

# International Relations

WMG00801 | Spring 2020

---

<b>Instructor:</b>	Gaku Ito (IDEC 506)	<b>Time:</b>	Mondays 12:50 pm – 4:05 pm
<b>Email:</b>	<a href="mailto:gkit@hiroshima-u.ac.jp">gkit@hiroshima-u.ac.jp</a>	<b>Place:</b>	IDEC 206
<b>Phone:</b>	+81-(0)82-424-3724	<b>Office:</b>	After class or by appointment
		<b>Hours</b>	

---

**Course Description and Objectives:** War is inefficient as a political means to resolve underlying disputes. Why, then, do armed conflicts ever occur? Given the otherwise unnecessary human and material costs of fighting, why do disputants in some situations fail to strike a war-avoiding bargain? Why do some conflicts terminate within months while others last for years? What determines when and how conflicts end? The bargaining model of war — the now dominant theoretical approach in International Relations — sees conflict onset, continuation, and termination as a part of a continuous political bargaining process. This course approaches these questions on the causes and dynamics of armed conflicts, with a particular focus on the pre- and intra-war bargaining in international and domestic arenas.

The objectives of this course are threefold. The first objective is to introduce students to both theoretical and empirical researches in the existing literature of International Relations and related fields, with a particular focus on the bargaining model and strategic approaches. Second, this course thereby provides students with relevant scientific knowledge about the causes of inefficient fighting, both in international and domestic arenas. The third is to provide students with practical training to review literature and conduct their own theoretical and empirical studies.

**Prerequisites:** This course has no formal prerequisites. However, note that we will use four arithmetic operations. Familiarity with (undergraduate-level) Political Science, modern history of international relations, and game theory will be helpful, but not required.

The course schedule and requirements are subject to change. Updates will be announced in the first several weeks of the course.

**Requirements and Grade Policy:** Students are expected to do all the assigned readings, attend to every lecture, and participate in classroom discussion. Each week, we have a two-to three-period lecture followed by a one- or two-period classroom discussion. Grades will be based on participation in classroom discussion (30%), midterm essay (first draft of final research paper) and in-class presentation (30%), and final research paper and presentation (40%). No exams are assigned. Details on the requirements and expectations for the assignments will be announced 2–4 weeks before the deadlines. Acts of cheating and plagiarism will be punished according to Hiroshima University's policy.

The length of the final research paper will be 3,000–5,000 words in English (or 6,000–10,000 characters in Japanese; roughly 5–10 pages in either case) and cover a related topic to the course. Students submit a first draft with core research question(s), literature review, and tentative

hypothesis in the midterm essay, present it to the class (in 15–20 minutes), and “revise and resubmit” it as the final research paper with empirics.

***Note that students are expected to read and follow the recommendations of King, et al. (1994) and Johnson, et al. (2020) as well as the proposal template for graduate students in van Evera (1997) in their research projects. Presentations and research papers failing to address relevant topics, research questions, and/or research designs may not be considered as fulfilling the requirements.***

Students taking this course should regularly follow major academic debates and recently published articles in the major journals of political science, as well as keeping up on relevant world events by reading news media. Major journals relevant to this course include: *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *Annual Review of Political Science*, *International Organization*, *World Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *International Security*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Political Science Research and Method*, *Cooperation and Conflict*, *Comparative Political Studies*, and *Comparative Politics*, among others. Depending on their research interests, students are also strongly recommended to consult major journals in related fields such as *American Economic Review*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Econometrica*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Journal of Business and Economic Statistics*, *Economic Letters*, *Economics and Politics*, *Review of Economic Studies*, and *Political Analysis*.

## References:

### Main Text

1. Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2015. *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions* (Third Edition). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  
↪ 2nd (2015) or later edition

### Books (Political Science)

2. Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *Causes of War*. New York: Free Press. [Japanese translation available]
3. Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4. Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2020 *Peacekeeping in the Midst of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Kydd, Andrew H. 2015. *International Relations Theory: The Game-Theoretic Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Japanese translation available]
7. Pillar, Paul R. 1983. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton: Princeton University Press., Introduction–Chap. 1
8. Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
9. Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Japanese translation available]
11. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press. [Japanese translation available]

12. Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Walter, Barbara F. 2001. *Committing to Peace: Successful Settlements of Civil Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
14. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press. [Japanese translation available]

#### **Books (If you read Japanese)**

15. 浅古 泰史. 2018. 『ゲーム理論で考える政治学：フォーマルモデル入門』有斐閣 (esp. 第1, 9–12章)
16. 千葉 大奈. 2018. 「国家間戦争：交渉理論による理解」大芝 亮ほか編著『パワーから読み解くグローバル・ガバナンス論』有斐閣, 第4章.
17. 砂原 庸介・稗田 健志・多湖 淳. 2015. 『政治学の第一歩』有斐閣, 第10章.
18. 多湖 淳. 2020. 『戦争とは何か：国際政治学の挑戦』中央公論新社.

#### **Books (Research Design)**

19. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Japanese translation available]
20. Johnson, Janet Buttolph, H. T. Reynolds, and Jason D. Mycoff. 2020. *Political Science Research Methods*, 9th edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.
21. van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. [Japanese translation available]

#### **Book Chapters, Journal Articles, and Working Papers**

22. Brubaker, Rogers, & David D. Laitin. 1998. “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 423–452.
23. Cunningham, Kathleen G. 2013. Actor fragmentation and civil war bargaining: How internal divisions generate civil conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 659–672.
24. Cunningham, David E., & Lemke, Douglas. 2013. “Combining civil and interstate wars.” *International Organization* 67(3): 609–627.
25. Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.
26. Fearon, James D. 1996. “Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power.” Unpublished Manuscript, University of Chicago.
27. Fearon, James D. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 68–90.
28. Fearon, James D. 1998a. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” *International Organization* 52(2): 269–305.
29. Fearon, James D. 1998b. “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflicts.” In David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.) *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.107–126.
30. Fearon, James D. 1999. “Why Ethnic Politics and ‘Pork’ Tend to Go Together.” Unpublished Manuscript, University of Chicago.
31. Fearon, James D. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?”

- Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275–301.
32. Fearon, James D. 2006. “Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence.” In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 46.
  33. Fearon, James D. 2013. “Fighting rather than Bargaining.” Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University.
  34. Fearon, James D. 2018. “Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy.” *International Organization* 72(3): 523–559.
  35. Fearon, James D., & David D. Laitin. 2000. “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” *International Organization* 54(4): 845–877.
  36. Fearon, James D., & David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.
  37. Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, & Francesco Trebbi. 2015. “How Is Power Shared in Africa?” *Econometrica* 83(2): 465–503.
  38. Kalyvas, Stathis N., & Laia Balcells. 2010. “International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the Cold War shaped internal conflict.” *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 415–429.
  39. Kalyvas, Stathis N., & Matthew Adam Kocher. 2007a. “Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular War: Iraq and Vietnam.” *Politics & Society* 35(2): 183–223.
  40. Kalyvas, Stathis N., & Matthew Adam Kocher. 2007b. “How ‘Free’ is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem.” *World Politics* 59(2): 177–216.
  41. Kydd, Andrew H. 2010. “Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 101–121.
  42. Lake, David A. 2011. “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War.” *International Security* 35(3): 7–52.
  43. Lake, David A., & Robert Powell. 1999. “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach.” In David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1.
  44. Legro, Jeffrey W., & Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *International Security* 24(2): 5–55.
  45. Milner, Helen. 1991. “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.” *Review of International Studies* 17(1): 67–85.
  46. Milner, Helen. 1998. “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics.” *International Organization* 52(4): 759–786.
  47. Morrow, James D. 1999. “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Relations.” In David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.
  48. Morrow, James D. 2000. “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 63–83.
  49. Morrow, James D. 2007. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 559–572.
  50. Posner, Daniel N. 2004. “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi.” *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 529–545.
  51. Powell, Robert. 2002. “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 1–30.

52. Powell, Robert. 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information." *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 194–200.
53. Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60(1): 169–203.
54. Powell, Robert. 2013. "Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(2): 807–859.
55. Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427–460.
56. Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2017. "Information, Uncertainty, and War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 505–527.
57. Reiter, Dan. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27–43.
58. Rogowski, Ronald. 1999. "Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choices." In David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 4.
59. Roessler, Phillip. 2011. "The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa." *World Politics* 63(2): 300–346.
60. Roessler, Phillip & David Ohls. 2018. "Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States." *International Organization* 72(2): 423–454.
61. Schultz, Kenneth A. 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." *American Political Science Review* 92(4): 829–844.
62. Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization* 53(2): 233–266.
63. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003a. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 123–133.
64. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003b. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 621–632.
65. Slantchev, Branislav L., & Ahmer Tarar. 2011. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 135–148.
66. Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 79(4): 923–942.
67. Stein, Arthur A. 1982. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World." *International Organization* 36(2): 299–324.
68. Stein, Arthur A. 1999. "Actors and Preferences in International Relations." In David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 2.
69. Thomas, Jakana L., Reed M. Wood, & Scott Wolford. 2016. "The Rebels' Credibility Dilemma." *International Organization* 70(3): 477–511.
70. Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61(3): 821–840.
71. Walter, Barbara F. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51(3): 335–364.
72. Walter, Barbara F. 2009. "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 243–261.
73. Walter, Barbara F. 2017a. "The New New Civil Wars." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 469–486.



74. Walter, Barbara F. 2017b. "The Extremesit's Advantage in Civil Wars." *International Security* 42(2): 7–39.
75. Weinstein, Jeremy. M. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598–624.

### Course Page:

- Course materials will be available at <https://gaku-ito.github.io> and Bb9.

### Tentative Class Schedule:

Week 1 **Course Introduction** ..... April 20  
 This lecture will overview how scholars define and measure interstate, intrastate, and other types of armed conflict and introduce the students to the bargaining model of war.

- Lecture (no classroom discussion and student presentation)

Week 2 **A Strategic (Rationalist) Approach to International Relations: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions** ..... April 27  
 This lecture will introduce the students to the modern theories of International Relations and overview in the basic framework of "interests, interactions, and institutions" outlined in the Frieden, Lake, and Schultz (2015) book.

- Lecture and classroom discussion (no student presentation)

#### Readings

##### Required:

- **Main Text:** Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, Introduction–Chap.2
- Lake & Powell (1999)
- Legro & Moravcsik (1999)
- Milner (1991, 1998)
- Morrow (1999)
- Rogowski (1999)
- Snidal (1985)
- Stein (1982, 1999)

##### Recommended:

- Cunningham & Lemke (2013)
- Fearon (1998a)
- Olson (1963), Chaps. 1–3
- Schelling (1960), Chaps. 1–3
- Waltz (1959)

Week 3 **War as a Bargaining Failure** ..... May 11  
 The following four lectures (Weeks 3–6) will first introduce the rational choice approach and bargaining theory and overview the concept of "war as bargaining failure" to explain why war can ever occur despite its costs and inefficiency.

The lectures will then overview the basic building blocks of the bargaining model of war with the primary focus on the two central bargaining problems that cause war —

informational problem and credible commitment problem. The lectures also cover the perspective of issue individuality as a cause of war.

After introducing the bargaining model of war, the lectures also take a quick look at the roles of domestic politics and international institutions in shaping the core bargaining problems.

- Lecture, student presentation, and classroom discussion

#### Readings

##### *Required:*

- **Main Text:** Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, Chap. 3
- Fearon (1995)
- Powell (1999), Chap. 1

##### *Recommended:*

- Blainey (1988)
- Kydd (2010)
- Kydd (2015), Chaps. 4–6 (if you are familiar with undergraduate-level game theory)
- Morrow (2000, 2007)
- Pillar (1983), Introduction–Chap. 1
- Powell (1999), Chap. 1, (2002)
- Reiter (2003)
- Schelling (1960), Chaps. 1–3
- Schelling (1966), Chaps. 1–2, 6
- Walter (2001, 2009)

#### Week 4 **Information Problem: War Under Incomplete Information** ..... May 18

This lecture will introduce the concept of the information problem (or bargaining failure under incomplete information). We explore why and when uncertainty about each other's capability and/or resolve matter(s), and when uncertainty leads to inefficient fighting.

- Lecture, student presentation, and classroom discussion

#### Readings

##### *Required:*

- **Main Text:** Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, Chaps. 3–5
- Blainey (1988)
- Fearon (1995, 1997)
- Ramsay (2017)
- Reiter (2009), Chaps. 1–3, 11
- Schelling (1960), Chaps. 1–3, 7–10
- Schelling (1966), Chaps. 1–2, 6
- Slantchev & Tarar (2011)
- Powell (1999), Chap. 1

##### *Recommended*

- Kydd (2015), Chaps. 4–6 (if you are familiar with undergraduate-level game theory)

- Putnam (1988)
- Morrow (1999)
- Schultz (1998, 1999)
- Schultz (2001), Preface–Chap.4
- Slantchev (2003b)
- Tomz (2007)

#### Week 5 **Commitment Problem: War Under Complete Information** ..... **May 25**

This lecture will introduce the concept of the credible commitment problem (or bargaining failure under perfect and complete information). By extending the time horizon of the model and introducing power shifts over time, we explore why and when bargaining fails into inefficient fighting without uncertainty or asymmetric information.

- Lecture, student presentation, and classroom discussion

#### Readings

##### *Required:*

- **Main Text:** Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, Chaps. 3–5
- Fearon (1995, 1996, 1998a,b, 2004)
- Powell (1999), Chap. 1, (2002, 2004, 2006)
- Reiter (2009), Chaps. 1–3, 11
- Schelling (1960), Chaps. 1–3, 7–10
- Schelling (1966), Chaps. 1–2, 6
- Walter (1997, 2009)

##### *Recommended*

- Fearon (2013, 2018)
- Kydd (2015), Chaps. 4–6 (if you are familiar with undergraduate-level game theory)
- Powell (2013)
- Lake (2011)
- Morrow (2007)
- Slantchev (2003a)

#### Week 6 **Issue Individuality and Mid-Term Presentation** ..... **June 1**

This lecture will summarize the building blocks and logics of information and commitment problems, followed by a brief introduction to the concept of issue individuality (bargaining over “indivisible” goods).

Students present and discuss rough drafts of their final research project, with primary research question(s), literature review, tentative hypothesis, and methods. The final version (not the midterm version) of research papers are expected to present a systematic discussion on what causes and stops interstate and/or intrastate conflicts and how third-parties or political institutions can(not) facilitate conflict prevention and resolution.

- Lecture, student presentation, and classroom discussion

#### Readings

##### *Required:*

- **Main Text:** Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, Chaps. 3–5



- Fearon (1995)
- Powell (2006)
- Walter (2009)

*Required:* (for mid-term presentation)

- King et al. (1994), Preface–Chap. 5
- Johnson et al. (2020), Preface–Chap. 4
- van Evera (1997), Chaps. 3–5 and Appendix

*Recommended*

- Kydd (2015), Chaps. 4–6 (if you are familiar with undergraduate-level game theory)

## Week 7 **Civil Conflicts: Rebel Mobilization and Domestic Bargaining** ..... **June 8**

This lecture will explore the determinants of bargaining processes in domestic arena, with particular focuses on information and commitment problems. This lecture will also pay careful attention to rebel mobilization and collective action problem, thereby examining the similarities and differences between international disputes and domestic conflicts.

- Lecture, student presentation, and classroom discussion

### Readings

*Required:*

- **Main Text:** Frieden, Lake, and Schultz, Chap. 6
- Brubaker & Laitin (1998)
- Cunningham (2013)
- Cunningham & Lemke (2013)
- Fearon (1998b, 1999, 2004, 2006)
- Fearon & Laitin (2000, 2003)
- Francois et al. (2015)
- Kalyvas & Balcells (2010)
- Kalyvas & Kocher (2007a,b)
- Kydd (2010)
- Olson (1963), Chaps. 1–3
- Posner (2004)
- Roessler (2011)
- Roessler & Ohls (2018)
- Thomas et al. (2016)
- Walter (1997, 2001, 2009, 2017a,b)
- Weinstein (2005)

*Recommended*

- Fortna (2008), Chaps. 1, 4, 6
- Hultman et al. (2020), Chap. 1
- Kydd (2015), Chaps. 4–6 (if you are familiar with undergraduate-level game theory)

## Week 8 **Presentation & discussion (final research paper)** ..... **June 15**

Students present drafts of their final research projects to the class, followed by a classroom

discussion. Students are expected to submit their manuscript before the presentation and revise and resubmit it as the final research paper.

#### Readings

*Required:* (for final presentation)

- King et al. (1994), Preface–Chap. 5
- Johnson et al. (2020), Preface–Chapter 4
- van Evera (1997), Chaps. 3–5 and Appendix