#### Sensitivity Analyses

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The Lab @ DC

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
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When inputs change, do outputs change?

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
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- With different assumptions about error structures, does causal mediation estimate change?
- ➤ With different data collected, would causal conclusion change?

# Sensitivity to Model Specification



Estimating all possible regressions

 ${\rm Idea}$ 

➤ "Great Recession" following global financial crisis of 2008-2009 ("subprime mortage crisis")

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Moore, Powell, and Reeves (2013): two quasi-private, particularistic bills.

Estimate relationship

(presence of auto factories)  $\Rightarrow$  (Congressional votes)

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Estimate relationship

(presence of auto factories)  $\Rightarrow$  (Congressional votes)

Claim: **Local econ interests** at least on par w/ corporate campaign contributions, lobbying, public positions.

# Moore, Powell, and Reeves (2013)

#### Industry minus Non-Industry, Bailout support




Figure 1: First diffs, predicted prob MoC supports auto bailout, member from industry v. non-industry district, other vars at means.

# Moore, Powell, and Reeves (2013)




Figure 2: First diffs, industry v. non-industry district member prob of supporting bailout positive at any value of DW-NOMINATE score.

#### Insensitivity to Specification




Figure 3: Industry presence coef always positive in Bailout logistic regressions. Coef densities w/ industry presence and

#### Insensitivity to Specification




Figure 4: Industry presence coef always positive in Cash for Clunkers logistic regressions. Coef densities  $\mathbf{w}/$  industry presence and

#### library(olsrr)

Estimate (all) linear models

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- Estimate (all) linear models
- ▶ Provide model fit stats

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Hebbali (2024)

```
library(qss)
data(social)
```

```
social |> select(-yearofbirth) |> head()
```

	sex	primary2004	messages	primary2006	hhsize	age
1	male	0	Civic Duty	0	2	65
2	${\tt female}$	0	Civic Duty	0	2	59
3	male	0	Hawthorne	1	3	55
4	${\tt female}$	0	Hawthorne	1	3	56
5	${\tt female}$	0	Hawthorne	1	3	24
6	male	0	Control	0	3	25

```
lm_out <- lm(primary2006 ~ messages + sex + age +</pre>
               primary2004 + hhsize, data = social)
all lm social <- ols step all possible(lm out)$result
dim(all lm social)
```

[1] 31 15

head(all_lm_social)									
	mindex	n	predictors	rsquare	adjr				
4	1	1	primary2004	0.0261502651	0.0261470812	0.4			

3 2 1 age 0.0167659386 0.0167627240 0.459 3 1 messages 0.0032825640 0.0032727879 0.469

5 4 1 hhsize 0.0025142362 0.0025109749 0.469 2 5 1 sex 0.0001863186 0.0001830498 0.463 13 6 2 age primary2004 0.0409175309 0.0409112596 0.453

9

10

11

12

13

5

5

```
all lm social coefs <- ols step all possible betas(lm out)
```

```
all lm social coefs
    model
                   predictor
                                      beta
                 (Intercept) 0.2966383083
2
          messagesCivic Duty 0.0178993441
           messagesHawthorne 0.0257363121
3
4
           messagesNeighbors 0.0813099129
5
                 (Intercept) 0.3059095493
6
                     sexmale 0.0126509479
        3
                 (Intercept) 0.1055564253
                         age 0.0041515670
8
```

(Intercept) 0.2508820413

primary2004 0.1528795252

(Intercept) 0.3763534949

(Intercept)

hhsize -0.0293482475

0.2902800648




Figure 5: 'Neighbors' Coefs from All Possible Regressions

Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 0.08023 0.08032 0.08081 0.08080 0.08122 0.08145

#### All Coefficients




Figure 6: Coefs from All Possible Regressions

➤ So far, "show all the models"

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"model-based adjustments ...will give basically the same point estimates"

X	T	Y(0)	Y(1)	$Y^{ m obs}$
1	1	1	2	2
1	0	1	2	1
1	0	1	2	1
2	1	2	3	3
2	1	2	3	3
2	0	2	3	2

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$$\tau_i = 1 \quad \forall i$$

$$ATE = \overline{Y(1) - Y(0)} = 1$$

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$$au_i = 1$$
  $\forall i$ 

$$ATE = \overline{Y(1) - Y(0)} = 1$$

$$\widehat{ATE} = \left( \overline{Y(1)} | T = 1 \right) - \left( \overline{Y(0)} | T = 0 \right) = \frac{8}{3} - \frac{4}{3} = \frac{4}{3}$$

Matching

Suppose we 1:1 exact match on X:

$\overline{X}$	T	Y(0)	Y(1)	$Y^{ m obs}$
1	1	1	2	2
1	0	1	2	1
1	$\Theta$	1	$\frac{2}{2}$	1
2	1	2	3	3
$\frac{2}{2}$	1	$\frac{2}{2}$	$\frac{3}{3}$	3
2	0	2	3	2

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$$\widehat{ATE}_m = \left(\overline{Y_m(1)}|T=1\right) - \left(\overline{Y_m(0)}|T=0\right) = \frac{5}{2} - \frac{3}{2} = 1$$

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$$\widehat{ATE}_m = \left(\overline{Y_m(1)}|T=1\right) - \left(\overline{Y_m(0)}|T=0\right) = \frac{5}{2} - \frac{3}{2} = 1$$

Not just coincidence; matching removes  $X \to T$ .

#### Ho et al. (2007)

"Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference"




Figure 7: Before: Direction of Effect depends on Model. After: Effect indendent of Model.

## Reducing Sensitivity in FDA Example




Fig. 2 Kernel density plot (a smoothed histogram) of point estimates of the in-sample ATT of the Democratic Senate majority on FDA drug approval time across 262,143 specifications. The solid line

## How to Identify Sensitivity?

Different distributions; non-overlap




Fig. 3 QQ plot of propensity score for candidate visibility. The black dots represent empirical QQ

## Reducing Sensitivity in Candidate Visibility Example




Fig. 4 Kernel density plot of point estimates of the effect of being a less visible male Republican candidate across 63 possible specifications with the Koch data. The dashed line presents estimates for

## Paradox of Regression for causal inference?

- ▶ If large diffs in distn's,
  - $\rightsquigarrow$  regression not enough, very sensitive


## Paradox of Regression for causal inference?

- ➤ If large diffs in distn's,

  ¬→ regression not enough, very sensitive
- ▶ If small diffs in distn's,
  - → regression won't matter much

# Dynamic Treatment Regimes

## Dynamic Treatment Regimes



Blackwell and Strezhnev (2022)

Preprocessing for Dynamic Treatment Regimes:

 $\blacktriangleright$  Match across early Tr  $(A_1)$  on baseline covariates X

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- $\blacktriangleright$  Match across early Tr  $(A_1)$  on baseline covariates X
- lacktriangle Match across late Tr  $(A_2)$  on early Tr (exact), baseline
  - + intermediate covariates  $(A_1, X, Z \text{ [or } X_1, X_2])$

Preprocessing for Dynamic Treatment Regimes:

- $\blacktriangleright$  Match across early Tr  $(A_1)$  on baseline covariates X
- Match across late Tr  $(A_2)$  on early Tr (exact), baseline + intermediate covariates  $(A_1 \times Z_1 \text{ [or } X_2 \times Z_2])$ 
  - + intermediate covariates  $(A_1, X, Z \text{ [or } X_1, X_2])$
- Use matches to impute "paths not taken"

Preprocessing for Dynamic Treatment Regimes:

Diff-in-means estimator for effect of "early treatment":

$$\hat{\tau} \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \hat{Y}_i(1,0) - \hat{Y}_i(0,0) \right)$$

## Telescope Matching Example

```
library(DirectEffects)
data(jobcorps)
```

- $\triangleright$  Y: self-reported good health (0/1)
- ➤ X1: school/training/job before Job Corps
- ► A1: Job Corps program
- $\triangleright$  X2: employment in Q4 after assg
- $\blacktriangleright$  A2: employment in Q just before outcome

```
# Formula: Y ~ X1 | A1 | X2 | A2

tm_form <- exhealth30 ~ schobef + trainyrbef + jobeverbef
    treat | emplq4 + emplq4full | work2year2q

tm_out <- telescope match(tm_form, data = jobcorps, verbose</pre>
```

## Telescope Matching Example

```
tm_out
```

```
Telescope matching output
```

```
Call:
```

telescope\_match(formula = tm\_form, data = jobcorps, verbose

```
Active treatment: treat
```

Controlled treatment(s): work2year2q

```
Estimated controlled direct effects of treat: work2year2q estimate
```

```
1 0 -0.003326327
2 1 0.029113581
```

## Telescope Matching Example

summary(tm\_out)

(1, 0) vs. (0, 0) (1, 1) vs. (0, 1)

```
Telescope matching results
Call:
telescope_match(formula = tm_form, data = jobcorps, verbose = FALSE)
Active treatment: treat
Controlled treatment(s): work2year2q
Matching summary:
        Term Matching Ratio L:1 N == 1 N == 0 Matched == 1 Matched == 0
                                                   5792
       treat
                            5 6034
                                       3991
                                                               3991
2 work2year2q
                            5 6207
                                       3818
                                                   3658
                                                               3667
Summary of units matching contributions:
                Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
                       0.6
                               0.8 1 1.40 4.00
treat
                     0.0
                               0.4 1 1.04 93.04
treat:work2year2q
work2year2q
                   0 0 0
                               0.4 1 1.20 65.60
Estimated controlled direct effects of treat:
```

0 -0.003326

1 0.029114

work2year2q Estimate Estimate (no BC) Std. Err.

-0.002749

0.029091


0.03763

0.01430

# Sensitivity to an Unidentifiable Parameter

## Mediation Analysis

Confounding in Observational Studies



large If interest is  $M \to Y$ , seek experiment-like M

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- If interest is  $M \to Y$ , seek experiment-like M
  - $\triangleright$  random M
  - $\triangleright$  subclassify/match for M

- If interest is  $M \to Y$ , seek experiment-like M
  - ightharpoonup random M
  - $\triangleright$  subclassify/match for M
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- $\blacktriangleright$  If interest is  $T \to Y$ , seek experimental T

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- ▶ If interest is  $M \to Y$ , seek experiment-like M
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  - $\triangleright$  RDD, synthetic control for T
- ▶ In mediation, interest is  $T \to M \to Y$

- If interest is  $M \to Y$ , seek experiment-like M
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- If interest is  $T \to Y$ , seek experimental T
  - ightharpoonup random T
  - $\triangleright$  subclassify/match for T
  - instrumented T
  - $\triangleright$  RDD, synthetic control for T
- ▶ In mediation, interest is  $T \to M \to Y$ 
  - $(and maybe <math>T \to (\neg M) \to Y)$

Condition on /control for M?


No: how to estimate  $M \to Y$ ?

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- $\blacktriangleright$  And if  $X \to M$ , too?

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- Yes: induces <u>post-treatment bias</u> in estimate of  $T \to Y$
- $\blacktriangleright$  And if  $X \to M$ , too?
- Even worse ...



# Addressing Confounding

To break confounding,

ightharpoonup can't break  $X \to Y$ 

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To break confounding,

- ightharpoonup can't break  $X \to Y$
- $\blacktriangleright$  break  $X \to T$
- $\blacktriangleright$  but  $X \to M$  may still remain!

▶ Interest in effect of news on attitude.

▶ Interest in effect of news on attitude. Randomly assign news:


```
n <- 200
news <- sample(0:1, n, replace = TRUE)</pre>
```

▶ News status greatly affects Anxiety:

```
pr.anx <- \frac{1}{1} + exp(-(news * \frac{2}{1} + rnorm(n)))
```

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pr.anx <- \frac{1}{1} + exp(-(news * \frac{2}{1} + rnorm(n)))
```



News status greatly affects Anxiety:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept) 0.461 0.017 26.551 0

news 0.360 0.025 14.138 0
```

▶ Anxiety greatly increases (negative) attitude

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  - but news also has other ways to increase negative attitude)


- ► Anxiety greatly increases (negative) attitude
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  - b (but news also has other ways to increase negative attitude)

```
attitude <- .1 * news + pr.anx + rnorm(n, sd = 0.2)
```

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  - but news also has other ways to increase negative attitude)

```
attitude <- .1 * news + pr.anx + rnorm(n, sd = 0.2)
```



▶ Interested in causal effect of news on attitude

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- Analysis 1: Adjust for anxiety status:

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```
\verb|summary(lm(attitude ~ news + pr.anx))$coef |> round(4)|
```

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.0290 0.0388 0.7476 0.4556
news 0.1278 0.0378 3.3862 0.0009
pr.anx 0.9257 0.0744 12.4441 0.0000
```

- Interested in causal effect of news on attitude
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```
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(Intercept) 0.0290 0.0388 0.7476 0.4556
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pr.anx 0.9257 0.0744 12.4441 0.0000
```

▶ Great! Now, say, multiply coefs, to get  $T \to M \to Y$ ?

- Interested in causal effect of news on attitude
- ► Analysis 1: Adjust for anxiety status:

```
\verb|summary(lm(attitude ~ news + pr.anx))$coef |> round(4)|
```

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.0290 0.0388 0.7476 0.4556
news 0.1278 0.0378 3.3862 0.0009
pr.anx 0.9257 0.0744 12.4441 0.0000
```

- ▶ Great! Now, say, multiply coefs, to get  $T \to M \to Y$ ?
- ▶ Problem: This doesn't work.

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▶ Great! Now, say, subtract coef Analysis 1 from this, to get  $T \to M \to Y$ ?

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- Analysis 2: Don't control for anxiety status:

```
summary(lm(attitude ~ news))$coef |> round(4)
```

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) (Intercept) 0.4554 0.0242 18.8115 0 news 0.4608 0.0355 12.9800 0
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- ▶ Great! Now, say, subtract coef Analysis 1 from this, to get  $T \to M \to Y$ ?
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### Mediation

Mediation analysis tries to estimate  $\underline{\text{how much}}$  effect of T on Y goes through M.

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- ▶ Quiz: In news/anxiety/attitude example,
  - what's  $Y_i(1, M_i(1))$ ?
    - what's  $Y_i(0, M_i(0))$ ?
    - $\qquad \qquad \text{what's } Y_i(1,M_i(1)) Y_i(0,M_i(0))?$
    - what's  $Y_i(1, M_i(0))$ ?

$$\blacktriangleright \ Y_i(1,M_i(1)) - Y_i(0,M_i(0)) \colon$$
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
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▶ Moderators and mediators are both "third variables"


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


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
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
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  - ▶ Informative bounds for ACME!

"Baron & Kenny Procedure"

$$M_{i} = \alpha_{1} + aT_{i} + \epsilon_{i1}$$

$$Y_{i} = \alpha_{2} + cT_{i} + \epsilon_{i2}$$

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$$(2)$$

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Then, call effect of

$$T o M = a$$
 $T o Y = c$  (Total)
 $T o Y = d$  (Direct)
 $M o Y = b$ 
 $T o M o Y = c - d = ab$  (Mediation)

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## Why Aren't 2 Experiments Enough?

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Population Proportion	Potential Mediators and Outcomes				Treatment Effect on Mediator	Mediator Effect on Outcome	Causal Mediation Effect
	$M_i(1)$	$M_i(0)$	$Y_i(t, 1)$	$Y_i(t, 0)$	$M_i(1) - M_i(0)$	$Y_i(t, 1) - Y_i(t, 0)$	$Y_i(t, M_i(1)) - Y_i(t, M_i(0))$
0.3	1	0	0	1	1	-1	
0.3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
0.1	0	1	0	1	-1	-1	1
0.3	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Average	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2	-0.2

Notes: The left five columns of the table show a hypothetical population proportion of "types" of units defined by the values of potential mediators and outcomes. Note that these values can never be jointly observed. The tar tow of the table shows the population average value of each column. In this example, the average causal effect of the treatment on the mediator (the sixth column) is positive and equal to 0.2. Moreover, the average causal effect of the mediator on the outcome (the seventh column) is also positive and equals 0.2. And yet the average causal mediation effect (ACME; final column) is negative and equals —0.2.

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0.3	1	0	0	1	1	-1	-1			
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But, true  $\bar{\delta}(t)$ , ACME, = -0.2!

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The ACME, e.g., is an estimate of the effect of changes in M due to changing T (but without changing T).

(Other manipulations of M rely on consistency.)

Big picture: to get more detailed estimates from same data, need more assumptions

Assumption 1 [Sequential Ignorability (Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto 2010)].

$$\{Y_i(t',m), M_i(t)\} \perp T_i \mid X_i = x,$$
 (3)


$$Y_i(t',m) \perp \!\!\!\perp M_i(t) \mid T_i = t, X_i = x,$$
 (4)

where  $0 < \Pr(T_i = t \mid X_i = x)$  and  $0 < p(M_i = m \mid T_i = t, X_i = x)$  for t = 0, 1, and all x and m in the support of  $X_i$  and  $M_i$ , respectively.

- ► Eqn 3: Conditional independence of PotOut's from Tr, given X (pretreatment!)
  - $\triangleright$  Ok, for random T, or balanced obs design. T as good as random, exog., etc.
  - t' is just saying, for each t = 0, 1, must have Y's from both t = 0, 1 must be indep.)
- ► Eqn 4: Hard. Mediator is as good as random, given particular Tr status
- Problem: can't randomize both T and M in same experiment
  - ightharpoonup (if want effect of T through M)
- You're getting 2 different QoI's if you randomize both:  $T \to M, Y$  and  $M \to Y$ .
  - Showed can't combine those into  $T \to M \to Y$

#### When Can You Get It?

FIGURE 8. Second Mediator Causing Serious Problem



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- Practical advice: start there. Then, formal mediation.

Given

$$M_{i} = \alpha_{1} + aT_{i} + \epsilon_{i1}$$
 (4)  
 $Y_{i} = \alpha_{2} + cT_{i} + \epsilon_{i2}$  (5)  
 $Y_{i} = \alpha_{3} + dT_{i} + bM_{i} + \epsilon_{i3}$  (6)

▶ Q: How much covariance  $\rho$  is there between  $\epsilon_{i1}$  and  $\epsilon_{i3}$ ?

Given

$$M_i = \alpha_1 + aT_i + \epsilon_{i1} \tag{4}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + cT_i + \epsilon_{i2} \tag{5}$$

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- ▶ A: If Seq. Ig. is true, then none (X-adjustment does its job)

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  - (If P, then Q.)
- If  $\rho \neq 0$ , then Seq. Ig. is false (likely hidden confounder) (If  $\neg Q$ , then  $\neg P$ .)

Given


$$M_i = \alpha_1 + aT_i + \epsilon_{i1} \tag{4}$$

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- ▶ Q: How much covariance  $\rho$  is there between  $\epsilon_{i1}$  and  $\epsilon_{i3}$ ?
- ▶ A: If Seq. Ig. is true, then none (X-adjustment does its job)
  - (If P, then Q.)
- If  $\rho \neq 0$ , then Seq. Ig. is false (likely hidden confounder) (If  $\neg Q$ , then  $\neg P$ .)

(I.e., From freq. standpoint, you can find "evidence of problem", or "no evidence of problem", but not "evidence of no problem".)



▶ Be careful.

▶ Be careful. If you estimate, you must do sensitivity.


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    - ▶ (Do plot(lm\_out), too ...)


- ▶ Be careful. If you estimate, you must do sensitivity.
  - A serious case of "don't just get an answer"
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- Imai et al. (2011) thorough on assumptions, when trouble, when sensitivity is OK, when identification can be done


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  - A serious case of "don't just get an answer"
  - ► (Do plot(lm\_out), too ...)
- Imai et al. (2011) thorough on assumptions, when trouble, when sensitivity is OK, when identification can be done
- From Bullock, Green, and Ha (2010):

a cumulative enterprise. Persuasive conclusions about mediation are difficult to reach under any circumstances, but they are most likely to be reached when they derive from an experimental research program that addresses the particular challenges of mediation analysis—challenges that we describe here.



# Confounding in Observational Studies





## Addressing Confounding

To break confounding,

- ightharpoonup can't break  $X \to Y$
- $\blacktriangleright$  break  $X \to T$
- $\blacktriangleright$  I.e., make  $X \perp \!\!\!\perp T$
- ▶ But this doesn't address  $U \to T$  (or  $U \to Y$ ).

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- ▶ But this doesn't address  $U \to T$  (or  $U \to Y$ ).

(Of course, if no causal effect of  $U \to Y$ , no problem.)

#### Hidden Bias

Where there is  $U \to T$  and  $U \to Y$ , there is <u>hidden bias</u>.

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Formally, i and j appear similar:

$$\mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{x}_j$$

but are different in prop score:

$$\pi_i \neq \pi_j$$

### Example

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However, **different** probabilities of being called, due to unobserved confounder, sociability.

Sociability affects whether called (know more people) and turnout.

Sensitivity: how strong must sociability be to invalidate inference about phone calls?

The odds of  $A_1$  vs.  $A_2$  is

$$A_1:A_2=\frac{p(A_1)}{p(A_2)}$$

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.03
.01
.01
.01

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$$\frac{\frac{.03}{.01}}{\frac{.01}{.01}} = \frac{\frac{.06}{.02}}{\frac{.02}{.02}}$$

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$$\frac{.9}{.9}$$

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	% I	3elow	Pov Line	% F	<b>1</b> bove	Pov Line
	В	W	$\frac{B}{W}$	В	W	$\frac{B}{W}$
$\overline{t_1}$	90	80	1.1	10	20	0.5

	% I	selow	Pov Line	% Above Pov Line			
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$t_1$	90	80	1.1	10	20	0.5	
$t_2$	15	5	3.0	85	95	0.89	

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Clearly, worse (odds of below pov line):

Odds Ratios:  $\frac{1.1}{.5} = 2.2$ ,  $\frac{3}{.89} = 3.4$ 

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Clearly, huge absolute improvements.

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- ► (Easy to produce examples of OR's same and AbsDiffs slightly diff.)
- ▶ (Diffs betwn groups real, importnt, but how we meas. changes is tricky)

### King's Conjecture



Gary King @kinggary
the "odds ratio" is a lame way to communicate statistical results;
I conjecture that there's \*always\* a better way

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Odds of treatment for i and j:

$$\frac{\pi_i}{1-\pi_i}, \frac{\pi_j}{1-\pi_j}$$

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OR of i versus j:

$$OR = \frac{\pi_i}{1 - \pi_i} \div \frac{\pi_j}{1 - \pi_j}$$
$$= \frac{\pi_i (1 - \pi_j)}{\pi_j (1 - \pi_i)}$$

Let  $\Gamma$  be upper bound on OR of treatment.

$$\frac{1}{\Gamma} \le \frac{\pi_i (1 - \pi_j)}{\pi_i (1 - \pi_i)} \le \Gamma \qquad \forall i, j \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{x}_j$$

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By what factor does the odds of treatment differ? (No more than  $\Gamma$ )

Rosenbaum (2020) shows that this is same as

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_i}{1-\pi_i}\right) = \kappa(\mathbf{x}_i) + \gamma u_i$$
$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_j}{1-\pi_j}\right) = \kappa(\mathbf{x}_j) + \gamma u_j$$

s.t.  $0 \le u_i \le 1$ .

# Modeling Hidden Bias

Rosenbaum (2020) shows that this is same as

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_i}{1 - \pi_i}\right) = \kappa(\mathbf{x}_i) + \gamma u_i$$
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s.t.  $0 \le u_i \le 1$ .

Interpretation: first rewrite

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_j}{1 - \pi_j}\right) = \kappa(\mathbf{x}_i) + \gamma u_j$$

Exponentiate:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\pi_i}{1-\pi_i} \end{pmatrix} = e^{\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i)+\gamma u_i}$$
 
$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\pi_j}{1-\pi_j} \end{pmatrix} = e^{\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i)+\gamma u_j}$$

Exponentiate:

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$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\pi_j}{1 - \pi_j} \end{pmatrix} = e^{\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i) + \gamma u_j}$$

Calculate OR:

$$\begin{split} OR &= \frac{\pi_i(1-\pi_j)}{\pi_j(1-\pi_i)} \\ &= \frac{e^{\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i)+\gamma u_i}}{e^{\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i)+\gamma u_j}} \\ &= e^{(\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i)+\gamma u_i)-(\kappa(\mathbf{x}_i)+\gamma u_j)} \\ &= e^{(\gamma u_i-\gamma u_j)} \\ &= e^{\gamma(u_i-u_j)} \end{split}$$

# Interpreting $\Gamma$

$$OR = e^{\gamma(u_i - u_j)}$$

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Shows  $\Gamma = e^{\gamma}$ .

TABLE 4.1. Sensitivity Analysis for Hammond's Study of Smoking and Lung Cancer: Range of Significance Levels for Hidden Biases of Various Magnitudes.

Γ	Minimum	Maximum
1	< 0.0001	< 0.0001
2	< 0.0001	< 0.0001
3	< 0.0001	< 0.0001
4	< 0.0001	0.0036
5	< 0.0001	0.03
6	< 0.0001	0.1

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4	< 0.0001	0.0036
5	< 0.0001	0.03
6	< 0.0001	0.1

- ► Groups: smokers/nonsmokers
- Outcome: lung cancer
- Something must increase smoking by  $6 \times$  to change inference.
- ▶ If exists, maybe it's that factor, not smoking directly.

(Bias from  $U \to T$ ; effectively,  $U \to Y$  nearly perfect.)

Γ	Minimum	Maximum
1	$\leq 0.0001$	$\leq 0.0001$
2	$\leq 0.0001$	0.0018
3	$\leq 0.0001$	0.0136
4	$\leq 0.0001$	0.0388
4.25	$\leq 0.0001$	0.0468
5	$\leq 0.0001$	0.0740

Table 4.2: Signed-Rank Statistic p-value Sensitivity for Lead in Children's Blood

- ▶ Groups: parents occupationally exposed/unexposed
- ▶ Outcome: children's levels
- Something must increase parents' exposure by  $5 \times$  to change inference.
- ▶ If exists, maybe it's that, not parental exposure directly.

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### (one-sided)

Γ	Minimum	Maximum
1	15	15
2	10.25	19.5
3	8	23
4	6.5	25
5	5	26.5

Table 4.3: Point Estimate Sensitivity for Lead in Children's Blood

Γ	Minimum	Maximum
1	15	15
2	10.25	19.5
3	8	23
4	6.5	25
5	5	26.5

Table 4.3: Point Estimate Sensitivity for Lead in Children's Blood

- HL point estimate: 15 (median of all  $m \times n$  possible matched pairs)
- ▶ With confounding, wider range of possible effects.

Τ.	95% C1
1	(9.5, 20.5)
2	(4.5, 27.5)
3	(1.0, 32.0)
4	(-1.0, 36.5)
5	(-3.0, 41.5)

Table 4.4: Confidence Interval Sensitivity for Lead in Children's Blood

Γ	95% CI
1	(9.5, 20.5)
2	(4.5, 27.5)
3	(1.0, 32.0)
4	(-1.0, 36.5)
5	(-3.0, 41.5)

Table 4.4: Confidence Interval Sensitivity for Lead in Children's Blood

- ► Inverted NHST CI's
- If something increases parental exposure by  $4\times$ , negative estimates of parents on children are reasonable.

(two-sided)

# Implementation

# Packages

- Frank et al. (2013): konfound
- ► Keele (2022): rbounds
- sensitivitymw
- sensitivitymv

## Example

```
lm_out <- lm(turnout12 ~ pid_rep, data = anes)</pre>
summary(lm out)
```

```
Call:
lm(formula = turnout12 ~ pid_rep, data = anes)
```

```
Residuals:
```

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q
-0.3395 -0.2451 -0.2451 -0.2451 1.7549
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.24512 0.01868 66.641 < 2e-16 ***
pid_rep 0.09435 0.03320 2.842 0.00456 **
```

Max

```
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 '
```

Residual standard error: 0.535 on 1198 degrees of freedom 

```
library(konfound)
konfound(lm_out, pid_rep)
```

```
library(konfound)
konfound(lm_out, pid_rep)
```

Robustness of Inference to Replacement (RIR):

have to be due to bias.

This is based on a threshold of 0.065 for statistical significance (alpha = 0.05).

To invalidate an inference, 30.959 % of the estimate would

To invalidate an inference, 372 observations would have to be replaced with cases for which the effect is 0 (RIR = 372).

See Frank et al. (2013) for a description of the method.

Citation: Frank, K.A., Maroulis, S., Duong, M., and Kelcey

B. (2013).
What would it take to change an inference?
Using Rubin's causal model to interpret the

```
lm_out <- lm(turnout12 ~ pid_rep + age, data = anes)
summary(lm_out)</pre>
```

```
Call:
lm(formula = turnout12 ~ pid_rep + age, data = anes)
```

Residuals:

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.5825 -0.3388 -0.1711 0.0301 1.9831

```
Coefficients:
```

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept) 1.678649 0.045960 36.524 < 2e-16 ***

pid_rep 0.082685 0.031870 2.594 0.00959 **

age -0.008943 0.000873 -10.244 < 2e-16 ***
```

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 '

## konfound(lm\_out, pid\_rep)

Robustness of Inference to Replacement (RIR):
To invalidate an inference, 24.379 % of the estimate would

have to be due to bias.

This is based on a threshold of 0.063 for statistical significance (alpha = 0.05).

be replaced with cases for which the effect is 0 (RIR = 293).

To invalidate an inference, 293 observations would have to

See Frank et al. (2013) for a description of the method.

Citation: Frank, K.A., Maroulis, S., Duong, M., and Kelcey B. (2013).

What would it take to change an inference?
Using Rubin's causal model to interpret the robustness of causal inferences.

```
cor(anes[,c("pid_rep", "turnout12", "econnow")])
```

```
pid_rep turnout12 econnow
pid_rep 1.00000000 0.081825966 0.141257803
turnout12 0.08182597 1.000000000 0.008599061
econnow 0.14125780 0.008599061 1.000000000
```

```
lm out <- lm(turnout12 ~ pid rep + age + econnow, data = age</pre>
summary(lm out)
Call:
```

lm(formula = turnout12 ~ pid\_rep + age + econnow, data = age

```
Residuals:
                     3Q
         1Q Median
                             Max
   Min
```

-0.60257 -0.33748 -0.17138 0.04458 1.96702

```
Coefficients:
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.6290966 0.0565381 28.814 <2e-16 ***
```

pid\_rep 0.0755031 0.0322095 2.344 0.0192 \*

age -0.0091496 0.0008833 -10.358 <2e-16 \*\*\* econnow 0.0202398 0.0134633 1.503 0.1330

0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' Signif. codes:

```
konfound(lm_out, pid_rep)
```

robustness of causal inferences.

Paration Postion and

Robustness of Inference to Replacement (RIR):
To invalidate an inference, 16.303 % of the estimate would have to be due to bias.

This is based on a threshold of 0.063 for statistical significance (alpha = 0.05).

be replaced with cases for which the effect is 0 (RIR = 196).

To invalidate an inference, 196 observations would have to


See Frank et al. (2013) for a description of the method.

Citation: Frank, K.A., Maroulis, S., Duong, M., and Kelcey B. (2013).

What would it take to change an inference?

Using Rubin's causal model to interpret the

## hist(pscore.glm\$fitted)



Estimate	0.032309
SE	0.042412
T-stat	0.76367
p.val	0.44506
Original num	ber of observations

10829

```
library(rbounds)

# Sensitivity Test
# binarysens(m.obj, Gamma = 2, GammaInc = .1)
```

```
#hlsens(m.obj, Gamma = 5, GammaInc = 1)
```

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Thanks!

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