

## GLOSSARY

# Glossary of Information & Intelligence

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*Note: this is about information, intelligence, security it, and measurements on these. Communicating it is not here, especially the portions of manipulation of media to convey it. Nor are generic reliability concepts.*

<b>access control</b>	The element of <i>identity management</i> that regulates access to a resource. Determines what a user (subject) can do and can't do with a resource. Determines if system is in an uncorrupted state. May be contingent on time of day, location, channel of access, so on  see also <i>authorization, biometrics, capabilities</i>
access level	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Private</li><li>2. Controlled</li><li>3. Restricted</li><li>4. Confidential</li><li>5. Public</li></ol>
assign level of access and trust	Too many parties assigning trust may allow too high of access. Social flaws: if you don't give permission 'you've wronged that person.' Too few assigning parties has weaknesses too. Restricting 'certificates' can create an artificial scarcity leading to inflated prices and poor organizational administration.
attribute based	e.g. 18 and over, level of trust in the identity
changes	Changing restrictions is operating with authorization for a known secure path only.
discretionary access control	Defines how something (subject) may have access privileges to an entity (object).
grants	Rights granted based on (see <i>security evidence</i> ) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Information gathered</li><li>▪ Listed and path caps on access</li><li>▪ Limits to knowledge and proof</li><li>▪ Security policy</li></ul>
mandatory access control	The computer maintains access restrictions in all cases; the intention is to prevent accidents and compromises by the user. This ensures that anything (that contains elements of the restricted information) is kept at least at the same level of restricted access as the original information.
matrix	Access control matrix

<i>Object</i>	<i>Operation</i>	<i>Users</i>
<b>1</b>	operation 1 operation 2 operation 3	set of users
<b>2</b>	operation 1 operation 2	

**Table 1:** Access control matrix example

	operation 3
<b>3</b>	operation 1 operation 2 operation 3

**privileges** Privileges (or permissions) typically include at least read, write, execute, list permission, and change permission.

**time and region limits** Information can be limited with a marked Geographical Zone distribution:

- Current zone
- Host
- Local network
- External network

Anything that employs it inherits restrictions on zone access as well. This reduces accidental release of information outside of the zone.

## **accountability**

**ADVISE** US government program.  
analysis, dissemination, visualization, insight and semantic enhancement  
See *TANGRAM*

**analysis** Logical accounting for all individual parts of a main body of data.  
Know the functions and limits of the individual parts  
missing parts  
nonassociated parts  
1. Study data in its original form, look for obvious or significant parts  
2. Look for signs of unusual conditions

**aircraft tracking** Aircraft info: Altitudes, numbers and type  
Intercept track  
Call sign, and frequency to station location for azimuth-range position reports  
recognize ELFAIR-relevant traffic,  
recognize irrelevant chatter

**automotive tracking** Virginia's Department of Motor Vehicles: 1997 Operating costs were in part, paid by selling lists of data.

**Ameritech's GovServices** Civilink: Computer system to maintain public records, usually court records  
Ameritech is also often hired to perform those government operations

**approaches**

- Evidence-based security: information gathered about the code
- Code-access security: examines calling chain to cap access; Can annotate code with security limits and requirements.
- Defined process to verify assembly – type safety, operation use, modifications
- Role-based security: security ids and attributes based on a role, title, task
- Cryptography
- Separate application Domains

**assesses** performance  
capabilities  
vulnerabilities

	what it is doing at any given time	
<b>attack surface</b>	<i>cliché</i> don't use.	
<b>attribute</b>	May be static characteristics or dynamic properties (functions or behaviours). Documentation often includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Definition of attributes</li> <li>▪ Explanations for measurements of attributes</li> <li>▪ Guidance as to data sources, quality and data</li> <li>▪ Explanations for missing values or inappropriateness of a measure</li> <li>▪ Any other information to provide clear explanations of the data</li> </ul> Predictor attribute; dependent attribute See also <i>property</i>	
<b>auditing</b>		
<b>audit trail</b>	Values of the relevant shared variables are recorded prior to an update	
<b>authentication</b>	A process of <i>identity management</i> that maps an unknown user (etc) to an identity (approximately a known person). May use credentials. This is, or is similar to, certification. It may have an expiration time. <i>see biometrics, credentials, password</i>	
level of	Increasing security level of unknown person. More destructive or dangerous operations require a higher level of authentication. May require more than just the identification of the person; it may require certification that the person has character.	
of message	Properly identifies sender. Message digest of the transmission using A's private key. A encodes a known message using its private key.	
<b>authorization</b>	The element of <i>access control</i> that regulates access to a resource based on the accessor (subject); ensures that contents/commands are done only by authorized parties	
authorization check	Can I do $A_1..A_n$ accesses on $D_1..D_n$ ? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can anyone do these?</li> <li>2. Do I have a set of keys that allow those access?</li> <li>3. If I am authenticated, retrieve my level of access information. Do I have sufficient level of access for an item of this type? (Each item has a level of classification code)</li> <li>4. Am I (or my authentication Id) on a list of people allowed to <math>A_1..A_n</math> for this? (ACL groups many objects can share such a list)</li> <li>5. If classified at a higher level than you, an intermediary can send you a (possibly redacted) portion, or answer some of your're queries about it.</li> </ol>	
<b>biometrics</b>	"The literature defines biometrics as distinguishable (rather than unique) physiological and behavioral traits that may be used for identification and authentication." "Most biometric applications rely on an assessment of similarity between stored templates created at enrollment and biometric samples taken during user authentication. The matching process suffers from imprecise standards (such as the rigidity of thresholds to define performance precisions) for the measurement of similarity. Stricter (or more relaxed) matching requirements result in higher rates of false rejections (or false acceptance)."  <i>see also authentication, credentials</i>	<i>Chandra, Akhilesh; Thomas Calderon. "Challenges and constraints to the diffusion of biometrics in information systems" Communications of the ACM, December 2005</i>
<b>block cipher system</b>	Groups of plain text are treated as large binary integers (200+ digits). This number is transformed by an encryption function to create another large integer (the cipher).	
<b>botnet</b>	A system created when several home & office computers (up to tens of thousands) are illicitly infected with a virus or worm known as a 'bot'. This system may allow the bots to be commanded to do some limited tasks, such	<a href="http://www.lurhq.com/phantbot.html">http://www.lurhq.com/phantbot.html</a>

	as:
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• send out spam,</li> <li>• send out other bots,</li> <li>• attack a site or computer network (usually in a massive denial of service attack),</li> <li>• install or manage key-logging (and other 'spy' software)</li> <li>• execute, copy, modify, upload or download files.</li> <li>• open the system for further attacks.</li> </ul> <p>The bots may be controlled thru custom network software, or they may connect to popular IRC (internet relay chat) or other P2P systems (include. Gnutella, WASTE, etc.) and await commands. It is reported that botnets controlled by eastern European hackers are available rented for as little as \$20. Agobot is the most common bot family; its source code is widely available.</p>
<b>break</b>	<p>A method of generating a (fake) message with a specified signature, with less complexity than a pure brute force attack. Most breaks are not security risks – they are modified brute force attacks, and have a complexity that makes them impossible to employ.</p> <p>See also <i>dictionary attack</i>, <i>rainbow table</i></p>
<b>broadcast flag</b>	<p>To prevent signal theft and redistribution of materials. There is a great deal of heated debate, mainly from parties with poor legal background or a liberals arts background. The devices for 5C compliance internally are not required per se, merely to prohibit recording, just redistribution.</p>
<b>CALEA</b> communications assistance for law enforcement act	<p>1994. Major telecommunications carriers quietly cooperate to prevent the losses publicity would cause if they required (or fought) warrants. CALEA made it physically easier (rather than remove q's on warrants)</p>
<b>call sign</b>	<p>a basic call sign may be assigned to a function supplemented with geographic reference, or number suffix</p>
<b>capabilities</b> StarOS style	<p>Modify (t/f) Can modify object property Destroy (t/f) Object can be removed from system Copy (t/f) If the object &amp; capabilities can be copied Restrict (t/f) If the other capabilities can be removed Pointer to item. Type:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ NULL: Slot is empty</li> <li>▪ Representation: Pointer is to a representation object</li> <li>▪ Abstract: Pointer points to an abstract object</li> <li>▪ Token Type: Pointer is a special extended privilege for the list holder</li> </ul> <p>Capabilities list: configuration data on what operations A can perform on other objects. F(object, caps) → set of allowed selectors.</p>
<b>method</b>	<p>Complex expression is rewritten into a 'normal form' (B). Usually this is wrt the operations. Reduces the variation to a more manageable amount. The normal form is translated into the target set.</p>
<b>functions</b>	<p>Funds transfer, licensing format, security, spam control / denial of services, privacy control, certificates, door badges, access smart card, IO communication, messaging</p>

application	<p>Movie &amp; music redistribution &amp; control, buying music, licensing, document change control, smart cards (building access), keyless entry (start, door, trunk)</p> <p>Broadcast systems, smart card with satellite tv, broadcast flags, DVDs.</p> <p>Distributed resources: leases, GC exit state (trumps all others), phone system, access control.</p> <p>Computer: execution privileges, device channel (to get boot access, reduce egg-shell security issues with physical access). Databases, IO model (switch/fabric has this) NT security tokens in API's.</p>
<b>capability search model</b>	<p>Tokens in feedback: tokens relations with cash (money), resource scarcity, options &amp; tokens</p> <p>Spam control: token is used to indicate email was paid for / should be sorted / or processed in some way. Each machine / sender has a credit account; when it runs of credit, no one will forward any more messages. This effects a feedback, slowing down trojan's / zombie machines. Alternatively, billing occurs only when tokens are redeemed; people only redeem those when recipient rejects them. Thos doesn't seem as fast to sop spam &amp; virii.</p> <p>Palladium / Nexus: tokens are used by special processor to hand-off control of main processor, one thus happens, usually the Os in charge.</p>
<b>certificates</b>	<p>A type of credential, where an Agency says file/service conforms to level XYZ.</p> <p>Some Certifications – like that this person is trustworthy – should be time limited (the person may change). Others – like that a person was exposed to such and such training – should not be,</p> <p>Restricting certificates can create an artificial scarcity, leading to inflated prices and poor organizational administration.</p>
<b>CIA</b>	<p>Directorate: if subject doesn't answer, this is considered evidence that they are guilty (e.g. had special training for evasiveness) and should be promoted to enhanced interrogation.</p>
<b>classification</b>	<p>Extract features and classify. Categories, grouping, classification hierarchy, taxonomy. A document may cover multiple topics.</p> <p>Constructing a taxonomy. Identifying relationships between documents.</p>
<b>codes of standard terminology</b>	<p>Consist of a standard name for a procedure, a number or other identifier assigned to represent it, and a brief description of the procedure.</p> <p>Organized into logical groups to aid finding the appreciate code quickly, with easy. To provide a uniform language that accurately describes procedures &amp; services – a means of reliable communication over many different kinds of people (e.g. a nation). Compilations are copyrightable if creativity in their selection or their arrangement. [Argued that if the effort produces a useful work, it should not be copyrightable]</p>
<b>codewords</b>	<p>Shared between US, Canada, UK, Aus, NZ; rules:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 5-letters,</li> <li>2. pronounceable,</li> <li>3. infrequently used words,</li> <li>4 not derogatory or profane,</li> <li>5 do not reveal the meaning</li> </ol> <p>see also <i>cover term</i></p>
bookbreaking	<p>Codewords / phrases related to secrecy?</p>
<b>compartmentalization</b>	<p>A document is in at least one compartment and labeled with a codeword relative to the department. A compartment is a special control structure. Compartments have unique codewords, used to protect specific information. And a channel.</p>

<b>confidentiality</b>	Hiding part or all from eavesdroppers	
<b>containment</b>	paged or segmented memory ; files; vdisk; user group	
<b>Corona</b>	Spy satellites in use from 1959-1972. The satellites ejected film canisters, which were retrieved by C130 jets. The highest orbit was 12500 feet. Cloudy skies made for a nifty horizon.	
<b>cosine measure</b>	Measures the angle between normalized vectors (is this term as valid covariance?). This is most often used to estimate text similarity, when categorizing texts.  see also <i>naïve Bayesian</i>	
<b>costs incremental</b>	The cost of keeping up with CERTS is very low on OpenVMS, since OpenVMS is the subject of very few CERTS vulnerability alerts.	<a href="http://h71000.www7.hp.com/openvms/whitepapers/TCS_2004.pdf">http://h71000.www7.hp.com/openvms/whitepapers/TCS_2004.pdf</a>
<b>cover term<sup>1</sup></b>	These are characterized by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The type of cover term</li> <li>▪ The definition of its intended use, and what that signifies</li> <li>▪ The authority (if any) in providing or assigning the term</li> <li>▪ The length of the term</li> <li>▪ The alphanumeric rules</li> <li>▪ The security classification rules; the term alone and it's meaning</li> <li>▪ Exclusions: words that can't be employed, such as those on other lists</li> </ul>	
<b>credentials</b>	Used in <i>authentication</i> to establish that an identity is warranted. Based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Who you are: uses authenticated identifier</li> <li>▪ What you've got: token or key</li> <li>▪ What you know: a password or secret</li> </ul> <p>The credentials may have an associated trust level.</p> <p>see also <i>identification</i></p>	
<b>crime motives</b>	It is commonly asserted that profit is the motive. Others disagree: "few computer criminals are indeed motivated purely by profit. Employees become criminals during employment to solve personal problems that may involve money, sabotage, or espionage. They are often motivated by debt, relationships gone bad with other employees or spouses, personal dissatisfaction, or an attempt to hide poor or unethical business decisions."	<i>Parker Donn B; Letter to Communications of the ACM, June 2008, cites Crime by Computer (1976, Scribners), and Fighting Computer Crime (1983, Scribners)</i>
<b>Curveball</b>	defector to Germany, made it all up. Based on what interrogators asked, would research and extrapolate new "info" for them.	
<b>database</b>	Regular structure for information; as a database's scope expands, relational tables approach matrices.	
<b>data classes</b>	Based on availability, performance, cost <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Business critical</li> <li>▪ Business operations</li> <li>▪ Business internal data</li> <li>▪ Departmental &amp; Remote office data</li> <li>▪ Reference data</li> <li>▪ Archive data</li> </ul>	

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<sup>1</sup> V2N4

dictionary	Defines the attributes in the model, including their type and value range. See also <i>attribute, model</i>	
<b>data mining</b>	“Goals common to all... the detection, interpretation and prediction of qualitative or quantitative patterns in [existing databases]” see also <i>data quality, modeling methods</i>	Ramakrishnan, Naren; Ananth Grma, “Data Mining: From Serendipity to Science” Computer, August 1999, p34-37
core techniques	Clustering, Classification, Association, Time-Series Analysis, Trend & Forecasting	
issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Hard to get the proper source data</li> <li>▪ Unrealistic expectations about the quality of data</li> <li>▪ Plan and et al inflexible &amp; inappropriate</li> <li>▪ Usually the data has enough data errors, inaccuracies and inconsistencies to be of concern</li> </ul>	
scope	Enterprise-wide: Data-warehouse Business-unit specific: Data-mart Subject-specific: Data-mart	
industries	Industries that employ data mining: insurance, direct mail IBM Advanced Targeted Marketing for Single Events. Business Intelligence @ Fingerhut, Inc. Used IBM Probabilistic Estimations data-mining  IBM Underwriting Profitability Analysis, for Farmers Insurance Group.  MCI ‘Friends & Family’ (1991) relative small sub-graphs in long distance call graph → calling circles. Sought to make these calling circles regular customers  Minimum Length of time a telecomm is required to maintain call records (US Federal Law) – 2 years.	
<b>data normalization</b> rules of	<p>Attempts to reduce redundancy in a database, and provide useful constraints by striving to define the data as a set of relations in which all of the attributes are functionally dependent on only the primary key. Each step of normalizing produces more tables than in higher-precision forms, with fewer columns per table. The rules are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Eliminate repeating groups</li> <li>2. Eliminate redundant data</li> <li>3. Eliminate columns not dependent on key</li> <li>4. Isolate independent multiple relationships</li> <li>5. Isolate semantically related multiple relationships</li> </ol> <p>Note: structuring a model purely based on the normalization rules will yield a poor model. The complexity of the work rapidly rises with the increase of tables, usually by an order of magnitude. I.e., normalizing table A (lets say <math>O(n)</math> access time) splitting it into two tables, would produce an access time of <math>O(n^2)</math>.</p>	
<b>data notation</b>	<p>Does the data belong to one information category or many?</p> <p>What is the coding system?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ numeric</li> <li>▪ alphanumeric</li> <li>▪ alphabetic</li> <li>▪ mixed</li> <li>▪ mnemonic</li> </ul> <p>extending an existing standard to meet the needs</p> <p>differentiation from related data</p>	

<b>data quality</b>	<p>Data often has enough inaccuracies, errors, and inconsistency to be of concern:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Assessing data quality</li> <li>▪ Adjusting processes</li> <li>▪ Cleansing to resolve problems</li> <li>▪ Techniques to make inferences and analysis robustly in the face of this</li> <li>▪ Control matrices</li> <li>▪ Sampling</li> </ul>
<b>data taxonomy</b>	<p>What is the range of data produced and consumed?</p> <p>What is the best way to <i>store</i> the data, <i>retrieve</i> it, <i>manipulate</i> it, and <i>serve</i> it? Is it transactional? Atomic? What are the consistency requirements? Integrity? How do you do this reasonably efficiently and scalably? How redundant are you expecting it to be? Service levels?</p>
<b>delegation</b>	<p>The element of <i>identity management</i> that allows one to perform actions on the behalf of another. It forms an algebra of operation. The basic operations look like</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">A speaks for B A says Y</p> <p>Example rules:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">A says (B speaks for A) then it is believed; other's may not be believed. (B speaks for A) is true A says (A says C) then same as (A says C) (A speaks for B) and A says C then B says C</p> <p>There is an ordering of security level</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">T(x) x is a type T<sub>security level</sub>(x) there is a type, secret-x (not quite the same as type x)</p>
<b>DES</b> data encryption standard	<p>Encryption technique developed in the early 1970's by IBM, with NSA feedback. (Most assertions that the NSA weakened DES are inaccurate; their feedback was crucial to strengthening it). Uses either 40-bit or 56-bit keys (the later, and any other encryption using 56-bit or longer keys, required an export license until 2000). The standard was adopted in 1976 as a federal standard for transmitting both industry data and classified federal data. The legal regulation dates from the 1940s; until the early 1990s strong encryption required special equipment. (The use of dedicated computers was an impractical possibility). Since the early 90's encryption time has fallen, due to computers capabilities; this is one reason n that longer keys have been required to ensure strength.</p> <p>DES was replaced with AES in 2000 as the recommended standard.</p>
<b>dictionary attack</b>	<p>Stores a bit table correlating a dictionary of words (and other inputs) to a digest/hash output. This allows mapping an encrypted password to the password (or message).</p> <p>See also <i>rainbow table</i></p>
<b>digital signatures</b>	<p>Were first tried in the 70s but failed as cumbersome and expensive; study of the algorithms has continued.</p>
<b>Domain and type enforcement</b>	<p>Partitions system resources. Processes have an associated domain; objects have an associated type. Two global tables defined allowed access: Domain-definition table, domain interaction table.</p>
<b>doppelganger</b>	<p>Jon Orwant</p> <p>Events. Succession Events: Fields include: Organization, Post, In&amp;Out (links to below), VacancyReason, Comment</p> <p>In&amp;Out. fields include: Person, NewStatus, OnTheJob, OtherOrg, Comment</p> <p>Organization. Fields include Name, Alias, Descriptor, Type, Name</p> <p>Person. Fields include:</p>



**enforcement**

Concentrated in a small part of the system. Concentrates assurance effort on that part.

Difficulties:

1. Multilevel security
2. Techniques are very similar
3. Attitudes toward what's already there.

Three approaches:

1. Live with it, but patch it
2. Replace it
3. Extend it

Notes. All systems are replace eventually, the rate varies and the strategy of replacements. Identify common mistakes and better approaches. Records are important.

Practical, Messy: Complicated, or add-ons: virus checkers, firewalls

Practical, Sound: Replicate low security to high security system

Impractical, Sound: Orange Book (Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria), Red book, requires too much change in products. Breaks legacy systems.

**electronic intelligence**  
ELINT

operational

technical

collection manager

analyst

**entropy**  
conditional

Entropy a data source has and that an adversary might have knowledge about.

## unconditional

Entropy ignoring such knowledge

**espionage**

"Espionage is defined as the practice of spying on or spying by governmental and military entities to gain information."

**Executive Order 13292**

Applies FIPS 199 military plans, weapons systems, operations, foreign government information, intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, and foreign relations.

**fact estimation**

noisy-or model to estimate facts from how often it is repeated.

Simple form. The probability is the extraction rule's accuracy. Not very good, ignores sample size:

$$P(x \text{ is correct} \mid \text{statement } X \text{ appears } k \text{ times}) = 1 - (1 - p)^k$$

Better:

$$P(x \text{ is correct} \mid \text{statement } X \text{ appears } k \text{ times in } n \text{ documents}) =$$

$$\frac{\sum_{r \in \text{num}(c)} \left(\frac{r}{s}\right)^k \left(1 - \frac{r}{s}\right)^{n-k}}{\sum_{r \in \text{num}(c-e)} \left(\frac{r}{s}\right)^k \left(1 - \frac{r}{s}\right)^{n-k}}$$

c = correct statements

e = erroneous apps

Redundancy helps cope with noise (Information by redundancy), correlation of correct relation much higher than correlation of errors.

P(conclusion), P(conclusion|given) can be a probability distribution. Use Poisson

	approximation	
<b>finger print</b>	A hash of an encryption key	
<b>FIPS 199</b>	Protocols for determining confidentiality levels, data integrity levels, and availability level. Created in Feb 2004; mandated by E-Government Act of 2002 Title III, "The Federal Information Security Management Act."	
<b>firewall</b>	"barriers between us and them for arbitrary values of <i>them</i> " "A point of logical flow of a program where the validity of logical constraints is checked. If the constraint is satisfied, execution proceeds. If the constraint is violated, the firewall triggers and takes appropriate action."	
<b>FISA</b> foreign intelligence surveillance act	1978. Established special, secret courts (without oversight) to allow spying on US citizens, especially by the NSA. The NSA was required to show probable cause, and typically looked at 10-20 people at a time. The NSA always thought of it as a hindrance to their moral superiority and desired to collect info on larger numbers of people.  In 2001, changed with little to no oversight. Standard was lowered to "reasonable belief." NSA typically monitors 5000 people at a time.	
<b>grouping items</b>	Find sets of items in a transactional database purchased together so as to "improve the placement of items in a store or layout of mail-order catalog pages and web pages."  Item set – a "set of item's that appear together in many transactions"  Item set's support – "the percentage of transactions that contain an item set"  Market basket – "a collection of items purchased by a customer in an individual customer transaction."  Process goes thru transactions building a pool of best item sets and discarding weaker ones. With databases too large to go thru, randomly selects regions.  Is-a hierarchies to generate abstract item sets.	<i>Ganti et al, "Mining Very Large Databases" Computer, April 1997, p38-45</i>
<b>heap spraying</b>	Lots of exploit code placed throughout memory in an attempt to overlap with a hole (buffer overflow).	
<b>HIPAA</b> health insurance portability and accountability act of 1996	aka, Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act, Public Law 104-191.  If the healthcare providers choose to use electronic transactions, specifies the mandatory standards for electronic transactions (in health insurance). Typical claims, prior, cost \$6-\$8 to process. 2001 estimate was that an electronic claim cost \$0.17 to process. A number of packages and organization process have come into being (and are still maturing) to handle the issues identified in HIPAA, as well as the standards.	<a href="http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/">http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/</a>
<b>ANSI X12.837</b> standardized data exchange	Standardized data exchange, security and privacy standards (specified in ANSI X12.837). Six areas of standardization are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. transactions – claims, enrollment, eligibility, payments, referrals</li><li>2. code sets – identifying diseases, procedures, equipment, drugs, transportation, ethnicity</li><li>3. identifiers – to identify providers, payers, patients, etc.</li><li>4. benefit coordination when more than one health plan is involved</li><li>5. security of information and privacy</li><li>6. electronic medical records</li></ol> Rolled out in stages: Oct 2002. Healthcare organizations compliance with transaction and data set standards Apr 2003. Compliance with privacy standards	<i>Format:</i> <a href="http://www.com1software.com/c1088.htm">http://www.com1software.com/c1088.htm</a> <i>Dictionary of elements in the data exchange:</i> <a href="http://www.ihs.gov/AdminMngrResources/HIPAA/docs/ded4010.pdf">http://www.ihs.gov/AdminMngrResources/HIPAA/docs/ded4010.pdf</a>

Unknown. Security, identifiers, etc

Security Guidelines: Requires that an organization implement controls for accessing records, auditing, and authorization tasks; data and entity authentication. It is up to the organization to define these, “maintains or transmits health information shall maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards.”

**identification**

Do not confuse with *authentication*

1. A persons signature (e.g. drawer or endorse on a check)
2. The sending banks password (the issuer key) in an ETF
3. Personal Identification Number
4. Biometric identification
5. Personal information known to both account holder and the other party (usually written on a card)
6. SSN, Taxpayer Identification Number
7. Bank Identification Number
8. Machine Readable code on the bottom edge of cheques
9. CUSIP number

see also *credential*

**identifiers**

Start with an uncommon letter, e.g. Q or K, to make it easy to find on a page or display.

Use checksum on identifier to catch typos

Print as groups of 3 or 4 characters.

Eliminate pairs of letters that sound the same on a phone.

**identity based on**

Pointer to memory region.

“state” the memory it points to. Require everyone to create a sensible definition.

**identity management**

authentication, authorization, roles, delegation, interchange of identify information between domains.

**informatics**

The development of techniques and systems for more efficient organization, storage and dissemination of recorded scientific information.

**information**

Type of information	Technique
<b>structured information</b>	relational DB, etc.
<b>population information</b>	statistics
<b>unstructured information</b>	keyword tables

**Table 2:** How structured is the information we have and how do we work with that?

**information cost**

When it is too inconvenient to get better information, people will use the information they already have.

*Mooers, 1969*

If the people who (have to) use a tool/technique/system do not benefit from it, it may fail, be worked around, undermined, or be subverted by the workers.

*Jonathan Grudin*

**information diffusion**

Information diffuses out: it moves to more systems, it becomes inaccurate, less precise and/or outdate. It gets public.

**information extraction**

Filling fields and records of a database from text or loosely structured inputs.

SEGMENTATION – find the start & end boundary of the text snippet

CLASSIFICATION – which database field to use?

ASSOCIATION – which fields belong in the same record

NORMALIZATION – putting the information into a standard format

Identifying names, places, organizations, phone #'s, dates, times, internet address, currencies.

Identify key points using part of speech estimation and sense disambiguation to identify interesting phrases.

**information flow**  
lattice model of

Security applications (secure information flow)

*Denning*

Lattice based access control restriction; lattice defines level of security an object may have and access to

Labels attached to objects

Labels attached to data (contained by objects)

See also *access control*

policy

A policy of a set of allowed accessors:

owner<sub>1</sub>: accessor<sub>1</sub>, ... , accessor<sub>n</sub>

owner<sub>2</sub>: accessor<sub>m</sub>, ... accessor<sub>p</sub>

**information lifecycle management**

Information Lifecycle Management requires more finely detailed information than most file systems provide.

- Tiered storage (keeping some files fast, and archiving others) requires fine attribute details and policies
- Requires atleast application support to be successful
- Applications to create (atleast) the data that couldn't otherwise be deduced or inferred
- Summary tables created by applications or extraction tools
- Backup SW and HSM SW that uses this information to best stored the data cheaply or for fast access, etc.

criteria

- Relevance
- Comprehensiveness
- Freshness
- Presentation

**information market**

Markets that exist to aggregate information. They might “bet” on the likelihood of an event (to form the group estimate the likelihood), or sell information such as measured facts.

- Coordination Systems
- Information Sharing
- Sale of Reynolds numbers and lab work

**information practices**

code of fair information practices

Five principles

There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret

There must be a way for a person to find out what information about the person is in a record and how it is used

There must be a way for a person to prevent information about the person that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without the persons consent.

There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about the person

Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of

identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuses of the data.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1973; simson 2000

Canadian Principles

1. Accountability
2. Identifying purposes
3. Consent
4. Limiting collection
5. Limiting use, disclosure and retention
6. Accuracy, adequate for purpose
7. Safeguards
8. Openness
9. Individual access
10. Challenging compliance

**information processing**

Needs to protect managers "from irrelevant distractions of their attention."

*Simon p144*

"allocate the time [people] have available for receiving information [in such a way] that they will get only the information that is most important and relevant to the decisions that they will make"

Context input processing product model

Evaluation is to be conducted:

*Swanson, p79*

1. Needs analysis
2. "In an appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of alternatives
3. "During implementation
4. "In a comparison of the implementation with expectations."

**Information retrieval**  
without  
world/situation

Look person by name: direct, relational

look person up by property: relational query

person property: dereference, relational query

approximate  
methods

fuzzy methods

bayesian

vector space

**information security**

At least partly concerned with users, actions, objects, and media/channel – and combinations thereof. Is the action possible? Can the user carry out the action? Can the user access on the object? Can this user perform this action on the object? And so forth.

1. Confidentiality – must also be able to handle non-confidential data
2. Information Integrity – validity, completeness, and precision of information
3. Possession
4. Information Authenticity
5. Availability – data must be in a useful form
6. Utility
7. Validity
8. Completeness
9. Precision
10. Possession

information security policy

An information security policy should address: Systems security, product security, community security, and corporate information security. It should include managerial oversight: periodic checks, establish clear policies, self-audit and control functions in each department. For items to be protect it should identify:

- Categories of users; the object would have a subset of these that are

	<p>permitted to access it</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ An extent to which access is provided</li> <li>▪ Various levels of access (that is, what may be accessed) and some guidelines to help decide which level of access each item should have</li> <li>▪ Relevant time restrictions, periods and duration of use</li> </ul>
	<p>Other issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Propagation of privileges</li> <li>▪ Restriction</li> <li>▪ Revocation</li> <li>▪ Anonymous – broadcast keys, public keys, capability sets, public/world access privileges</li> </ul>
multi-level security	<p>Objects, Users, Communication Channels have a security privilege (or permission) level assigned to them; classically this is: classified, secret, top secret, Pink Toto. Access and operations compare the security levels. This is a fast operation on a per access basis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <math>A &gt; B</math> is true if A is more secure than B.</li> <li>▪ A User can read Obj if his security level is <math>\geq</math> Obj's security level</li> <li>▪ A User can create Obj if its security level is <math>\geq</math> his security level</li> <li>▪ A User can post to a CommChannel if his security level is <math>\leq</math> the CommChannel's Security Level.</li> </ul> <p>Other methods include Access Control Lists, Capability sets, Group/User/World permissions. This system is imperfect and has tends to create some characteristic problems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Most objects are classified at a higher security level than intrinsically necessary</li> <li>▪ People in turn are promoted to higher levels of security just to gain access to the objects, etc.</li> </ul>
multiple routes of access	<p>There is often more than one means of accessing a given resource -- and may not be adequately protected</p>
<b>information theory</b>	<p>A signal, chosen from a specified class, is applied to a channel, and the output probabilistically linked to that application.</p> <p>Shannon: a message is encoded into a sequence of those signals, and the recipient decodes them by mapping them to the message.</p> <p>Wiener, applies a signal to a channel, and the recipient estimates some property of the input.</p> <p>“explains organized complexity in terms of the reduction of entropy... that is achieved when systems.. absorb.. from external sources and convert it to a pattern or structure.” (Simon 127)</p>
<b>information value</b>	<p>= Expected value(x) – Expected Value(no information)</p>
<b>insurance actuarial calculations</b>	<p>Involves the loss experienced by many customers. Risk of rare loss incidents are not measurable, not controllable, and ergo not manageable by at-risk parties</p> <p>Why insurance makes for a bad mitigation driver in security. Future Risk Involves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Determination by unknown assailants not by victims</li> <li>▪ Unknown time of attack</li> <li>▪ Unknown methods and resources</li> <li>▪ Unknown purposes</li> <li>▪ Unknown and known vulnerability</li> </ul>

- Unknown consequences

This assessment has little shown methods to change victim behaviour and reduce risk

## intelligence<sub>2</sub>

An information gathering process, especially for information that is difficult to obtain. This information, usually, is intended to support decisions by policy makers.

- The information gathering methods and discipline
- How the information is analyzed
- How the information will be used
- How the conclusions or information is revised
- The sensitivity to misinformation

see also *traffic analysis*

derived intelligence

technical intelligence

- How gathered, which limits it to kind of information gathered, and couples with analysis techniques

- Images, source test interception (ala government documents) voice/video interception, reports from people (confessions, boats, etc.)

Discovering problems, opportunities.

<i>Terms</i>	<i>Sources</i>
<b>COMINT</b>	Communications intelligence
<b>diplomatic intelligence</b>	Assess intentions
<b>ELINT</b>	Electronic means
<b>HUMINT</b>	Talking to people, interrogation
<b>military intelligence</b>	assess capabilities
<b>IMINT</b>	photo from plane, balloon, satellite
<b>SIGINT</b>	Signals intelligence
<b>Standards &amp; Measurement</b>	

**Table 3:** Different types of intelligence

Distinction of the terms

<i>Term</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
<b>communication</b>	How to form and interpret information, communicated between parties
<b>diagnostic</b>	Trace to causes
<b>intelligence</b>	Forming the who-what-why-how information of signals, communication, and circumstances
<b>safety</b>	How to prevent or reduce risks or harms
<b>security</b>	Preventing, reducing, etc others from finding the information above

**Table 4:** Distinctions

analysis

Derived info about organization structure

facts about their current state

	plans for future organization structural actions
business	<p>Concerned with facts and measures about a business's internal operations, its industry, customers, competitors, and other market conditions.</p> <p>There are some flaws. First, it is very expensive (often several hundred million) and takes years to deploy. Second, the tools don't reasonably support basic information; Every Burger King has an SQL Server, but none can immediately answer "How many Whoppers have I sold today?" Third, the tools are too separate for end users. The user thinks in terms of a series of related steps serving one purpose. They not given one cohesive application; rather, they have several, complex applications that operate differently, and they have to forcibly switch between them.</p> <p>From an IT perspective, these tools required deploying a network on top of the network -- server support, application support, protocols, update "router configurations," security and etc.</p>
goals	<p>Seeks to answer:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ "Do we have an enemy/adversary? If we do, <i>who</i> is he and <i>why</i> is an opponent?</li> <li>▪ "Where is he and in what <i>strength</i>?</li> <li>▪ "What are his <i>intentions</i>?</li> <li>▪ "What are his perceptions of himself, <i>his own purpose and goals</i>?</li> <li>▪ "Are his intentions <i>consistent</i> with his strength (capability? If not , might he be practicing <i>deception</i>?" [v2n12]</li> </ul>
open source	Concerned with handling information gathered from sources open to the public.
signals	<p>For electronic, see above measurement &amp; signature</p> <p>HF direction finding</p> <p>callsign (operation). Different systems of callsign</p> <p>Traffic analysis / network flow</p> <p>identify the cipher system, codebook.</p> <p>What plain text language?</p>
<b>intelligence agency</b>	<p>gather intelligence</p> <p>analysis</p> <p>covert action</p> <p>who is doing what to whom, and for what reasons</p>
<b>intelligence analysis management</b>	<p>cycle:</p> <p>plan</p> <p>collection: instrument / acquire / measure</p> <p>analysis</p> <p>processing &amp; exploitation</p> <p>interpretation</p> <p>distribution</p>
<b>intercept linguist</b>	<p>A linguist determines</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the content of the message or the voice transmission</li> <li>▪ its intelligence value, if any</li> <li>▪ the appropriate vehicle for reporting the information</li> </ul>



<b>Kerkoffs, Auguste</b>	<p>Wrote “La Cryptographie Militaire” (1883), most famous for its separation of strength of cryptography system and keeping its mechanisms secret. This has since become an ideological assertion that one should not keep its mechanisms a secret, a misreading. He also insisted that the tools “must be easy to use and must neither require stress of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of rules”</p> <p>These are graceful degradation of secrets.</p>
<b>labeled</b>	<p>Such systems have a means of identifying all the things in the system – called tags.</p> <p>Each item gets a <i>label</i> – a list of tags.</p> <p>These are tracked. X can only speak to Y if it (or its secrecy label) hasn’t seen any secrets. X’s permission cap can only be decreased.</p> <p>Data politics: items can change their labels by adding and removing tags; items can allocate tags.</p> <p>This system is very similar to capability systems.</p>
<b>legal aspects</b>	legal issues: evidence, chain of custody, signal theft, legal discovery
<b>legal impact</b>	<p>Collecting so much private information may overwhelm the legal system (esp. w. discovery). Everything in US is being preserved, include. Memory sticks, cellphones, bills, PDAs. The cost of lawyers is \$125-\$600/hour, with up to 200 lawyers pouring over the info,</p> <p>Merits of case are even more likely to be lost in the tactics.</p> <p>In our adversarial system, opponents decide what to keep.</p> <p>In “inquisitorial legal systems” (France &amp; Germany) the discovery is proportional to the case, with judges determining relevancy.</p>
<b>levels of system security</b>	<p>DRM style enforcement of contracts ‘doesn’t work’ – alienates too many people, may never work, may be circumvented.</p> <p>Auditing behaviour on demand (tracks sale / distribution)</p> <p>Super distribution: transparency, accountability.</p>
<b>loss function</b>	consequences of wrong decision
<b>market</b> bringing data to market	<p>Bringing data to market</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What data do we own or have access to?</li> <li>2. Which of these are of sufficient quality to withstand scrutiny?</li> <li>3. Which will others pay for?</li> </ol> <p>Options:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide new content: now, novel, new uses, better quality, personalized</li> <li>2. Repackage: filter, synthesize, reformat from others</li> <li>3. Refit current offerings to create and deliver more useful data</li> <li>4. Unbundle: extract data from existing product, and sell</li> <li>5. Do you have better access to or understanding of data?</li> <li>6. Find who to sell to level playing field</li> <li>7. Provide identifiers</li> <li>8. Provide sift and understanding tools (behaviour, trend, structure, etc.</li> </ol>
<b>measurement and signature intelligence</b>	deviation from norms

MASINT	signatures: distinctive characteristics describing identifying detecting tracking example radar:
measurement	finite metric parameters of a subject
signature	distinctive features of subject as sensed by instrument Radio/transmitter strength manufacturer model, make same vs different transmitter direction, triangulation, distance propagation path frequency, modulation form antenna
<b>memory systems</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Relational complexity in storage, wallowing complexity</li> <li>▪ Streaming systems: metadata &amp; stream, continuing where one left off, chunk transfer, transfer encoding</li> <li>▪ Transactioning system</li> <li>▪ Compression: input data / output data</li> </ul>
<b>metrics</b>	% of relevant documents retrieved out of all relevant documents in database
precision	
recall	% of relevant documents retrieved out of all retrieved documents
<b>modeling</b>	Elements: See also <i>attributes, data dictionary</i>
<b>money laundering</b>	legitimate businesses, transactions, but for more than the booked price. The later is also used to lower taxes.
<b>mutual information</b>	$\text{mutual inf } o(x, y) = \log \frac{P(x, y)}{P(x)p(y)}$ <p>X can be John, y can be calls(DC), calls(Bogota), etc. can be used with a similarity measure, e.g. cosine similarity.</p>
<b>nodal analysis</b>	What a person does, and how they live
<b>nonrepudiation</b>	Providing auditable proof of origin, delivery and other elements of transmission or agreement.
<b>orientation</b>	Process-oriented: focus on performing operations with data Data-oriented: focus on the structure, storage and maintenance of data.
<b>pattern recognition</b>	Adjaciewz grammar Tries (if x=b) do x; goto next item in sequence, goto Rule N Adaptive resonance theory – similarity is called ‘resonance’

<b>permissions conditional</b>	“let an entity perform a certain action or set of actions under the condition that it will assume certain additional responsibilities.	<i>Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, Anumpam Joshi, Sol Greenspan, “Security and Privacy Challenges in open and Dynamic environments” IEE computer, June 2006</i>
<b>photogrammetry</b>	Photo info: authenticity, time of day, ephemeris Fog/haze removal Panopticon	
photo analysis	quality assessment clustering near-duplicate detection; aggregate & select face detection concept detection importance detection coverage-importance	
interpretation of photo	Surface illumination: - What are the light positions? - Fog? Something is at location x: it’s height, type (plane, tower, etc), make, model, # of people Items of interest	
<b>photograph</b>	who: who is in the photograph? who are these people? what objects are I the photo? time: when the photo was taken? location: where the photo was taken: the event, other photos from the event.”	
<b>PICL</b>	Presidents, intelligence, check list. PICL (Pickle) Factory	
<b>pin–tumbler lock</b>	Apparently, the ancient Egyptians invented such devices, but they were lost with the decline 4,000 years ago. Linus Yale also invented some, in an attempt to create one that he couldn’t pick	
<b>policy</b>	“An explicit representation of constraints and rules that govern an agent or system’s behavior.. Explicit policies can define permissions, obligations, norms, and preferences for an agent’s actions and interactions with other agents and programs. Such policies, especially those expressed in high-level declarative languages, can form the basis for electronic contracts and provide a sublanguage useful for negotiating agreements and commitments.” (p89-	<i>Lalana Kagal, Tim Finin, Anumpam Joshi, Sol Greenspan, “Security and Privacy Challenges in open and Dynamic environments” IEE computer, June 2006</i>
<b>privacy contextual integrity</b>	Four classes of variable / datum set <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Principle of transmission: describes the basis on which information flows. This can be contractual terms, legal rights, gossip, etc.</li> <li>2. The capacity(s) in which the individuals sending and receiving the information are acting.</li> <li>3. The context of a flow if information</li> <li>4. The types of information involved</li> </ol> <p>Linear Temporal Logic is being investigated to evaluate such instances.</p>	<i>Helen Nissenbaum, New York University</i> <i>Adam Barth</i>
privacy laws	health: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) education records: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) financial records: Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act Wiretap Act Pen Register and Trap& Trace Act – dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling	

	information																	
principles of	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Limits to collection of personal data; knowledge &amp; consent of subject</li><li>▪ Quality of data, its relevance for purpose or use; requirements on keeping it accurate, complete, and up to date.</li><li>▪ Specifying the purpose for collecting it</li><li>▪ Limited use, and limited disclosure</li><li>▪ Safeguarding and securing the data against unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure</li><li>▪ Openness about the developments, practices, and policies; provide means to establish existence and nature of purpose of personal develop, as well as other features listed hear.</li><li>▪ Individual participation. The individual should have the right to obtain confirmation of whether or not they have data relating to him, to have the data communicated to him, in a readily intelligible form. To be given an explanation if denied, and to be able to challenge the denial; to have (on successful challenge) the data rectified, erased, completed, or amended.</li><li>▪ The company (and its representatives) should be accountable for complying with these principles.</li></ul>	OECD Basic Privacy Principles of National Application																
types of	Types of privacy include: territorial (of space), bodily, communication, information.  Issue of control over disclosure																	
private	Data transmission is encrypted using the targets public key.																	
public key	Create session symmetric key. Typical and max duration to use the key for the session.																	
quality of data/information	true/unquestionable... captured information high degree of reliability ... lesser value suspected garbles; project / expected info (but not observed) information in its original form compromised information highly suspect information																	
question and answer	Classify question, generate list, rank. See also <i>information extraction</i>																	
Table 5: Type of query and mode of response																		
<table><tr><th>Word/phrase</th><th>Answer entity</th></tr><tr><td>How far / how long</td><td>Dimension</td></tr><tr><td>How many</td><td>Number</td></tr><tr><td>How much</td><td>Currency</td></tr><tr><td>What/which</td><td>Person, organization, company, place</td></tr><tr><td>When</td><td>Time</td></tr><tr><td>Who is</td><td>Organization</td></tr><tr><td>Who/whose</td><td>Person</td></tr></table>			Word/phrase	Answer entity	How far / how long	Dimension	How many	Number	How much	Currency	What/which	Person, organization, company, place	When	Time	Who is	Organization	Who/whose	Person
Word/phrase	Answer entity																	
How far / how long	Dimension																	
How many	Number																	
How much	Currency																	
What/which	Person, organization, company, place																	
When	Time																	
Who is	Organization																	
Who/whose	Person																	
rainbow books	Colored book protocol (rainbow book specs) ~1979 Blue Book: file transfer Pink book: ethernet protocols																	

Yellow book: network independent transport services  
 Green book: TS29 Terminal protocol  
 Red book: Job transfer and manipulation protocol  
 Grey book: Mail protocol  
 Orange book: Cambridge ring 82 hardware & protocol specs  
 Fawn book: screen management protocol

**rainbow table** A variation on dictionary attack, for fast reversal of encrypted passwords. Specific to the hash function used.

**reference monitor** Every access for a given resources thru a monitor.

*Jim Anderson, Computer Security Technology Planning Study, 1972*

**ring based protection** Limits the privileges to resources, access, instructions, and capabilities available to processes within the ring. Higher privilege rings have all the privileges of the lower privilege rings. Each ring is enumerated, typically with lower numbers denoting higher privilege levels. Kernels typically exist in Ring 0; applications typically exist in ring 3.

Switching between two ring levels. Often this involves – a means of a lower privilege process to communicate with a higher privilege level. It is a type of call, that employs special entries in a descriptor table, and an associated selector.

**risk management** either accept it, mitigate it, or transfer it.

**role** The element of *identity management* that groups operations (and/or other roles). A role is a set of actions, and/or a role. A role may have a password. Description of allowable access characteristics of host use. Determines scope of access a user has to files and privileged operations. Identifies the use of privileges on a case by case basis. Set once by the access path (and never allowed to change).

**RSA** Security derives from the difficulty of factoring N. The values  $M^F$  and  $C^P$  are large and tedious to compute.

decryption  $C=M^E \bmod N$

encryption key  $C=M^E \bmod N$   
 where C is the cipher, M is the plaintext

private key A secrete, large number that has no common factors with the product  $(P-1)(Q-1)$  of the public key

public encryption key A number E such that  $ED \bmod (P-1)(Q-1)=1$

## **schelling point**

**Schengen** Schengen Information Systems (via the Schengen Treaty)

**SOX** “A formal, explicit specification for the integrated use of multiple data sources in a semantic way”

Sarbannes  
 Oxley

“A conceptual representation of the types and properties of data and knowledge..

“A vocabulary of terms and relationships to model the domains specifying how to view the data sources.”

*Sox Sect 404 “Management Assessment of Internal Controls.”  
 Sect 302 “Corporate Responsibility for Incident Reports.”*

<b>secure boot</b>	<p>The history includes:</p> <p>1970's – US Government agencies &amp; Military explore ideas. Ford Aerospace, Comm Corp. (now in Lockheed-Martin) opened trusted OS divisions.</p> <p>1980s – SecureWare (by SecureWare, Inc) was first commercial Trusted Operating System</p> <p>1993 – market was gone, too expensive, low demand</p>	<p>William Arbaugh, primarily. (University of Pennsylvania). "Security for Private Intranets." <i>IEEE Computer</i>, September 1998. and others in 1997-1998. Looks like Palladium</p>
<b>?</b>	<p>Only load files from controlled source; files are lock as read-only to prevent changes during loading.</p> <p>asset identification</p> <p>security policies and threats definition</p> <p>risk assessment</p> <p>protection measures design</p> <p>validation</p>	<p>Sandra Kay Miller, "Trusted OS Makes Comeback" <i>IEEE Computer</i>, Feb 2001, p16-19</p>
<b>security attack</b>	Types of cases: confidentiality case (getting access to information they aren't supposed to see). Denial of Service (availability case). Integrity Attack (the kind meant to be seen, the kind meant not be seen)	
<b>controls</b>	countermeasures to address risk assessment.	
<b>evidence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Unusual requests for resources</li> <li>▪ Origins, signature</li> <li>▪ Storage place (in application directory, temporary folder, network drive, etc.)</li> </ul>	
<b>forward security</b>	if the system is compromised at some point, it does not stay compromised forever.	
<b>guidelines</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Secure the weakest link</li> <li>2. Practice defense in depth</li> <li>3. Fail securely</li> <li>4. Follow the principle of least privilege</li> <li>5. Compartmentalize</li> <li>6. Keep it simple</li> <li>7. Promote privacy</li> <li>8. Remember that hiding secrets is hard</li> <li>9. Be reluctant to trust</li> <li>10. Use your community resources</li> </ol>	<p>John Viega, Gary McGraw ;Building Secure Software: How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way Addison Wesley, 2001, <a href="http://www.buildingsecuresoftware.com/">http://www.buildingsecuresoftware.com/</a></p>
<b>in depth</b>	The depth is the <i>sequential</i> steps that must be taken to achieve bad things. Deeper security has more required steps. Often confused with multiple security measures that operate in parallel.	
<b>levels of</b>	<p>None: no security</p> <p>Light: connection is validated or authenticated</p> <p>Moderate: Connection is validated and authenticated</p> <p>Stringent: Conversation is Private.</p>	
<b>token</b>	small electronic tag or smart card. Used instead of a password	
<b>zone</b>	Security zone: range from unsafe to very stringent. Specifically in windows: NoZone*, Untrusted, Internet, Trusted, Internet, My Computer	
<b>secure software construction</b>		
<b>principles of a security design</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Economy of mechanism; too many different ways to do things leads to failure</li> <li>2. Fail-safe defaults</li> <li>3. Complete mediation (see <i>reference monitors</i> that are always used, consistent mechanism to protect resources)</li> <li>4. Open design – obscurity isn't a critical part of the design</li> <li>5. Separation of duties – multifactor verification for access</li> <li>6. Least privilege</li> </ol>	<p>Saltzer, Jerome; Michael Schroeder <i>The Protection of Information in Computer Systems</i>, 1974</p>

7. Least common mechanism – resources aren't implicitly shared
8. Psychological acceptability – system understandable by users.

<b>signed application</b>	<p>Detects <i>new bugs</i> – and any other code alternation – since it was signed. It does not protect against bugs already in the code. Often implemented by signing the set of files in the application, as a whole. Signed with certificates, and need to chain back to some level. Must verify the certificates authenticity, the responsible party's identity, and credentials, etc. Certificates can be revoked. Reduces the variety of ways that a file can be corrupted and not detected, but makes for many ways that the security system can be violated.</p> <p>Loader is responsible for verifying and loading executable content, and (possibly) transferring control to the executable module.</p>
<b>signed file</b>	Identifies origin (similar to a watermark) and other info in a hard to fraudulate manner.
<b>social media</b>	channel, credentials, media it accepts
<b>software connections</b>	The ways in which software modules can be interconnected: files, IO, semaphores, mutex, shared memory, data structures, API, signals, Interrupts, DMA.
<b>speech / spoken / voice</b>	<p>interception techniques</p> <p>record techniques</p>
crypto-linguistics	<p>identify the language</p> <p>transcribe: note garbled words, note estimated words</p>
linguistics	<p>Translate</p> <p>Specialized topic? Vocabulary idioms, etc</p> <p>Special 'code words' related to communication</p> <p>speaker recognition</p> <p>speech recognition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- transcribe</li> <li>- sentiment</li> <li>- literal / polarity (sarcasm)</li> </ul>
<b>split horizon</b>	Information about a network (i.e., name to IP address, ARP information, routing information, etc.) can only be sent to interfaces other than the one it was received from. That is, if the information was received on en0, it can't be answer queries with that on en0. This prevents various problems.
<b>spoofing</b>	Falsifying messages
<b>standards</b>	<p>Department of justice maintains a standards registry.</p> <p><a href="http://it.ojp.gov/jsr/public/list.jsp">http://it.ojp.gov/jsr/public/list.jsp</a></p>
<b>summarization</b>	Key elements of text, text tiling, structural recomposition, tracking related events in multiple documents, sentiment analysis, attitude and disposition
<b>surveillance</b>	"Surveillance involves monitoring persons or locations to identify behaviors, activities, and other changing information." "adversarial surveillance that is to gather information in preparation for an aggressive action and likely criminal in nature."
<b>TANGRAM</b>	NSA. Suffers from guilt by association. Related to TIA. Normal behaviour is classed as criminal.
<b>taxonomy</b>	focus on noun concepts, organizes, translations to automation, allows interpreting knowledge base

**terms**  
categories of  
terms

1. “primarily of concern to traffic analysis”
  - 2 “terms of secondary concern in traffic analysis”
  - 3 no concern,
  4. cross reference.
- see also cover term

**text fusion**

Several articles (*texts*) about the same topic are merged and summarized.

- How to find the subset of articles discussing the same thing
- How to related the two articles on common areas
- How to handle disagreement on common portions
- How to identify ‘new’ information
- How to select it – or filter our non-sense, based on rumour
- How to merge into a single structure
- How to revise structure into text with prosody

See also *analogy*

**text mining**  
**software**  
**companies**

Autonomy, HNC, UBM

**threats**

Categories of threats include:

1. “Act of human error failure (accidents, employee mistakes)
2. “Compromises to Intellectual Property (piracy, copyright infringement)
3. “Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass (unauthorized access and/or data collection)
4. “Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion (blackmail of information disclosure)
5. “Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism (destruction of systems or information)
6. “Deliberate Acts of Theft (illegal confiscation of equipment or information)
7. “Deliberate Software Attacks (viruses, worms, macros, denial of service)
8. “Forces of Nature (fire, flood, earthquake, lightning)
9. “Quality of Service Deviations from Service Providers (power and WAN service issues)
10. Technical Hardware Failures or Errors (equipment failures)
11. Technical Software Failures (bugs, code problems, unknown loopholes)
12. Technological Obsolescence (antiquated or outdated technologies)”

*Whitman, Michael, Enemy at the Gate: Threats to Information Security Communications of the ACM, August 2003*

**traffic analysis**

Change in behaviour, statefulness. Organizational pecking order, negotiating activities, planning activities

**mask**

A bitmask of signals, most commonly used for passing to sigprocmask() or pthread\_setmask() to block or unblock signals. Manipulated with sigaddset(), sigdelset(), sigfillset(), sigemptyset().

**pending**

Generated but not yet delivered or accepted. Usually only for a moment, but for longer if the signal is blocked (see below). Can be checked for with sigpending().

**synchronous**

Occurs at a definite point in the program's execution. For example, a SIGSEGV is triggered right on the instruction that accesses invalid memory. A SIGPIPE is raised during a read() or write(), not after. All synchronous events are thread-



	directed.
trust metric	One of a variety of foo bah
<b>trust management</b>	Certifications and other's have a level of trust based on who attested to it, and how much they are trusted.
<b>two worlds</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A model of the user's data, used for the user's problems</li> <li>2. Relational model of the system, used by the compiler / translator (this is not accessible by the users)</li> </ol>
<b>types</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Few people have access to information, and it is hard to gain access</li> <li>▪ Data is duplicated everywhere and in many forms; leaving it chaotic</li> <li>▪ Information flows in free but managed way</li> <li>▪ Information flows beyond the immediate organization to partners, suppliers, and customers.</li> </ul> <p>It is hard to mature a company thru those stages. It is costly and resource intensive to secure data. Security impedes productivity, decision making.</p>
<b>URI</b>	Uniform Resource Identifier: can be a URL; does not have to specify protocol. Can be a resource name but does not have to be globally unique
<b>URL</b>	Uniform Resource Locator: the location of an object (specifies access protocol)
<b>URN</b>	Uniform Resource Name: globally unique name
<b>user allow action</b>	<p>The set of all possible actions that a user can perform. Constructed by constructing a labeled transition system.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) The definition of the users state</li> <li>b) A set of inference rules: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How the users capabilities</li> <li>- preconditions required for operations on resources</li> <li>- current state of users. Updated description of the system</li> </ul> </li> </ol>
<b>validation of party A</b>	<p>A encodes a known message using A's private key.  The ciphertext is sent to B  B decodes this message using A's public key  If the message can be decoded properly, then A has been validated to B.</p>
<b>of party B</b>	<p>B takes part of the original message &amp; adds in its own information.  This is encoded using B's private key  This ciphertext is sent to A  A decodes the message using B's public key  If the message can be decoded properly, then B has been validated to A.</p>
<b>voting</b>	3 ballot system
<b>watermark</b>	<p>Tracking the origin of a file by associating data with the file.</p> <p>Safe against who &amp; what? Safe enough vs safe as people think it is.</p> <p>US British governments sold refurbished Enigma machines to 3<sup>rd</sup> world countries for several decades.</p>
<b>dynamic</b>	The participants change regularly (not just do to occasional failures)
<b>open</b>	<p>Doesn't pre-identify the set of known participants</p> <p>Best to describe what could be 'a constitutional' NSA program. It is legal, and the home officer's role is to provide information about whether it is legal. Foreign operations revelations went too far.</p>

**legal directives** bulk vs targeted  
discriminant: definition, examples  
selector  
classification to cover conduct, bad use  
  
it is easier to keep a program or approach going.