

Mobile Security


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


DIPARTIMENTO
MATEMATICA

- Generic understanding on what the app does?
- Find ways to attack the app?
- How does the app interact with network endpoints?
- How does it store private information?
- Check whether a specific functionality can be abused?

- Top-down mentality:
 - Start with high-level understanding of the app's organization/functionality, then drill down on the tech details depending on your needs
 - Start with the various entry points, explore the different functionalities, explore the app as a "user"
 - Perform attack surface analysis
- Keep a flexible mindset!

- Static analysis vs. dynamic analysis
- Static analysis: inspect the app without running it
- Dynamic analysis: run the app and check what it does
- They are complementar: taken independently are limited
- Key skill: understand which one to use and when



Key: learn when to switch between static and dynamic analysis

- Key point: you do not run the app
- You inspect it "statically"
- Take the app, unpack it, check what's inside
 - Manifest analysis, disassemble/decompile .dex, check .so files, etc.

- Key point: you actually run the app.
- You want to know what's going on "at run-time"
 - Actual values at run-time (useful when strings are obfuscated)
 - Trace of API invocation
 - Trace of syscalls
- Two main techniques
 - Debugging
 - Instrumentation

- You run the app and you "attach" a debugger
- You can ask debuggers a number of things
 - Stop the execution when you reach point XYZ
 - Tell me the content of this field / memory location
 - Single-step through instructions
- Helpful to understand the state / context at a given point

- Run the app in an "instrumented" environment so that
 - Every APIs invocation is traced
 - Every network-related API invocation is traced + all their arguments
 - Log all strings
 - Dump additional information when specific conditions are met
 - Note: too much info is not always good!
- Many technical ways
 - Modify the Android emulator, ART environment, the app's itself
 - Manual instrumentation vs. instrumentation frameworks
 - But still, somehow it is still an open problem

- Bytecode injection
 - Unpack the app, add extra functionality, pack the app
- Example:
 - What's the value at run-time of variable X?
 - Add proper Log invocations
- Usual trick
 - 1) write your functionality in Java
 - 2) get the smali
 - 3) inject the smali

- It can instrument the app itself
- Based on code injection
 - It actually injects a Javascript engine into a running process
- Modules are written in Javascript

- By default, it requires root
 - It needs to ptrace the target app for code injection
- You can inject the "frida-server" directly into the target app
 - <https://koz.io/using-frida-on-android-without-root/>
- In both cases: it can be detected

● Pros

- Initial general understanding
- What does the app do from an high-level perspective / "semantics"?
- Determine which points are interesting
- Answer questions such as: how can I reach a specific point?
- Find security vulnerabilities

● Cons

- Some values may be difficult to determine at static-analysis time!
 - String obfuscation, complex algorithms, etc.
- Some of them may not even be available!
 - Strings coming from the network, dynamic code loading, etc.

● Pros

- Dump actual values at run-time
- Dump network traffic (both sent and received), no reconstruction needed
- Stop analysis at any-point and do context/memory inspection
- "Is this API ever invoked?", "With which arguments?"
- Verify that a security vulnerability is actually exploitable

● Cons

- Limited code coverage: Where should I click? Input to insert?
- How can I reach a specific point?
- Is what I'm seeing "bad"? Missing context!
- It can be evaded (app can understand it is under analysis / bypass it)

- How do researchers find malware / bugs?
 - In many cases: mostly manual reverse engineering
 - The holy grail: find everything automatically
- Why is it important?

- The scale is huge
- Not enough good people to analyze all apps out there
 - Google Play Store: 3 million apps+
 - Apple Store: 1.8 million
- Researcher still find malware & vulns in very popular apps

- Static analysis
 - Manual: static reverse engineering, manual unpacking & inspection
 - Automatic: detection of specific payload, signature-based matching, taint tracking, symbolic execution

- Dynamic analysis
 - Manual: manually start & interact with app in instrumented environment, instrumented app, debugging
 - Automatic: fully automated system that takes an APK, run it in an instrumented environment and track what it's doing

- Common traits
 - The app is not actually executed (hence, "static")
 - "Scan" all possible paths (vs. "only one")
 - While scanning the code, keep track of "relevant information"
 - What "relevant info" is depends on the specific instance of static analysis
- Useful to answer
 - Can X happen (when running the app)?
 - Can I be sure that X never happens (when running the app)?
 - Useful to extract "invariants"
 - "Invariant" \Leftrightarrow a property that always holds when the app is run

- Simple/scalable approaches
 - "Quick" types of analyses that do not require significant resources
 - Manifest analysis, simple API analysis / scanning, signature scanning
 - [YARA rules](#)
 - The output is presented to the analyst and/or
 - The output is fed to a classification engine based on machine learning
- Actual static program analysis

- Conceptual steps

- "Go through" the program/app you want to analyze
- If a register contains something "sensitive" (e.g., location data), "taint it"
- "location taint" \Leftrightarrow "value in register X may contain "info of type location"
- Propagate taint according to the operations performed on these objects

- Common use case

- Q: Does this app send location information to a network end-point?
- Analysis
 - Taint objects coming from location-related APIs ("sources")
 - If a tainted object reaches network end-point APIs ("sinks"), flag the app
- Popular "research" tool: FlowDroid

- Conceptual steps
 - "Go through" the program/app you want to analyze
 - When possible, keep track of "real" values / "concrete"
 - When not possible, keep track of values "symbolically"
 - Keep track of each operation on these objects in form of "symbolic expressions"
- Common use cases
 - Q: which conditions should be satisfied for a branch ("if") to be taken?
 - Q: what are the possible arguments API X is invoked with?

- Inherent trade-off between scalability and precision
- Precision is (usually) characterized by FP / FN
- FP: False Positive
 - The analysis says "X can happen" while, in fact, it cannot happen
- FN: False Negative
 - The analysis says "X will never happen", while, in fact, it can happen
- The semantics of FP/FN is analysis-dependent

- Malicious apps intentionally make use of code constructs to make static analysis challenging
- Reflection, dynamic code loading, string obfuscation, native code
- How to statically deal with these tricks is an open research problem
 - Current solution: use hybrid approach with dynamic analysis

- Common traits
 - The app is actually executed
 - Usually: only "one path" at the time (all values are "concrete")
 - Either the app or the environment is instrumented to track what happens
 - It needs to address the "how to interact with the UI" problem
- Useful to answer
 - Does X happen (when running the app)?
 - Cf. "can X happen?" of static analysis
 - Cf. "can I be sure that X never happens?" of static analysis
 - Collect files accessed, network connections, IP addresses / URLs, APIs invoked, access of sensitive info (location, contacts, etc.), UI usage

- We have already seen the underlying techniques
 - debugging
 - instrumentation
 - app rewriting / repackaging
 - environment instrumentation
 - xposed, frida
 - UI interaction
 - monkey runner
 - uiautomator
- Analysis usually builds on top of these blocks

- Key problem: limited code coverage
 - Dynamic analysis only sees what it "reaches"
 - If the malicious piece code is not even reached, dynamic analysis will not see it
 - In the general case: it's difficult to "explore" everything
 - Compare with static analysis that (in principle) covers "all paths"
- Common difficult questions
 - On which button should the analyzer click to reach X?
 - What are the conditions to reach X?
 - What should be the environment set to?

- When analyzing malware: dynamic analysis evasion!
 - Malware uses "code coverage" problem to its benefit
- Intentional use of "difficult-to-satisfy" conditions
 - Time bombs: functionality X only runs at a specific time constraint
 - Rationale: this "time constraint" will likely NOT be satisfied during the tests / analysis
 - Many variants: location bombs, SMS bombs, env bombs, logic bombs

- Malware apps attempt to determine whether they are "under analysis"
 - Emulator-related checks: if emulator \Rightarrow don't do anything
 - Rationale: real users don't use emulators; Google Bouncer does
 - Motion-based: no motion during the analysis (because it's all fake)
 - Is the app repackaged/instrumented? Is debugger/xposed/frida running?
 - Is the environment "too clean"? Distinguish real user vs. analysis system
 - Idea: pre-populate address book, photo album, sms messages, files, ...

- Static Program Analysis
 - Pros
 - Full code coverage
 - Cons
 - Evasion problems
- Dynamic Program Analysis
 - Pros
 - Results are usually "actionable"
 - Cons
 - Code coverage problems
 - Evasion problems