# Incident Response tactics with Compromise Indicators

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Basics

# Outline

Basics

**Basics** 

Standards

Tools

Sharing IOCs

**IOCs** composites

Case Study

More on Tools

Questions

#### Introduction

Rasics

#### Indicators of Compromise


Indicator of compromise (IOC) in computer forensics is an artifact observed on network or in operating system that with high confidence indicates a computer intrusion.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator\_of\_compromise

#### IOC workflow

**Basics** 

A typical flow with Indicators of Compromise allows to integrate dynamic threat intelligence into detection process:



source: Sophisticated indicators for the modern threat landscape, 2012 paper

Standards Tools Sharing IOCs IOCs composites Case Study More on Tools Questions

## Standards: OpenIOC

Rasics

OpenIOC - Mandiant-backed effort for unform representation of IOC (now FireEye) http://www.openioc.org/

```
-<ioc id="6d2a1b03-b216-4cd8-9a9e-8827af6ebf93" last-modified="2011-10-28T19:28:20">
   <short description>Zeus</short description>
   <description>Finds Zeus variants, twexts, sdra64, ntos</description>
   <keywords/>
   <authored by>Mandiant</authored by>
   <authored_date>0001-01-01T00:00:00</authored_date>
   ks/>
 -<definition>
   -<Indicator operator="OR" id="9c8df971-32a8-4ede-8a3a-c5cb2c1439c6">
     -<Indicator operator="AND" id="0781258f-6960-4da5-97a0-ec35fb403cac">
      -<IndicatorÎtem id="50455b63-35bf4efa-9f06-aeba2980f80a" condition="contains">
          <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/name" type="mir"/>
          <Content type="string">winlogon.exe</Content>
        </IndicatorItem>
      -<IndicatorItem id="b05d9b40-0528-461f-9721-e31d5651abdc" condition="contains">
          <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Type" type="mir"/>
          <Content type="string">File</Content>
        </IndicatorItem>
      -<Indicator operator="OR" id="67505775-6577-43b2-bccd-74603223180a">
        -<IndicatorItem id="c5ae706f-c032-4da7-8acd-4523f1dae9f6" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Name" type="mir"/>
           <Content type="string">system32\sdra64.exe</Content>
          </IndicatorItem>
        -<IndicatorItem id="25ff12a7-665b-4e45-8b0f-6e5ca7b95801" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Name" type="mir"/>
            <Content type="string">svstem32\twain 32\user.ds</Content>
          </IndicatorItem>
        -<IndicatorItem id="fea11706-9ebe-469b-b30a-4047cfb7436b" condition="contains">
           <Context document="ProcessItem" search="ProcessItem/HandleList/Handle/Type" type="mir"/>
           <Content type="string">\WINDOWS\system32\twext.exe</Content>
```

#### Standards: Mitre

Rasics

```
Mitre CybOX: http://cybox.mitre.org/
https://github.com/CybOXProject/Tools
```

https://github.com/CybOXProject/openioc-to-cybox Mitre

CAPEC: http://capec.mitre.org/ Mitre STIX:

http://stix.mitre.org/ Mitre TAXII http://taxii.mitre.org/

#### Open-source tools

Rasics

#### OpenIOC manipulation

https://github.com/STIXProject/openioc-to-stix

https://github.com/tklane/openiocscripts

Mantis Threat Intelligence Framework

https://github.com/siemens/django-mantis.git Mantis supports

STIX/CybOX/IODEF/OpenIOC etc via importers:

https://github.com/siemens/django-mantis-openioc-importer

Search splunk data for IOC indicators:


https://github.com/technoskald/splunk-search

Our framework: http://github.com/fygrave/iocmap/

# Online Sharing of IOCs

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#### http://iocbucket.com/



# Policies on Sharing

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#### Policies on sharing IOCs:

- what to be shared/can be shared
- who to share with
- when to share

#### Where to look for IOCs:

- Outbound Network Traffic
- User Activities/Failed Logins
- User profile folders
- Administrative Access
- Access from unsual IP addresses
- Database IO: excessive READs
- Size of responses of web pages
- Unusual access to particular files within Web Application (backdoor)
- Unusual port/protocol connections
- DNS and HTTP traffic requests
- Suspicious Scripts, Executables and Data Files



# Challenges

Rasics

Why we need IOCs? because it makes it easier to systematically describe knowledge about breaches.

- ▶ Identifying intrusions is hard
- ▶ Unfair game:
  - defender should protect all the assets
  - attacker only needs to 'poop' one system.
- Identifying targeted, organized intrusions is even harder
- Minor anomalous events are important when put together
- Seeing global picture is a mast
- ..
- ▶ Details matter
- Attribution is hard

# Challenges

Rasics

#### All networks are compromised

The difference between a good security team and a bad security team is that with a bad security team you will never know that you've been compromised.

## An Example

Rasics

#### A Network compromise case study:

- Attackers broke via a web vuln.
- Attackers gained local admin access
- Attackers created a local user
- Attackers started probing other machines for default user ids
- ▶ Attackers launched tunneling tools connecting back to C2
- Attackers installed RATs to maintain access

#### **Indicators**

Rasics

So what are the compromise indicators here?

- ▶ Where did attackers come from? (IP)
- ► What vulnerability was exploited? (pattern)
- What web backdoor was used? (pattern, hash)
- ▶ What tools were uploaded? (hashes)
- What users were created locally? (username)
- What usernames were probed on other machines

## Good or Bad?

```
File Name
                                  · RasTls exe
File Size
                                    105 LB
File Modification Date/Time
                                    2009:02:09 19:42:05+08:00
File Type
                                  · Win32 FXF
                                    application / octet - stream
MIME Type
Machine Type
                                  : Intel 386 or later, and compatibles
Time Stamp
                                    2009:02:02 13:38:37+08:00
PE Type
                                    PF32
Linker Version
                                    8 0
Code Size
                                    49152
Initialized Data Size
                                  · 57344
Uninitialized Data Size
Entry Point
                                  · 0x3d76
OS Version
                                  . 40
Image Version
                                    0 0
Subsystem Version
Subsystem
                                    Windows GUI
File Version Number
                                  . 11 0 4010 7
Product Version Number
                                    11.0.4010.7
File OS
                                    Windows NT 32-bit
                                    Executable application
Object File Type
Language Code
                                    English (U.S.)
Character Set
                                  : Windows. Latin1
                                    Symantec Corporation
Company Name
File Description
                                    Symantec 802.1x Supplicant
File Version
                                    11.0.4010.7
Internal Name
                                  : dot1xtrav
```

#### It really depends on context

RasTls . DLL

RasTls.DLL.msc

RasTls.exe

http:

Rasics

//msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682586(v=VS.85).aspx
Dynamic-Link Library Search Order



# Tools for Dynamic Detection of IOC

▶ Snort

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- ► Yara + yara-enabled tools
- ► Moloch
- Splunk/Log search

# Tools for Dynamic Detection

Moloch

- Moloch supports Yara (IOCs can be directly applied)
- ► Moloch has tagger plugin:

```
# tagger.so
# provides ability to import text files with IP and/or h
# into a sensor that would cause autotagging of all mate
plugins=tagger.so
taggerlpFiles=blacklist,tag,tag,tag...
taggerDomainFiles=domainbasedblacklists, tag, tag, tag
```

#### Sources of IOCs

```
ioc collection http://iocbucket.com
Public blacklists/trackers could also be used as source:
https:
//zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=ipblocklist
https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php?download=
domainblocklist.
```

#### where to mine IOC

Rasics

- passive HTTP (keep your data recorded)
- passive DNS

These platforms provide ability to mine traffic or patterns from the past based on IOC similarity

show me all the packets similar to this IOC

We implemented a whois service for IOC look-ups

whois -h ioc.host.com attribute:value+attribute:value

# Mining IOCs from your own data

- ▶ find and investigate incident
- Or even read paper

- determine indicators and test it in YOUR Environment
- use new indicators in the future see IOC cycle we mentioned earlier

## Example

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```
If event chain leads to compromise

http:// liapolasens[.]info/indexm.html

http:// liapolasens[.]info/counter.php?t=f&v=win%2011,7,700,169&a=true

http:// liapolasens[.]info/354Rlcx

http:// liapolasens[.]info/054Rlcx

What to do?
```

# Use YARA, or tune your own tools

Rasics

```
rule susp_params_in_url_kind_of_fileless_bot_drive_by
{

meta:
    date = "octu2013"
    description = "Landinguhxxp://jdatastorelame.info/indexm.htmluu04.10.2013u13:14;
    description1 = "uJavauSploituhxxp://jdatastorelame.info/054Rlwjuuuuu"

strings:
    Sstring0 = "http"
    Sstring1 = "indexm.html"
    Sstring2 = "054Rl"
```

condition:

}

# Use snort to catch suspicious traffic:

```
# many plugX deployments connect to google DNS when not in use alert tcp !$DNS_SERVERS any -> 8.8.8.8 53 (msg:"APT_possible_PlugX_Google_DNS_TCP port_53gconnection_pattempt"; classtype:misc-activity; sid:500000112; rev:1:)
```


# IOC management portal

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# and every manager loves graphs :p

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Sharing IOCs

IOCs composites

Case Study

More on Tools

Questions

Or contact us at ...

Standards

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Q and A

Tools