Is Your Pain My Pain? Altruistic Legacies of Herbicidal Warfare in Vietnam

Gaku Ito (Osaka Metropolitan University)
Duc Tran (Hiroshima University)
Yuichiro Yoshida (Kwansei Gakuin University)

Outline

Introduction

Experiment Design

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Introduction

How Does War Foster Altruism?



- Factor to wartime violence fosters altruism and prosocial behavior (e.g., Bauer et al., 2016; Blattman, 2009; Dinas et al., 2021; Lindsey & Koos, 2024; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Walden & Zhukov, 2020; Wayne & Zhukov, 2022)
 - identification challenge of confounding and collider bias
- Insights from a lab-in-the-field experiment in Da Nang, Vietnam (pilot experiment, with N = 30)
 - "My pain" effect: Herbicide victims behave altruistic
 - "Your pain" effect: Non-victims behave altruistic toward victims

Introduction 1/1


Experiment Design


Sample, Survey Mode, etc.

- "Hard-to-reach" population: Herbicide victims and their families/descendants
 - We are somehow (officially) granted access to the herbicide victim households in Da Nang, Vietnam
 - Two major US air bases for Operation Ranch Hand (1962–1971): Bien Hoa (near Ho Chi Minh City/Saigon) and Da Nang air bases
- Sample: 15 households (each) with/without herbicide victims (30 in total) in 24 villages in Hoa Hai (commune), Da Nang (district)
 - Survey mode: Face-to-face (online is infeasible)
 - Date: August 28-September 2, 2023
 - We ended up with a sample of 28(/30) households due to errors in the field

Experiment Design 2/

S-NAS-HERBS File, 1961-1971





Experiment Design 3/1-

Study Area: Hoa Hai, Da Nang



Experiment Design 4/1

Outcomes and Covariates

Behavioral Outcome

Dictator (sharing) game (next slide) ↔ today's talk

Attitudinal Outcome

- Government/party support → NOT approved
- Institutional/interpersonal trust → NOT approved
 - both direct questioning and indirect (endorsement/list)

Demographic Variables, etc.

- Covariates: Household and respondent attributes (reported in Appendix)
- Other outcomes: Social and political organization membership/leadership (results not reported here)

Experiment Design 5

Dictator Game and Treatment

Dictator (Sharing) Game

- Respondents receive VND 80K (~ USD 3.5)
 - ▶ Minimum hourly wage in Vietnam ~ USD 1
- decide how to share ("donate") the VND 80K with an anonymous recipient with an increment of 10K (0-80K)

Randomized Treatments

- 2. Decision timing: Dictator game at the beginning/end of the herbicide-related survey winformation stimulus


Observed Herbicide Victim Status


- **Respondent status:** With 1+ victims or not **→ "my pain"**
- mimicking the key variable in previous studies

Experiment Design 6/

Results


Naïve Difference





esults 7/14

Naïve Difference



- "Your pain" effect: Recipient victim status is associated with an increase in donation of VND 18.6K (from 10.7K to 29.3K)
- "My pain" effect: Respondent victim status is associated with an increase in donation of VND 8.6K (15.4K to 24K)
 - consistent with existing literature
 - yet the association remains statistically indeterminate
- Decision timing (after the survey) is weakly negatively associated with donation amount (23.8K to 16.7K)


esults 8/1²

Regression Estimates

	Outcome: Donation (in 1,000 VND)									
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Main Effects	(-)	(-/	(-)	(- /	(-)	(-)				
Victim Recipient	18.65 ⁺	34.04*	18.71 ⁺	27.45*	42.70**	27.75*				
("Your Pain")	(10.79)	(15.56)	(10.91)	(10.84)	(13.78)	(11.37)				
Decision Timing	-9.71	-9.84	-17.53	-17.97	-14.67	-19.90				
(1 if at the end)	(10.89)	(10.71)	(16.01)	(10.57)	(10.22)	(16.76)				
Victim Respondent	8.62	22.83	0.81	11.93	34.88+	9.90				
("My Pain")	(10.89)	(15.01)	(16.01)	(10.65)	(17.10)	(17.26)				
Interaction Effects										
Victim Recipient	– 28.69				- 38.12					
× Victim Respondent		(21.23)			(22.91)					
Decision Timing			14.82			3.59				
× Victim Respondent			(22.03)			(23.63)				
Demographic Controls				√	√	✓				
Average outcome	20	20	20	20	20	20				
Observations	28	28	28	27	27	27				
Adjusted R ²	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.34	0.41	0.30				

old estimates. Standard errors in parentineses.


Interaction Effects




- Recipient victim status is associated with an increase in the donation by non-victim households (dots)
 - yet the effect is invisible among victim households (triangles)
- "Your pain" effect in non-victim responses, but not among victims
 - No pain, no altruism?
 - Ceiling effect?
- Other moderation (interaction) effects remain less clear (next slide)
 - almost identical results with the logged outcome (Appendix)

Results 10/1


Interaction Effects





esults 11/14

Randomization Inference



Simulated Values (ATEs)
Randomization Inference (Exact) p-value: 0.039
Parametric (Asymptotic) p-value: 0.022

- Accounting for the small sample size (N = 28)
 - also the right-skewed outcome distribution
 - asymptotic approach would be ill-suited
- Randomization inference and asymptotic inference yield similar results for recipient victim status
 - with a sharp null hypothesis: $\tau_i = 0 \ \forall i$
 - without (Model 1, top), with controls (Model 4, bottom) (Young, 2019)

Results 12/3

Conclusion

Your Pain Is My Pain

- "Your pain" matters in generating post-war altruism
 - "Your pain" effect is visible among non-victims
 - "My pain" may also matter in shaping altruism
 - Information stimulus (decision timing) is negatively associated with altruism but remains less effective
- Dual legacies of war on altruism
 - "My pain" effect: War alters victim's behavior by direct damage (e.g., Bauer et al., 2016; Blattman, 2009) and indirect exposure/transmission (e.g., de Juan et al., 2024; Lindsey & Koos, 2024; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Wayne & Zhukov, 2022)
 - "Your pain" effect: War alters non-victim's behavior
 → Previously under-studied legacies of wartime violence
- **Lasting** legacies of political violence **beyond** the first-generation victims → transmission via interaction?

Conclusion 13/14

No Pain, No Altruism?

- Full-scale experiment is scheduled later this year with a bigger sample (hopefully 500, reflecting a power analysis)
- Design and estimation
 - Block random assignment by, e.g., respondent victim status (+ gender, household size)
- Experimental measures
 - Game: Ultimatum game, trust game, and envy game
 - **Behavioral:** Petition for WMD prohibition or related
 - Attitudinal: Sympathy for wartime violence victims (Hiroshima/Nagasaki/Palestine/Ukraine, etc.) and anti-US sentiments (perpetrator of indiscriminate violence)
- Mechanisms? Mediators?
 - causal processes (= indirect effect) and causal interactions
 (= conditioning effect of a mediator) (Acharya et al., 2018)

Conclusion 14/

Thank You

Gaku Ito // Osaka Metropolitan University

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E gaku@omu.ac.jp
W https://gaku-ito.github.io
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Duc Tran // Hiroshima University

E tranduc@hiroshima-u.ac.jp

Yuichiro Yoshida // Kwansei Gakuin University

E yuichiroyoshida@kwansei.ac.jp

Our Another Manuscript

W on the legacies of herbicidal warfare is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4512129


Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcome (dictator game)					
Donation	28	20	29.059	0	80
20/80 = 25% approximately matches the	e know	n experim	ental resu	lts (~ 30)%)
Herbicide victim status					
With herbicide victim dummy (1 = yes)	28	0.536	0.508	0	1
Household attributes					
Household size	28	3.357	1.789	1	7
Female household head dummy (1 = yes)	28	0.464	0.508	0	1
Wage income dummy (1 = yes)	28	0.929	0.262	0	1
Annual wage income (in million VND)	28	95.793	90.575	0	300
Respondent attributes					
Female respondent dummy (1 = yes)	28	0.571	0.504	0	1
Respondent's age	27	57.889	13.846	32	80
Respondent's education (years)	28	9.250	4.178	0	15
Not in regression models					
Residence duration (years)		16.714	18.378	5	72
(14 NAs = "for centuries")					
Number of herbicide victims		0.821	0.905	0	3
Number of died herbicide victims		0.286	0.659	0	3
Serious illness member dummy (1 = yes)		0.500	0.509	0	1
Number of seriously ill members	28	0.750	0.887	0	3


Appendix


Interaction Effect: Logged Outcome



Appendix 2/3

Randomization Inference





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