

Is Your Pain My Pain? Altruistic Legacies of Herbicidal Warfare in Vietnam

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Introduction

How Does War Foster Altruism?





- ❖ Exposure to **political violence** fosters **altruism** and **prosocial behavior** (e.g., Bauer et al., 2016, 2014; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Dinas et al., 2021; Lindsey & Koos, 2024; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Wayne & Zhukov, 2022)
 - ❖ **identification** challenge of **confounding** and **collider** bias
- ❖ Insights from **a lab-in-the-field experiment** in Da Nang, Vietnam (pilot experiment, with $N = 30$)
 1. **“My pain”** effect: Herbicide victims behave **altruistic**
 2. **“Your pain”** effect: **Non-victims** behave **altruistic toward** victims

Experiment Design

Sample, Survey Mode, etc.

- ❖ **“Hard-to-reach” population:** Herbicide victims and their families/descendants
 - ❖ We are somehow (officially) granted **access to the herbicide victims (households) in Da Nang, Vietnam**
 - ❖ Two major **US air bases** for Operation Ranch Hand (1962–1971): Bien Hoa (near Ho Chi Minh City/Saigon) and **Da Nang** air bases
- ❖ **Sample:** 15 households (each) **with/without** herbicide victims (30 in total) in 24 villages in **Hoa Hai** (commune), **Da Nang** (district)
 - ❖ Survey mode: Face-to-face (online is infeasible)
 - ❖ Date: August 28–September 2, 2023
 - ❖ We ended up with **a sample of 28(/30) households** due to errors in the field

S-NAS-HERBS File, 1961–1971



Study Area: Hoa Hai, Da Nang



Outcomes and Covariates

Behavioral Outcome

- ❖ **Dictator (sharing) game** (next slide) \rightsquigarrow today's talk

Attitudinal Outcome

- ❖ Government/party support \rightsquigarrow **⊗ NOT** approved
- ❖ Institutional/interpersonal trust \rightsquigarrow **⊗ NOT** approved
 - ❖ both **direct** questioning and **indirect** approaches (e.g., crosswise model, endorsement and list experiments)

Demographic Variables, etc.

- ❖ **Covariates**: Household and respondent attributes (education, gender, household size, etc., Appendix)
- ❖ **Other outcomes**: Social and political organization membership/leadership (results not reported here)

Dictator Game and Treatment

Dictator (Sharing) Game

- ❖ Respondents receive VND 80K ~ a half-day wage
 - ❖ Minimum hourly wage in Vietnam ~ VND 20K ~ USD 0.8
- ❖ decide how to **share** (“donate”) the VND 80K with an **anonymous recipient** with an increment of 10K (0–80K)

Randomized Treatments



1. **Recipient status**: Household **with/without** herbicide victim(s) \rightsquigarrow **“your pain”**
2. **Decision timing**: Dictator game at the **beginning/end** of the herbicide-related survey \rightsquigarrow **information stimulus**

Observed Herbicide Victim Status


- ❖ **Respondent status**: With 1+ victims or not \rightsquigarrow **“my pain”**
- ❖ echoing the **key variable** in previous studies

Results

Naïve Difference



Naïve Difference



- ❖ **“Your pain” effect: Recipient victim status** is associated with an **increase** in donation of **VND 18.6K** (from 10.7K to 29.3K)
- ❖ **“My pain” effect: Respondent victim status** is associated with an **increase** in donation of **VND 8.6K**
 - ❖ **consistent** with existing literature
 - ❖ yet the association remains statistically **indeterminate**
- ❖ **Decision timing** (after the survey) is associated with a **decrease** in donation amount of **VND 7.1K**
 - ❖ and remains **inconclusive**

Regression Estimates

Outcome: Donation (Dictator Game, in 1,000 VND)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Main Effects

Victim Recipient ("Your Pain")	18.65 ⁺ (10.79)	34.04* (15.56)	18.71 ⁺ (10.91)	32.32* (11.54)	50.14** (14.20)	33.82* (12.28)
Decision Timing (1 if at the end)	-9.71 (10.89)	-9.84 (10.71)	-17.53 (16.01)	-20.11 ⁺ (10.63)	-16.87 (9.96)	-26.39 (17.37)
Victim Household ("My Pain")	8.62 (10.89)	22.83 (15.01)	0.81 (16.01)	6.22 (11.65)	30.54 ⁺ (16.73)	-0.74 (19.18)


Interaction Effects

Victim Recipient × Victim Household	- 28.69 (21.23)				- 42.21 ⁺ (22.24)	
Decision Timing × Victim Household			14.82 (22.03)			11.21 (24.13)

Demographic controls				✓	✓	✓
Pre-1961 resident FE				✓	✓	✓
Average outcome	20	20	20	20	20	20
Observations	28	28	28	27	27	27
Adjusted R ²	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.35	0.45	0.32


OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$.

Heterogeneous Effects




- ❖ **Recipient victim status** is associated with an **increase** in the donation by **non-victim households** (dots, Model 2)
 - ❖ yet the effect is **invisible** among **victim** households (triangles)
- ❖ **“Your pain”** effect in **non-victim** responses, but **not** in **victims’**
 - ❖ **Ceiling effect?** (up to 80K)
- ❖ **Heterogeneous effect** on **behavioral** outcome
 - ❖ similar to previously-reported **effect heterogeneity** (Dinas et al., 2021; Wayne & Zhukov, 2022)

Heterogeneous Effects



Respondent (Observed)



- Non-victim
- ▲ Victim



Decision Timing (Randomized)

- Beginning
- ▲ End

Randomization Inference



- Accounting for the **small sample size** ($N = 28$)
 - also the right-skewed outcome distribution
 - asymptotic approach would be ill-suited
- Randomization inference** and **asymptotic** inference yield **similar** results for **recipient** victim status
 - with a sharp null hypothesis: $\tau_i = 0 \quad \forall i$
 - without (Model 1, top), with controls (Model 4, bottom) (cf. Young, 2019)

Conclusion

Your Pain Is My Pain

- ❖ **“Your pain”** matters in generating post-war **altruism**
 - ❖ “Your pain” effect is visible among **non-victims**
 - ❖ “My pain” might also foster **altruism**
 - ❖ **Non-victims’** choices were **swayed** by the “your pain” treatment, but **victims’** were not \rightsquigarrow effect **heterogeneity**
- ❖ **Dual legacies** of war on **altruism**
 1. **“My pain” effect:** War alters **victim’s behavior** via **direct exposure** (e.g., Bauer et al., 2014; Bellows & Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009) and **indirect exposure/transmission** (e.g., Lindsey & Koos, 2024; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Wayne & Zhukov, 2022)
 2. **“Your pain” effect:** War alters **non-victim’s behavior**
 \rightsquigarrow **Previously under-studied legacies** of political violence
- ❖ **Lasting legacies** of political violence **beyond** the first-generation victims \rightsquigarrow **transmission** via **interaction?**

No Pain, No Altruism?

- ❖ **Full-scale experiment** is scheduled later this year with a **bigger sample** (hopefully 500, reflecting a power analysis)
- ❖ **Design and estimation**
 - ❖ **Block random assignment** by, e.g., respondent victim status (survivors/descendants + gender, household size)
- ❖ **Experimental measures/outcomes**
 - ❖ **Behavioral**: (1) **Games** (ultimatum game, trust game, and envy game) and (2) **risk propensity** (dichotomous choice, coin toss or not, keeping the expected value constant)
 - ❖ **Attitudinal**: (1) **Sympathy** for wartime violence victims (Hiroshima/Nagasaki/Palestine/Ukraine) and (2) anti-US **sentiments** (perpetrator of indiscriminate violence)
- ❖ **Mechanisms? Mediators? Moderators?**
 - ❖ causal **processes** (= indirect effect) and causal **interactions** (= conditioning effect of a mediator) (Acharya et al., 2018)

Thank You

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Our Another Manuscript


W on the legacies of herbicidal warfare is available at:
`https://ssrn.com/abstract=4512129`

Appendix

Descriptive Statistics


	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcome (dictator game)					
Donation	28	20	29.059	0	80
20/80 = 25% approximately matches the known experimental results (~ 30%)					
Herbicide victim status					
With herbicide victim (1 = yes)	28	0.536	0.508	0	1
Household attributes					
Pre-herbicide (1961) resident (1 = yes)	28	0.536	0.508	0	1
Household size (N family members)	28	3.357	1.789	1	7
Female household head (1 = yes)	28	0.464	0.508	0	1
With wage income (1 = yes)	28	0.929	0.262	0	1
Annual wage income (in million VND)	28	95.793	90.575	0	300
Respondent attributes					
Female respondent (1 = yes)	28	0.571	0.504	0	1
Respondent's age	27	57.889	13.846	32	80
Respondent's education (years)	28	9.250	4.178	0	15
Not in regression models					
Residence duration (years; NA = "for centuries")	14	16.714	18.378	5	72
Included as pre-herbicide resident					
N herbicide victims	28	0.821	0.905	0	3
N died herbicide victims	28	0.286	0.659	0	3
Family member(s) with serious illness (1 = yes)	28	0.500	0.509	0	1
N family members with serious illness	28	0.750	0.887	0	3

Heterogeneity: Logged Outcome




Respondent (Observed)

- Non-victim (blue circle)
- Victim (orange triangle)



Respondent (Observed)

- Non-victim (blue circle)
- Victim (orange triangle)




Decision Timing (Randomized)

- Beginning (pink circle)
- End (purple triangle)


Randomization Inference

Respondent Victim, Model (1)




Simulated Values (ATEs)
Randomization Inference (Exact) p-value: 0.457
Parametric (Asymptotic) p-value: 0.436

Respondent Victim, Model (4)




Simulated Values (ATEs)
Randomization Inference (Exact) p-value: 0.602
Parametric (Asymptotic) p-value: 0.601

Decision Timing, Model (1)



Simulated Values (ATEs)
Randomization Inference (Exact) p-value: 0.400
Parametric (Asymptotic) p-value: 0.381

Decision Timing, Model (4)



Simulated Values (ATEs)
Randomization Inference (Exact) p-value: 0.119
Parametric (Asymptotic) p-value: 0.078

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