
# Computer Security: Principles and Practice

Chapter 4 – Access Control

#### **Access Control**

- "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner"
- > central element of computer security
- assume have users and groups
  - authenticate to system
  - assigned access rights to certain resources on system

## **Access Control Principles**



#### **Access Control Policies**

- Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
  - Based on identity / group of requestors
  - An entity can extends to other entities the permissions
- Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
  - Security labels on resources
  - Policy controlled by the administrator
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
  - Based on the roles of the users

#### **Access Control Elements**

- > subject entity that can access objects
  - a process representing user/application
  - often have 3 classes: owner, group, world
- → object access controlled resource
  - e.g. files, directories, records, programs etc
  - number/type depend on environment
- access right way in which subject accesses an object
  - e.g. read, write, execute, delete, create, search


## **Discretionary Access Control**

- ➤ often provided using a 2D access matrix
  - lists subjects in one dimension (rows)
  - lists objects in the other dimension (columns)
  - each entry specifies access rights of the specified subject to that object
- ➤ Do you see any problem with this representation?

## **Discretionary Access Control**

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- ➤ Do you see any problem with this representation?
- > access matrix is often sparse
- > can decompose by either row or column

#### **Access Control Structures**



#### **Access Control Structures**

- Access Control List: list of users for each object
  - o Pros
    - We can set default permissions
    - Easy to define groups permissions
  - Cons
    - Not optimize for determining access rights of users
- Capability tickets
  - o Pros
    - Easy to determine set of rights of users
  - Cons
    - Tickets must be hold by OS

#### **Access Control Model**


- > We want to generalize the DAC model
- ➤ Three main requirements
  - Good representation
  - Enforcing the access rights
  - Capability of users to alter specific rights
- > Extension of the objects universe
  - Process
  - Device
  - Memory location
  - Subjects

#### **Access Control Model**

		OBJECTS								
		subjects			files		processes		disk drives	
		$S_1$	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>	$\mathbf{F_1}$	F <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>2</sub>	$\mathbf{D}_1$	D <sub>2</sub>
	$\mathbf{S}_1$	control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
SUBJECTS	$S_2$		control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
	$S_3$			control		write	stop			

\* - copy flag set

## Access Control Function




#### **Protection Domains**

- > set of objects with associated access rights
- ➤ in access matrix view, each row defines a protection domain
  - but not necessarily just a user
  - may be a limited subset of user's rights
  - applied to a more restricted process
- > may be static or dynamic

## **UNIX File Concepts**

- > UNIX files administered using inodes
  - It is a control structure with key info on file
    - •attributes, permissions of a single file
    - One active inode per each file
  - have inode table / list for all files on a disk
    - copied to memory when disk mounted
- > directories form a hierarchical tree
  - may contain files or other directories
  - Each of these with its own inode


#### **UNIX File Access Control**




#### **UNIX File Access Control**

- > "set user ID"(SetUID) or "set group ID"(SetGID)
  - system temporarily uses rights of the file owner / group in addition to the real user's rights when making access control decisions
  - enables privileged programs to access files / resources not generally accessible
- > sticky bit
  - on directory limits rename/move/delete to owner
- > superuser
  - is exempt from usual access control restrictions

# Role-Based Access Control



# Role-Based Access Control



				OBJECTS				
R <sub>1</sub>	R <sub>2</sub>	$\mathbf{R}_n$	$\mathbf{F_1}$	$\mathbf{F_1}$	P <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>2</sub>	$\mathbf{D}_1$	D <sub>2</sub>
control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
	control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
		control		write	stop			
		control owner	control owner control	R <sub>1</sub> R <sub>2</sub> R <sub>n</sub> F <sub>1</sub> control owner control read *  control write *	R <sub>1</sub> R <sub>2</sub> R <sub>n</sub> F <sub>1</sub> F <sub>1</sub> control owner control read * read owner  control write * execute	control owner control read * read owner wakeup  control write * execute	R <sub>1</sub> R <sub>2</sub> R <sub>n</sub> F <sub>1</sub> F <sub>1</sub> P <sub>1</sub> P <sub>2</sub> control owner control read * read owner wakeup wakeup  control write * execute	R <sub>1</sub> R <sub>2</sub> R <sub>n</sub> F <sub>1</sub> F <sub>1</sub> P <sub>1</sub> P <sub>2</sub> D <sub>1</sub> control owner control read * read owner wakeup wakeup seek  control write * execute owner owner

## **Summary**

- > introduced access control principles
  - subjects, objects, access rights
- > discretionary access controls
  - access matrix, access control lists (ACLs), capability tickets
  - UNIX traditional and ACL mechanisms
- > role-based access control