

Trade Information, Not Spectrum

– A Novel Information Market for TV White Space Networks

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Outline


① Background

② Information Market Modeling

③ Optimal Information Pricing

④ Conclusion

Mobile Data Explosion



Figures in parentheses refer to regional share in 2018.

Source: Cisco VNI Mobile, 2014

Fig. Global Mobile Data Traffic, 2013 to 2018 (from [Cisco VNI](#))

- Mobile data traffic explosive growth: 61% annual grow rate
 - Reaching 15.9 exabytes per month by 2018, a 11-fold increase over 2013.

Radio Spectrum Scarcity




Fig. Frequency Allocation Chart in USA

- Radio spectrum is scarce: No new radio spectrum resource for telecommunication services.

TV White Space

- Spectrum Inefficient Usage

- ▶ Many frequencies are in **inefficient usage**, especially those in UHF/VHF for television broadcasting services.
 - ★ TV services may not be provided continuously;
 - ★ Some frequencies are free up from the **digital switchover**.

- TV White Space

- ▶ Frequencies (VHF/UHF) allocated to television broadcasting services but not used locally.
 - ★ **Time-** and **location-dependent**.

TV White Space in USA



Fig. Number of TV White Space Channels in the United States (from [Google](#))

- In most of the places, there are **more than 10** TV white space channels (each with **6MHz**).

TV White Space Network

- Database-Assisted TV White Space Network
 - ▶ This architecture has been supported by many spectrum regulators, standards bodies, industrial organizations, and major IT companies.




Fig. Architecture of Database-Assisted TV White Space Network (by FCC)

TV White Space Network

- Geo-location White Space Database

- Update TV licensees information periodically;
- Identify the available white spaces at any location and time;
 - Step 1: White space devices report their locations to a database;
 - Step 2: Database returns the available white spaces at a given location;




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TV White Space Network

- We study the **business model** for TV white space networks.
- Business Modeling Techniques
 - ▶ Secondary Spectrum Market (Traditional Approach)
 - ★ Trade the spectrum among unlicensed devices and spectrum owners;
 - ★ Database acts as a **broker** or **agent** in the spectrum trading process.
 - ★ **Limitation:** Some TV white spaces cannot be traded!

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 - ★ **Limitation:** Some TV white spaces cannot be traded!
 - ▶ Information Market (Our Approach)
 - ★ **Key idea:** Trading the advanced information among the database and unlicensed devices.

An Example

- Consider a particular white space device (WSD):
 - ▶ Available white space channels: $[ch1, ch2, ch3, ch4]$
 - ▶ Interference levels: $[1, 2, 3, 4]$ (equivalent data rates: $[5, 2, 1, 0]$)
 - ★ Known by the database, but not known by the WSD.

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 - ▶ Receive the available white space channels, and choose an available channel randomly;
 - ▶ Average data rate: $\frac{5+2+1+0}{4} = 2$;

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- If **not purchasing** the advanced information,
 - ▶ Receive the available white space channels, and choose an available channel randomly;
 - ▶ Average data rate: $\frac{5+2+1+0}{4} = 2$;
- If **purchasing** the advanced information,
 - ▶ Receive both the available white space channels and the interference levels (or equivalent data rates), and choose the best channel;
 - ▶ Average data rate: 5;

Information Market Modeling

- **Key Idea:** Databases sell the advanced information regarding the qualities of white space channels to unlicensed WSDs.
- **Key Problems**
 - ▶ How to explicitly define the advanced information?
 - ▶ How to accurately evaluate the advanced information (for WSDs)?
 - ▶ How the information market dynamically evolves?
 - ▶ What is the market equilibrium point?
 - ▶ How to optimally pricing the advanced information (for databases)?

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2 Information Market Modeling


3 Optimal Information Pricing

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TV White Space Network Model

- Network Model

- One Database, N white space devices (WSDs), K white space channels



Definition of Advanced Information

- Interference on each channel k for a particular WSD
 - ▶ U_k : Interference from licensed devices;




Fig: Interference (on channel 2) from licensed devices to WSD 6.

Definition of Advanced Information

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


Fig: Interference (on channel 2) from outside systems to WSD 6.

Definition of Advanced Information

- Interference on each channel k for a particular WSD
 - ▶ U_k : Interference from licensed devices;
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 - ▶ $W_{k,m}$: Interference from an other WSD m ;




Fig: Interference (on channel 2) from other WSDs to WSD 6.

Definition of Advanced Information

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 - ▶ U_k : Interference from licensed devices;
 - ▶ V_k : Interference from unknown outside systems;
 - ▶ $W_{k,m}$: Interference from an other WSD m ;
 - ▶ Total interference on channel k : $Z_k = U_k + V_k + \sum_{m \in \mathcal{N}_k} W_{k,m}$.




Fig: Total interference on channel 2 for WSD 6.

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- Advanced information is defined as the interference components on each channel k known by the database.

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- U_k : Interference from licensed devices → known;
- V_k : Interference from unknown outside systems → unknown;
- $W_{k,m}$: Interference from an other WSD m → known or unknown;
 - ★ If WSD m purchases the advanced information from a database, $W_{k,m}$ is known by that database;
 - ★ If WSD m does not purchase the advanced information from a database, $W_{k,m}$ is not known by that database;

Definition of Advanced Information

- Advanced information is defined as the interference components on each channel k known by the database:
- Advanced information of database on channel k :

$$X_k = \underbrace{U_k}_{\text{Licensed Devices}} + \underbrace{\sum_{m \in \mathcal{N}_k} W_{k,m}}_{\text{WSDs Purchasing Information}}$$

- Uncertain information of database on channel k :

$$Y_k = \underbrace{V_k}_{\text{Unknown Outside System}} + \underbrace{\sum_{m \notin \mathcal{N}_k} W_{k,m}}_{\text{WSDs Not Purchasing Information}}$$

Evaluation of Advanced Information

- Each WSD has 3 channel selection strategies:
 - ▶ (a) Choose a channel randomly
 - ★ Expected data rate is: $R_{[b]} = E_Z[\mathcal{R}(Z)]$,
where Z is the random variable denoting the interference on an arbitrary channel;
 - ▶ (b) Choose the best channel based on perfectly sensing
 - ★ Expected data rate is: $R_{[s]} = E_{Z_{(1)}}[\mathcal{R}(Z_{(1)})]$,
where $Z_{(1)} \triangleq \min\{Z_1, \dots, Z_K\}$ is the random variable denoting the minimal interference on all channels;
 - ▶ (c) Choose the channel based on advanced information (purchased from the database)
 - ★ WSD will choose a channel with the minimal X_k ;
 - ★ Expected data rate is: $R_{[a]} = E_{Z_{[a]}}[\mathcal{R}(Z_{[a]})]$,
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Evaluation of Advanced Information

- When purchasing the advanced information (not sensing or randomly choosing), WSDs always choose the channel with the minimal X_k ;
 - ▶ This implies that **the database always knows the channel selection of the WSDs purchasing the advanced information.**
- **Positive externality**
 - ▶ More WSDs purchasing the advanced information from a database, more accurate the advanced information of that database.

WSD's Utility

- When choosing channel randomly, its utility is

$$\Pi = \theta \cdot R_{[b]}$$

- When choosing channel based on sensing, its utility is

$$\Pi = \theta \cdot R_{[s]} - c$$


- When using the advanced information, its utility is

$$\Pi = \theta \cdot R_{[a]} - \pi$$


- θ : the WSD's evaluation for data rate.
- c : the cost of sensing;
- π : the price of advanced information;
- η : the percentage of WSDs purchasing the advanced information;
(market share of the database)
 - $R_{[b]}, R_{[s]}$ independent of η
 - $R_{[a]}$ increases with η *(positive externality)*

WSD's Best Subscription Decision

- Illustration of WSD's Best Subscription Decision
 - Region I: choosing channel randomly;
 - Region II: purchasing the advanced information;
 - The database's achieved market share is $\theta_{AS} - \theta_{BA}$;
 - Region III: choosing channel based on sensing;



WSD Subscription Dynamics




- **Market Equilibrium**

$$\Delta\eta = \eta^t - \eta^{t-1} = 0$$


- ▶ η^t : the database's market share at stage t ;
- ▶ Under market equilibrium, the market share no longer changes.

$\Delta\eta$ under Low Information Price



- Low Information price: $0 < \pi_1 < \pi_2 < \pi_3$
- Under the price π_2 , there are 3 market equilibria η_{C1} , η_{C2} , and η_{C3} .
 - ▶ η_{C1} and η_{C3} are stable market equilibrium point;
 - ▶ η_{C2} is unstable market equilibrium point;

$\Delta\eta$ under High Information Price



- High Information price: $\pi_4 < \pi_5 < \pi_6 < c$
- Under the price π_4 , there is a unique **stable** market equilibrium $\eta D1$.

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
Database's Optimal Pricing Decision

- Database's Revenue

$$\Pi^{\text{DB}}(\pi) = \pi \cdot \eta^*(\pi)$$


- ▶ $\eta^*(\pi)$: the market equilibrium under price π ;

$\eta^*(\pi)$ under Different Information Prices



- $\eta^*(\pi)$ increases with sensing cost α ;
- $\eta^*(\pi)$ decreases with price π ;
 - ▶ **Tipping price:** A slight increase on the price will lead to a significant decrease on the market equilibrium.
 - ★ E.g., $\pi = 0.03$ when $\alpha = 0.25$; $\pi = 0.02$ when $\alpha = 0.2$.

Database's Revenue



- Database's revenue **increases** with the degree of licensee interference;
 - ▶ A larger licensee interference makes the information more valuable.
- Database's revenue **increases** with the sensing cost α ;
 - ▶ A larger sensing cost makes the information more valuable.

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Conclusion

- **Main Contribution**

- ▶ We propose a novel **information market** for TV white space networks;
- ▶ We analyze the **market equilibrium** under the monopoly scenario with one database, and derive the database's **optimal information pricing** systematically.

- **Related Work**

- ▶ Information market under duopoly competitive scenario (SDP 2014)

- **Future Work**

- ▶ Information market under more general scenarios

Thank You !

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