
World Financial Cycles and Global Trade

Yan Bai Minjie Deng Chang Liu Gabriel Mihalache
U of Rochester, Simon Fraser U Stony Brook U Ohio State
NBER, and CEPR


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The Role of Trade Costs for EM Spreads



■ Timeline of episodes from "A Neoclassical Model of the World Financial Cycle," Bai-Kehoe-Lopez-Perri 2025: global financial cycle view vs traditional view

The Role of Trade Costs for EM Spreads



- Timeline of episodes from "A Neoclassical Model of the World Financial Cycle," Bai-Kehoe-Lopez-Perri 2025: global financial cycle view vs traditional view
- Our work: a role for global trade costs
 - 2000–2007: mean & dispersion spreads ↓ + trade integration
 - After 2016: mean & dispersion spreads ↑ + trade barriers ↑

World Financial Cycles and Global Trade

- A world GE model with SOEs' sovereign default risk
 - Rep. advanced economy (AE) and unit mass of emerging markets (SOE)
 - Gross trade flows: all import final goods from all, use as intermediates
 - Global iceberg trade cost
 - Sovereign default setting for SOEs: incomplete markets, default, haircuts

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- **Mechanism**: Global trade cost shock ↑
 - Import cost $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ output $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ sovereign default risk \uparrow (same across countries)
 - Real depreciation ↑ ⇒ borrowing ↓ ⇒ borrowers lower imports and output by more ⇒ sovereign default risk ↑ more (heterogeneous across countries)

Plan for Today

- Numerically, show heterogeneous impact of global trade shock
 - Fixed exogenous distribution of productivity and financial flows
- Empirically, when trade costs \uparrow , greater trade deficits \Rightarrow greater output \downarrow
 - Panel local projection with heterogeneous effects
 - Alternative measures of trade cost, sample selection, etc.
- Dynamic world equilibrium (ongoing)
 - Endogenize government default and borrowing decisions
 - Clear all financial and goods' markets
 - Quantify impact of trade shock on trend & dispersion of spreads

Related Work

■ Sovereign default

Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Aguiar and Gopinath (2006); Arellano (2008); Cuadra et al. (2010); Yue (2010); Hatchondo et al. (2016); Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012, 2015); Na et al. (2018), Aguiar et al. (2016), Aguiar and Amador (2023), etc.

Introduce trade frictions as a driver of dynamics in sovereign spreads

■ Global financial cycles

Longstaff et al. (2011); Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020, 2022); Morelli et al. (2022); Gilchrist et al. (2022); Bai et al. (2024), etc.

Aggregate trade shocks impact trend and time-varying dispersion of spreads

■ World general equilibrium models with international financial markets

Bai and Zhang (2012); Morelli et al. (2022); Alessandria et al. (2024), etc.

World GE model of interactions between gross trade and limited enforcement

■ Trade costs consequences of sovereign defaults

Rose (2005); Borensztein and Panizza (2010); Martinez and Sandleris (2011); Mendoza and Yue (2012); Zymek (2012); Serfaty (2021); Andreasen et al. (2024); Alessandria et al. (2024), etc.

Impact of sovereign defaults on trade, through global equilibrium effects

A Model of Gross Trade Flows and Default

Model

- World general equilibrium model: a continuum of small open economies (SOE) and a stand-in advanced economy (AE)
- Countries
 - Produce using labor and a composite intermediate good
 - Import intermediates from all countries, export final goods
 - Iceberg trade costs
- Imperfect international financial markets
 - Centralized borrowing and default decision
 - Sovereign default ⇒ haircut + productivity loss (no market exclusion)
- Idiosyncratic productivity shock + global trade cost shock τ

Individual Country: Production

■ Each country *i* produces a tradable differentiated good with labor, domestic intermediate *H*, and imported intermediate *M*

$$Q_{it}=z_{it}L_{it}^{\alpha}G_{it}^{\theta},$$

where

$$G_{it} = \left(\omega H_{it}^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + (1-\omega) M_{it}^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}$$

■ Firms take prices as given and solve

$$\max_{L_{it},H_{it},M_{it}} \{ p_{it}Q_{it} - w_{it}L_{it} - p_{it}H_{it} - p_{t}^{M}\tau_{t}M_{it} \},$$

Individual Country: Households

■ A representative household's optimization problem

$$\max_{\{C_{it}, L_{it}\}} \mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\left(C_{it} - \chi \frac{L_{it}^{1+1/\nu}}{1+1/\nu}\right)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$
s.t. $p_{it}C_{it} = w_{it}L_{it} + T_{it} + \pi_{it}$,

- \blacksquare T_{it} : lump sum tax or transfer from government
- π_{it} : profits of the representative firm
- Optimal GHH labor supply: $\chi L_{it}^{1/\nu} = \frac{w_{it}}{p_{it}}$

Individual Country: The Sovereign

- Country i issues claims to b_{it+1} units of long-term defaultable bonds at t
 - Sequence of payments starting from t + 1: κ , $\kappa(1 \delta)$, $\kappa(1 \delta)^2$,...
 - \bullet δ : controls bond duration
- The sovereign decides whether to default and future bond position b_{it+1}
 - Default $(d_{it} = 1) \Rightarrow immediate$ debt reduction, $b_{it} \rightarrow \phi b_{it}$, with $\phi < 1$
 - Cost: utility cost (ζ) + productivity loss ($\tilde{z}_{it} = h(z_{it}, d_{it}) \leq z_{it}$)
- Budget constraint

$$T_{it} = -\kappa \phi^{d_{it}} b_{it} + q_t(z_{it}, b_{it+1}) \left[b_{it+1} - (1-\delta) \phi^{d_{it}} b_{it} \right]$$

Global Intermediate Producer

■ Competitive global intermediaries assemble goods from all countries:

$$Y_t = \left(X_{\mathrm{AE},t}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \int_0^1 X_{it}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} di\right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$$

Optimization

$$\max_{X_{\text{AE},t},\{X_{it}\}} p_t^M Y_t - \int_0^1 p_{it} \tau_t X_{it} di - \underbrace{p_{\text{AE},t}}_{\rightarrow 1} \tau_t X_{\text{AE},t}$$

⇒ demand function and price index for global intermediate

$$X_{it} = \left(rac{ au_t p_{it}}{p_t^M}
ight)^{-rac{1}{\eta}} Y_t, \qquad p_t^M = au_t \left(p_{ ext{AE},t} + \int_0^1 p_{it}^{1-\eta} di
ight)^{rac{1}{1-\eta}}$$

Bond Pricing

- Intl' lenders: risk neutral and competitive, fully committed
 - $b_{it+1} \le 0$: Country i holds long-term bonds issued by international lenders
 - $b_{it+1} > 0$: Lenders hold long-term risky bonds issued by country i
- Introduce short-term, gross risk-free rate R_t
- Equilibrium bond prices:

$$q_{it} = \begin{cases} q_{it}^{rf}, & \text{if } b_{it+1} \leq 0\\ \frac{1}{R_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\phi^{d_{it+1}} \left(\kappa + (1 - \delta) q_{it+1} \right) \right], & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

with

$$q_t^{rf} = \frac{1}{R_t} \left(\kappa + (1 - \delta) q_{t+1}^{rf} \right)$$

Static Private Trade Equilibrium

Given the trade cost τ_t and distribution $\Omega_t(\tilde{z}_{it}, T_{it})$, the static-private equilibrium allocations $\{C_{it}, L_{it}, Q_{it}, X_{it}, M_{it}\}$, prices $\{w_{it}, p_{it}, p_t^M\}$ satisfy the following i

- Firms' optimization conditions on labor and intermediate goods, for each *i*
- \blacksquare Households optimizes, for each i
- Global intermediate producers optimize
- lacksquare Goods market clearing and balance of payment, for each i

$$Q_{it} = C_{it} + H_{it} + \tau_t X_{it},$$
 $T_{it} + \underbrace{p_{it} \tau_t X_{it}}_{\text{Exports}} = \underbrace{p_t^M \tau_t M_{it}}_{\text{Imports}}$

lacksquare Global intermediate goods clearing, $Y_t = au_t \left(M_{{
m AE},t} + \int_0^1 M_{it} di
ight)$

Dynamic World Equilibrium

■ Given aggregate state variable $S_t = (\tau_t, \Omega_t(z_{jt}, b_{jt}))$, government i solves

$$\begin{split} V_{it}(z_{it},b_{it},S_{t}) &= \max_{d_{it} \in \{0,1\}} \left\{ d_{it} \left[W_{it}(\tilde{z}_{it},\phi b_{it},S_{t}) - \zeta \right] + (1-d_{it}) W_{it}(z_{it},b_{it},S_{t}) \right\} \\ W_{it}(z_{it},b_{it},S_{t}) &= \max_{b_{it+1}} \left\{ u(C_{it},L_{it}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} V(z_{it+1},b_{it+1},S_{t+1}) \right\} \\ \text{s.t. } T_{it} &= -\kappa b_{it} + q_{t}(z_{it},b_{it+1}) \left[b_{it+1} - (1-\delta)b_{it} \right], \\ C_{it} &= \mathcal{C}_{it}(z_{it},T_{it},\Omega_{t},\tau_{t}), \quad L_{it} &= \mathcal{L}_{it}(z_{it},T_{it},\Omega_{t},\tau_{t}), \\ \Omega_{t+1} &= H_{\Omega}(\Omega_{t},\tau_{t}) \end{split}$$

■ Bonds market clearing, determining R_t : $\int_0^1 q_{it}b_{it+1}di + q_{AE,t}b_{AE,t+1} = 0$

Differential Effects of Global Trade Shocks

Static Private Equilibrium

Given $\{\tau, Y, p^M\}$, (z, T) for each country, $\{C, L, H, M, X, Q, p\}$ solve

$$X = \left(\frac{\tau p}{p^M}\right)^{-\eta} Y \qquad \text{(export demand)}$$

$$\alpha \frac{Q}{L} = \chi L^{1/\nu} \qquad \text{(labor market)}$$

$$\frac{\tau p^M}{p} = \theta (1 - \omega) Q G^{\frac{1}{\gamma} - 1} M^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \qquad \text{(M demand)}$$

$$1 = \theta \omega Q G^{\frac{1}{\gamma} - 1} H^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \qquad \text{(H demand)}$$

$$Q = z L^{\alpha} G(H, M)^{\theta} \qquad \text{(gross output)}$$

$$C = Q - H - \tau X \qquad \text{(domestic resources)}$$

$$T + \tau p X = \tau p^M M \qquad \text{(BoP)}$$

Mechanism: Effects of Trade Cost Shocks

Following a trade cost shock, $\tau \uparrow$,

- Intermediate price p^M increase (same across countries)
 - \Rightarrow import cost $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ output \downarrow , price $p \uparrow$
- Heterogeneous effects

Higher *T*, transfer in domestic goods $T/p \downarrow (\text{since } p \uparrow)$

- \Rightarrow either lower imports or increase export
- \Rightarrow larger fall in Q or smaller increase in p

$$\underbrace{\frac{T}{p}}_{\text{in domestic}} + \underbrace{\tau \left(\frac{\tau p}{p^M}\right)^{-\eta} Y}_{\text{Exports}} = \underbrace{(1-\theta)Q}_{\text{Imports}},$$

■ Higher *T* (countries with large deficit) has a larger fall in output


Simple Numerical Illustration

■ Fix standard parameter values:

$$\alpha = 0.4$$
, $\theta = 0.42$, $\chi = 1.0$, $\nu = 0.72$, $\eta = \gamma = 3$, $\omega = 0.6$


- Equilibria with $\tau \in [1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5]$
 - Assume T_i are exogenous, (z_i, T_i) jointly normally distributed
 - Positive T_i : a net borrower (net importer)

Global Trade Shock: Average Effect




(h) Imported intermediate M (i) Domestic intermediate H

Global Trade Shock: Average Effect



■ Higher trade cost \Rightarrow increase in price, fall in GDP and consumption


Global Trade Shock: Differential Effect



- Positive $T \Rightarrow$ a country is a net borrower
- Higher trade cost hurt borrowers' output and consumption by more

$$C = \underbrace{\theta Q}_{\text{GDP}} + T/p$$

Global Trade Shock: Differential Effect



Alternative Bond Denomination

■ **Benchmark:** bond pay in terms of *AE good*, $p_{AE} = 1$

$$\frac{1}{p}T + \tau \left(\frac{\tau p}{p^M}\right)^{-\eta} Y = (1 - \theta)Q$$

High $\tau \to p \uparrow \to T/p$ falls if T > 0 (borrower) $\Rightarrow Q$ falls by *more*

■ **Alternative:** bond pay in terms of *global intermediate bundle*

$$\frac{p^{M}}{p}T + \tau \left(\frac{\tau p}{p^{M}}\right)^{-\eta} Y = (1 - \theta)Q$$

High $\tau \to p/p^M$ falls $\to \frac{p^M}{p}T$ increases if $T > 0 \Rightarrow Q$ falls by less

Evidence on Differential Effect of Trade Shocks

Testing the Differential Effect of τ


- 12 Emerging markets, 2000Q1–2023Q3
 - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, and Turkey
 - EMBI spreads (working on CDS)
- Panel Local Projection, Jorda (2005)
 - Heterogeneous effects, Cloyne-Jorda-Taylor (2023)
- Alternative measures of trade cost shock

Heterogeneous Local Projection

$$Y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_{low}^{h} \left(TC_{t-1} \times \mathcal{I}_{t-1}^{low} \right) + \alpha_{high}^{h} \left(TC_{t-1} \times \mathcal{I}_{t-1}^{high} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{P} \gamma_{j}^{h} W_{j,t-1} + \delta_{i}^{h} + u_{i,t+h}, \quad h = 0, \dots, H$$


- Y_{it} : outocome, HP-cycle of GDP or spreads, for country i at time t
- *TC_t*: trade cost measure, (today) naive PC of trade-GDP ratio or GFI-Trade index
- \mathcal{I}_{t-1}^{low} (\mathcal{I}_{t-1}^{high}): dummy, 1 if trade deficit (M-X)/GDP lower (higher) than mean value
- $W_{j,t-1}$: other controls, including lags of outcome variable
- \bullet δ_i^h : country fixed effect

Trade Cost Proxies



- (Today) we consider two measures of global trade costs
 - First principal component of *gross trade-to-GDP* ratio (different samples)
 - The Geopolitical Fragmentation Index of Fernandez-Villaverde, Mineyama, Song


Trade-to-GDP Proxy Results



Consistent with theory:

- Significantly greater GDP drop in higher deficit countries (first 3 quarters)
- Significantly higher spread increases in higher deficit countries (throughout)

GFI-Trade Results



Consistent with theory:


- Significantly greater GDP drop in higher deficit countries (throughout)
- Significantly higher spread increases in higher deficit countries (throughout)

First Pass at the Full Model

A First Exercise in the Full Model


- One-time "MIT" transitory shock to global trade cost τ
- Representative Advanced Economy keeps $B_{AE,t} = \overline{B} < 0$ constant, saver
- Time paths $\{p_t^M, Y_t, R_t\}$ to clear markets
- Keep track of Ω_t distribution for SOE-level outcomes, Q, C, \dots
- Caveat: not calibrated, qualitative patterns only today

Full Model: A Transitory Trade Cost Shock



Expensive imported intermediates, depressed global demand. High safe rates discourage borrowing.

Full Model: Outcomes




Increased level and dispersion of spreads, fanning out. Low output and consumption, but *lower* dispersion.

Summary

- We build a world GE model with gross trade and sovereign default
- Effects of trade cost shock
 - On average, output decrease due to higher import cost
 - Countries with large deficit have greater fall in output, consistent with empirics
- Quantitative analysis of dynamic world equilibrium (ongoing)
 - IRFs to unexpected trade cost shocks: WTO, Trump trade war
 - Feed dynamics of trade cost: how much spread variance explained by global trade shock?

Appendix


Trade-to-GDP Proxy Results, TC_t timing



Consistent with theory:

- Significantly greater GDP drop in higher deficit countries (first 4 periods)
- Significantly higher spread increases in higher deficit countries (throughout)

GFI-Trade Results, TC_t timing



Consistent with theory:

- Significantly greater GDP drop in higher deficit countries (throughout)
- Significantly higher spread increases in higher deficit countries (throughout)