

CyberSecurity: Principle and Practice

*BSc Degree in Computer Science
2022-2023*


Lesson 6: User Authentication

Prof. Mauro Conti

Department of Mathematics
University of Padua
conti@math.unipd.it
<http://www.math.unipd.it/~conti/>

Teaching Assistants

Pier Paolo Tricomi
pierpaolo.tricomi@phd.unipd.it
Tommaso Bianchi
tommaso.bianchi@studenti.unipd.it



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PADOVA



SPRITZ
SECURITY & PRIVACY
RESEARCH GROUP



DIPARTIMENTO¹
MATEMATICA

- Fundamental security building block
 - Basis of **access control & user accountability**
- User auth. is the process of **verifying** an identity claimed by or for a system entity
- Has two steps:
 - **Identification** - specify identifier
 - **Verification** - bind entity (person) and identifier
- Distinct from message authentication

- User authentication example:
 - User real name: *Alice Toklas*
 - User ID: *ABTOKLAS*
 - Password: *A.df1618hJb*
- These informations are stored in a system
 - Only Alice can access with this credential
 - But attackers can still do something ...

- Four means of authenticating user's identity
- Based on something the individual
 - **Knows** - e.g. password, PIN
 - **Possesses** - e.g. key, token, smartcard
 - **Is** (static biometrics) - e.g. fingerprint, retina
 - **Does** (dynamic biometrics) - e.g. voice, sign
- Can use alone or combined
- All can provide user authentication
- All have issues

- Widely used user authentication method
 - User provides name/login and password
 - System compares password with that saved for specified login
- Authenticates ID of user logging and
 - That the user is authorized to access system
 - Determines the user's privileges
 - Is used in discretionary access control

- Offline dictionary attack
 - **Attack:** the attacker has the hash of the target password and he tries to break it
 - Common passwords
 - Info related to the target
 - **Countermeasure:** ?

- Offline dictionary attack
 - **Attack:** the attacker has the hash of the target password and he tries to break it
 - Common passwords
 - Info related to the target
 - **Countermeasure:**
 - Protect these informations

- Specific account attack
 - **Attack:** the attacker target a specific account and tries to guess the correct password
 - Common passwords
 - Info related to the target
 - **Countermeasure:** ?

- Specific account attack
 - **Attack:** the attacker target a specific account and tries to guess the correct password
 - Common passwords
 - Info related to the target
 - **Countermeasure:**
 - account lockout mechanisms (i.e., allow only few authentication attempts)

- Popular Password Guessing
 - **Attack**: the attacker tries popular password against a wide range of accounts
 - Users tend to choose simple passwords
 - Likely to detect some passwords
 - **Countermeasure**: ?

- Popular Password Guessing
 - **Attack**: the attacker tries popular password against a wide range of accounts
 - Users tend to choose simple passwords
 - Likely to detect some passwords
 - **Countermeasure**:
 - Policies that do not allow the use of simple and common passwords

- Workstation hijacking
 - **Attack**: The attacker waits until a logged-in workstation is unattended
 - **Countermeasure**: ?

- Workstation hijacking
 - **Attack:** The attacker waits until a logged-in workstation is unattended
 - **Countermeasure: Countermeasure:**
 - Automatically logging-out mechanisms
 - Anomaly behaviour detection

- Exploiting user mistakes
 - **Attack**: Users tend to write down passwords
 - E.g., post-it near the protected device
 - Devices with pre-configured passwords
 - **Countermeasure**: ?

- Exploiting user mistakes
 - **Attack:** Users tend to write down passwords
 - E.g., post-it near the protected device
 - Devices with pre-configured passwords
 - **Countermeasure:**
 - User training
 - Combined authentication mechanism
 - Password + token

- Exploiting multiple password uses
 - **Attack**: users tend to use same (or similar) passwords in different systems
 - If an attacker correctly guess a password, he can extend the damage in multiple systems
 - **Countermeasure**: ?


- Exploiting multiple password uses
 - **Attack**: users tend to use same (or similar) passwords in different systems
 - If an attacker correctly guess a password, he can extend the damage in multiple systems
 - **Countermeasure**:
 - User training
 - Forbid the password-reuse in multiple systems
 - Feasible only on a specific network that we can control

- Electronic monitoring
 - **Attack**: if the password is communicated through a network, an attacker can sniff these packets and steal the password
 - **Countermeasure**: ?


- Electronic monitoring
 - **Attack**: if the password is communicated through a network, an attacker can sniff these packets and steal the password
 - **Countermeasure**:
 - Secure communication links

- Widely used security mechanism
- Steps:
 - The user create a new password
 - The password is **combined with a fixed length salt**
 - The salt usually is pseudo-randomly generated
 - Hashed Password = Hash(password, salt)
- ID, Hashed password and Salt are saved in a file
 - Password file
- These hashed functions are designed to be slow

Hashed Passwords



(a) Loading a new password



(b) Verifying a password


- Why do we use salt?
- We can identify three main reasons:
 - Password duplication prevention
 - If two users share the same password, the use of different salt produce different hashed passwords
 - Increase the difficultness of dictionary attacks
 - If the salt has b bits, the factor will be 2^b
 - Impossible to find out if a person uses the same password in different systems

- Dictionary attacks
 - Try each word then obvious variants in large dictionary against hash in password file
 - First try all common password
 - If there is no-matches, we try possible modifications (numbers, punctuation)
 - Computationally expensive
- Rainbow table attacks
 - Precompute tables of hash values for all salts
 - A mammoth table of hash values
 - E.g., 1.4GB table cracks 99.9% of alphanumeric Windows passwords in 13.8 secs
 - Not feasible if larger salt values used

- Users may pick short passwords
 - E.g., 3% were 3 chars or less, easily guessed
 - System can reject choices that are too short
- Users may pick guessable passwords
 - So crackers use lists of likely passwords
 - E.g., one study of 14000 encrypted passwords guessed nearly 1/4 of them
 - Would take about 1 hour on fastest systems to compute all variants, and only need 1 break!

- Object user possesses to authenticate, e.g.
 - Embossed card (e.g., old credit cards)
 - Magnetic stripe card (e.g., hotel keys)
 - Memory card (e.g., SIM)
 - Smartcard (e.g., Biometric ID card)


- Authenticate user based on one of their physical characteristics



Questions? Feedback? Suggestions?



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PADOVA



- BACKUP slides after this point

- Store but do not process data
- Magnetic stripe card, e.g. bank card
- Electronic memory card
- Used alone for physical access
- With password/PIN for computer use
- Drawbacks of memory cards include:
 - Need special reader (increase the cost of the security solution)
 - Loss of token issues (we cannot trust users)
 - User dissatisfaction (not totally approved by users)

- Two type of authentications:
 - Local and from remote
- Authentication over network more complex
 - problems of eavesdropping, replay
- Generally use challenge-response
 - User sends identity
 - Host responds with:
 - Random number r (a.k.a. nonce)
 - An hash function h
 - A function f
 - User computes $f(r, h(P))$ and sends back
 - Host compares value from user with own computed value, if match user authenticated
- Protects against a number of attacks