FYEO

FLARE

Repo: https://github.com/mboben/avalanchego

Security Review Update: September 29, 2025

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Security Code Review FLARE

New security issues, 6

After the development team implemented the latest updates, FYEO conducted a review of the modifications. The primary goal of this evaluation was to ensure the continued robustness of the program's security features, safeguarding user funds and maintaining the overall integrity of the program.

General Updates:

The changes perform a broad, cross-cutting refactor of how validator weights and related counts are represented and handled across the codebase: many components (APIs, trackers, sync/pathing, throttlers, metrics and database helpers) move from fixed-width integers to arbitrary-precision integers. That work standardizes weight arithmetic and quorum/startup calculations, and ripples into API responses and allocation logic, so numeric handling and some public representations have changed.

Alongside that refactor the patch expands multi-network support and behavior: new genesis/config entries and network targets were added (Flare, Songbird, Costwo/Coston and local variants), and platform VM logic gained per-network, time-aware inflation and staking rules that the verifier now consults. A few compatibility and UX tweaks were included as well (more complete validator replies behind a flag, a small secp256k1 signing fallback for broader signer compatibility, a network-aware application prefix helper, and some tightened config validations).

CALLING DAEMON/MINT DURING STATE TRANSITION

Finding ID: FYEO-FLARE-01

Severity: Low

Status: Acknowledged

Description

StateTransition.TransitionDb calls atomicDaemonAndMint(st, log) while processing a transaction (inside TransitionDb) — after successful VM call but before returning the execution result. The daemon/mint operation appears to change chain state (mint balances). Running minting while a transaction is being processed risks concurrent or out-of-order state changes that can break consensus or introduce race conditions (different execution order between nodes).

Proof of Issue

File name: core/state transition.go

```
// Call the daemon if there is no vm error
if vmerr == nil && (isSongbird || isFlare) {
   log := log.Root()
   atomicDaemonAndMint(st, log)
}
```

Severity and Impact Summary

Potential consensus divergence or non-deterministic block processing. If daemon/mint mutates global balances/state that other parts of the transaction processing expect to be stable, nodes may apply different state changes in different orders (or at different times), causing forked state or invalid blocks.

Recommendation

Do not perform non-deterministic or external daemon state changes inside per-transaction TransitionDb flow. Move daemon/mint calls into a deterministic block finalisation path where order is well-defined and identical across validators.

Add tests that assert identical post-block state across independent runs and verify no concurrent access to shared state during TransitionDb.

API COMPATIBILITY & JSON ENCODING

Finding ID: FYEO-FLARE-02 Severity: Informational Status: Remediated

Description

Public ACP API fields were changed from <code>json.Uint64</code> (numeric JSON) to <code>*big.Int.big.Int</code> marshals to JSON as a string (via <code>TextMarshaler</code>), and a <code>nil *big.Int</code> marshals to <code>null</code>. This is a breaking change for API consumers who expect numeric JSON fields (and not strings or <code>nulls</code>).

Proof of Issue

File name: api/info/service.go

```
type ACP struct {
    SupportWeight *big.Int json:"supportWeight"
    ...
}
```

Old code used json. Uint 64 which encoded as JSON number.

Severity and Impact Summary

API clients expecting numeric JSON will break (parsing errors or type mismatches). nil fields produce null — unexpected for numeric semantics.

Recommendation

Either keep the public API numeric or implement custom Marshallson on ACP to emit a JSON number (or 0) consistently. Ensure nil big.Ints are marshalled as 0 (not null) if that matches previous behavior.

GETBIGINT / PARSEBIGINT SHOULD TREAT EMPTY DB VALUE AS ZERO

Finding ID: FYEO-FLARE-03 Severity: Informational Status: Remediated

Description

GetBigInt / ParseBigInt call SetBytes (b) directly. If the DB returns an empty []byte{} (zero-length) the result may be 0 or ambiguous; currently code returns new(big.Int).SetBytes(b) without guarding for len(b) ==0. Prefer to explicitly return big.NewInt(0) for empty input to avoid nil or undefined behaviour.

Proof of Issue

File name: database/helpers.go

```
func GetBigInt(db KeyValueReader, key []byte) (*big.Int, error) {
   b, err := db.Get(key)
   if err != nil {
      return nil, err
   }
   return new(big.Int).SetBytes(b), nil
}
```

And ParseBigInt:

```
func ParseBigInt(b []byte) (*big.Int, error) {
    return new(big.Int).SetBytes(b), nil
}
```

No len(b) == 0 guard.

Severity and Impact Summary

Unexpected nil or zero handling may propagate and interact badly with consumers. Standardize on 0 for empty DB values to avoid panics or ambiguous semantics.

Recommendation

Update both functions to treat empty byte slices as zero. Also consider returning (*big.Int, bool, error) where bool indicates presence vs missing key, if distinction between DB-missing and zero is important. Add unit tests for empty/absent keys.

Inconsistent getTxFeeConfig condition vs genesis.GetTxFeeConfig

Finding ID: FYEO-FLARE-04 Severity: Informational Status: Remediated

Description

getTxFeeConfig was changed from returning a TxFeeConfig for many non-mainnet networks to returning it only when networkID equals LocalFlareID or LocalID. Meanwhile genesis.GetTxFeeConfig was modified to omit LocalFlareID and LocalID (comment: fees are set from program arguments).

This mismatch is confusing: either local networks should be handled by CLI args in which case both functions should omit them, or local networks should remain in the genesis mapping and <code>getTxFeeConfig</code> should not special case them.

Proof of Issue

File name: config/config.go

File name: genesis/params.go

```
func GetTxFeeConfig(networkID uint32) TxFeeConfig {
    // TxFee configs are ommitted for LocalFlare and Local networks since they
    // are set from program arguments (getTxFeeConfig)
    switch networkID {
    case constants.MainnetID:
        return MainnetParams.TxFeeConfig
    case constants.FlareID:
        return FlareParams.TxFeeConfig
    ...
    }
}
```

Severity and Impact Summary

Networks other than MainnetID, LocalFlareID, and LocalID may not receive the intended TxFeeConfig from getTxFeeConfig.

Recommendation

Choose one explicit, consistent approach and make the code reflect it.

Possible NIL `*BIG.INT` DEREFERENCES

Finding ID: FYEO-FLARE-05 Severity: Informational Status: Remediated

Description

ACP numeric fields were changed from json.Uint64 to *big.Int. Code performs in-place Add/SetUint64 operations assuming the pointer is non-nil. If fields like SupportWeight, ObjectWeight, AbstainWeight are nil, calls such as new (big.Int).Add (acp.SupportWeight, ...) will panic.

Proof of Issue

File name: api/info/service.go

```
type ACP struct {
    SupportWeight *big.Int json:"supportWeight"
    ...
}
...
acp.SupportWeight = new(big.Int).Add(acp.SupportWeight,
new(big.Int).SetUint64(weight))
```

Also getacp is expected to allocate defaults but code shows no explicit zero init.

Severity and Impact Summary

Nil pointer dereference panics at runtime when building API responses — will crash the info service or handler and disrupt API availability.

Recommendation

Ensure ACP instances initialize their big.Int fields to zero on creation.

SPLITALLOCATIONS RETURNS NIL WHEN NUMSPLITS IS 0

Finding ID: FYEO-FLARE-06 Severity: Informational Status: Remediated

Description

splitAllocations currently returns nil when numSplits == 0. This silently returns nil instead of an error, which can cause nil deref or silent logical errors downstream.

Proof of Issue

File name: genesis/genesis.go

```
func splitAllocations(allocations []Allocation, numSplits int) [][]Allocation {
   if numSplits == 0 {
      return nil
   }
   ...
}
```

Severity and Impact Summary

Silent nil return can propagate and cause panics or unexpected behavior where caller expects a non-nil slice or an explicit error. It hides incorrect inputs.

Recommendation

Validate input and return an explicit error or panic with a clear message.

Commit Hash Reference:

For transparency and reference, the security review was conducted on the specific commit hashes for the following repositories. The commit hashes for the reviewed versions are as follows:

Avalancego:

https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego/compare/049be36ded7d35d0709f5f9b29917a3f9c5abed5...mboben:avalanchego:flare-merge-1_11_13

Coreeth:

 $https://github.com/ava-labs/coreth/compare/c06af9bb10be60babe9ecbdc2d0582cef68f40bc...mboben:coreth:flare-merge-0_13_9_rc1$

Remediations were submitted with the commit hash f657f5c28720ec99d0c4e9c65190eb61a0011404.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the security aspects of the FLARE program remain robust and unaffected by the recent updates. Users can confidently interact with the protocol, assured that their funds are well-protected. The commitment to security exhibited by the development team is commendable, and we appreciate the ongoing efforts to prioritize the safeguarding of user assets.