### Sovereign Partial Default in Continuous Time

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2023 A. Stockman University of Rochester Alumni Conference





#### What We Do

- Continuous time analysis and solution methods for the *partial default* quantitative theory of Arellano, Mateos-Planas, and Ríos-Rull (2023, JPE)
- Partial default theory consistent with...
  - endogenous length of default crisis,
  - exiting the crisis with a high debt level compared to outset, arrears,
  - implicit seniority among creditors, Schleg, Trebesch, and Wright (2019)
- Computation with
  - Upwind finite difference scheme, Achdou et al. (2022, ReStud)
  - Deep neural network, Maliar, Maliar, and Winant (2021, JME)

#### Partial Default

- Sovereign chooses with discretion what share of the *due debt service payment* to make. Default on flow, not on stock.
- The share of payment not made accumulates as *arrears*, extra debt.
- No "market exclusion," sovereign can issue new bond units at all times, at prices at which lenders break even in expectation.
- Convex penalty function of default, with discontinuity at 0. *Inaction region*.

#### In discrete time:

$$c_t = \phi(\mathbf{d}_t)z_t - (1 - \mathbf{d}_t)b_t + q_t\ell_t$$
$$b_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)b_t + \kappa \mathbf{d}_t b_t + \ell_t$$

# The Sovereign

$$\begin{split} V(B_0, z_0) &= \max_{\{c_t, d_t\}_{t \in [0, \infty]}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left\{ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad c_t &= \phi \left( d_t, z_t \right) e^{z_t} - \left( 1 - d_t \right) \left( \delta + \lambda \right) B_t + q_t \ell_t \\ \frac{dB_t}{dt} &= -\delta B_t + \kappa \left( \delta + \lambda \right) d_t B_t + \ell_t \end{split}$$

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$$\frac{dB_t}{dt} = -\delta B_t + \kappa \left( \delta + \lambda \right) d_t B_t + \ell_t$$

#### Consumption $c_t$ :

- GDP:  $\phi(d_t, z_t) e^{z_t}$
- Debt service payment (minus):  $(1 d_t) (\delta + \lambda) B_t$
- New issuance proceeds:  $q_t \ell_t$

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#### Drift of debt $dB_t/dt$ :

- Maturing debt (minus):  $\delta B_t$
- Arrears:  $\kappa (\delta + \lambda) d_t B_t$
- New issuance:  $\ell_t$

### The Sovereign: HJB and FOCs

$$\rho V(B,z) = \max_{c,d \in [0,1]} \left\{ u(c) + S(B,z,c,d,q) V_B(B,z) - \mu z V_z(B,z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} V_{zz}(B,z) \right\}$$
(1)
$$S(B,z,c,d,q) \equiv \frac{c - \phi(d,z) e^z}{a(B,z)} + \left[ \left( \frac{1}{a(B,z)} + \left( \kappa - \frac{1}{a(B,z)} \right) d \right) (\delta + \lambda) - \delta \right] B$$

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$$S(B,z,c,d,q) \equiv \frac{c - \phi(d,z) e^{z}}{q(B,z)} + \left[ \left( \frac{1}{q(B,z)} + \left( \kappa - \frac{1}{q(B,z)} \right) d \right) (\delta + \lambda) - \delta \right] B$$

FOCs:

$$c^*(B,z) = u_c^{-1} \left( -\frac{V_B(B,z)}{q(B,z)} \right)$$
 (2)

$$d_{\text{int}}^*(B,z) = \min\left\{1, \, \phi_d^{-1}\left(\left(1 - \kappa \, q(B,z)\right)\left(\delta + \lambda\right) \frac{B}{e^z}, \, z\right)\right\} \tag{3}$$

#### **International Lenders**

$$q_t = \mathbb{E}_t \int_t^\infty e^{-(r+\delta)(s-t) + \int_t^s \kappa(\delta+\lambda) d_\tau d\tau} (\delta+\lambda) (1-d_s) d_s$$

$$\xi(d^*(B,z))q(B,z) = (1 - d^*(B,z))(\lambda + \delta) + \tilde{S}(B,z)q_B(B,z) - \mu z q_z(B,z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}q_{zz}(B,z)$$
(4)

With,

- Effective discount rate, inclusive of arrears:  $\xi(d) \equiv r + \delta \kappa(\delta + \lambda)d$
- Equilibrium drift of debt:  $\tilde{S}(B,z)$

### Equilibrium

#### A Markov Perfect Equilibrium consist of

- the sovereign's value function V(B, z),
- policy functions for consumption and default,  $c^*(B, z)$  and  $d^*(B, z)$ , and
- the bond price function q(B, z),

#### such that

- given q and V, the policies satisfy FOCs (2) and (3),
- $\blacksquare$  given q and policies, the sovereign's value satisfies the HJB equation (1), and
- given policy functions, the bond price satisfies equation (4).

#### Calibration

Parameter	Value	Comment
Preferences		
ν	2.0	AMPRR
ρ	0.047	Implied discount rate
Debt		-
δ	0.13	Macaulay duration
κ	0.7	Partial default haircut
r	0.039	Ct. compounding rate
$\lambda$	r	Normalization
Endowment I	Process	
$\mu$	0.221	Time aggregation of
$\sigma$	0.062	AMPRR AR(1)
Default Penal	ty	
$\gamma_0$	0.0476	AMPRR
$\gamma_1$	2.0	AMPRR
$\gamma_2$	0.12	AMPRR
$ ilde{z}$	-0.062	AMPRR

$$u\left(c_{t}\right) = \begin{cases} \frac{c_{t}^{1-\nu}}{1-\nu} & \text{if } \nu \neq 1\\ \log c_{t} & \text{if } \nu = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\phi\left(d_{t}, z_{t}\right) = \left(1 - \gamma_{0} d_{t}^{\gamma_{1}}\right) \times \left[1 - \left(z_{t} - \tilde{z}\right) \gamma_{2} \mathbb{1}_{\left\{d_{t} > 0 \text{ and } z_{t} > \tilde{z}\right\}}\right]$$

$$dz_t = -\mu z_t dt + \sigma dW_t$$

(Ornstein-Uhlenbeck with  $[\underline{z}, \overline{z}]$  barriers)

### Computation: Two Methods


#### Today, deep neural network:

- Neural network inputs < B, z >, outputs < V, q, c >
- Minimize minibatch residuals of HJB for *V*, HJB for *q*, and FOC for *c*
- Stochastic gradient descent
- Method amenable to extensions with many state variables

#### Work in progress, *upwind finite difference scheme*:


- Fast and precise
- Use in literature on traditional default models in continuous time, Hurtado, Nuño, and Thomas (2023, JEEA) and Borstein (2020, JEDC)

### Preliminary Results: Default Policy




■ Inaction zone (d = 0) dark blue, no debt service (d = 1) in yellow. Intermediate intensities in blue-green range.

### Preliminary Results: Drift of B




■ Borrow aggressively when debt is low and endowment is low, reduce debt at high debt and/or high endowment. Keep B in place at S = 0, mid-green.

### Preliminary Results: Value Function and Consumption



■ Value and consumption increasing in endowment (*z*) and decreasing in debt (*B*)

## Preliminary Results: Bond Price and Spreads



■ Spreads decreasing in endowment (*z*) and increasing in debt (*B*)