



RISC-V External Debug Security Specification

Version v0.5.0, 2024-06-03: Draft

Table of Contents

Preamble.....	1
Copyright and license information.....	2
Contributors.....	3
1. Introduction.....	4
2. External Debug Security Threat model.....	5
3. Sdsec (ISA extension).....	6
3.1. External Debug.....	6
3.1.1. Machine Mode Debug Control.....	6
3.1.2. Submachine Mode Debug Control.....	6
3.1.3. Debug Access Privilege.....	7
3.1.4. Privilege Changing Instructions.....	8
3.2. Trace.....	8
3.2.1. Machine Mode Trace Control.....	8
3.2.2. Submachine Mode Trace Control.....	8
3.3. Trigger.....	9
3.3.1. Machine mode accessibility to dmode accessibility.....	9
3.3.2. External triggers.....	9
3.3.3. Trigger chain.....	9
3.4. Updates of CSR.....	10
3.4.1. Sdext CSR.....	10
Debug Control and Status (dcsr).....	10
Debug PC (dpc) and Debug Scratch Register (dscratch0 and dscratch1).....	11
3.4.2. Sdtrig CSR.....	11
3.4.3. Sdsec CSR.....	12
4. Debug Module Security Extension (non-ISA extension).....	13
4.1. Debug Module Security Extension Discovery.....	13
4.2. Halt.....	13
4.3. Reset.....	13
4.4. Keepalive.....	14
4.5. Abstract Commands.....	14
4.5.1. Relaxed Permission Check relaxedpriv	14
4.5.2. Address Translation aamvirtual	14
4.6. System Bus Access.....	14
4.7. Security Fault Error Reporting.....	14
4.8. Update of Debug Module Status (dmstatus).....	15
Appendix A: Theory of Operation.....	17
A.1. Debug Module security control.....	17
A.2. Trace Encoder security control.....	18

Bibliography	19
--------------------	----

Preamble



This document is in the [Development state](#)

Expect potential changes. This draft specification is likely to evolve before it is accepted as a standard. Implementations based on this draft may not conform to the future standard.

Copyright and license information

This specification is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0). The full license text is available at creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

Copyright 2023-2024 by RISC-V International.

Contributors

This RISC-V specification has been contributed to directly or indirectly by (in alphabetical order): Aote Jin (editor), Beeman Strong, Gokhan Kaplayan, Greg Favor, Iain Robertson, Joe Xie (editor), Ravi Sahita, Robert Chyla, Ved Shanbhogue, Vicky Goode

Chapter 1. Introduction

Debugging and tracing are essential tools utilized by developers to identify and rectify software and hardware issues, optimize performance, and ensure robust system functionality. The debugging and tracing extensions in RISC-V ecosystem play a pivotal role in enabling these capabilities, allowing developers to monitor and control the execution of programs during the development, testing and production phases. However, ensuring the security of this interface is of paramount importance to prevent unauthorized access and potential security breaches. Without adequate security measures, these functions can be exploited by malicious actors to gain unauthorized access, compromise system integrity, and extract sensitive information.

The extension is complementary to RISC-V Debug Specification [1] and trace specifications [2] [3], ensuring robust security. It comprises of [Sdsec \(ISA extension\)](#) and [Debug Module Security Extension \(non-ISA extension\)](#). The Sdsec defines the enhancement inside the hart while the Debug Module Security Extension enforces the security rules on Debug Module and the trace encoder.

The following enforcements are applied to the debug specification:

- **Per-Hart Debug Control Knobs:** Separate control knobs are introduced for each hart, specifically for machine mode and supervisor domains [4].
- **Debugging Restrictions:** The external debugger is restricted to halting the hart only when it is in a debug-allowed machine mode program or supervisor domain.
- **Operations Constraints:** All debug operations, such as memory accesses and CSR accesses, are constrained by the per-hart control knobs.
- **Memory Protection:** The external debugger cannot bypass the memory translation or protection mechanisms enforced on the hart.
- **Trigger Constraints:** The firing or matching of triggers is constrained by the per-hart control knobs.
- **System Bus Access Protection (Optional):** If implemented, System Bus Access must be protected by a bus initiator protection mechanism, such as IOPMP or WorldGuard.

The following enforcements are applied to the trace specifications:

- **Per-Hart Trace Control Knobs:** Dedicated per-hart control knobs are introduced for tracing, specifically for machine mode and supervisor domains.
- **Trace Encoder Control:** The trace encoder is enabled or disabled by a sideband signal from the hart to the trace encoder, controlled according to the per-hart knobs.

Chapter 2. External Debug Security Threat model

The growing complexity of modern System-on-Chip (SoC) designs has led to a corresponding increase in the need for effective debugging capabilities. However, the use of debugging functions also introduces potential security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or perform malicious actions on the system.

Modern SoC development consists of several different actors who may not trust each other, resulting in the need to isolate actors' assets during the development and debugging phases. The current RISC-V Debug specification grants external debuggers the highest privilege in the system regardless of the privilege level at which the target system is running. This leads to privilege escalation issues when multiple actors are present.

For example, the owner of a SoC, who needs to debug their M-mode firmware, may be able to use the external debugger to bypass PMPL and attack Boot ROM (the SoC creator's asset).

Additionally, RISC-V privilege architecture supports multiple software entities or "supervisor domains" that do not trust each other. The supervisor domains are managed by secure monitor running in M-mode, they are isolated from each other by PMP/IOPMP and they may need different debug policies. The entity that owns secure monitor wants to disable external debug when shipping the secure monitor, however, the entity that owns the supervisor domain needs to enable external debug to develop the supervisor domain. Since the external debugger will be the granted highest privilege in the system, a malicious supervisor domain will be able to compromise M-mode secure monitor with the external debugger.

This specification defines ISA extensions and non-ISA extensions to address the above security issues in the current RISC-V Debug Specification and trace specifications.

Chapter 3. Sdsec (ISA extension)

This chapter introduces the Sdsec ISA extension, which extends the ISA section of The RISC-V Debug Specification. The RISC-V hart must implement all features to ensure external debug security. It is designed to enforce access control over operations initiated by the Debug Module, as well as constraints on trigger behaviors [1]. Additionally, it incorporates trace functionality [2], with its output constrained based on hart privilege levels.

3.1. External Debug

By default, the extension forbids the following debug operation in following table unless they are explicitly granted to the external debugger.

The debug operations affected by Sdsec extension

- Entering Debug Mode
- Executing Program buffer
- Serving abstract commands (Access Register, Quick Access, Access Memory)

When the debug operations are not granted, any action to enter debug mode will be pending while abstract commands and requests to execute program buffer will be dropped. The subsequent subsections detail how debug operations are granted.

3.1.1. Machine Mode Debug Control

An input port, named `mdbggen[i]`, is introduced to control the debuggability of machine mode for each hart *i*. This signal is transmitted to the hart and its corresponding debug access control logic. When `mdbggen[i]` is set to 1, the debug operations outlined in [The debug operations affected by Sdsec extension](#) are permitted when hart *i* executes in machine mode. Moreover the following rules apply:

- The [debug access privilege](#) for the hart can be configured to any privilege level
- If register access without halting the hart is supported, this access carries the privilege of machine mode.

When `mdbggen[i]` is set to 0, debug operations in machine mode are prohibited for hart *i*. Any attempt to halt the hart and bring it into Debug Mode will remain pending, and triggers configured to enter Debug Mode will neither fire nor match in machine mode.



For the homogeneous computing system, the implementation can consolidate all `mdbggen[i]` into a single port to enforce unified debug policy across all harts.

3.1.2. Submachine Mode Debug Control

The submachine mode debug of hart *i* is determined by the `sdedbga1w` field of CSR `msdcfg` within hart *i* and `mdbggen[i]`. Debug operations listed in [The debug operations affected by Sdsec extension](#) are allowed when hart *i* executes in submachine mode only if the logical-OR of values in `sdedbga1w`

and `mdbgen[i]` is 1.

The legal value of **debug access privilege** for hart *i* is solely determined by `sdedbgalw` when `mdbgen[i]` is 0. In the event of `sdedbgalw` being 1 while `mdbgen[i]` is 0, the debug access privilege can be configured to privilege levels other than machine mode. Any attempt to set debug access privilege to machine mode will either result in an legal sub-machine mode privilege level or trigger a security fault error (cmderr 6).



As the `prv` and `v` fields in `dcscr` are Write Any Read Legal (WARL) fields, the debugger has two options to confirm the success of a prior write: either by reading back the attempted written value or by checking the `cmderr`, depending on the hardware implementation choice.

If register access without halting the hart is supported, this access bears the privilege of supervisor/hypervisor mode to access the hart when `mdbgen[i]` is 0 and `sdedbgalw` is 1.

Debug operations in all modes are prohibited for hart *i* when the logical-OR of `sdedbgalw` and `mdbgen[i]` is 0. All halt requests from the Debug Module will remain pending, and triggers configured to enter debug mode will neither match nor fire. The register access without halting is dropped.

Table 1. The debuggable privilege levels per debug controls

<code>mdbgen[i]</code>	<code>sdedbgalw</code>	Debuggable privilege levels
1	x	All
0	1	All except M
0	0	None

3.1.3. Debug Access Privilege

The **debug access privilege** is defined as the privilege with which abstract commands or instructions in program buffers access hardware resources such as registers and memory. This privilege operates independently of hart privilege levels and exclusively affects operations within Debug Mode. Memory and register access within Debug Mode are subject to the **debug access privilege**, with all hardware protections, including MMU, PMP, and PMA, checked against it. This privilege is represented by the `prv` and `v` fields in `dcscr`, and it is updated to reflect the hart privilege level upon entering Debug Mode. Each hart has a dedicated **debug access privilege** and it may vary from each other. The permissible privilege levels programmable to `dcscr` in Debug Mode are elaborated in subsequent sections.

In addition, the `mprv` and `mpp` fields take effect exclusively when the **debug access privilege** is in machine mode.

Table 2. Determining maximum debug access privilege with `mdbgen[i]` and `sdedbgalw`

<code>mdbgen[i]</code>	<code>sdedbgalw</code>	Maximum debug privilege
1	x	M
0	1	S(HS)

mdbggen[i]	sdedbgalw	Maximum debug privilege
0	0	None

3.1.4. Privilege Changing Instructions

The RISC-V Debug Specification defines that the instructions that change the privilege mode have UNSPECIFIED behavior when executed within the Program Buffer, with exception of the ebreak instruction. In Sdsec, those instructions such as mret, sret, uret, ecall, must either act as NOP or trigger an exception, stopping execution and setting **cmderr** to 3. Notably, these instructions retain their normal functionality during single stepping.

3.2. Trace

The extension requires that trace availability from each hart is constrained by default. When Sdsec is supported, the optional sideband signal to trace encoder, **sec_check[i]** [2], must be implemented for each hart *i*, and this signal must be reset to 1. The **sec_check[i]** signal is only cleared when trace is permitted by machine mode trace control or submachine mode trace control.

3.2.1. Machine Mode Trace Control

For each hart *i*, an input port, **mtrcen[i]**, controls machine mode trace availability. Setting **mtrcen[i]** to 1 enables machine mode and submachine mode trace by clearing the **sec_check[i]** signal to 0 across all privilege levels. Conversely, if **mtrcen[i]** is set to 0, the **sec_check[i]** signal cannot be cleared when the hart operates in machine mode.



For the homogeneous computing system, similarly to machine mode debug control, the implementation can consolidate all **mtrcen[i]** into a single port to constrain trace capability across all harts.

3.2.2. Submachine Mode Trace Control

The **sec_check[i]** signal for hart *i* in submachine mode is determined by the **sdetr calw** field of CSR **msdcfg** within hart *i*, alongside **mtrcen[i]**. When the logical-OR of **sdetr calw** and **mtrcen[i]** is 1, the **sec_check[i]** signal is cleared while the hart runs in submachine mode.

When both **sdetr calw** and **mtrcen[i]** are set to 0, the **sec_check[i]** signal cannot be cleared at all.

Table 3. The status of the **sec_check[i]** sideband signal across privilege levels

mtrcen	sdetr calw	Machine mode	Submachine mode
1	x	sec_check[i] = 0	sec_check[i] = 0
0	1	sec_check[i] = 1	sec_check[i] = 0
0	0	sec_check[i] = 1	sec_check[i] = 1



The **sec_check** signal serves as an additional signal for the trace module, indicating that trace output is prohibited due to security controls. Functionally, **sec_check**

behaves identically to the halted signal. Both `sec_check` and halted signals cannot be active simultaneously. Reserved for future applications, the combined state of `[sec_check, halted]` as `0b11` remains unutilized. In cases where a trace module lacks support for the `sec_check` signal, the hart may alternatively toggle the halted signal to restrict trace output.

3.3. Trigger

The trigger configured to enter Debug Mode is checked by Sdsec extension. The trigger can fire or match in privilege modes outlined in [Table 1](#).

The extension requires that all pending triggers intending to enter Debug Mode must match or fire before any hart mode switch to prevent privilege escalation.

3.3.1. Machine mode accessibility to `dmode` accessibility

The RISC-V Debug Specification defines that the `dmode` field is accessible only in Debug Mode. When this field is set, the trigger is allocated exclusively to Debug Mode, and any write access from the hart are disregarded. However, the Debug Mode exclusive trigger could potentially serve as an attack surface for unauthorized submachine mode software where debugging is forbidden. The extension relaxes the constrain to the `dmode`, allowing it to be R/W in machine mode when `mdbgen[i]` is set to 0. When `mdbgen[i]` is set to 1, it remains exclusively accessible within Debug Mode.



In this definition, machine mode software assumes responsibility for switching the trigger context according to the debug policy enforced for the submachine mode. As a result, it maintains a clean trigger context for the submachine mode.

3.3.2. External triggers

The external trigger outputs follow the same limitations as other triggers, ensuring they do not fire or match when the privilege level of the hart exceeds the ones specified in [Table 1](#).

The sources of external trigger input (such as machine mode performance counter overflow, interrupts, etc.) require protection to prevent information leakage. The external trigger inputs supported are platform-specific. Therefore, the platform is responsible for enforcing limitations on input sources. As a result, `tmexttrigger.intctl` and `tmexttrigger.select` should be restricted to legal values based on `mdbgen[i]` and `sdedbgalw`. Their definitions are provided in the [Table 7](#) below.

3.3.3. Trigger chain

The privilege level of the trigger chain is determined by the highest privilege level within the chain. The entire trigger chain cannot be modified if the chain privilege level exceeds the [debug access privilege](#).



This represents a balance between usability and hardware complexity. The integrity of the trigger chain set by the hart must be maintained when an external debugger intends to utilize triggers. There may be instances where the triggers are

linked across different privilege levels (e.g., from supervisor mode to machine mode), while the external debugger may only have access to supervisor mode privilege. The external debugger should not alter the chain, because it could suppress or incorrectly raise breakpoint exceptions in machine mode.

3.4. Updates of CSR

3.4.1. Sdext CSR

Debug Control and Status (dcsr)

The hart must not automatically treat an external debugger with machine mode privilege (or surpassing machine mode privilege) without conditions. The `prv` and `v` fields in the `dcsr` (at `0x7b0`) have been enhanced to authorize privilege for debugger accesses. Upon transitioning into Debug Mode, the `prv` and `v` fields are updated to reflect the privilege level the hart was previously operating in. The `dcsr` is always permitted to be accessed in Debug Mode and the fields `prv` and `v` could be configured to grant privilege to the debugger other than the privilege level when the harts transitioned to Debug Mode. The maximum debug privilege level that can be configured in `prv` and `v` is determined in [Table 2](#). It will generate a security fault error (cmderr 6) if the external debugger attempts to configure `prv` and `v` with a privilege higher than the maximum debug privilege level.

Memory and CSR accesses initiated by abstract commands or from the program buffer will be treated as if they are at the privilege level held in `prv` and `v`. These accesses will undergo protections of PMA, PMP, MMU, and other mechanisms, triggering traps if they violate corresponding rules.



The external debugger has the capability to write to `prv` and `v` and subsequently read back the value, thus determining the maximum debug privilege level.

Additionally, the fields in `dcsr` are further constrained based on their sphere of action. For example, when a field is effective in machine mode, it is accessible only to debugger which is granted with machine mode privilege. The detailed accessibility is listed in the following table.

Table 4. Dcsr fields accessibility against privilege granted to external debugger

Field	Allowed debug access privilege
<code>ebreakvs</code>	M/S/VS
<code>ebreakvu</code>	M/S/VS/VU
<code>ebreakm</code>	M
<code>ebeaks</code>	M/S
<code>ebreaku</code>	M/S/U
<code>stepie</code>	M
<code>stoptime</code>	M
<code>mprven</code>	M
<code>nmip</code>	M

Debug PC (dpc) and Debug Scratch Register (dscratch0 and dscratch1)

Debug PC (at 0x7b1) and Debug Scratch Register (at 0x7b2 and 0x7b3) are not restricted by prv and v fields to simplify the architecture.

3.4.2. Sdtrig CSR

The extension enforces access control in Debug Mode, which complicates trigger usage within Debug Mode. To mitigate these complications, certain trigger CSRs, tselect, tdata1, tdata2, tdata3, and tinfo are always permitted in Debug Mode, irrespective of the privileges granted to external debuggers. However, the remaining CSRs, tcontrol, scontext, hcontext, mcontext, and mscontext continue to adhere to the debug privileges granted.

Table 5. Trigger CSR accessibility in Debug Mode

Register	without Sdsec	with Sdsec
tselect(0x7a0)	Always	No change
tdata1(0x7a1)	Always	No change
tdata2(0x7a2)	Always	No change
tdata3(0x7a3)	Always	No change
tinfo(0x7a4)	Always	No change
tcontrol(0x7a5)	Always	Debug access privilege = M
scontext(0x5a8)	Always	Debug access privilege \geq Sub-M
hcontext(0x6a8)	Always	Debug access privilege \geq Sub-M
mcontext(0x7a8)	Always	Debug access privilege = M
mscontext(0x7aa)	Always	Debug access privilege = M

Beyond CSR-level accessibility adjustments, the fields within mcontrol, mcontrol6, icount, ittrigger, ettrigger, and tmexttrigger—variants of tdata1 located at 0x7a1—are redefined to limit the effective scope of triggers as follows.

Table 6. Tdata1 fields accessibility against privilege granted to external debugger

Field	Allowed debug access privilege
m	M
s	M/S
u	M/S/U
vs	M/S/VS
vu	M/S/VS/VU

The textra32, textra64 provides additional filtering capability for triggers. They are permitted for access in Debug Mode, as they do not affect the trigger firing/matching as it is constrained by

mdbgen[i] and sdedbgalw.

The intctl and sselect field within tmexttrigger are redefined as follows.

Table 7. The redefinition of field intctl and sselect within tmexttrigger

Field	Description	Access	Reset
intctl	This optional bit, when set, causes this trigger to fire whenever an attached interrupt controller signals a trigger. the field is only configurable when mdbgen[i] is set to 1.	WLRL	0
sselect	Selects any combination of up to 16 TM external trigger inputs that cause this trigger to fire The legal value must be constrained by mdbgen[i] and sdedbgalw according to trigger input type.	WLRL	0

3.4.3. Sdsec CSR

The Sdsec extension does not introduce any new CSR. The CSR control knobs in msdcfg for submachine mode debug and submachine mode trace are specified in Smsdedbg and Smsdetr extension respectively in *RISC-V Supervisor Domains Access Protection* [4]. The Smsdedbg and/or Smsdetr extension must be implemented to activate security enforcement for debugging and/or tracing.

Chapter 4. Debug Module Security Extension (non-ISA extension)

This chapter outlines the security enhancements implemented in the Debug Module. The debug operations from external debuggers will be prohibited when the debug capability is not allowed by `mdbgen[i]` and `sdedbgalw`.

The affected debug operations, including:

- Halt request
- Reset request
- Keepalive request
- Abstract commands

Will be addressed as follows.

4.1. Debug Module Security Extension Discovery

The Debug Module Security Extension imposes security constraints and introduces non-backward-compatible changes. The presence of the Debug Module Security Extension can be determined by polling the `allsecured/anysecured` bits in `dmstatus` [Table 8](#).

4.2. Halt

The hart can only be halted when it is running in privilege levels specified in [Table 1](#). Otherwise, the halt request will remain pending. Consequently, the response to the external debugger request may take longer than one second, and this constraint must be eliminated.

When machine mode is not permitted (`mdbgen[i]` set to 0) to engage in debugging, the halt-on-reset (`resethaltreq`) operation must fail and raise security fault error. The debugger could check the error by polling `allsecfault/anysecfault` bits in `dmstatus` as specified in [Table 8](#).

4.3. Reset

The reset operations must be safeguarded against various attacks. The RISC-V Debug Specification [\[1\]](#) defines the `hartreset` operations, which reset selected harts. The reset operations must be prohibited when machine mode is not allowed to be debugged. The security fault error will be raised if the operation is issued when `mdbgen[i]` is 0. The debugger could monitor the error by polling `allsecfault/anysecfault` in `dmstatus`.

The `ndmreset` operation is a system-level reset not tied to hart privilege levels and reset the entire system (excluding the Debug Module). It can only be secured by the system. Thus, it must be de-featured. The debugger can determine support for the `ndmreset` operation by setting the field to 1 and subsequently verifying the returned value upon reading.

4.4. Keepalive

The keepalive operation serves as an optional request for the hart to remain available for debugger. It is only allowed when machine mode is permitted to debug. Otherwise, it causes a security fault error when `mdbggen[i]` is 0, indicated by `allsecfault/anysecfault` bits in `dmstatus`.

4.5. Abstract Commands

The hart's response to abstract commands is details in [Section 3.1.1](#) and [Section 3.1.2](#). The following subsection delineates the constraints when the Debug Module issues the abstract commands.

4.5.1. Relaxed Permission Check `relaxedpriv`

The field `relaxedpriv` in `abstractcs` (at 0x16) allows for relaxed permission checks, such as bypassing PMA, PMP, MMU, etc. However, this relaxation violates security requirements, and the extension mandates that `relaxedpriv` be hardwired to 0.

4.5.2. Address Translation `aamvirtual`

The field `aamvirtual` in `command` (at 0x17) determines whether physical or virtual address translation is employed. However, when `mdbggen[i]` is 0, the extension mandates that `aamvirtual` is hardwire to 1 and memory access addresses are processed as if initiated by the hart in [debug access privilege](#).

4.6. System Bus Access

System Bus Access enables direct reading/writing of memory space without involving the hart. However, it must always be checked by bus initiator protection mechanisms such as IOPMP, WorldGuard, etc. If these protections are not implemented or not deployed for Debug Module, System Bus Access must not be Supported. Failed system bus access attempts result in a bus security fault error (serror 6).



In scenarios where a Debug Module lacks System Bus Access, memory access by the debugger can be achieved through the use of abstract commands. These commands provide secure means of accessing memory.



Trusted entities like RoT should configure IOPMP or equivalent protection before granting debug access to machine mode. Similarly, machine mode should apply the protection before enabling submachine mode debug.

4.7. Security Fault Error Reporting

A dedicated error code, security fault error (cmderr 6), is included in `cmderr` of `abstractcs` (at 0x16). The implementation has the flexibility to utilize this error code to signal any breaches of security enforcement by abstract commands, such as misconfiguration of `dcsr`. Additionally, the bus security fault error (serror 6) is introduced in `serror` of `sbscs` (at 0x38) to denote errors related to system


bus access.

The error raised by other debug operations which could be applied to selected harts such as `resethaltreq`, `reset` and `keepalive` can be identified through the fields `allsecfault/anysecfault` in `dmstatus`. The security fault errors must be detectable prior to any subsequent read of the register responsible for reporting the error. Error statuses are internally maintained for each hart, with the `allsecfault/anysecfault` fields indicating the error status of the currently selected harts. Any error indicated by `allsecfault/anysecfault` remains until updated through a successful `resethaltreq`, `reset` or `keepalive` operation.



While the `resethaltreq`, `reset`, and `keepalive` operations can potentially take a significant amount of time to complete depending on the implementation, the error status can be immediately reported via following read of `allsecfault/anysecfault` if the operation is prohibited. Therefore, if a read of `allsecfault/anysecfault` indicates no error, it suggests that the operation is allowed and either currently in progress or has been successfully executed.

4.8. Update of Debug Module Status (`dmstatus`)



Register 1: The `allsecured` and `anysecured` fields in `dmstatus`

Table 8. The updates in `dmstatus`

Field	Description	Access	Reset
<code>allsecured</code>	The field is 1 when all currently selected harts implement Sdsec extension	R	-
<code>anysecured</code>	The field is 1 when any currently selected hart implements Sdsec extension	R	-
<code>allsecfault</code>	The field is 1 when all currently selected harts have raised security fault due to reset or keepalive operation.	R	-

Field	Description	Access	Reset
anysecfault	The field is 1 when any currently selected hart has raised security fault due to reset or keepalive operation.	R	-

Appendix A: Theory of Operation

This chapter explains the theory of operation for the External Debug Security Extension. The subsequent diagram illustrates the reference implementation of security control for the Debug Module and trace encoder, respectively.

A.1. Debug Module security control

As outlined in the specification, the security control on the Debug Module can vary for each hart. The dedicated security policy for hart *i* is enforced by the input port `mdbggen[i]` and the `sdedbgalw` field inside CSR `msdcfg`. The security control logic examines all debug operations and triggers (with `action=1`) firing/matching based on `mdbggen[i]`, `sdedbgalw`, and the privilege level of the hart. The failed action will either be dropped or pending. Additionally, the platform-specific external trigger inputs must obey to platform constraints, which must be carefully handled by platform owner. The `mdbggen[i]` can be bundled in an MMIO (Memory-Mapped I/O) outside the hart, such as in the Debug Module, or implemented as fuses.

The privilege level of the hart is determined by code execution, while the debug requests are validated against the privilege level generated by the hart. This process involves two actors, which may lead to a potential Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) issue. To mitigate this, the implementation must ensure that the inspection and execution of debug requests occur within the same privilege level of the hart. Failure to do so could result in debug requests bypassing access controls intended for higher privilege levels. If the accesses fail the security check, it must prompt an immediate termination of access to prevent any information leakage.

When the external debugger is stepping through an instruction that triggers a transition to a higher privilege level, the security control logic must verify against debug capability according to [Table 1](#) before entering Debug Mode. If debugging is permitted, the hart re-enters Debug Mode after executing the instruction. Otherwise, the hart continues executing with the pending single step request until it becomes debuggable and can re-enter Debug Mode. In scenarios where multiple submachine mode software are debuggable, the secure monitor in machine mode may switch the context during single stepping. In such cases, the debugger might stop in a different application than the original one. Users of the debugger should be mindful of this possibility.

Application-level debugging is primarily accomplished through self-hosted debugging, allowing the management of debug policies at the supervisor/hypervisor level. As a result, user-level debugging management is not addressed within this extension.



Figure 1. The security control on Debug Module

A.2. Trace Encoder security control

Similar to the Debug Module, the trace encoder is controlled by the `mtrcen[i]` and `sdetrca1w` in CSR `msdcfg` for each hart `i`. The halted sideband signal to the trace encoder is determined by [Table 3](#).




Figure 2. The security control on trace module

Bibliography

- [1] “RISC-V Debug Specification.” [Online]. Available: github.com/riscv/riscv-debug-spec.
- [2] “RISC-V Efficient Trace for RISC-V.” [Online]. Available: github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-trace-spec.
- [3] “RISC-V N-Trace (Nexus-based Trace) Specification.” [Online]. Available: github.com/riscv-non-isa/tg-nexus-trace.
- [4] “RISC-V Supervisor Domains Access Protection.” [Online]. Available: github.com/riscv/riscv-smm-tt.