Do museums promote reconciliation? Evidence from a field experiment in Santiago, Chile POL 591 Draft

Laia Balcells* Valeria Palanza † Elsa Voytas ‡§

March 31, 2017

This is a work in progress! Please don't cite or circulate. Thank you.

Abstract

How do memorial museums impact visitors? This project draws on evidence from a field experiment studying the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile to begin to answer this question. We suggest that memorial museums both impart knowledge and elicit emotional reactions among their visitors. Our findings suggest that though perceptions of museums vary along ideological lines, they lead to 1) greater support of democratic institutions and a rejection of governance associated with the repressive period and 2) increased concern with modern day injustices. At the same time, museums do not generate significant ideological change or increase support for other transitional justice policies. Moreover, though museums do not seem to exacerbate or stoke tension along the lines of those sympathizing with and those critical of the Pinochet regime, we find only weak support that they explicitly encourage reconciliation along these divides but stronger evidence that visiting a memorial museum induces convergence on potentially divisive political issues. We also consider differing experiences according to relationships with victims from the period of repression.

*Duke University. Email: laia.balcells@duke.edu

†Universidad Católica de Chile Email: vpalanza@uc.cl

‡Princeton University. Email: evoytas@princeton.edu

§A heartfelt thank you for valuable feedback from: ESOC participants at Princeton, Naoki Egami, Kosuke Imai, Jake Shapiro, Brandon de la Cuesta, Lucy Martin, Josh Kertzer, Brendan Cooley, Daniela Urbina Julio, Yang-Yang Zhou, PRESS participants at Princeton, Consuelo Amat, Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Carrie Barnett, Gema Garcia-Albacete, Héctor Cebolla, and Pablo Argote Tironi.

1 Introduction

In the aftermath of World War II and the Jewish holocaust, hundreds of museums and memorials rose up to commemorate the victims and remember the atrocities that transpired. Since then, similar efforts have been made to address a society's sensitive past, Rwanda has established the Kigali Memorial Centre, the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Cambodia now commemorates victims of the Khmer Rouge regime, and the National September 11 Memorial and Museum was opened in 2014 recounting the devastating terrorist attacks of 2001. These few examples are emblematic of a larger trend wherein the victims of conflict and crimes against humanity are commemorated through the inauguration of museums and memorial sites. The prevalence of such sites, however, begs the question: how do they impact visitors and observers?

The conventional wisdom suggests that by reconstructing the past, museums and memorials highlight a society's troubled past, recounting the grave human rights abuses that transpired while simultaneously paying tribute to victims. In doing so, it has often been assumed that visiting such museums will encourage respect and tolerance - not only toward those negatively impacted by the past conflict, but in contemporary relationships. Others have highlighted, however, how these physical spaces can serve as a reminder of a conflictual past, perhaps activating divisive ideologies Jelin (2007). In either case, these changes should be reflected in individuals' interpersonal attitudes, serving to stoke or mute societal cleavages. Moreover, the post-conflict or post-repression settings where museums are constructed are often areas where transitional justice policies are currently being formulated, debated, and implemented. Thus, we might expect that visiting a museum - where individuals are exposed to the human rights violations committed and encouraged to actively engage with their history - will impact individuals' attitudes toward policies designed to confront these periods. Further, this experience may translate into changed opinions of political figures directly associated with or supportive of the dictatorship, as well as political institutions associated with it. These notions - that visiting a museum might affect individuals' intergroup attitudes and political beliefs - have yet to be tested.

This project describes a first attempt to do so. We carried out a field experiment to evaluate the impact of a visit to a site memorializing victims of General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile: the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos (Museum of Memory and Human Rights, hereafter MMDH). In March 2017, we randomly assigned Chilean university students to a treatment group that visited the museum for one hour, or a control group, who merely met up at a campus computer lab to complete the same survey as those completed after the museum visit. We therefore leverage our random assignment procedure to make causal inferences regarding the impact of a museum visit on a variety of outcomes. Specifically, we probe the ways in which a visit to MMDH alters individual-level emotions, political beliefs, and interpersonal attitudes.

We find that museum visits significantly impact individuals' emotions and shape their perceptions toward political institutions. After visiting the MMDH, participants are more likely to support democracy, oppose military governments, and distrust the police. The visit also appears to affect attitudes toward contemporary debates with roots in the period of conflict, moving individuals with divergent pre-treatment political views closer toward convergence. However, our evidence suggests that visitors to museums are no more likely to support or oppose transitional justice policies than their counterparts in a control group. Nor do our results suggest that visiting a museum induces explicit attitude change toward one's ingroup or outgroup or perceptions of overall social cohesion. Tentatively, these results suggest that museums generate subtle advances toward reconciliation though their ability to increase agreement on divisive political issues rather

than by explicitly altering perceptions of others.

With our results, we seek to advance our understanding of the effects of museums and memorials addressing a society's history, not just in Chile, but across the world.

2 Transitional Justice and Museums

Following a transition to democracies, states find themselves in a precarious position. Newly installed governments must adjudicate amongst often incompatible societal demands and practical realities. Citizens in a post-repression or post-conflict society may call for punishment of former perpetrators in an effort to attain acknowledgment of the crimes that transpired and hold those who committed them accountable for their actions. At the same time, however, leaders are likely to be hyper aware of the potentially destabilizing effects of doing so. Moreover, those who carried out violations during the period of repression or conflict are unlikely to welcome measures intended to expose their guilt and validate their victims. These dynamics, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, develop in an environment characterized by "omnipresent fear, during the transition, and often long after political democracy has been installed, that a coup will be attempted and succeed" (23) (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

Thus, newly democratized states face an initial difficult decision: how will they address past injustices without disrupting prospects for a successful democratic transition? Though transitional justice policies, or the policies a society invokes in an effort to restore peace and normalcy after periods of conflict or severe repression, are not ubiquitous (Samii 2013), the so-called "third-wave" of democratization (Hungtinton 1991) ushered in numerous transitioning states, most of which implemented some or many components of transitional justice. Modern transitioning societies thus face a series of additional difficult decisions: which policies will they invoke? How will these policies be implemented? And critically, how will these policies impact society?

Transitional justice consists of a set of procedures to deal with atrocities committed by an autocratic regime or during a violent conflict. They can be divided into three overlapping categories: (a) justice measures aimed at punishing former perpetrators for human rights violations or depriving them of illegitimate privileges; (b) policies aimed at providing material and/or symbolic reparation for victims; (c) truth revelation procedures (Aguilar, Balcells and Cebolla 2011). Accounts of the three categories and their application in transitioning societies abound, describing the mechanisms implemented in Rwanda, Cambodia, Argentina, Chile, Sierra Leone, Peru, and numerous other states. From these analyses, we have learned about the preferences of citizens in transitioning societies (Aguilar, Balcells and Cebolla 2011; Samii 2013; Pham and Vinck 2010; Grossman et al. 2015; Nalepa 2012), the varying mechanisms adopted (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010; Lira 2011), and the factors that increase the likelihood of adoption (Dancy et al. 2010; Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010).

However, we know less about how effective transitional justice policies are, and whether they manage to lead societies towards reconciliation and, ultimately, long-lasting peace. Several advances have been made in this area recently, investigating the impacts of trials, truth commissions, and reparations.

Truth commissions, or groups established to gather evidence surrounding the crimes committed during the conflict period, have perhaps been the most studied. Scholars studying the South African Truth and

Reconciliation Commission have found 1) little support for hypothesized positive effects (i.e. increased sense of truth and reconciliation) of the commission among those most harmed by prior repression (Gibson 2006) evidence that over time, dissatisfaction with the process grows (Backer 2010). More recently, a truth and reconciliation intervention with randomly selected conflict-affected villages in Sierra Leone documented the costs and benefits of the policy; though participants were more likely to increase trust and forgiveness of perpetrators and develop social capital, they were also more likely to suffer harmful psychological effects (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016).

The evidence concerning post-conflict prosecutions is also mixed. Cross-national evidence suggests that trials can deter would-be human rights violators, thereby decreasing the incidence of crimes against humanity (Sikkink 2011). At the individual level, though some studies suggest that trials appear increase the perception of justice (David and Choi 2009) and that punishment increases pro-democratic attitudes (Capoccia and Pop-eleches N.d.), detrimental psychological effects have also been documented among those participating in criminal trials (Brounéus 2010).

Finally, studies have found that material compensation can increase civic trust de Grieff (2006) though their interpretations tend to vary with degrees of victimization (Sveaass and Sønneland 2015) and victims often feel that the policy does not adequately address or compensate them for the atrocities they faced (Svensson 2000; Laplante and Phenicie 2009).

3 The Effects of Museums

Despite a renewed focus on understanding the effects of transitional justice policies, still unknown is how engagement with one aspect of transitional justice might impact an individuals' political attitudes, such as support for certain political actors, their trust in institutions, and their support for other transitional justice policies. This is especially the case when we consider the societal and individual impact of symbolic spaces such as memorials.

Research concerning symbolic transitional justice has thus far been largely theoretical. Scholars note how monuments, museums, plaques, and other markers can be used for a variety of reasons. First, they can serve to embody memories. In this way, they reconstruct the past and "serve as vehicles for the intergenerational transmission of historical memory" (Hamber 2006). Second, politicians or other state actors can use these memory sites as mediums through which actors can make political affirmations, propagate a certain version of a contested history (Hamber 2006; Jelin 2007).

Third, they can commemorate the victims, serving as a form of symbolic reparation for the atrocities they suffered Hamber (2006); Jelin (2007). Often, they accomplish all three simultaneously. In achieving these objectives, some museums and memorials explicitly seek to alter attitudes and perceptions among those who encounter them; others seek to do so implicitly or not at all.

Though we have theoretical notions of the way in which museums are constructed and how they function, we lack a complete understanding of how they operate in practice. This 591 seeks to investigate the extent to which visitors to a specific memorial museum - The Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile -alter their political beliefs and perceptions of others.

Given what we have reviewed about the purposes of museums and impact of transitional justice policies,

how should we expect a visit to a transitional justice museum to impact its visitors? From the transitional justice scholarship, we know that transitional justice policies are unlikely to affect everyone uniformly and that their effects may vary over time. In addition to studies focused explicitly on transitional justice, we can also glean theoretical insights from scholarship concerning political opinion change and intergroup attitudes.

We posit that museums constitute an experiential and emotive engagement with one's national history. As such, the intervention encourages reflection on political and intergroup phenomena and may therefore result in varying levels of changes in beliefs and attitudes. Recent randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have demonstrated how interventions can alter perceptions of social norms of intergroup prejudice in post-conflict societies (**?**)Paluck2009a, Paluck2008, and how reconciliation policies can promote forgiveness, despite sometimes inducing trauma (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016). Moreover, in contrast to theories maintaining the persistence of political beliefs (Tesler 2015)), recent field experiments draw on theories of active processing (Petty, Haugtvedt and Smith 1995)and perspective-taking to suggest that short-term interventions can induce significant and durable changes in individuals' political attitudes and behavior (Broockman and Kalla 2016). This suggests that an intervention in the form of a visit to a memorial might result in sizable shifts in visitors' attitudes and preferences.

At the same time, however, visiting a museum is a complex experience that is likely to generate effects of varying sizes on varying outcome measures. As already mentioned, not only do museums present information that may be new to visitors, they reconstruct a historical narrative, emphasizing certain events and facts and de-emphasizing others. Thus, museums act as a sort of framing mechanism, with the potential to reorient thinking on a subject (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 2007; Chong and Druckman 2007). Though museums have the potential to shape perceptions, we note that these effects are likely to vary along a number of dimensions. We thus consider separately the following three dependent variables: 1) political attitudes (specifically ideological preferences, views toward political institutions, and transitional justice beliefs), 2) intergroup attitudes, and 3) views toward current inequality. We also suggest that an individual's experience and engagement with a museum is likely to vary according to prior experiences and beliefs, so we examine heterogeneity across pre-treatment ideological preferences and relationship to victims from the repressive period.

3.1 Political Attitudes

First, we consider the effects that a visit will have on political beliefs. Before doing so, we distinguish between strong, or crystallized, political attitudes and ones that are more malleable. Crystallized attitudes are persistent over time, resistant to new information, and condition the processing of new information (Sears 1975, 1983, 2001; Petty, Haugtvedt and Smith 1995; Tesler 2015). Weaker attitudes, in contrast, are less fully formed and therefore more susceptible to change in the presence of new information. For our purposes, we adopt this distinction, suggesting that we are more likely to evince changes in individuals' weaker - rather than core - beliefs.

A significant body of research in psychology and political science demonstrates the durability of ideological attachments (Sears 1983; Tesler 2015). Even in the midst of powerful primes, partisan affiliation acts as a core, crystallized political view. Moreover, research has also documented the strong influence and attachment to party elites Zaller (1992). We therefore analyze ideological predisposition and evaluation of specific politicians in our political beliefs hypothesis and expect these views to entrench rather than change.

3.2 Political Institutions

Second, in contrast to the relative stability of core beliefs, research has documented greater variation among an individual's issue-based political beliefs, particularly those that are not aligned with any particular party platform Tesler (2015). Considered as such, memorial museums engage with a host of malleable political beliefs. Museums frame and discuss political institutions in certain ways, often implicitly or explicitly condemning the political institutions associated with the time period being memorialized while venerating those that came about during transition periods. Thus, we hypothesize that the content of the museum, by exposing and highlighting the negative experiences with authoritarian institutions, is thus likely to increase support for democracy and other institutions centrally opposed to the authoritarian regime (in this case, the church). At the same time, visitors are likely to decrease their support for institutions associated with the dictatorship (i.e. the military and police) as well as their general beliefs toward military governments. We title this the political institutions hypothesis.

3.3 Transitional Justice Attitudes

Third, transitional justice museums aim to reconstruct memory. In doing so, they provide historical accounts of victim experiences in an interactive manner. In line with recent research that has documented the sizable changes in attitudes based on active processing and induced empathy, we expect that visiting a transitional justice museum will increase support for transitional justice policies (Broockman and Kalla 2016; Shechter and Salomon 2007). For example, after the visit, a pilot participant wrote "[The museum] touches on the important themes of the dictatorship with the principal focus on the victims. Human rights need emphasis and should be promoted by the Chilean state." Also, because transitional justice issues are not identified as part of a core partisan platform, we expect that they will exhibit more variation than an individual's political identity. This is the logic underlying the transitional justice hypothesis.

3.4 Intergroup Attitudes

We hypothesize that museums will have a damaging effect on social cohesion. Intergroup bias, defined by (Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002), is "the systematic tendency to evaluate oneâĂŹs own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members" has been well-documented across political orientations (Balliet, Wu and De Dreu 2014; Balliet et al. 2016; González et al. 2008). In this case of our experiment, we expect that those on the right may feel threatened or offended by the negative portrayal of their co-partisans (Steele, Spencer and Aronson 2002) increasing animus toward those on the left and positive evaluations of those on right. On the other hand, we expect a similar phenomenon for participants on the left; the visit will serve to highlight the crimes committed by individuals on the right, and therefore increase negative feelings toward their outgroup. In this way, our intergroup attitudes hypothesis predicts that a visit to a transitional justice museum may harm intergroup relations.

3.5 Modern-Day Injustice

Finally, we expect that being exposed to past injustices may increase empathy with those currently disadvantaged. In addition to remembering past atrocities, memorial museums often explicitly seek to ensure that similar injustices do not repeat themselves. Moreover, by highlighting historical patterns, museums invite visitors to compare contemporary situations with those of the past, allowing them to note the ways in which society has changed or remained consistent since the period being documented.

3.6 Heterogeneity

We will focus on two sources of heterogeneity: 1) by ideology and 2) by relationship to victim.

First, we expect that those on the right are more likely to see the museum as biased. We expect to find evidence of this among those in the treatment group.

Second, we expect that those with close familial ties to victims will experience smaller attitude shifts as a result of treatment. This is because those closely related to conflict victims are unlikely to be shocked by the material inside the museum and are less likely to learn new information. However, it may be the case that these individuals are more traumatized or emotionally impacted by the museum, similar to findings that suggest that transitional justice can by psychologically trying for victims who relive their traumatic pasts Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi (2016); Brounéus (2010).

3.7 Hypotheses

In sum, our hypotheses are as follows:

- **Intergroup attitudes hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will harm perceptions of intergroup relations.
- **Political attitudes (institutional) hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will cause visitors to reject the political institutions associated with the military dictatorship.
- **Political attitudes (ideological) hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will entrench existing political views.
- **Political attitudes (transitional justice) hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will increase support for transitional justice policies.
- **Political attitudes (current inequalities) hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will increase individuals' awareness of current inequalities and injustices.

3.8 Durability

When individuals' attitudes change, a key question concerns the persistence of that change. While some research has shown that effects are fleeting (**?**) others persist months down the line Broockman and Kalla (2016); Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi (2016). We lack a clear of understanding, however, of the mechanism that results in durable versus ephemeral change. This makes it fairly difficult to predict whether changes from a

museum visit will be durable. We aim to help refine this puzzle by estimating the longevity of shifts resulting from a museum visit.

4 The Chilean Case

4.1 The Military Dictatorship

Because many countries, such as Rwanda, Cambodia, Peru, and Germany, have undergone transitions after periods of dictatorship or governmental repression and have constructed memorials and museums to commemorate the victims of these periods, our research proposal could be applied to a wide range of cases. We propose Chile as a first case but hope to expand to other locations in the future.

In 1970, socialist Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile. Capitalizing on domestic discontent due to rising prices and food shortages as well as international support from the US, the Chilean military and national police staged a coup, overthrowing Allende's administration and installing their own regime. A military dictatorship ruled Chile from 1973-1990. During this time, General Augusto Pinochet and a military junta oversaw a period of systematic repression. As in much of the Southern Cone and throughout Latin America during the Cold War period, political dissidents were disappeared, tortured, detained, and murdered.

In 1978, the military regime passed an amnesty law protecting themselves from future prosecutions for human rights violations committed between 1973 and 1978 - a law which remains in place today. In 1980, Pinochet established a new constitution which called for a popular referendum eight years later, granting citizens the opportunity to approve of or reject the military junta candidate (Pinochet himself) in upcoming elections. In the 1987 referendum, 55.99 % of Chilean voters voted "NO", ousting Pinochet and initiating a transition to democracy. In late 1989, Patricio Aylwin was democratically elected president, though Pinochet remained Commander-in-Chief of the Army until 1998 as specified by the 1980 constitution.

After the return to democracy, Aylwin established the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation which released the Rettig Report in 1981. The report documented over 2,000 disappearances during the Pinochet regime. Later, a second truth commission documented 80,000 political prisoners, 30,000 victims of torture, and 3,200 deaths. The commission's report, the Valech Report, released the names of individuals who were tortured, but a fifty-year secrecy law prevents public or judicial access to victim testimonies (Collins 2016).

Additionally, despite the fact that the amnesty law remains in tact, human rights advocates, lawyers, and politicians have circumvented the provision, resulting in numerous trials and subsequent sentences for those convicted of committing human rights violations during the Pinochet years (Collins 2016). Alongside these justice measures and truth-finding policies, individuals and the government have also established symbolic transitional justice measures, in the form of museums, memorials, and landmarks.

4.2 Chile today

Chile is an ideal case to begin the study transitional justice museums and memorials for a number of reasons. First, as will be described further be.ow, the construction of museums and memorials has taken place in the intervening years since the democratic transition. Additionally, the transition from dictatorship happened over 25 years ago, ensuring that the issues we seek to study are less sensitive than in a country with a more recent transition. That said, the dictatorship and the role of Pinochet are still largely debated among the general public. Many Chileans denounce the dictatorship altogether, while others believe that Pinochet helped their nation evade a communist takeover and instead instilled an era of economic growth. Recent public opinion polls help to illustrate this divide. In 2013, 55% of Chileans responded that the military dictatorship was bad or very bad, while 9% regarded the dictatorship as good or very good and 21% were split on the matter (CERC 2013). With regard to compensating the victims of the dictatorship, a poll found that 30% felt the state should do more, 36% said enough had been done, and the rest were undecided (CERC 2013, BBC News 2013). More recently, in 2015, a poll found that one in five Chileans maintained a positive view of Pinochet, and 75% suggested that Chilean society had not fully reconciled since the transition to democracy (Alvarez 2015). In many contexts, these debates are refueled. Claims that those convicted of human rights violations currently serving prison sentences are accorded unfair privileges, that the Valech secret should be revealed, and that the amnesty law should be annulled are commonplace. Thus, this split in public opinion provides an ideal environment where we can measure the impact of memorials and museums on individuals who begin the experiment with differing opinions on the subject. This will allow us to 1) isolate the role of the museum without fear of ceiling effects and 2) investigate heterogeneity among those with varying perceptions of and relationships to the dictatorship.

4.3 Establishment of the Museum

As briefly mentioned above, since Pinochet left power, Chile has invoked a number of transitional justice mechanisms, including reparations, two truth commissions and reports, and trials for military officials. Several sites have emerged to commemorate the victims of the dictatorship. For the most part, these sites have been constructed at symbolic locations (i.e. former torture centers or other meaningful locations). For example, a former site of detention and interrogation, Villa Grimaldi opened as a memorial site in 1994. These have been orchestrated by victims' groups or other individuals seeking to commemorate those affected by the military regime.

In 2007, President Michelle Bachelet announced the construction of a state-funded memorial museum, the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos, which was inaugurated in 2010. The creation of the museum itself was a political process, as the inauguration occurred very near the 2010 presidential election, and attracted large crowds and prominent leaders and politicians (Kornbluh and Hite 2010). Moreover, the construction of the museum replaced an extant effort by human rights NGOs to create a museum that would house their artifacts, creating tensions between these activists and those leading the effort to create a different museum (Opotow 2015). At the same time, conservative groups also criticized the museum for presenting a biased version of the dictatorship, by excluding the period preceding the military coup. The designers were aware of the sensitivity surrounding the museum. An excerpt from Opotow (2015) describes how this was a central concern:

"As Marcial Corteś-Monroy of Color de Arboles, the Chilean design firm that had been selected in the competition for the exhibition design. A key challenge of the exhibition, he says, is that "in Chile today there are strong opinions that are against what the museum says. There are a lot of people who think favorably of Pinochet."...To address this political divide, he designed the exhibition to speak to the larger country rather than to a specific faction of it. He emphasized that "the most important part is not to pretend to have an absolute truth." ..."

5 Research Design

In this section, we describe more fully our research design, the contents of the treatment, and our identification strategy.

5.1 Treatment description

To assess the effect of visiting a memorial museum, this project utilizes a field experiment. In doing so, we randomly assigned university students to a treatment group or a control group, where the treatment involved a museum visit and the control group completed surveys to allow us to credibly estimate a treatment effect. In this section, we provide a brief description of our treatment which consists of visiting the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos.

To test the effects of this treatment, we recruited a random sample of students from the Pontificia Universidad Catolica (UC) in Santiago, Chile. We worked with the Institutional Research Office at UC to administer two surveys to a random sample of first, second, and third year undergraduate students (N=9,000). 1,857 subjects responded to our simple survey, supplying basic covariates. We also listed all the museums in Santiago; respondents indicated which they had been to. We excluded any participants who responded that they had already visited the Museum of Memory and Human Rights. This left us with a total N of 914. [1]

In March 2017, we emailed a survey to these 914 individuals, asking if they wished to participate in the research project and obtaining their availability during the research period (March 21-28, 2017). A total of 502 indicated that they wished to participate and provided their availability. Based on their responses, we 1) conducted matched pair randomization, identifying individuals similar in their ideology and gender and participating in the experiment at the same time (Imai, King and Nall 2009); and 2) distributed a survey designed to measure basic covariates as well as pre-treatment views on some of our key dependent variables, with the exception of those addressing Pinochet, human rights, or transitional justice. We opted to measure these variables only after treatment so as not to induce experimenter demand.

Our experimental design is graphically depicted in Figure 1.

We invited a treatment (N=251) and control group (N=251) to meet at a central location at UC, where individuals randomly assigned to the control group completed a survey in a computer lab, and those in the treatment group boarded a bus which took them to the museum. We randomly assigned seating and asked

[1] Despite our efforts to exclude individuals who had already visited the museum, we are aware of a small percentage who visited the museum between the administration of our baseline survey and the treatment. Future analyses will estimate the impcat of excluding these individuals from analysis.

Figure 1. Experimental timeline and design.



subjects not to talk to each other throughout the course of their participation. Each treatment group was accompanied by one of the authors listed here and a research assistant.

On the trip to the museum, participants were given a museum map with highlighted stations. This was done to ensure that the museum visit would be contained within a one hour window. Participants were then told to meet back at the entrance of the museum in one hour. Upon arrival to the museum, all our participants were given a Spanish language audio guide and asked to meet back at the entrance in one hour where they completed a survey about their experience, which included questions designed to measure our key dependent variables. This survey was emailed to participants during their visit, and after the hour elapsed, participants immediately completed the post-treatment survey on their personal telephones or individual iPads. This approach has the virtue of minimizing spillover among treatment groups. Additionally, the self-administered survey completed on a participant's own device may help to elicit honest responses to sensitive questions (Daly, Paler and Samii 2016; Tourangeau and Yan 2007).

We had a sizable amount of noncompliance during our experiment; though both treatment and control consisted of 251 assigned individuals, 138 individuals assigned to treatment (55%) and 127 individuals assigned to control (50.6%) showed up at their assigned time. Table 1 presents covariate balance. Before correcting for the false discovery, we note that our covariates are imbalanced on ideology, victim relationship, and views toward the military government and current inequality. Though these differences appear not to be concerning after implementing the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure, we nevertheless present methods to address this in the next section.

Variable	Control	Treatment	$p-value$	$q-value$
Age	21.09	20.91	0.61	1.00
Gender	1.64	1.63	0.88	1.00
Ideology	4.55	5.10	0.03	0.34
Most common major	Engineering (10%)	Engineering (16%)		
Victim relationship	0.28	0.18	0.07	0.66
Democracy	1.07	1.07	0.98	1.00
Political interest	1.50	1.40	0.31	1.00
Military government	0.24	0.37	0.03	0.33
Government satisfaction	0.82	0.83	0.88	1.00
Confidence in church	1.04	1.07	0.79	1.00
Trust	1.86	1.90	0.78	1.00
Divided society	2.44	2.36	0.38	1.00
Current inequality	3.71	3.51	0.04	0.36
N	126	131		

5.2 Visiting the museum

Visitors to the museum enter by descending a walkway framed by concrete walls displaying the United Nations's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon entering, visitors can choose to use an audio guide or visit the museum without. As noted, all our participants used a Spanish language audio guide. The museum's first floor contains the exhibit "Human Rights: A Universal Challenge." This exhibit describes cross-national experiences with crimes against humanity and policies invoked to address them.

After climbing a wide staircase to the second floor, visitors immediately confront an open space with videos, text, and interactive exhibits recounting the military coup. The remainder of the second floor details the repressive nature of the Pinochet regime, with descriptions of policies invoked to limit political dissent, the international community's reaction, and the internal operations of the Chilean police forces. In addition, the second floor contains a section with intimate accounts of repression and torture as described by victims themselves through a series of videos and the recreation of a torture cell. The second floor therefore facilitates an emotional and empathic reaction among visitors.

The third floor shifts the focus from the repressive nature of the regime and describes the growing resistance to the Pinochet dictatorship and its eventual defeat. In particular, it details efforts by religious groups to assist victims and their families, resistance movements among local artists, and protests organized by students. A large section of the third floor recreates the plebiscite vote, with videos documenting the campaign and the reactions to the vote. Finally, an enclosed platform, lit with small candles, allows visitors to view photos of numerous victims from the Pinochet era. Still, by focusing on the courageous actions of the resistance and the defeat fo Pinochet, the third floor conveys a message of hope and triumph.

5.3 Estimation

To estimate the complier average treatment effect (CATE) of a museum visit, our main specification estimates our post-treatment dependent variable while controlling for its pre-treatment level. This procedure is commonly used in experimental research to lower variance and increase power (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016).

We thus fit the following regression:

$$Y_{1ij} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma X_{ij} + \delta Y_{0ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where Y_{1ij} and Y_{0ij} refer to the outcome of interest post and pre-treatment, respectively, for individual i in section j. The interaction term δY_{0ij} allows the pre-treatment effect to vary over time, according to the time difference between when an individual completed the pre-treatment survey and participated in the expertiment [2]. X_{ij} indicates a vector or pre-treatment covariate controls. T_{ij} indicates treatment assignment, and β estimates the CATE. Though we made every effort to individualize the treatment, we cluster standard errors at the section level, allowing standard errors to be correlated within our unit of treatment allocation.

For transitional justice dependent variables, where we did not obtain pre-treatment measurements in an attempt to reduce experimenter demand, we estimate a similar but modified regression:

$$Y_{1ij} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

.

Again, β estimates the CATE.

6 Preliminary Results

6.1 Descriptive Results

We begin by presenting descriptive results of participants' perceptions of the museum. Anecdotally, our qualitative results suggest that an individual's ideological preference conditions his/her experience in the museum. After exiting MMDH, we asked individuals what their perception of the museum was. Two excerpts from these responses are illustrative.

> "Little objectivity, 100% politically charged with a tendency to ignore facts that are relevant for this historical period." - Subject self-scoring 8/10 on the ideological scale

> "Remembering is critical if we are to move forward. But Chile requires more than just remembering. The existence of this museum is fundamental and absolutely necessary for students of all primary and secondary schools and all univerisities. Everyone should come and remember, but it should be the first step in a longer process of reconciliation." - Subject self-scoring 3/10 on the ideological scale

By and large, our data align with these two anecdotes. As shown in Table 1, perceptions vary significantly along ideological lines. Those on the right are significantly more likely to believe that the museum has a left bias and that it inhibits societal advancement (by focusing too much on the past). Meanwhile, those on the left are more likely to respond that the museum exceeded their expectations, impacted them emotionally, and

[2] Though all individuals were sent the pre-treatment survey a week before their assigned time slot, some individuals completed the survey immediately upon distribution while others completed it closer to treatment

that it is important for other Chileans to visit the museum. There is no statistical difference, however, among left and right individuals reporting that they learned new information in the museum. Though perceptions clearly vary along ideological lines, our main results suggest that these heterogeneous perceptions do not preclude attitudinal change along our key dependent variables.

Table 1. Each row represents a separate t-test on the variable specified in the left-most column. Unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured along a 4-point Likert scale (from 0 = no agreement to 3 = complement agreement (i.e. higher values indicating higher levels of agreement)). Means are reported among those on the left and the right. Q-values computed via BH procedure.

	Left	Right	$p-value$	$q-value$
Museum had left bias	1.33	1.65	0.03	0.10
Museum had right bias	0.52	0.59	0.51	0.51
Exceeded expectations	2.62	2.41	0.09	0.18
Emotional impact	2.64	2.33	0.01	0.04
Inhibits advancement	0.13	0.73	0.00	0.00
Important for Chileans	2.82	2.46	0.00	0.00
Info was new to me	1.00	1.09	0.33	0.65
Observations	45	79		

6.2 Main Results

We turn now to our main results and considering evidence pertaining to our hypotheses. Note that these hypothesis tests are registered in a pre-analysis plan found at http://egap.org/content/do-museums-promote-reconciliation-field-experiment-santiago-chile. Though in the future we plan to create indices of our questions pertaining to each dependent variable, I present preliminary evidence concerning the constructs of these proposed indices.

For each test, we consider the following populations 1) our entire sample, 2) those classified as right-leaning according to their pre-treatment self-location on a 0-10 ideology scale, 3) those self-identifying as left-leaning, 4) participants whose grandparents, uncles, aunts, parents, or cousins were victimized during the military dictatorship,[3] and 5) those without a familial relationship to victims.

First, we find little evidence suggesting that visiting a museum directly harms intergroup attitudes. As Table 2 shows, visitors to a museum do not appear to alter their general views on trust, betrayal, or the notion that Chile is a society divided among the left and the right. Moreover, if anything, it appears that individuals actually increase their trust in members opposite their ideological preference, though the increases are not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Second, we find sizable support for our political institutions hypothesis, which suggested that after visiting a museum, individuals would be more likely to reject the political institutions associated with the military dictatorship and more likely to embrace those associated with democracy. Table 3 documents our findings, showing that overall satisfaction with and trust in the government increases after visiting the Museum of Memory and Human Rights.

At the same time, trust in the police declines significantly, particularly among the right. [4]. It is interesting

[3] This is a fairly blunt way of characterizing victimization. We also measured how familial contacts were victimized, and we intend to create a more precise scale of victimization in future analyses.

[4] This is likely due, at least in part, to floor effects among those on the left. In future analyses, we plan to investigate this further

Table 2. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment (measured via a 5-point Likert scale). The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level.

	Intergroup Attitudes Hypothesis				
	All	Right	Left	Victim Family	No victim Relationship
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Trust in					
Left	0.18* (0.1)	0.22* (0.16)	0.11 (0.12)	0.22 (0.19)	0.20* (0.11)
Right	0.13* (0.08)	0.15 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)	0.12 (0.21)	0.14 (0.11)
General views					
Betrayal	0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.11)	0.09 (0.15)	0.08 (0.19)	0.06 (0.08)
Trust	0.06 (0.08)	0.09 (0.10)	0.01 (0.14)	−0.17 (0.19)	0.141(0.1)
Divided society	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.115 (0.085)	0.038 (0.069)
Observations	257	145	112	59	198

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

to note that though trust in the police declines in a meaningful way, decreases in military trust are not significant. This may be because MMDH emphasizes the distinct roles of the Chilean military and the repressive secret police force (DINA) who were primarily responsible for torture and human rights violations during the dictatorship period.

Satisfaction with democracy (measured on a 4-point Likert scale) also increases following a museum visit, particularly among those on the left. At the same time, support for a military government drops significantly after visiting a museum, particularly among those on the right, whereas those on the left were unlikely to support it from the start. [5]Measured before treatment, only 6 individuals on the left agreed with the statement that they would "support a military government in favor of a democratic one if things got very bad.")

After visiting MMDH, individuals increase their trust in the church. These results are particularly interesting because of the way in which the church is portrayed throughout the museum. The church devotes a sizable exhibit space to resistance organized by religious groups and victim assistance provided by church organizations. In particular, it documents the Vicaria de la Solidaridad, a human rights organization that arose during the Pinochet dictatorship to oppose human rights violations and take care of victims' families. The organization was deemed threatening by the military government, and its members and a former leader were kidnapped and brutality murdered in what became referred to as Caso Degollados (Slit-Throat Case). This suggests that the way in which MMDH frames issues does indeed generate significant attitudinal adjustments.

We suggested that because ideologies are core to individual's identities, we did not expect them to change significantly with a museum visit. Table 4 offers support for this notion. We also examine the likelihood that participants would vote for UDI (the party most closely associated with the dictatorship) or the Partido Socialista (a leftist party whose leader, Michelle Bachelet, established the museum). Though it appears that

[5](

Table 3. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level

	Political Institutions Hypothesis				
	All	Right	Left	Victim Family	No victim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Satisfaction with					
Govt	0.183** (0.072)	0.134 (0.087)	0.273** (0.124)	0.136 (0.133)	0.181** (0.086)
Military	−0.035 (0.067)	−0.031 (0.071)	−0.094 (0.101)	−0.015 (0.231)	−0.020 (0.079)
Police	−0.134 (0.085)	−0.223** (0.103)	0.014 (0.109)	−0.292** (0.121)	−0.085 (0.092)
Democracy	0.148* (0.089)	0.109 (0.098)	0.179** (0.084)	0.231 (0.138)	0.120 (0.103)
Trust in					
Govt	0.127** (0.057)	0.064 (0.081)	0.206 (0.125)	0.214 (0.128)	0.095 (0.081)
Military	−0.103 (0.080)	−0.079 (0.100)	−0.123 (0.090)	−0.092 (0.132)	−0.100 (0.110)
Police	−0.171** (0.072)	−0.269** (0.123)	−0.076 (0.156)	−0.010 (0.135)	−0.195** (0.076)
Church	0.22*** (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.32* (0.19)	0.41*** (0.15)	0.17** (0.07)
Support for					
Military gov	−0.110*** (0.033)	−0.156*** (0.049)	−0.003 (0.037)	−0.134** (0.066)	−0.106*** (0.036)
Observations	257	145	112	59	198

visiting a museum makes respondents slightly more likely to favor left-leaning parties over their right-leaning counterparts, the effect is not significant.

Table 4. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level

	Ideological hypothesis				
	All	Right	Left	Victim Family	No victim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideology	−0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.15)	−0.23 (0.19)	−0.17 (0.15)	−0.04 (0.09)
Pinochet feeling thermometer	−0.36 (1.97)	1.16 (3.25)	−1.81 (2.69)	−1.04 (5.08)	−0.27 (2.49)
Vote for UDI	−0.10 (0.19)	0.07 (0.19)	−0.44 (0.33)	−1.01 (0.72)	−0.02 (0.20)
Vote for Partido Socialista	0.34 (0.21)	0.15 (0.28)	0.70** (0.31)	−0.02 (0.59)	0.56** (0.28)
Observations	257	145	112	59	198

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Turning now to the evidence concerning transitional justice, our hypothesis that visiting the museum would increase support for transitional justice policies does not seem to receive much support. Though the coefficients go in the hypothesized direction, only the statement that "The military as an institution should show remorse and make a public apology" receives significantly more support after treatment. These results are surprising. We suspect that they may partially be due to MMDH's lack of coverage of contemporary dealings with those who committed human rights violations. In fact, the concluding section of MMDH paints a rosy

picture of the reestablishment of democracy. In future analyses, we will aim to examine how agreement with statements such as "Dwelling on the past presents progress" might help to explain these results. For now, these results suggest that MMDH functions more as a transitional justice policy itself, rather than as a means through which to shore up support for other policy initiatives.

Table 5. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. Variables measured on a 4 point Likert scale (unless otherwise noted). The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level

	Transitional justice hypothesis				
	All	Right	Left	Victim Family	No victim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Level of agreement with					
Lack of accountability	−0.16 (0.12)	−0.13 (0.17)	0.002 (0.18)	0.06 (0.28)	−0.16 (0.15)
Army hasn't changed enough	−0.18 (0.13)	−0.10 (0.16)	−0.28 (0.17)	−0.26 (0.32)	−0.10 (0.13)
Pinochet names/symbols removed	−0.10 (0.15)	−0.21 (0.19)	−0.31 (0.21)	−0.23 (0.17)	−0.27 (0.21)
Support for					
Victim recompensation	0.14 (0.11)	0.15 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	0.04 (0.16)	0.18 (0.12)
Trials	0.05 (0.07)	0.13 (0.10)	−0.04 (0.14)	−0.12 (0.15)	0.11 (0.07)
Public apology	0.21** (0.10)	0.25* (0.15)	0.16 (0.13)	−0.21 (0.27)	0.32** (0.14)
Keeping amnesty (0-1)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.005 (0.06)
Observations	257	145	112	59	198

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, we consider evidence concerning changes in attitudes toward current policies. As suggested earlier, the content in the museum invites visitors to compare the historical period memorialized with contemporary realities. As one participant writes:

> "The experience of reliving the events of the past made me realize how much we still lack being an inclusive democracy and guaranteeing the rights of everyone. You could appreciate how the cleavage between rich and poor was very salient during the dictatorship and still today...they still lack employment and they are always hungry which is normal in a country that favors the interests of the businesspeople and not regular people."

Specifically, we consider agreement with three statements: 1) torture is sometimes necessary, 2) inequality is a problem in Chilean society, and 3) censorship is necessary to maintain moral standards. We select these three issue areas because they were both relevant during the time of the dictatorship but they also are highly debated today. Though views toward torture do not appear to be significantly altered after visiting a museum overall, those on the left are less likely to believe it is justifiable. Overall, participants are more likely to believe that inequality is a problem in Chilean society and less likely to believe that censorship is necessary after treatment. These effects are higher on the right. Because individuals on the left are more likely to hold views that inequality is problematic and that censorship is unnecessary from the start, these findings therefore suggest that individuals on the right and left are moving closer together on divisive issues after visiting a transitional justice museum.

Table 6. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level

	Current policies				
	All	Right	Left	Victim Family	No victim
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Torture sometimes necessary	−0.02 (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	−0.19** (0.09)	−0.17 (0.13)	−0.0001 (0.08)
Inequality is a problem	0.12*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.09)	0.17** (0.07)
Censorship necessary	−0.19*** (0.07)	−0.18** (0.08)	−0.24 (0.15)	−0.55** (0.26)	−0.10 (0.08)
Observations	257	145	112	59	198

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.3 The Emotional Pathway

Thus far, our results suggest that memorial museums generate sizable attitudinal shifts with regard to political institutions and views toward modern-day policies. In this section, we shed some light on one possible mechanism: the notion that a museum visit generates an emotion reaction from visitors. On both pre-treatment and post-treatment surveys in the treatment and control group, we asked participants to respond to the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson and Clark 1988). This construct, used often in psychology, asks respondents to consider a slew of positive and negative emotions and indicate how much they feel that way in the present moment.

First, we consider the positive emotions constituting the scale. These emotions (listed separately in figure 2) can be added together to create one positive score (labelled as "Positve") in the figure. Full regression results are included in the appendix.

As shown in Figure 2, those in the treatment group are unlikely to experience meaningful diversions from their control counterparts. However, we also note that those leaving the museum are more likely to feel inspired - perhaps due to the positive message conveyed by the museum or the desire to want to enact change after leaving MMDH. Differences along ideological lines are minimal.

Next, we consider the negative affect schedule in Figure 3.

Museum visitors are more likely to feel scared, fearful, embarrassed, hostile, afraid, guilty, disgusted, and tense than those in the control group. Ideological differences are minimal, though it appears that relationships to victims may mute the emotional impact of visiting a museum.

Taken together, the positive and negative results provide suggestive evidence that the emotional experience of a museum may act as a mediating variable when we consider our dependent variables. We aim to fully explore this possibility through formal causal mediation analysis in future studies.

Figure 2. Positive Affect Schedule



Figure 3. Negative Affect Schedule



7 Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps

This project presents a first analysis of the impact of visiting a transitional justice museum in a post-conflict or post-repressive society. We conducted a field experiment in Santiago, Chile, leveraging random assignment to suggest that visiting a museum is emotionally impactful, increases support for democratic institutions, and generates meaningful changes in individuals' propensity to oppose or support contemporary polarizing policies. The ability to generate convergence on divisive political issues is perhaps our most consequential and surprising result and the one that offers the most affirmative response to the question our title poses: "Do museums promote reconciliation?"

Now that we have attempted to answer this question, we note that two further questions stand out immediately. First, how generalizable are our findings? Though we believe that our evidence is unlikely specific to Chile, it is true that much time has passed since the transition, our study was conducted among non-victims, the museum commemorates a repressive period rather than a civil war, and its construction, content, and approach are highly particular. Nonetheless, some of our findings - including the emotional impact of visiting museums and memorials - is likely to travel. Most promising, our research design is highly portable and can be easily implemented in other post-conflict or post-repression societies to further our understanding of the specificity and generalizability of museums as a transitional justice tool.

Second, how durable are these results? As was alluded to in the body of the paper, we have planned several follow-up surveys, the first of which went out this week. The next one will be administered in June 2017 (3 months after treatment) and the final one will go out in September 2017 (6 months after treatment). Though we are well aware that we will battle attrition during these periods, we are optimistic that our responses will allow us to contribute to existing literature that probes the persistence of attitude change (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016; Gerber et al. 2010; Broockman and Kalla 2016). Additionally, most studies have focused on the tendency for effects to wane over time; while that is likely in our case, we also have reason to believe that the intervening period may invite further reflection on our dependent variables and might therefore result in differing attitudinal changes. We look forward to investigating this further over the coming months.

Finally, I would like to highlight some immediate next steps and areas where I welcome feedback. First, we intend to further analyze heterogeneous treatment affects, precising our distinctions along the following dimensions: 1) ideology, 2) victim relationships, and 3) scores on a right-wing authoritarianism index. Though we have offered preliminary evidence along these lines, we plan to investigate them more systematically, Second, we intend to conduct additional analyses using randomization inference, though imbalances among our treated and control units may problematize this goal. Third, we noted in the body of the paper that our compliance rate was rather low. However, many of those who did not show up to our experiment nonetheless completed our pre-treatment survey, providing a wealth of data that can be used to further examine non-compliance among our sample. Fourth, we have conducted multiple tests in this draft. As specified in our pre-analysis plan, we will create indices of our main dependent variables using principal component analysis to reduce this problem. Moreover, we will adjust our regression analyses to account for FDR as we have already done in the t-tests presented here. Any additional thoughts are welcome!

Thanks for reading!
Elsa

8 Appendix

Table 7. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level

	All	Right	Left	Victim Family	No victim Relationship
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Positive	0.91 (0.71)	0.20 (1.06)	2.47 (1.66)	−0.95 (2.44)	1.62* (0.85)
Interested	0.322*** (0.098)	0.240* (0.129)	0.503*** (0.180)	0.159 (0.298)	0.341*** (0.127)
Stimulated	0.50*** (0.13)	0.32* (0.19)	0.79*** (0.16)	0.08 (0.29)	0.66*** (0.17)
Energetic	−0.132 (0.118)	−0.094 (0.166)	−0.110 (0.202)	−0.531* (0.278)	0.006 (0.124)
Enthusiastic	−0.277** (0.122)	−0.490*** (0.132)	0.095 (0.261)	−0.394 (0.345)	−0.206 (0.140)
Proud	−0.05 (0.10)	−0.23 (0.16)	0.23 (0.21)	0.21 (0.31)	−0.07 (0.12)
Inspired	0.69*** (0.09)	0.64*** (0.15)	0.76*** (0.18)	0.57* (0.29)	0.77*** (0.15)
Determined	−0.09 (0.14)	−0.25 (0.20)	0.23 (0.27)	−0.23 (0.25)	−0.02 (0.17)
Attentive	0.11 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.13)	0.32 (0.23)	−0.30 (0.31)	0.28*** (0.08)
Active	−0.27** (0.13)	−0.36* (0.19)	−0.11 (0.27)	−0.41 (0.40)	−0.21 (0.13)
Alert	−0.03 (0.11)	0.16 (0.13)	−0.30 (0.29)	−0.23 (0.34)	0.04 (0.12)
Negative	5.13*** (0.70)	4.91*** (0.87)	5.91*** (1.06)	2.32** (1.11)	5.99*** (0.67)
Tense	0.78*** (0.13)	0.84*** (0.19)	0.77*** (0.15)	0.44 (0.29)	0.90*** (0.12)
Disgusted	1.68*** (0.14)	1.51*** (0.16)	1.88*** (0.27)	1.17*** (0.30)	1.83*** (0.12)
Guilty	0.37*** (0.11)	0.37** (0.16)	0.51*** (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)	0.45*** (0.14)
Scared	0.39*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.10)	0.50*** (0.15)	0.24 (0.21)	0.43*** (0.09)
Hostile	0.37*** (0.06)	0.44*** (0.1)	0.198 (0.172)	0.127 (0.180)	0.429*** (0.061)
Embarrassed	0.683*** (0.121)	0.637*** (0.120)	0.806*** (0.163)	0.221 (0.183)	0.845*** (0.122)
Fearful	0.228** (0.099)	0.179* (0.107)	0.390** (0.165)	0.245 (0.284)	0.228*** (0.086)
Afraid	0.52*** (0.11)	0.47*** (0.12)	0.68*** (0.19)	0.56*** (0.20)	0.51*** (0.13)
Irritable	0.15 (0.14)	0.15 (0.16)	0.08 (0.24)	−0.22 (0.23)	0.23 (0.14)
Nervous	0.20 (0.14)	0.25 (0.17)	0.19 (0.14)	−0.04 (0.18)	0.30** (0.14)
Observations	257	145	112	59	198

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

References

Aguilar, Paloma, Laia Balcells and Hector Cebolla. 2011. "Determinants of Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice: An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Case." *Comparative Political Studies* pp. 1–34.

Backer, David. 2010. "Watching a Bargain Unravel? A Panel Study of Victims' Attitudes about Transitional Justice in Cape Town, South Africa." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 4(October):443–456.

Balliet, D., J. M. Tybur, J. Wu, C. Antonellis and P. A. M. Van Lange. 2016. "Political Ideology, Trust, and Cooperation: In-group Favoritism among Republicans and Democrats during a US National Election." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* pp. 1–22.
URL: *http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022002716658694*

Balliet, D., J. Wu and CK De Dreu. 2014. "Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: a meta-analysis." *Psychology Bulletin* 140(6):1556–81.

Broockman, David and Joshua Kalla. 2016. "Durably reducing transphobia: A field experiment on door-to-door canvassing." *Science Translational Medicine* (November 2015):220–224.

Brounéus, Karen. 2010. "The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(3):408–437.

Capoccia, Giovanni and Grigore Pop-eleches. N.d. "Transitional Justice and Democratic Attitudes. Evidence from West Germany.".

Chong, Dennis and James N Druckman. 2007. "Framing Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10:103–126.

Cilliers, Jacobus, Oeindrila Dube and Bilal Siddiqi. 2016. "Reconciling after civil conflict increases social capital but decreases individual well-being." *Science* 352(6287):787–794.

Collins, Cath. 2016. "Truth-justice-reparations interaction effects in transitional justice practice: The case of the âĂŸValech Commission ' in Chile." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 16:69–94.

Daly, Sarah Zukerman, Laura Paler and Cyrus Samii. 2016. "Wartime Networks and the Social Logic of Crime." *Work in progress* 2017.

Dancy, Geoff, Hunjoon Kim, Eric Wiebelhaus-brahm, Geoff Dancy, Hunjoon Kim and Eric Wiebelhaus-brahm. 2010. "The Turn to Truth : Trends in Truth Commission Experimentation The Turn to Truth : Trends in Truth Commission Experimentation." *Journal of Human Rights* pp. 45–64.

David, Roman and Susanne Choi. 2009. "Getting Even or Getting Equal? Retributive Desires and Transitional Justice." *Political Psychology* 30(2):161–192.

de Grieff, Pablo. 2006. *The Handbook of Reparations*.

Gerber, Alan S., Gregory a. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling and Shang E. Ha. 2010. "Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts." *American Political Science Review* 104(01):111.
URL: *http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7449476&jid=PSR&volumeId=104&issueId=01&*

Gibson, James L. 2006. "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(3):409–432.

González, Roberto, Jorge Manzi, José L. Saiz, Marilynn Brewer, Pablo De Tezanos-Pinto, David Torres, María Teresa Aravena and Nerea Aldunate. 2008. "Interparty attitudes in Chile: Coalitions as superordinate social identities." *Political Psychology* 29(1):93–118.

Grossman, Guy, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Samuel Pimental and Jeremy M Weinstein. 2015. "Descriptive Representation and Judicial Outcomes in Multiethnic Societies." *American Journal of Political Science* 00(0):1–26.

Hamber. 2006. Defining Reparations: A Psychological Approach. In *The Handbook of Reparations*. pp. 562–588.

Hewstone, Miles, Mark Rubin and Hazel Willis. 2002. "Ntergroup ias." *Annual Review of Psychology* 53(1):575–604.
URL: *http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11752497*

Hungtinton, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. The University of Oklahoma Press.

Imai, Kosuke, Gary King and Clayton Nall. 2009. "The Essential Role of Pair Matching in Cluster-Randomized Experiments, with Application to the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Evaluation." *Statistical Science* 24(1):29–53.

Jelin, Elizabeth. 2007. "Public Memorialization in Perspective : Truth , Justice and Memory of Past Repression in the Southern Cone of South America." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1:138–156.

Kornbluh, Peter and Katherine Hite. 2010. "Chile's Turning Point." *The Nation* .
URL: *https://www.thenation.com/article/chiles-turning-point/*

Laplante, Lisa J and Kelly Phenicie. 2009. "Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue : The Media ' s Role in Transitional Justice Processes." *Marquette Law Review* 93(1):251–283.

Lira, Elizabeth. 2011. Contribution of Truth, Justice, and Reparation Policies to Latin American Democracies. Technical report Inter-American Institute of Human Rights San Jose, CR: .

Nalepa, Monika. 2012. "Tolerating Mistakes: How Do Popular Perceptions of Procedural Fairness Affect Demand for Transitional Justice?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(3):408–437.

Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley. 2007. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 91(3):567–583.

O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies.* Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Olsen, Patricia, Leigh A Payne and Andrew Reiter. 2010. *Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Opotow, Susan. 2015. "Historicizing Injustice: The Museum of Memory and Human Rights, Santiago, Chile." *Journal of Social Issues* 71(2):229–243.

Petty, Richard E., Curtis P. Haugtvedt and Stephen M. Smith. 1995. Elaboration as a Determinant of Attitude Strength: Creating Attitudes That Are Persistent, Resistant, and Predictive of Behavior. In *Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences.* Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates pp. 93–110.

Pham, Phuong and Patrick Vinck. 2010. Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda. Technical report Human RIghts Center, University of California, Berkeley School of Law.

Samii, Cyrus. 2013. "Who wants to forgive and forget? Transitional justice preferences in postwar Burundi." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(2):219–233.

Sears, David O. 1975. Political Socialization. In *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. 2 ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley pp. 93–153.

Sears, David O. 1983. "The Person-Positivity Bias." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44(2):233–250.

Sears, David O. 2001. The Role of Affect in Symbolic Politics. In *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*, ed. James Kuklinski. Cambridge University Press pp. 14–40.

Shechter, Hava and Gavriel Salomon. 2007. "Does vicarious experience of suffering affect empathy for an adversary ? The effects of Israelis ' visits to Auschwitz on their empathy for Palestinians Does vicarious experience of suffering affect empathy for an adversary ? The effects of Israelis ' vis." *Journal of Peace Education* 0201(April 2016).

Sikkink, Kathryn. 2011. *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics.* W.W. Norton & Company.

Steele, C. M., S. J. Spencer and J. Aronson. 2002. "Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and identity threat." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 34:379–440.
URL: *disjointedthinking.jeffhughes.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Steele-Spencer-Aronson-2002.-Contending-with-group-image.pdf*

Sveaass, Nora and Anne Margrethe Sønneland. 2015. "Dealing with the past: Survivors' perspectives on economic reparations in Argentina." *International Perspectives in Psychology: Research, Practice, Consultation* 4(4):223–238.
URL: *https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pdh&AN=2015-44054-001&site=ehost-live%5Cnhttp://nora.sveaass@psykologi.uio.no*

Svensson, Jakob. 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking." 51:437–461.

Tesler, Michael. 2015. "Primed or Changed." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4):806–824.

Tourangeau, Roger and Ting Yan. 2007. "Sensitive questions in surveys." *Psychological bulletin* 133(5):859–883.

Watson, David and Lee Anna Clark. 1988. "Development and Validation of Brief Measures of Positive and Negative Affect : The PANAS Scales." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54(6):1063–1070.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.*