A Composable View of Verifiable Homomorphic Encryption in Multi-Party Settings

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Motivation

- On-the-Fly MPC [LTV12]

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

Motivation

– Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a good candidate...



Figure: Use cases of HE [Int].

Goal


Security
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Robustness
Input Privacy
Circuit Privacy
Corruption Tolerance
Multi-Group HE [KLSW24]

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
Security
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Non-malleability
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zkSNARK

Contribution

- Formalism

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EPFL

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  - New game-based notions for (Multi-Key, Threshold, Multi-Group) HE in multi-party setting.

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  - UC functionality for HE in multi-party setting.
- Construction
  - UC-secure MPC via verifiable multi-group HE.

Multi-Group HE (MGHE) [KLSW24]

EPFL

- Hybrid approach between Threshold HE and Multi-Key HE

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  - Fewer public keys $\Rightarrow$ better scalability

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

Multi-Group HE



Confidentiality with Multi-Group HE

$$\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{KRK}} \xrightarrow{\Pi_{\mathsf{MGHE}}} \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{MGHE}}$$

if MGHE satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{IND-CPA}^{\text{pD}} \\ \wedge\ & \{\text{IND}, \text{SIM}\}\text{-CIRC} \\ \wedge\ & \text{SIM-PDEC} \\ \wedge\ & \text{Decryption Consistency (DC)} \end{aligned}$$

Client Side: IND-CPA^{pD} Security

IND-CPA

For PKE

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Server Side: Circuit Privacy

EPFL

– Usually formalized using *Simulation* [IP07, Gen09, BdPMW16].

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$$\mathtt{Sim}_{circ}((\mathsf{jpk}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{jpk}_\ell), f(m_1,\ldots,m_\ell))$$
$$\overset{s}{\approx}$$
$$\hat{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{MGHE}.\mathtt{Eval}(f,(\mathsf{jpk}_j,c_j)_{j\in[\ell]})$$

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– Stronger security with *statistical indistinguishability*.

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$$\hat{m} = f(m_1, \ldots, m_\ell)$$

$$\hat{m} + \varepsilon \leftarrow \mathsf{MGHE.Dec}(\hat{c})$$

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

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

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

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- Security of secret key sk_j of honest client i.e., $j \notin I_{\mathcal{A}}$

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

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

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

- $\mathcal{A}$ wins if

$$m \neq \mathtt{Combine}(c, \{d_i\}_{i \in I \setminus I_{\mathcal{A}}} \cup \{d'_i\}_{i \in I \cap I_{\mathcal{A}}})$$

UC: Global Key Registry $\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{KRK}}$

EPFL

– Global subroutine for key management taken from [BCNP04].



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

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- Key aggregation for groups (equivalent to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{MPC}}$).



UC: Ideal Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{MGHE}}$



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

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

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

Realization of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{MGHE}}$

EPFL

Theorem 1

Π_{MGHE} *UC-realizes* $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{MGHE}}$ *against a semi-malicious adversary in presence of* $\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{KRK}}$ *if* MGHE *is* IND-CPA$^{\mathrm{pD}}$, IND-CIRC *(*SIM-CIRC*), and* SIM-PDEC *secure under the static corruption of clients in a group up to the threshold and possibly the server.*

Realization of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MGHE}}$



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

Integrity via Verifiability

MGHE $\Rightarrow$ Security against *semi-malicious* adversary

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MGHE $\Rightarrow$ Security against *semi-malicious* adversary

MGHE + zkSNARK $\Rightarrow$ Security against *(full) malicious* adversary

zkSNARK in ROM

EPFL

- UC-secure zkSNARK

zkSNARK in ROM

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zkSNARK		[CF24]	[BFKT24]	[GKO+23]
NIZK	[BS21]	[LR22]		[LR22]
	CRS	ROM	ROM-AGM	CRS-ROM

zkSNARK in ROM

EPFL

– UC-secure zkSNARK

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

Properties of zkSNARK

EPFL

- *Completeness*: Valid arguments must be accepted.

$$\forall (x,w) \in R,\ \Pr\left[\mathtt{Vfy}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(x,\pi) = 1 \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\lambda) \\ \pi \leftarrow \mathtt{Prv}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(x,w) \end{array}\right] = 1.$$

Properties of zkSNARK

- *Zero-Knowledge*: Arguments do not disclose information about witness.

$$\left\{ \mathsf{out} \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\lambda) \\ (x, w, \mathsf{aux}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}} \\ \pi \leftarrow \mathtt{Prv}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(x, w) \\ \mathsf{out} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(\mathsf{aux}, \pi) \end{array} \right\} \approx \left\{ \mathsf{out} \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\lambda) \\ (x, w, \mathsf{aux}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}} \\ (\pi, \mathsf{pg}) \leftarrow \mathtt{Sim}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(x) \\ \mathsf{out} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}[\mathsf{pg}]}(\mathsf{aux}, \pi) \end{array} \right\}$$

Properties of zkSNARK

EPFL

- *Simulation Soundness*: Non-malleability of arguments.

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{l} |x| \leq n \\ \wedge\, x \notin \mathcal{L}(R) \\ \wedge\, \mathtt{Vfy}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(x,\pi) = 1 \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\lambda) \\ (x,\pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{RO}}}(\mathtt{Sim}) \end{array}\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}.$$

Properties of zkSNARK

EPFL

- *Succinctness*: Argument is efficient.

$$|\pi| \ll |w|$$

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation
  - Result Retrieval

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation
  - Result Retrieval
- Security

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation
  - Result Retrieval
- Security
  - against *malicious* adversary.

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation
  - Result Retrieval
- Security
  - against *malicious* adversary.
  - under *non-adaptive* corruption of

On-the-Fly MPC

EPFL

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation
  - Result Retrieval
- Security
  - against *malicious* adversary.
  - under *non-adaptive* corruption of
    - the server

On-the-Fly MPC

- Three-phase protocol
  - Data Uploading
  - Circuit Evaluation
  - Result Retrieval
- Security
  - against *malicious* adversary.
  - under *non-adaptive* corruption of
    * the server
    * the clients in a group up to the threshold

Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

- Naor-Yung Double Encryption Paradigm.

Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

– Naor-Yung Double Encryption Paradigm.



Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

– Naor-Yung Double Encryption Paradigm.



Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

– Naor-Yung Double Encryption Paradigm.



– Naor-Yung Double Encryption Paradigm.



$$R_{\mathsf{NY}} = \left\{ \left(\begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{jpk}_1, c_1, \\ \mathsf{jpk}_2, c_2 \end{pmatrix}, (m, \omega_1, \omega_2) \right) \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{l} c_1 = \mathsf{MGHE.Enc}(\mathsf{jpk}_1, m; \omega_1) \\ \wedge \\ c_2 = \mathsf{MGHE.Enc}(\mathsf{jpk}_2, m; \omega_2) \end{array} \right\}$$

Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

- CCA1-secure HE as in [LMSV12, BSW12, CRRV17].

Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

- CCA1-secure HE as in [LMSV12, BSW12, CRRV17].
  - Tampering with c_1 or $c_1 \Rightarrow$ Verification fails.

Phase 1: Data Uploading

EPFL

- CCA1-secure HE as in [LMSV12, BSW12, CRRV17].
  - Tampering c_1 or $c_1 \Rightarrow$ Verification fails.
  - Must know m to generate valid ciphertext tuple.

Phase 1: Data Uploading

Naor-Yung + Simulation Soundness

Phase 1: Data Uploading

Naor-Yung + Simulation Soundness

or

One-Pass + Simulation Extractability

Phase 1: Data Uploading

Naor-Yung + Simulation Soundness

or

One-Pass + Simulation Extractability

$$R_{\mathsf{NY}} = \{(\mathsf{jpk}, c), (m, \omega)) \quad c = \mathsf{MGHE.Enc}(\mathsf{jpk}, m; \omega)\}$$

Phase 2: Circuit Evaluation



Phase 2: Circuit Evaluation



Phase 2: Circuit Evaluation



Phase 2: Circuit Evaluation

EPFL

$$R_{\mathsf{Eval}} = \left\{ \left(\begin{pmatrix} \hat{c}_1, (\mathsf{jpk}_{j,1}, c_{j,1})_{j\in[\ell]}, \\ \hat{c}_2, (\mathsf{jpk}_{j,2}, c_{j,2})_{j\in[\ell]} \end{pmatrix}, (f, \sigma_1, \sigma_2) \right) \;\middle|\; \begin{array}{l} \hat{c}_1 = \mathsf{MGHE.Eval}(f, (\mathsf{jpk}_{j,1}, c_{j,1})_{j\in[\ell]}; \sigma_1) \\ \wedge \\ \hat{c}_2 = \mathsf{MGHE.Eval}(f, (\mathsf{jpk}_{j,2}, c_{j,2})_{j\in[\ell]}; \sigma_2) \end{array} \right\}.$$

Phase 3: Result Retrieval - Partial Decryption



Phase 3: Result Retrieval - Partial Decryption



Phase 3: Result Retrieval - Partial Decryption



$$R_{\mathsf{Dec}} = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{pp}_1, \mathsf{pk}_1, c_1, d_1, \\ \mathsf{pp}_2, \mathsf{pk}_2, c_2, d_2 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{sk}_1, \gamma_1, \eta_1 \\ \mathsf{sk}_2, \gamma_2, \eta_2 \end{pmatrix} \middle| \begin{array}{l} \forall u \in \{1,2\} : \\ \quad d_u = \mathsf{MGHE.PDec}(\mathsf{sk}_u, c_u; \eta_u) \\ \quad \wedge\, \mathsf{pk}_u = \mathsf{PKGen}(\mathsf{pp}_u, \mathsf{sk}_u; \gamma_u) \end{array} \right\}.$$

Phase 3: Result Retrieval - Reconstruction



Phase 3: Result Retrieval - Reconstruction



Phase 3: Result Retrieval - Reconstruction



Realization of On-the-Fly MPC

EPFL

Theorem 2

$\Pi_{\text{OtF-MPC}}$ UC-realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OtF-MPC}}$ in $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{MGHE}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{zkSNARK}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Aut}}]$-hybrid model in presence of $\mathcal{G}_{\text{KRK}}$ and $\mathcal{G}_{\text{RO}}$.



Conclusion


Full malicious $\mathcal{A}$
Non-adaptive Corruption
Semi-Malicious $\mathcal{A}$
Non-adaptive Corruption
$\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{KRK}}$
Π_{MGHE}
$\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{MGHE}}$
$\mathrm{IND\text{-}CPA}^{\mathrm{pD}}$
$\wedge$ {IND, SIM}-CIRC
$\wedge$ SIM-PDEC
$\wedge$ Decryption Consistency(DC)
2Pass + SIM-SOUND
or
1Pass + SIM-EXT
$\Pi_{\mathsf{OtF\text{-}MPC}}$
$\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{OtF\text{-}MPC}}$
$\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{RO}}$
Π_{NARG}
$\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{zkSNARK}}$

Appendix: Completeness

– Valid arguments must be accepted.



Appendix: Zero-Knowledge

– Arguments does not disclose information about witness.



Appendix: *s*SIM-EXT

- Stronger version for *Knowledge Soundness*.
- *Non-malleability* for UC-security.



Appendix: Global Random Oracle $\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{RO}}$

EPFL

– Global random oracle with restricted *programming* and *observability* [CDG+18].



Appendix: Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{zkSNARK}}$ [CF24]



Appendix: $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{zkSNARK}} + \mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{RO}}$



Appendix: Realization of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{zkSNARK}}$

EPFL

Theorem 3[?, TCC:ChiFen24

$\mathcal{J}\Pi_{\mathsf{NARG}}$ securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{zkSNARK}}$ in $\mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{RO}}$-hybrid model if NARG *satisfies completeness, s*SIM-EXT*, and zero-knowledge.*




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