Incident Response tactics with Compromise Indicators

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IOCs composites

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Introduction

Basics

Indicators of Compromise


Indicator of compromise (IOC) in computer forensics is an artifact observed on network or in operating system that with high confidence indicates a computer intrusion.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise

IOC workflow

Basics

A typical flow with Indicators of Compromise: source: Sophisticated indicators for the modern



Standards Sharing IOCs IOCs composites Case Study Tools More on Tools Questions

Standards: OpenIOC

Rasics

OpenIOC - Mandiant-backed effort for unform representation of IOC (now

```
FireEye) http://www.openioc.org/
-<ioc id="6d2a1b03-b216-4cd8-9a9e-8827af6ebf93" last-modified="2011-10-28T19:28:20">
   <short description>Zeus</short description>
   <description>Finds Zeus variants, twexts, sdra64, ntos</description>
   <keywords/>
   <authored by>Mandiant</authored by>
   <authored_date>0001-01-01T00:00:00</authored_date>
   ks/>
 -<definition>
   -<Indicator operator="OR" id="9c8df971-32a8-4ede-8a3a-c5cb2c1439c6">
    -<Indicator operator="AND" id="0781258f-6960-4da5-97a0-ec35fb403cac">
      -<IndicatorItem id="50455b63-35bf-4efa-9f06-aeba2980f80a" condition="contains">
         <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/name" type="mir"/>
         <Content type="string">winlogon.exe</Content>
       </IndicatorItem>
      -<IndicatorItem id="b05d9b40-0528-461f-9721-e31d5651abdc" condition="contains">
         <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Type" type="mir"/>
         <Content type="string">File</Content>
        </IndicatorItem>
      -<Indicator operator="OR" id="67505775-6577-43b2-bccd-74603223180a">
        -<IndicatorItem id="c5ae706f-c032-4da7-8acd-4523f1dae9f6" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Name" type="mir"/>
           <Content type="string">system32\sdra64.exe</Content>
         </IndicatorItem>
        -<IndicatorItem id="25ff12a7-665b-4e45-8b0f-6e5ca7b95801" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Name" type="mir"/>
           <Content type="string">system32\twain 32\user.ds</Content>
         </IndicatorItem>
        -<IndicatorItem id="fea11706-9ebe-469b-b30a-4047cfb7436b" condition="contains">
```

Standards: Mitre

```
Mitre CybOX: http://cybox.mitre.org/
https://github.com/CybOXProject/Tools
https://github.com/CybOXProject/openioc-to-cybox Mitre CAPEC:
http://capec.mitre.org/ Mitre STIX: http://stix.mitre.org/ Mitre TAXII http://taxii.mitre.org/
```

Open-source tools

Rasics

```
OpenIOC manipulation
```

https://github.com/STIXProject/openioc-to-stix

https://github.com/tklane/openiocscripts

Mantis Threat Intelligence Framework

https://github.com/siemens/django-mantis.git Mantis supports

STIX/CybOX/IODEF/OpenIOC etc via importers:

https://github.com/siemens/django-mantis-openioc-importer


Search splunk data for IOC indicators:

https://github.com/technoskald/splunk-search

Our framework: http://github.com/fygrave/iocmap/

Online Sharing of IOCs

http://iocbucket.com/



Policies on Sharing

Basics

Policies on sharing IOCs:

- what to be shared/can be shared
- ▶ who to share with
- when to share

Where to look for IOCs:

- Outbound Network Traffic
- User Activities/Failed Logins
- User profile folders

- Administrative Access
- Access from unsual IP addresses
- Database IO: excessive READs
- Size of responses of web pages
- Unusual access to particular files within Web Application (backdoor)
- Unusual port/protocol connections
- DNS and HTTP traffic requests
- Suspicious Scripts, Executables and Data Files

Challenges

Rasics

Why we need IOCs? because it makes it easier to systematically describe knowledge about breaches.

- ▶ Identifying intrusions is hard
- Unfair game:
 - defender should protect all the assets
 - attacker only needs to 'poop' one system.
- Identifying targeted, organized intrusions is even harder
- Minor anomalous events are important when put together
- Seeing global picture is a mast
- ▶ Details matter
- Attribution is hard

Challenges

Rasics

All networks are compromised

The difference between a good security team and a bad security team is that with a bad security team you will never know that you've been compromised.

An Example

Rasics

A Network compromise case study:

- Attackers broke via a web vuln.
- Attackers gained local admin access
- Attackers created a local user
- Attackers started probing other machines for default user ids
- Attackers launched tunneling tools connecting back to C2
- Attackers installed RATs to maintain access

Indicators

Rasics

So what are the compromise indicators here?

- ▶ Where did attackers come from? (IP)
- What vulnerability was exploited? (pattern)
- ▶ What web backdoor was used? (pattern, hash)
- What tools were uploaded? (hashes)
- ▶ What users were created locally? (username)
- ▶ What usernames were probed on other machines

Good or Bad?

```
File Name
                                  · RasTls exe
File Size
                                    105 LB
File Modification Date/Time
                                     2009:02:09 19:42:05+08:00
File Type
                                    Win32 FXF
MIME Type
                                     application / octet - stream
Machine Type
                                    Intel 386 or later, and compatibles
Time Stamp
                                    2009:02:02 13:38:37+08:00
PE Type
                                    PF32
Linker Version
                                    8 0
Code Size
                                    49152
Initialized Data Size
                                  · 57344
Uninitialized Data Size
                                    0
Entry Point
                                   · 0×3476
OS Version
                                   . 4 0
Image Version
                                     0 0
Subsystem Version
Subsystem
                                     Windows GUI
File Version Number
                                     11 0 4010 7
Product Version Number
                                     11.0.4010.7
File OS
                                    Windows NT 32-bit
Object File Type
                                     Executable application
Language Code
                                     English (U.S.)
Character Set
                                  : Windows . Latin1
                                    Symantec Corporation
Company Name
File Description
                                    Symantec 802.1x Supplicant
File Version
                                    11.0.4010.7
Internal Name
                                  : dot1xtrav
```

It really depends on context

RasTls.DLL RasTls.DLL.msc

RasTls.exe

Basics

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682586(v=VS.85).aspx Dynamic-Link Library Search Order



Tools for Dynamic Detection of IOC

► Snort

Basics

- ► Yara + yara-enabled tools
- Moloch
- ► Splunk/Log search

Tools for Dynamic Detection

Moloch

Rasics

- ► Moloch supports Yara (IOCs can be directly applied)
- Moloch has tagger plugin:

```
# tagger.so
# provides ability to import text files with IP and/or hostn
# into a sensor that would cause autotagging of all matching
plugins=tagger.so
```

taggerlpFiles=blacklist ,tag ,tag ,tag ... taggerDomainFiles=domainbasedblacklists , tag , tag , tag

Sources of IOCs

Rasics

```
Public blacklists/trackers could also be used as source:
https:
//zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=ipblocklist
https:
//zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=domainblocklist
```

ioc collection http://iocbucket.com

where to mine IOC

- passive HTTP (keep your data recorded)
- passive DNS

Rasics

These platforms provide ability to mine traffic or patterns from the past based on IOC similarity

show me all the packets similar to this IOC

We implemented a whois service for IOC look-ups

whois -h ioc.host.com attribute:value+attribute:value

Mining IOCs from your own data

- find and investigate incident
- Or even read paper

- determine indicators and test it in YOUR Environment
- use new indicators in the future see IOC cycle we mentioned earlier

Example

Basics

If event chain leads to compromise

```
http:// liapolasens[.]info/indexm.html
```

```
http://liapolasens[.]info/counter.php?t=f&v=win%2011,7,700,169&a=true
```

```
http:// liapolasens[.]info/354Rlcx
```

```
http:// liapolasens[.]info/054Rlcx
```

What to do?

Use YARA, or tune your own tools

Rasics

```
rule susp_params_in_url_kind_of_fileless_bot_drive_by
{

meta:
    date = "octu2013"
    description = "Landinguhxxp://jdatastorelame.info/indexm.htmluu04.10.2013u13:14uu108.
    description1 = "uJavauSploituhxxp://jdatastorelame.info/054Rlwjuuuuu"

strings:
    Sstring0 = "http"
    Sstring1 = "indexm.html"
    Sstring2 = "054Rl"
```

condition:

Use snort to catch suspicious traffic:

```
# many plugX deployments connect to google DNS when not in use alert tep !$DNS_SERVERS any -> 8.8.8.8 53 (msg: "APT_u possible_u PlugX_u Google_u DNS_uTCP port_u53_connection_u attempt"; classtype:misc-activity; sid:500000112; rev.1:)
```

IOCs composites

Case Study

More on Tools

Questions

IOC management portal

Tools

Sharing IOCs

Standards

Basics

Monitoring system Dashboard Tables Tables Antivirus Settings Lumension All Export to CSV ioc ioc type ioc domain add user description http://docfiles.dvndns.org/4/instruktsiva-na-planshet-samsung-gt-46.165.250.237 4/Mat/2014 3/Mar/2014 vandex ru Traffic, Meta 198.50.131.220 4hu015ui4yv9h417c6-4.overlooktableland.ru No comment 19/Mar/2014 19/Mar/2014 yellowcompress.meok.info Traffic, Meta www.agroru.com, 148.251.14.227 13/Mar/2014 Traffic Meta www.badger.ru Network http://iephahgh.nahmieni.com:8000/apgsxisfs?dmhmvpri=1333217 6/Mar/2014 7/Mat/2014 xidytol.pp.ua, etotox.pp.ua Traffic Meta http://lephahgh.nahmieni.com:8000/apgsxisfs?dmhmypri=1333217 14Mar/2014 xidyfol.pp.ua Traffic, Meta Network No details 123333 4/Mat/2014 discussegpiau, mostwanted.p Traffic Meta http://doctries.dyndns.org/4/instruktsiya-na-planshet-samsung-gt-5/Mat/2014 Traffic, Meta 2014-03-20 103.31.186.79 xajakbidikapm dyndns.org, akebosa dyndns.org, rywnosuci.dyndns.biz. 4/Mar/2014 19/Mar/2014 www.supercar.ru Traffic Meta discussegplau.mostwanted.p Network u1a0x0d299s5313rq-d4x.speschm.ru, 2199158758-4.speschm.ru 108 50 244 144 add new

commen


ioc domain

ioc type

IOC exportable to json

```
{ "8000" : { "IP" : ['212.83.167.192', '212.83.170.14', '212.83.170.22', '212.83.173.163', '2
"fyflash" : { "IP" : ['103.246.246.103', '74.126.177.68', '204.200.222.136', '194.183.224.75'
'76.73.80.188', '74.126.177.70', '192.74.246.219', '74.126.177.241'],
"Domain": ['wmi.ns01.usu', 'proxy.ddns.infou', 'windows.ddns.usu',
'microsafes.no—ip.orgu', 'fuckchina.govnb.comu', 'ids.ns01.usu',
'updatedns.ns01.usu', 'updatedns.ns02.usu',
'adservice.no-ip.orgu', 'java.ns1.nameu'],
"MD5" : ['7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e', '1ec5141051776ec9092db92050192758'] },
"btc" : { "IP" : ['184.106.146.244'] },
"slvbuso" : { "MD5" : ['45645F17E3B014B9BCE89A793F5775B2'] , "Domain" : ['helldark.biz'] },
"sp" : { "IP" : ['194.58.91.186', '95.156.238.14', '192.95.46.0', '198.50.131.220', '198.50.20', '198.50.140.72', '95.156.238.5', '192.95.46.25'] },
"pw" : { "IP" : ['185.8.106.97', '195.2.253.25'] },
"sophMdropFQI" : { "MD5" : ['cf656fd9f839a5cd56bb999197745a49'] , "Domain" : ['samiollo.org']
"symsr" : { "IP" : ['212.95.32.52', '95.211.130.132', '123.45.67.89'] ,
 "Domain": ['wertdghbvrukl.ch', 'rgtrvhbgddtvh.biz'] }
"fakeinstr" : { "IP" : ['46.165.250.237', '46.165.250.236', '46.165.250.197'] },
"msProlaco" : { "Domain" : ['kathell.com', 'coginix.org'] } }
```

and every manager loves graphs :p



IOCs composites

Case Study

More on Tools

Questions

Or contact us at ...

Standards

Basics

Q and A

Tools

Sharing IOCs