

Elections In Germany, Canada, And The Syrian Situation


- Trudeau's departure seems imminent, but early elections remain uncertain.
- Germany's elections will likely result in a CDU-SPD coalition, delivering insufficient economic reforms.
- Syria's new Sunni Islamist government risks destabilizing the region.
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*turdeau** Canada: Is Trudeau Gone Soon?

Following Canadian Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland's resignation on Dec. 16, speculation about Justin Trudeau's government's longevity has intensified. Having presided over rising housing costs, price levels since 2021, and declining GDP/capita (**Chart 1**), the government is deeply unpopular.

Its precarious position worsened after the New Democratic Party (NDP) ended its supply-and-confidence agreement on Sep. 4, leaving the Liberals reliant on *ad hoc* NDP support, especially after also losing the Bloc Quebecois. Though the government survived two Conservative-led no-confidence votes this autumn with NDP backing, Freeland's departure has emboldened NDP leader Jagmeet Singh to call for Trudeau's resignation.

Chart 1 Trudeau's Economic Legacy Is Unpopular




*Source: OECD

**Source: Bank of Canada

Note: Vertical line denotes when Justin Trudeau assumed office

Chart 2 Conservatives Likely To Win The Next Election



Both the Liberals and NDP are keen to avoid early elections, which must occur before Oct. 20, 2025. Polls indicate both would lose seats, with the Liberals facing near-obliteration if elections were held today (Chart 2). Delaying elections in hopes of a Conservative polling dip is politically smart. Recent history, such as Covid-era governments in the U.K. and France, shows voters severely punish

ruling parties that are unpopular and called early elections. Playing for time is the smartest option for the Liberals and the NDP.


Trudeau now faces four choices. First, he could try to remain in office and prorogue Parliament for weeks or months, betting dissatisfaction will subside – a move that risks massive political backlash and could worsen the Liberals' unpopularity. Second, Trudeau could also try to just stay in office, though a non-confidence vote backed by all other parties is likely, in early 2025, if so.

Third, he could resign, a now-likely scenario. This would enable the Liberals to install a new PM with implicit NDP support (notably, Singh only called for Trudeau's resignation, not for early elections). Potential replacements include Freeland, Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly, former Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney (a market favorite), or Finance Minister Dominic LeBlanc. A new leader might help the Liberals and NDP hold on until next October, hoping for improved electoral prospects.

The last option is early elections, possibly between April-June, if the Liberals lose a confidence vote soon. Barring major political missteps or a miracle polling turnaround, Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre is poised to become Prime Minister at some point during 2025.

A Conservative government would likely be considerably more market-friendly, pushing policies such as cutting taxes, eliminating the carbon tax, deregulating the energy sector, and boosting housing construction. Combined with further expected Bank of Canada rate cuts and improving GDP growth, this could benefit Canadian assets, especially equities.




Chart 3 U.S. Trade Uncertainty Could Hit The CAD, As During 2018


*Advanced by 3 months; source: Economic Policy Uncertainty

Poillievre would also enjoy notably better relations with Donald Trump. While we do not think Trump will impose 25% tariffs on Canada due to lax border controls (Canada will comply no matter the government), a Poillievre government could have more constructive ties with Trump, and better position Canada for the USMCA renegotiations in 2026. As Chart 3 shows, trade uncertainty impacts the Canadian dollar at times. While the CAD will remain under pressure (e.g., given growing interest rate differentials with the U.S.), calming trade tensions would limit policy headwinds for the currency.

Germany: Will A New Government Mean Serious Reforms?

Following the collapse of the “traffic light coalition” and a no-confidence vote on Dec. 16, 2024, Germany will hold early parliamentary elections on


Chart 4 Based On Current Polls, A CDU-SPD Coalition Seems The Most Likely Outcome


Source: Politpro.eu as of Dec 18, 2024

Note: The restrictive clause for the German federal election is 5%, except for parties representing national minorities; dots denote previous election performance; the horizontal line represents a 50% majority; a CDU/CSU + AfD coalition is improbable.

Feb. 23, 2025. Polls show the center-right CDU/CSU leading with over 30% support, followed by the far-right AfD and the Social Democrats (SPD). The CDU/CSU will fall short of a majority and will thus likely form a coalition with the SPD. The far-right AfD and far-left BSW will be shut out of government. **CDU**



Chart 5 Germany's Budget Balance And GDP Growth



leader Friedrich Merz has also ruled out a coalition with the Greens, deeming them market unfriendly.

Chart 4 outlines polling, and seat distribution, with a CDU-SPD coalition as the most likely outcome.

That said, surprises are possible. The CDU could underperform due to Merz's lack of charisma, while the Greens and anti-establishment parties like the AfD or BSW could exceed expectations.

Merz aims to address Germany's economic stagnation by reducing regulation, capping corporate taxes at 25%, reviving nuclear power, and reversing the combustion engine phaseouts, and by limiting welfare and social spending. However, a coalition with the SPD would water down these plans, as the SPD prioritizes higher social spending. Still, CDU-SPD coalitions have historically delivered

Instead, that social spending would be redirected towards a genocidal israel

Chart 6 The Euro Often Depreciates Ahead Of German Elections



pragmatic governance (e.g., 2005-09, 2013-21). This may enable progress on issues like energy reform and deregulation though limiting major tax cuts or welfare reforms.

One area of potential agreement is reforming Germany's constitutional debt brake, which caps new federal borrowing at 0.35% of GDP. However, this requires a constitutional amendment and two-thirds majorities in both parliamentary chambers. Opposition parties, like the Greens, AfD and BSW may block this. Ultimately Germany needs to spend more to boost its sagging GDP growth (**Chart 5**).

The run-up to the elections may be a headwind for the euro, as often happens before German elections (**Chart 6**), adding to the monetary policy headwinds on the currency. Post-election, bund



Chart 7 Increasing Germany's Debt Issuance Will Be Politically Difficult, Suggesting A Trade Of Being Long 10-Year Bunds Minus The Eurozone OIS Contract



yields are expected to decline due to constrained debt issuance under the debt brake (unlikely to be quickly or completely removed even if an agreement is reached). Thus **Alpine Macro¹ recently recommended going long 10-year bunds while shorting equivalent OIS contracts, noting misplaced expectations for significant new debt issuance (Chart 7).**

Trade and investment ties with the U.S. could also weigh on German equities, especially under a Trump White House. A Merz chancellorship may mitigate these: he is likely to have a decent relationship with the White House. Equity markets may react

¹ Alpine Macro *Special Report "Germany: No Early Discharge For The Patient"* (December 2, 2024).

positively in advance of the elections, if CDU polling improves, but a coalition government remains the most likely outcome.

The Middle East: Will Syria Export Instability?

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime unfolded rapidly, with opposition forces toppling it in under two weeks (Nov. 27–Dec. 8, 2024). This followed Israel's massive air campaign which degraded the Lebanese Hezbollah, a key Assad ally; this created a power vacuum. The regime was also abandoned by its primary backers, Iran and Russia.

The future of Syria's governance is uncertain. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist paramilitary group, led Assad's removal and now controls the capital and government. Many HTS leaders originate from terror groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS – though HTS has fought these groups recently. Backed by Turkey and Qatar, HTS claims it will govern moderately and protect minorities. This remains doubtful.

The HTS-dominated Syrian Transitional Government will face challenges consolidating power in a country still teeming with other militias, and foreign militaries (U.S., Turkish, Russian). Israel has also advanced deeper into Syria and attacked Syrian Army assets to preempt threats.

The risk of a Sunni Islamist government destabilizing the region looms large, with potential spillover effects on Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and even the GCC states. HTS' roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and ties to Turkey's Erdogan deepen regional apprehension.



Egypt and Jordan appear most vulnerable. Egypt, plagued by economic woes and growing discontent with the El-Sisi regime, risks becoming the epicenter of regional instability. A renewed Islamist-driven challenge to Egypt's government would have profound geopolitical consequences.


Markets' reactions right after the fall of Assad may be indicative of these risks. Israeli equities and currency gained, reflecting benefits from Syria's removal from Iran's sphere of influence. Turkish equities rose on expectations of Syria falling into Turkey's sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Egyptian and Jordanian markets declined, signaling fears of regional instability (**Chart 8**). GCC equities slightly gained, either coincidentally, or due to the removal of Iran's influence from Syria.

The risks are clear: the HTS-led government may either export its destabilizing ideology, or fail to consolidate power, plunging Syria back into civil war and also, spreading regional chaos. Of course, there is a chance that the regime proves moderate, but we do not think that is very likely. Turkey's growing regional influence adds complexity, potentially straining U.S. relations, especially with the incoming Trump administration. Trump will try to keep out of the Levant, but risks of regional chaos could draw the U.S. in.

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Chart 8 Asset Moves In Wake Of Assad's Fall, May Suggest Which Countries Could Be Most Vulnerable To Regional Instability Next



*Source: MSCI IMI Large, Mid & Small Cap

Note: Series are rebased to Nov 25, 2024=100; shaded area denotes the start of the Syrian opposition offensive to the fall of the Assad regime"

Just for reference to anyone reading this, HTS just like ISIS is a pro-israel organization sponsored by the CIA & Mossad. These people parade themselves as Muslims when really they are not. These are western proxies made to generate instability in the region, proxies meant to increase the influence and soft power of the western powers. Read up on it, I only gave you a direction, be a responsible citizen and do some work to understand what's really happening in the world.





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