874
- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" SCODEF:924 CREDAT:79873
- "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" SCODEF:924 CREDAT:79874

.

Windows Searched

Shell_TrayWnd

Static

MS_AutodialMonito

MS_WebCheckMonitor

Synchronization Mechanisms & Signals ①

Mutexes Created

ConnHashTable<1444>_HashTable_Mutex

Local\!BrowserEmulation!SharedMemory!Mutes

Local\!IETId!Mutex

Local\WininetProxyRegistryMutex

Local\WininetStartupMutex

Local_!MSFTHISTORY!_

Local\c:lwindows!system32!config!systemprofile!appdata!local!microsoft!feeds cache!

 $Local \verb|\c:| windows! system 32! config! system profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. ie 5! the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. It is the profile! appdata! local! microsoft! windows! history! history. It is the profile! history! his$

 $Local \ \ limit to soft limi$

 $Local \verb|| c: | windows | system 32! config! system profile! appdata! roaming! microsoft! windows! cookies! \\$

根据报告显示,这个文件存在有网络行为:链接 http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com/ad.html、对桌面的一些配置信息进行修改、修改注册表信息

lab 1-4

实验要求


Analyze the file Lab01-04.exe.


Questions

- 1. Upload the *Lab01-04.exe* file to *http://www.VirusTotal.com/*. Does it match any existing antivirus definitions?
- 2. Are there any indications that this file is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it if possible.
- 3. When was this program compiled?
- 4. Do any imports hint at this program's functionality? If so, which imports are they and what do they tell you?
- 5. What host- or network-based indicators could be used to identify this malware on infected machines?
- 6. This file has one resource in the resource section. Use Resource Hacker to examine that resource, and then use it to extract the resource. What can you learn from the resource?

实验过程


1. 将 Tab01-04.exe 提交到 VirusTotal.com, 得到report





2. 使用工具判断是否加壳

1. Exeinfo



2. PEiD




3. 使用strings工具检测

```
CloseHandle
OpenProcess
GetCurrentProcess
CreateRemoteThread
GetProcAddress
LoadLibraryA
WinExec
WriteFile
CreateFileA
SizeofResource
LoadResource
FindResourceA
GetModuleHandleA
GetWindowsDirectoryA
MoveFileA
GetTempPathA
KERNEL32. d11
AdjustTokenPrivileges
LookupPrivilegeValueA
OpenProcessToken
ADVAPI32. dll
snprintf
MSVCRT. dll
exit
XcptFilter
exit
p initenv
 getmainargs
initterm
setusermatherr
adjust fdiv
 _p_commode
p fmode
_set_app_type
except_handler3
controlfp
stricmp
winlogon. exe
<not real>
SeDebugPrivilege
sfc os.dll
\system32\wupdmgr.exe
%s%s
BIN
#101
EnumProcessModules
psapi. dll
```

```
EnumProcesses
psapi. dll
\system32\wupdmgr.exe
%s%s
\winup.exe
%s%s
BIN
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
1ft1b^1h}1
1 \mid 1
m\dot{1}1
|1z\}1
Rich
.text
`. rdata
@. data
```

```
GetWindowsDirectoryA
WinExec
GetTempPathA
KERNEL32. d11
URLDownloadToFileA
urlmon. dll
snprintf
MSVCRT. dll
exit
XcptFilter
exit
_p__initenv
 _getmainargs
initterm
_setusermatherr
adjust_fdiv
_p_commode
p_fmode
_set_app_type
except_handler3
_controlfp
\winup.exe
%s%s
\system32\wupdmgrd.exe
%s%s
http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/updater.exe
```

4. 使用resource hacker工具查看



问题回答

Q1

从VirusTotal的报告可以看出,有56家杀毒公司检测出此文件为病毒

Q2

从两个工具的检测结果来看,此样本应当是没有进行加壳

Q3

VirusTotal的报告如下:

History ①

Creation Time	2019-08-30 22:26:59
First Seen In The Wild	2011-07-05 18:16:16
First Submission	2011-07-06 00:05:42
Last Submission	2021-09-09 00:18:57
Last Analysis	2021-09-13 08:41:09

可以看出,文件的创建时间应该是在2019-08-30

Q4

VirusTotal的报告如下:

Imports

ADVAPI32.dll

AdjustTokenPrivileges

LookupPrivilegeValueA

OpenProcessToken

KERNEL32.dll

CreateRemoteThread

MoveFileA

GetTempPathA

SizeofResource

LoadResource

GetModuleHandleA

OpenProcess

GetWindowsDirectoryA

WriteFile

GetCurrentProcess

CloseHandle

CreateFileA

GetProcAddress

FindResourceA

LoadLibraryA

WinExec

^

MSVCRT.dll



可以看出,该程序使用了 ADVAPI32.dll 、 KERNEL32.dll 和 MSVCRT.dll

从 OpenProcess 、 GetProcAddress 、 CreateFileA 、 WriteFile 、 LoadResource 等函数可以看出该程序可以创建进程、读写文件、加载资源,猜测会进行远程的资源加载

Q5

根据strings中的检测结果,可以看见此样本可能会访问一个网址: http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/updater.exe, 同时还有 URLDownloadToFileA 这个函数的调用,由此可以将文件下载当做特征进行检测

Q6

在resource hacker中有这样一段:

00007040	100 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00007050	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00007060	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00007070	5C 77 69 6E 75 70 2E 65 78 65 00 00 25 73 25 73 \winup.exe %s%s
00007080	00 00 00 00 5C 73 79 73 74 65 6D 33 32 5C 77 75 \system32\wu
00007090	70 64 6D 67 72 64 2E 65 78 65 00 00 25 73 25 73 pdmgrd.exe %s%s
000070A0	00 00 00 00 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 77 77 77 2E 70 http://www.p
00007080	72 61 63 74 69 63 61 6C 6D 61 6C 77 61 72 65 61 racticalmalwarea
00007000	6E 61 6C 79 73 69 73 2E 63 6F 6D 2F 75 70 64 61 nalysis.com/upda
00007000	74 65 72 2E 65 78 65 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ter.exe
000070E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00007070	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

可以看见这里也显示出了之前Q5中strings工具找到的网站。也就是说,在程序进行使用时,不是必须要将所有的信息都自己手敲出来,而是可以通过类似于include的方式,将外部资源进行导入,利用外部资源的一些信息、代码等执行,达到自己程度的目的。同时在对某个样本进行分析时,不单单需要分析源码或者反汇编里的代码,同时还需要注意到其引用的资源等,有时可能源文件是没有什么问题的,但是他加了一句对某个资源的调用,就会产生恶意行为。