# FYEO

Security Code Review of Ruji Perps

Levana

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Security Level Public

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## **Executive Summary**

#### Overview

Levana engaged FYEO Inc. to perform a Security Code Review Ruji Perps.

The assessment was conducted remotely by the FYEO Security Team. Testing took place on February 26 - March 07, 2024, and focused on the following objectives:

- To provide the customer with an assessment of their overall security posture and any risks that were discovered within the environment during the engagement.
- To provide a professional opinion on the maturity, adequacy, and efficiency of the security measures that are in place.
- To identify potential issues and include improvement recommendations based on the results of our tests.

This report summarizes the engagement, tests performed, and findings. It also contains detailed descriptions of the discovered vulnerabilities, steps the FYEO Security Team took to identify and validate each issue, as well as any applicable recommendations for remediation.

### **Key Findings**

The following issues have been identified during the testing period. These should be prioritized for remediation to reduce the risk they pose:

FYEO-LEVANA-01 – Missing Bound Checks

Based on our review process, we conclude that the reviewed code implements the documented functionality.

### Scope and Rules of Engagement

The FYEO Review Team performed a Security Code Review Ruji Perps. The following table documents the targets in scope for the engagement. No additional systems or resources were in scope for this assessment.

The source code was supplied through a public repository at https://github.com/Levana-Protocol/levana-perps with the commit hash f2d4a2a277e6bbedbcad5bdcf562bdfce5dbaac3.

Remediations were submitted with the commit hash ff8a96960f5a22835d1c4262ba01e7cb4bb7e7f8.

The audit was done on a diff between these versions: https://github.com/Levana-Protocol/levana-perps/compare/d2f81083b19c1cad899b4072daea25b5e989d 733...f2d4a2a277e6bbedbcad5bdcf562bdfce5dbaac3

The scope was further reduced to these folders:

#### Files included in the code review

- packages/perpswap
- contracts/factory
- contracts/market
- contracts/copy\_trading
- contracts/countertrade
- contracts/liquidity\_token
- contracts/position token

Table 1: Scope

# **Technical Analyses and Findings**

During the Security Code Review of Ruji Perps, we discovered:

• 1 finding with INFORMATIONAL severity rating.

The following chart displays the findings by severity.



Figure 1: Findings by Severity

### **Findings**

The *Findings* section provides detailed information on each of the findings, including methods of discovery, explanation of severity determination, recommendations, and applicable references.

The following table provides an overview of the findings.

Finding #	Severity	Description
FYEO-LEVANA-01	Informational	Missing Bound Checks

Table 2: Findings Overview

### **Technical Analysis**

The source code has been manually validated to the extent that the state of the repository allowed. The validation includes confirming that the code correctly implements the intended functionality.

#### Conclusion

Based on our review process, we conclude that the code implements the documented functionality to the extent of the reviewed code.

### **Technical Findings**

#### **General Observations**

The codebase has been expanded with new functionalities, including support for additional contract types, improved logging and monitoring, enhanced error handling, and centralized configuration management. A significant portion of the update involves refactoring for maintainability. Refactoring operations such as consolidating code into new structs enhanced the maintainability of the code base. The addition of the "countertrade" and "copy\_trading" contracts expands functionality of the Levana DeFi suite. These updates aim to improve flexibility, maintainability, and functionality while introducing new architectural changes.

### Missing Bound Checks

Finding ID: FYEO-LEVANA-01

Severity: Informational Status: Remediated

#### **Description**

There are no upper or lower bounds checked on any of the configuration values.

#### **Proof of Issue**

File name: contracts/copy trading/src/execute.rs

Line number: 175

```
fn leader update config(
   state: &State,
   storage: &mut dyn Storage,
   config: ConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<Response> {
   let ConfigUpdate {
       name,
       description,
       commission rate,
    } = config;
   let mut config = crate::state::CONFIG
        .may load(storage)?
        .context("CONFIG store is empty")?;
   let mut event = Event::new("leader-update-config");
   if let Some(commission rate) = commission rate {
        config.commission rate = commission rate;
        event = event
            .add attribute(
                "old-commission-rate",
                state.config.commission rate.to string(),
            .add attribute("new-commission-rate", commission rate.to string())
    if let Some(description) = description {
       config.description = description.clone();
       event = event
            .add attribute("old-description", state.config.description.to string())
            .add attribute("new-description", description);
   if let Some(name) = name {
       config.name = name.clone();
       event = event
            .add attribute("old-name", state.config.name.to string())
            .add attribute("new-name", name);
   crate::state::CONFIG.save(storage, &config)?;
   Ok(Response::new().add event(event))
```

File name: contracts/countertrade/src/execute.rs

Line number: 253

```
fn update config(
   mut state: State,
   storage: &mut dyn Storage,
   sender: Addr,
   ConfigUpdate {
       min funding,
       target funding,
       max funding,
       max leverage,
       iterations,
       take profit factor,
       stop loss factor,
   }: ConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<Response> {
   ensure! (
       state.config.admin == sender,
        "You are not the admin, you cannot update the config"
   let mut event = Event::new("update-config");
   if let Some (min funding) = min funding {
       event = event.add attribute("old-min-funding",
state.config.min funding.to string());
       event = event.add attribute("new-min-funding", min funding.to string());
       state.config.min funding = min funding;
    if let Some(target funding) = target funding {
       event = event.add attribute(
            "old-target-funding",
            state.config.target funding.to_string(),
       );
       event = event.add attribute("new-target-funding", target funding.to string());
       state.config.target funding = target funding;
    if let Some (max funding) = max funding {
       event = event.add attribute("old-max-funding",
state.config.max funding.to string());
       event = event.add attribute("new-max-funding", max funding.to string());
       state.config.max funding = max funding;
   if let Some(max leverage) = max leverage {
       event = event.add attribute("old-max-funding",
state.config.max leverage.to string());
       event = event.add attribute("new-max-funding", max leverage.to string());
        state.config.max leverage = max leverage;
    if let Some(iterations) = iterations {
       event = event.add attribute("old-iterations",
state.config.iterations.to string());
```

```
event = event.add attribute("new-iterations", iterations.to string());
        state.config.iterations = iterations;
    if let Some(take profit factor) = take profit factor {
       event = event.add attribute(
           "old-take-profit-factor",
           state.config.take profit factor.to string(),
       event = event.add attribute("new-take-profit-factor",
take profit factor.to string());
        state.config.take profit factor = take profit factor;
   if let Some(stop loss factor) = stop loss factor {
        event = event.add attribute(
            "old-stop-loss-factor",
            state.config.stop loss factor.to string(),
       );
       event = event.add attribute("new-stop-loss-factor",
stop loss factor.to string());
       state.config.stop loss factor = stop loss factor;
   crate::state::CONFIG.save(storage, &state.config)?;
   Ok (Response::new().add event(event))
```

**File name:** packages/perpswap/src/contracts/market/config.rs **Line number:** 212

```
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
    // note - crank_execs_after_push and mute_events are inherently always valid

    if self.trading_fee_notional_size >= "0.0999".parse().unwrap() {
        let error_msg = format!("trading_fee_notional_size must be in the range 0 to
0.0999 inclusive ({} is invalid)", self.trading_fee_notional_size);
        bail!(PerpError::market(ErrorId::Config, error_msg))
    }
    ...
```

The referral reward ratio has no bound checks.

#### Severity and Impact Summary

Certain values, especially for settings such as referral\_reward\_ratio may cause issues if accidentally set.

#### Recommendation

It is advisable to have upper and lower bounds on config values.

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### **Our Process**

### Methodology

FYEO Inc. uses the following high-level methodology when approaching engagements. They are broken up into the following phases.



Figure 2: Methodology Flow

#### **Kickoff**

The project is kicked off as the sales process has concluded. We typically set up a kickoff meeting where project stakeholders are gathered to discuss the project as well as the responsibilities of participants. During this meeting we verify the scope of the engagement and discuss the project activities. It's an opportunity for both sides to ask questions and get to know each other. By the end of the kickoff there is an understanding of the following:

- Designated points of contact
- Communication methods and frequency
- Shared documentation
- Code and/or any other artifacts necessary for project success
- Follow-up meeting schedule, such as a technical walkthrough
- Understanding of timeline and duration

### Ramp-up

Ramp-up consists of the activities necessary to gain proficiency on the project. This can include the steps needed for familiarity with the codebase or technological innovation utilized. This may include, but is not limited to:

- Reviewing previous work in the area including academic papers
- Reviewing programming language constructs for specific languages
- Researching common flaws and recent technological advancements

#### Review

The review phase is where most of the work on the engagement is completed. This is the phase where we analyze the project for flaws and issues that impact the security posture. Depending on the project this may include an analysis of the architecture, a review of the code, and a specification matching to match the architecture to the implemented code.

In this code audit, we performed the following tasks:

- 1. Security analysis and architecture review of the original protocol
- 2. Review of the code written for the project
- 3. Compliance of the code with the provided technical documentation

The review for this project was performed using manual methods and utilizing the experience of the reviewer. No dynamic testing was performed, only the use of custom-built scripts and tools were used to assist the reviewer during the testing. We discuss our methodology in more detail in the following sections.

### **Code Safety**

We analyzed the provided code, checking for issues related to the following categories:

- · General code safety and susceptibility to known issues
- · Poor coding practices and unsafe behavior
- Leakage of secrets or other sensitive data through memory mismanagement
- Susceptibility to misuse and system errors
- Error management and logging

This list is general and not comprehensive, meant only to give an understanding of the issues we are looking for.

#### **Technical Specification Matching**

We analyzed the provided documentation and checked that the code matches the specification. We checked for things such as:

- Proper implementation of the documented protocol phases
- Proper error handling
- Adherence to the protocol logical description

### Reporting

FYEO Inc. delivers a draft report that contains an executive summary, technical details, and observations about the project.

The executive summary contains an overview of the engagement including the number of findings as well as a statement about our general risk assessment of the project. We may conclude that the overall risk is low but depending on what was assessed we may conclude that more scrutiny of the project is needed.

We report security issues identified, as well as informational findings for improvement, categorized by the following labels:

- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Informational

The technical details are aimed more at developers, describing the issues, the severity ranking and recommendations for mitigation.

As we perform the audit, we may identify issues that aren't security related, but are general best practices and steps that can be taken to lower the attack surface of the project. We will call those out as we encounter them and as time permits.

As an optional step, we can agree on the creation of a public report that can be shared and distributed with a larger audience.

### Verify

After the preliminary findings have been delivered, this could be in the form of the approved communication channel or delivery of the draft report, we will verify any fixes within a window of time specified in the project. After the fixes have been verified, we will change the status of the finding in the report from open to remediated.

The output of this phase will be a final report with any mitigated findings noted.

### **Additional Note**

It is important to note that, although we did our best in our analysis, no code audit or assessment is a guarantee of the absence of flaws. Our effort was constrained by resource and time limits along with the scope of the agreement.

While assessing the severity of the findings, we considered the impact, ease of exploitability, and the probability of attack. This is a solid baseline for severity determination.

#### The Classification of vulnerabilities

Security vulnerabilities and areas for improvement are weighted into one of several categories using, but is not limited to, the criteria listed below:

#### <u>Critical – vulnerability will lead to a loss of protected assets</u>

- This is a vulnerability that would lead to immediate loss of protected assets
- The complexity to exploit is low
- · The probability of exploit is high

#### High - vulnerability has potential to lead to a loss of protected assets

- All discrepancies found where there is a security claim made in the documentation that cannot be found in the code
- All mismatches from the stated and actual functionality
- · Unprotected key material
- · Weak encryption of keys
- Badly generated key materials
- Txn signatures not verified
- Spending of funds through logic errors
- · Calculation errors overflows and underflows

#### Medium - vulnerability hampers the uptime of the system or can lead to other problems

- Insecure calls to third party libraries
- Use of untested or nonstandard or non-peer-reviewed crypto functions
- Program crashes, leaves core dumps or writes sensitive data to log files

#### Low – vulnerability has a security impact but does not directly affect the protected assets

- Overly complex functions
- Unchecked return values from 3rd party libraries that could alter the execution flow

### <u>Informational</u>

• General recommendations