

Build to deliver

Public services and the politics of administration

Galileu Kim

Princeton University

November 28, 2017

Overview:

- Motivation.

Overview:

- Motivation.
- The case: Brazil.

Overview:

- Motivation.
- The case: Brazil.
- Research question.

Overview:

- Motivation.
- The case: Brazil.
- Research question.
- Extant literature and theoretical debate.

Overview:

- Motivation.
- The case: Brazil.
- Research question.
- Extant literature and theoretical debate.
- Next steps.

Overview:

- Motivation.
- The case: Brazil.
- Research question.
- Extant literature and theoretical debate.
- Next steps.
- Conclusion.

It all began...



...in Peru.

- A journey to municipalities in the Andes.

...in Peru.

- A journey to municipalities in the Andes.
 - Nurses → healthcare.

...in Peru.

- A journey to municipalities in the Andes.
 - Nurses → healthcare.
 - Teachers → education.

...in Peru.

- A journey to municipalities in the Andes.
 - Nurses → healthcare.
 - Teachers → education.
- Local service delivery.

...in Peru.

- A journey to municipalities in the Andes.
 - Nurses → healthcare.
 - Teachers → education.
- Local service delivery.
 - Public services as administration.

...in Peru.

- A journey to municipalities in the Andes.
 - Nurses → healthcare.
 - Teachers → education.
- Local service delivery.
 - Public services as administration.
 - Political decision.

Across the world:

- Local service delivery is global.

Across the world:

- Local service delivery is global.
 - Decentralization in developing and developed world.

Across the world:

- Local service delivery is global.
 - Decentralization in developing and developed world.
 - Falletti 2010, Ferwerda 2015.

Across the world:

- Local service delivery is global.
 - Decentralization in developing and developed world.
 - Falletti 2010, Ferwerda 2015.
 - Delegation to local governments.

Across the world:

- Local service delivery is global.
 - Decentralization in developing and developed world.
 - Falleti 2010, Ferwerda 2015.
 - Delegation to local governments.
 - Ahmad and Brosio 2008.

Across the world:


- Local service delivery is global.
 - Decentralization in developing and developed world.
 - Falleti 2010, Ferwerda 2015.
 - Delegation to local governments.
 - Ahmad and Brosio 2008.
 - Restructuring of public services delivery.

Across the world:

- Local service delivery is global.
 - Decentralization in developing and developed world.
 - Falleti 2010, Ferwerda 2015.
 - Delegation to local governments.
 - Ahmad and Brosio 2008.
 - Restructuring of public services delivery.
 - OECD 2016.

Delegation in the world:


Local Share of Expenditures
(% of Total)



Source: IMF

Welfare implications:

Relationship between Education Level and
Welfare Outcomes in Brazil:
Municipal Teachers and Doctors



Source: RAIS, IBGE, PNUD.

Control for logged population, year-fixed effects, urbanization,
income inequality, extreme poverty, average wage.

Case study:

- Brazil.

Case study:

- Brazil.
 - Primary education and healthcare under municipal jurisdiction.

Case study:

- Brazil.
 - Primary education and healthcare under municipal jurisdiction.
 - Arretche 2016.

Case study:

- Brazil.
 - Primary education and healthcare under municipal jurisdiction.
 - Arretche 2016.
 - Municipal autonomy over hiring decisions.

Case study:

- Brazil.
 - Primary education and healthcare under municipal jurisdiction.
 - Arretche 2016.
 - Municipal autonomy over hiring decisions.
 - Pessoa 1988.



Case study:

- Brazil.
 - Primary education and healthcare under municipal jurisdiction.
 - Arretche 2016.
 - Municipal autonomy over hiring decisions.
 - Pessoa 1988.
 - Unique dataset of all municipal bureaucrats from 1984-2015.

Case study:

- Brazil.
 - Primary education and healthcare under municipal jurisdiction.
 - Arretche 2016.
 - Municipal autonomy over hiring decisions.
 - Pessoa 1988.
 - Unique dataset of all municipal bureaucrats from 1984-2015.
 - RAIS (Annual Report of Social Information).



Expenditure, local share:



Source: Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional

—●— National —●— State —●— Municipal

Personnel, local share:



Source: RAIS

State Municipal

Map of Teachers:


Education Level: Teachers (2010)



Lower School High School
Middle School College


Source: RAIS

Research question:




- Under what conditions do local politicians hire competent bureaucrats to deliver public services?

Research question:




- Under what conditions do local politicians hire competent bureaucrats to deliver public services?
 - Intersection of politics and public administration.

Research question:




- Under what conditions do local politicians hire competent bureaucrats to deliver public services?
 - Intersection of politics and public administration.
 - Tendler 1997, Geddes 1994.

Research question:




- Under what conditions do local politicians hire competent bureaucrats to deliver public services?
 - Intersection of politics and public administration.
 - Tandler 1997, Geddes 1994.
 - Two public services:

Research question:



- Under what conditions do local politicians hire competent bureaucrats to deliver public services?
 - Intersection of politics and public administration.
 - Tandler 1997, Geddes 1994.
 - Two public services:
 - Education (teachers).

Research question:



- Under what conditions do local politicians hire competent bureaucrats to deliver public services?
 - Intersection of politics and public administration.
 - Tandler 1997, Geddes 1994.
 - Two public services:
 - Education (teachers).
 - Healthcare (doctors and nurses).

Extant Literature:

- Three strands of literature.

Extant Literature:

- Three strands of literature.
 - State capacity.

Extant Literature:

- Three strands of literature.
 - State capacity.
 - Developmental state and bureaucracies.

Extant Literature:

- Three strands of literature.
 - State capacity.
 - Developmental state and bureaucracies.
 - Clientelism/patronage.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.
- State → local states.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.
- State → local states.
 - Weberian state decentralized.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.
- State → local states.
 - Weberian state decentralized.
 - Falletti 2010, Eaton 2004.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.
- State → local states.
 - Weberian state decentralized.
 - Falletti 2010, Eaton 2004.
- State capacity → capacities.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.
- State → local states.
 - Weberian state decentralized.
 - Falletti 2010, Eaton 2004.
- State capacity → capacities.
 - Uneven capacities.

State capacity:

- What is the state capable of?
 - Taxation, industrialization, neither.
 - Tilly 1994, Kohli 2004, Van de Walle 2001.
- State → local states.
 - Weberian state decentralized.
 - Falletti 2010, Eaton 2004.
- State capacity → capacities.
 - Uneven capacities.
 - Skocpol 1985, Bersch et al. 2016, Centeno et al. 2017.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.
 - Educated, meritocratic, depoliticized.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.
 - Educated, meritocratic, depoliticized.
- Political entrepreneurship and change over time.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.
 - Educated, meritocratic, depoliticized.
- Political entrepreneurship and change over time.
 - Weber's wall of separation.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.
 - Educated, meritocratic, depoliticized.
- Political entrepreneurship and change over time.
 - Weber's wall of separation.
 - Grindle 2012, Geddes 1994.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.
 - Educated, meritocratic, depoliticized.
- Political entrepreneurship and change over time.
 - Weber's wall of separation.
 - Grindle 2012, Geddes 1994.
 - Ideal type → changing institutions.

Developmental state and bureaucracy:

- Variation in state capacity.
 - Bureaucracy → economic development.
 - Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004.
 - Institutional characteristics.
 - Educated, meritocratic, depoliticized.
- Political entrepreneurship and change over time.
 - Weber's wall of separation.
 - Grindle 2012, Geddes 1994.
 - Ideal type → changing institutions.
 - Thelen 1999, Tandler 1997.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017
- Patronage as clientelistic redistribution.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017
- Patronage as clientelistic redistribution.
 - Public jobs to loyalists or party members.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017
- Patronage as clientelistic redistribution.
 - Public jobs to loyalists or party members.
 - Calvo and Murillo 2004, Hagopian 1997, Grindle 2012.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017
- Patronage as clientelistic redistribution.
 - Public jobs to loyalists or party members.
 - Calvo and Murillo 2004, Hagopian 1997, Grindle 2012.
- Patronage refined.

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017
- Patronage as clientelistic redistribution.
 - Public jobs to loyalists or party members.
 - Calvo and Murillo 2004, Hagopian 1997, Grindle 2012.
- Patronage refined.
 - Who gets hired?

Clientelism and patronage:

- Political motivation behind goods allocation.
 - Politicians (and voters) as strategic actors.
 - Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2015, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2017
- Patronage as clientelistic redistribution.
 - Public jobs to loyalists or party members.
 - Calvo and Murillo 2004, Hagopian 1997, Grindle 2012.
- Patronage refined.
 - Who gets hired?
 - What qualifications?

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:
 - Data gathering effort largely concluded.

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:
 - Data gathering effort largely concluded.
 - Descriptive and causal analysis ongoing.

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:
 - Data gathering effort largely concluded.
 - Descriptive and causal analysis ongoing.
- Incorporating qualitative evidence.

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:
 - Data gathering effort largely concluded.
 - Descriptive and causal analysis ongoing.
- Incorporating qualitative evidence.
 - Fieldwork in Brazil.

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:
 - Data gathering effort largely concluded.
 - Descriptive and causal analysis ongoing.
- Incorporating qualitative evidence.
 - Fieldwork in Brazil.
 - Explore accounts of local administrative changes.

Next steps:

- From framing to testing:
 - Data gathering effort largely concluded.
 - Descriptive and causal analysis ongoing.
- Incorporating qualitative evidence.
 - Fieldwork in Brazil.
 - Explore accounts of local administrative changes.
 - Motivations and decision-making process.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.
 - State-society synergy.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.
 - State-society synergy.
 - Evans 1996

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.
 - State-society synergy.
 - Evans 1996
 - Party turnover (time horizon).

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.
 - State-society synergy.
 - Evans 1996
 - Party turnover (time horizon).
 - Akhtari et al. 2017.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.
 - State-society synergy.
 - Evans 1996
 - Party turnover (time horizon).
 - Akhtari et al. 2017.
 - Overlapping jurisdiction.

Possible mechanisms:

- Politicians decide who to hire, retain or fire.
 - Education level.
 - Type of contract (permanent or temporary).
 - Wage.
 - Work experience (years).
- Possible mechanisms:
 - Economic modernization.
 - State-society synergy.
 - Evans 1996
 - Party turnover (time horizon).
 - Akhtari et al. 2017.
 - Overlapping jurisdiction.
 - Gulzaar and Pasquale 2017.

Data:

- Data collection effort.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.
 - Breakdown by function, 1998-2010.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.
 - Breakdown by function, 1998-2010.
 - Electoral data.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.
 - Breakdown by function, 1998-2010.
 - Electoral data.
 - Mayoral elections from 1994 to 2014.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.
 - Breakdown by function, 1998-2010.
 - Electoral data.
 - Mayoral elections from 1994 to 2014.
 - Education and healthcare infrastructure.

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.
 - Breakdown by function, 1998-2010.
 - Electoral data.
 - Mayoral elections from 1994 to 2014.
 - Education and healthcare infrastructure.
 - Unique Health System (SUS).

Data:

- Data collection effort.
 - Demographic census.
 - Municipal level, 1980-2010.
 - Municipal budget.
 - Breakdown by function, 1998-2010.
 - Electoral data.
 - Mayoral elections from 1994 to 2014.
 - Education and healthcare infrastructure.
 - Unique Health System (SUS).
 - School census.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.
- Going local.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.
- Going local.
 - Municipal governments and capacities.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.
- Going local.
 - Municipal governments and capacities.
 - Executive leadership and personnel.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.
- Going local.
 - Municipal governments and capacities.
 - Executive leadership and personnel.
- Build to deliver.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.
- Going local.
 - Municipal governments and capacities.
 - Executive leadership and personnel.
- Build to deliver.
 - Bureaucracies as changing institutions.

Conclusion:

- Public service as administration.
 - Bureaucratic organization behind delivery.
- Going local.
 - Municipal governments and capacities.
 - Executive leadership and personnel.
- Build to deliver.
 - Bureaucracies as changing institutions.
 - Political decisions behind these changes.

Thank you!

- Please send comments to galileuk@princeton.edu.