

Malware Analysis

Chapter 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis

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College of Cyber Science Nankai University 2021/2022



- Basic Dynamic Analysis
- Sandbox
- Launch DLLs
- Monitor process
- Regshot
- Faking a Network
- Basic Dynamic





Basic Dynamic Analysis

Why Perform Dynamic Analysis?

- Static analysis can reach a dead-end, due to
 - Obfuscation
 - Packing
 - Examiner has exhausted the available static analysis techniques
- Dynamic analysis is efficient and will show you exactly what the malware does





Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach



- All-in-one software for basic dynamic analysis
- Virtualized environment that **simulates network services**
- Examples: Norman Sandbox, GFI Sandbox, Anubis, Joe Sandbox, ThreatExpert, BitBlaze, Comodo Instant Malware Analysis
- They are expensive but easy to use
- They produce a nice PDF report of results





GFI SandBox Analysis # 2307

Sample: win32XYZ.exe (56476e02c29e5dbb9286b5f7b9e708f5)

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- Without command-line options
 - Botnet C&C packets
- Not record all events
 - Stalling behaviors
- Anti-VM techniques
- Certain Environment





Launching DLLs

Launching DLLs

- EXE files can be run directly, but DLLs can't
- Use rundll32.exe (included in Windows)

rundll32.exe DLLname, Export arguments

• The *Export* value is one of the exported functions you found in Dependency Walker, PEview, or PE Explorer.



Launching DLLs

- Example
 - rip.dll has these exports: Install and Uninstall

rundll32.exe rip.dll, Install

- Some functions use **ordinal** values instead of names, like rundll32.exe xyzzy.dll, #5
- It's also possible to modify the PE header and convert a DLL into an EXE



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Launching DLL

- Installed as a service
 - rpr32x.dll has the export: InstallService
 - rundll32 ipr32x.dll, InstallService ServiceName
 - net start ServiceName





Process Monitor



Process Monitor

- Monitors registry, file system, network, process, and thread activity
- All recorded events are kept, but you can filter the display to make it easier to find items of interest




力 Process Monitor

- Don't run it too long or it will fill up all RAM and crash the machine
 - Use RAM to log events until it is told to stop capturing
 - run out memory to crash the system
 - limited periods of time
 - File->Capture Events
 - File->Clear Display




Launching Calc.exe





Process Monitor Toolbar



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
Filtering with Exclude

- One technique: hide normal activity before launching malware
- Filter on process name
- Filter on system calls
- Right-click each Process Name and click Exclude



Filtering with Include

• Most useful filters: Process Name, Operation, and Detail







Process Explorer

Process Explorer

- List all processes currently running on the system
 - Dlls loaded
 - Various process properties
 - Overall system information





File Options View Process Fi	nd User	- 14					
Process	PID	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	Description	Company Name	-
System Idle Process	0	96.81	0 K	24 K			
∃ ■.' System	4	0.09	48 K	560 K			
Interupts	n/a	0.88	0 K	0 K	Hardware Interrupts and DPCs	.	
smss.exe	260		224 K	748 K	Windows Session Manager	Microsoft Corporation	=
csrss.exe	348	< 0.01	1,252 K	3,164 K	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation	
i wininit.exe	400		892 K	3,084 K	Windows Start-Up Application	Microsoft Corporation	
□ services.exe	504	0.01	3,972 K	6,640 K	Services and Controller app	Microsoft Corporation	
	652		2,700 K	6,024 K	Host Process for Windows S	. Microsoft Corporation	
dllhost.exe	1716		6,176 K	4,804 K	COM Surrogate	Microsoft Corporation	
■ WmiPrvSE.exe	740		1,804 K	4,736 K	WMI Provider Host	Microsoft Corporation	
svchost.exe	724	< 0.01	2,972 K	6,012 K	Host Process for Windows S	. Microsoft Corporation	
☐ svchost.exe	772		13,776 K	11,760 K	Host Process for Windows S	. Microsoft Corporation	
audiodg.exe	3200		14,960 K	13,972 K	Windows Audio Device Grap	. Microsoft Corporation	
☐ svchost.exe	912		37,940 K	42,292 K	Host Process for Windows S	. Microsoft Corporation	
ii dwm.exe	3248	0.74	61,892 K		Desktop Window Manager	Microsoft Corporation	
svchost.exe	936	0.02	20,836 K	29,900 K	Host Process for Windows S	. Microsoft Corporation	
svchost.exe	1116	0.03	5,136 K		Host Process for Windows S		
svchost.exe	1260	0.06	10,840 K		Host Process for Windows S		
spoolsv.exe	1352		5,392 K		Spooler SubSystem App		
svchost.exe	1388		6,752 K		Host Process for Windows S		
svchost.exe	1500		2,472 K		Host Process for Windows S	•	
		< 0.01	1,216 K		gogoCLIENT	gogo6, Inc.	
vm vmtoolsd.exe	1728	0.07	7,260 K	10,368 K	VMware Tools Core Service	VMware, Inc.	7






- Services are pink
- Processes are blue
- New processes are green briefly
- Terminated processes are red









Handle Mode


Туре 📤	Name
Directory	\Windows
Directory	\BaseNamedObjects
Event	\BaseNamedObjects\crypt32LogoffEvent
Event	\BaseNamedObjects\userenv: User Profile setup event
Event	\BaseNamedObjects\userenv: Machine Group Policy has been applied
Event	\BaseNamedObjects\userenv: User Group Policy has been applied
File	C:\Tools\ProcessExplorer
File	C:\WINDOWS\WinSzS\z86_Microsoft.Windows.Common=Controls_6595b64144ccf1d
File	C:\WINDOWS\WinSzS\z86_Microsoft.Windows.Common=Controls_6595b64144ccf1d
File	C:\WINDOWS\WinSzS\z86_Microsoft.Windows.Common=Controls_6595b64144ccf1d
File	\Device\KsecDD
File	C:\Documents and Settings\xpbot\Local Settings\Temp\Perflib_Perfdata_25
File	\Device\PROCEXP152
File	C:\WINDOWS\WinSzS\z86_Microsoft.Windows.Common=Controls_6595b64144ccf1d
File	\Device\Tcp
File	\Device\Tcp
File	\Device\Ip
File	\Device\Ip
File	\Device\Ip





Properties


- Shows DEP and ASLR status
- Verify button checks the disk file's Windows signature
 - But not the RAM image, so it won't detect process
 replacement





Strings

Compare Image to Memory
 strings, if they are very different,
 it can indicate process
 replacement



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Detecting Malicious Documents

- Open the document (e.g. PDF) on a system with a vulnerable application
- Watch Process Explorer to see if it launches a process
- The Image tab of that process's Properties sheet will show where the malware is





Regshot



- An open source registry comparison tool
 - Take registry snapshots
 - Compare two registry snapshots





Regshot 1.8.3-beta1V5	_
Compare logs save as: One Plain TXT On HTML document	1st shot 2nd shot
Scan dir1[;dir2;dir3;;dir nn]: C:\Windows	Compare
Output path: C: \Users\student\AppData\	Quit About
Add comment into the log:	English ▼
	English ▼



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Windows注册表有哪些功能?



Faking a Network

Taking a Network

- Malware:
 - beacons out
 - communicate with a C&C server
- Fake Network
 - obtain network indicators
 - airgap between VM and Internet



Using ApateDNS to Redirect DNS Resolutions

Time Domain Requested DNS Returned 11:19:40 linkhelp.clients.google.com FOUND 11:19:44 www.google.com FOUND 11:19:44 www.google.com FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 oijlsiiwzv.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 oijlsiiwzv.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 oijlsiiwzv.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 gzpqyjdoml.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:40 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:40 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain		dow DNS Hex View			_
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11:19:46 oijlsiiwzv.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 oijlsiiwzv.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 gzpqyjdoml.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 gzpqyjdoml.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:48 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:49 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:40 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:40 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:40 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:40 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:41 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:42 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:43 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain	11:19:46	zqwpmuzjov.localdomain		FOUND	
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11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND 11:19:46 zqwpmuzjov.localdomain FOUND +] Attempting to find DNS by DHCP or Static DNS. +] Using IP address 192.168.119.2 for DNS Reply. +] DNS set to 127.0.0.1 on Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection. +] Sending valid DNS response of first request. +] Server started at 11:19:37 successfully.	11:19:46	gzpqyjdoml.localdomain			
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+] Attempting to find DNS by DHCP or Static DNS. +] Using IP address 192.168.119.2 for DNS Reply. +] DNS set to 127.0.0.1 on Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection. +] Sending valid DNS response of first request. +] Server started at 11:19:37 successfully. DNS Reply IP (Default: Current Gatway/DNS):	11-19-76	zawomuziov localdomain		FOUND	
+] Using IP address 192.168.119.2 for DNS Reply. +] DNS set to 127.0.0.1 on Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection. +] Sending valid DNS response of first request. +] Server started at 11:19:37 successfully. DNS Reply IP (Default: Current Gatway/DNS):					
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	11:19:46 [+] Attemp [+] Using [+] DNS se [+] Sendin [+] Server	zqwpmuzjov.localdomain oting to find DNS by DHCP or St IP address 192.168.119.2 for C tt to 127.0.0.1 on Intel(R) PRC ng valid DNS response of first started at 11:19:37 successfu	ONS Reply. 0/1000 MT Network Connection. request. ully.		
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Monitoring with Neat (included with Nmap)

```
Administrator: cmd - Shortcut (2) - ncat -180

C:\Windows\System32>ncat -1 80

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: 127.0.0.1

Connection: keep-alive
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/29.0.1547.57

Safari/537.36

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate.sdch
Accept-Language: en-US.en;q=0.8
```






- Open source sniffer
 - capture packets
 - intercepts and logs network traffic
- Understand malware network communication
- Chapter 14 discusses protocol analysis and additional uses of Wireshark.



Packet Sniffing with Wireshark






Follow TCP Stream

• Can save files from streams here too

```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 14) · wireshark pcapnq en0 20160703230...
GET /homepage/index.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: cc.nankai.edu.cn
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10 11 5) AppleWebKit/
537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/
webp, */*; q=0.8
DNT: 1
Referer: http://cc.nankai.edu.cn/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.6
Cookie: ASP.NET SessionId=lur2tcou1ybolkgkosgfcjub;
ITEMISUserAccount=wangz;
ITEMISWEB.ASPXAUTH=D328CEA165654EBEA54D65B9C36ADA140B2058F08F75204B7DC844
D0B296475C580FB83C02E62FBA9556AE38EDA871AEBFE92A1AE52B0EE296D9C90E8A4D061
0D0979D28EFDC8D7B63CF35314F4D0A5399359D079EDF2F226BC5407AD30A33F183889A17
A52B4F09C3C88B27FADA41E737E09D17BE35F03500725C35E167C9E940CDD40AF28C2F6FE
EDA7FB2346B3D5B
HTTP/1.1 200 0K
Cache-Control: private
Content-Length: 68066
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Sun, 03 Jul 2016 15:09:51 GMT
```









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
INetSim Fools a Browser





INetSim Fools Nmap







Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice



Using the Tools

- Procmon
 - Filter on the malware executable name and clear all events just before running it
- Process Explorer
- Regshot
- Virtual Network with INetSim
- Wireshark





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


Figure 4-12. Example of a virtual network





- Assist and conform basic static analysis findings
- Most of tools are free and easy to use
- Next chapter is Advanced Static Analysis using reverse engineering.





Lab 3-1

Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab03-01.exe* using basic dynamic analysis tools.

- 1. What are this malware's imports and strings?
- 2. What are the malware's host-based indicators?
- 3. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware? If so, what are they?





Lab 3-2

Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab03-02.dll* using basic dynamic analysis tools.

- 1. How can you get this malware to install itself?
- 2. How would you get this malware to run after installation?
- 3. How can you find the process under which this malware is running?
- 4. Which filters could you set in order to use procmon to glean information?
- 5. What are the malware's host-based indicators?
- 6. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware?



Lab 3-3

Execute the malware found in the file *Lab03-03.exe* while monitoring it using basic dynamic analysis tools in a safe environment.

- 1. What do you notice when monitoring this malware with Process Explorer?
- 2. Can you identify any live memory modifications?
- 3. What are the malware's host-based indicators?
- 4. What is the purpose of this program?





Lab 3-4

Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab03-04.exe* using basic dynamic analysis tools. (This program is analyzed further in the Chapter 9 labs.)

- 1. What happens when you run this file?
- 2. What is causing the roadblock in dynamic analysis?
- 3. Are there other ways to run this program?





Malware Analysis

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