*109th Congress*

Securing America's Future

April 2006 • State Work Period
http://src.senate.gov

SENATE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
Rick Santorum, Chairman
Kay Bailey Hutchison, Vice Chairman
http://gop.senate.gov

SENATE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE

Rick Santorum, Chairman
Kay Bailey Hutchison, Vice Chairman

109th Congress

April 6, 2006

Dear Colleague,

Thank you for your ongoing commitment to work together to **Secure America's Future**. During the upcoming recess period we encourage you to highlight the strength of the economy, the ongoing critical importance of fighting the War on Terror, and our goal to provide affordable, accessible health care to all Americans. As we continue to address the healthcare needs of American families, we urge you to organize events highlighting the implementation of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and support for medical liability reform and other solutions soon to be considered in the Senate.

Republican pro-growth tax policies are fueling job creation and economic growth. Since August of 2003, nearly 5 million net new jobs have been created for American workers and families. Jobs have been created for 30 consecutive months. Moreover, the signing into law of the Deficit Reduction Act also accomplishes a critical step in restraining federal spending, while maintaining our commitment to those in need. April 17 is the deadline for filing taxes this year - and we continue to work to prevent a tax increase on American families through the Tax Reconciliation Act Conference efforts.

In the ongoing fight against terror, we have made significant progress by completing long-term renewal of the Patriot Act to maintain and refine the essential tools for this effort. We also need to continue to remind our constituents of the critical role of proactive surveillance and intelligence gathering in keeping Americans safe. The importance of continued progress in Iraq and the ongoing insights generated from the release of the Iraqi pre-war documents should also be highlighted.

Comprehensive immigration reform must begin with securing our borders. America is a nation of immigrants, which we embrace. We are also a nation of laws. Without properly securing our borders, we remain vulnerable to those who may enter our country undetected--criminals, terrorists, and other individuals who may mean harm to Americans.

Please continue to highlight the vision of our Conference to provide solutions, build on our accomplishments, and embrace a positive agenda for America.

OVERALL THEMATIC: **SECURING AMERICA'S FUTURE**

SECURING AMERICA'S FREEDOM, HOMELAND, AND BORDERS

SECURING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVENESS AND CREATING JOBS THROUGH A GROWING ECONOMY

SECURING AFFORDABLE AND ACCESSIBLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS

SECURING AMERICA'S ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

SECURING A SAFE AND QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL AMERICANS

.

Thank you,

Rick Santorum, Chairman

Kay Bailey Hutchison, Vice-Chair

Agenda/Accomplishments

Thematic: Securing America's Future

PRIORITY ISSUE: **WAR ON TERROR**

SECURING AMERICA'S FREEDOM, HOMELAND, AND BORDERS

- Patriot Act Renewed
- Combat Meth Act
- Budget Funding for Defense
- Budget Funding for Homeland, Port, and Border Security

PRIORITY ISSUE: **JOBS/ECONOMY**

SECURING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVENESS AND CREATING JOBS THROUGH A GROWING ECONOMY

- JOBS: Nearly 5 million jobs created since August 2003.
- 30 consecutive months of continued jobs growth
- Deficit Reduction Act signed into law
- FY07 Budget – fiscal responsibility

PRIORITY ISSUE: **HEALTH CARE**

SECURING AFFORDABLE AND ACCESSIBLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS

- Medicare Prescription Drugs Implementation

PRIORITY ISSUE: **ENERGY/CONSERVATION**

SECURING AMERICA'S ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

PRIORITY ISSUE: **EDUCATION**

SECURING A SAFE AND QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL AMERICANS

- Budget Education Funding

War on Terror

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Three Years Later

Remarkable Progress Has Been Made In Iraq In The Last Three Years:
On March 19, 2003, United States And Coalition Forces Launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. Life in Iraq under Saddam Hussein was marked by brutality, fear, and terror. Iraqis had no voice in their country or their lives. Saddam devastated Iraq, wrecked its economy, ruined and plundered its infrastructure, and destroyed its human capital.

Iraq Has A Democratically Elected Government. The reign of a dictator has been replaced by a democratically elected government operating under one of the most progressive constitutions in the Arab world. Millions of Iraqis have joined the political process over the past year alone.

- **Saddam Hussein Is Facing Justice In An Iraqi Court.** The Iraqi people are holding Saddam accountable for his crimes and atrocities.

The Next Year Will Bring A Consolidation Of These Gains, Helping A New Government Stabilize And Build A Solid Foundation For Democracy And Increased Economic Growth. Iraq's elected leaders are diligently working to form a government that will represent all the Iraqi people. As the Iraqi government comes together and Iraqi Security Forces improve their readiness, efforts to stabilize the nation will increasingly be Iraqi-led.

Securing A Lasting Victory In Iraq Will Make America:
- **Safer** by depriving terrorists of a safe haven from which they can plan and launch attacks against the United States and American interests overseas.

- **More Secure** by facilitating reform in a region that has been a source of violence and depriving terrorist control over a hub of the world's economy.

- **Stronger** by demonstrating to our friends and enemies the reliability of U.S. power, the strength of our commitment to our friends, and the tenacity of resolve against our enemies.

Despite Progress, The Situation On The Ground Is Tense. As al Qaida's actions show, terrorists want to impose a dictatorial government on the Iraqi people. The Coalition is united in support of the Iraqi people and helping them win their struggle for freedom. The terrorists know they lack the military strength to challenge Iraqi and Coalition forces directly – so their only hope is to try and provoke a civil war.

The President's National Strategy For Victory In Iraq Has Three Tracks – Political, Security, And Economic. All three tracks are progressing.

Political Track: Millions Are Participating In Iraq's Political Process:

- **Iraqis Completed Two Successful Nationwide Elections And A National Constitutional Referendum In 2005.** Each successive election experienced less violence, bigger voter turnout, and broader political participation. On December 15, more than 75 percent of the Iraqi voting-age population participated in the election for a new government, an increase of more than three million voters over the January election.

Security Track: Iraqi Security Forces Are Increasingly In The Lead:

Three years Ago, under Saddam Hussein's rule, the Iraqi Army was an instrument of repression. Today, an all-volunteer Iraqi Security Force is taking increasing responsibility for protecting the Iraqi people.

- **Iraqi Security Forces Are Growing In Number And Assuming A Larger Role.** More than 240,000 Iraqi Security Forces have been trained and equipped. Over 112,000 Iraqi soldiers, sailors, and airmen have now been trained and equipped. More than 87,000 police have been trained and equipped. These police work alongside over 40,000 other Ministry of Interior forces.

- **Additional Iraqi Battalions Are Conducting Operations.** Last fall, there were over 120 Iraqi Army and Police combat battalions in the fight against the enemy – and 40 of those were taking the lead in the fight. Today, the number of battalions in the fight has increased to more than 130 – with more than 60 taking the lead.

Economic Track: Iraq's Economy Is Recovering, And The Iraqi People Have Better Access To Essential Services:

- In 2005, the Iraqi economy grew an estimated 2.6 percent in real terms, and the International Monetary Fund has estimated it will grow by more than 10 percent in 2006.

- 3.1 million Iraqis enjoy improved access to clean water, and 5.1 million have improved access to sewage treatment.

- More than 30 percent of Iraq's schools have been rehabilitated and more than 36,000 teachers have been trained.

Source: White House Office of Communications

What They're Saying ...

Elected Officials Discuss Their Visits To Iraq This Month

Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): "I am confident that we can and will and must win, because the consequences of failure are catastrophic. The Iraqi military is doing a much better job. They are taking on a lot of the responsibilities." (Sen. John McCain, Press Availability, 3/28/06)

Gov. Phil Bredesen (D-TN): "I did come away probably more impressed with the extent to which the Iraqis had been trained to take over." (Edward Lee Pitts, "Bredesen Assesses War Zones," Chattanooga Times Free Press, 3/22/06)

Gov. Tim Kaine (D-VA): "I have not been of a school that we should set a timetable to leave. I think that would be a real disaster. I feel that even stronger having been there." (Frank Green, "After Iraq, Afghan Trip, Kaine Says Morale Of Troops Is High," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3/18/06)

Sen. Ken Salazar (D-CO): "I'm hopeful because I see signs of positive action on the ground in terms of training [Iraqi Security Forces]." (Anne C. Mulkern, "Salazar: U.S. Can't Walk Away From Iraq," The Denver Post, 3/22/06)

Sen. John Warner (R-VA): "I think because of a lot of sacrifice of our troops over here, loss of life and of limb, and an awful lot of money being invested by the American people, there is progress. There remains, on my visit today, a measure of hope this thing will eventually succeed." (Peter Hardin, "J. Warner Says Iraqi Strife Can't Be Defined As Civil War," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3/22/06)

Sen. John Thune (R-SD): "From the time I was there about a year ago, Brian, we've seen a remarkable increase in the number of Iraqi Security Forces – those who are able to effectively defend the Iraqi people, both the Army and the police, border security, those sorts of things. So I would say that's probably the biggest change since the last time I was there and obviously that's a very positive change." (Fox News' "Fox & Friends," 3/28/06)

Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-GA): "Despite the media reports that Iraq is on the brink of civil war, we are making real and substantive progress. Having been to Iraq four times now, I have seen tremendous progress being made by our troops and Iraqi security forces." (Sen. Saxby Chambliss, Op-Ed, "The Iraq War: 48th Brigade Fills Georgians With Pride," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 3/20/06)

Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA): "There have been some ethnic difficulties in Baghdad, but the Iraqi military handled them entirely and stabilized the environment. … I don't think we're close to a civil war, and I didn't hear that from those we talked to." (Gene Rector, "Ga. Delegation Finds No Hard Feelings In Dubai," The Macon Telegraph, 3/15/06)

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL): "I believe the Iraqi Army is coming along well. … There's a real life and death struggle to create a healthy, wholesome democratic government and it won't be easy. But we cannot afford to lose, and will not." (Sen. Jeff Sessions, Press Availability, 3/28/06)

Gov. Tim Pawlenty (R-MN): "We need to win this war. … If we don't, there are going to be likely serious and potentially catastrophic consequences for the region and for our country's national security interests. … [The troops'] morale and energy and dedication to this mission is incredible." (Bill Salisbury, "Pawlenty: 'We Need To Win This War'," The [St. Paul, Minnesota] Pioneer Press, 3/28/06)

Gov. Bob Riley (R-AL): "So far most of the troops have been very positive, very upbeat. One of the troops told me that this was the most meaningful thing they had ever done." (Bob Johnson, "Governor Visits Alabama Troops In Iraq," The Associated Press, 3/25/06)

Gov. Kenny Guinn (R-NV): "I'm stronger about my feelings of what we're trying to accomplish there." (Brendan Riley, "Nevada Governor's Iraq War Support Grows After Middle East Tour," The Associated Press, 3/27/06)

Gov. Jim Douglas (R-VT): "Most of the country has been turned over to the Iraqi army." (John Flowers, "Gov. Douglas On Iraq And Afghanistan," The Addison Independent, 3/23/06)

Rep. Christopher Shays (R-CT): "I have traveled to Iraq 11 times since 2003 and have met remarkable people. When I ask them what their biggest fear is, it is not the violence. It is 'that you will leave us.'" (Rep. Christopher Shays, Op-Ed, "The Case For The War," New York Daily News, 3/20/06)

Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA): "Their morale is good and strong. … It's because of the men and women of the [Georgia National Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade Combat Team] that we are winning the war. … That opportunity to visit the medical facilities, for me as a physician, was an eye opener. … It's obviously free care and lifesaving care." (Elliott Minor, "Four Georgia Republicans Pleased With The Progress In Iraq," The Associated Press, 3/14/06)

Rep. John Linder (R-GA): "[The war is] going very well. … We just wanted to go and say thanks." (Camie Young, "Lawmakers Return From Middle East," Gwinnett Daily Post, 3/15/06)

Secretary of State Rice In Iraq – April 3, 2006

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64036.htm

Importance Of Political Progress:

"And indeed the international partners, particularly the United States and Great Britain and others who have forces on the ground and have sacrificed here, have a deep desire and I think a right to expect that this process will keep moving forward, because it is after all the political process that will disable those who wish to engage in violence against the Iraqi people. It is only through a political process in which the Iraqi people have confidence and political leadership in which they have confidence that they can be certain to abandon for all time any resort to violence."

The Resilience Of Iraqi People:

"It's important to acknowledge that a people who have had a history of solving their problems and their differences by violence and coercion are now trying to do that through a political course. … [T]he Shia who suffered enormous acts of repression under Saddam Hussein, who still mourn mass graves here in Iraq simply because they were Shia, that to see these people overcome that terrible history and to be a part of an effort for a national unity government is indeed inspirational to all of us who believe in democracy. … It is also, of course, the case that other communities – Kurds – have suffered, and let us not forget that Saddam Hussein repressed Sunnis as well. So this is a country that is trying to overcome a very terrible past and, of course, there are sectarian tensions, and those who would stoke those sectarian tensions. But what I have been amazed at is the resilience of this community, this country, the resilience of their political leaders, and the degree to which they have been able to overcome those efforts of those who would try and tear them apart. The next and most important step in overcoming the efforts of those who would tear them apart is to get a government of national unity, to get one quickly, and to put it to work on behalf of the problems, difficulties, and challenges facing the Iraqi people."

Achieving Victory In Iraq:

"The goal is to leave the foundation for a democratic and stable Iraq, because once that democratic and stable Iraq is in place, you will have the foundations of a different kind of Middle East and our own security will be much stronger. And so the President has said many times that the presence here is for the purposes that I've just talked about, and it is going to remain the presence that we need until Iraqis are able to secure themselves."

Talking Points on Documents Captured in Iraq
& Released by the Government of the United States

The Iraq documents help to educate the American people of Saddam's regime and the Global War on Terror.

- Members of Congress have worked hard to get the Administration to release a trove of more than 2 million exploitable documents captured by the U.S. military during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These 48,000 cartons of documents are now gradually being released by the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, so that the world can see for itself whether fighting in Iraq is central to the war on terror.

- Leaders in both the House and Senate believe that these documents, videos, official papers, and tapes will help teach the world about the terror network, how it works, with whom, and what it intends to accomplish

- Some documents are available at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products-docex.htm. Some of these documents have already been translated; others are in the original Arabic and are being translated by people all over the globe. Also, only 28 of 700,000 documents from the "Harmony" database which contains Al-Qaeda documents have been released at http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony_doc.asp.

Examples of recently published Iraqi documents:

SADDAM TRAINED TERRORISTS
These documents are at: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf

- The Iraq Perspectives Project has documents about Saddam Hussein's regime training non-Iraqi Arab volunteers in Iraq beginning (at least) in 1998. The authors used only documents which were corroborated by other information, in this case, intelligence from debriefings and other documentation confirms the reporting.

- The report also indicates that Saddam was importing jihadists in the months before the war, reporting that Iraqi training camps were humming with frenzied activity in January 2003. Lists of these jihadists were also found in April 2003 in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

SADDAM'S AGENTS MET WITH AL-QAEDA
These documents are on the website of the Foreign Military Studies Office Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, Operation Iraqi Freedom Documents: http://70.169.163.24/

- There are documents which show Iraqi outreach to Saudi opposition groups. Documents describe requests for assistance from bin Laden to Saddam, and were released within the past two weeks. Other sections indicate the eagerness of Saddam's regime to strengthen relationships with Saudi fundamentalists. The existence of this document was reported by ABC News, and had been first reported by The New York Times on June 25, 2004. The reporter noted that a Pentagon task force that had studied the document concluded that it was likely authentic.

- Another document from 1992 that was captured in postwar Iraq is a list of Iraqi Intelligence assets. It lists Osama bin Laden as an asset who has good relations with the Iraqi intelligence station in Syria.

SADDAM CONNECTION TO FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING

The Senate Intelligence Committee report (bipartisan) includes a passage on Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi who admitted to mixing the chemicals for the first WTC bombing in 1993. The report asserts that Iraqi regime facilitated Yasin's return to Iraq just days after that attack. An ABC News reporter in 1994 went to Baghdad and interviewed the neighbors of Yasin's father, who said Yasin lived in the house, came and went freely, and "worked for the government."

Strategy For Victory: Clear, Hold, And Build

Recently, President Bush Discussed The Strategy For Victory In Iraq And Profiled The Northern Iraqi Town Of Tal Afar. Once a key base of operations for Al-Qaida, Tal Afar is a concrete example of progress in Iraq.

Tal Afar Shows How The Three Elements Of The Strategy For Victory In Iraq – Political, Security, And Economic – Depend On And Reinforce One Another. By working with local leaders to address community grievances, Iraqi and Coalition forces helped build the political support needed to make the military operation to drive terrorists out of that city successful. The military success against the terrorists gave the citizens of Tal Afar security, and this allowed them to vote and rebuild their city. The economic rebuilding taking place is giving Tal Afar's residents a real stake in the success of a free Iraq – and further marginalizing the terrorists.

Tal Afar Was An Al-Qaida Base

After Saddam Hussein's Removal In April 2003, The Terrorists Began Moving Into Tal Afar. With roughly the population of Akron, Ohio, Tal Afar is a city of more than 200,000 residents. It has dozens of tribes of different ethnicity and religions. Due to its strategic location, Tal Afar was a key base of operations for al-Qaida. Al-Qaida's stated goal is to drive American forces out of Iraq so they can take over the country, overthrow moderate Muslim governments throughout the region, and use Iraq as a base to plan and launch attacks against America. They seek to do this by recruiting terrorists from across the Middle East to come to Iraq, infiltrate the cities, and sow violence. After Saddam Hussein's removal, the terrorists moved into Tal Afar seeking to divide its many ethnic and religious groups. The terrorists forged an alliance of convenience with those who benefited from Saddam's regime and others with their own grievances, skillfully used propaganda to foment hostility, and exploited the weak economy to recruit young men to their cause.

- **We Drove The Terrorists And Insurgents Out Of The City, But They Returned.** By September 2004, the terrorists and insurgents had seized control in Tal Afar. We launched a military operation that drove the enemy out after three days of heavy fighting. To keep the terrorists on the run, Coalition forces kept pursuing the enemy and rooting out the terrorists in other parts of Iraq. Unfortunately, the local Security Forces were not able to maintain order, and by November 2004, the terrorists had returned.

The Terrorists And Insurgents Imposed In Tal Afar The Brutal Reality They Seek For All Of Iraq. Ruling through fear and intimidation, the terrorists and insurgents controlled the only hospital, beheaded civilians who had worked as interpreters for Coalition forces, gunned down a popular city councilman, booby-trapped bodies, and deliberately fired mortars into playgrounds and soccer fields filled with children.

Building Support For Military Operations

In Response To Experiences In Tal Afar And Elsewhere, The Coalition Adopted A New Approach – Clear, Hold, And Build. The ability of al-Qaida and its associates to retake Tal Afar was a problem seen elsewhere in Iraq, and the Iraqi government and Coalition adopted a new approach. Instead of coming in, removing the terrorists, and then moving on, Iraqi and Coalition forces pursued a strategy of clearing a city of terrorists, leaving well-trained Iraqi units behind to hold the city, and working with local leaders to build economic and political infrastructure.

In May 2005, Iraqi And Coalition Forces Began Implementing This New Approach To Restore Order In Tal Afar And Give Residents Confidence The Terrorists Would Not Return.

Clearing And Holding Tal Afar

In The Summer Of 2005, Iraqi And Coalition Forces Launched Operation Restore Rights To Clear Tal Afar Of Terrorists. Iraqi forces took the lead. The primary force was 10 Iraqi battalions backed by three Coalition battalions. Many Iraqi units conducted their own anti-terrorist operations and controlled their own battle space. By focusing on securing the safety of Tal Afar's population, Iraqi and Coalition forces won the trust of the city's residents – which was critical to defeating the terrorists.

After The Main Combat Operations, Iraqi Forces Moved In To Hold The City. More than 1,000 Iraqi Army soldiers and emergency police were deployed to keep order, supported by a restored police force that would eventually number about 1,700 officers. We embedded Coalition forces with the Iraqi police and Army units to work with their Iraqi counterparts and help them become more capable and professional. Today, the Iraqi police have built stations throughout the city, and residents are stepping forward to provide vital intelligence about the terrorists. By turning control of these cities over to capable Iraqi troops and police, Coalition forces give Iraqis confidence that they can determine their own destiny – and our troops are better able to go after high-value terrorist targets.

Recent Elections Demonstrate The Benefits Of A Secure Environment. Tal Afar is the largest city in Western Nineva province. In the elections held in January 2005, only 32,000 of about 190,000 registered voters cast a ballot. By the October constitutional referendum and December elections, Iraqi and Coalition forces had secured Tal Afar and surrounding areas. Voter registration increased to about 204,000, and more than 175,000 voted in each election – more than 85 percent of the eligible voters in Western Nineva province.

Rebuilding Tal Afar

The Residents Of Tal Afar Are Seeing Their City Come Back To Life. Terrorists who once exercised brutal control over every aspect of the city have been killed, captured, driven out, or put on the run. Children are going to school, electricity and water service are restored throughout the city, and the police force better reflects the ethnic and religious diversity of the communities they patrol. Markets are opening, buildings are going up, and homes are being repaired. Immediately following military operations, the Coalition helped Iraqis set up humanitarian relief for the civilian population, and we set up a fund to reimburse innocent Iraqi families for damage to their homes and businesses in the fight against the terrorists. The Iraqi government pledged $50 million to help reconstruct Tal Afar by rebuilding hospitals and schools and by improving infrastructure from the electric grid to the sewer and water systems.

Work Remains, But Tal Afar Exemplifies The Progress In Iraq

The Story Of Tal Afar Shows That With A Basic Level Of Safety And Security, Iraqis Can Live Together Peacefully. After the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the reaction in Tal Afar was subdued, with few reports of sectarian violence. On the Friday after the attack, more than 1,000 demonstrators gathered in peaceful protest.

- Despite Progress, Challenges Remain In Iraq. Though most of the country has remained relatively peaceful, in some parts of Iraq the enemy is carrying out savage acts of violence – particularly in Baghdad and surrounding areas. Even in Tal Afar, the people still face many challenges, including age-old resentments, an economy that needs to create jobs and opportunity for its young people, and determined enemies. But the progress made in bringing more Iraqi Security Forces online is helping bring peace and stability to Iraqi cities.

In Tal Afar, A Free And Secure People Are Getting Back On Their Feet, Are Participating In Government And Civic Life, And Have Become Allies In The Fight Against The Terrorists. As Iraqis see the benefits of liberty, they will gain confidence in their future – and work to ensure that common purpose trumps narrow sectarianism.

Source: White House Iraq Update

http://70.169.163.24/

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Address: http://70.169.163.24/   go

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE
JOINT RESERVE INTELLIGENCE CENTER

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM DOCUMENTS

At the request of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office has created this portal to provide the general public with access to unclassified documents and media captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The US Government has made no determination regarding the authenticity of the documents, validity or factual accuracy of the information contained therein, or the quality of any translations, when available. Users who come across documents they feel are inappropriately released may contact the responsible officers at docex@center.osis.gov. The ODNI press release and public affairs contact information is available at http://www.odni.gov/

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WELCOME TO THE OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM DOCUMENT PORTAL

The documents contained on this site were captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom and represent a dramatic departure from previous document release efforts which have historically taken place decades after the cessation of hostilities. Viewers are urged to carefully read the disclaimer above.

The following is a sample of the types of documents, audio and video files available in the Portal. The overwhelming majority of these documents are not in English, although English translations (full or partial) are posted when available.

Sample of Text Files

- CMPC-2003-000776
- CMPC-2003-001850
- CMPC-2003-012666

Sample of Audio Files

- ISGP-2003-10151533
- ISGP-2003-10151569
- ISGP-2003-10151576

Sample of Video Files

- ISGQ-2003-M0001267
- ISGQ-2003-M0001291
- ISGQ-2003-M0001294

Internet zone

http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp

Combating Terrorism Center
at West Point

Combating Terrorism Center
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Documents from the Harmony Database

Note: Documents will open in a new browser window.
If you have problems opening a document, then right click on the file and select "save as."
You will need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view these documents.

Other released documents can be found at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products-docex.htm.

Additional Harmony Documents (Posted 17 March 2006)

|			
Thoughts About Security of Principal Squads	AFGP-2002-600002	English	Arabic
Book by Mustafa Hamid	AFGP-2002-600087	English	Arabic
Al-Qa'ida Constitutional Charter	AFGP-2002-600175	English	Arabic
Camp Acceptance Requirements	AFGP-2002-600849	English	Arabic
Condolence Letter	AFGP-2002-601402	English	Arabic

Documents Released as part of "Harmony and Disharmony" Report (14 February 2006)

Al-Qa'ida Goals and Structure	AFGP-2002-00078	English	Arabic
Interior Organization	AFGP-2002-00080	English	Arabic
Open Letter to King Fahd from bin Laden	AFGP-2002-000103	English	Arabic
Al-Qa'ida Staff Count Public Appointments	AFGP-2002-000112	English	Arabic
Letter of Threat to Americans	AFGP-2002-001120	English	Arabic
A Memo to Sheikh Abu Abdullah	AFGP-2002-003251	English	Arabic
Employment Contract	AFGP-2002-600045	English	Arabic
Al-Qa'ida Bylaws	AFGP-2002-600048	English	Arabic
Five Letters to the Africa Corps	AFGP-2002-600053	English	Arabic
Lessons Learned from the Jihad Ordeal in Syria	AFGP-2002-600080	English	Arabic
A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi	AFGP-2002-600113	English	Arabic
Letter to Aba Khalid from bin Laden	AFGP-2002-600157	English	Arabic
Letter to Mullah Mohammed 'Omar from bin Laden	AFGP-2002-600321	English	Arabic
Call to Jihad Against the Syrian Regime	AFGP-2002-600966	English Part: One Two Three Four Five Six	Arabic
A Response to Accusations Against Sheikh Albani	AFGP-2002-601041	English	Arabic
Criticism of Abu Al-Bara'a	AFGP-2002-601346	English	Arabic
Status of Jihad	AFGP-2002-601693	English	Arabic
Political Speculation	AFGP-2002-602181	English	Arabic
Criticism of Sheikh Bin Baz	AFGP-2002-602187	English	Arabic
Get the Idolaters Out of Arab Island	AFGP-2002-603856	English	Arabic
Various Admin Documents and Questions	AFGP-2002-801138	English	Arabic
Letter to Pakistani Scholars from bin Laden	AFGP-2002-901188	English	Arabic
Al Adl Letter	--	English	Arabic

Link : http://ctc.usma.edu/ao/AFGP-2002-600321-Orig.pdf

Iraqi Perspectives Project

A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom
from Saddam's Senior Leadership

Kevin M. Woods
With Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout,
Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey

Sunshine for the Iraq Files

March 15, 2006; Page A22

It has taken far too long, but it looks as if the Bush Administration has finally decided to release most of Saddam Hussein's secret documents. That word came late Monday from the Directorate of National Intelligence, the new executive branch office that is supposed to coordinate the various American intelligence services.

Only last week, the DNI seemed determined to keep secret -- or at least release very s-l-o-w-l-y -- the millions of documents, computer files and audio tapes captured in Iraq and Afghanistan and now collected in Qatar as part of what's called the Harmony document exploitation program. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte had publicly said the material was largely of "historical" value, and had shown no great urgency to find out what was in them.

But now Mr. Negroponte has done an about-face, though not without pressure from Congress and perhaps also from his boss, President Bush. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Pete Hoekstra and Senator Rick Santorum both refused to take no for an answer and even introduced legislation that would require the DNI to be more forthcoming. Mr. Bush had also privately expressed to Members of Congress his desire to get the documents out, and that message may finally have made its way down through the bureaucracy. Once in a while in Washington, even Presidents get their way.

Mr. Hoekstra told us yesterday he's been talking to Mr. Negroponte and other senior DNI officials in recent days, and that they've committed to begin "aggressively" releasing documents on the Internet as soon as this week. He says he also senses a spirit of openness and compromise that he hadn't before. For example, DNI officials initially balked at releasing their own potentially flawed translations of the largely Arabic language documents. But they have now agreed to do so with the caveat that interested parties would be well-advised to double check the accuracy of the DNI's work.

The Congressman has also been told that documents won't be kept secret because of mere uncertainty about possible -- and vague -- "national interest" implications. And, finally, Congress will have an oversight role regarding documents that the DNI decides should remain classified for whatever reason.

We don't think Mr. Hoekstra is exaggerating when he says that removing these materials from the exclusive domain of the U.S. intelligence community and offering them to all interested analysts will cut years off the amount of time it takes to extract the important information they contain. While some of what's uncovered may be misleading, we trust an open process to discover the truth more than we do intelligence services with a stake in defending their previous (mis)judgments.

This information may well shed light on whether Saddam planned the insurgency that we and the Iraqis are now fighting, or whether he canoodled with Islamist terrorists, as some of the documents already translated suggest. Only this week, we are learning from the new book on Iraq by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor that many of Saddam's own generals believed he had weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to use them. So much for the allegation that "Bush lied" about WMD; Saddam lied to everyone.

All of these issues are highly relevant to the ongoing debate over how the U.S. is fighting both in Iraq and in the larger war on terror, and where we should go from here. The Iraq War is a long way from being over, and anything we can know about the accuracy of our judgments before and during the fight is well worth trying to uncover and understand.

The Threat Saddam Posed
A dictator and his WMD

JAMES LACEY

For almost three years, the anti-war protesters have kept up the drumbeat: "Bush lied and people died." Because weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not found in Iraq, an endless stream of commentators continues to declare that Saddam Hussein was not the serious threat the administration claimed him to be. The critics usually go even further, and assert that sanctions and the destruction of WMD facilities by U.N. investigators had done so much damage to WMD infrastructure that it would have taken Saddam years to rebuild it even to a minimal capacity.

But these claims ignore huge amounts of contrary evidence; and most of this evidence can be found in the final report of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) — the very same report that many critics hold up as proof positive that Iraq was not a WMD threat. The evidence found by the ISG (an investigative commission set up by the Bush administration after the invasion of Iraq) confirms that Saddam was preparing to rapidly reconstitute his WMD program the moment he broke out of sanctions, which — given the frayed state of the coalition against him — would inevitably have happened. Not only did Bush not "lie"; the critics themselves are guilty of selectively citing evidence and of ignoring facts inconvenient to their argument. The ISG report, as well as the other evidence that continues to come to light, demonstrates that Saddam couldn't be trusted with the apparatus of a modern state, which he would have turned quickly back to producing WMD as soon as circumstances allowed.

Consider just one datum: According to the report, Saddam had the capability to start anthrax production within one week of making the decision to do so, and thereafter to produce over ten tons of weaponized anthrax a year. If even 1 percent of that amount — 200 pounds — were released into the air over Washington, D.C., Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimates that up to 3 million people would die.

How did Saddam keep such a massive capability from being discovered by the inspectors? Simply by hiding it in plain sight. For instance, at a facility called al-Hakam, Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha al-Azawi maintained a production line that produced ten tons of biopesticides for agricultural use each year. These biopesticides were produced in powder form and milled to 1 to 10 microns in size — but bio agents milled this finely are absolutely useless for agricultural purposes. Farmers found the biopesticide Dr. Rihab was sending them almost impossible to use, as it had to be hand-dropped one plant at a time or it would disappear. When they followed her recommendation to mix it with water and spray it, all they got was a thick slurry that clogged spray nozzles.

Though such finely milled powder may be useless for agricultural work, it is the perfect size for an inhalation bioweapon. (To be effective, anthrax must be milled at less then 10 microns.) Experts estimate that weaponized-anthrax spores that infect the skin will kill 50 percent of untreated patients; inhaled anthrax will kill 100 percent of untreated victims and 50 percent of those receiving immediate treatment. Simulations prior to Desert Storm estimated that an anthrax attack would kill over 25 percent of Coalition forces, as many as 200,000 men. In the hands of terrorists, this would be a weapon of incalculable value.

Dr. Rihab, the supposed agricultural scientist, is better known to U.S. intelligence agencies as "Dr. Germ," the head of Saddam's biological-warfare program for most of the decade immediately preceding the invasion. A 1999 Defense Intelligence Agency report called her the most dangerous woman in the world, and others have testified that she used political prisoners to test her bioweapons when she began to doubt she was getting accurate data from infected donkeys and dogs. When questioned by U.N. inspectors about al-Hakam, she claimed it was a chicken-feed plant. (Charles Duelfer, deputy executive chairman for the U.N. inspection team, later told reporters, "There were a few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed production plant, beginning with the extensive air defenses surrounding it.") According to the 1999 DIA report, the normally mild-mannered

Rihab exploded into violent rages when questioned about al-Hakam, shouting, screaming, and, on one occasion, storming out of the room, before returning and smashing a chair.

In 1995, the U.N. inspectors showed Rihab documents obtained from the Israelis that demonstrated that Iraq had purchased ten tons of growth media from a British company called Oxoid. Shown this evidence, Rihab admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 liters of botulism toxin; 8,000 liters of anthrax; 2,000 liters of aflatoxins, which can cause liver cancer; clostridium perfringens, a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene; and ricin, a castor-bean derivative that can kill by impeding circulation. She also admitted conducting research into cholera, salmonella, foot-and-mouth disease, and camel pox. Neither the U.N. nor later inspectors were able to certify that all of this lethal cornucopia was ever destroyed.

In fact, in a document declassified just recently, there are indications that these deadly organisms — and the infrastructure to create them — were not destroyed. According to this document, persons at the highest levels of the regime were convinced that Iraq had eliminated its entire biological-weapons program: In a mid-1990s conference of Saddam's Revolutionary Command Council, Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz told Saddam Hussein that he expected to resolve all biological issues with U.N. inspectors very quickly, because the program no longer existed. But Aziz was immediately contradicted by Saddam's son-in-law, who reminded Saddam that not everything had been disclosed, not even to supposedly trusted members of the regime's inner circle:
Some teams work and no one knows of them. Sir, they [U.N. investigators] do not know all of the methods or all of the means nor all of the scientists nor all of the places. Frankly, yes, some activities were discovered . . . Sir, what they have discovered in the biological file is the least and most insignificant concern. The 17 tons [the amount of biological growth medium imported into Iraq] are not the problem, but the thousands of tons we have not accounted for or told how they were produced or how they were used . . . Sir, I would like to go back to this subject [biological weapons]: Do we have to reveal everything? If we continued with the silence and if the meeting took this line, I must say that it is in our interest not to reveal anything.
It is clear from the remainder of this transcript — a document captured by U.S. forces — that Tariq Aziz is both startled and angry to discover that Saddam has been keeping him in the dark about continuing WMD programs even as he tries to convince U.N. inspectors that no such programs still exist. It was not until Saddam's son-in-law defected in August 1995 that the U.N. was alerted to the fact that Iraq's biological program was far greater than they believed. But by this time Saddam was close to throwing the inspectors out — before they could uncover and dismantle the program in its entirety.

The ISG report goes out of its way to understate its WMD findings, but the underlying facts are duly alarming. For instance, the report goes on at great length about Iraq's attempts to import super-high-quality aluminum tubes in 2001–2003. At the time, this was cited by Western intelligence agencies as evidence that Saddam was trying to reconstitute his WMD program. The agencies claimed that the tubes were intended to be used to build centrifuges for nuclear enrichment. The Iraqis maintained, however, that the tubes were for 81mm rockets and had nothing to do with WMD. The ISG report accepts this explanation, even though it notes that Iraq was producing 50 lower-quality tubes a day for its 81mm rockets, and had no need for the expensive higher-quality imported tubes. The report also states that an Iraqi general, Husam Muhammad Amin, became worried about repeated attempts to purchase aluminum tubes that were subject to U.N. nuclear controls and took his concerns to Abdullah Mullah al-Huwaysh (deputy prime minister and head of the Military Industrial Commission). Nonetheless, Iraq persisted in its attempts to purchase the high-grade aluminum tubes and a contract was still being negotiated as Coalition tanks rolled into Baghdad.

MOBILE DEATH FACTORIES
The ISG report dedicates an entire annex — 20 pages of exhaustive analysis — to proving that the two suspected mobile bio-labs were not what Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed they were, before the U.N., in the run-up to war. But the report gives the discovery of Iraq's actual mobile bioweapons labs only a little over one page of attention.

After the 1995 defection of Saddam's son-in-law forced Iraq to admit to an extensive bioweapons program that it had been hiding, U.N. inspectors made an effort to eliminate it. But Saddam was not ready to give up all he had gained, and large portions of the bioweapons research program were continued in small mobile labs by a band of key scientists and technicians under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The ISG report says its investigators were unsure if any of this continuing bioweapons research was military-related. (No one ever bothered to ask the investigators if there was any other conceivable purpose for bioweapons.)

The ISG found evidence that at least five mobile bioweapons research labs were operating in Baghdad right up to the commencement of the Coalition invasion. At one site, which building residents claimed was a biological lab, investigators found chemicals, along with documents from lab employees asking for hazardous-duty pay for having to work with biological materials. Another lab, discovered in a Baghdad mosque, was filled with equipment belonging to a known bioweapons scientist. Still another clandestine lab was identified by the ISG team at the Baghdad Central Public Health Laboratory, which employees admitted was operated by the Intelligence Service for several years prior to 2003.

According to the ISG report, Samarra Drug Industries had tanks available for bio-agent production ranging from 100 to 10,000 liters that could have begun bioweapons production three to four weeks after the order was given. Just one of these 10,000-liter tanks, if filled with botulinum toxin, would be enough to wipe out the global population more than twice over.

And it could be worse: Even a thimbleful of smallpox germs would kill tens of millions. If smallpox were released by terrorists in the United States, where inoculations ceased in 1972, the result would be a disaster of almost unimaginable magnitude. With some estimates claiming that each infected person can infect between 10 and 17 others, the smallpox germ is the bioweapon of choice for terrorists. Given Saddam's close links to terror groups it would have been sheer folly to allow his regime to possess even the smallest capability to produce the germ.

The report states that the ISG found evidence that Iraq had in fact obtained smallpox cultures from the former Soviet Union in 1992. An Iraqi scientist also described for the ISG Iraq's efforts to develop smallpox for biological warfare by using eggs and viral cultures. ISG investigators visited two labs where they found equipment that appeared to be used for making animal vaccines, but "this dual-use equipment was assessed to be easily diverted to produce smallpox or other pathogenic viruses." The ISG also visited a location where animal pox vaccines were produced in tissue culture; its assessment was that this equipment could be used for the rapid production of large amounts of smallpox virus.

The ISG report states in bold font that investigators "uncovered no evidence to support smallpox R&D at ASVI [Al-Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine] Institute for possible use as an offensive BW agent." Since this was the only facility in Iraq previously known to be associated with smallpox, the ISG's declaration that no bio-warfare research was being conducted there would seem to give the institute a clear bill of health. But the report also says that Dr. Rihab (a.k.a. Dr. Germ) made frequent visits to the institute to conduct unidentified biological-warfare research, and that the institute maintained a "small capability" for organic production; it needs to be stressed that when it comes to smallpox, you need only a very small amount to cause a catastrophic amount of damage.

A TYRANT'S DESIGNS

In summary, then, what the Iraqi Survey Group discovered was that Saddam was maintaining a biological-warfare research program right up to the Coalition invasion, and that he had the installed capability to produce bio-toxins. Would he have used them? An amazing conversation between Saddam and his inner circle was recorded in a captured but undated Iraqi document.

SADDAM: I want to make sure that — close the door please (door slams) — the germ and chemical warheads,

as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to [those concerned], so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any of their targets?

HUSAYN KAMIL: Sir, if you'll allow me. Some of the chemicals now are distributed, this is according to the last report from the Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you, Sir. Chemical warheads are stored and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, some other artillery machines and rockets (missiles) are available from the army. While some of the empty "stuff" is available for us, our position is very good, and we don't have any operational problems. Moreover, in the past, many substantial items and material were imported; now, we were able to establish a local project, which was established to comply with daily production. Also, another bigger project will be finalized within a month, as well as a third project in the coming two to three months that will keep us on the safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir, only deal in common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol, and methyl (interrupted) . . .

SADDAM: What is it doing with you, I need these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the action to happen at anytime, and I consider Riyadh as a target . . .

HUSAYN KAMIL: (door slams) Sir, we have three types of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one we should use, some types stay capable for many years (interrupted).

SADDAM: We want the long term, the many years kind . . .

HUSAYN KAMIL: . . . There has to be a decision about which method of attack we use; a missile, a fighter bomb, or a fighter plane.

SADDAM: With them all, all the methods . . . I want as soon as possible, if we are not transferring the weapons, to issue a clear order to [those concerned] that the weapon should be in their hands as soon as possible. I might even give them a "non-return access." [Translator Comment: to have access to the weapons; to take them with them and not to return them.] I will give them an order stating that at "one moment," if I'm not there and you don't hear my voice, you will hear somebody else's voice, so you can receive the order from him, and then you can go attack your targets. I want the weapons to be distributed to targets; I want Riyadh and Jeddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities with all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. This is for the germ and chemical weapons . . . Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.

HUSAYN KAMIL: Sir, the best way to transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful. This is according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted) . . .

SADDAM: May God help us do it . . . We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody.

And while biological weapons may have been the most dangerous near-term threat that Saddam could pose to the world, other WMD programs were also being fostered. As Oil for Food money began to fill his coffers, Saddam was restarting chemical-warfare, ballistic-missile, and even nuclear programs. After Desert Storm, Saddam encouraged Iraqi officials to, in his words, "preserve the nation's scientific brain trust essential for WMD." He told his close advisers that he wanted to keep Iraq's nuclear scientists fully employed, and this theme of preserving personnel resources persisted throughout the sanctions period. According to his science adviser, Ja'far Diya' Ja'far Hashim, "Saddam's primary concern was retaining cadres of skilled scientists to facilitate reconstitution of WMD programs after sanctions were lifted." Saddam instructed the general directors of Iraqi state companies

to prevent key scientists from the pre-1991 WMD program from leaving the country. Saddam, as quoted by his presidential secretary, Abid Hamid Mahmud, also told scientists that they should "preserve plans in their minds" and "keep the brains of Iraq's scientists fresh."

Husayn Kamil — Saddam's son-in-law and minister of military industrialization — announced in a speech in 1995, to a large audience of WMD scientists at the Space Research Center in Baghdad, that WMD programs would be resumed and expanded as soon as U.N. inspectors left Iraq. Clearly, Saddam viewed inspectors and sanctions as little more than a temporary obstacle. In a written statement to the ISG, Saddam's presidential secretary stated that "if sanctions were lifted and there was no U.N. monitoring, then it was possible for Saddam to continue WMD activities and in my estimation it would have been done in total secrecy because he [Saddam] had learned from 1991."

HOW IMMINENT A THREAT?
The question remains as to how long it would have taken Saddam to reconstitute WMD programs once he had escaped the sanctions regime. We have already seen the answer, in the case of bioweapons: a matter of weeks. For the rest of his programs, estimates vary. Tariq Aziz said recently that "Saddam would have restarted his WMD programs, beginning with the nuclear program, after sanctions." Aziz estimated that Iraq would have a full WMD capability two years after sanctions ended. Saddam's minister of military industrialization, Abdullah Mullah al-Huwaysh, told the ISG that Saddam would have reconstituted all of the proscribed programs within five years: This would have included having a sizeable nuclear inventory on hand for immediate use. Huwaysh also stated that in response to a Saddam inquiry regarding how long it would take to start mass production of chemical weapons, he told the dictator that mustard-gas production could start within six months, but Sarin and VX would take a bit longer. Other WMD scientists claimed they had the materials and equipment to start mustard production in days, though such a fast start could damage the production equipment. By 2002, Iraq was already purchasing the precursor chemicals for the production of Sarin.

The ISG report quotes one senior official as stating that by successfully targeting scientists from Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, China, and several other countries, and coupling them with resident know-how, Saddam ensured that he could rebuild his entire WMD program within two years.

After 1991, Iraq's own resident WMD scientists were moved from government labs into universities: There they could carry out their work without fear of being targeted by Coalition aircraft or much bothered by U.N. inspectors. According to the ISG report, "Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research through its universities to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by U.N. sanctions." By 1997, the number of university instructors working on WMD-related projects increased from a handful to 3,300, while a further 700–800 were sent to WMD-related companies on a regular basis to help with technical problems.

As the billions in Oil for Food cash flowed in, Saddam "began investing his growing reserves of hard currency in his military-industrial complex, increasing access to dual-use items and materials, and creating numerous research and development programs." Between 1996 and 2002, the annual budget for the military-industrialization ministry — which was responsible for WMD development — increased over forty-fold; by the time the Coalition invaded, it had grown to 1 trillion Iraqi dinars. The military "technical research" projects at Iraqi universities had skyrocketed from about 40 projects in 1997 to 3,200; and the military-industrialization workforce had expanded by over 50 percent in just three years. Saddam's WMD program was ready to move into overdrive. Financial salvation led Saddam to start thinking again about nuclear weapons. In 1999 he met with his senior nuclear scientists and offered to provide them with whatever they needed, and immediately thereafter new funds began to flow to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). In 2001, Saddam mandated a large budget increase for the IAEC and increased the salaries of nuclear scientists tenfold. He also directed the head of the IAEC to keep nuclear scientists together, and instituted new privileges for IAEC scientists, while also investing

in numerous new projects. From 2001 onward, Saddam convened frequent meetings with the IAEC to highlight new achievements.

While money flowed back into the nuclear project, Saddam also maintained an extensive ballistic-missile program. He had previously told his ministers that he did not consider ballistic missiles to be WMD and that he would never accept missile-range restrictions. In 2002, Iraq began serial production of the Al Samoud II, a ballistic missile that violated U.N. range limits: Test firings reached 183 miles (294 km). By the time the Coalition invaded, 76 of these missiles had been produced and more were in the pipeline. Saddam also, in early 2002, directed the design and production of a missile with a range of 650 to 750 km, and told Huwaysh that he wanted it within six months. Huwaysh relates that when Saddam was informed that production would take longer, and that the twin Volga engines they could sneak through sanctions would reach only 550 km, he left the room "profoundly disappointed." The difference would keep Tel Aviv out of range. (These were not the only means Saddam pursued to strike at Israel: His al-Quds organization was building four UAVs — pilotless drones — that were to be turned over to Hamas for the express purpose of killing Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.)

What becomes clear, as example piles upon example in the ISG Report, is that this document that has been used by one side of the debate as proof that Saddam had no WMD capability actually says quite the opposite. The fact that no weapons stockpiles were found in Iraq does not mean that Iraq was not a threat. Accordin g to the report, Saddam could start producing deadly bioweapons within a week of deciding to do it; he retained the capability to produce smallpox; he had the capability to start producing chemical weapons such as mustard gas within days or at most weeks of deciding to do so; he was actively preparing to produce the nerve agents Sarin and VX; he was pouring cash into nuclear research; he was working on his ballistic-missile program even as the Coalition crossed the border into Iraq.

In short, the unholy trinity of the WMD world — bioweapons, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons — were either readily available or in the process of being created, along with the missiles required to deliver them anywhere in the region, when Coalition armor rolled into Baghdad. Three years later, we should still be very glad it did.

Mr. Lacey is a Washington-based writer focusing on defense and foreign-policy issues.

Camp Saddam
What we've learned about Iraq's terrorist training camps.

by Stephen F. Hayes
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REPRESENTATIVE John Murtha, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, appeared on NBC's Meet the Press on Sunday, March 19, to evaluate the war in Iraq on its third anniversary. Murtha, a decorated veteran and longtime hawk, has become a leading spokesman for his party on the war. And on the show, he spoke of what "probably worries me the most" about the U.S. effort in Iraq. The war, said Murtha, is a diversion from the global war on terror.

"There was no terrorism in Iraq before we went there," said Murtha. "None. There was no connection with al Qaeda, there was no connection with, with terrorism in Iraq itself." This is now the conventional wisdom on Iraq and terrorism. It is wrong.

A new study from the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, paints quite a different picture. According to captured documents cited in the study and first reported in THE WEEKLY STANDARD in January, the former Iraqi regime was training non-Iraqi Arabs in terrorist techniques.
Beginning in 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam opened its own paramilitary training camps for volunteers, graduating more than 7,200 "good men racing full with courage and enthusiasm" in the first year. Beginning in 1998, these camps began hosting "Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, 'the Gulf,' and Syria." It is not clear from available evidence where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were "sacrificing for the cause" went to ply their newfound skills. Before the summer of 2002, most volunteers went home upon the completion of training. But these camps were humming with frenzied activity in the months immediately prior to the war. As late as January 2003, the volunteers participated in a special training event called the "Heroes Attack." This training event was designed in part to prepare regional Fedayeen Saddam commands to "obstruct the enemy from achieving his goal and to support keeping peace and stability in the province."

Some of this training came under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service's "Division 27," which, according to the study, "supplied the Fedayeen Saddam with silencers, equipment for booby-trapping vehicles, [and] special training on the use of certain explosive timers. The only apparent use for all of this Division 27 equipment was to conduct commando or terrorist operations."

The publication of the Joint Forces Command study, called the "Iraqi Perspectives Project," coincides with the release by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of several hundred documents captured in postwar Iraq. There are many more to come. Some of the documents used to complete the study have been made public as part of the ODNI effort; others have not.

It is early, but the emerging picture suggests that the U.S. intelligence community underestimated Saddam Hussein's interest in terrorism. One U.S. intelligence official, identified only as an "IC analyst" in the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report on Iraq, summarized the intelligence community's view on Iraq and terrorism with disarming candor: "I don't think we were really focused on the CT [counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] going out and proactively conducting terrorist attacks. It wasn't until we realized that there was the possibility of going to war that we had to get a handle on that."

A report produced by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, signed by all members of the Intelligence Committee, Democrats and Republicans, offered this withering assessment of the intelligence community's work on Iraq and terrorism:

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no [redacted] sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism.

It wasn't just Iraq. "The CIA had no [redacted] credible reporting on the leadership of either the Iraqi regime or al Qaeda, which would have enabled it to better define a cooperative relationship, if any did in fact exist."

One document posted on the Internet by the government last week, after it was excerpted in the most recent issue of THE WEEKLY STANDARD, sheds additional light on the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. The internal Iraqi Intelligence memo was written at some point after January 1997 and described the efforts by the IIS to strengthen its relationships with four Saudi opposition groups. One of those groups was the "Reform and Advice Committee," run by Osama bin Laden. The New York Times reported that a Pentagon task force that studied the document concluded that it "appeared authentic." Last week, the investigative unit of ABC News summarized the document in a report.

A newly released prewar Iraqi document indicates that an official representative of Saddam Hussein's government met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan on February 19, 1995, after receiving approval from Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden asked that Iraq broadcast the lectures of Suleiman al Ouda, a radical Saudi preacher, and suggested "carrying out joint operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabia. According to the document, Saddam's presidency was informed of the details of the meeting on March 4, 1995, and Saddam agreed to dedicate a program for them on the radio. The document states that further "development of the relationship and cooperation between the two parties to be left according to what's open [in the future] based on dialogue and agreement on other ways of cooperation." The Sudanese were informed about the agreement to dedicate the program on the radio.

The report then states that "Saudi opposition figure" bin Laden had to leave Sudan in July 1996 after it was accused of harboring terrorists. It says information indicated he was in Afghanistan. "The relationship with him is still through the Sudanese. We're currently working on activating this relationship through a new channel in light of his current location," it states.

The summary was followed by an "Editor's Note" assessing the contents and meaning of the document.

This document is handwritten and has no official seal. Although contacts between bin Laden and the Iraqis have been reported in the 9/11 Commission report and elsewhere (e.g., the 9/11 report states "Bin Laden himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995) this document indicates the contacts were approved personally by Saddam Hussein.

It also indicates the discussions were substantive, in particular that bin Laden was proposing an operational relationship, and that the Iraqis were, at a minimum, interested in exploring a potential relationship and prepared to show good faith by broadcasting the speeches of al Ouda, the radical cleric who was also a bin Laden mentor.

The document does not establish that the two parties did in fact enter into an operational relationship. Given that the document claims bin Laden was proposing to the Iraqis that they conduct "joint operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabia, it is worth noting that eight months after the meeting--on November 13, 1995--terrorists attacked Saudi National Guard Headquarters in Riyadh, killing 5 U.S. military advisers. The militants later confessed on Saudi TV to having been trained by Osama bin Laden.

John Murtha's claim--that there was no connection "with terrorism in Iraq itself"--might come as a surprise to the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines. In early April 2003, they found a ten-acre terrorist training camp ten miles

outside of Baghdad. In an interview at the time with an embedded reporter from Stars & Stripes, Captain Aaron Robertson said: "We believe this is a training camp where Iraqis trained forces for the Palestine Liberation Front. This is what we would refer to as a sensitive site. This is clearly a terrorist training camp, the type Iraq claimed did not exist."

Reporter Mark Oliva described the camp in detail:
About a dozen reinforced concrete buildings line the front edge with a large parade field, concrete and steel obstacle course and even a shooting range within its confines. The camp has many modern amenities, including running and heated water, a large kitchen and electricity. Some buildings had ceiling fans and central air conditioning.

Said Captain Robertson: "It's much more sophisticated than those training camps we found in Afghanistan. It has a permanent obstacle course, which rivals anything our Marines have back at Camp Pendleton."

The Marines recovered training manuals in Arabic and English, along with rosters of Palestinians trained there. Last week, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released an Iraqi "intelligence-coded" memo that included lists of "Palestinians trained in Iraq." In fact, Saddam Hussein boasted of his support for Palestinian terrorists and provided the families of Palestinian "martyrs" rewards of $25,000. Another captured document details those payments.

Among the documents released last week was a translation of a three-page Iraqi Intelligence memo regarding a wave of attacks to be conducted by the Saddam Fedayeen. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence website states that it cannot verify the authenticity of the posted documents, but the document appears to be similar to one described in the "Iraqi Perspectives Study." The undated document was apparently prepared in response to orders given on May 5, 1999.

According to those orders, the Fedayeen Saddam was "to start planning from now on to perform special operations (assassinations/bombings) for the centers and the traitor symbols in the fields of (London/Iran/self-ruled areas) and for coordination with the Intelligence service to secure deliveries, accommodations, and target guidance." The execution of the plan would take place in several steps. After the IIS selected 50 "fedayeen martyrs," they were to receive training at an IIS school. Those who passed the tests would be assigned targets. "The first ten will work in the European field (London). The second ten will be working in the Iranian field. The third will be working in the self-ruled field."

How many of these attacks were executed, if any? And who, exactly, were the non-Iraqi Arabs trained in Iraq beginning in 1998? Did some of them return to Iraq before the war? Are we fighting them still?

That is a distinct possibility. In an interview last month, David Dunford, a career foreign service officer who served as the chief U.S. government liaison to the post-Saddam Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad, described a document his team found in the abandoned ministry building. It was "a list of jihadists, for want of a better word, coming into Iraq from Saudi Arabia before the war," he said, unprompted. "That suggested to me that Saddam was planning the insurgency before the war."

One key element in shaping the conventional wisdom on Iraq and terrorism was the 9/11 Commission Report, which found that Iraq and al Qaeda had no "collaborative operational relationship." But the day that report was released, Commissioner John Lehman offered this prophetic warning in an interview with THE WEEKLY STANDARD: "There may well be--and probably will be--additional intelligence coming in from interrogations and from analysis of captured records and so forth which will fill out the intelligence picture. This is not phrased as, nor meant to be, the definitive word on Iraqi Intelligence activities."

The "Iraqi Perspectives Project" has provided a look at Iraqi support for terrorism through its analysis of captured documents. The interrogation of the military commander of Salman Pak, a terrorist training camp outside of Baghdad, is said to add to this picture. And then there is the provocative "Summary of Evidence" on an Iraqi detainee at Guantanamo. Based in part on an interrogation of the detainee, it was produced by the U.S. government and released last year.

1. From 1987 to 1989, the detainee served as an infantryman in the Iraqi Army and received training on the mortar and rocket propelled grenades.

2. A Taliban recruiter in Baghdad convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan to join the Taliban in 1994.

3. The detainee admitted he was a member of the Taliban.

4. The detainee pledged allegiance to the supreme leader of the Taliban to help them take over all of Afghanistan.

5. The Taliban issued the detainee a Kalashnikov rifle in November 2000.

6. The detainee worked in a Taliban ammo and arms storage arsenal in Mazar-E-Sharif organizing weapons and ammunition.

7. The detainee willingly associated with al Qaeda members.

8. The detainee was a member of al Qaeda.

9. An assistant to Usama Bin Ladin paid the detainee on three separate occasions between 1995 and 1997.

10. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp in Darwanta, Afghanistan, where he received 1,000 Rupees to continue his travels.

11. From 1997 to 1998, the detainee acted as a trusted agent for Usama Bin Ladin, executing three separate reconnaissance missions for the al Qaeda leader in Oman, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

12. In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and British embassies with chemical mortars.

13. Detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Khudzar, Pakistan, in July 2002.

Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard.

Saddam's Terror Training Camps:
What the documents captured from the former Iraqi regime reveal--and why they should all be made public.

THE FORMER IRAQI REGIME OF Saddam Hussein trained thousands of radical Islamic terrorists from the region at camps in Iraq over the four years immediately preceding the U.S. invasion, according to documents and photographs recovered by the U.S. military in postwar Iraq. The existence and character of these documents has been confirmed to THE WEEKLY STANDARD by eleven U.S. government officials.

The secret training took place primarily at three camps--in Samarra, Ramadi, and Salman Pak--and was directed by elite Iraqi military units. Interviews by U.S. government interrogators with Iraqi regime officials and military leaders corroborate the documentary evidence. Many of the fighters were drawn from terrorist groups in northern Africa with close ties to al Qaeda, chief among them Algeria's GSPC and the Sudanese Islamic Army. Some 2,000 terrorists were trained at these Iraqi camps each year from 1999 to 2002, putting the total number at or above 8,000. Intelligence officials believe that some of these terrorists returned to Iraq and are responsible for attacks against Americans and Iraqis. According to three officials with knowledge of the intelligence on Iraqi training camps, White House and National Security Council officials were briefed on these findings in May 2005; senior Defense Department officials subsequently received the same briefing.

The photographs and documents on Iraqi training camps come from a collection of some 2 million "exploitable items" captured in postwar Iraq and Afghanistan. They include handwritten notes, typed documents, audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, floppy discs, and computer hard drives. Taken together, this collection could give U.S. intelligence officials and policymakers an inside look at the activities of the former Iraqi regime in the months and years before the Iraq war.

The discovery of the information on jihadist training camps in Iraq would seem to have two major consequences: It exposes the flawed assumptions of the experts and U.S. intelligence officials who told us for years that a secularist like Saddam Hussein would never work with Islamic radicals, any more than such jihadists would work with an infidel like the Iraqi dictator. It also reminds us that valuable information remains buried in the mountain of documents recovered in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past four years.

Nearly three years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, only 50,000 of these 2 million "exploitable items" have been thoroughly examined. That's 2.5 percent. Despite the hard work of the individuals assigned to the "DOCEX" project, the process is not moving quickly enough, says Michael Tanji, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official who helped lead the document exploitation effort for 18 months. "At this rate," he says, "if we continue to approach DOCEX in a linear fashion, our great-grandchildren will still be sorting through this stuff."

Most of the 50,000 translated documents relate directly to weapons of mass destruction programs and scientists, since David Kay and his Iraq Survey Group--who were among the first to analyze the finds--considered those items top priority. "At first, if it wasn't WMD, it wasn't translated. It wasn't exploited," says a former military intelligence officer who worked on the documents in Iraq.

"We had boxloads of Iraqi Intelligence records--their names, their jobs, all sorts of detailed information," says the former military intelligence officer. "In an insurgency, wouldn't that have been helpful?"

How many of those unexploited documents might help us better understand the role of Iraq in supporting transregional terrorists? How many of those documents might provide important intelligence on the very people--Baathists, former regime officials, Saddam Fedayeen, foreign fighters trained in Iraq--that U.S. soldiers are fighting in Iraq today? Is what we don't know literally killing us?

ON NOVEMBER 17, 2005, Michigan representative Pete Hoekstra wrote to John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence. Hoekstra is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He provided Negroponte a list of 40 documents recovered in postwar Iraq and Afghanistan and asked to see them. The documents were translated or summarized, given titles by intelligence analysts in the field, and entered into a government database known as HARMONY. Most of them are unclassified.

For several weeks, Hoekstra was promised a response. He finally got one on December 28, 2005, in a meeting with General Michael Hayden, principal deputy director of national intelligence. Hayden handed Hoekstra a letter from Negroponte that promised a response after January 1, 2006. Hoekstra took the letter, read it, and scribbled his terse response. "John--Unacceptable." Hoekstra told Hayden that he would expect to hear something before the end of the year. He didn't.

"I can tell you that I'm reaching the point of extreme frustration," said Hoekstra, in a phone interview last Thursday. His exasperated tone made the claim unnecessary. "It's just an indication that rather than having a nimble, quick intelligence community that can respond quickly, it's still a lumbering bureaucracy that can't give the chairman of the intelligence committee answers relatively quickly. Forget quickly, they can't even give me answers slowly."

On January 6, however, Hoekstra finally heard from Negroponte. The director of national intelligence told Hoekstra that he is committed to expediting the exploitation and release of the Iraqi documents. According to Hoekstra, Negroponte said: "I'm giving this as much attention as anything else on my plate to make this work."

Other members of Congress--including Rep. Dana Rohrabacher and Senators Rick Santorum and Pat Roberts--also demanded more information from the Bush administration on the status of the vast document collection. Santorum and Hoekstra have raised the issue personally with President Bush. This external pressure triggered an internal debate at the highest levels of the administration. Following several weeks of debate, a consensus has emerged: The vast majority of the 2 million captured documents should be released publicly as soon as possible.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has convened several meetings in recent weeks to discuss the Pentagon's role in expediting the release of this information. According to several sources familiar with his thinking, Rumsfeld is pushing aggressively for a massive dump of the captured documents. "He has a sense that public vetting of this information is likely to be as good an astringent as any other process we could develop," says Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita.

The main worry, says DiRita, is that the mainstream press might cherry-pick documents and mischaracterize their meaning. "There is always the concern that people would be chasing a lot of information good or bad, and when the Times or the Post splashes a headline about some sensational-sounding document that would seem to 'prove' that sanctions were working, or that Saddam was just a misunderstood patriot, or some other nonsense, we'd spend a lot of time chasing around after it."

This is a view many officials attributed to Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Steve Cambone. (Cambone, through a spokesman, declined to be interviewed.) For months, Cambone has argued internally against expediting the release of the documents. "Cambone is the problem," says one former Bush administration official who wants the documents released. "He has blocked this every step of the way." In what is perhaps a sign

of a changing dynamic within the administration, Cambone is now saying that he, like his boss, favors a broad document release.

Although Hoekstra, too, has been pushing hard for the quick release of all of the documents, he is currently focusing his efforts simply on obtaining the 40 documents he asked for in November. "There comes a time when the talking has to stop and I get the documents. I requested these documents six weeks ago and I have not seen a single piece of paper yet."

Is Hoekstra being unreasonable? I asked Michael Tanji, the former DOCEX official with the Defense Intelligence Agency, how long such a search might take. His answer: Not long. "The retrieval of a HARMONY document is a trivial thing assuming one has a serial number or enough keyword terms to narrow down a search [Hoekstra did]. If given the task when they walked in the door, one person should be able to retrieve 40 documents before lunch."

Tanji should know. He left DIA last year as the chief of the media exploitation division in the office of document exploitation. Before that, he started and managed a digital forensics and intelligence fusion program that used the data obtained from DOCEX operations. He began his career as an Army signals intelligence [SIGINT] analyst. In all, Tanji has worked for 18 years in intelligence and dealt with various aspects of the media exploitation problem for about four years.

We discussed the successes and failures of the DOCEX program, the relative lack of public attention to the project, and what steps might be taken to expedite the exploitation of the documents in the event the push to release all of the documents loses momentum.

TWS: In what areas is the project succeeding? In what areas is the project failing?

Tanji: The level of effort applied to the DOCEX problems in Iraq and Afghanistan to date is a testament to the will and work ethic of people in the intelligence community. They've managed to find a number of golden nuggets amongst a vast field of rock in what I would consider a respectable amount of time through sheer brute force. The flip side is that it is a brute-force effort. For a number of reasons--primarily time and resources--there has not been much opportunity to step back, think about a smarter way to solve the problem, and then apply various solutions. Inasmuch as we've won in Iraq and Saddam and his cronies are in the dock, now would be a good time to put some fresh minds on the problem of how you turn DOCEX into a meaningful and effective information-age intelligence tool.

TWS: Why haven't we heard more about this project? Aren't most of the Iraqi documents unclassified?

Tanji: Until a flood of captured material came rushing in after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom [in October 2001], DOCEX was a backwater: unglamorous, not terribly career enhancing, and from what I had heard always one step away from being mothballed.

The classification of documents obtained for exploitation varies based on the nature of the way they were obtained and by whom. There are some agencies that tend to classify everything regardless of how it was acquired. I could not give you a ratio of unclassified to classified documents.

In my opinion the silence associated with exploitation work is rooted in the nature of the work. In addition to being tedious and time-consuming, it is usually done after the shooting is over. We place a higher value on intelligence information that comes to us before a conflict begins. Confirmation that we were right (or proof that we were wrong) after the fact is usually considered history. That some of this information may be dated doesn't mean it isn't still valuable.

TWS: The project seems overwhelmed at the moment, with a mere 50,000 documents translated completely out of a total of 2 million. What steps, in your view, should be taken to expedite the process?

Tanji: I couldn't say what the total take of documents or other forms of media is, though numbers in the millions are probably not far off.

In a sense the exploitation process is what it is; you have to put eyes on paper (or a computer screen) to see what might be worth further translation or deeper analysis. It is a time-consuming process that has no adequate mechanical solution. Machine translation software is getting better, but it cannot best a qualified human linguist, of which we have very few.

Tackling the computer media problem is a lot simpler in that computer language (binary) is universal, so searching for key words, phrases, and the names of significant personalities is fairly simple. Built to deal with large-scale data sets, a forensic computer system can rapidly separate wheat from chaff. The current drawback is that the computer forensics field is dominated by a law-enforcement mindset, which means the approach to the digital media problem is still very linear. As most of this material has come to us without any context ("hard drives found in Iraq" was a common label attached to captured media) that approach means our great-grandchildren will still be dealing with this problem.

Dealing with the material as the large and nebulous data set that it is and applying a contextual appliqué after exploitation--in essence, recreating the Iraqi networks as they were before Operation Iraqi Freedom began-- would allow us to get at the most significant data rapidly for technical analysis, and allow for a political analysis to follow in short order. If I were looking for both a quick and powerful fix I'd get various Department of Energy labs involved; they're used to dealing with large data sets and have done great work in the data mining and rendering fields.

TWS: To read some of the reporting on Iraq, one might come away with the impression that Saddam Hussein was something of a benign (if not exactly benevolent) dictator who had no weapons of mass destruction and no connections to terrorism. Does the material you've seen support this conventional wisdom?

Tanji: I am subject to a nondisclosure agreement, so I would rather not get into details. I will say that the intelligence community has scraped the surface of much of what has been captured in Iraq and in my view a great deal more deep digging is required. Critics of the war often complain about the lack of "proof"--a term that I had never heard used in the intelligence lexicon until we ousted Saddam--for going to war. There is really only one way to obtain "proof" and that is to carry out a thorough and detailed examination of what we've captured.

TWS: I've spoken with several officials who have seen unclassified materials indicating the former Iraqi regime provided significant support--including funding and training--to transregional terrorists, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ansar al Islam, Algeria's GSPC, and the Sudanese Islamic Army. Did you see any of this?

Tanji: My obligations under a nondisclosure agreement prevent me from getting into this kind of detail.

Other officials familiar with the captured documents were less cautious. "As much as we overestimated WMD, it appears we underestimated [Saddam Hussein's] support for transregional terrorists," says one intelligence official.

Speaking of Ansar al Islam, the al Qaeda-linked terrorist group that operated in northern Iraq, the former high-ranking military intelligence officer says: "There is no question about the fact that AI had reach into Baghdad. There was an intelligence connection between that group and the regime, a financial connection between that group and the regime, and there was an equipment connection. It may have been the case that the IIS [Iraqi

Intelligence Service] support for AI was meant to operate against the [anti-Saddam] Kurds. But there is no question IIS was supporting AI."

The official continued: "[Saddam] used these groups because he was interested in extending his influence and extending the influence of Iraq. There are definite and absolute ties to terrorism. The evidence is there, especially at the network level. How high up in the government was it sanctioned? I can't tell you. I don't know whether it was run by Qusay [Hussein] or [Izzat Ibrahim] al-Duri or someone else. I'm just not sure. But to say Iraq wasn't involved in terrorism is flat wrong."

STILL, some insist on saying it. Since early November, Senator Carl Levin has been spotted around Washington waving a brief excerpt from a February 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency assessment of Iraq. The relevant passage reads: "Saddam's regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control."

Levin treats these two sentences as definitive proof that Bush administration officials knew that Saddam's regime was unlikely to work with Islamic fundamentalists and ignored the intelligence community's assessment to that effect. Levin apparently finds the passage so damning that he specifically requested that it be declassified.

I thought of Levin's two sentences last Wednesday and Thursday as I sat in a Dallas courtroom listening to testimony in the deportation hearing of Ahmed Mohamed Barodi, a 42-year-old Syrian-born man who's been living in Texas for the last 15 years. I thought of Levin's sentences, for example, when Barodi proudly proclaimed his membership in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and again when Barodi, dressed in loose-fitting blue prison garb, told Judge J. Anthony Rogers about the 21 days he spent in February 1982 training with other members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood at a camp in Iraq.

The account he gave in the courtroom was slightly less alarming than the description of the camp he had provided in 1989, on his written application for political asylum in the United States. In that document, Barodi described the instruction he received in Iraq as "guerrilla warfare training." And in an interview in February 2005 with Detective Scott Carr and special agent Sam Montana, both from the federal Joint Terrorism Task Force, Barodi said that the Iraqi regime provided training in the use of firearms, rocket-propelled grenades, and document forgery.

Barodi comes from Hama, the town that was leveled in 1982 by the armed forces of secular Syrian dictator Hafez Assad because it was home to radical Islamic terrorists who had agitated against his regime. The massacre took tens of thousands of lives, but some of the extremists got away.

Many of the most radical Muslim Brotherhood refugees from Hama were welcomed next door--and trained--in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Spanish investigators believe that Ghasoub Ghalyoun, the man they have accused of conducting surveillance for the 9/11 attacks, who also has roots in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, was trained in an Iraqi terrorist camp in the early 1980s. Ghalyoun mentions this Iraqi training in a 2001 letter to the head of Syrian intelligence, in which he seeks reentry to Syria despite his long affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Reaching out to Islamic radicals was, in fact, one of the first moves Saddam Hussein made upon taking power in 1979. That he did not do it for ideological reasons is unimportant. As Barodi noted at last week's hearing, "He used us and we used him."

Throughout the 1980s, including the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam cast himself as a holy warrior in his public rhetoric to counter the claims from Iran that he was an infidel. This posturing continued during and after the first Gulf war in 1990-91. Saddam famously ordered "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great) added to the Iraqi flag. Internally, he launched "The Faith Campaign," which according to leading Saddam Hussein scholar Am-

atzia Baram included the imposition of sharia (Islamic law). According to Baram, "The Iraqi president initiated laws forbidding the public consumption of alcohol and introduced enhanced compulsory study of the Koran at all educational levels, including Baath Party branches."

Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law who defected to Jordan in 1995, explained these changes in an interview with Rolf Ekeus, then head of the U.N. weapons inspection program. "The government of Iraq is instigating fundamentalism in the country," he said, adding, "Every party member has to pass a religious exam. They even stopped party meetings for prayers."

And throughout the decade, the Iraqi regime sponsored "Popular Islamic Conferences" at the al Rashid Hotel that drew the most radical Islamists from throughout the region to Baghdad. Newsweek's Christopher Dickey, who covered one of those meetings in 1993, would later write: "Islamic radicals from all over the Middle East, Africa and Asia converged on Baghdad to show their solidarity with Iraq in the face of American aggression." One speaker praised "the mujahed Saddam Hussein, who is leading this nation against the nonbelievers." Another speaker said, "Everyone has a task to do, which is to go against the American state." Dickey continued: Every time I hear diplomats and politicians, whether in Washington or the capitals of Europe, declare that Saddam Hussein is a "secular Baathist ideologue" who has nothing do with Islamists or with terrorist calls to jihad, I think of that afternoon and I wonder what they're talking about. If that was not a fledgling Qaeda itself at the Rashid convention, it sure was Saddam's version of it.

In the face of such evidence, Carl Levin and other critics of the Iraq war trumpet deeply flawed four-year-old DIA analyses. Shouldn't the senator instead use his influence to push for the release of Iraqi documents that will help establish what, exactly, the Iraqi regime was doing in the years before the U.S. invasion?

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Read All About It:
Prewar Iraqi documents are of
more than academic interest.

AT HIS CONFIRMATION HEARING FOR the new post of director of national intelligence, John Negroponte pledged to keep open lines of communication with Congress. He also explained that his experience as the first U.S. ambassador to Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would help him meet the director's responsibility to--in the president's words--"make sure that those whose duty it is to defend America have the information they need to make the right decisions."

Testifying in April 2005, Negroponte said:
I saw firsthand the savage depredations of terrorists and insurgents who oppose the birth of a new democracy. These are violent, determined adversaries who cannot be thwarted, captured or killed without close coordination between all of our intelligence assets--military and civilian, technical and human.

Consider that perspective and that pledge to Congress as you contemplate the government's inability to make meaningful use of the vast majority of the documents, computer hard drives, and other remnants of the Baathist regime acquired by U.S. forces in Iraq.

More than two months ago, for instance, Rep. Pete Hoekstra requested 40 mostly unclassified documents from postwar Iraq. In a separate request on November 18, 2005, Hoekstra and Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Pat Roberts wrote to Negroponte seeking the public release of "tens of thousands of boxes of documents captured since the 1991 Desert Storm operation." Two weeks ago, Negroponte told Hoekstra that he was spending a significant amount of his time in consideration of this request.

So I asked Negroponte's spokesman for a progress report. He declined to say when Hoekstra might get his documents. And he told me, "The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is presently evaluating Chairman Hoekstra's and Chairman Roberts's request for public access to Iraqi documents and an overall Iraq document exploitation effort."

In fairness, Negroponte's office--like the intelligence community as a whole--has faced an abundance of pressing issues in recent weeks: the NSA wiretapping policy, Syrian support for terrorism, the Iranian nuclear program, Russian manipulation of energy markets, North Korean intransigence. Still, two months is a long time for the House Intelligence chairman to wait for unclassified documents.

To date, some 50,000 of the 2 million "exploitable items" in the possession of the U.S. government have been examined by U.S. intelligence analysts, many of them only for their relevance to the search for weapons of mass destruction. (The numbers are the best guesses of several officials who have worked on the document exploitation project.) There remain, then, approximately 1,950,000 items whose contents are unknown to anyone in the U.S. government.

Some U.S. officials, including several at the Department of Defense, have argued in internal deliberations that the exploitation of these materials is best left to historians. What is the urgency, they ask, about translating and analyzing documents that come from a deposed regime?

There are at least two answers: to defeat the insurgency in Iraq; and to gain a better understanding of the relationship between rogue regimes and the transregional terrorists they use to extend their power.

"It's not about looking at the past to understand the past," says one former U.S. official who has worked on the document exploitation project. "It is about looking at the past to understand the present and to understand the future."

Consider: Among the vast intelligence take are boxes and boxes of files captured from the Baghdad headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. According to U.S. officials familiar with them, the Iraqi Intelligence documents include detailed personnel files of Iraqi intelligence officers and operatives. While some of these files have been exploited, many of them have not. It is a safe bet that today some of these Iraqis are coordinating the insurgency. Our failure to exploit the materials we have almost suggests we do not want to know all we can about the "terrorists and insurgents who oppose the birth of a new democracy."

A hypothetical: What if these files contain fingerprints of Iraqi intelligence officials or Saddam Fedayeen fighters? The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division runs something known as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System to track criminals in the United States. According to the FBI website, the database:

provides automated fingerprint search capabilities, latent searching capability, electronic image storage, and electronic exchange of fingerprints and responses, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. As a result of submitting fingerprints electronically, agencies receive electronic responses to criminal ten-print fingerprint submissions within two hours and within 24 hours for civil fingerprint submissions.

When insurgents attacked the al Rashid Hotel in Baghdad on October 26, 2003, 11 of their 40 rockets never fired. Within two hours of the attack, military ordnance specialists and FBI investigators examined those rockets and their makeshift launcher, lodged in the blue casing of an old generator. I don't know whether they pulled fingerprints from the unfired rockets. If they did, imagine how useful such a database would have been in the subsequent investigation of the incident.

And what about fingerprints found on unexploded roadside bombs? Or on weapons seized in late-night raids? Or in recently abandoned insurgent safehouses?

Other captured documents detail training that the Iraqi regime provided to thousands of Islamic terrorists in the years immediately preceding the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Rosters of trainees, I am told, include names, birthdates, countries of origin, guerrilla warfare skills, and dates of training. In some cases, the terrorist trainees posed for group photographs with their classmates, according to officials who have seen them.

Wouldn't this information be useful in interrogating captured foreign fighters? Or in breaking up terrorist cells? Or in understanding the structure of the foreign fighter network inside Iraq or the funding and recruitment mechanisms outside Iraq?

Exploiting this material would also help us better understand the nature of relationships between rogue regimes like Iraq and the transregional terrorists the regime supported. The Iraqi training of jihadists before the war is one example. Although a Pentagon official says such training was "something we had some knowledge of pre-war," U.S. intelligence analysts were largely skeptical of reports that Saddam's regime collaborated with Islamic radicals. Daniel Benjamin, a senior counterterrorism official on the National Security Council from 1994 to 1999, expressed this view in a New York Times op-ed on September 30, 2002:

Saddam Hussein has long recognized that al Qaeda and like-minded Islamists represent a threat to his regime. Consequently, he has shown no interest in working with them against their common enemy, the United States. This was the understanding of American intelligence in the 1990s.

What if that "understanding of American intelligence" was wrong? Consider just what we could have learned from public sources: Throughout the 1990s Saddam's rhetoric was increasingly the rhetoric of jihad; he hosted conferences for radical Islamists from throughout the world; he expanded relations with Islamic fundamentalists like Sudan's Hassan-al Turabi; his own son-in-law told the U.N. in 1995 that the regime was "instigating fundamentalism" throughout Iraq.

Among the terrorist groups whose members received training in Iraq was the GSPC (Salafist Group for Call and Combat) from Algeria. The GSPC was founded in the late 1990s after a split from another radical Islamist group known as the GIA (Armed Islamic Group). Both had ties to Saddam Hussein's regime and continue to have ties to Osama bin Laden. According to Stan Bedlington, a former senior analyst at the CIA's counterterrorism center, the GIA may have received Iraqi support in the months and years after the first Gulf war.

"We were convinced that money from Iraq was going to bin Laden, who was then sending it to places that Iraq wanted it to go," Bedlington told USA Today in December 2001. "There certainly is no doubt that Saddam Hussein had pretty strong ties to bin Laden while he was in Sudan, whether it was directly or through (Sudanese) intermediaries. We traced considerable sums of money going from bin Laden to the GIA in Algeria. We believed some of the money came from Iraq."

When I spoke with him later, Bedlington elaborated on the relationship, saying, "Osama bin Laden had established contact with the GIA. Saddam was using bin Laden to ship funds to his own contacts through the GIA."

So, according to Bedlington, the U.S. intelligence community had evidence that Saddam Hussein was actively supporting Islamic radicals in the early 1990s. And yet many of the intelligence analysts who studied the former Iraqi regime believed that such assistance was unlikely. For instance, a February 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency assessment--recently declassified and continually touted by Senator Carl Levin--concludes: "Saddam's regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control." Report after report suggested that Iraq would be unlikely to work with radical Islamists, and vice versa, because of their religious and ideological differences. (A notable exception was George Tenet's October 7, 2002, letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee, which stated: "Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al Qaeda, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action." But, again, Tenet's letter was the exception.)

Understanding what we got right and what we got wrong about Iraq's involvement in terrorism is more than an academic exercise. It is important as the U.S. intelligence community continues to analyze the roles of other rogue states--Syria, Iran, North Korea--in support of terror. Winning the fight in Iraq, meanwhile, requires making maximum use of intelligence resources at hand. Negroponte is surely right that our determined adversaries cannot be thwarted otherwise.

It may be that the director's consideration of the request to open the files from Iraq involves weighing whether documents with value in fighting the insurgency should be withheld. That's a fair point, though whatever such value these nearly three-year-old files have is presumably diminishing. All the more reason to get serious.

As for where to begin in exploiting the remaining documents, here's a suggestion: Hire a few thousand native-speakers of Arabic to read and categorize them, with careful cross-checking and U.S. supervision. How about hiring a few thousand Iraqis?

Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard.

Iraqi Security Forces in the Lead

Data as of: 6 March 2006

Mar 06

Baghdad Area

Component	Division HQs	Brigade HQs	Battalions
Iraqi Army	2	13	50
National Police	0	2	6
Total	2	15	56

Iraqi Army Lead
National Police Lead

Oct 05

Baghdad Area

Component	Division HQs	Brigade HQs	Battalions
Iraqi Army	1	4	23
National Police	0	2	6
Total	1	6	29

Majority Message

The Obstruction Continues: Democrats Block Real Debate On Immigration Reform

In A Partisan Fit, Reid Refuses To Allow Amendments Or Discussion

Yesterday, Minority Leader Harry Reid "Brought The Immigration Debate … To A Standstill." "Minority Leader Harry Reid brought the immigration debate on the Senate floor to a standstill Tuesday, refusing to allow votes on Republican amendments and instead forcing a procedural one to cut off debate on legislation that would allow illegal immigrants in the country to stay and earn citizenship. Over and over, Reid, D-Nev., objected to requests from Republicans to bring an amendment by Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., up for a vote." (Michael Sandler and Elizabeth B. Crowley, "Reid Brings Immigration Debate To Halt Despite Frist Call For Vote This Week," CQ.com, 4/4/06)

Reid Claimed He "[Does] Not Have To Explain In Any More Detail" Why He Opposes Open Debate On The Immigration Bill. REID: "At this stage, as a senator from the state of Nevada, I am not ready to move forward on the Kyl amendment. I do not have to explain in any more detail than I have why I do not want to move forward on it. I do not agree with the amendment. … I am going to do what I can to prevent a vote on it. I can't be more direct than that…" (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 4/4/06)

Instead Of Focusing On Results, Reid Issued Juvenile Taunts At Republicans: "They Are Getting A Taste Of Their Own Medicine." REID: "[W]e have had example after example in the last many years where there is legislation on this floor and we are not allowed to offer amendments. We offer them once in a while, we don't get votes on those, and we are not allowed to offer amendments. As my mother would say, they are getting a taste of their own medicine." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record , 4/4/06)

Reaction To Reid's Tirade: "Disrespectful," "Not Right," "Travesty"

Majority Leader Bill Frist: Democrat Obstruction "Disrespectful" To The Senate. FRIST: "I think it is disrespectful to the body itself because they are good amendments on both sides of the aisle that need to be debated and that need to come to a vote, and we are not allowed to do that. It is coming from the other side of the aisle. So I am very frustrated now, and I think colleagues on both sides of the aisle are. … [T]he other side is basically delaying, postponing, obstructing, and not allowing us to consider amendments, and that is all that we ask." (Sen. Bill Frist, Congressional Record, 4/4/06)

Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.): "Senator Reid Is Not Right On This One … He Should Not Do This." DOMENICI: "I tell you, I really cannot believe what I heard here today. I have been here 34 years, and I cannot believe what I have heard today. … [T]his bill [is] one of the most important bills confronting America. … And we have one Senator who has looked at the bill and said: It is good for our side of the aisle. We like it just like it is, and we don't care what the rules of the Senate are, there will be no amendments. We are in charge. … Senator Reid is not right on this one. He is right many times. This is not right. He is not right. He should not do this. The Senate should not let him do it." (Sen. Pete Domenici, Congressional Record, 4/4/06)

Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) Called Reid's Actions "A Travesty." SPECTER: "Mr. President, it would be a travesty of the procedures of the Senate to vote on this bill without giving Senators an opportunity to file amendments. It would just be – it is hard to find the right characterization – a travesty, unheard of, unthinkable, unprecedented … our procedure is to vote on amendments." (Sen. Arlen Specter, Congressional Record, 4/4/06)

Reid's Faulty Logic And False Complaints

One Of Reid's Justifications For Blocking Immigration Reform: He's Been Waiting "For Years" To Have A Vote On The Minimum Wage. REID: "It seems quite unusual that these crocodile tears are being poured out now because amendments aren't being considered. We have waited for years to have an amendment considered on raising the minimum wage." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 4/4/06)

There Have Been Four Senate Votes On The Minimum Wage Over The Past Thirteen Months. (CQ Vote #26, 3/7/05; CQ Vote #27, 3/7/05; CQ Vote #257, 10/19/05; CQ Vote #258, 10/19/05)

Reid Used To Sing A Different Tune On Immigration Reform

In 1994, Reid Wrote Legislation That Would Have Denied Immigrant Status To Anyone Who Had Violated Immigration Laws. (S. 1923, Introduced 3/10/94)

Reid Describes His Legislation: "The provisions in my new bill would do the following: … It prohibits violators of immigration laws from filing for immigrant status. And it eliminates administrative discretion to waive grounds for excluding criminal aliens." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 3/10/94)

Reid Said "No Sane Country" Would Offer A Reward For Being An Illegal Immigrant. REID: "If making it easy to be an illegal alien is not enough, how about offering a reward for being an illegal immigrant? No sane country would do that, right? Guess again. If you break our laws by entering this country without permission and give birth to a child, we reward that child with U.S. citizenship and guarantee full access to all public and social services this society provides. And that is a lot of services. Is it any wonder that two-thirds of the babies born at taxpayer expense in county-run hospitals in Los Angeles are born to illegal alien mothers?" (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 9/20/93)

In 1993, Reid Said "Current [Immigration] Laws And Regulations Are Unworkable." REID: "It is clear to everyone that our current laws and regulations are unworkable. I hope it is clear because it is to those I have discussed this with. As one colleague told me, the more you learn about our immigration process, the bigger mess you see it is. It is time to begin cleaning up that mess." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 9/20/93)

Reid Decried Immigration Laws That Allowed "Cheaters … To Prosper." REID: "Penalties for violation of our immigration laws also generally are quite weak and provide little deterrent effect. … Under our immigration laws, cheaters tend to prosper." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 3/10/94)

Reid Called The Growth Of Immigration In The 1980s A "Wretched Excess." REID: "When history is written, the decade of the eighties will be remembered as a decade of wretched excess and, true to form, immigration has been one of those excesses. As we focus on reining in many of the other excesses in the preceding decade, we must not overlook immigration." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 9/20/93)

In 1993, Reid Compared U.S. Immigration Laws To Japan's More Restrictive Policies, Adding: "You Wonder Why Their Economy Is More Stable Than Ours." REID: "Compare [U.S. immigration policy], for example, to Japan. I am not defending their immigration policy. I do not like it. They do not have any immigration basically. And you wonder why their economy is more stable than ours." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 9/20/93)

Reid Questioned Whether 1993-Era Immigration Levels Would Unite Or Divide America. REID: "Can the melting pot absorb and absorb and assimilate and assimilate people arriving at this rate? Or will we become increasingly isolated and alienated from one another?" (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 9/20/93)

Reid Claimed A "Disproportionate Number Of Crimes Are Being Committed By Immigrants, Many Of Whom Are Here Illegally." REID: "The issue of crime and public safety is the No. 1 concern of most Americans. Immigration clearly is related to our crime problem. A quarter of all felons in Federal prisons are not even citizens of our country. Unfortunately this shocking number suggests that a disproportionate number of crimes are being committed by immigrants, many of whom are here illegally." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 3/10/94)

In 1994, Reid Seemed To Feel Amnesty And Other "Massive Legalization Programs" Had Not Solved The Problem Of Illegal Immigration. REID: "In 1986, Congress gave amnesty and legal status to 3.1 million individuals not lawfully residing here, and in 1990, it granted 'temporary protected status' – which tends to be de facto permanent legal residence – to hundreds of thousands of others who did not play by the rules. Even after Congress has passed massive legalization programs, millions of individuals do not lawfully reside in the United States today, and many more continue to cheat the rules and continue to enter unlawfully." (Sen. Harry Reid, Congressional Record, 3/10/94)

Majority Message

Floor Excerpts
April 5, 2006

On Democratic Obstruction Of The Border Security Bill:

Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN): "We've been here since last Wednesday on a bill, doing what the American people expect, and that is identifying a problem, discussing a problem, putting together amendments in order to take a bill to the floor and therefore improve a bill. And yet, we're being denied that basic opportunity." (Floor Statement, 4/5/06)

Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA): "We are at an impasse. The rules of the Senate have been used to block meaningful consideration of the pending legislation. … I think it is a very good bill. But under our rules, it is subject to being amended, and the senators who wish to offer amendments are being stymied by the imposition of technical rules being imposed by the Democrats, led by Senator Reid, the Democratic leader. That's the brutal fact of life." (Floor Statement, 4/5/06)

Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-KS): "There are 33,200 reasons why we should move and why we should reach accommodation if we possibly can to pass a good immigration reform bill. That's 33,200 people that will be coming across our borders during the two weeks that we'll be in recess … As Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I know how this affects our national security."(Floor Statement, 4/5/06)

Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): "[T]he fact is that the Senate has not moved forward with debate and amendments and votes. The United States Senate is supposed to do that. That's what this body is supposed to be all about. … We should not be afraid to debate these issues and vote on them." (Floor Statement, 4/5/06)

Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ): "The Minority Whip … noted that there were about 200 amendments that had been filed, and his point was that it's hard to figure out which ones to consider. And my point is this: if anything is certain, it is that if you don't start, you don't consider any of them. … To complain that there are 200 amendments out there and we just don't know where to start … and that's why we're stopping you from voting on any of them doesn't wash." (Floor Statement, 4/5/06)

Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS): "This is a big issue, an important issue. This is about who we are and who we are going to be. Thank goodness the Senate is living up to the expectations our forefathers had for us to take up a tough issue, have a debate, have amendments … All of a sudden people say we can't have votes, we can't have amendments. Hallelujah." (Floor Statement, 4/5/06)

Topline Message Points on Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Securing America's Freedom, Homeland and Borders

<u>Comprehensive immigration reform must begin with securing our borders.</u>

- Our national security depends on border security. We need to know who is coming into the country, where they are from, and what they are doing here.

  - No reform of the immigration system will be successful unless Congress makes a definitive commitment to ensure that the agencies responsible for stopping illegal immigrants have the resources that they need to get the job done.

- Without properly securing our borders, we remain vulnerable to those who may enter our country undetected – criminals, terrorists, and other individuals who may mean harm to Americans.

- We must ensure our border patrol agents have the resources, the manpower, and the technology to do their jobs.

<u>America is a nation of immigrants. We are also a nation of laws.</u>

- America has been built on the hard work and innovation of immigrants. Our country thrives on the new ideas and fresh energy that our many legal immigrant groups continue to bring. It is part of what makes our country great.

  - America will remain a nation of immigrants, regardless of what we do in legislation because of the number of legal immigrants that we welcome to our shores every year.
  - We invited over 1 million new permanent immigrants last year – much more than any other nation. And we accept over 6 million applications for immigration benefits each year.

- But America has also been founded on respect for rule of law, and those who enter our country illegally disrespect our laws, and take advantage of our generous immigration system.

- We must find a comprehensive solution that acknowledges the important contributions legal immigrants make to our country without rewarding illegal behavior.

  - We must remove the magnet of illegal employment and enable employers to determine whether their workers are legal. All employers must be held accountable.

<u>Comprehensive immigration reform must reflect America's best values – fairness, opportunity, and respect for rule of law.</u>

- Comprehensive immigration reform must provide a temporary worker program that unites willing employers with willing temporary workers when no U.S. citizen is available to do the job.

- We must find a way to address those individuals already here illegally in a way that is humane and realistic, but does not provide amnesty.

o As a critical part of controlling future illegal immigration, there must be a temporary program that addresses the illegal immigrants already here.

o A viable temporary worker program – when we know who has entered the country, who their employer is, and where they are working – will guard against abusive labor practices.

o Citizenship is an incredible privilege and millions have patiently waited their turn to legally immigrate. We must find a way to address those individuals already here illegally, in a way that is humane and realistic but does not allow people to "cut in line."

• Securing our borders and eliminating illegal employment will control illegal immigration. But no solution is complete unless we deal with the illegal immigrants already living here. True reform must bring those workers out of the shadows, but amnesty is not an option.

Source: Senate Republican Conference, War on Terror Working Group