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Foucauldian Diagnostics: Space, Time, and the Metaphysics of Medicine

JEFFREY P. BISHOP
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee, USA

This essay places Foucault's work into a philosophical context, recognizing that Foucault is difficult to place and demonstrates that Foucault remains in the Kantian tradition of philosophy, even if he sits at the margins of that tradition. For Kant, the forms of intuition—space and time—are the a priori conditions of the possibility of human experience and knowledge. For Foucault, the a priori conditions are political space and historical time. Foucault sees political space as central to understanding both the subject and objects of medicine, psychiatry, and the social sciences. Through this analysis one can see that medicine's metaphysics is a metaphysics of efficient causation, where medicine's objects are subjected to mechanisms of efficient control.

Keywords: *Foucault, Kant, metaphysics, space*

I. INTRODUCTION

Our thinking becomes almost immediately mechanical because it is our habit to think instrumentally. Old habits are hard to break, preventing us from thinking differently; not that thinking differently is impossible, just difficult. Preventing our practices in medicine from becoming thoughtless, thus, means that we must once again turn to how we think about what it is that we do. But then thinking differently about what we do, paradoxically perhaps, calls for us to realize that all thinking is also a kind of doing. *Theoria* and *praxis* and subjects and objects are strictly thought separable in the West. In a way, it is a false division, but it is a division that continues to flourish in our practices and our thinking. Some thinkers, like Nietzsche (1999) and Heidegger (1996), believe these lines sit at the very heart of the history

Address correspondence to: Jeffrey P. Bishop, MD, Center for Biomedical Ethics and Society, Vanderbilt University, 2525 West End Ave., 4th Floor, Suite 400, Nashville, TN 37203, USA. E-mail: jeffrey.bishop@Vanderbilt.Edu

of the West, or perhaps these lines between subject and object and theoria and praxis are just an aberration of late Western Scholasticism, as held by Milbank (2003, 2006) or Pickstock (1998), or are lines drawn at the Enlightenment, as held by MacIntyre (1984, 1990). If we accept Foucault's position, we know that there are various kinds of practices implicit in all theoretical endeavors, and at the same time, there are implicit theoretical stances in all that we do.

In this essay, I shall do two things. The first is to place Foucault into a philosophical context. The first claim is that Foucault sits in the Kantian tradition of philosophy, even while sitting at the margin of that tradition. Like Kant, he too is concerned with the a priori of time and space but not as transcendental time and space. For Foucault, they are oxymoronically a priori, no longer transcendentals but fully immanent. No longer are we dealing with time and space as pure forms of intuition, they are now conceived as historical time and political space.

The second claim that I shall make in this essay is that it is because Foucault sees deeply into the metaphysical position of the West that his work on medicine remains relevant even today because medicine continues to deploy, in the name of care and concern, the same metaphysical violences over and over again. No one dares to acknowledge these violences. It is hard for us to accept that our practices continue to repeat these violences, even while they are meant to do good, to bring good effects into the world.

Medicine as a discipline is mostly concerned with the effects it brings about in the world and how to pragmatically produce or cause those effects in the world. It is perhaps in this sense that medicine has become thoughtless as it is mostly about pragmatic doing, utilitarian maximization, and efficient control. Or, as Carl Elliott (1999) points out, medicine collapses into an unthinking pragmatism. It is the possibility of controlling the world that justifies information as knowledge, to be able to do something with it. Medicine's metaphysical stance then is a metaphysics of efficient causality, concerned with the empirical realm of effects and the rational working out of their causes for the purposes of bringing about some good. Among Aristotle's four causes, efficient causality took precedence and reigns supreme in all technological thinking. At least since Bacon, it has been understood that knowledge is power gained to relieve the human condition (Bacon, 2000, 60, 221/Book I, LXXIII, Book II, LII). That is to say, true knowledge can do things with the real world, and the real world is what can be manipulated with real power/true knowledge. The purpose of knowing—the end of knowing—is to bring about effects in the world. Yet, medicine seems to deny having a metaphysics and thus gives no thought to its metaphysics. Thus, for Western medicine, indeed perhaps all scientific and technological thought, the important bit about the world is how to manipulate it in order to get the effects that we desire. It is in this sense that Eric Krakauer (1998) has said that medicine is the standard bearer of Western metaphysics. The

world stands before us as a manipulable object and all thinking about the world becomes instrumental doing, and to be good and to do good, we must manipulate the world and show our effects.

In this essay, then, I argue that Foucault's insights are adequate to his analysis of medicine precisely because he sees the metaphysical structure at the heart of the West. Foucault's place in philosophy and history is a subject of some controversy for a myriad of reasons, but his method sees deeply into the thinking that animates medical practices and brings into relief medicine's metaphysics. Thus, his method is central to the thesis of this essay because he recognizes that medicine's thinking about doing is related to the metaphysical thinking of the West. Method cannot be taken as separable from metaphysics, for Foucault notes—in a vein similar to the Kantian tradition in philosophy—that notions of space and time, subjects and objects, stasis and flux, and bounded and unbounded freedom relate to how we conceive doing in the West. And it is this insight that Foucault brings in his analysis of the rise of medicine in France, and how for medicine, the dead body becomes the normative body, and how for the allied social sciences, the disciplinary power of expertise is deployed.

II. FOUCAULT'S PROJECT

As with any project that begins by taking up a thesis of Michel Foucault, one must first place Foucault himself. But this is no little foray into Foucault's method simply to define my methodology. Foucault's method is adequate to his inquiries into both medicine and the human sciences. But engaging Foucault is no easy task. Foucault has occupied a questionable place as both historian (Rousseau, 1972; Megill, 1987) and philosopher (Tallis, 1999). Historians often reject him as a historian but are willing to entertain him as a philosopher; and philosophers often reject him as a philosopher but entertain his work as a historian. I embrace him as both a philosopher of history—where history becomes a philosophical category of analysis—and as an historian of philosophy—where philosophy is understood as an endeavor to understand what animates very particular practices in very particular places at very particular times. Yet, Foucault refuses the manacle of historian of the great ideas (Gutting, 1994) and, instead of writing histories of great ideas, writes the histories of the others of those great ideas. He writes histories of thought about problems (Foucault 1978, 1984a). He takes for himself the moniker of historian of thought or historian of problematizations (Foucault, 1984a). These are the sorts of distinctions that Foucault makes in the endless interviews published after his death—distinctions that drove contemporaries of Foucault—and for that matter distinctions that continue to drive scholars today—mad. Yet, even those who find Foucault maddening cannot dispute his influence or the complexity of his work. As pointed out by Gutting

(1994), Foucault's writing, for all of its modernist reservations, demands interpretation. Thus, it is difficult to embrace his methodology or take up a thesis from Foucault without first placing his work in some sort of context.

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) present Foucault as both historical and philosophical; they think of Foucault as offering an interpretative analytics. Foucault is analytic in the Kantian sense as he searches out the conditions for the possibility of unreason in *Madness and Civilization* (1988)[1]; of medicine in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1991); and of life, language, and labor in *The Order of Things* (1994); but he also searches out the sources and legitimate uses of our various knowledges. His work is interpretative in that it seeks a pragmatic reading of the coherence of our practices—practices in which our knowledges are instantiated.

Gutting, on the other hand, does not wish to look for easy ways to make Foucault's work to cohere. For instance, Gutting separates Foucault's works into three distinct eras: (1) Archaeology of discourse—including *History of Madness* (2006), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1991), *The Order of Things* (1994), and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1991); (2) Genealogy of power relations—including *Discipline and Punish (1995) and The history of sexuality, Volume I* (1978); and (3) The problematization of ethics—including *The Use of Pleasure* (1990) and *The Care of the Self* (1988c)—(Gutting, 1994, 2).

In other words, to say that Foucault has a project, it is almost an un-Foucauldian position to take. As Gutting notes, Foucault was prone to interpreting his own works differently at different times. Taking the early works up to *Order of Things* as an instance, Gutting notes that in 1969 Foucault claims that these works were imperfect sketches of an archaeological method. In 1976, Foucault claims that these early works are about power relations, and then in 1982 he claims that they are not about power relations but about the subject (Gutting, 1994, 4). Thus, even for Foucault, the idea of a project is at best a moving target if not an outright fabrication.

Moreover, in the interviews and writings in *Power-Knowledge*, Foucault clearly refuses to be hemmed-in by labels or categories or roles. For instance, he questions the practice of trying to find the unifying authority at the core of an essay or of a book—an *oeuvre*, a work—or at the core of a body of works; that is to say, he questions the practice of trying to find the author, the essential originary point of the work (Foucault, 1984b) and thus the original intention or meaning of the work. As Jon Simons (1995) points out, Foucault would object to the placing of his work as either his or as a body of work. His writings suggest that to create the work or to put the works together so as to capture the thinker is to render that thinker as a subject or to perpetuate the author function—a kind of essential ground of authority (Foucault, 1984b), when in fact works are open to interpretation. In an effort to remain antiessentialist—as having no essential core—Foucault resisted being made that kernel of origin of any one work, and he resisted pulling all his works together and finding FOUCAULT, writ large, as the origin

(Foucault, 1980a). Thus, any attempt to unify Foucault through creating him in the mode of an author is to render him in the terms of modernity, which goes counter to his work.

It is clear that Foucault realizes that he has been thrown into the world in a particular place and at a particular time. It is also clear that he thinks that the *polis* and the history into which he is thrown is already ongoing and that this particular place and this particular history form the conditions for the possibility of his work. Thus, Foucault is as much a product of his place and time as he is a free agent, author, or subject who writes about the conditions of his time and place. And Foucault, writing philosophical histories, necessarily writes of particular times and of particular places—time and space.

Thus, as Gutting states in no uncertain terms, each of the works should be read as idiosyncratic, as a work unto itself (Gutting, 1994, 2). Indeed, Foucault (1984c) hints at the need for idiosyncratic studies as central to both understanding the Enlightenment and ourselves. Foucault himself in his lifetime refused to be reduced to an author with originary intention (1984b, 101–2) or to allow himself to be categorized according to various ideologies—Marxist, liberal, or humanist—or to a particular discipline—intellectual historian or philosopher (1980a, 1980b, 1984a). Foucault's "analyses are effective precisely because they are specific to the particular terrain of the discipline he is challenging, not determined by some general theory or methodology" (Gutting, 1994, 3). Gutting goes on to say that none of Foucault's major works refer to one another, this despite the fact that both *History of Madness* and *The Birth of the Clinic* share a similar space—medicine.

Gutting seems correct at one level but incorrect at another. True, *History of Madness* does not seem to have an agenda or cause, even while—as noted by those who translated it in its entirety into English only very recently—the first translators of it into *Madness and Civilization* had an agenda in psychiatry. Yet, *History of Madness* is not so much an examination of the birth of the discipline of psychiatry but rather as a particular occasion to reflect on the notion of reason and its other, unreason. It serves as a chance to capture the fluid movement of an unreasonable object—madness or the person suffering madness—in terms of a reasonable subject whose position of power stands as relation to the power of medicine and the state. Reason and unreason are defined one against the other. But reason, that Nietzschean mask for the will to power, has the power to define its object. Reason, with its fixed power, comes to fix the fluidity of unreason, to define it as an object. Thus, *History of Madness* is a work on reason and power as the conditions of possibility for a new object—unreasonableness/madness/mental illness—to appear on the scene. It is a work examining the interplay of the Apollonian and the Dionysian elements in the post-Enlightenment landscape, not unlike Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* (1999).

The task of *The Birth of the Clinic* is not just an examination of the birth of a discipline so much as it is an examination of the discontinuities of history

(Foucault, 1973, xvi–xviii)—where ideas and practices with different histories are joined together. It is an occasion to see once again the excess that language betrays and begets but oddly also delimits (Foucault, 1973, xvi–-xviii). It is the occasion to see how medical practice missed the idea that the gap between signifiers and the signified create the need to endlessly comment upon commentary (Foucault, 1973, xvi–xviii), and how medical practice conceived signs as speaking their truth without remainder or excess; no interpretation necessary (Foucault, 1973, xvii and 88–106). In another sense, it is also a reflection on the task of the historian and upon the intractability of writing and interpreting. Thus, Foucault's projects are broad and yet, strangely, specific. His work operates on many different levels and, in that way, is philosophical.

In this very broad sense, then, Foucault is a philosopher. On the one hand, I am in agreement with those who would keep us from reducing Foucault to a subject position (Foucault, 1972, 54–5) or author function (Foucault, 1984b) or from reducing Foucault to a Marxist or a liberal or a philosopher. Not only does Foucault reject such easy categorization in the interviews but the various works themselves, taken individually or in aggregate, also resist such easy labeling. I am in agreement with those who would point out to us that to reduce the idiosyncratic nature of Foucault's various works is to stifle and indeed to kill the very object of inquiry. Yet, at the same time, it seems odd to me to think that somehow Foucault would have objected to the work of the archaeologist or genealogist in examining a major figure of our present moment, namely, this Foucault figure, who wished to remain an ephemeral ghost rather than a substantial object. Indeed, it was only as an ephemeral ghost that he could remain free against the tide of history and the political spaces that had come to shape his works on both our thinking and our practices, including our practices of thinking and our thinking on our doing.

Although it indeed sounds odd to define a Foucauldian project, it is odder still to think that one ought not to search for the historical and political conditions of the possibility of the works of this ghostly Foucault figure, this phenomenon that appears on the scene in late modernity. On Foucault's view, we are becoming subjects historically constituted by power/knowledge structures—even if those structures are subliminally operative—even while we might be freely engaged in aesthetical and ethical self-creation (Foucault, 1988b). Thus, the endeavor to find the task that engaged Foucault and produced his writings—even when he resists our making him into an author, historian, or Marxist (a role, a member of a discipline, or an ideologue)—is itself to do what Foucault does. The task of the historian of the present is always a task to find the historical and political conditions for the possibility of what we find interesting about our time and about ourselves.

It is this interest in ourselves that Foucault says is unique to the Enlightenment—its concern with the present, the history of the present, and

why things are the way they are for us—why things appear to us in the ways that they do (Foucault, 1984b). We are concerned with what is present—near to us in space; after all, that is the task of the scientist to look at things present in front of us. We are concerned with what is present—near to us in time; after all that is the task of the social scientist to look at the behaviors of this object called society and to describe what is happening in real time. Thus, Foucault is concerned with objects—madness and disease—and subjects—doctors, historians, and authors. He is concerned with time (genealogy) and space (archaeology). In this way, Foucault plays within the field created by Enlightenment figures. In this way, he sees deeply into the metaphysics of the West.

III. FOUCAULT AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE KANTIAN TRADITION

If one takes a note from the pseudonymous Maurice Florence, one might find the general area of thought that occupied Foucault: "If Foucault is indeed perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of Kant, and his undertaking could be called *A Critical History of Thought*" (Florence, 1994, 314). If we take Foucault at his word—for Foucault wrote this about himself as Maurice Florence—then we shall have to say that insofar as he is a philosopher, Foucault is a Kantian. That is to say, he falls within the Kantian tradition. By "tradition" I mean what MacIntyre means. Tradition is not some sort of longing for a romantic past—the good old days. Rather, a tradition is a dynamic set of practices, which may even be practices of intellectual and theoretical inquiry. Traditions have *telei*, ends, and purposes, as well as notions of their origins and starting points; and traditions have notions for what counts as rational. But even within a particular tradition, origins, *telei*, and rationality can be contested by insiders or outsiders to the tradition. Someone can call into question one's origins, the *telos*, or even what counts as rational—including what counts as rational argumentation. Depending on how convincing the arguments are, those who participate in the tradition might change their practices or their beliefs about the origins or *telos* of that tradition, or indeed, they might even change what counts as rational. Traditions are moving in space and time, according to MacIntyre.

Yet, problematic for my claim that Foucault operates in the Kantian tradition—as defined by MacIntyre—is that MacIntyre (1990) opposes tradition to genealogy, a task that engaged Foucault. In *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, MacIntyre notes that those modes of thinking and knowing born out of the Enlightenment, explicitly opposed themselves to tradition, abandoning it, throwing it off, and indeed, as noted above, rejecting traditional metaphysics for a metaphysics of efficient causality. Instead, the thinkers of the Enlightenment attempted to ground their projects not in the authority of what had gone before but instead grounded them in the new empiricism (Hume, 1977;

Locke, 1996; Bacon, 2000), rationalism (Descartes, 1980), rational and skeptical empiricism, the sciences, or Kantian reason.

According to MacIntyre, the various Enlightenment projects gave rise to what he calls "encyclopedic efforts"; that is to say, efforts to catalogue knowledge, including ethical knowledge. Foucault does not fall within the encyclopedic mode of inquiry on MacIntyre's reading. Rather, Foucault takes up the Nietzschean banner of genealogy that exploration of the "history of those social and psychological formations in which the will to power is distorted and concealed by the will to truth" (MacIntyre, 1990, 39). MacIntyre thinks that Nietzsche fails in his attempt to abandon standards of moral inquiry because the *Genealogy of Morals* is precisely his attempt to make the argument according to the standards of the very academy against which Nietzsche is writing (MacIntyre, 1990, 44). Nietzsche moves from the professoriate to become a homeless wanderer. But, oddly, claims MacIntyre, Foucault begins without a home (is he historian, philosopher, or someone wandering around outside of the academy?) and makes his way to the professoriate and not just at the College de France. He becomes a professor to the world, holding appointments in Lille, Warsaw, California, Brazil, and Tunisia, with concerns about China and Iran. Foucault becomes the professor of professors. Moreover, claims MacIntyre, Foucault's style becomes rather more academic in the series of books on the *History of Sexuality* and submits itself to these rather more mundane academic standards. MacIntyre reads this as Foucault's abandonment of genealogy and asks if genealogy is even a sustainable task.

Thus, adding to the oddity of my claim that Foucault has a project, it is odder still for me to claim that Foucault is operating within a tradition. Yet, he does end up as a quintessential figure in the academy. Just as noted by MacIntyre, traditions are not static but are instead ongoing interpretations and readings of practices, and these traditions happen upon new events and challenges in time. A tradition often must search out its authorities and sources, whether historical or scientific, when it butts up against an impasse. And I believe that Foucault is himself doing the same sort of inquiry. It seems to me that Foucault is attempting to offer answers to the problems presented to us after Kant, particularly the incoherencies within Kant's *Critiques*. For both Foucault and MacIntyre, what animates thought is the solving of problems. Foucault calls them "problematizations of thought"; MacIntyre calls them "epistemological crises."

So, as noted by MacIntyre, Foucault begins outside the University. He begins writing *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* while he worked in Sweden as a cultural attaché and initially had proposed it as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Uppsala, where it was rejected (Macey, 1993, 78–80). In addition, at the Sorbonne, where the thesis was accepted, even the *soutenance* committee criticized points where it thought Foucault had lapsed in his academic rigor (Macey, 1993, 110–3). Even after its publication, Foucault

received mixed reviews, some positive, many negative, and most were not directed at the thesis of the book itself but at its lack of the accepted academic standards. Philosophy and history, not to mention other of the sciences, had become great encyclopedic efforts to catalogue the world (MacIntyre, 1984, 264–78, 1990, 9–31); yet, despite Nietzsche's work, the institutions of philosophical inquiry remained intact. Foucault rejected the grand unifying themes in philosophy, which had been designed to catalogue the world, knowledge, metaphysics, and other typically philosophical endeavors. Foucault looked at very narrow, particular sets of practices and how these instantiated thought. Foucault's endeavor is a threat to a philosophical discipline that sees itself as sharpening the mind for accurate analyses, for saying what might be said that is true at all times and in all places.

Yet, Foucault—who would note that even truth has a history—cannot help but be shaped by Kant, who is looking for the a priori conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Kant seeks those features of knowledge that exist prior to our experience of whatever occupies our attention. As is so widely known, those a priori features are the pure forms of the intuition—space and time. As noted by Beatrice Han in her exhaustive treatment of *Foucault's Critical Project* (2002), Foucault needed to settle a problem presented by Kant, namely the exact moment when the transcendental theme—the a priori of space and time—came to coincide with the studies of man—studies that occupied so much of Foucault's later work. In fact, Foucault's complementary thesis of 1961, which was not published during his lifetime, is a commentary on Kant's *Anthropology from a Practical Point of View* (Foucault, 2008). Thus, his complementary thesis becomes central in forming Foucault's questions, for this is precisely the point very early in Foucault's studies that he began to seek a relationship between Kant's *Anthropology* and the *Critiques*. Where the critiques are seeking to articulate the transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge, in Kant's *Anthropology*, Foucault already sees ambivalence between the transcendental constituting subject and the already constituted object. Han states: "The object of the *Anthropology* would therefore be neither the 'subject in itself' of the Second Critique, nor the 'pure I' as studied in the first, but an 'object-I'—also 'subject'—in other words, man in his paradoxical identity as determined and determining" (Han, 2002, 20). This idea of the constituted subject and the constituting subject—the empirical–transcendental doublet—would be more clearly articulated by Foucault in Order of Things. The "I" that knows that I experience myself having an experience is the transcendental "I". The subject is empirical because it recognizes itself in its experiences and transcendental in that it forgets itself in experiencing itself. So, early on in his studies, we see Foucault at play in the terrain mapped out by Kant, but Foucault is addressing the "crises" or "problematizations" created by Kant and which manifest themselves in the practices of psychiatry, medicine, and other of the social sciences.

Moreover, in Foucault's *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, we even begin to see some of the problems associated with genealogical studies. He notes that Kant's *Anthropology* developed over a 30-year period and bemoans the fact that there are not earlier versions of the manuscript available (Foucault, 2008, 17–23). We even see the outlines of Foucault's method when he states, "it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the genetic perspective and the structural method in analysis of [Kant's *Anthropology*]" (Foucault, 2008, 22–3). In other words, in this very early work, we see that Foucault not only concerns himself with the subject that becomes its own object of investigation, creating the Kantian problematic, but also with his own method of discovering the conditions of possibility for this problem to emerge as a problem. In other words, we see in a very cursory form the outlines of the intersections of Foucault's genealogical (genetic perspective) and archaeological (structural method) studies. In this way, Foucault has a project that plays itself out within the Kantian tradition, precisely because he is concerned with subjects and objects, and what constitutes certain kinds of objects and subjects, and the prior conditions of possibility for our present situation.

In addition, Han notes that if Foucault has a project, there needs to be an organizing question. According to Han, that question is: How is it possible to have true knowledge, and what are the necessary conditions of that knowledge? (Han, 2002, 2). It is this question that animates Foucault's work, and it is this question that is Kantian. Foucault is at play at the margins of the field demarcated by Kant. Furthermore, Han notes that Foucault attempts to solve the problem of subjectivity while avoiding the transcendental reduction. So the organizing question is about the conditions of the possibility for true knowledge, but to get at that Foucault keeps butting up against questions about subjects and objects and their constitution but now not in terms of the pure forms of intuition—space and time—and categories of knowledge but in terms of historical time and political space. Foucault is not interested in pure theoretical knowledge per se but in how that knowledge is instantiated in various practices.

Foucault, thus, is solving certain problems and incoherencies of Kantianism, particularly around supposed stable objects: madness (*History of Madness*), notions of the subject (*The Birth of the Clinic*), the subject being the doctor, and the subject that becomes its own object—the transcendental–empirical doublet (*The Order of Things*). He is showing how objects are produced by a supposedly static reason, with the quintessential object being the other of reason, namely unreason. He is showing how the subject—the doctor—is produced in a field of political circumstances and how the good citizen becomes the healthy citizen in Republican France. He takes a little foray into the human sciences in *The Order of Things*, examining life, labor, and language—biology, economics, and linguistics—looking at the oddities of man who becomes his own object, that is to say, when the empirical subject

becomes object to the transcendental subject. This problem of the doublet self, the self that comes to know itself as object—in other words, the self that is both constituting and constituted—does not get solved by Foucault except in some sort of mystical disappearance of man-the-subject, that will be erased, "like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea" (Foucault, 1970, 387).

The *Archaeology of Knowledge* is an attempt to find a new way into the problematics of subjects and objects and of the historical and political constitution of subjects and objects. In this work on methodology, Foucault expounds on an insight gained in the *Birth of the Clinic*, namely that one does not have to do deep genealogical studies in order to see how perspectives change. Where the genealogist digs deeply into the past—into time—looking for hidden continuities, the archaeologist takes a good look around the space in a very narrow time period. The genealogist looks for continuities; the archaeologist sees discontinuities. The genealogist sees how old things shape new things. The archaeologist sees how new things appear on the scene because of the immediate conditions in that very narrow time period. The genealogist is more concerned with time; the archaeologist is more concerned with space. New objects emerge not only because they are begotten by the past but also because of the space in which they emerge.

Discipline and Punish returns to the subject but now not the self-constituting subject. He examines the prisoner, that form of being that is subjected to the forces of surveillance and how surveillance itself comes to produce conformity in the bodies of prisoners to the will of those in power. The inside casts out the prisoner; but then the outside comes to shape the interior lives of outcasts. *Discipline and Punish*, then, is about the production of subjects. Foucault notes how prisons and judges take on a therapeutic model of incarceration where bodies and minds are normalized so that they can return to society. The power inevitably becomes internalized by those subjected to the categories created by those in power and how those in power are informed by the psychological and sociological disciplines. Although power no longer manifests itself in the direct subjugation of the body—as in the graphic depiction at the beginning of *Discipline and Punish*—those in power control bodies through more subtle means. Thus, *Discipline and Punish* serves as the "historical background to various studies of power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in modern society" (Foucault, 1995, 308). And thus Foucault's interest in power/knowledge is born. Through the internalization and habituation of dispersed power/knowledges, the subject is created.

Yet, although there are certainly oppressive forces at work that come to subjugate the body of the criminal—himself a creation of society—Foucault begins to see that power/knowledge is not only oppressive but at the same time opens onto new possibilities, new vitalities, and freedoms. Like Kant, whose ethics—on my reading—is attempting to carve out a space for human

freedom in the face of determinative heteronymous forces, Foucault is trying to find a place for human freedom in a world of historical and political determinism. Foucault attempts to find a little freedom for the self somewhere between the determining and determined subject. As pointed out by Jon Simons, power is, for Foucault, not so much about oppression in his later works as it is about that which forms the conditions for the possibilities that shape our forms of life (Bishop, 2008). We oscillate between the unbearable heaviness of being constituted by those powers that would rigidly oppress us and the unbearable lightness of being if those powers are not structured enough.[2] As noted by Han, Foucault is trying to find freedom without appeal to the transcendental (Han, 2002, 174–96). In later Foucault, however, we find that the self either accepts or resists the power structures into which she is thrown, and it is this self-creating that defines authentic subjectivity for Foucault. It is here between the lightness and heaviness of being that Foucault tries to carve out a space of freedom for self-creation, the freedom of becoming.

Yet, those spaces of freedom are only carved out of the forces that shape and mold the uses of the body and the forces that shape and mold psyches. That is to say, those forces, those powers, are not merely social or political powers instantiated in the state but also the powers that shape the forms of life itself, such as medicine, psychiatry, and other of the human sciences. This is a power of expertise, the power of knowledge. And part of Foucault's point is that knowledge is not discovered so much as it is created. The powerful forces of politics are not merely placed in the hands of the Sovereign but in those forces that both oppress and sustain our forms of life. In this sense, Foucault begins to talk about a biopolitics.

IV. HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT; TIME AND SPACE

So far I have mostly covered epistemological points about Foucault's work. We can see, therefore, how Foucault understands that human life is not just some sort of object awaiting discovery by scientists. Life, and even the scientific study of life, is shaped not only by history but also by the coincidence of factors in the surrounding space, each having their own historical development. Sure, there are continuities, but there are also discontinuities. And the coincidence of continuities and discontinuities form the conditions for the possibility of the truth claims, whether made by scientists, by doctors, or by social scientists. Foucault therefore plays within the field demarcated by Kant, even if at the margins of that field. He is looking at the powers of constitution and at what is constituted. He is concerned with objects and subjects, and the a priori conditions necessary for knowledge. He is concerned with marking out a zone of freedom, all the while attempting to steer clear of Kant's transcendentals. He is also concerned with space and time, now political space and historical time.

Edward Casey (1987) and Charles Scott (1987) both bring into relief the importance of space in relation to time in Foucault. Both draw our attention

to the importance of space for Foucault's *Birth of the Clinic*; indeed I would argue for the whole of his work, and I shall illustrate this by looking at Foucault's relationship to Heidegger. Hubert Dreyfus notes similarities between Foucault's notion of biopolitics and Heidegger's notion of technology. Dreyfus notes that Foucault uses power in a way similar to the way that Heidegger uses Sein. For Heidegger, there are epochs of the history of Being; for Foucault, there are regimes of truth in the history of power. Where Heidegger is interested in the way things appear for us in the clearing that both opens and limits what can show up, Foucault is interested in the way people act in relation to power that both limits the field of possibility and makes it possible (Dreyfus, 1992).

Dreyfus further describes similarities between *Seinsgeschichte* and genealogy. For Heidegger, there is in the "age of the world-picture"—that is to say, in the age of representation—something that fundamentally changes metaphysics and gives birth to modernity. It is with his analyses of *Las Meninas* that Foucault begins his analysis of representation and the transition to modernity in *The Order of Things*. Heidegger notes that man becomes both the source of meaning of objects and an object in the world; Foucault notes that man is both the constituting subject and the constituted subject in the world. And both Heidegger and Foucault look forward to the death of humanism, man being the source and object, the central figure in all of thinking. Yet, both thinkers in their mature work come to realize that man is produced by technology for Heidegger and by biopower for Foucault.

Dreyfus further notes that Foucault is interested almost exclusively in people, and Heidegger is interested in things. Both are concerned with representation and man as the origin of things (Heidegger referring to Kant) and man as the origin of 'man' (Foucault referring to Kant). We are once again back to the old problem of subjects and objects. Heidegger: How do things appear for us? Foucault: How is it possible for man to appear as his own object? Both are concerned for how we are thrown into time (Heidegger) and place (Foucault) and how our times and places produce things and people.

Time and space then link both Heidegger and Foucault back to Kant. Kant gave us the pure forms of the intuition: space and time. Kant notes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty. (Kant, 1998, 273, A141/B180–1)

Kant continues:

> The schemata are therefore nothing but a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules, and these concern, according to the categories, the time-series, the content of time, the order of time, and finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects. (Kant, 1998, 275, A145/B184–5)

Time is the form of intuition that determines the imagination—the "depths of the human soul" (Kant, 1998, 273, A141/B180–1). Out of this form of intuition, Kant holds that the time series, the order of time, and other objective measures of time are possible and that time is the form of intuition of the interior life of the mind, the "depths of the soul" (Kant, 1998, 273, A141/B180–1).

This point about the centrality of the schematism and the depths of the human soul are specifically noted by Heidegger in *Being and Time*—a question and problem from which Kant shrinks according to Heidegger. "As pure intuition, time is that which furnishes an aspect prior to all experience," Heidegger says about Kant and time (Heidegger, 1996, 21). However, the point of *Being and Time* is that time is operative for all categorizations of ordinary and scientific time and for the appearance of all objects, but not as pure intuition, not as the pure form. Time, for Heidegger, is not univocal. There are a myriad of times that structure our ways of experiencing those things that appear for us. One's time in history is a kind of time into which one is thrown and which structures the kinds of projects in which one engages. Where Heidegger's claim is that time can be experienced but not represented, he seems to be claiming that death can be represented but not experienced in itself. Thus, death itself, as the end of one's time, also structures one's experience allowing certain kinds of objects or things or even projects to come into relief. Thus, all forms of objective marking of time rest on the existential running into the future, toward death, toward the end of time. Death time structures our experience, the objects that emerge for us, and the projects in which we are engaged. Thus, like Kant in the schematism, Heidegger grants a priority to time over subjects, objects, and space, even while time takes on a very different kind of meaning for Heidegger. And Foucault turns that around and grants priority of space over time.

Catherine Pickstock has also noted this priority of space over time in Western thinking and brings into relief several points that are central to the thesis of this essay and further emphasizes points made by Foucault. Pickstock tracks this shift through Descartes and undercuts the well-known claim that Descartes grounds knowledge in subjectivity. Pickstock's point is that Descartes' *cogito* is a regulative spatialization. For Descartes, singularity and homogeneity are preferred to multiplicity and diversity (Pickstock, 1998, 58). There is little doubt that Descartes believes science is best done without the opinions of many, but by the one shut up in a room, left alone to converse with himself (Pickstock, 1998, 52; Descartes, 1980, 6). Pickstock notes that the second half of the *Discourse on Method* uses the notion of the city—a politics—as the analogy for his organization of knowledge, knowledge that is unassailable from enemies. Cities designed by a single planner are more proportionate and more efficient than those that have developed over time and with a myriad of craftsmen. And Pickstock notes that Descartes cites Sparta as an example of the well-designed city because it was designed along military

lines for the "defence of its own absolute interior" (Pickstock, 1998, 59). Thus, for Descartes, the impure, which must be excluded from the city and from knowledge, is that which bears "traces of time, multiplicity, and difference" (Pickstock, 1998, 59). Thus, claims Pickstock, prior to Descartes' *cogito* is a well-defined interior space, unassailable from the outside, and from this space of the unassailable interior, time might emerge in a more orderly fashion of time determinations. For our purposes, and as noted above, Kant claims that time is the form of intuition operative in the depths of the soul (Kant, 1998, 273, A141/B180–1). Time is the pure form of the interior life. Thus, time, even for Kant, is not prior to the space of the depths of the human soul. Even for Kant, then, Descartes' interior space—the depths of the soul—is prior to the intuition of time. Time, even for Kant, has been spatialized.

This priority of space over time, then, has repercussions for our understanding of things and people and objects and subjects, including medical objects—mental illness, disease, and life—and medical subjects—doctors, nurses, social workers, and psychologists. In the classical and early middle ages, things were thought to be real and to exist prior to knowledge. It was also held that something true could be said about things, even though there was no sense in which the thing in its entire truth could be completely graspable by the human mind. And neither could the mind exhaust the myriad of presentations of the thing. In other words, in classical thought, there is the sense that things exceeded the categories into which the human mind tried to place them. Yet, with the rise of Cartesian spatialization and mathesis, as described by Pickstock and by Foucault, we begin to see representation and epistemology as prior to ontology and prior to the things and people emergent from a chaotic reality in flux. Thus, the mind becomes its own absolute interior space demarcated from the flux of time, from the complexity and diversity of reality, and from things outside itself—things which we cannot be sure exist because they are outside of that absolute interior. It is an act of the mind that acts to stabilize those things of flux and diversity, fixes them so that they can be known.

"There arises, therefore, an epistemological circuit whereby knowledge is based entirely on objects, whose 'being' does not exceed the extent to which they are known" (Pickstock, 1998, 63). In this way, after Descartes, what is measurable becomes the standard for what is "knowable," which in turn becomes the standard for what "is". Pickstock concludes that prior to the subject is a schema of the "internally mapped spatialized city: there will follow absolute divisions between the mind and body newly conceived as 'areas,' and the mind itself conceived as the spatial traverse of an inevitable order of intuited deductions" (Pickstock, 1998, 61).

Thus, things have ceased being things that appear of their own accord, lending themselves to interpretation in time. After Descartes, things become objects that have extension according to the measurable interiority of the subject, the mathesis, the mathematization—a spatialization, as it is called by

Pickstock. For our purposes, two important themes emerge from this history told by both Pickstock and Foucault. First, the body becomes an object that must submit to the measure of the gaze. Making this measuring difficult is that this body, as alive, is in constant flux. But the dead body is more stable, more knowable, and, as a kind of template for knowing, more transferable to other bodies in the space of the polis.

Second, not only is mathesis applied to the dead body of the individual but also is applicable to the bodies within the space of the polis. Hobbes would come to describe a city set up according to a geometer king, the king who builds society according to the rules of geometric space. But, objects—bodies—manifest themselves in other mathematical modes, such as in statistics and probabilities. With the work of Petty and Graunt in the seventeenth century, we see the rise of statistical thinking and measuring for the benefit of the King, who must know the state of his dominion (Porter, 1986, 1995; Desrosières, 1998). The long development of probability and statistics would find fruition in the work of Sir Francis Galton, whose work not only influenced what in his day was called eugenics and today is called sociobiology but also psychology and sociology and evidence-based medicine as well. These disciplines use statistics to make stable what is in reality unstable within political space, and these forced stabilities have come to shape not only medicine but also other of the human sciences.

Thus, the mathematical table, the geometric rules, and the mathematical statistical models are the unmoving, timeless certainties on which the flux and fluidity of the chaos of real things can be mapped, for what is mapped becomes stable as knowable. Through the process of mathesis, the chaotic reality of things and people—giving themselves in appearance and open to interpretation—becomes the stable objects of knowledge. Spatialization is an attempt to control the chaos and to define the boundaries, the interiors and exteriors, and what can be tossed out, and what can be left in. Space takes priority for Foucault as a mode of analysis, precisely because so much of our thinking after Descartes and Kant places priority on the dead, immovable space of interiority.

Thus, what begins as an essay on Foucauldian method ends as an essay on metaphysics; for our methods are derived to get at something about the world, whether that be space, time, violence, or death. Our apparatuses for knowing the world are built out of how we think reality is. Our methods are believed to be adequate to the world; the world is subjected to our measurement. And for the medicine and the science of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the world is exhausted through measurement and through a medical language, which, as noted by Foucault, comes to capture disease and people in its truth. Medical language became a kind of mathematics spoken by those who were initiated into the space of the clinic (Foucault, 1973, 107–23). But insofar as medicine could efficiently manipulate things within a delimited and controlled space, it deploys a metaphysics.

And this is precisely Foucault's point in *Birth of the Clinic*. The book begins, "This book is about space" (Foucault, 1973, ix). Foucault documents how different spaces came to influence the practice of medicine for the purposes of controlling bodies, diseases, and death. There was the intellectual abstract space of formal medicine, bent on the formal arrangements of knowledge in tables; there was the qualitative space of the disease and how it manifests itself in qualities of the body; there was the tertiary spaces of the home and society and the natural space for the occurrence of both disease and healing. And finally, there is the space of the body, which became possible due to a mutation in medical thinking. The space carved out by the clinic is a coming together of each of these; each of these spaces described in *Birth of the Clinic* has a separate genealogy, and each arrives on the scene in the political space surrounding the French revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. *The Birth of the Clinic* is an archaeology because it takes this moment in time when all these histories—these ideas with different histories in time—come together. Foucault cuts transversely through that time period to see how this little space of the clinic came to be. Foucault himself is concerned with taking a good look around the space in which different histories came together to create the new space of the clinic. Foucault's method of analysis of the clinic matches the metaphysical beliefs of the clinic.

What does he find in the space of the clinic? Foucault notes that the political space of Republican France influenced the development of medicine by providing the stability of the body politic and a means to control disease. The good citizen is the healthy citizen, and the drive for good health begins with the drive for good government (Foucault, 1991, 33). Moreover, the flux of time, the flux of life itself, prevents medicine from having a stable object of knowledge. Death is the zero point, the point where that flux of life becomes static, where true knowledge becomes possible in medicine. That stasis can be found, according to *The Birth of the Clinic*, in the space of the body. The body had to be opened up as close to the time of death—as close to death time—as possible, so that true knowledge of death could be seen clearly in the light of reason (Foucault, 1973, 124–48). In medicine, claims Foucault, it is space that holds primacy over time; or, perhaps better, time and space coincide in the dead body. Time is spatialized in the dead body, fixed in the moment of death in the space of the body. The flux of life ceases with death, and the new medicine is born. But, Foucault is not only concerned with the object of the dead body but also concerned with the gaze of the subject and how that subject is transformed by its new object and how the space of the clinic shapes what is possible for those whose bodies become ill and are subjected to medicine.

Thus, it is not so much that Foucault's analyses are focused on space or that they are done from the perspective of space, but that in his researches he notices the priority of space over time in the various disciplines—from

psychology to medicine to other of the human sciences—especially in the elaborate tables created for the encyclopedic classification of disease (Foucault, 1973, 3–21) and in the biological classifications schemes, like those of Linnaeus, in which living organisms are classified by genus and species (Foucault, 1994, 250–302). Thus, what something is depends on how it is classified within the space of the table.

Space is about organizing, about placing living beings into classificatory tables—and this is precisely what the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) is for modern psychiatry. This person is a depressive; that person is a schizophrenic; he is a homosexual, as if there is something essential, some ontological characteristic that defines that person, qua diagnostic category (Pickstock, 1998, 49–57).[3] Space—the space of the table, for instance—thus organizes knowledge and provides the conditions of power over those things or people in the table.

In *The Order of Things* (1970), Foucault makes the claim that medicine is the queen of the human sciences. What he means by this is that medicine—at the time of his writing in 1976—tended to order the other human sciences, to decide which of the sciences were important to human thriving generally, as well as in the particular circumstances of particular patients. Foucault would later think of this relationship between the individual and the social in terms of a biopolitics (Bishop, 2008)—the "politics of life itself" as one commentator (Rose, 2007) has called it—where the body and soul of the individual are shaped by the historical and political circumstances of the society into which he is born. In retrospect, Foucault's work seems prophetic because shortly after the publication of *The Order of Things*, we find medicine rethinking itself in response to a crisis with the publication of George Engel's "The Need for a New Medical Model" (1977). In this model, expertise, and thus power, is diffused out to those sociologists and psychologists who come to define human thriving in psychosocial medicine and into the even newer and more comprehensive medicine—biopsychosociospiritual medicine (Bishop, Rosemann, and Schmidt, 2008; Bishop, 2009). Thus, the human will is no free agent acting to fulfill her desires but instead is a being delimited by the sum of the comprehensive caregivers.

Radically reinterpreting freedom, Foucault's essay *What is enlightenment?* clearly takes up the mantle from Kant's *Was ist Äufklarung?* Rereading Kant's answer to the question, Foucault begins to articulate what the contemporary scholar does that is similar to Kant's *Was ist Äufklarung?* In this little reflection, Foucault reads Kant as arguing that Enlightenment is the freeing of the self in private matters but binding oneself in public matters. It is this tradition in which Foucault seems to be working, hoping to open up a modicum of freedom for the self in private matters, even while bound by powerful forces that constitute that subjectivity, all the while avoiding the problems presented by the various humanisms—where man is both subject and object of

knowledge—and the various liberalisms—where man is both Sovereign and subject to that sovereignty.

Where Kant attempts to find the place of freedom in the transcendental subject, Foucault attempts to navigate a space between the historical and the transcendental. In other words, Foucault's works emerge on the historical scene like any other work—on the historical scene of Kantian philosophy. No longer are we dealing with time and space as pure forms of intuition, but now we are dealing with historical time and political space. Thus, Foucault is concerned with the historical and political production of subjects. In the *Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault works out the production of the subject—the doctor—in relation to the dead body. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault turns his attention to relationship of subjectification—the production of subjects—and objectification—the production of objects, and the production of man that is both the subject and object of the human sciences (Foucault, 1994, 303–43).

Thus, I am arguing a thesis not dissimilar to those theses of Gerald McKenny (1997), Carl Elliott (2003), and Brent Waters (2007). In my estimation, these thinkers are saying that the problematic of our time, especially with regard to medicine and its technologies, is the tension between the individual and society, where the will of the individual seeks to enact its desires through manipulating the body or realizing the true desires of a deep and essential self. As Milbank points out, this is also the paradigmatic relationship of Western politics—the "'bodily' mediation between the unlimited sovereignty of the State and the self-will of the individual" (Milbank, 2006, 103). The battle lines of the culture wars—the so-called culture of life and culture of death—are then around when the individual is free to do what she desires and when society can curb her freedom. When can Sovereign society subject the individual, with her own absolutely interior life, to its demands, and when does that excursion of the social into the desires of the individual violate the sovereignty of the individual?

I am saying something only slightly different. The expert knowledges of the various disciplines—that is to say, disciplinary power—comes to shape those desires in very subtle, but powerful ways. Biopsychosociospiritual medicine is one of those mechanisms that shapes the forms of our lives. The trajectory of contemporary medicine begins in biomedicine—a medicine of doctor–disease relations—that mutates into a medicine of doctor–body relationships, then into doctor–patient, and then into a biopsychosociospiritual medicine. Yet, the biopsychosociospiritual medicine of doctor–patient relationships remains a medicine of subject–object relationships, precisely because of the priority of space over time. The static object—the dead body—and the stable subject—the dead gaze—cross one another in the clinic, where not only the bodies are totalized but also the psychosocial, and indeed the spiritual, comes to find its place in the ordering space of the clinic. The doctor, the psychiatrist, the social worker, and the hospital chaplain, all

seek to manipulate bodies for the benefit of those bodies and psyches that are manipulated. Thus, by taking a Foucauldian look at medicine, one can see medicine at work, where bodies and psyches are efficiently and effectively molded, manipulated, controlled, and even coerced, by surgery, drugs, technologies, and techniques deployed by physicians, surgeons, machines, psychologists, social workers, and chaplains. The metaphysics of medicine is a metaphysics of efficient causation.

NOTES

1. Note that *Madness and Civilization* is a translation of the 1964 abridged French version of his larger work *Folie et déraison. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, published in 1961. It has only recently been translated into English as *History of Madness* (2006).

2. Simons borrows Kundera's felicitous phrase—the unbearable lightness of being—in order to show that if the structures that bound us are too oppressive, the subject succumbs to the heaviness of oppression. But likewise, if we free ourselves totally, we suffer from the lightness of life without direction or purpose or meaning.

3. Pickstock makes several key points about how Peter Ramus, a sixteenth-century logician, operates on the spatialization of knowledge. She shows how that space of tables becomes a regulative space, which in turn comes to be thought of as essential to uncovering supra-real realities, a deeper reality than the one that is available to someone who experiences the world without aid of the table. That space becomes a regulative space. It is not true knowledge if it is not able to be represented spatially.

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