

Stateless

Recon phase:

Stateless

[Home](#)[Profile](#)[Flag](#)

A stateless webpage.

This is a crypto challenge, not a web challenge. Mind the padding.

Stateless

[Home](#)[Profile](#)[Flag](#)

User profile.

You can edit and check your data.

First name

michael

Last name

per

Nickname

mike

Age

26

University

a

Job

sut

☒ Admin (Readonly)

Submit

Hint – Mind the padding and the challenge is easy.

At this time I have no idea which encryption but I keep it in mind.

There is 3 pages:

Home – show us the hint.

Profile – construct information about me.

Flag - only admins can reach there.

Inside the page there is no authentication phase so, I assume that the authentication came from the cookies.

I investigate the meaning of the term "stateless" and I realized that like JWT the server save piece of data in client side cookie to store the state of the user, in our case: Admin or not.

When I rewrite the Profile with different parameters I saw that my cookie is changed.

Something else that I saw from first look on cookie is that there another encryption with base64 after the main encryption.

I decide to look more into the network flow to see if I can distinguish something about the data that send from me to the server and I saw that I sent the raw data like this:

"firstname=michael&lastname=per&nickname=mike&age=26&university=a&job=sut"

I assumed that the full string is like:

"firstname=michael&lastname=per&nickname=mike&age=26&university=a&job=sut&admin=0"

Because when I trying to reach profile page I got:


```
{"admin": "0", "age": "26", "firstname": "michael", "job": "sut", "lastname": "per", "nickname": "mike", "university": "a"}
```

Probably the server takes this input and reconstruct some encrypted output.

Weapon phase:

Before I select the right weapon I saw weird pattern that connected to the hint in the beginning, each time that I changed the parameters in the Profile page I got cookie with length that is a multiple of 32.

I search more in the internet and intersect the easy knowledge of the challenge and I came with the idea that the encryption is AEC with mode ECB.



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode decryption

Now I know that the raw data that I sent parsed to blocks of strings with 32 bytes length.

After playing with AES in ECB mode with myself I saw that if the string has 16 bytes the algo generates automatically more 16 bytes with the same key and padding.

My attack:

All the string length before the `&admin=0` will be modulo 16 so the last block plaintext contains only `&admin=0` and padding

Before the last block inject `&job= AAA...`. Contains 2 blocks and another block string that ends with `&admin=1`.

Copy the block encryption that ends with `&admin=1` and copy paste without the block before and remove the last block.

Then I got the flag.