

$(D, V), g \models a(x)$	iff	$x \in V(a)$
$(D, V), g \models \neg a(x)$	iff	$x \notin V(a)$
$(D, V), g \models x \approx y$	iff	$g(x) = g(y)$
$(D, V), g \models x \not\approx y$	iff	$g(x) \neq g(y)$
$(D, V), g \models \varphi \vee \psi$	iff	$(D, V), g \models \varphi$ or $\mathbb{M}, g \models \psi$
$(D, V), g \models \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff	$(D, V), g \models \varphi$ and $\mathbb{M}, g \models \psi$
$(D, V), g \models \exists x. \varphi$	iff	there is $s \in D$ such that $(D, V), g[x \mapsto s] \models \varphi$
$(D, V), g \models \forall x. \varphi$	iff	for all $s \in D$, $(D, V), g[x \mapsto s] \models \varphi$.

desired

As wished, this definition induces a truth relation $(D, V) \models \varphi$ between one-step models and one-step formulas, as the one-step formulas of $\text{FOE}_1(A)$ are defined to be the sentences, thus there is no need of an explicit free variables assignment g in determining their semantics.

rewrite (too long)

In order for the semantic notion of co-continuity to be well-defined (Definition 3.2), we also need to define what is the dual of a formula. This just coincides with the familiar notion of boolean dual.

Definition 3.4. The dual $\varphi^\delta \in \text{FOE}_1^\infty(A)$ of $\varphi \in \text{FOE}_1^\infty(A)$ is given by:

$(a(x))^\delta := a(x)$	$(\neg a(x))^\delta := \neg a(x)$
$(\top)^\delta := \perp$	$(\perp)^\delta := \top$
$(x \approx y)^\delta := x \not\approx y$	$(x \not\approx y)^\delta := x \approx y$
$(\varphi \wedge \psi)^\delta := \varphi^\delta \vee \psi^\delta$	$(\varphi \vee \psi)^\delta := \varphi^\delta \wedge \psi^\delta$
$(\exists x. \varphi)^\delta := \forall x. \varphi^\delta$	$(\forall x. \varphi)^\delta := \exists x. \varphi^\delta$

We now introduce an extension of first-order logic with two additional quantifiers, which first appeared in the context of Mostowski's study [Mostowski 1957] of generalised quantifiers. The first, written $\exists^\infty x. \varphi$, expresses that there exist infinitely many elements satisfying a formula φ . Its dual, written $\forall^\infty x. \varphi$, expresses that there are at most finitely many elements falsifying the formula φ . The formal definition goes as follows, where \mathcal{Q} ranges over $\{\exists^\infty, \forall^\infty\}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \exists^\infty &:= \{(J, X) \mid |X| \geq \aleph_0\} & \forall^\infty &:= \{(J, X) \mid |J \setminus X| < \aleph_0\} \\ (D, V), g \models \mathcal{Q}x. \varphi(x) & \text{ iff } (D, \{s \in D \mid (D, V), g[x \mapsto s] \models \varphi(x)\}) \in \mathcal{Q} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

why not use simpler def as in other paper?

Definition 3.5. The one-step language $\text{FOE}_1^\infty(A)$ is defined by adding to the grammar of $\text{FOE}_1(A)$ the cases $\exists^\infty x. \varphi$ and $\forall^\infty x. \varphi$. The truth relation $(D, V) \models \varphi$ is defined by extending the one for $\text{FOE}_1(A)$ with clauses (9).

In the rest of the subsection we recall from [?] syntactic characterisations for semantic properties of the first-order logics FOE_1 and FOE_1^∞ . We first discuss FOE_1 . The properties of monotonicity and continuity will be characterised both with a grammar and a normal form.

Definition 3.6.

- (a) The positive fragment of $\text{FOE}_1(A)$, written $\text{FOE}_1^+(A)$, is the set of sentences generated by the grammar (8) without clauses $\neg a(x)$.
- (b) For $B \subseteq A$, the B -continuous fragment of $\text{FOE}_1(A)$, written $\text{FOE}_1 \text{CON}_B(A)$, is the set of sentences generated by the following grammar, where $b \in B$ and $\psi \in \text{FOE}_1^+(A)$