## Incident Response tactics with Compromise Indicators

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## Introduction

**Basics** 

#### Indicators of Compromise


Indicator of compromise (IOC) in computer forensics is an artifact observed on network or in operating system that with high confidence indicates a computer intrusion.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator\_of\_compromise

#### IOC workflow

**Basics** 

A typical flow with Indicators of Compromise: source: Sophisticated indicators for the modern



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## Standards: OpenIOC

Rasics

OpenIOC - Mandiant-backed effort for unform representation of IOC (now

```
FireEye) http://www.openioc.org/
-<ioc id="6d2a1b03-b216-4cd8-9a9e-8827af6ebf93" last-modified="2011-10-28T19:28:20">
   <short description>Zeus</short description>
   <description>Finds Zeus variants, twexts, sdra64, ntos</description>
   <keywords/>
   <authored by>Mandiant</authored by>
   <authored_date>0001-01-01T00:00:00</authored_date>
   ks/>
 -<definition>
   -<Indicator operator="OR" id="9c8df971-32a8-4ede-8a3a-c5cb2c1439c6">
    -<Indicator operator="AND" id="0781258f-6960-4da5-97a0-ec35fb403cac">
      -<IndicatorItem id="50455b63-35bf-4efa-9f06-aeba2980f80a" condition="contains">
         <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/name" type="mir"/>
         <Content type="string">winlogon.exe</Content>
       </IndicatorItem>
      -<IndicatorItem id="b05d9b40-0528-461f-9721-e31d5651abdc" condition="contains">
         <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Type" type="mir"/>
         <Content type="string">File</Content>
        </IndicatorItem>
      -<Indicator operator="OR" id="67505775-6577-43b2-bccd-74603223180a">
        -<IndicatorItem id="c5ae706f-c032-4da7-8acd-4523f1dae9f6" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Name" type="mir"/>
           <Content type="string">system32\sdra64.exe</Content>
         </IndicatorItem>
        -<IndicatorItem id="25ff12a7-665b-4e45-8b0f-6e5ca7b95801" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Name" type="mir"/>
           <Content type="string">system32\twain 32\user.ds</Content>
         </IndicatorItem>
        -<IndicatorItem id="fea11706-9ebe-469b-b30a-4047cfb7436b" condition="contains">
```

## Standards: Mitre

```
Mitre CybOX: http://cybox.mitre.org/
https://github.com/CybOXProject/Tools
https://github.com/CybOXProject/openioc-to-cybox Mitre CAPEC:
http://capec.mitre.org/ Mitre STIX: http://stix.mitre.org/ Mitre TAXII http://taxii.mitre.org/
```

## Open-source tools

Rasics

```
OpenIOC manipulation
```

https://github.com/STIXProject/openioc-to-stix

https://github.com/tklane/openiocscripts

Mantis Threat Intelligence Framework

https://github.com/siemens/django-mantis.git Mantis supports

STIX/CybOX/IODEF/OpenIOC etc via importers:

https://github.com/siemens/django-mantis-openioc-importer


Search splunk data for IOC indicators:

https://github.com/technoskald/splunk-search

Our framework: http://github.com/fygrave/iocmap/

## Online Sharing of IOCs

#### http://iocbucket.com/



# Policies on Sharing

Basics

#### Policies on sharing IOCs:

- what to be shared/can be shared
- ▶ who to share with
- when to share

#### Where to look for IOCs:

- Outbound Network Traffic
- User Activities/Failed Logins
- User profile folders

- Administrative Access
- Access from unsual IP addresses
- Database IO: excessive READs
- Size of responses of web pages
- Unusual access to particular files within Web Application (backdoor)
- Unusual port/protocol connections
- DNS and HTTP traffic requests
- Suspicious Scripts, Executables and Data Files

## Challenges

Rasics

Why we need IOCs? because it makes it easier to systematically describe knowledge about breaches.

- ▶ Identifying intrusions is hard
- Unfair game:
  - defender should protect all the assets
  - attacker only needs to 'poop' one system.
- Identifying targeted, organized intrusions is even harder
- Minor anomalous events are important when put together
- Seeing global picture is a mast
- ▶ Details matter
- Attribution is hard

## Challenges

Rasics

#### All networks are compromised

The difference between a good security team and a bad security team is that with a bad security team you will never know that you've been compromised.

## An Example

Rasics

#### A Network compromise case study:

- Attackers broke via a web vuln.
- Attackers gained local admin access
- Attackers created a local user
- Attackers started probing other machines for default user ids
- Attackers launched tunneling tools connecting back to C2
- Attackers installed RATs to maintain access

#### Indicators

Rasics

So what are the compromise indicators here?

- ▶ Where did attackers come from? (IP)
- What vulnerability was exploited? (pattern)
- ▶ What web backdoor was used? (pattern, hash)
- What tools were uploaded? (hashes)
- ▶ What users were created locally? (username)
- ▶ What usernames were probed on other machines

# Good or Bad?

```
File Name
                                  · RasTls exe
File Size
                                    105 LB
File Modification Date/Time
                                     2009:02:09 19:42:05+08:00
File Type
                                    Win32 FXF
MIME Type
                                     application / octet - stream
Machine Type
                                    Intel 386 or later, and compatibles
Time Stamp
                                    2009:02:02 13:38:37+08:00
PE Type
                                    PF32
Linker Version
                                    8 0
Code Size
                                    49152
Initialized Data Size
                                  · 57344
Uninitialized Data Size
                                    0
Entry Point
                                   · 0×3476
OS Version
                                   . 4 0
Image Version
                                     0 0
Subsystem Version
Subsystem
                                     Windows GUI
File Version Number
                                     11 0 4010 7
Product Version Number
                                     11.0.4010.7
File OS
                                    Windows NT 32-bit
Object File Type
                                     Executable application
Language Code
                                     English (U.S.)
Character Set
                                  : Windows . Latin1
                                    Symantec Corporation
Company Name
File Description
                                    Symantec 802.1x Supplicant
File Version
                                    11.0.4010.7
Internal Name
                                  : dot1xtrav
```

### It really depends on context

RasTls.DLL RasTls.DLL.msc

RasTls.exe

Basics

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682586(v=VS.85).aspx Dynamic-Link Library Search Order



## Tools for Dynamic Detection of IOC

► Snort

- ► Yara + yara-enabled tools
- Moloch
- ► Splunk/Log search

## Tools for Dynamic Detection

Moloch

Rasics

- ► Moloch supports Yara (IOCs can be directly applied)
- Moloch has tagger plugin:

```
# tagger.so
# provides ability to import text files with IP and/or hostn
# into a sensor that would cause autotagging of all matching
plugins=tagger.so
```

taggerlpFiles=blacklist ,tag ,tag ,tag ... taggerDomainFiles=domainbasedblacklists , tag , tag , tag

#### Sources of IOCs

▶ ioc bucket:

http://iocbucket.com

▶ Public blacklists/trackers could also be used as source:

```
https:
```

Rasics

//zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=ipblocklist
https:

//zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=domainblocklist

Eset IOC repository

https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc more coming?

#### where to mine IOC

- passive HTTP (keep your data recorded)
- passive DNS

Rasics

These platforms provide ability to mine traffic or patterns from the past based on IOC similarity

show me all the packets similar to this IOC

We implemented a whois service for IOC look-ups

whois -h ioc.host.com attribute:value+attribute:value

## Mining IOCs from your own data

- find and investigate incident
- Or even read paper

- determine indicators and test it in YOUR Environment
- use new indicators in the future see IOC cycle we mentioned earlier

# Example

Basics

If event chain leads to compromise

```
http:// liapolasens[.]info/indexm.html
```

http:// liapolasens[.]info/counter.php?t=f&v=win%2011,7,700,169&a=true

```
http:// liapolasens[.]info/354Rlcx
```

http:// liapolasens[.]info/054Rlcx

What to do?

# Use YARA, or tune your own tools

Rasics

```
rule susp_params_in_url_kind_of_fileless_bot_drive_by
{

meta:
    date = "octu2013"
    description = "Landinguhxxp://jdatastorelame.info/indexm.htmluu04.10.2013u13:14uu108.
    description1 = "uJavauSploituhxxp://jdatastorelame.info/054Rlwjuuuuu"

strings:
    Sstring0 = "http"
    Sstring1 = "indexm.html"
    Sstring2 = "054Rl"
```


condition:

## Use snort to catch suspicious traffic:

```
# many plugX deployments connect to google DNS when not in use alert tep !$DNS_SERVERS any -> 8.8.8.8 53 (msg: "APT_u possible_u PlugX_u Google_u DNS_uTCP port_u53_connection_u attempt"; classtype:misc-activity; sid:500000112; rev.1:)
```

## GRR: Google Rapid Response:

http://code.google.com/p/grr/ Hunting IOC artifacts with GRR





## GRR: Creating rules





# GRR: hunt in progress



IOCs composites

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## IOC management portal

Tools

Sharing IOCs

Standards

Basics

#### Monitoring system Dashboard Tables Tables Antivirus Settings Lumension All Export to CSV ioc ioc type ioc domain add user description http://docfiles.dvndns.org/4/instruktsiva-na-planshet-samsung-gt-46.165.250.237 4/Mat/2014 3/Mar/2014 vandex ru Traffic, Meta 198.50.131.220 4hu015ui4yv9h417c6-4.overlooktableland.ru No comment 19/Mar/2014 19/Mar/2014 yellowcompress.meok.info Traffic, Meta www.agroru.com, 148.251.14.227 13/Mar/2014 Traffic Meta www.badger.ru Network http://iephahgh.nahmieni.com:8000/apgsxisfs?dmhmvpri=1333217 6/Mar/2014 7/Mat/2014 xidytol.pp.ua, etotox.pp.ua Traffic Meta http://lephahgh.nahmieni.com:8000/apgsxisfs?dmhmypri=1333217 14Mar/2014 xidyfol.pp.ua Traffic, Meta Network No details 123333 4/Mat/2014 discussegpiau, mostwanted.p Traffic Meta http://doctries.dyndns.org/4/instruktsiya-na-planshet-samsung-gt-5/Mat/2014 Traffic, Meta 2014-03-20 103.31.186.79 xajakbidikapm dyndns.org, akebosa dyndns.org, rywnosuci.dyndns.biz. 4/Mar/2014 19/Mar/2014 www.supercar.ru Traffic Meta discussegplau.mostwanted.p Network u1a0x0d299s5313rq-d4x.speschm.ru, 2199158758-4.speschm.ru 108 50 244 144

add new


ioc domain

ioc type

## IOC exportable to json

```
{ "8000" : { "IP" : ['212.83.167.192', '212.83.170.14', '212.83.170.22', '212.83.173.163', '2
"fyflash" : { "IP" : ['103.246.246.103', '74.126.177.68', '204.200.222.136', '194.183.224.75'
'76.73.80.188', '74.126.177.70', '192.74.246.219', '74.126.177.241'],
"Domain": ['wmi.ns01.usu', 'proxy.ddns.infou', 'windows.ddns.usu',
'microsafes.no—ip.orgu', 'fuckchina.govnb.comu', 'ids.ns01.usu',
'updatedns.ns01.usu', 'updatedns.ns02.usu',
'adservice.no-ip.orgu', 'java.ns1.nameu'],
"MD5" : ['7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e', '1ec5141051776ec9092db92050192758'] },
"btc" : { "IP" : ['184.106.146.244'] },
"slvbuso" : { "MD5" : ['45645F17E3B014B9BCE89A793F5775B2'] , "Domain" : ['helldark.biz'] },
"sp" : { "IP" : ['194.58.91.186', '95.156.238.14', '192.95.46.0', '198.50.131.220', '198.50.20', '198.50.140.72', '95.156.238.5', '192.95.46.25'] },
"pw" : { "IP" : ['185.8.106.97', '195.2.253.25'] },
"sophMdropFQI" : { "MD5" : ['cf656fd9f839a5cd56bb999197745a49'] , "Domain" : ['samiollo.org']
"symsr" : { "IP" : ['212.95.32.52', '95.211.130.132', '123.45.67.89'] ,
 "Domain": ['wertdghbvrukl.ch', 'rgtrvhbgddtvh.biz'] }
"fakeinstr" : { "IP" : ['46.165.250.237', '46.165.250.236', '46.165.250.197'] },
"msProlaco" : { "Domain" : ['kathell.com', 'coginix.org'] } }
```

## and every manager loves graphs :p



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Q and A

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