The following model is adapted, with little to no modifications, from Banks (2000). We can model the executive bargain with the legislature as follows. A mayor wants to pass her proposal x. We can include under this category a set of policy proposals: a new legislation, an infrastructure project or budgetary approval. In order to implement her proposal, she must pass it in the city council through a simple majority rule. However, the mayor does not govern alone. An opposition wants to block the mayor's proposal and maintain the status quo, denoted as y.

Each city councilor is characterized by a proposal valuation parameter v_i for all $i \in N$, where $v_i > 0$ means that the mayor's proposal x is preferred. Payoff gets realized when city councilor i votes, independent of the outcome. For each councilor, the mayor and opposition set a bribe schedule

$$a \in (a_1, ..., a_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$$
$$b \in (b_1, ..., b_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ +$$

Solving through backward induction, given a bribe schedule (a, b), councilor i prefers to vote for the mayor's proposal (x) if $a_i + v_i > b_i$ and to maintain the status quo (y) otherwise. Since indifferent councilors vote for the status quo, party b needs to only match bribes from A, adjusting for individual preferences, i.e. $b_i = a_i + v_i$. Therefore, the opposition solves