

Will Chinese Reflation Work?

The poor reading of Chinese Q3 growth numbers released last week is likely the reason behind Beijing's recent abrupt policy changes ([Chart 1](#)). Investors and analysts are focusing squarely on second-guessing the exact size of the stimulus "bazooka." The market has been on a roller coaster ride following each policy announcement out of Beijing.

Our view is that this is Beijing's "whatever it takes" moment. We doubt the authorities have a clear idea of how much stimulus the economy really needs, and therefore, they have an open-ended commitment to boost growth until the economy improves. The bad news is that after the initial jolt, further policy easing will likely be a data-dependent process. The good news is that several important factors suggest that Chinese reflation should work.

Tally The Stimulus

Details are still sketchy to gauge the full scale of Beijing's current round of growth measures, but there is no question that the easing efforts are coordinated across major government agencies, focusing on all key areas.

- On monetary policy, regulators have cut interest rates and reserve requirements and set up lending facilities to directly support the stock market. Yesterday the central bank cut loan prime rates by 25 basis points, and pledged more easing before year-end ([Chart 2](#)).

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Chart 1 GDP Growth Fell Further Behind Target





Chart 2 PBoC Gets More Aggressive

- On housing, all previous demand restrictions have been removed, mortgage interest rates and down payment ratios have been lowered, and regulators are considering measures to improve the financial conditions of developers. Beijing is also mandating local governments to absorb residential inventories and convert them to social housing projects, financed by bond issuance.
- On fiscal policy, Beijing is conducting another round of local government “debt swap,” recapitalizing state-owned banks, and providing welfare benefits to special groups, such as low-income households and unemployed youth.
- An important message is that policymakers have stated that the stimulus efforts are not limited to these measures. The Ministry of Finance suggests that the central government has “fairly

large” flexibility to increase the fiscal deficit and debt to support growth.


In some recent reports, we outlined the “three arrows” Beijing must use to revitalize the economy: large stimulus measures to boost demand, decisive debt-relief programs for local governments, and a credible commitment to advancing liberal reforms.¹ Recent developments suggest that Beijing continues to move in this direction. The first two arrows have been checked off, while the third is still missing.

Will Reflation Work?

With Q3 GDP growth coming in at 4.6%, we doubt the government will meet its 5% growth target for the year. Nonetheless, we see reasonable odds that the economy will improve in the wake of reflation efforts.

First, our view has always been that China’s poor growth is mostly a “man-made” disaster rather than a result of “structural imbalances,” as many have argued. In short, policymakers failed to support aggregate demand when the economy was operating below trend, creating a deflationary downward spiral (Chart 3). Beijing long demonized strong countercyclical measures as “flooding the system,” and the overall macro environment remained far too tight despite ailing growth. As recently as this summer, top decision-makers were still downplaying the rapidly deteriorating economic signals and repeatedly ruled out “massive stimulus,” further weakening confidence and dampening demand.


¹ Alpine Macro *EM & China Strategy* “Is China In A Slow-Motion Implosion?” (August 27, 2024).

Chart 3 Beijing's Failure To Support Ailing Growth

Note: All series are shown in real terms and rebased to Dec 2019 =100; series in bottom panel are shown as 12-month moving sum

In this context, recognizing the economic challenges and removing the self-imposed policy straitjacket is a crucial first step toward addressing these issues. The policy change itself sends a strong pro-growth signal to both government officials and the business community.

Second, the pandemic and poor economic performance in recent years have led to enormous pent-up demand in the household sector. Unlike other countries, China's household confidence has never recovered from the pandemic lows (Chart 4).


Chart 4 Upside Potential For Consumer Demand

*Source: National Bureau of Statistics

The yawning gap between household deposits and loans in recent years represents a massive mountain of precautionary savings, which can be released as growth conditions improve and confidence recovers.

It remains to be seen whether Beijing's latest confidence-boosting campaign can successfully mobilize household savings into consumption. What's more certain is that household balance sheets are in reasonably good shape and should respond to the right incentives. A case in point is the

Chart 5 Chinese Consumers Will Respond To Incentives




strong sales of consumer durable goods in recent months, as Beijing has been offering subsidies for consumers to upgrade household appliances. Sales of household appliances jumped by over 20% last month compared to a year ago, a rare bright spot in an otherwise bleak economic backdrop ([Chart 5](#)). Similar measures could further unlock household savings, contributing to a stronger growth recovery.

Finally, we believe China's housing meltdown has undershot long-term fundamentals, which should at least limit the downside of further contraction. In an earlier report published in 2021, we argued that China's housing supply may not be as excessive as commonly perceived, and that Beijing's crackdown on developers was dangerous.² Fast forward to today: China's real estate-related activities as a

² Alpine Macro *EM & China Strategy* "Why Rogoff et al. (And Chinese Policymakers) Are Wrong" (October 20, 2021).

Chart 6 The Chinese Housing Meltdown Is Likely Overdone



*Source: "Has China's Housing Production Peaked?" by Kenneth Rogoff & Yuanchen Yang, *China and the World Economy* 21 (1): 1-31
 **Alpine Macro proprietary model based on housing starts

share of GDP, by our estimate, have fallen to early 2000s levels, even below those in many highly urbanized and developed economies ([Chart 6](#)). This, along with Beijing's latest easing measures, increases the odds of a bottoming process in the Chinese housing sector.

What To Watch?

Page 6 provides an update of our **China Macro Watch** chartpack, covering the country's latest growth and market indicators. Most economic indicators remain deeply depressed, with deflationary pressures intensifying. This is old news. After the initial reflex rally in Chinese stocks since September, markets will soon look for evidence of whether the easing measures will bear fruit.

As discussed in last week's webcast,³ three groups of indicators are particularly important to gauge the reflation and recovery process:

- Confidence and demand among households and companies
- Credit and monetary aggregates
- Housing activities

For now, we give policymakers the benefit of the doubt that China's business cycle will improve following the latest growth push and remain long/overweight on Chinese stocks. We will continue to closely monitor policy developments and growth conditions going forward. Stay tuned.

Housekeeping

Our stop point for the long position on MSCI China was breached last week during the pullback following the sharp rally. However, we are maintaining the long position with a new 10% rolling stop to manage risk.

Our long position on the South African rand versus the U.S. dollar is not working. We're concerned that the Fed may not ease as much as the market anticipates, which could keep the dollar well-supported against EM currencies. As a result, we are closing the long ZAR/USD position with a 1.3% loss, and will focus on pair trade ideas among EM currencies.

Please continue to page 6 for the **China Macro Watch** chartpack.

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3 Alpine Macro EM & China Strategy Webcast "China's 'Whatever It Takes' Moment: An Update" (October 13, 2024).

Market Performance											
Equity Benchmark*	Level	YTD Return (%)	1-Month Return (%)	1-Year Return (%)	P/E	P/B	Chinese Bond Yields	Level (%)	YTD Chg (bps)	1-Month Chg (bps)	1-Year Chg (bps)
MSCI China Free (US\$)	67.8	24.2	21.8	23.4	13.1	1.5	10-Year Government Bonds	2.12	-43.2	7.6	-58.4
CSI 300	3935.2	16.5	23.1	13.3	16.0	1.7	Spread over U.S. 10-Year Treasury	-1.96	-60.2	-29.9	26.6
Shanghai A Shares	3425.4	10.1	19.5	11.2	15.8	1.4	5-Year AAA-Rated Corporate Bonds	2.24	-70.3	10.0	-89.4
STAR 50	1000.4	20.6	53.6	19.1	82.2	5.0	Currency	Level	YTD Chg (%)	1-Month Chg (%)	1-Year Chg (%)
Shenzhen A Shares	2026.0	6.8	29.4	9.0	35.9	2.3	USD/CNY	7.115	0.0	-0.6	2.8
ChiNext	2210.3	20.5	42.9	18.5	32.8	4.3	Nominal Broad Effective RMB (CFETS)	99.19	1.4	1.3	-0.5

*In local currency terms, unless otherwise specified


Note: Data as of October 21, 2024

Economic Barometer														
		2023-09	2023-10	2023-11	2023-12	2024-01	2024-02	2024-03	2024-04	2024-05	2024-06	2024-07	2024-08	2024-09
Leading Indicator	NBS PMI	50.2	49.5	49.4	49.0	49.2	49.1	50.8	50.4	49.5	49.5	49.4	49.1	49.8
	Caixin Manufacturing PMI	50.6	49.5	50.7	50.8	50.8	50.9	51.1	51.4	51.7	51.8	49.8	50.4	49.3
	Caixin Services PMI	50.2	50.4	51.5	52.9	52.7	52.5	52.7	52.5	54.0	51.2	52.1	51.6	50.3
Inflation (%yoy)	CPI	0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-0.3	-0.8	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.4
	Food CPI	-3.2	-4.0	-4.2	-3.7	-5.9	-0.9	-2.7	-2.7	-2.0	-2.1	0.0	2.8	3.3
	Core CPI	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.1
	PPI	-2.5	-2.6	-3.0	-2.7	-2.5	-2.7	-2.8	-2.5	-1.4	-0.8	-0.8	-1.8	-2.8
Economic Activity	Unemployment Rate (%)	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.1
	Fixed Asset Investment* (%yoy)	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.6	4.2	4.5	4.2	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.4	3.4
	Industrial Production (%yoy)	4.5	4.6	6.6	6.8	6.9	7.0	4.5	6.7	5.6	5.3	5.1	4.5	5.4
	Retail Sales (%yoy)	5.5	7.6	10.1	7.4	6.0	4.5	3.1	2.3	3.7	2.0	2.7	2.1	3.2
	Car Sales Annual Change (Mn)	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	-0.4	0.2	0.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0
International Trade (%yoy)	Exports in US\$	-6.2	-6.4	0.5	2.3	4.7	7.1	-7.5	1.5	7.6	8.6	7.0	8.7	2.4
	Imports in US\$	-6.2	3.0	-0.6	0.2	1.9	3.5	-1.9	8.4	1.8	-2.3	7.2	0.5	0.3
	Imports of Crude Oil**	14.0	13.9	12.2	11.9	12.4	12.9	10.5	11.1	9.4	4.7	3.0	-0.1	-1.3
	Imports of Iron Ore**	5.3	5.4	6.2	6.7	6.7	6.8	5.6	6.2	6.4	5.9	6.6	5.3	5.4
	Imports of Copper**	-7.7	-5.6	-6.0	-5.8	-4.8	-3.8	-0.9	0.8	2.5	3.6	3.6	3.0	3.4
Real Estate (%yoy)	Imports of Coal**	59.5	60.8	64.3	68.7	64.7	60.6	48.1	43.0	36.2	28.0	23.9	20.0	18.8
	Floor Space Sold*	-7.5	-7.8	-8.0	-8.5	-14.5	-20.5	-19.4	-20.2	-20.3	-19.0	-18.6	-18.0	-17.1
	Floor Space Started*	-23.4	-23.2	-21.2	-20.4	-25.1	-29.7	-27.8	-24.6	-24.2	-23.7	-23.2	-22.5	-22.2
	Floor Space Completed*	19.8	19.0	17.9	17.0	-1.6	-20.2	-20.7	-20.4	-20.1	-21.8	-21.8	-23.6	-24.4
	Housing Price	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7	-0.9	-1.2	-1.9	-2.7	-3.5	-4.3	-4.9	-5.3	-5.7	-6.1
Credit	M1 (%yoy)	2.1	1.9	1.3	1.3	5.9	1.2	1.1	-1.4	-4.2	-5.0	-6.6	-7.3	-7.4
	M2 (%yoy)	10.3	10.3	10.0	9.7	8.7	8.7	8.3	7.2	7.0	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.8
	New Loans Annual Change (Bn RMB)	-155.6	123.2	-120.0	-234.8	20.0	-360.0	-800.0	11.2	-410.0	-921.2	-85.9	-460.0	-720.0
	Aggregate Social Financing (%yoy)	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.4	7.8	7.6	7.4	7.3	6.8	6.8	6.6	6.3
Financial Markets & Interest Rates	MSCI China Free (%MoM)	-2.9	-4.3	2.5	-2.6	-10.6	8.4	0.9	6.5	2.1	-2.6	-2.3	0.9	23.6
	CSI 300 (%MoM)	-2.1	-3.0	-2.1	-3.1	-5.0	9.4	2.3	0.2	-0.4	-3.1	-1.0	-5.1	23.1
	Iron Ore Price (%MoM)	7.9	1.3	1.4	4.8	-0.7	-10.1	-13.6	10.5	0.7	-6.7	-6.4	0.5	2.4
	Copper Price (%MoM)	-3.6	0.3	1.7	0.6	-0.1	-0.6	4.9	13.1	0.4	-5.0	-4.9	0.1	6.8
	Steel Price (%MoM)	-0.5	0.0	3.0	1.1	-0.5	-0.7	-5.6	1.4	0.2	-3.8	-5.8	-4.4	0.2
	Loan Prime Rate 1-Year*** (%)	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.1
	SHIBOR 3-Month (%)	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8
	10-Year Government Bond Yield (%)	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2


*Shown as year-to-date

**Imports in volume terms; shown as 12-month moving average



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



*In US\$ terms
Source: MSCI



*In US\$ terms
Source: MSCI






*Source: Citi

**Source: Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business









***Source: Credit Suisse



*Truncated at 60

**Shown as 12-month moving sum

*Shown as 12-month moving average





*Truncated at +20/-5

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*Truncated at +/-20

**Truncated at 100

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




*Alpine Macro calculation based on year-to-date data


**Source: NBS

***Calculated as transacted value divided by units; source: NBS









*Shown as 10-day moving average













*Includes bank loans, non-bank credit, corporate bonds & equity issuance





*Percentage of major industries with higher prices than last year; Alpine Macro calculation





*Both series are rebased to Jan 2016=100

**Source: BIS



Investment Recommendations

Strategic Positions (6 - 12 months)

Recommendations	Open Date	Closing Date	Total P&L	Notes
Long Colombian 10-year Government Bond, Currency Unhedged	11/21/2023		6.5%	Long Colombian 10-year Government Bond, Currency Unhedged; stop point at -10%.
Long MSCI Greece Equity Index	11/21/2023		12.0%	Long MSCI Greece Equity Index in US\$ terms; stop point at -10%.
Long Indian 10-year Government Bond, Currency Unhedged	06/04/2024		3.6%	Long Indian 10-year Government Bond, Currency Unhedged; stop point at -10%.
Long Malaysian Equities, Currency Unhedged	08/20/2024		1.9%	Long MSCI Malaysia Equity Index in US\$ terms; stop point at -10%.
Long ASEAN Equities, Currency Unhedged	09/17/2024		0.4%	Long MSCI EM ASEAN Index in US\$ terms; stop point at -10%.
Long BRL/MXN	09/23/2024		0.0%	Long Brazilian <i>Real</i> versus Mexican Peso; stop point at -10%.

Tactical Investment Positions (3 - 6 months)

Recommendations	Open Date	Closing Date	Total P&L	Notes
Short CZK/HUF	06/05/2023		3.4%	Short Czech Koruna versus Hungarian Forint; rolling stop point at -5%, or -2.7% from current level.
Long MSCI China Equity Index	02/20/2024		29.7%	Long MSCI China Equity Index in US\$ terms; rolling stop point at -10%, or -10% from current level.
Short COP/CLP	03/05/2024		7.5%	Short Colombian Peso versus Chilean Peso; rolling stop point at -5%, or -1.3% from current level.
Long ZAR/USD	09/23/2024	10/21/2024	-1.3%	Long South African Rand versus U.S. Dollar; position closed.
Long CSI 300 Index	02/20/2024*		10.2%	Long China A-shares Index in US\$ terms; stop point at -10%. *Trade opened on 20 Feb, 2024, closed on 13 Sep, 2024 and reopened on 24 Sep, 2024.



EM Equity Country Allocation				
Strong Overweight	Overweight	Neutral	Underweight	Strong Underweight
	Brazil		India	
	Chile		Czech Republic	
	China		Hungary	
	Colombia		Mexico	
	Greece		Peru	
	South Africa		Poland	
	Indonesia		Taiwan	
	Philippines		Turkey	
	Malaysia			
	Thailand			
	South Korea			

EM Equity Sector Allocation	
Strong Overweight	Overweight
	Materials
	Health Care
	Consumer Discretionary
	Consumer Staples
Neutral	
Energy	
Communication Services	
Information Technology	
Financials	
Strong Underweight	Underweight
	Industrials
	Utilities

EM Local-Currency Government Bond Allocation		
Overweight	Neutral	Underweight
Indonesia	Poland	Czech Republic
Peru	Hungary	Thailand
Brazil	South Korea	China
Colombia	Malaysia	Taiwan
Chile	Philippines	Turkey
India	South Africa	
	Mexico	



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